I just watched William Langewiesche interviewed on CNBC about his current article in the NY Times Magazine.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html?searchResultPosition=1I may have recommended Langewiesche's aviation articles previously. His Vanity Fair pieces on the Hudson River crash and the loss of the Air France plane off South America in 2009 are the most informative investigative pieces I have ever encountered. For this eminent journalist to tell the interviewers today, and to publish his findings in the newspaper of record, that the crashes were preventable and that the pilots should have known how to adjust the trim tabs might very well throw some high octane av fuel on the fire. Previous discussions about the 737 Max here on MFO demonstrated a lot of expertise and passion among the participants; I imagine the same sort of interest might be piqued again.
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Thanks for linking this. I had a lot of trouble yesterday getting into the actual (complete) NYT Magazine article due to their tendency to block some content from non-subscribers. But I was able to download the entire (50 page) study tonight and save it. It’s very technical. But I enjoy learning about these things (as you know) and am looking forward to digesting it over the next several days. Hopefully, I’ll find something intelligent to offer than.
I suspect others who were involved in the earlier discussions will be chiming in over the coming days.
https://www.msn.com/en-ae/news/world/what-really-brought-down-the-boeing-737-max/ar-AAHwewr
Add- I've gotten to pg 21 (of 51), and must say that I find this observation to be fascinating:
Thanks for chiming in. Haven’t read it yet. Listened to bits and pieces as I was falling asleep last night via ipad’s ability to read text aloud. Just looking at your excerpt, I’d say that’s a gross oversimplification of why Airbus came out with a more automated aircraft. Fact is the A320 is a newer aircraft than the original 737 by more than 20 years. The technology didn’t exist when the 737 was conceived that went into the A320.
I won’t dispute, however, that Boeing’s philosophy makes it easier for pilots to override the automated systems. So there’s some truth to what the writer says. Generally, there’s a very “slanted” tone to much of the NYT piece. He’s writing to prove a case. Wish they had an app that could scan for emotionally charged words and count them. I’ve seen a lot of them. To some extent that detracts from what should be a judicious objective examination. I’ve read a lot of NTSB accident reports, notably Northwest 255 in 1987, and they don’t sound like that.
(Flight #255) http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR88-05.pdf).
Plan to go back and contrast his findings with some of the experts we cited back in March, April, May to see where they agree and where they diverge on key points. But working with limited time. It’s been known for many years that overall piloting skills have declined as aircraft systems have become more automated. Been going on for a long time. Other than takeoff and landing, the big jets have been flying largely automated at least since the 70s. I suspect some of our driving skills have experienced the same decline. How many today could shift a manual transmission or change a flat tire along the road? I’m amazed at the number who don’t even know whether they’re driving a FWD or RWD, as it makes big difference in how the vehicle handles under various conditions. And heaven forbid should your PS go out at 70 MPH. Couple the decreasing pilot skill set with a severe shortage of pilots and it spells potential trouble.
• Yes, for sure. The Korean Air "landing" of a Boeing 777 at SFO in 2013 is a prime example. Interestingly, while Langewiesche goes out of his way to disparage the flight training of the 737 crews, that Korean Air crew were ex-military with lots of experience and flight time, but they were also unable to cope because of an excessively rigid cockpit operating environment which led to an inability to deviate from normal (or as Langewiesche would put it "scripted") procedures.
• For sure.
At a training facility such as San Carlos a pilot first obtains the "private" rating, then progresses through "commercial", with additional requirements for "instrument rating" and "multi-engine rating". These are all non-specific as to aircraft type. To advance further, a pilot would then need to become "type rated", which involves a prescribed number of hours flying each particular aircraft "type", such as a 737 vs a 777, under supervision.
This touches on the desperation of Boeing to maintain the "type rating" for the 737Max, so as not to have it designated as a new "type", which would have required all 737Max pilots to be additionally trained so as to be rated as qualified for that particular type. Needless to say, the airlines exerted significant pressure on Boeing so as to avoid that expense.
Hi guys. I’m on page 1 of my reading assignment. But the above jumped out at me. How on earth does the author intend to document his (rather dismal) assessment of the co-pilot? I’m eager to find out as I read on. (The captain had 6,000 hours flight experience and 7 years with the airline. Sounds like the co-pilot had about the same.)
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Additional: No further mention of this airman’s professionalism is made that I could find. I’d sure like to know how the author reached that conclusion. Fluff? Designed to jerk readers’ emotions around? Seems so. (And dead pilots can’t talk.)
This is exactly the type of statement that seems to me to be without reference to information source, and therefor offers a strong suggestion of "slant". While I'm inclined to believe the general nature of Langewiesche's commentary, the lack of source reference is very troubling.
Regarding bias, I suggest reading the first four letters under NYT Picks. #4 is reproduced in its entirety: The slant becomes apparent in the paragraph reading: Let's try the same content a different way: Boeing set up a process where it cut corners, where the left hand (however honest it might have been) did not know what the right hand was doing. It thus gained speed of design and consequently greater profits.
While it did not intentionally sacrifice safety, Boeing seems to have been grossly if not criminally negligent in its procedures. (Notice how lack of "intent" in the article's paragraph is used to deflect guilt; he doesn't mention the actual intent to use a flawed process for gain.)
The paragraph also mentions supervision by the FAA. It's being used to imply that, well, Boeing was "supervised", therefore it cannot be held at fault. Nice try. In some areas, following the laws can provide legal protection. In others, and I strongly suspect this is one of them, following the laws is just a minimum requirement. You're supposed to do better.
If following the rules were enough to exonerate a company, then Lion Air should also be exonerated. As described, the pilots went through the required training motions. Both Boeing and Lion Air followed the rules pro forma. The article is applying a double standard.
I had the same thought as hank about driving. Remember Toyota's "unintended acceleration" problem? There was an easy way to control the car - put it into neutral. That's something that would come naturally to most drivers experienced with manual transmission cars. That's what one might call "drivermanship".
Which brings me back to your comments that manufacturers cannot expect everyone in the cockpit to be a crackerjack pilot. One legal definition of a defectively designed product is a product that is not safe for uses that are reasonably foreseeable, like a car being driven by an ordinary driver, or a plane being piloted by one of these newly minted, fly by wire, pilots.
Another form of product defect is one without adequate warnings. Like letting pilots know that the plane had added software that could make it respond in a way unlike any other version of the 737.
Finally, one small item buried in the article. The writer says " no regular airline pilot will ever experience [MACS's] activation — unless a sensor fails". If you believe that, then Boeing installed a component that had no function except to put the plane in more peril (i.e. did not help, but activated upon bad info). The writer was trying to use this to show that this was such an innocuous device that no documentation was required. But in his zeal to exonerate Boeing, he inadvertently faulted the company.
“The MCAS as it was designed and implemented was a big mistake. It remains unclear exactly what went wrong at Boeing — who decided what, and why — but a small collective breakdown had obviously occurred, and the F.A.A. had gone along for the ride.” (P. 38)
Yes, having finished the read, that's my opinion also. Mr. Langewiesche effectively makes the point that in many parts of the world the training, proficiency and experience requirements for commercial pilots are significantly lower than is typical in "first world" countries. Indeed, knowledge of this situation is hardly a well-kept secret, and has been commented on extensively within aviation circles for quite some time. For example, review the professional commentary after the Korean Air fiasco at SFO in 2013. It would seem that not much has changed in this area, nor is it likely to do so any time soon.
He then goes on to justify as normal the sales of these complex commercial aviation products to those very countries well-known for these deficiencies, without any requirement for those pilots to be given sufficient training to safely fly those very same aircraft. In fact, in this case, Boeing's foremost interest was to insure that additional training was not required.
Author believes an inadvertent MCAS activation falls within the category known as “runnaway trim” and claims the Max’s electronic trim can be shut off and full “manual” used in such a case. (Some might disagree that the malfunction falls within that category.)
Faults ATC for giving the troubled Indonesian plane “banked” routs away from other aircraft, increasing their inability to hold altitude.
Puts maximum aerodynamic airspeed of 737 at around 340 knots. What?
Insinuates Boeing caved in to the airlines in accepting fault (to avoid losing business).
Sees Boeing engineers & employees as high integrity. Criticizes the company in other respects.
Faults FAA for delegating certification authority to Boeing.
Faults shoddy maintenance in general worldwide and specifically in Indonesia. I tend to agree.
In 2007 the U.S. and EU banned Indonesian airlines from territories due to lax procedures.
Boeing and AB sent instructors to several Far East countries, including Indonesia, to help pilots learn better. Author suggests trainees were tag-alongs in crowded simulators who learned by rote rather than hands on.
Boeing intervened big-time 10 years ago at Lion Air. Spent tons of $$ trying to improve training and operations.
Author notes the different approaches by AB and Boeing Towards automation.
Says that the crash numbers (737 vs A320) have been roughly the same in recent years.
Acknowledges that the MAX has a “slightly higher” tendency to pitch up and stall at cruise altitude (flaps up) than most planes. Says FAA wasn’t overly concerned.
Auto-pilot had to be “OFF” for MCAS to activate and push nose down. Also, wouldn’t kick-in until flaps were retracted. Interesting.
Boeing felt errant activation of MCAS would appear to a pilot as a known issue called “runaway trim.” Pilots were already trained to switch off electronic trim and go manual in that event; so MCAS wasn’t addressed in specific. (Dumb)
The Lion Air 737 had had prior issues with AS sensors. Mechanics had rebooted system several times. Eventually replaced one with a cheap (faulty) part from low quality supplier.
Faults Boeing for MCAS failure to cross-check speed sensors before initiating nose down.
Prior flight nearly crashed. Third pilot in jump seat may have intervened to turn off electronic trim at last minute.
Author accuses that crew of falsifying their aircraft mechanical report so as to pass their in flight issue off as less serious than it was.
Stall warning occurred early in fatal flight. But only after flaps were retracted did MCAS kick in dooming the flight. Crew had not been informed of MCAS system.
The MCAS sequence repeated as crew unwittingly extended and retracted flaps at around 5000 feet where they were holding.
Sharp criticism of “Lion City” - a training school in Indonesia for pilots and attendants. But little specific documentation to back up assertions. These graduates move on to airlines around the world.
* P 41 begins the Ethiopian plane episode. @Old_Joe might find that one of interest. Several competing control inputs appear to be at work here. Gets the head spinning.
Describes captain’s commands as “erratic”. This crew had been informed about MCAS, but failed to address it correctly.
Clearly, this crew needed more simulator experience in dealing with MCAS related problems. Went around in circles trying to resolve problems.
Boeing and NTSB have legal authority to participate in the investigations. Author claims Ethiopia isn’t providing full access to all data.
The NYT has reported on attempted bribery of NTSB investigators by foreign airlines in the past. Author levies other harsh criticisms of alleged coverups by corrupt foreign officials regarding past crashes.
Author concluded both 737 Max crashes were a failure of “basic airmanship.” Also suggests Boeing will follow AB’s lead in more automated systems.
Thanks @BenWP for a very informative read.
Whatever “slant” I uncovered after reading pertains to his harsh criticism of training standards and operating procedures of many foreign carriers. As he alluded, it’s easy to falsify records and hard to detect when it’s been done (ie: logs, reports, inspections). Your KA accident out there confirms there’s a problem. OOPS - you’ve already identified that one ...
A more subtle slant might be against the trend to more and more automation. Sounds like an old school “fly by the seat of your pants” pilot.
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Overheard conversation on a recent flight: Former military airman grousing about how when he was in the military, it was the very poorest aviators that went on to fly for the big U.S. airlines. I’ve no idea if he knew what he was yacking about.
As an air traveler, I’ve experienced some of the hardship from the 737 MAX being out of service for so long. It’s cut severely into some airlines’ operations. American has cancelled many flights as a result. Flying American recently, planes were packed. Show up 25-minutes before departure and they’ll find a way to screw you out of your confirmed seat. Good luck trying to re-book the same day.
As far as I know, the National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates accidents in the U.S., has stayed largely out of this fray until now. Often in the past they have seemed at odds with the FAA, which certifies new aircraft.
The thing to remember is that 50% of all pilots are below average. ... To say you have 7 friends who fly 737s and all of them think they would have responded correctly to the two situations and saved lives is to skirt the more salient issue of how do “average” pilots on “average” days respond when things suddenly go south?
Sorry for their sermon. Here’s the story: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/ntsb-faults-boeing-tests-of-max-system-for-not-assessing-pilot-response-to-multiple-alerts/
One of the problems that I see with Mr. Langewiesche's NY Times Magazine article is that he first defines himself as an example of a competent airman, and then suggests that any pilot who does not rise to his personal standard is guilty of “a failure of basic airmanship". It's not quite as facile and simplistic as that, as many MFO commentators have already noted. Since the training and certification system varies so widely in different parts of the world, it's obvious that many pilots who have been "certified" may in fact not measure up to the personal standards of Mr. Langewiesche.
To design and sell an aircraft that, in the event of multiple system failures, depends on a pilot with the talents, experience, and qualifications of Mr. Langewiesche is a serious mismatch with reality.
Additional: The headline of a current Wall Street Journal article summarizes the whole situation very nicely: "Safety Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 MAX Crashes"
Is it possible the FAA, for whatever reason(s), is more politicalized and also more subject to pressures from vested interests?
From a glamor standpoint the FAA has the “classier” job. Nothing at all glamorous about sifting through burnt remains of transportation disasters, piecing oft-charred wreckage together, and listening to the final words from the crew in an effort to determine what went wrong. And from that, the NTSB does an outstanding job working to enhance the safety of the traveling public.
Regards,
Ted
@hank- Is the Pope Catholic?