Even as Boeing inches closer to getting the 737 Max back in the air, new problems with the plane are emerging that go beyond the software that played a role in two deadly crashes.As part of the work to return the Max to service, the company and regulators have scrutinized every aspect of the jet, uncovering new potential design flaws.
At the request of the Federal Aviation Administration, Boeing conducted an internal audit in December to determine whether it had accurately assessed the dangers of key systems given new assumptions about how long it might take pilots to respond to emergencies, according to a senior engineer at Boeing and three people familiar with the matter. Among the most pressing issues discovered were previously unreported concerns with the wiring that helps control the tail of the Max. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/05/business/boeing-737-max.htmlRelated:
Boeing changes stance, recommends 737 MAX simulator training for pilots (Reuters) - “Boeing Co (BA.N) said on Tuesday it was recommending that airline pilots undergo simulator training before they resume flying the 737 MAX, a shift from its previous position that pilots only needed computer-based training.”.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-simulator/boeing-changes-stance-recommends-737-max-simulator-training-for-pilots-idUSKBN1Z6292
Comments
Thx for article
In the design and manufacture of anything as complex as a modern aircraft, hundreds if not thousands of component design considerations need to be reviewed or reexamined. "We did it that way the last time and there's been no problem" may seem to be a reasonable perspective, but in fact it's really not, because every design and manufacturing decision needs to be reviewed to determine if anything in the current design and manufacturing environment has changed enough to warrant a second look.
It's encouraging that Boeing has apparently reexamined the MAX in such detail as to bring the matters noted in the article to light. One could ask why those matters had not been noted before the MAX was released for service, but the current design review is taking place under a new and more conservative estimation of the ability of pilots to respond to mechanical/electrical/software control issues.
Concerning that, it seems possible that because of the really excellent overall safety record of Boeing and Airbus products, there's been an industry perspective that professional pilots are typically well equipped and trained to handle almost any possible problem, despite the ever-increasing automation and complexity of aircraft systems and subsystems. That appraisal may not be completely accurate- because those systems are generally so dependable, pilots have not really been called upon to exercise emergency response maneuvers with any great frequency. This paucity of real-life pilot testing has possibly led to an overestimation of their actual emergency response abilities.
After this intensive overall scrutiny of the 737 MAX it may in the long run turn out to be an extremely safe and dependable aircraft. Let's hope so.
“Designed by clowns” - Boeing releases flood of troubling internal documents related to 737 Max https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/09/business/boeing-documents/index.html
Boeing’s departing CEO leaves company with $62 million amid 737 Max supplier layoffs
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/10/airplane-fuselage-supplier-spirit-aerosystems-lays-off-2800-wichita-due-boeing-737-max-production-cut/
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/10/business/boeing-737-employees-messages.html Then Boeing goes and faults the pilots for being unable to handle a situation it intentionally failed to train them for. Talk about blaming the victim.
Agree
(Not necessarily related) By automating planes so extensively over the past several decades, manufacturers have achieved a somewhat predictable result. I’m sure the professionals who operate them try to stay proficient. But it must be tough. (Most of us can trace a noticeable decline in our math skills since the hand-held calculator came out.) So they need to be able to depend on the reliability and predictability of the “intelligence” that’s built-in to the technological marvels they’re given to operate. Forget Sully. That was an unusually proficient pilot at work on a very good day. (Ever have an “off-day” at work?)
Yep - This thing is starting to smell to high heavens. Kudos to @Old_Joe, with his extensive experience in aviation, for getting so much right about this situation back in March when we had very little to go on.
as in... I'm sometimes very surprised at how closely our minds seem to mesh. Perhaps you're my long-lost evil twin... you'll remember when they separated us in the orphanage because of all of that rotten stuff that you did and blamed on me.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/20/business/boeing-737-accidents.html
“ The company has estimated the costs of the 737 MAX grounding at more than $9 billion to date, and is expected to disclose significant additional costs during its fourth-quarter earnings release on Jan. 29. Boeing faces rising costs from halting production of the plane this month, compensating airlines for lost flights and assisting its supply chain.”
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-loan/boeing-seeks-to-borrow-10-billion-or-more-amid-737-max-crisis-source-idUSKBN1ZJ27T
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ALSO - See @msf’s above post. The 737 - NG was the previous upgrade for the 737. The crash of one several years earlier bears resemblance to the two MAX crashes. Like the MAX, the NG’s built-in “auto-correct” software depended on a single AOA sensor. My memory says the NG, like the MAX, incorporated more fuel efficient engines which were larger and heavier and also involved significant changes to mounting / configuration / CG of this very old model.
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Delta workers to receive profit-sharing payouts worth 2 months’ pay
Not really about the 737 MAX. However, Delta’s good fortune is due in part to the advantage it has over several competitors (like United, American, Southwest) because it never ordered or operated the 737 MAX (though it does fly some older 737s).
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/21/delta-workers-receive-profit-sharing-payouts-worth-2-months-pay/
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Here’s a mfo thread linking a 20-30 minute interview with current Delta CEO that I posted a few weeks back. (maybe an “ oldie-goldi”).
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/54825/interview-delta-airlines-ceo-ed-bastian-with-bloomberg-s-david-rubenstein
The 737 Max 800 will have to be scrapped. Period. No one will fly it. Start figuring this into your investment decisions.
and so it goes,
peace,
rono
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boeing-737max-finance/financier-doubts-add-to-boeings-max-headaches-idUSKBN1ZN1P5
More concerned that they make this plane safe than in what they call it. Expect they will eventually. Few flyers pay close attention to the type of aircraft they’re on. After something like this they will for a while perhaps. But memories are short. In a year, baring another serious mishap, most will have forgotten the name of the plane and its unfortunate happenstance. Likely, the reputation of the entire 737 line of aircraft among airplane aficionados and some in the industry will have taken a hit - unfair as it might be.
Ask the person seated next to you what particular plane they’re riding on and most haven’t a clue. Most distinguish the type using more generic terms like: “real big plane” (777, A330); “big plane” (737, A320); and “small plane” (various regional jets). Then there’s the “noisy little thing that shakes a lot” that almost no one likes (commuter turboprop).
If you want to know what you’re on, the easiest way is to pull out the safety card that airlines are required to stash in the seat pocket in front of you. That always states the type of plane. And when booking online there’s an extra tab you can click on usually called “Details” that almost always gives the exact designation of the aircraft in service on that route.