Not technically a fund question, but here goes. My grandson received an inheritance of three stocks, APPL, META, and NFLX, with a present value of $10,000, $4000, and $3000, with around $2000. capital gain since receiving. He is asking me if he should sell all and eliminate his balance on a school and car loan and move the now available dollars to a savings account in preparation for a future wedding or other emergency needs. He is making sufficient money that making the monthly payments on the loans is not burdensome, but he is averse to being in any kind of debt. Any suggestions? Are these three stocks, Buy Hold or Sell? His question is to sell them now something he will regret in the future.

You could save the trouble and buy just about any CEF if you enjoy the volatility. Down 30% and than up 40% not uncommon. And the manager does all the buying and selling for you … typically for a 3% cut - give or take.

You may be thinking of the typical 2 and 20 fees for hedge funds.
https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/capital-markets/2-and-20-hedge-fund-fees/
CEF fees are not all that different from actively managed OEF fees.

CEFs’ average annual fees sit at 1.09% (or $109 for every $10,000 invested), according to CEF Insider data, though it’s not unusual to see fees in the 3%-4% range.

https://www.kiplinger.com/slideshow/investing/t041-s001-cheap-cefs-7-closed-end-funds-unusually-low-fees/index.html
(2019 data)

Dallas firm expects to hand back keys to 19 hotels, including two in Plano
The Plano properties are among a portfolio that would have required a paydown of $255 million and $80 million in capital spending.
Read in The Dallas Morning News: https://apple.news/AegWIHgtISIa34X7E9rHjDQ
I am assuming this is the right thread to post the above, given the OP. If not, please feel free to move it to the right thread.
I know everybody talks about office RE being the only sore spot in real estate. A few weeks ago two landmark hotels were surrendered by the owner in SF and I told myself that SF probably has some idiosyncratic issues and this is likely limited to SF and that if travel and entertainment is booming, the office contagion is unlikely to get to hotels.
I guess I need to read the Baron funds link @devo posted to understand the nuances of the RE.
Edit: Baron funds link covers Travel related real estate on page 8 of the 16 page document. Note that the fund, while talks about the great prospects for travel related RE, has allocated only 4.4% to Hotel & Leisure (15+% going to Casinos (grouped in Travel)).
Hotels 2.0
Timeshare Operators 1.5
Ski Resorts 0.9

Barron’s Funds Quarterly (2023/Q2–July 10, 2023)
https://www.barrons.com/topics/mutual-funds-quarterly
(Performance data quoted in this Supplement are for 2023/Q2 and YTD to 6/30/23)
Pg L2: Growth is outperforming value/cyclicals as techs have led on AI-hype. But rates are still rising, and growth valuations are stretched; recession may be out there. Stick with high-quality growth; there are also several large-cap growth ETFs. Small-cap growth may be attractive. Funds mentioned include FBGRX, IVV, QGRO, XLK, VUG, QQQ, SLYG. (By @LewisBraham at MFO)
Pg L7: It may be time to go beyond T-Bills, money-market funds and short-term bonds. The Fed is almost done raising rates and they should remain high for a while. Funds mentioned include MWTRX, VBTLX, PONAX, SLQD, BIV, IBMN.
Pg 9: The SP500 has become a mega-cap tech growth fund with big 7 accounting for 30%. But there are many alternatives – small-cap value AVUV; value IVE, SPYV, VOOV; foreign IXUS, VXUS, VEU, DFAI; glide-path hybrids target-date funds (TDFs).
Fund news from elsewhere in Barron’s (Part 2).
Pg 20, INCOME. Don’t stay in T-Bills and money-market funds for too long. Use a barbell to mix short-term and intermediate/long-term bond funds including the MBS. Eventually, when the rates fall, these would have capital gains. Mentioned are preferreds PFLD, PSK, PFF.
Pg L33: In 2023/Q2 (SP500 +8.30%): Among general equity funds, best were LC-growth +12.34%, and worst were SC/MC 3.xx%; ALL general equity categories were positive AGAIN. Among other equity funds, the best were Lat Am +15.85%. sc & tech +12.14%, and worst were China -10.36%, precious metals -7.75%. Among fixed-income funds, domestic long-term FI +0.14%, world income +0.83%; ALL FI categories were positive too AGAIN (FI isn’t very refined in Lipper mutual fund categories listed in Barron’s).
LINK

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1593547/000139834423012759/fp0084056-1_497.htm
497 1 fp0084056-1_497.htm
THE ADVISORS’ INNER CIRCLE FUND III
(the “Trust”)
FS Chiron SMid Opportunities Fund
(the “Fund”)
Supplement dated July 7, 2023 to the Fund’s Prospectus (the “Prospectus”), Summary Prospectus
(the “Summary Prospectus”) and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”), each dated
March 1, 2023, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI.
The Board of Trustees of the Trust, at the recommendation of Chiron Investment Management, LLC (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser of the Fund, has approved a plan of liquidation providing for the liquidation of the Fund’s assets and the distribution of the net proceeds pro rata to the Fund’s shareholders. In connection therewith, the Fund is closed to investments from new and existing shareholders effective immediately. The Fund is expected to cease operations and liquidate on or about July 31, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”). The Liquidation Date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.
Prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders may redeem (sell) their shares in the manner described in the “How to Sell Your Fund Shares” section of the Prospectus. For those Fund shareholders that do not redeem (sell) their shares prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute to each such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date.
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, the Adviser may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate the Fund’s orderly liquidation, such as by holding cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
The liquidation distribution amount will include any accrued income and capital gains, will be treated as a payment in exchange for shares and will generally be a taxable event for shareholders investing through taxable accounts. You should consult your personal tax advisor concerning your particular tax situation. Shareholders remaining in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will not be charged any transaction fees by the Fund. However, the net asset value of the Fund on the Liquidation Date will reflect costs of liquidating the Fund. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
CHI-SK-042-0100

Excerpted from M* Q2 2023 fixed income retrospective.
"It was a mixed second quarter for bond fund investors. Funds sensitive to interest rates, like long government and intermediate core bonds, were once again beaten down. These funds, which invest sizable stakes in U.S. Treasuries, saw bond prices slip while U.S. Treasury yields rose during the period."

"Credit-sensitive funds also felt some pain, mostly in May. Still, lower-quality fixed-income assets, such as leveraged loans and high-yield corporate bonds, eked out gains for the full quarter amid interest-rate volatility thanks to their shorter-duration profiles. As such, the average bank loan and high-yield bond funds posted solid returns of 2.7% and 1.5%, respectively."
Link

I’ve had my eyes on ICEM - a new multi-asset ETF from Franklin Templeton with an ER of .38%. That helps explain why I jumped (unfairly perhaps) on @Crash’s post.
The fund is new (June 6) and there’s very little about how it actually invests either in the prospectus or other F/T literature. (Kind of a “trust us” portrait). By prospectus it can own up to 25% high yield. Yet, M* seems to show it with more than that if you include the around 25% “unrated.” Anyway, it’s heavily weighted towards junk and unrated paper. So that has given me pause. And it held up well yesterday but is off close to 1% today. Looks like it buys an equity based option index as part of its strategy to harvest gains in the S&P and still protect principal on the downside. That also gives me pause and might help explain why it’s falling today.
This link might pull it up. https://www.morningstar.com/etfs/arcx/incm/portfolio
@Junkster knows so much about junk. Wish he’d weigh in sometime on spreads and relative valuation vs equities or high grade bonds. Probably hiking the Blue Ridge.
PS / All you “Giroux-Heads” - What can say? PRWCX held up exceptionally well yesterday, falling only .15% compared to 3X that much for VWINX. Keep this up and somebody will nominate him for Prez.

Eponymous funds are hard investments. Muhlenkamp was bequeathed to Ron's son, and has been vastly better without him. Akre Focus was the outgrowth of one betrayal of Chuck Akre by his analysts; he intensely prepped their successors. By MFO Premium's and Morningstar's reckoning, they've outperformed their peers by a healthy margin since but have seen huge outflows. Walthausen's team gave up. Bill Miller's successors at Miller Opportunity are top 1% this year, but the fund was also top 1% in 2020 and bottom 1% in 2021 and 2022. Cook & Bynum is five-star after Dowe's passing, but most of that comes from being reclassified by Morningstar, perhaps fairly, as a diversified EM fund.
And Bruce? The Younger Mr. Bruce will persevere, I suspect. His dad was more and more a voice in the background, I suspect. And I'm certainly willing to ask them, if you'd like.
The prudent course for active investors is usually a functional team or a firm (T Rowe Price, Mairs & Power) that has a really good record for manager replacement. The prudent course for skeptics might be a passive strategy that's not purely market-cap or debt weighted.

Sorry to hear about Robert Bruce. Owning BRUFX was a bit of a challenge, given the iconoclastic nature of the company. One cannot, for instance, put a slice of this good fund into an IRA held elsewhere to take advantage of its high distributions.
The same key-person concern appears to have been warranted the case of AKREX. From July 2020, about the time the fund began talking of a planned transition from the management of Chuck Akre, performance has truly flagged. M*'s current *** grade is generous.

[snip]
I don't know of another portfolio manager that combines industry sector, allocations, country region and stock intersection.
I have looked around several times but don't find anything else as comprehensive. The brokerages will give u asset allocation and sectors but I am not sure they use % cash in the mutual funds for example.
[snip]

@sma3,
Same here - that's what prompted the OP.
I use the free version of Portfolio Manager only to track prices and returns for holdings / watch lists.
Portfolio X-Ray is accessed via the library for detailed portfolio analysis.
I use the free Portfolio Visualizer Backtest Portfolio feature, but it has some major shortcomings:
Allows only 4 funds to be included in portfolio.
Doesn't list asset weights (US stocks, foreign stocks, bonds, cash).
Doesn't list equity styles (small value, large growth, etc.).
Doesn't list sector weights.
Doesn't list stock intersection.
I've also tried the free version of Personal Capital (added investments manually, didn't aggregate).
It has a bit more functionality:
Lists asset weights.
Lists equity styles for US stocks.
Lists sector weights for US stocks.
However, equity styles / sector weights for foreign stocks are omitted.
Performance data is only available for the following time periods: 90 days, 1 Year, this year, last year.
Stock intersection data is not provided.
I'm willing to pay a reasonable amount for a good tool with functionality similar to Portfolio X-Ray.
Edit: Added strike-through for most PV Backtest Portfolio shortcomings. See my post below.

The 2 biggest items for most people are housing and transportation. They increase 40+% and vehicles are up 30+% since 01/2020. Do you know many who got a 30% salary increase?
Are most better off now than four years ago? the answer is clear, it's not. https://apnews.com/article/biden-poll-economy-survey-jobs-inflation-b3c77cb208f96f9b039cf48cbc4fb67b
You don't need a weatherman to know which way the wind blows.

Electric cars are increasingly popular in the only U.S. State which is located in Polynesia. Before the pandemic, gas was $3.25. For a period of time, it was over $5, and is by now down a bit to about $4.69---- which is still totally nuts.
We shop at Costco, which saves some money------ per unit. But it's always an adventure to find room in the fridge and the cupboards just to PUT stuff away. It does not hurt much to give to our church's food drive for the starving students at the university. They can't get federal money for their food bank because they serve a particular population.
Despite dreadful inflation, we count ourselves very lucky. Wife works way too many hours, but she wants it that way. And that's why we're sitting pretty. We do not yet need the dividends and capital gains which our portfolio produces.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1467831/000089418923004618/etfmgbsealiquidationsupple.htm
497 1 etfmgbsealiquidationsupple.htm SUPPLEMENT RE FORTHCOMING LIQUIDATION
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e)
File Nos. 333-182274; 811-22310
Supplement to the
Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”)
dated October 31, 2022, of the ETFMG Breakwave Sea Decarbonization Tech ETF (BSEA)
July 3, 2023
The Board of Trustees of the Trust has approved a Plan of Liquidation for the ETFMG Breakwave Sea Decarbonization Tech ETF (the “Fund”). The Plan of Liquidation authorizes the termination, liquidation and dissolution of the Fund. The Fund will create and redeem creation units through July 20, 2023 (the “Closing Date”), which will also be the last day of trading of the Fund’s shares on the NYSE Arca, Inc., the Fund’s principal U.S. listing exchange.
On or about July 21, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”), the Fund will cease operations, liquidate its assets, and prepare to distribute proceeds to shareholders as of the Liquidation Date. Shareholders on the Liquidation Date will receive cash at the net asset value of their shares as of such date. While shareholders remaining on the Liquidation Date will not incur transaction fees, any liquidation proceeds paid to shareholders should generally be treated as received in exchange for shares and will therefore generally give rise to a capital gain or loss depending on a shareholder’s tax basis. Shareholders should contact their tax adviser to discuss the income tax consequences of the liquidation.
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, ETF Managers Group, LLC, the Fund’s adviser, will manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate its orderly liquidation, such as by raising cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective. Shareholders may sell their holdings on the NYSE Arca, Inc., on or prior to the Closing Date. Customary brokerage charges may apply to such transactions. After the Closing Date, we cannot assure you that there will be a market for your shares. Please contact the Fund at 1-844-383-6477 if you have any questions or need assistance.
Please retain this Supplement with your Summary Prospectus, Prospectus
and SAI for future reference.

A couple notes from Mr. P. On inside ownership of the fund:

The GoodHaven Fund disclosed in its annual and semi-annual reports insider ownership as follows - and please note the vast majority of these shares are related to Mr. Pitkowsky and entities connected to his immediate family - "As of November 30, 2022, the members, officers, and employees of GoodHaven Capital Management, LLC, the investment advisor to the GoodHaven Fund, owned approximately 124,075 shares of the Fund. It is management’s intention to disclose such holdings (in the aggregate) in this section of the Fund’s Annual and Semi-Annual reports on an ongoing basis."

He's also thinking about the redemption fee question, and might yet share thoughts there.
We also talked about two misrepresentations of the fund's portfolio, which Chip will correct from the wilds of the Catskills tonight. First, I reported Morningstar's cash stake of the fund and concluded it was fully invested. It's not because the fund uses T-Bills as cash equivalents. Cash-like is around 10%, still less than half of its pre-transition average. Seond, I suggested they had too much exposure to special situations. Mr. P's take is that they had too much exposure to not-quite-special-enough situations leading to a portfolio with a lot of exposure to "the messy middle." Those were stocks that weren't super high quality or super distressed, which are his targets. They've been mostly purged. Following the transition the fund's turnover ratio has dropped 80% from an average of 15% pre-transition to around 3% now.
For what interest that holds,
David

Surprisingly, GP's version of events concerning First Republic doesn't contain so much a shred of admission that they made any kind of error.
"Our very selective approach to investing in Banks led us to own First Republic at portfolio weights that expressed a high degree of conviction in the company’s risk-adjusted return profile. As you are likely aware, over the past month, First Republic experienced a significant crisis, as collateral damage from the Silicon Valley Bank (SIVB US) collapse, which resulted in a severe de-rating of the FRC share price. A fair question for anyone to ask is how to reconcile our very selective approach to investing in banks with a large position in a bank that has experienced a significant crisis. At a very high level, our investment thesis on First Republic was based in its application of a world-class client service model to arguably the world’s most attractive banking client markets (specifically, the high net worth and high-end professional services markets in urban coastal population centers across the United States). That strategy for First Republic had enabled the company to structurally grow earnings while preserving exceptionally conservative underwriting standards. In other words, while First Republic is a bank, we observed that its unique model and exposure profile largely neutralized most of the quality attributes that generally make banks less attractive and more risky. Put another way, an attribute-by-attribute analysis of First Republic, reinforced over its long successful track record, made us comfortable treating First Republic as we would treat best-in-class growth companies we discover in other industries.
"However, after SVB Financial shared its post-close announcement on Wednesday, March 8th, highlighting elevated deposit attrition, the sale of available-for-sale securities at a material loss, and an equity capital raise, we spoke with First Republic’s CFO in order to confirm our knowledge of the company’s exposure to deposits from early-stage companies, net unrealized losses in available-for-sale securities, and other aspects of its capacity to avoid the negative feedback loop that SVB was beginning to experience. We left that balance sheet review confident enough to continue holding our positions. What destabilized our confidence was Friday’s announcement that SVB Financial would enter receivership and the recoverability of uninsured deposit balances at SVB was in question. As these revelations became clear, we concluded that the probability of contagion extending to First Republic depositors had become too high to justify continuing to hold our positions. In other words, we concluded that First Republic had ceased to be an investment opportunity and had instead transitioned to more of a pure gamble on which wagering our clients’ funds was unacceptable. We proceeded to exit our entire investment position in First Republic at the next opportunity (the Monday morning pre-market) as efficiently as we could without further pressuring the share price."
https://secure.alpsinc.com/MarketingAPI/api/v1/Content/grandeurpeakglobal/grandeurpeakglobal-comm-20230421.pdf
If they can't find any mistake in their investment process, then what's to prevent them from making the same mistake again?

Many (most?) of us get seduced by good story telling - after all that is one of the seductions of generative AI.
Fool me once . . ., fool me twice . . . and all that. I thought there was plenty of time between SVB collapse and First Republic collapse for a manager to react and preserve whatever capital could have been preserved, even if one were to think SVB collapse came from the left field. Cutting losers short (and letting winner run) is the basic investing lesson that was drilled into me early on after I watched an investment go to zero. It is more troubling to me if a manager did not employ proper risk management than if they lost an opportunity to make money.
Multiple insider sellings within a short period of time is a red flag for any of my holdings.
GP probably have too many funds for a small shop to pay attention to each fund holdings! I think we previously discussed about this risk at GP.
IMO, GP executives are a much better story tellers than risk managers.

Very interesting points raised by several members. It is true that the equal weight fund does have to sell its winners down to the .2 allocation, but I understand that such rejiggering occurs only 4 times per year. Winners are pared back while stocks that have become cheaper (i.e., lost value) are on sale, so to speak. The gains from this « value proposition «  should compensate for the opportunity cost of selling gainers early.
I did not previously own an S&P 500 index fund in my actively managed portfolio, so I am not replacing or duplicating anything by dipping my toes into RSP. I do own plenty of TIEIX, the TIAA-CREF Equity Index Fund, in my retirement account. I often hear chirping in my mind from some irritating creature named FOMO. Maybe others have been visited by this PITA. On good days, I can show him/her the door.

@dryflower - I did a quick look back comparing RSP and SPY using PV with starting ranges of 2007-2010, followed by extending the end date through to 2020. (Since I’m using a free version I’m unable to link the charts).
- From Oct 2007 through Mar 2009, SPY outpaces RSP.
- But by July 2009, RSP regains the lead over SPY and holds it until
- 2020 when SPY begins to dominate.
So from my simple look-back, it appears that your thinking about an extreme bear market benefiting the equal weight index “bears out.” At least using RSP and SPY.

@dryflower...so what is the alternative...buying a SPY -like index with the top holding of AAPL...with a PE of 33, YOY top line down -2.5%, Profit$ down a little more than that, cash on hand now under 2% of total capital unlike recently when it was 25%+...but damn the torpedos or for you youngsters out there YOLO...keep plowing your life savings into the casino?
Not sure what the class thinks about this comment...but...while we are all sailing in the same ocean, we all experience inflation differently in the water craft we are on....you could argue that your portfolio as a whole gets whacked by inflation but I would also state for example if my annual spend is $150k before taxes annually and that inflation has gone up by +10, +15% (can we talk, be real, who really believes that bullshit that inflation was/is only 5,6,7% the past year) but that $150k is only very tiny % of my overall portfolio, inflation doesn't really impact my lifestyle, spending habits....I can always cut back somewhere. But say if one puts 35-50% of their portfolio in the markets and it gets whacked which is not out of the realm of reasonable possiblities and you add the "real world" inflation...you could get in trouble quickly as a near or in retiree.
Rule #1 is capital preservation. Live to fight another day. don't get greedy...nothing wrong with ther 5% annual return...so many co workers the past 15 years in their early 50's were saying....all I "need" is 5% a year....until then they kept grinding....

@Roy, you are getting great inputs from many posters here on your asset allocation. Target date fund’s glide path provides a good starting point for the major asset class allocations, and I use them as a reference point, just as @Observant1 is doing. I am several years older than you are and am approaching retirement too.
Several years ago, I gradually reduced stock exposure gradually to a 50/25/25 (stock/bond/cash) allocation. This conservative allocation was helpful to navigate through the difficult year of 2022 when both stocks and bonds fell simultaneously. This year has been the quite the reversal as both stocks and bonds move up amidst of banking crisis. Now that the bulk of rate hike is behind us, I am more optimistic that bonds will have more meaningful gain this year with respect to yields (4-5%) and some capital appreciation on the bond prices. T bills, CDs and money market are yielding 5%. And that is good enough for me.