RPHYX / RSIVX: New commentary explains mistakes that resulted in credit losses I’ve a different take on the Riverpark commentary. I’ve had an unwanted degree of familiarity for some time, with Verso, Newpage and the now-merged entity, due to my ‘day-job’. (and please excuse me, a lot of this is based on recollection). Riverpark’s explanation of the problems at Verso are incongruous with my perception/experience with them.
(Old-) Verso and the merged Verso have been bleeding cash perpetually. Without the merger, Verso would probably likely have had a “corporate event” already. Newpage itself, had entered, then emerged from BK a few years ago. Its trip through BK, allowed Newpage to de-lever somewhat. So along comes Verso, somewhat like a parasitic organism to extract Newpage’s cash to prolong its own existence.
Riverpark’s commentary states that Verso has “exceeded expectations with respect to achieving synergies (of the merger)”. I can tell you with certainty that is a (Verso-) management talking point they put out when their horrific Q2-2015 results came out. – Trying to seduce investors to have faith in a management team, DESPITE the poor results. Riverpark is just parroting Verso’s earnings release/presentation materials, presumably taking it at face value. I viewed the “exceeding expectations” comment from Verso as an indictment --- if they were ahead of the curve in terms of slashing costs, and STILL their reported results were so poor, then they must REALLY be in trouble – and presumably the low-hanging fruit of the synergies has been done. (So not much more to be done to help them.)
As part of the merger (which, I believe closed in January) they did some type of bond exchange. Seem to recall the effect of it was to cram down a principal haircut on some bondholders. In return, the bondholders got a token lump-sum cash-out payment (further draining the merged entity of needed liquidity!!), and higher interest rates on the “new” bonds, some/much of it PIK, not cash. Possibly also a lightening of covenants. Why would you want to lend to a borrower who is doing a principal haircut of its debt? Isn’t that a major red-flag?
A key problem is ownership – Verso is controlled by private-equity firm Apollo. If memory serves, Apollo had large (likely controlling) stakes in both Newpage and Verso. Apollo has a particularly ugly history of asset-stripping companies which it controls, leaving them debt-hobbled to such a degree that servicing the debts eventually becomes impossible. The (predictable-) outcome occurs frequently enough with Apollo, that I view it as a standard Apollo business model. I’ve seen them play this game time and again. Verso, like Apollo’s prior ‘projects’ need not face bankruptcy – all that needs to happen is for Apollo to a)buy a substantial amount of Verso’s bonds at the steep discount provided by Mr. Market, then b) surrender it to Verso in return for equity. In this way, Verso could de-lever. It’s remaining bonds would no doubt substantially rebound in price, lowering its cost of capital.
But doing so, is not in Apollo’s playbook. They extract cash, they don’t contribute cash. I could readily cite other ‘red flags’ over the past year on Verso, but am running long. Attributing Verso’s problems to the regulators is diverting blame. By the way, why didn’t Riverpark mention Apollo, its control of Verso, and its sordid history with other investments?
I’ve a small ‘stub’ holding in RPHYX, having sold most of it earlier in the year as junk spreads kept widening. At that time, also sold a ‘starter position’ in RSIVX which was doing nothing. I was contemplating adding to my RPHYX position shortly, as I suspect junk may continue to be buoyed. Frankly, I’d no idea Verso was a significant holding of Riverpark’s. That it was (is ?) is troubling to me, given my familiarity with Verso -- Verso was never (in the past 3 years) a credit that a prudent portfolio manager would own – at least not without hedging it (possibly by shorting the equity).
After reading the Riverpark commentary, I am rather dis-inclined to add to my Riverpark position at this time. Their explanation of Verso is absent some critical understanding of what they invested my money in. Verso should have been a VERY EASY problem to keep out of the portfolio.
RPHYX / RSIVX: New commentary explains mistakes that resulted in credit losses RE: RSIVX and RPHYX, nothing is working for me this year.
Mutual Fund Ladder (vs a CD Ladder) I asked a question as part of a different thread, but thought it worthy of its own limelight.
Here's part of that thread:
rphyx-rsivx-new-commentary-explains-mistakes-that-resulted-in-credit-losses@David_Snowball commented on a possible alternative to RPHYX or
RSIVX :
"...the best bogey I've got is Osterweis Strategic Income (OSTIX), which Mr. Sherman considers a legitimate peer. In their worst stretch, it took them nine months to recover from a drawdown. Since OSTIX is still below its previous high, the drawdown underway now might last longer. So maybe this is your "in a year or two" money, which implies judging performance over a couple year cycle."This got me thinking and I commented back to David:
"Just picking up on your thoughts for OSTIX as part of someone's "in a year or two" money. I went a bit further and added other time frames as well as other fund considerations to create kind of a "fund ladder"."For Less than 1 year money - PSHDX, BSBSX, FOSIX,
For 1 year money - RPHYX or RSIVX...or instead, maybe FIRJX or DLSNX
For 1-2 year money - OSTIX,
For 3-5 year money - PONDX, FAGIXAnyone have thoughts on what your "fund ladder" might consist of?"
RPHYX / RSIVX: New commentary explains mistakes that resulted in credit losses @David_Snowball,
Just picking up on your thoughts for OSTIX as part of someone's "in a year or two" money. I went a bit further and added other time frames as well as other fund considerations to create kind of a "fund ladder".
For less than 1 year money - PSHDX, BSBSX, FOSIX,
For 1 year money - RPHYX /
RSIVX...or, maybe FIRJX or DLSNX
For 1-2 year money - OSTIX,
For 3-5 year money - PONDX, FAGIX
Anyone have thoughts on what your "fund ladder" might consist of?
RPHYX / RSIVX: New commentary explains mistakes that resulted in credit losses FWIW, RSIVX is underperforming OSTIX by about 3% so far this year after outperforming it by around 2.6% last year. So this is no disaster though I do own it and I am a bit disappointed in two permanent losses of capital in a market that hasn't had all that many blow ups so far. If the discounts for closed end funds like DSL and BGH hold up for the rest of the year, come January I'll be sorely tempted to accept the greater risk and move there from RSIVX (tax considerations preclude me from considering it now).
RPHYX / RSIVX: New commentary explains mistakes that resulted in credit losses @claimui thanks for this post. I had suspected the volatility might be due to holding thinly traded but "money good" bonds. This info reminds me of a comment Junkster made that basically predicted this outcome. I will think some more about current investment in
RSIVX.