In recent days, a crisis in the financial sector has centered around regional banks as Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank collapsed, both casualties of poor management in the face of eight interest rate hikes by the Federal Reserve in the last 12 months. Wednesday morning attention turned to the big banks with shares of Credit Suisse hitting an all-time low.
Saudi National Bank, Credit Suisse’s largest investor, said Wednesday it could not provide any more funding, according to a Reuters report. This comes after the Swiss lender said Tuesday it had found “certain material weaknesses in our internal control over financial reporting” for the years 2021 and 2022.
As Credit Suisse dragged down the European Bank sector, U.S. big bank shares declined in sympathy. Citigroup and Wells Fargo shed 3%, while Goldman Sachs and Bank of America fell 2%. The Financial Select Sector SPDR Fund lost 2.9% in premarket trading, giving up its 2% pop on Tuesday.
Regional Banks, whose rebounded helped lift sentiment for the broader market on Tuesday, fell back into the red again. The SPDR S&P Regional Banking ETF (KRE) was down 3% in the premarket, led by losses in Old National Bancorp, Zions Bancorp and Fifth Third Bancorp. To be sure, shares of First Republic Bank were clinging to gains.

Credit Suisse on Tuesday published its annual report for 2022 saying the bank had identified "material weaknesses" in controls over financial reporting and not yet stemmed customer outflows.
Switzerland's second-biggest bank is seeking to recover from a string of scandals that have undermined the confidence of investors and clients. Customer outflows in the fourth quarter rose to more than 110 billion Swiss francs ($120 billion).

https://reuters.com/business/finance/credit-suisse-shares-drop-fresh-record-low-cds-widen-2023-03-15/
Oakmark funds sold their remaining shares last week.

The economic results of this counterrevolution were far from unambiguous. Growth in the early 1980s slumped. Entire industrial sectors were rendered uncompetitive by soaring interest rates and surging exchange rates. Unemployment hit postwar records. It was painful, but on the conservative reading there was, as British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher liked to say, no alternative. If the struggles of the 1970s had continued, she suggested, the result would have been a slide toward ever more rapid inflation and threats to the institutional status quo. Ultimately, the Cold War order was in peril, and if avoiding that fate required turning monetary policy into a more blunt-force form of political struggle, then so be it. In fighting the mineworkers into submission in 1984-85, she was waging war on enemies within, as she waged war on the Soviet enemy without. The prize was nothing less than a permanent shift in the balance of social and economic power and the exclusion of alternatives to the rule of private property and markets.

But you might make an argument that inflation harms the wealthy more than the working class.

On the other hand, if you have lots of debt (assuming at a fixed-rate) you are helped by inflation as you pay back the debt with cheaper dollars.

It’s easy for investors to dismiss the ripples from the collapse of Silicon Valley Bank SVIB as contained and nothing to worry about when it comes to a broader portfolio.
But if there’s one thing to know about banking crises, it’s that they are never just about the banks. They may start there, but they don’t end there. Easy financial conditions tend to lead to higher risk-taking and a complacency that long-established patterns will continue. Until they don’t.
As Warren Buffett has been known to observe, only when the tide goes out do you see who’s been swimming naked.
The Worry Is Fear
The failure of two major regional banks since Friday threatens to erode investor and consumer confidence to a degree that could spiral in unexpected ways. And with inflation still raging at the highest levels in 40 years and the Federal Reserve raising interest rates at the most accelerated pace since those years, things are starting to break.
“The worry is about fear,” says Tim Murray, capital markets strategist for multi-asset portfolios at investment manager T. Rowe Price.
In good times, too, policymakers get lax and tend to feel like it is safe to repeal or reduce important protections designed to prevent systemic events and consumer safeguards.

Depositors with big cash holdings are – reasonably – expected to be aware of the risks and spread their cash around several institutions. Businesses backed by venture capital, such as the customers of SVB, ought to have been advised how to manage their liquid holdings.
... the sight of depositors being made whole ... provides a disincentive for both depositors and banks to be prudent. There’s no reward here for SVB customers who banked more carefully.

A good first step... would be to cease the present practice of fully paying out uninsured depositors when bank failures occur. This practice, of course, is de facto insurance [emphasis in original] ... Paul Duke, Jr. reports that "many [bankers] support proposals to give depositors a 'haircut' a 10% of 15% loss on deposits above the [FDIC insurance limit] — when a bank fails. Two of banking's biggest guns, Citicorp Chairman John Reed and Chase Manhattan President Thomas Lebrecque, support variations of this proposal (WSJ, Aug 3, 'S9, A16). ... Such a shift in policy should not encounter insuperable opposition since it falls far short of enforcing the insurance limitations which legally already exist.
Since the Continental Illinois bankruptcy the federal banking and S&L authorities have adopted a too—big—to-fail policy. The policy is closely related to the unwritten policy of rescuing any faltering American corporation if it is large enough. The most notable cases so far have been Continental Illinois and Chrysler.
...In the beginning this de facto extension of coverage only applied to the banks and S&Ls which were large enough to have a wide financial influence. ... only the eleven largest banks were originally covered, hence the designation "too-big—t o—fail". The government however was rightfully criticized for this policy on the grounds that it put smaller banks at a competitive disadvantage, so, to correct this inequity the government has for several years made it a general policy to pay off all depositors in both large and small failed banks.

In [Diamond Hill Mid Cap's] shareholder commentary from the end of 2022, manager Chris Welch acknowledged the stock was facing difficulties. “Regional banks First Republic and SVB Financial were pressured amid a rising rate environment, which is weighing on net interest margins.”
Welch singled out the unique position of Silicon Valley Bank. “SVB Financial faced additional headwinds given its exposure to the innovation economy, its primary area of focus—though we believe such an environment offers the company an opportunity to add tremendous value for its clients and cement its leadership position in a lucrative space,” he wrote.

To Our Valued Clients,
In light of recent industry events, the last few days have caused uncertainty in the financial markets. We want to take a moment to reinforce the safety and stability of First Republic, reflected in the continued strength of our capital, liquidity and operations.
Our capital remains strong. Our capital levels are significantly higher than the regulatory requirements for being considered well capitalized.
Our liquidity remains strong. In addition to our well-diversified deposit base, we continue to have access to over $60 billion of available, unused borrowing capacity at the Federal Home Loan Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank.
We are here to fully serve you. We stand ready to process transactions and wires, fund loans, answer questions and serve your overall financial needs — as we do every day.
For almost 40 years, we have operated a simple, straightforward business model centered on taking extraordinary care of our clients. We have successfully navigated various macroeconomic and interest rate environments, and today we have among the industry’s highest rates of client satisfaction and retention.

Silicon Valley Bank’s failure boils down to a simple misstep: It grew too fast using borrowed short-term money from depositors who could ask to be repaid at any time, and invested it in long-term assets that it was unable, or unwilling, to sell.
In addition, nearly 90% of SVB’s deposits were uninsured, making them more prone to flight in times of trouble since the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. doesn’t stand behind them. The Federal Reserve was the primary federal regulator for both banks.
“A $200 billion bank should not fail because of liquidity,” said Eric Rosengren, who served as president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston from 2007 to 2021 and was its top bank regulator before that. “They should have known their portfolio was heavily weighted toward venture capital, and venture-capital firms don’t want to be taking risk with their deposits. So there was a good chance if venture-capital portfolio companies started pulling out funds, they’d do it en masse.”
To be sure, banks regularly borrow short-term to lend for longer periods of time. But SVB concentrated its balance sheet in long-dated assets, essentially reaching for yield to bolster results, at the worst possible time, just ahead of the Federal Reserve’s rate-hiking campaign. That left it sitting on big unrealized losses, making it more susceptible to customers pulling funds.
The banking industry as a whole had some $620 billion in unrealized losses on securities at the end of last year, according to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., which began highlighting those late last year.
Another regulatory issue: accounting and capital rules that allow banks to ignore mark-to-market losses on some securities if they intend to hold them to maturity. At SVB, the bucket holding these securities—consisting largely of mortgage bonds issued by government-sponsored entities—is where the biggest capital hole is.
The idea behind such a bucket is that it insulates an institution from short-term price volatility. The problem this poses is two-fold.
First, a bank may not be able to hold such securities to maturity if it faces a cash crunch, as happened at SVB. Yet selling the securities would force the bank to recognize potentially massive losses.
Second, the treatment of the securities means banks like SVB are discouraged from selling when losses emerge, potentially causing problems to fester and grow. That appears to have been the case at SVB and many other banks as rising interest rates in 2022 caused large losses in bond markets.
Banks have an additional incentive to pile into Treasurys. They have to hold less capital against such holdings, supposedly because they are risk-free. However, this means banks are holding less capital to absorb losses, and Treasurys can lose value due to changes in interest rates.
Others said monetary policy over the past decade played a role. The Fed “suppressed the yield curve and made it very clear to the banking industry that [it] would do this for a considerable period,” said Thomas Hoenig, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and former vice chairman of the FDIC. “So bankers are making decisions based on that message and based on that policy, and they fill their portfolio up with government securities of varying maturities, and they say they’re going to hold them to maturity.”
That suggests the need for regulators to take a broader view of the risks in the financial system.