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New View of Why 737 Max Crashed

I just watched William Langewiesche interviewed on CNBC about his current article in the NY Times Magazine.

https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/18/magazine/boeing-737-max-crashes.html?searchResultPosition=1

I may have recommended Langewiesche's aviation articles previously. His Vanity Fair pieces on the Hudson River crash and the loss of the Air France plane off South America in 2009 are the most informative investigative pieces I have ever encountered. For this eminent journalist to tell the interviewers today, and to publish his findings in the newspaper of record, that the crashes were preventable and that the pilots should have known how to adjust the trim tabs might very well throw some high octane av fuel on the fire. Previous discussions about the 737 Max here on MFO demonstrated a lot of expertise and passion among the participants; I imagine the same sort of interest might be piqued again.

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Comments

  • Just as I have stated in the past, lack of seasoned pilots and management whose concerns were making money rather than passenger safety.
  • Glad you agree, @Gary. It did seem to me shortly after the crashes that the facile and perhaps discriminatory story that “foreign” pilots were to blame might have been untrue. After reading this article, my ire at the FAA and Boeing has diminished somewhat. What puzzles me is that all the MFOers who condemned the company and the federal agency have not chimed in on this discussion. I thought Langewiesche really did some great research. One finding, among many, was that China had a terrible safety record in the 1980’s, but with Boeing’s help, turned things around and became a safe place to fly. Today, Boeing has a crucial moral decision: keep selling its planes to airlines whose pilots are unqualified or refuse to do so until the airlines train their personnel adequately.
  • @BenWP -

    Thanks for linking this. I had a lot of trouble yesterday getting into the actual (complete) NYT Magazine article due to their tendency to block some content from non-subscribers. But I was able to download the entire (50 page) study tonight and save it. It’s very technical. But I enjoy learning about these things (as you know) and am looking forward to digesting it over the next several days. Hopefully, I’ll find something intelligent to offer than.

    I suspect others who were involved in the earlier discussions will be chiming in over the coming days.
  • Thanks @hank. I might have mentioned that Langewiesche brings to bear his own experience as a pilot as well as his extraordinary contacts in the field of air crash investigation. I didn't check his Sullenberger article for the exact quote, but the line that has stuck in my head has to do with the "heroic" pilot saying that the A320 is such a feat of engineering that it could have landed itself on the Hudson. Modesty? Sure, but the comment also underscores Langewiesche's theory that Boeing builds planes that rely on pilot expertise in crises, while Airbus builds planes that far less qualified pilots can fly safely. BTW, the NYT article is one of the longest I seen them publish. You probably qualify for an academic rate digital subscription which brings the monthly cost of the paper to the equivalent of a fancy drink at Starbucks.
  • edited September 2019
    Just to check in on this, even though I do have a Times subscription I am unable (for unknown reasons) to access the Times from this particular computer. Hank was kind enough to email me a pdf of the article, and I've started to read it as time permits. I'll try to comment, but it may be a few days on that.

    Add- I've gotten to pg 21 (of 51), and must say that I find this observation to be fascinating:
    Airbus decided to take on Boeing by creating a robotic new airplane that
    would address the accelerating decline in airmanship and require minimal
    piloting skills largely by using digital flight controls to reduce pilot workload,
    iron out undesirable handling characteristics and build in pilot-proof
    protections against errors like aerodynamic stalls, excessive banks and
    spiral dives. The idea was that it would no longer be necessary to protect the
    public from airplanes if Airbus could get airplanes to protect themselves
    from pilots.
  • edited September 2019
    @Old_Joe,

    Thanks for chiming in. Haven’t read it yet. Listened to bits and pieces as I was falling asleep last night via ipad’s ability to read text aloud. Just looking at your excerpt, I’d say that’s a gross oversimplification of why Airbus came out with a more automated aircraft. Fact is the A320 is a newer aircraft than the original 737 by more than 20 years. The technology didn’t exist when the 737 was conceived that went into the A320.

    I won’t dispute, however, that Boeing’s philosophy makes it easier for pilots to override the automated systems. So there’s some truth to what the writer says. Generally, there’s a very “slanted” tone to much of the NYT piece. He’s writing to prove a case. Wish they had an app that could scan for emotionally charged words and count them. I’ve seen a lot of them. To some extent that detracts from what should be a judicious objective examination. I’ve read a lot of NTSB accident reports, notably Northwest 255 in 1987, and they don’t sound like that.
    (Flight #255) http://libraryonline.erau.edu/online-full-text/ntsb/aircraft-accident-reports/AAR88-05.pdf).

    Plan to go back and contrast his findings with some of the experts we cited back in March, April, May to see where they agree and where they diverge on key points. But working with limited time. It’s been known for many years that overall piloting skills have declined as aircraft systems have become more automated. Been going on for a long time. Other than takeoff and landing, the big jets have been flying largely automated at least since the 70s. I suspect some of our driving skills have experienced the same decline. How many today could shift a manual transmission or change a flat tire along the road? I’m amazed at the number who don’t even know whether they’re driving a FWD or RWD, as it makes big difference in how the vehicle handles under various conditions. And heaven forbid should your PS go out at 70 MPH. Couple the decreasing pilot skill set with a severe shortage of pilots and it spells potential trouble.
  • "Generally, there’s a very “slanted” tone to much of the NYT piece"
    @hank- Yes, that's my impression also, but it does contain a wealth of background information that hasn't been given coverage so far in the major media (at least that I've seen). And I'm having some difficulty in accurately pinning down the "slant", because just as I suspect that he's taking some particular side he turns his guns equally on the other side. Perhaps it's just his general tone that's a bit abrasive. I'm going to finish the read and meditate a bit before forming an opinion.
    "plan to go back and contrast his findings with some of the experts we cited back in March, April, May to see where they agree and where they diverge on key points."
    • You read my mind on that. This whole thing is going to take a while.
    "It’s been known for many years that overall piloting skills have declined as aircraft systems have become more automated."
    • Yes, for sure. The Korean Air "landing" of a Boeing 777 at SFO in 2013 is a prime example. Interestingly, while Langewiesche goes out of his way to disparage the flight training of the 737 crews, that Korean Air crew were ex-military with lots of experience and flight time, but they were also unable to cope because of an excessively rigid cockpit operating environment which led to an inability to deviate from normal (or as Langewiesche would put it "scripted") procedures.
    "Couple the decreasing pilot skill set with a severe shortage of pilots and it spells potential trouble. "
    • For sure.
  • I think industry wide pilots are taken advantage of; back in the 70's and 80's here in the states there were a lot of small feeder airlines that would (if they could) try to make their pilots fly a tremendous number of hours. This was great till there were several crashes. Took FAA involvement to rectify the situation.
  • edited September 2019
    Yes, here in the US the normal progression of an airlines pilot is from training at a facility such as San Carlos, mentioned (it seems to me, disparagingly) by Langewiesche, then to those small feeder airlines, and after a few years, hired on at a major airline. As you mention, the hours demanded by those small airlines were similar to the punishing experiences that some in the medical professions experience as interns.

    At a training facility such as San Carlos a pilot first obtains the "private" rating, then progresses through "commercial", with additional requirements for "instrument rating" and "multi-engine rating". These are all non-specific as to aircraft type. To advance further, a pilot would then need to become "type rated", which involves a prescribed number of hours flying each particular aircraft "type", such as a 737 vs a 777, under supervision.

    This touches on the desperation of Boeing to maintain the "type rating" for the 737Max, so as not to have it designated as a new "type", which would have required all 737Max pilots to be additionally trained so as to be rated as qualified for that particular type. Needless to say, the airlines exerted significant pressure on Boeing so as to avoid that expense.

  • edited September 2019
    “His co-pilot was an Indonesian 10 years his elder who went by the single name Harvino and had nearly the same flight experience. ... No reference has been made to Harvino’s initial flight training. ... (His) experience with flying was scripted, bounded by checklists and cockpit mandates and dependent on autopilots. He had some rote knowledge of cockpit procedures as handed down from the big manufacturers, but he was weak in an essential quality known as airmanship”

    Hi guys. I’m on page 1 of my reading assignment. But the above jumped out at me. How on earth does the author intend to document his (rather dismal) assessment of the co-pilot? I’m eager to find out as I read on. (The captain had 6,000 hours flight experience and 7 years with the airline. Sounds like the co-pilot had about the same.)
    -

    Additional: No further mention of this airman’s professionalism is made that I could find. I’d sure like to know how the author reached that conclusion. Fluff? Designed to jerk readers’ emotions around? Seems so. (And dead pilots can’t talk.)
  • "How on earth does the author intend to document his (rather dismal) assessment of the copilot? "

    This is exactly the type of statement that seems to me to be without reference to information source, and therefor offers a strong suggestion of "slant". While I'm inclined to believe the general nature of Langewiesche's commentary, the lack of source reference is very troubling.
  • @hank , @Old_Joe - thanks for the comments. You wrote some of what I was thinking, but coming with a much better background. Here's a little more, based on what I've found and what I know:

    Regarding bias, I suggest reading the first four letters under NYT Picks. #4 is reproduced in its entirety:
    I have a Pd.D. in aerospace engineering, a number of years in the industry as a full-time employee and consultant, and have taught courses in design for many years. This article placing the blame on pilot error, while trying to minimize Boeing's responsibility, is deeply disturbing. It could serve as a textbook example of an attempt to shift the blame to the user, and victim, for disasters caused by errors in basic design practice.
    The slant becomes apparent in the paragraph reading:
    The rush to lay blame was based in part on a poor understanding not just of the technicalities but also of Boeing’s commercial aviation culture. The Max’s creation took place in suburban Seattle among engineers and pilots of unquestionable if bland integrity, including supervising officials from the Federal Aviation Administration. Although Boeing’s designers were aware of timetables and competitive pressures, the mistakes they made were honest ones, or stupid ones, or maybe careless ones, but not a result of an intentional sacrifice of safety for gain.
    Let's try the same content a different way: Boeing set up a process where it cut corners, where the left hand (however honest it might have been) did not know what the right hand was doing. It thus gained speed of design and consequently greater profits.

    While it did not intentionally sacrifice safety, Boeing seems to have been grossly if not criminally negligent in its procedures. (Notice how lack of "intent" in the article's paragraph is used to deflect guilt; he doesn't mention the actual intent to use a flawed process for gain.)

    The paragraph also mentions supervision by the FAA. It's being used to imply that, well, Boeing was "supervised", therefore it cannot be held at fault. Nice try. In some areas, following the laws can provide legal protection. In others, and I strongly suspect this is one of them, following the laws is just a minimum requirement. You're supposed to do better.

    If following the rules were enough to exonerate a company, then Lion Air should also be exonerated. As described, the pilots went through the required training motions. Both Boeing and Lion Air followed the rules pro forma. The article is applying a double standard.

    I had the same thought as hank about driving. Remember Toyota's "unintended acceleration" problem? There was an easy way to control the car - put it into neutral. That's something that would come naturally to most drivers experienced with manual transmission cars. That's what one might call "drivermanship".

    Which brings me back to your comments that manufacturers cannot expect everyone in the cockpit to be a crackerjack pilot. One legal definition of a defectively designed product is a product that is not safe for uses that are reasonably foreseeable, like a car being driven by an ordinary driver, or a plane being piloted by one of these newly minted, fly by wire, pilots.

    Another form of product defect is one without adequate warnings. Like letting pilots know that the plane had added software that could make it respond in a way unlike any other version of the 737.

    Finally, one small item buried in the article. The writer says " no regular airline pilot will ever experience [MACS's] activation — unless a sensor fails". If you believe that, then Boeing installed a component that had no function except to put the plane in more peril (i.e. did not help, but activated upon bad info). The writer was trying to use this to show that this was such an innocuous device that no documentation was required. But in his zeal to exonerate Boeing, he inadvertently faulted the company.
  • edited September 2019
    This might be the most significant line from the 51 page report:

    “The MCAS as it was designed and implemented was a big mistake. It remains unclear exactly what went wrong at Boeing — who decided what, and why — but a small collective breakdown had obviously occurred, and the F.A.A. had gone along for the ride.” (P. 38)
  • edited September 2019
    "The article is applying a double standard."

    Yes, having finished the read, that's my opinion also. Mr. Langewiesche effectively makes the point that in many parts of the world the training, proficiency and experience requirements for commercial pilots are significantly lower than is typical in "first world" countries. Indeed, knowledge of this situation is hardly a well-kept secret, and has been commented on extensively within aviation circles for quite some time. For example, review the professional commentary after the Korean Air fiasco at SFO in 2013. It would seem that not much has changed in this area, nor is it likely to do so any time soon.

    He then goes on to justify as normal the sales of these complex commercial aviation products to those very countries well-known for these deficiencies, without any requirement for those pilots to be given sufficient training to safely fly those very same aircraft. In fact, in this case, Boeing's foremost interest was to insure that additional training was not required.
  • edited September 2019
    My Reading Notes - if anyone’s interested:


    Author believes an inadvertent MCAS activation falls within the category known as “runnaway trim” and claims the Max’s electronic trim can be shut off and full “manual” used in such a case. (Some might disagree that the malfunction falls within that category.)

    Faults ATC for giving the troubled Indonesian plane “banked” routs away from other aircraft, increasing their inability to hold altitude.

    Puts maximum aerodynamic airspeed of 737 at around 340 knots. What?

    Insinuates Boeing caved in to the airlines in accepting fault (to avoid losing business).

    Sees Boeing engineers & employees as high integrity. Criticizes the company in other respects.

    Faults FAA for delegating certification authority to Boeing.

    Faults shoddy maintenance in general worldwide and specifically in Indonesia. I tend to agree.

    In 2007 the U.S. and EU banned Indonesian airlines from territories due to lax procedures.

    Boeing and AB sent instructors to several Far East countries, including Indonesia, to help pilots learn better. Author suggests trainees were tag-alongs in crowded simulators who learned by rote rather than hands on.

    Boeing intervened big-time 10 years ago at Lion Air. Spent tons of $$ trying to improve training and operations.

    Author notes the different approaches by AB and Boeing Towards automation.

    Says that the crash numbers (737 vs A320) have been roughly the same in recent years.

    Acknowledges that the MAX has a “slightly higher” tendency to pitch up and stall at cruise altitude (flaps up) than most planes. Says FAA wasn’t overly concerned.

    Auto-pilot had to be “OFF” for MCAS to activate and push nose down. Also, wouldn’t kick-in until flaps were retracted. Interesting.

    Boeing felt errant activation of MCAS would appear to a pilot as a known issue called “runaway trim.” Pilots were already trained to switch off electronic trim and go manual in that event; so MCAS wasn’t addressed in specific. (Dumb)

    The Lion Air 737 had had prior issues with AS sensors. Mechanics had rebooted system several times. Eventually replaced one with a cheap (faulty) part from low quality supplier.

    Faults Boeing for MCAS failure to cross-check speed sensors before initiating nose down.

    Prior flight nearly crashed. Third pilot in jump seat may have intervened to turn off electronic trim at last minute.

    Author accuses that crew of falsifying their aircraft mechanical report so as to pass their in flight issue off as less serious than it was.

    Stall warning occurred early in fatal flight. But only after flaps were retracted did MCAS kick in dooming the flight. Crew had not been informed of MCAS system.

    The MCAS sequence repeated as crew unwittingly extended and retracted flaps at around 5000 feet where they were holding.

    Sharp criticism of “Lion City” - a training school in Indonesia for pilots and attendants. But little specific documentation to back up assertions. These graduates move on to airlines around the world.

    * P 41 begins the Ethiopian plane episode. @Old_Joe might find that one of interest. Several competing control inputs appear to be at work here. Gets the head spinning.

    Describes captain’s commands as “erratic”. This crew had been informed about MCAS, but failed to address it correctly.

    Clearly, this crew needed more simulator experience in dealing with MCAS related problems. Went around in circles trying to resolve problems.

    Boeing and NTSB have legal authority to participate in the investigations. Author claims Ethiopia isn’t providing full access to all data.

    The NYT has reported on attempted bribery of NTSB investigators by foreign airlines in the past. Author levies other harsh criticisms of alleged coverups by corrupt foreign officials regarding past crashes.

    Author concluded both 737 Max crashes were a failure of “basic airmanship.” Also suggests Boeing will follow AB’s lead in more automated systems.

    Thanks @BenWP for a very informative read.:)
  • edited September 2019
    Old_Joe said:


    "Generally, there’s a very “slanted” tone to much of the NYT piece"
    @hank- Yes, that's my impression also, but it does contain a wealth of background information that hasn't been given coverage so far in the major media (at least that I've seen). And I'm having some difficulty in accurately pinning down the "slant", because just as I suspect that he's taking some particular side he turns his guns equally on the other side. Perhaps it's just his general tone that's a bit abrasive. I'm going to finish the read and meditate a bit before forming an opinion.
    "plan to go back and contrast his findings with some of the experts we cited back in March, April, May to see where they agree and where they diverge on key points."
    • You read my mind on that. This whole thing is going to take a while.
    "It’s been known for many years that overall piloting skills have declined as aircraft systems have become more automated."
    • Yes, for sure. The Korean Air "landing" of a Boeing 777 at SFO in 2013 is a prime example. Interestingly, while Langewiesche goes out of his way to disparage the flight training of the 737 crews, that Korean Air crew were ex-military with lots of experience and flight time, but they were also unable to cope because of an excessively rigid cockpit operating environment which led to an inability to deviate from normal (or as Langewiesche would put it "scripted") procedures.
    "Couple the decreasing pilot skill set with a severe shortage of pilots and it spells potential trouble. "
    • For sure.
    -
    Whatever “slant” I uncovered after reading pertains to his harsh criticism of training standards and operating procedures of many foreign carriers. As he alluded, it’s easy to falsify records and hard to detect when it’s been done (ie: logs, reports, inspections). Your KA accident out there confirms there’s a problem. OOPS - you’ve already identified that one ...

    A more subtle slant might be against the trend to more and more automation. Sounds like an old school “fly by the seat of your pants” pilot.
    -

    Overheard conversation on a recent flight: Former military airman grousing about how when he was in the military, it was the very poorest aviators that went on to fly for the big U.S. airlines. I’ve no idea if he knew what he was yacking about.
  • I know several currently flying commercial pilots with years of experience on the 737 and some on the Max. They all said they were aware of this problem before the doomed flight and could easily explain to me, a layman how to disable the system and fly the plane safely. They all believe the pilots were poorly trained. Clearly Boeing has to have some responsibility for designing and selling an airplane to airlines whose pilots were out of their league.
  • edited September 2019
    Plane Manufactures build a lot of planes to customers specifications, it is a never ending process. They install more fuel efficient engines, bigger engines more seats different configurations and the process goes on. To this I say the Aircraft operators still have the responsibility for proper crew size and training. I look at airline companies who fly plane X better make sure at least two soles on their flight crews are well trained to fly plane X with a minimum ?0,000 hours experience.

  • One takeaway for me has been to review what flights we have taken in the recent past on airlines that are not flagship quality and which may have employed pilots trained who-knows-where. Several domestic flights in China in the 1990's when we were there adopting our two youngest daughters come to mind. We had to get from points A to points B, so little thought went into the "airworthiness" of the pilots. We took a couple of short hops in Costa Rica, taking off from a tarmac that was literally bordered with dwellings. Again, it was the only way to get back to the capital other than a miserable bus or taxi trip of 8-10 hours. In the 80's we flew Korean Air on the same route from Anchorage to Seoul on which the senior pilot flew into Soviet airspace because no other junior crew member would challenge his judgement; that plane was shot down. Flights from the old Kimpo airport in Seoul had to take off heading towards North Korean airspace, then bank sharply to avoid a possible confrontation. All passengers had to turn over their cameras and all cabin shades were put down for fear that we would catch a glimpse of the Hermit Kingdom. Pure nuttiness. Recently we needed to get from Jodphur, India, to Delhi and took whatever flight was on offer. Frankly, I don't know how we could have screened for safety records before making these reservations. I surely won't take Lion Air and will be far more alert when we make travel plans in the future.
  • edited September 2019
    New today: NTSB Faults 737 Certification Process, Issues 7 Recommendations

    As an air traveler, I’ve experienced some of the hardship from the 737 MAX being out of service for so long. It’s cut severely into some airlines’ operations. American has cancelled many flights as a result. Flying American recently, planes were packed. Show up 25-minutes before departure and they’ll find a way to screw you out of your confirmed seat. Good luck trying to re-book the same day.

    As far as I know, the National Transportation Safety Board, which investigates accidents in the U.S., has stayed largely out of this fray until now. Often in the past they have seemed at odds with the FAA, which certifies new aircraft.

    The thing to remember is that 50% of all pilots are below average. ... To say you have 7 friends who fly 737s and all of them think they would have responded correctly to the two situations and saved lives is to skirt the more salient issue of how do “average” pilots on “average” days respond when things suddenly go south?

    Sorry for their sermon. Here’s the story: https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-aerospace/ntsb-faults-boeing-tests-of-max-system-for-not-assessing-pilot-response-to-multiple-alerts/
  • edited September 2019
    Adding to hank's comments, we have this from a current NPR news article:
    The [NTSB] report found that "neither Boeing's system safety assessment nor its simulator tests evaluated how the combined effect of alerts and indications might impact pilots' recognition of which procedure(s) to prioritize."

    NTSB Chairman Robert Sumwalt said in a statement that the crews in the planes did not react in the ways Boeing and federal aviation officials had anticipated.

    The incorrect assumptions "were used in the design of the airplane and we have found a gap between the assumptions used to certify the MAX and the real-world experiences of these crews, where pilots were faced with multiple alarms and alerts at the same time," Sumwalt said.
    I have a strong and deep respect for the NTSB, developed over many years of observing their deeply researched and even-handed reports on safety matters. Over the years the NTSB has criticized the FAA for their laxity towards and general unresponsiveness to various safety issues. Once again this is the situation: while they do not specifically call out the FAA, the comment that "the assumptions used to certify the MAX" falls strictly into the FAA's area of responsibility.

    One of the problems that I see with Mr. Langewiesche's NY Times Magazine article is that he first defines himself as an example of a competent airman, and then suggests that any pilot who does not rise to his personal standard is guilty of “a failure of basic airmanship". It's not quite as facile and simplistic as that, as many MFO commentators have already noted. Since the training and certification system varies so widely in different parts of the world, it's obvious that many pilots who have been "certified" may in fact not measure up to the personal standards of Mr. Langewiesche.

    To design and sell an aircraft that, in the event of multiple system failures, depends on a pilot with the talents, experience, and qualifications of Mr. Langewiesche is a serious mismatch with reality.

    Additional: The headline of a current Wall Street Journal article summarizes the whole situation very nicely: "Safety Tests Must Use Average Pilots, NTSB Says After 737 MAX Crashes"
  • That's a wonderful summary of the problem, @hank and @Old_Joe. Boeing, it seems to me, has a huge challenge: how to realign its culture with that of the customers and pilots of its planes. As to the NTSB/FAA failures to coordinate their efforts, I have to opine that this is a consequence of American reliance on decentralization and fear of creating federal agencies that might "infringe" on business. Sometimes the centralized, authoritarian systems of the governments of our economic rivals are better suited to develop appropriate safeguards and policies. If you want to see a brawl, suggest that Boeing and other mega-companies ought to hew to federal "economic policies." One side would be sure to accuse the other of wanting to impose a discredited Soviet-style control of the economy, the other would point to the great benefits of unfettered capitalism (without, of course, using the Koch brothers as exemplars).
  • @BenWP- Thanks for starting this thread, and for your comments on our posts. One of the many reasons that I have great respect for the NTSB is that they do not shrink from calling out bad actors, even if those actors are very large and powerful businesses, or another arm of the government.
  • edited September 2019
    Ditto OJ.

    Is it possible the FAA, for whatever reason(s), is more politicalized and also more subject to pressures from vested interests?

    From a glamor standpoint the FAA has the “classier” job. Nothing at all glamorous about sifting through burnt remains of transportation disasters, piecing oft-charred wreckage together, and listening to the final words from the crew in an effort to determine what went wrong. And from that, the NTSB does an outstanding job working to enhance the safety of the traveling public.
  • @MFO Members: More of the same !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
    Regards,
    Ted:(
  • "Is it possible the FAA, for whatever reason(s), is more politicized and also more subject to pressures from vested interests?"

    @hank- Is the Pope Catholic?
  • edited September 2019
    Notice how POSTUS isn’t satisfied just to insult those he thinks have encroached on his dead threads? He also somehow feels compelled to demean those who participate in live discussions.
  • Pure envy. His ratio of posts making it to the "Comments+" section is about 1%, and that drives him nuts. "Quantity, not Quality" be his motto.
  • Here's what MFO contributor Linter had to say, way back in June:
    linter
    June 11

    Ted said:
    @MFO Members: A year from now the flying public will say, 'what was the name of that plane that was grounded last year" ? The safest form of transportation is flying. Time to move on !
    Regards,
    Ted
    i just came upon this comment and all i can say is, man o man, what a stupid thing to say, so stupid that i'm basically left speechless.
    is there no way on this site to put guys like ted on ignore? if anyone deserves it, it's him.
    With Ted, nothing changes.
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