I have held DSENX for more than a year, but your reference to CAPE got me to look at that ETN (not an ETF). It's done considerably better than the OEF and expenses are about half of DSENX. Problem is very low trading volume and a price premium. Not sure I fully understand the risks in the ETN structure. Anyone have a thought on that?

Seems to me to tend to the slightly less risky, based on my uninformed historical lookbacks and comparisons. (How's that for handwaving?) Its past performance looks not bad when it comes to slumps (bond portion w Gundlach sauce), and its general outperformance (less so vs CAPE etf, which you might want to look at) at every increment since inception is interesting. 50-50 w PONDX looks similarly appealing when you backtest it, though I would probably do 60-40 since DSENX has this special bondish component.

There are both similarities and differences of faults with hedge funds and open end funds. In one sense, you're right about people tending to pile into some funds based on manager past performance.
People piled into Gundlach's funds, even though they use "exotic financial derivatives like total return swaps". (See below.) IMHO use of exotic derivatives has become more commonplace - they're not limited to hedge funds and a few offbeat mutual funds as the article suggested. Though they're still insignificant if not absent from vanilla funds.
People piled into DoubleLine, into Yacktman, and others based on the managers' long term past performance at substantially identical funds. Not on a short term (3 year) record at a fund that was substantially different. RSIVX by design holds longer term, often illiquid bonds, than RPHYX, as opposed short term bonds ("think 30-90 day maturity").
So ISTM there is a qualitative difference between piling into funds like RSIVX (unproven management for that type of fund) or TFCIX or WBMAX (both with untested strategies for open end funds), and piling into proven management and strategies in the hedge fund arena. Another example of a mismatch between strategies and open end funds - stable value funds. There were (as I recall) over a dozen open end stable value funds attempted. They couldn't handle the open end fund daily redemption requirement.
YACKX also floundered for its first couple of years. It was only in 1994, in a relatively flat market, that it began to shine. Yet people stuck with him. Quoting Yacktman: "My only real fear in 1993 was that people who put their money in during 1992 would take it out at a loss. I didn't want this to happen, because I knew my performance would come back. ... As it turned out, more money came in than went out."
With hedge funds, accredited investors have the responsibility (and supposedly the opportunity) of investigating the offering. These "sophisticated" investors don't get the same disclosures as are required of open end funds. If managers have buried past failures, it's up to the investors to discover that.
The mandated disclosures of open end funds are supposed to make it easier for the other 99%. It is their choice to accept or reject a disclosure that discloses little other than: "just trust us".
DoubleLine funds and total return swaps:
Reuters, Nov 16, 2015: RiverNorth/DoubleLine Strategic Income Fund possesses economic exposure to an aggregate of 1,103,373 shares of Common Stock [of FSC] due to certain cash-settled total return swap agreements."

ThinkAdvisor, Nov 22, 2013“It’s [DSEEX] put together using a total-return swap,” Gundlach said of the fixed-income side of the fund.
Probably other funds; this was a quick search.

FYI: Convertible bonds offer access to two otherwise separate security markets. They start out as corporate bonds, which are debt instruments that carry the normal attributes of bond offerings: protection of principal, income generation and favorable position in a bankruptcy situation. If certain criteria are met, the holder of the bond may convert the corporate bonds into common stock of the issuing company. This allows investors flexibility in terms of equity appreciation or an escape from interest rate risk.
Regards,
Ted
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/122415/top-6-convertible-bond-funds-2016.asp
M* Convertible Fund Returns: http://news.morningstar.com/fund-category-returns/convertibles/$FOCA$CV.aspx

@ Chinfist - IF you are primarily interested in just the major producers and have an account at Fidelity I'd suggest looking at FENY. It trades for free.
Personally I think that there's still some more downside and tax-loss selling in the works and I am content to wait for the beginning of a rebound before buying any of them again.
On a side note I can't for the life of me figure out how Valero and Tesoro escaped the carnage in this sector.

The apparent text section in question from the December 1 commentary is below and is opening of the paragraph just above "Briefly Noted", which is #17 in the content list.
I do agree with the two previous comments; that I also don't understand who to attribute this statement to.....as noted by @VintageFreak...."Who is Several of us?"; followed by @JohnChisum and his question/statement.
"Several of us have taken the position that we’re likely in the early stages of a bear market. The Wall Street Journal (12/01/2015) reports two troubling bits of economic data that might feed that concern: US corporate capital expenditures (capex) continue dropping and emerging market corporate debt defaults continue rising. For the first time in recent years, e.m. default rates exceed U.S. rates.
Briefly Noted . . ."
Regards,
Catch

Several of us have taken the position that we’re likely in the early stages of a bear market. The Wall Street Journal (12/01/2015) reports two troubling bits of economic data that might feed that concern: US corporate capital expenditures (capex) continue dropping and emerging market corporate debt defaults continue rising. For the first time in recent years, e.m. default rates exceed U.S. rates.
Who is Several of us?

Hi Heezsafe,
Thanks very much for your submittal, but especially thank you for reminding me of the Conjunction fallacy. I am familiar with the work of Kahneman and Tversky so I am aware of the Conjunction fallacy, but I failed to recall that its common nickname is The Linda Problem.
I agree with you that we all fall victim to this behavioral fallacy at some time or another; it is a pervasive shortcoming. And yes it does appear on a few MFO posts; it is hard to escape from it if folks don’t think in terms of compound probabilities. Folks seem to resist that discipline.
For example, if you are invited to a financial investment meeting, what is the probability that a casual encounter will be with the money manager presenter if M people are present? The likely answer is 1/M or 2/M. Most folks would know that answer.
Now, what is the likelihood that the person you meet is a successful money manager? Most folks would not know that a high probability correct answer to that question is 0.1/M. Successful money managers are hard to find because they are a rare breed.
The Conjunction fallacy has been captured in many public media. It is often a major part of a movie theme. A terrific example of it is excitingly demonstrated in “The Enemy Below” movie. That film features Robert Mitchum as the destroyer skipper and Curt Jürgens as the submarine commander. It’s the great “he thinks I’ll do this, so I will not, but he knows I will not so…..” 3rd or even 4th level logic chain.
Here is a Link to that 1957 movie trailer:

I agree with the Keynes and the Zweig observation that multidimensional thinking and depth are required when making decisions. However, there is a practical limit and danger in the depth dimension.
Many of us are guilty of over-thinking an investment. Since we never have access to complete information, we often delay and delay a decision until the optimum investment point has passed. We are victim to paralysis caused by too much analyses.
As investors, it is a challenge to decide when enough information is enough to make a reasonable decision. That threshold balance point is hard to define, and likely changes for each decision. Firm rules don’t exist. Investing may seem easy, but is never easy to execute.
I have pontificated far too long. Thanks again for your comments.
Best Wishes.

Just compared with CAPE and DSENX, as it seems not dissimilar but a lot jumpier for sure. I am sticking with DSENX.

@LewisBraham From what I've read of Lord Byron, he would be considered the modern-day equivalent of the drama queen. Several daguerreotypes I've seen of him showcase his full dark mane, and always draped with a long flowing cape (the Victorian "windbreaker"). Given your status as The People's Financial Champion, I suppose you could go with the cape, if you fancied taking another step in the Byron direction. After Bonfire of the Vanities, it worked for NYC dandy Tom Wolfe, remember? I'd say "hey, not such a stretch, it could work for you, too," except, in Pittsburgh, .....hmmm, perhaps that would be a stretch. :)

WBMAX almost down 17%
WBLSX almost down 4%
I own the latter. I'm thinking OTCRX and ACVVX are better replacements. Something seems broken at Whitebox. Only a severe bear market would correct the situation and I don't think the Fed will permit that. I did move half of my WBLSX to OTCRX earlier in the year. One "Hussman" is quite enough for me personally. I think the issue with some Long/Short managers maybe their "academic theories" seem to be a dogma they cannot escape.
I know Whitebox was a darling of some on the board. I never got convinced on WBMAX but thought WBLSX would be a reasonable risk cash alternative. Anyone still own these funds?

I find the attitude expressed in that article reminiscent of Alfred E Neuman's "What me worry?"
One of the most storied investors on Wall Street was the late Marty Zweig. Mr. Zweig was famous for admitting with great frequency, when queried about the stock market that he "was worried".
Admittedly, the stock market will do what it will, whether we worry or not. But worry is a very salutary phenomenon -- it's nature's way of focusing the mind. Consider an investment landscape without people "worrying":
1. Company management: Nothing to worry about if we miss our numbers, we don't hold costs down, or revenues decline.
2. Company auditors: Nothing to worry about if we don't catch fraudulent numbers.
3. Security analysts: Nothing to worry about if we miss the problems at a company.
4. Ratings agencies: Nothing to worry about if we wrongly characterize a firm's liquidity and solvency.
Ever more all-time highs in the stock market is not guaranteed -- at least in a timeframe relevant to individual investors. It took something like 25 years for the stock market to regain its 1929 levels. Japanese investors are still well below the highs they experienced in 1989. How do you say "no need to worry in Japanese?"
Not worrying is the enemy. Worrying is your friend.

>> in severe drawdown period in 2008, few asset classes escape except cash and some bond sectors.
True, but some did rather better than others (PRBLX, Yackts, e.g.).
I was sort of thinking a value-oriented algorithmic vehicle w/ special bond twist might show its chops comparably. I assume its snapback will be good.
Have been in and departed min vol and low vol, rightly or wrongly.

@davidrmoran, in severe drawdown period in 2008, few asset classes escape except cash and some bond sectors. I have been intrigued with DSENX's since inception, but chose Vanguard Global Min Volatility, VMVFX, in the end for all its simplicity and low ER (0.30% vs 0.87%). David S. wrote a nice piece describing the merits of VMVFX (thank you David). This fund held up very well comparing its benchmark, Vanguard Total World Index.

The N Y Times has a few good columns today on the stock and bond markets. As for bonds, there's a front-page article reporting that mutual funds are engaging in a selling spree of emerging-market bonds, and this is contributing to a sharp decline in global markets. They are selling for good reason: their investors are withdrawing money from these funds. Last week alone, investors withdrew $2.5 billion from emerging-market bond funds.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/business/investors-race-to-escape-risk-in-once-booming-emerging-market-bonds.html?_r=0
And Gretchen Morgenson writes a column in which she questions the vague disclosures made by highflying mutual funds. She warns that these funds put investors in peril.
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/23/business/vague-disclosures-by-highflying-mutual-funds-may-put-investors-in-peril.html
If the waters are receding (a new bear market?), then we may soon discover which fund managers have been swimming without clothes.
[Confession: I really don’t know what’s in my bond funds. I’m trusting the managers to be prudent. I hope I’m trusting the right fund families.]

Hi JohnN,
Thank you for the Link to this Joshua Kennon article. Over many years I have been informed by his many fine financial articles. This one did not disappoint in that regard.
Kennon mostly directs his writings towards neophyte investors. After many years, I am not a novice investor, but since I have no formal training in that arena, my amateur knowledge base is somewhat spotty. It has holes that Kennon can and does fill.
Although I read Benjamin Graham’s “The Intelligent Investor”, it completely escaped my memory that Graham recommended a portfolio asset allocation that had a 25% bond holding floor and a 75% bond position ceiling. I didn’t recall these limits to his conservative investing approach. I wonder if his student, Warren Buffett, shares the same or similar portfolio construction constraints.
Best Wishes.

Yellen has said in the past she's not against NIRP.

Do you have any idea how NIRP could be implemented in the USA?
NIRP takes money from everyone, even the poor.

NIRP is happening in other parts of the world, why couldn't it happen here? NIRP on savings/checking accounts.
Eventually, would not surprise me if they do away with paper currency. If everything's digital, no way to escape monetary policy.

Hi Old Joe,
Folks who do not commonly make sophisticated calculations (non-linear differential equations) overly trust the precision of the numbers computed. This is especially the case if the calculations include some unfamiliar modeling elements.
Scientists, engineers, and perhaps even mathematicians (attempt at humor) know better. They recognize the simplifications, the many assumptions, and the incomplete data that are often inputs to arrive at an answer. These needed shortcuts often significantly compromise accuracy. That’s why safety factors are introduced.
All models in all fields are simplifications of reality. An infinite number of digits after a decimal point is never taken seriously by an experienced engineer. It is merely an artifact of the calculation itself. He appreciates the accuracy limits of what he knows and rounds-off accordingly. I apply that same discipline in many of my posts.
Unfortunately, we frequently don’t recognize our modeling limitations in the investment world. We fall victim to false myths and deficient models; we overreact to very loose, meaningless correlations. Investment outcomes suffer.
This talk about modeling deficiencies and data inaccuracy prompted a memory of a famous WWII mistake told to engineering students as a lesson. It’s a terrific tale about the first US bomber that was recovered nearly intact by the Germans after being shot-down in an early bombing raid.
The German engineers puzzled over the profile of the wing configuration. It seemed to be inefficiently contoured. Wind Tunnel tests verified that assessment. The Germans could not accept that US designers had blundered so badly.
They postulated that the US designers knew some aerodynamic nuances that escaped them. They committed research resources to discover the suspected subtleties. The research failed. There was nothing to discover. The US designers had simply made an error in interpreting their own wind tunnel data. Mistakes on a grand scale do happen.
Many such mistakes are well documented. The scientific community is not immune to them. That’s why in many research disciplines, a duplication of original results from an independent test source is a mandatory standard before product approval and dissemination.
Given the uncertainties of market forecasting and modeling deficiencies, the decision to dump any precision requirements is easily made when doing market analyses.
Thank you for your comments and your patience.
Best Wishes.

FYI: According to the 2015 Advisor Brandscape report from Cogent Reports, across 10 leading brand attributes, the extent to which advisers trust an asset manager has the greatest impact on whether or not they will consider investing with that company in the future. Cogent Reports also found that the impact of trust exceeds that of more traditional purchase drivers such as perceptions of reliability, consistency of performance, or information and guidance.
“It’s clear from these findings that even some of the biggest asset managers still have their work cut out for them in building greater trust among RIAs,” said Meredith Lloyd Rice, senior research director and lead author at Market Strategies, in a news release.
Following are the 10 mutual funds advisers trust most.
Regards,
Ted
1. American Funds
2. Franklin Templeton
3. BlackRock Funds
4. Vanguard
5. Fidelity Investments/Advisor Funds
6. OppenheimerFunds
7. MFS Investment Management
8. T. Rowe Price
9. First Eagle
10. Dimensional Fund Advisors
From Cogent Webslite:
Across four of the five primary retail distribution channels, American Funds, Franklin Templeton and BlackRock are the most trusted brands. However, among RIAs only, American Funds remains in the top three, trailing Vanguard and DFA.
“It’s clear from these findings that even some of the biggest asset managers still have their work cut out for them in building greater trust among RIAs,” said Rice. “But with so much focus on this increasingly important channel, we expect nothing less than an all-out effort to win that trust.”

My fear or lack of fear in spending varies with the conditions. If the markets are raging ahead and my IRA has been increasing at 7-10% annually, I'm inclined to splurge more (on vacations, home improvements, etc.). The past couple years the IRA's been stuck in a rut. That's partially due to some longer-term speculative plays that haven't yet worked out, but also due to slower growth in the major equity and bond indexes. So the IRA hasn't grown much the past year or so. As a consequence, I'm less likely to spend.
Another concern is the intense political rhetoric about curtailing SS which seems to ebb and flow. We're also dependent on a couple DB pensions, so the speculation re SS and pension solvency both have an impact on our thinking. While I can control our investing and spending, I have no control over what the politicians and courts do in regard to those other two matters. Probably a dumb response - but there's an emotional component to all this that's hard to escape.
I was probably 45+ when we finally got down to hard-tacks and paid off all our revolving credit and instituted an annual written budget. It was than that savings really increased. The first few years were excruciatingly difficult for us. Drove worn out vehicles and curtailed discretionary travel among other things. In retrospect, it was the smartest thing we ever did.