Bloomberg's Authers and Matt Levine have very good pieces about what went wrong, but they require a subscription ( which I pay as their articles are very good)
In summary, the tech industry in a low interest rate world had gobs of money, which they deposited at SVB. Most Banks make loans with their depositors money, and get paid back with interest, taking on credit risk; some loans are adjustable so interest return may go up, too.
Most of SVB customers ( most of them companies with accounts far in excess of $250,000 FIDC limit) didn't need loans so SVB had to do something with the money. They bought Government bonds in a low interest rate world. (They could have used them to lend for mortgages but they didn't). SVB had far far more bonds on their books than loans compared to most banks, and almost all of those bonds were fixed rate.
So SVB was exposed, not to credit risk ( from loans as a typical bank) but to interest rate risk. When interest rates shot up, and venture capital started to dry up the start ups needed their money so they started withdrawing their deposits.
Eventually to meet this demand for cash, SVB had to sell the bonds which were worth a lot less than they paid for them. Then the panic started and they ran out of things to sell.
Compared to a typical bank, SVB had far fewer loans and more Bonds, far more fixed rate bonds at low interest rates, a customer base all in one industry and therefore subjected to the same economic conditions all at the same time and far far more exposure to interest rate risk in a rapidly rising interest rate world.
They also were just under the asset level that would have designated them "too big to fail" and required government stress testing. The limit was lower before Trump, and SVB growth would have pushed them past it and required stress testing. But Trump raised the limit dramatically because it was "too much regulation" and they were just under the new limit too.
So here we have a train derailment in the banking world that could have been prevented.
Hard to know how many other banks are in same shape. The impact on tech startups may be more profound.

I do have linked Schwab Bank account with my Schwab Brokerage account. I don't know too much specifically about the Schwab Bank, but Charles Schwab is #8 bank holding company (it is also included in annual Fed stress tests). Schwab Bank is also an important profit center for Schwab and it is integrally tied to its robo-advisors. So, I doubt that "Chuck" would let anything bad happen to it and have heaps of eggs on him. I am not worried. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_largest_banks_in_the_United_States
There is good coverage of Silvergate/SI, SVB Financial/SIVB and banks in the current Barron's:
TRADER. The STOCK market has been hit by rising RATE expectations (after POWELL’s 2-day testimony) and falling BANKS/financials (after the failures of SI and SIVB). The problem faced by SIVB – a forced sale of Treasuries at huge loss – isn’t that unusual for banks facing runs (if there is no help from the Fed, FHLB, etc). These events may cause the FED to go slow on rate hikes. In a soft-landing scenario, the SP500 of 4,600 is possible.
UP AND DOWN WALL STREET. Silicon Valley Bank/SIVB is the 2nd largest bank failure in history; it was in part due to losses on forced sale of a huge portfolio of Treasuries. The fed fund futures projections were all over – up after POWELL’s 2-day testimony, and then down on the failure of 2 CA banks, the crypto-friendly Silvergate/SI and the venture-capital (VC)-friendly SIVB. The financials were stressed (KRE, KBE, XLF); credit conditions have tightened. As SIVB lent to tech startups and others burning cash, the prospects of those companies became gloomy. The 2-yr fell 48 bps from Wednesday and similar moves were seen in the past during 10/1987 crash, Lehman failure in 09/2008, 9-11 terrorist attacks. In all this drama, the jobs report was a minor sideshow. But coming are the CPI (Tuesday) and PPI (Wednesday).
All BANKS/FINANCIALS sold off last week (KRE, KBE, XLF). But most differ from SVB Financial/SIVB (and Silvergate/SI). The problem with SIVB was a large loss on huge forced-sale of available-for-sale (AFS, market-to-market) Treasuries, and its efforts for raising capital failed (and the Fed or the FHLB didn’t step in for the rescue). Most large banks have diversified businesses, are well capitalized and can tap multiple sources of funding. While rising RATES are generally good for banks, some overleveraged banks with poor quality loan-books get squeezed. DEPOSITS are also moving from banks into higher-rate Treasuries and money-market funds. SIVB was really a bank for venture-capitalists (VCs) who are sophisticated investors that can move large amounts of money (its sudden closure during the business hours may have been to limit that flight). In better times, SIVB just parked excess deposits into Treasuries that it had to sell suddenly at depressed prices (due to higher rates now). All banks now have large unrealized losses that may be hidden within their hold-to-maturity (HTM, not marked-to-market) portfolios – really, a permissible accounting trick. (In a bank run, the distinction between HTM and AFS basically disappears) Large banks also have tougher regulations and undergo annual stress-tests by the Fed. So, this general selloff offers opportunities in banks now – FITB, HBAN, JPM, KEY, MTB, PNC, RF, USB, etc.
https://www.barrons.com/magazine?mod=BOL_TOPNAV
See also open access LINK1 LINK2

Riders on the Storm, March 6 - 10, 2023
Song titles that may apply for this write:
--- Riders on the Storm, The Doors, 1971
--- Dazed and Confused, Led Zeppelin, 1969
--- I Can see Clearly Now, Jimmy Cliff, 1993
Bonds mostly in a funk until the Silicon Bank melt on Friday, March 10. Then, IG bonds performed as normal for a flight to safety. I suspect some of these price gains will be pulled back next week. 'Course, this may put a pinch on the FED plans for rate changes coming March 26; and I imagine numerous folks in the FED and Treasury departments do not have the weekend 'off'. As noted in a thread by @Old_Joe, Silicon Bank's UST collateral had to be dumped at market rates without benefit of maturity. Contagion towards other FDIC banks may be a problem at some point 'IF' their portfolio is concentrated within their customer base. I only note this now, as I imagine some bank portfolios will find a deep analysis of 'where is your money', being loans and deposits.
An example could be: a bank catering to sub-prime used auto loan.
The 2007-2008 melt was the result of too many folks with their fingers inside the sub-prime mortgage loans areas, and a lot of fancy quasi guarantees layered to protection against default of the mortgage borrower. As the dominoes fell, not many could cover one another's butts with the heavily margin monies. Default city X 10. So many of these sub-prime mortgages were packaged and sold as 'good', with a nice yield. A lot of lying by the peddlers and failure to verify from buyers. I recall pension funds in Finland and other places one would not think about who found their money 'up in smoke'.
There will likely by some more banks with problems, but not to the point of a FDIC grab; but with impact to a stock price and withdrawal of deposits. Any of this could be highly modified with 'social media', which was not a concern in 2007 - 2008. Some companies having monies with SVB may have problems. ROKU (online digital streaming) reportedly had $500 million parked at the bank. What will be their fate with this money recovery?
One may suggest that poor bank management, high interest rates, improper regulatory monitoring and the poor decisions by companies having a concentration of their monies at one bank helped cause a 'perfect storm' for a bank run.
I feel that the appropriate and timely actions with SVB were performed properly, which should add assurance.
If you're curious; a list of failed banks 2009 - 2023. I last posted this list in 2010 or there about. Scroll down for names.
I digress.
IG bonds will likely find favor until the dust settles. IMHO.
Those MMKT's. Stagnant yields again this week, as they've hit a plateau; but most still having a yield between 4.2 and 4.5%, unless it's a magic sauce MMKT. Perhaps another bump up in yields when the FED raises rates again.
--- U.S.$ DOWN -.32% for the week, +.86% YTD
*** UST yields chart, 6 month - 30 year. This chart is active and will display a 6 month time frame going forward to a future date. Place/hover the mouse pointer anywhere on a line to display the date and yield for that date. The percent to the right side is the percentage change in the yield from the chart beginning date for a particular item. You may also 'right click' on the 126 days at the chart bottom to change a 'time frame' from a drop down menu. Hopefully, the line graph also lets you view the 'yield curve' in a different fashion, for the longer duration issues, at this time. Save the page to your own device for future reference.
--- The NAV's list below had a few small positive moves on Thursday, and of course; big positive price moves on Friday, with exceptions; as yields had large down moves from a flight to safety from the failure of SVB. The longer duration were in favor.
A good day to you.....
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---Several selected bond funds returns since October 25, 2022. I'll retain this date, as it is a recent inflection point when bonds began to have positive price moves. We'll need to watch if this was just a 'blip'.
NOTE: I've kept the prior dated reports in the beginning of this thread; and have added YTD to this data.
For the WEEK/YTD, NAV price changes, March 6 - March 10, 2023
***** This week (Friday), FZDXX, MMKT yield continues to move with Fed funds/repo/SOFR rates and ended the week at 4.46% (flat lined now). The core Fidelity MMKT's have continued a slow creep upward to 4.22%. The holdings of these different funds account for the variances at this time.
--- AGG = +1.04% / +1.63% (I-Shares Core bond), a benchmark, (AAA-BBB holdings)
--- MINT = +.11% / +1.26% (PIMCO Enhanced short maturity, AAA-BBB rated)
--- SHY = +.56% / +.44% (UST 1-3 yr bills)
--- IEI = +.4% / +.91% (UST 3-7 yr notes/bonds)
--- IEF = +2.27% / +2.05% (UST 7-10 yr bonds)
--- TIP = +.07% / +1.55% (UST Tips, 3-10 yrs duration, some 20+ yr duration)
--- VTIP = -.19% / +.62% (Vanguard Short-Term Infl-Prot Secs ETF)
--- STPZ = -.2% / +.46% (UST, short duration TIPs bonds, PIMCO)
--- LTPZ = +.97% / +5.15% (UST, long duration TIPs bonds, PIMCO)
--- TLT = +3.63% / +6.6% (I Shares 20+ Yr UST Bond
--- EDV = +4.48% / +8.98% (UST Vanguard extended duration bonds)
--- ZROZ = +4.63% / +9.92% (UST., AAA, long duration zero coupon bonds, PIMCO
--- TBT = -7.% / -11.8% (ProShares UltraShort 20+ Year Treasury (about 23 holdings)
--- TMF = +10.9% / +16% (Direxion Daily 20+ Yr Trsy Bull 3X ETF (about a 3x version of EDV etf)
*** Additional important bond sectors, for reference:
--- BAGIX = +1.25% / +1.83% (active managed, plain vanilla, high quality bond fund)
--- LQD = +.61% / +1.99% (I Shares IG, corp. bonds)
--- BKLN = -.81% / +3.09% (Invesco Senior Loan, Corp. rated BB & lower)
--- HYG = -1.71% / +.83% (high yield bonds, proxy ETF)
--- HYD = +.41%/+1.63% (VanEck HY Muni)
--- MUB = +.67% /+1.04% (I Shares, National Muni Bond)
--- EMB = -.33%/+1.29% (I Shares, USD, Emerging Markets Bond)
--- CWB = -3.1% / +2.41% (SPDR Bloomberg Convertible Securities)
--- PFF = -4.08% / +3.28% (I Shares, Preferred & Income Securities)
--- FZDXX = 4.46% yield (7 day), Fidelity Premium MMKT fund
*** FZDXX yield was .11%, April,2022.
Comments and corrections, please.
Remain curious,
Catch

@Hank. Have you ever tried a custom benchmark from however many component ETF’s you choose and assemble to your desired asset allocation. Then put in Portfolio Visualizer. I don’t think it will work for daily but by months it’s fine. Compare with your balance from any start date. Like when you retired to now.

I appreciate your response Larry. I’m not really in search of some performance benchmark. Just wondered how you would go about it. As one who has always eschewed holding cash what I really concern myself with is the inherent short term volatility of the riskier things I invest in. I figure if I’ve invested in what seem to me sound investments with risk offsetting characteristics, than the performance part will take care of itself. (You may assume that like most I keep yearly performance records - now dating back some 25 years.)
Those holdings contain as of now:
6 individual stocks
1 traditional 60/40 balanced fund
1 traditional 40/60 conservative allocation fund
1 non-U.S. equity index fund
1 gold miners fund
1 commodities basket (metals) fund
1 capital allocation CEF using derivatives / leverage
1 infrastructure fund
1 long-short fund
1 risk premia fund
1 global real estate fund
1 EM stock fund
1 GNMA fund
1 global bond fund
1 intermediate HY fund
1 market neutral convertible bond fund
1 inverse S&P 500 fund
- negligible % in money market funds
Friday the entire collection ended down 0.22%. I made 3 purchases throughout the day as a stock was falling, so that number is a bit exaggerated to the high end. That’s reasonable daily volatility. Of course there are occasional off-days when the portfolio falls more than 0.50%. It’s the roughly 8-10% commitment to precious metals / mining that affects volatility the most. Also, individual stocks affect volatility, especially two which represent close to 5% of portfolio each..
If you are beyond 70, and if you hold close to 0 cash reserve, then daily / monthly / year-to year volatility may concern you a great deal. The “close your eyes and invest for the long-run” approach ceases to work at some point.
I know you’ve been looking at a simplified approach. Makes sense. I’d likely recommend that to many our age. Unfortunately, it’s hard to teach an old dog new tricks. I’ve always enjoyed investing. Am reasonably informed. Lived through some horrendous inflation during the 70s & 80s period and came to distrust holding much cash. Other than for ballast, I’ve not liked bonds that much. Albeit - under Paul Volker you could pull 15% or better in money market funds. But it wasn’t always that way. There were stretches where cash didn’t keep up with rising prices. And, as we learned in 2008, some of those money market funds were riskier than we thought.
Re the 3 funds I track daily for volatility: They are all conservative allocation type funds, selected primarily for their diverse investment approaches:
ABRZX from Invesco spreads risk equally among equities, bonds and commodities. It does so largely through the derivatives markets. A stated goal of the fund is “reduced volatility”.
PRSIX is an actively managed 40/60 allocation fund run by T. Rowe Price, one of the best managers in the business - notwithstanding this fund’s recent lackluster performance. Until the bond wipe-out of 2022, it was considered one of the best conservative allocation funds in its class.
AOK is a 30/70 allocation ETF from Blackrock with an appealing 0.15% management fee. It appears to rely partially or wholly on various market index funds. I like that it includes some domestic mid-caps, some foreign equities and even a small exposure to EM stocks. As far as I can tell it’s not actively managed, so the return - for better or worse - represents how the varied assortment of global / domestic indexes perform.
As I’ve stated, I do not own any of the 3 tracking funds above. Just enjoy watching their daily behavior. I did find it unusual - and a bit funny - that they managed to break-even on one of the most volatile trading days I can remember - and with a bank failure thrown in for good measure.

@Sven "I agree that quality journalism has decline significantly and I try to read as much as I can from our local library’s online subscription to major newspapers". =+1
@Old_Joe From your wrap up. "Hopefully we all know or understand that holding bonds or CDs of various types can easily lead to a capital loss if we are required to sell those types of instruments before maturity, and if their value has meanwhile deteriorated due to overall financial market conditions.
So they held short term T-bills paying ? , while paying their customers 20 times less than the T-bills on the customers accounts !! 2% T-bill & customer gets paid .1% !?
Over extended I'd say.
Have a good day, Derf

@LarryB- There's this, from the WSJ:
Following are selected excerpts from a current article in the Wall Street Journal-

First Republic shares fell 52% in early trading before storming back to near the previous day’s closing level, only to then finish the day down 15%. Investors expressed concerns about unrealized losses on assets at the bank as well as its heavy reliance on deposits that could turn out to be flighty.
Addressing its liquidity, First Republic said: “Sources beyond a well-diversified deposit base include over $60 billion of available, unused borrowing capacity at the Federal Home Loan Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank.” Regarding its financial position, First Republic said it “has consistently maintained a strong capital position with capital levels significantly higher than the regulatory requirements for being considered well-capitalized.”
Investors have grown wary of First Republic for reasons similar to those that caused concern at SVB. Like SVB, First Republic showed a large gap between the fair-market value and balance-sheet value of its assets. Unlike SVB, where the biggest divergence is in its portfolio of debt securities, First Republic’s gap mostly is in its loan book.
In its annual report, First Republic said the fair-market value of its “real estate secured mortgages” was $117.5 billion as of Dec. 31, or $19.3 billion below their $136.8 billion balance-sheet value. The fair-value gap for that single asset category was larger than First Republic’s $17.4 billion of total equity.
All told, the fair value of First Republic’s financial assets was $26.9 billion less than their balance-sheet value. The financial assets included “other loans” with a fair value of $26.4 billion, or $2.9 billion below their $29.3 billion carrying amount. So-called held-to-maturity securities, consisting mostly of municipal bonds, had a fair value of $23.6 billion, or $4.8 billion less than their $28.3 billion carrying amount.
Another point of concern that echoes SVB is First Republic’s liabilities, which rely heavily on customer deposits. At SVB, those deposits largely came from technology startups and venture-capital investors, who quickly pulled their money when the bank ran into trouble.
First Republic’s funding relies in large part on wealthy individuals who increasingly have a range of options to seek higher yields on their cash at other financial institutions as interest rates have risen.
Total deposits at First Republic were $176.4 billion, or 90% of its total liabilities, as of Dec. 31. About 35% of its deposits were noninterest-bearing. And $119.5 billion, or 68%, of its deposits were uninsured, meaning they exceeded Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. limits.
Uninsured deposits can prove flighty since they can be subject to losses if a bank fails.

(Text emphasis added in above.)
For additional perspective, there's this from a post that I made earlier in this thread:

Hopefully we all know or understand that holding bonds or CDs of various types can easily lead to a capital loss if we are required to sell those types of instruments before maturity, and if their value has meanwhile deteriorated due to overall financial market conditions.
But I had never given any thought to the possibility of potential bank losses when they have parked substantial amounts of their money in "ultra safe" US Treasuries. An article in this morning's WSJ pointed out that banks are potentially in the same situation as we are.
A bank such as Silicon Valley Bank can have a significant amount of their capital in short-term "safe" Treasuries, but if they are faced with an unexpected run on their deposits, they can be forced to sell those Treasuries before maturity, and at a loss.
So even a reasonably run bank can get into trouble.

Hopefully we all know or understand that holding bonds or CDs of various types can easily lead to a capital loss if we are required to sell those types of instruments before maturity, and if their value has meanwhile deteriorated due to overall financial market conditions.
But I had never given any thought to the possibility of potential bank losses when they have parked substantial amounts of their money in "ultra safe" US Treasuries. An article in this morning's WSJ pointed out that banks are potentially in the same situation as we are.
A bank such as Silicon Valley Bank can have a significant amount of their capital in short-term "safe" Treasuries, but if they are faced with an unexpected run on their deposits, they can be forced to sell those Treasuries before maturity, and at a loss.
So even a reasonably run bank can get into trouble. In the case of Silicon Valley Bank, evidently a significant number of demand deposits are/were well in excess of the 250k FDIC protection, so when things got shaky a number of large depositors were very quick to attempt to withdraw very substantial amounts of the bank's deposits.
I suppose that there's a "lesson" of some sort to all of this, but I'm damned if I know what it is. Forget banks, use mattresses or a box buried in your backyard?

CNBC broadcasting its attempts to raise capital have failed. It (SVB) is in talks to sell itself.

Heard on the radio about SVB on the way home. Radio commentator made the distinction that SVB invests in venture capital while Silvergate Capital was investing in bitcoin. Investors did not make that distinction and threw out the baby with the bathwater.

SVB Financial/SIVB had a masterfully BAD timing. Several of its filings at Edgar/SEC showed up yesterday (see the link below) - a huge AFS* portfolio for sale, a large capital raise by issuing stock, preferreds, etc, on the day after the shutdown announcement by (unrelated) Silvergate/SI. Then the SIVB CEO was on call to its venture-capitalists (VCs) to not panic, and that if everyone panicked at the same time, that could be a problem. Well, the VCs ran away in droves.
Banks are required to hold lots of Treasuries but can hold them at book value or initial purchase price (but not marked-to-market) in the long-term HTM portfolio that the banks may use for quick loans. They also hold securities in the short-term AWS portfolio that is marked-to-market. When there is a run on the bank, this distinction may disappear and almost everything becomes AWS (if the Fed or FHLB or somebody else doesn't step in for rescue) and huge losses ensue. Factors are also different for SI (a crypto-friendly bank) and SIVB (VC/startup-friendly bank).
Neither SI, nor SIVB tapped the Fed Discount Window - unclear if by choice or they were turned away. Late last year, SI strangely tapped the FHLB for liquidity and that loan was suddenly called just before its recent unwind - may be it triggered the unwind.
Twitter was buzz with both, but then it may not be mainstream media - is that CNBC?
*AFS = available-for-sale (marked-to-market)
HTM = Hold-to-maturity (NOT marked-to-market)
https://www.sec.gov/edgar/browse/?CIK=719739&owner=exclude

@hank @Junkster et al
UST yields..... 1, 3 and 6 month; as well as 1, 5, 10, and 30 year. The chart starts at October 25, 2022. This was the start reference for the BONDS thread. Call it intuition or whatever, but the pricing/yields caused me to look more closely. I don't know that the chart will help 'see' anything; but it is one I've used for some time, and is real time, if you choose to save the site. KEEP in mind, this is a 'yield', nor NAV/pricing chart.
The Ukrainian war and the inflation pressures everywhere had started to pull the FEDS chain, although they can't do much about many aspects of inflation. And as been noted previous, how far are they going to go with rate increases to 'fix' what they don't like, NOT break the economy and have a 2% inflation rate. Glad I'm not piloting that ship.
@Junkster noted too about the MMKT and CD rates. One may look at MMKT charts and see the steps in yield increases following the Fed Funds rates, at least with a chart view inside Fido for FZDXX. The chart from left to right looks like a side view of stair steps.
I agree with @Junkster about 'clear mud'. There are so many moving parts that the FED and the private sectors are focusing upon, that the best I can do is try to do at this time is be close enough to seeing a meaningful change to cause a change in the portfolio. NOT a fun time, right now; although I'm not a short term trader, I still want to have most of the gains between the high or low of an investment.
IG bonds had their 'protective' place today, yields down/prices up amidst the equity burn.
Perhaps something of consequence from some of the words. In a funk today, so I'm out of thinking gas.

Silvergate/SI to be shutdown.
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/silvergate-capital-will-liquidate-after-crypto-collapse-wipes-out-bank-220356639.html

Recent discussions on MFO on EM funds ex-China have set me on a search for a slightly different niche, namely small capitalization emerging market value stock funds. I have linked a SeekingAlpha article from 2020 on the subject as well as a page from LSV, the managers of several value MF’s. They have a SCV EM strategy, but no mutual fund.
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4325359-case-for-emerging-markets-small-cap-value
https://www.lsvasset.com/emerging-markets-small-value/
The two funds I own that have considerable EM exposure are SFVLX and EYLD. The former is an all-cap fund, with a decided international value methodology, while the latter is the real McCoy. EYLD does not avoid China and it has an array of holdings not easily recognizable, at least to me. Those who are familiar with Meb Faber at Cambria will not be surprised to see that stock selection in EYLD follows his basic tenets regarding free cash flow and profitability. His largest fund is SYLD, a worthy rival to COWZ on the domestic front. His FYLD does a decent job with international stocks, as well.
MSCI runs an EM SCV index and I’m in search of funds that follow it, specifically the value orientation. EEMS and DGS come up on SC EM searches, but they aren’t quite what I hope to find. Grandeur Peak might fit the bill, but they seem like a growth shop to me. Please post any suggestions you have for this market segment.

”Aside from ‘practical’ considerations, ie how much of a hit would I really take, there are the moral ones. While many people eschew using ‘moral values’ in investments, as everyone has different ethical values, there is a case to make that many moral issues have legitimate and well founded investment implications.”

Morally speaking, South Africa is a curious choice. Human rights concerns might also deter investments in mining funds, many with holdings there.
”South Africa failed to take meaningful measures to improve protection of social and economic rights, which has been undermined by widespread unemployment, inequality, poverty, the government’s response to the Covid-19 pandemic, and corruption. The authorities struggled to ensure law enforcement responded effectively to some of the worst riots and looting in the country since the end of apartheid. The violent riots triggered by the imprisonment of former President Jacob Zuma for contempt of court claimed more than 330 lives … Other human rights concerns include violence against women, failure to ensure justice and accountability for past xenophobic violence, and violence against environmental activists.
The government’s Covid-19 aid programs, including food parcels during national lockdown, overlooked people with disabilities, refugees and asylum seekers, and many lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. Among countries that collect gender-based violence (GBV) statistics, South Africa has one of the highest rates of GBV in the world.
The killing of environmental rights activist, Mama Fikile Ntshangase, in her house in KwaZulu-Natal province, on October 22, 2020, highlighted the plight of rights defenders in mining-affected communities across the country. Activists have experienced threats, physical attacks, and damage to their property because of their activism—which police failed to investigate”
Source

Aside from "practical " considerations, ie how much of a hit would I really take, there are the moral ones.
While many people eschew using "moral values" in investments, as everyone has different ethical values, there is a case to make that many moral issues have legitimate and well founded investment implications.
In China's case, the recent destruction of Hong Kong democracy and what little dissent there was in the Communist party are immoral and contrary to US democratic ideals.
They are also contrary to solid "rule of law" principles that capitalism requires. If a company or owner can loose all of the profits and assets of a company because of the whim of one man, there is little reason to commit capital to that country.
I don't see how the Communist party control over markets and capital flows will be beneficial for China in even the short run.

"Previous charge" makes it sound like Samra was a fund manager (even if not the lead) on OAKIX. No question about ARTKX doing better than OAKIX, just about what Samra was actually charged with at Harris.
It's true that he worked in Harris' international group, but that's as much responsibility as Sama was charged with. His name doesn't appear in any Oakmark prospectus (based on spot checking) in his Harris years of 1997-2002.
One does find statements that he worked as a portfolio manager at Harris, e.g.

Prior to joining Artisan Partners in May 2002, Mr. Samra was a portfolio manager and a senior analyst in international equities at Harris Associates LP, from August 1997 through May 2002.

https://www.artisancanvas.com/?filter=tag+eq+artisan-canvas:authors/david-samra
Though what Samra himself says is:

I worked in the international group there with a very famous value investor, David Herro, who still operates the Oakmark International, Oakmark International Small Cap Fund. And I worked there for five years and left there in 2002. By then I had had almost 10 years worth of experience as an analyst and decided that like to try employing my own philosophy, and I found a terrific home here at Artisan. We launched the International Value Fund in 2002.

https://mebfaber.com/2020/04/29/episode-216-david-samra-the-primary-driver-of-our-behavior-is-finding-a-company-that-trades-at-a-discount-to-intrinsic-value/
At least he was a whole lot closer to being responsible for a fund than Santos got to working at Goldman Sachs. For all we know, Santos was just a copyboy for a company (LinkBridge Investors) that in turn did business with GS.
https://people.com/politics/fact-checking-the-george-santos-claims-from-goldman-sachs-employee-to-college-volleyball-star/
Side note: curiously, there appears to be a Jorge Santos who is a VP at GS. Scroll down to #46 in this Yahoo piece.
https://www.yahoo.com/video/the-e-mpower-top-50-future-ethnic-minority-leaders-2019-230100555.html

Hi @yogibearbull
You noted previous in this thread regarding Capital One CD offers. I was contacted by an in-law today about the Capital One, 5% APY, 11 month CD, "360 Performance Saving", on line offer. Is there anything, hidden in the fine print, for a new customer as to having to maintain an account, if they choose to take the monies from the CD after it matures? I ask, as I've seen offers requiring to maintain an account with bill pay and such.
You mentioned: FWIW, I have Capital One a/c. But what I don't like is that it keeps coming up with new a/c with higher yields ("360 Performance Saving" is the latest) and leaves legacy savings at low levels (they exist but not even shown on the website).
Thank you,
Catch

Since you asked :-) ...
I'm not sure this is more arcane, but it's certainly in the running:

The special rules described on this page may convert some or all of your short-term loss into long-term loss — or into a nondeductible loss — when you sell shares held six months or less after receiving certain kinds of dividends.

Kaye Thomas goes on to give a clear explanation, even adding an exception where these rules don't apply to a sale within six months of a purchase.
Then there's this one, for treating fund dividends as qualified:

All of the following requirements must be met:

• The fund must have held the security unhedged for at least 61 days out of the 121-day period that began 60 days before the security’s ex-dividend date. (The ex-dividend date is the date after the dividend has been paid and processed and any new buyers would be eligible for future dividends.)
• For certain preferred stock, the security must be held for 91 days out of the 181-day period, beginning 90 days before the ex-dividend date. The amount received by the fund from that dividend-generating security must have been subsequently distributed to you.
• You must have held the applicable share of the fund for at least 61 days out of the 121-day period that began 60 days before the fund’s ex-dividend date.

https://www.fidelity.com/tax-information/tax-topics/qualified-dividends

I know most people will not be able to get past paywall but here is Bloomberg article about missing banker
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-06/missing-banker-reignites-fears-of-xi-in-china-s-tech-startups-venture-capital?srnd=premium&sref=OzMbRRMQ
In the latest sign of trouble, Bao Fan, the tech industry’s star banker, disappeared, with his firm issuing a terse statement that he is cooperating in an unspecified investigation. The eerie vanishing may have more influence on the psyche of China’s corporate class than any encouraging words from state media.
“It’s rule by fear: There is a feeling that Beijing can always come after you,” says Alicia Garcia Herrero, chief Asia Pacific economist at Natixis. “Of course, the private sector will be much more cautious.”

Mark Mobius, in a Fox News interview discussing in Fortune, claims that China doesn't want to let him move his money out of the country.

Mobius, founder of Mobius Capital Partners, has been a longtime booster of Chinese equities, yet revealed why he’d changed his mind ...
The investor revealed that he had funds trapped in an account with HSBC in Shanghai. “I can’t get my money out. The government is restricting the flow of money out of the country,” he said.
Mobius continued that the Chinese government was “putting all kinds of barriers” in his way. “They don’t say, ‘No, you can’t get your money out,’ but they say, ‘Give us all the records from 20 years of how you’ve made this money,’ and so forth. It’s crazy.”

We've written about both successful EM funds with low China exposure (2021) and funds that, by prospectus, exclude China (2023).
By coincidence, China's premier stepped down yesterday after 10 years in office. His departure was described as "marking a shift away from the skilled technocrats who have helped steer the world’s second-biggest economy in favor of officials known mainly for their unquestioned loyalty" to Xi (AP, 3/5/23).
Both of the Seafarer funds are China-light, about 9% weight against a peer average of 28%. My other EM fund, Grandeur Peak, is about 11% China.
For what caution it suggests,
David