I invested in IOFIX in April 2020 in my taxable accounts. I have no immediate plans to sell it. There is a difference between paying taxes for ordinary dividends now, or for long term capital gains in the future, e.g. any time after April 2021, in my case. But if one frequently trades in and out, then of course there should not be much difference.

“The study findings, released Friday, portend a long era of muted returns for higher education institutions, which will likely encourage them to have a fresh look at financial and investment strategies in order to meet critical return targets and sustain their mission of providing urgently needed support to students. The new study was based on responses of 705 institutions representing $638 billion in endowment assets, and covers the fiscal year July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2020.”
“Endowments’ average one-year returns were 1.8% as of June 30, compared with 5.3% for the previous fiscal year. The historical target return for endowments has been 7.5%, comprising spending requirements, but in recent years, endowments have been challenged to meet this target, according to the study.”
Article
NOTE - Study may be a bit misleading since it measures the one-year returns as of June 30 - shortly after the pandemic induced selloff. However, 1.8% seems like a dismal one-year return. My sense is that both 2019 and 2020 were pretty good years for most investors - despite the March / April pummeling.

For those who wonder what Mr. Grantham owns:
Tracking Jeremy Grantham's GMO Capital Portfolio - Q4 2020 Update

Please pay attention to the accuracy of their reporting in this notice (which covered only December 2020). They write:
"The Fund will send you a Form 1099-DIV in early 2022 for the 2021 calendar year that will tell you how to report these distributions."

@Graust and @carew388 et al
As time allowed today, I reviewed the prospectus for FSMEX (a select fund), as well as FBALX and FPURX; more traditional mutual funds.
The Excessive Trading Policy link I posted previous and dated Sept. 2020 and the language within is not described within the full prospectus for the 3 funds in this write.
FSMEX prospectus is dated April, 2020 and both FBALX and FPURX are dated Oct. 2020.
While at the Fido site (no login required) one should search for fund "x". Once open/displayed, select the prospectus TAB; which will pull up the summary prospectus. Select the "prospectus" tab from this new window. With this open, select " Additional Information about the Purchase and Sale of Shares" found along the left edge.
There is a conflict of information about what constitutes a possible problem with round trip transactions and time frames; RELATIVE to the Sept. 2020 link I posted 2 sections back. A phone call will be needed to clarify what/which is true.
Note: We're not frequently money movers, but our transactions would be more than $10k.
Now.........how many call centers/at home staff are being overrun from having to re-route calls due to weather or volume problems?
Anyhoo, I needed to clarify what I had posted previous; as I don't want anyone to be misdirected with information. The question/thought provided a needed exercise in due diligence; and to always read a prospectus, or sections thereof.

@carew388

Fidelity Excessive Trading Policy, September, 2020
SEE/READ FOLLOWUP in next post from me, regarding the Excessive Trading Policy. I write this at 4pm, Feb. 20.

Feb 20th Episode:

Beyond Diversification: What Every Investor Needs to Know About Asset Allocation:

On October 28th, Sébastien Page and Chris Dillon discussed principles from Sébastien’s recent book, “Beyond Diversification.” Sébastien combines his 20 years of investing experience; analysis from more than 200 academic articles; insights shared from a cast of expert colleagues at T. Rowe Price; and, perhaps most importantly, practical lessons passed down by his father, a renowned finance professor.

beyond-diversification-insights-webinar-replay
Against the Wind (CNBC Interview):

Sebastien Page's Bio and Articles:
Sébastien Page, CFA, Head of Global Multi-Asset

5.25% front-load. Nope. This method sounds too complicated for ME. (I had to edit this down just a bit. Straight from the Morningstar report.)
...will close to new investors starting March 12, 2021. The fund will no longer be able to receive subscriptions from new investors from that date; however, existing investors will continue to have the ability to make additional investments or to reinvest distributions. Assets under management have swelled to $15.6 billion as of Jan. 31, 2021, following a rush of inflows in 2020. Soft-closing the fund is a prudent decision aimed at preserving the strategy’s ability to effectively execute options trading, and further reinforces its Morningstar Analyst Rating of Silver for the cheapest share classes.
Attractive fees, a transparent and consistent process, and an experienced manager elevate JPMorgan Hedged Equity ahead of its peers... Morningstar Analyst Rating of Silver.
...aims to provide smoother equity returns by a systematically implemented options strategy. (T)he team purchases puts 5% below the S&P 500’s value. To offset the cost of the puts, the team first sells puts 20% out-of-the-money ...to protect the fund from quarterly losses in the 5%-20% range; if markets fall less than 5%, the fund should fall in line with the market, and if the market falls more than 20%, the fund should incur the same incremental losses beyond negative 5%. The team also sells call options to generate enough option premium income to cover remaining cost of the hedges. The systematic options overlay structure has led to a dependable outcome even in the most volatile markets, such as in the first quarter of 2020, when it contained losses to less than 5%.
Hamilton Reiner is the lead manager and architect of the strategy. Reiner joined JPMorgan in 2009 and has over three decades of equity and options trading experience.
Assets have grown at a staggering rate, but the strategy should be able absorb the influx relatively easily as it uses liquid securities. In the past three years through August 2020, assets have grown from just over $1 billion to nearly $9.7 billion thanks to solid performance and low fees. Institutional and retirement share classes, in particular, are a lot cheaper than the options-based Morningstar Category average. These low fees coupled with JPMorgan’s transparent process make it an interesting option.
This fund uses a well-defined and thoughtful approach to options trading. Its transparent and repeatable process should deliver predictable results over the long term. The strategy earns an Above Average Process rating.
The strategy aims to provide a smoother ride to equity investing by purchasing 5% out-of-the-money put options and selling 20% out-of-the-money put options over a U.S. equity portfolio. This structure, called a put-spread, is designed to protect capital when markets sell off 5%-20% in a given quarter but also has a lower cost compared with outright put protection. However, since the short option position is so far out-of-the-money, management also sells a call option to cover the price of the long put position. The call options are usually sold 3.5%-5.5% out-of-the-money, depending on the amount of income needed to cover the cost of the long put, but periods of heightened volatility can move that target higher. The level at which the call strikes are written will determine the strategy’s upside cap for the quarter.
The team intends to generate a small level of alpha in the equity portfolio by slightly overweighting attractively priced stocks and slightly underweighting expensive stocks based on fundamental analysis. Since the constitution of the equity portfolio closely replicates the S&P 500, the use of the index options is not problematic from a hedging perspective.
The core long equity portfolio should track the S&P 500 closely as it constrains tracking error to 1.5% annually. It aims to outperform that index by tweaking the individual stock exposure within a 1-percentage-point range using a dividend discount model that ranks stocks from most attractive to least attractive based on forecast earnings and company-specific growth catalysts. The team creates a well-diversified portfolio that mitigates risk associated with individual holdings, with the resulting portfolio holding around 200 stocks. Sector weightings resemble the S&P 500 with modest underweightings in real estate and consumer staples and a small overweighting in consumer discretionary.
The team constructs a zero-cost option overlay at the beginning of each calendar quarter and resets it at the end of the quarter. Call premiums received should improve with persistently high market volatility and higher interest rates, thus improving the strategy’s upside in such a market environment. This was the case at the beginning of 2020’s second quarter when the call options had a strike price closer to 7% out-of-the-money following a period of extremely high volatility. However, in periods of serious market stress (such as Black Monday in 1987, where the S&P 500 dropped 23% in a single day), the short out-of-the-money put leg of the spread may expose the fund to additional losses.
An experienced and dedicated manager and access to JPMorgan’s ample resources earn this strategy an Above Average People rating.
The core team tasked with managing this strategy is small, but concerns about its size are assuaged by the options overlay’s systematic implementation and access to a strong support team. Lead portfolio manager and strategy architect Hamilton Reiner joined the firm in 2009 and has extensive experience trading derivatives, with a career dating back more than three decades. Prior to joining JPMorgan, Reiner held senior positions at Barclays Capital, Lehman Brothers, and Deutsche Bank, and he spent the first 10 years of his career at O’Connor and Associates, an options specialist firm. It was announced last year that Reiner would be responsible for leading JPMorgan’s U.S. structured equity team, although this new responsibility should not interfere with his portfolio management duties on the option-based strategies. Raffaele Zingone, the other named portfolio manager, joined the firm in 1991 and is responsible for the equity portfolio implementation. He directs JPMorgan's deep bench of 26 equity analysts, who average 20 years of industry experience.
Reiner has more than $1 million invested alongside investors, signaling a strong alignment of interest between management and shareholders. Zingone has between $500,000 and $1 million invested in the fund.
Parent |
Above Average Jun 2, 2020
J.P. Morgan Asset Management’s strong investment culture, which shows through its long-tenured, well-aligned portfolio managers and deep analytical resources, supports a renewed Above Average Parent rating.
Across asset classes and regions, the firm's diverse lineup features many Morningstar Medalists, such as its highly regarded U.S. equity income strategy that’s available globally. There's been some turnover in the multi-asset team recently, but it remains deeply resourced and experienced. Manager retention and tenure rates, and degree of alignment for U.S. mutual funds compare favorably among the competition. Managers' compensation emphasizes fund ownership over stock ownership, which is distinctive for a public company.
The firm continues to streamline its lineup and integrate its resources further. For instance, in late 2019, the multi-asset solutions division combined with the passive capabilities. The firm hasn’t launched trendy offerings as it’s mostly expanded its passive business lately, but acquisition-related redundancies and more hazardous launches in the past weigh on its success ratio, which measures the percentage of funds that have both survived and outperformed peers. Fees are regularly reviewed downward globally; they're relatively cheaper in the U.S. than abroad. Also, the firm is building its ESG capabilities and supports distinctive initiatives on diversity.
Performance
This strategy has consistently met performance expectations.
Since its December 2013 inception, the strategy has returned 7.8% annualized through August 2020, beating the options-based category average by nearly 4.7 percentage points annualized. It has also outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis. Its Sharpe ratio of 1.0 since January 2014 trounces the category average of 0.3.
The options overlay is designed to protect capital when the S&P 500 drops 5%-20% in a given quarter. This means investors will be exposed to losses if the S&P 500 loses less than 5% in a three-month period. However, this hasn’t stopped the strategy from achieving its goal of lower volatility relative to the S&P 500. Since December 2013, it has had a 6.7% monthly standard deviation compared with the S&P 500's 13.8%. Moreover, the maximum drawdown (based on monthly data) has been limited to negative 7.9% relative to the S&P 500’s negative 19.6%.
Investors should note that the intraquarter experience will vary given that option pricing is dynamic until expiration. Options’ values are marked to market daily, which often results in intraquarter deviations from the quarter-end return. For example, the strategy was down nearly 19% at one point in the first quarter of 2020 but ended the period down 4.9%.
Price
It’s critical to evaluate expenses, as they come directly out of returns. The share class on this report levies a fee that ranks in its Morningstar category’s second-cheapest quintile. Based on our assessment of the fund’s People, Process and Parent pillars in the context of these fees, we think this share class will be able to deliver positive alpha relative to the category benchmark index, explaining its Morningstar Analyst Rating of Bronze.

Hi all... not trying to spam the thread - I think Telehealth will continue to grow and be extremely important to the Health Sector. My thinking has nothing to do with Covid - its what the Millennial/Gen Z expect: Convenience! So, I found this story on Mutual Funds with Telehealth. Note: Its from April 2020. Guess which fund is mentioned? (answer below)
https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/3-funds-to-gain-from-rising-trends-in-telehealth-2020-04-14
FSMEX

I just received the 19a for IOFIX showing the estimated FY-2020 source of distributions to consist of 50% ROC. As others have mentioned however these are not the final figures.
From the 19a notice:
"Not Tax Reporting. The amounts and sources of distributions reported in this notice are only estimates in order to comply with SEC regulations and are not being provided for tax reporting purposes. The actual amounts and sources of the amounts for tax reporting purposes will depend upon each Fund’s investment experience during the remainder of its fiscal year and may be subject to changes based on tax regulations. The Fund will send you a Form 1099-DIV in early 2022 for the 2021 calendar year that will tell you how to report these distributions for federal income tax purposes (e.g., ordinary income, long-term capital gain or return of capital)."

I just called to Fidelity, they discussed it with tax people without connecting me to them, and the reply was that I should wait for the final version of 1099 and if there is any issue I should contact IOFIX directly. So I will wait.
I have 19(a) forms from March to November 2020 as pdf files. Note that the forms 19(a) are not personal, my name is not present on them, they are addressed to ALL shareholders. However, I am not sure that one can use them for filing tax returns since each of them says that this is just AN ESTIMATE, not for tax reporting. Each form that I have says that approximately half of the distribution is ROC, the March form is special, it says that 100% of it is ROC. This is very different from what I see on my preliminary 1099; let us hope that this issue will be clarified.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/923184/000119312521047245/d136720d497.htm
497 1 d136720d497.htm 497
MATTHEWS ASIA FUNDS
Supplement dated February 18, 2021
to Prospectus dated April 29, 2020, as supplemented
This supplement should be read in conjunction with the Prospectus dated April 29, 2020, as supplemented.
For all existing shareholders of the Matthews Emerging Asia Fund—Institutional Class (MIASX) and Investor Class (MEASX):
The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of Matthews Asia Funds (the “Trust”) has approved the tax-free reorganization (the “Reorganization”) of the Matthews Emerging Asia Fund, a series of the Trust (the “Target Fund”), into the Matthews Asia Small Companies Fund, a series of the Trust (the “Acquiring Fund”), which is expected to be renamed the Matthews Emerging Markets Small Companies Fund on or about April 30, 2021. The Reorganization does not require the approval of the shareholders of the Target Fund or the Acquiring Fund.
The Matthews Emerging Markets Small Companies Fund will, as a result of the name change, also change its investment policies so that it will invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of its net assets in the common and preferred stocks of small-capitalization companies located in emerging market countries anywhere in the world. Emerging market countries generally include every country in the world except the United States, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and most of the countries in Western Europe. These changes to the name and principal investment strategies of the Acquiring Fund are subject to possible further changes related to obtaining effectiveness of an amendment to the registration statement and revised disclosure, which is expected to occur on or about April 30, 2021.
The Reorganization was proposed because Matthews International Capital Management, LLC, the Funds’ investment adviser (“Matthews”), recognized that Asia now represents approximately 75% of the emerging markets small capitalization universe, and therefore that there is an increasing overlap between an investment strategy focused on small companies in emerging market countries and one focused on small companies in Asia. Further, Matthews believes that shareholders of each Fund will benefit more from exposure to a broader investment universe as well as from potential operating efficiencies and economies of scale that may be achieved by combining the Funds’ assets in the Reorganization, than by continuing to operate the Funds separately. Matthews also believes that the Acquiring Fund’s investment objective and strategies make it a compatible fund within the Trust for a reorganization with the Target Fund. The Target Fund and the Acquiring Fund have the same investment objective and similar investment strategies, policies, risks and restrictions.
To effectuate the Reorganization, the Target Fund will transfer all of its assets to the Acquiring Fund, and the Acquiring Fund will assume all of the liabilities of the Target Fund. On the date of the closing of the Reorganization, shareholders of the Target Fund will receive Institutional Class or Investor Class shares, as applicable, of the Acquiring Fund equal in aggregate net asset value to the value of their shares of the Target Fund, in exchange for their shares of the Target Fund. The Reorganization is expected to be effective on or about April 29, 2021.
Effective after the close of business on April 16, 2021, shares of the Target Fund will no longer be offered to new or existing shareholders, and shareholders holding shares of any other series of the Trust will not be able to exchange their shares for shares of the Target Fund.
Effective on or about April 30, 2021, in connection with the name change of the Acquiring Fund, Robert Harvey, CFA, who is currently a Lead Manager of the Target Fund, will become a Co-Manager of the Acquiring Fund. Vivek Tanneeru, who has been Lead Manager of the Acquiring Fund since August 2020, will remain as Lead Manager of the Acquiring Fund. In addition, Jeremy Sutch, CFA, who has been a Senior Research Analyst at Matthews since 2015 and has supported the firm’s India and Pacific Tiger strategies, will become a Co-Manager of the Acquiring Fund.
If you do not want to participate in the Reorganization, you may redeem your shares of the Target Fund in the ordinary course until the last business day before the Reorganization is effective. Redemption requests received after that time will be treated as redemption requests for shares of the Acquiring Fund received in connection with the Reorganization.
Please keep this Supplement with your Prospectus.
From Matthews' website (check the footnotes) on the page:
https://us.matthewsasia.com/resources/docs/fund-documents/

I read that too, but Apple remains the largest holding in Berkshire Hathaway.
Look like he is taking profit from Apple and rotating into other value stocks. Trimming long held positions in Wells Fargo and JP Morgan indicates he is more flexible than in the past. Perhaps this came from his money managers. Selling all leisure/airline stocks is a good call and some of them are trending downward from the low of March 2020. His managers are very savvy investors.

I hold some IOFAX at Schwab and since the disastrous fall in the share price last year, I have received an email referring me to the monthly AC details on the distributions, with the ROC clearly identified. Unfortunately I have not archived or saved those emails, so I’m not sure how I’m going to access the information when I do my taxes. Given what others are saying here it may be my job to track down the ROC monthly figures and plug them into TurboTax. I’ll need the ROC info for 2021 taxes because I’m selling down my position now, but I had no sales in 2020.

Hi, guys.
I wanted to follow up with the GP folks before sharing anything. Exchanged notes with their president yesterday, and we've just sent this note to the folks on MFO's mailing list. I wanted to share if with you against the prospect that any of it is interesting to you.
David
- - - - -
On February 12, Grandeur Peak announced their intention to institute a "hard close" for four funds and a soft close on one fund. A hard close is one that stops additional purchases by both new and existing shareholders; a soft close stops new investors from opening accounts. The funds affected are:
Hard closed: Global Opportunities, International Opportunities, International Stalwarts and Global Micro Cap.
Soft closed: Emerging Markets Opportunities.
Each of the affected funds returned between 30-50% in 2020; Global Micro Cap and Emerging Markets have already posted double-digit returns for 2021. The hard closed funds all have four star ratings from Morningstar and are MFO Honor Roll funds; in addition, International Stalwarts is an MFO Great Owl which signals consistently first-tier risk-adjusted returns.
The public explanation was "we carefully review capacity at both the strategy and firm level. We are committed to keeping our investment strategies nimble to fully pursue their investment objectives without being encumbered by their individual asset base or the firm’s collective assets."
I asked president Eric Huefner to talk a bit about the necessity to close a $60 million fund and the oddity of hard-closing one of their least capacity-constrained funds. He noted that Global Micro Cap closed on the day it was launched but has doubled in size in the past 12 months. That's due to modest inflows, "sticky" investors and a 50% return in 2020. Grandeur's goal is "total investment flexibility in the micro-cap arena"
The Stalwarts funds were created, primarily, to serve the needs of investment advisors who had worked with Grandeur for years but found that Grandeur's "core" funds were now closed and, hence, inaccessible to new clients. The suite of Stalwarts funds were designed to give investors access to Grandeur's style through funds that targeted slightly larger (hence, more liquid) stocks. The hope was that those funds would not have to close as quickly as the small- and micro-cap focused core funds. I asked about what had happened to limit capacity. Mr. Huefner noted that total capacity for the Stalwarts strategy - funds + SMAs, US/global/international - was in the $5-7 billion range with International having more assets than the other two combined. "We soft closed the Int’l Stalwarts strategy in June [but] the AUM in the International Stalwarts strategy has still grown more than 40% since then. Given the continuing rapid growth, it felt necessary to close it in order to preserve space for our other Stalwarts strategies."
If you believe that the market will continue on its recent trajectory, dominated by US large tech stops, then there's nothing much you need to do. If you believe that the market might be rotating in response to a new administration, a new environment or simple exhaustion, you might anticipate international outperforming domestic, developing outperforming developed, small outperforming large. These funds are at the vanguard of investing in those style.
Possible responses to their closing:
Check your target asset allocation, whether for the individual fund or the asset class it represents. Consider whether you want to make an additional allocation now, in an admittedly pricey market, to bring your investment in line with your target.
In my case, Global Micro Cap is my third-largest holding and represents 15% of my portfolio. As much as I'm delighted by its performance - 18% annually since launch - it would be hard for me to justify allocating more there now.
Consider alternative GP funds as options. The young Global Contrarian fund has an R-squared of 97 against Global Micro Cap. Both have substantial micro cap exposure (about 40%) with Contrarian's stocks being a bit larger and noticeably lower priced than Micro Caps.
Similarly, Global Stalwarts has a correlation to International Stalwarts of 98 and a nearly identical Sharpe ratio, annual return and maximum drawdown. Global is about 55% international.
Consider Rondure, Wasatch and Seven Canyons funds as options. All four families are driven by Wasatch alumni. While they have very distinctive perspectives and strengths, all have a shared perspective on global small- and micro-cap investing and a respect for their investors as partners. By way of example, Rondure New World (four star, $250 million) has an R-squared of 95 against Emerging Markets Opportunities and Wasatch EM Small Cap (four star, $520 million) has an R-squared of 93. These are all very solid advisors with investor-centered cultures and strong records, though not identical strategies. Between them, 11 of their 24 eligible funds (those with records of three years or more) have earned an MFO Great Owl designation.

Here's a bit of additional information excerpted from a recent article in the WSJ:

The billionaire Warren Buffett added two more big, American brands to Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s investment portfolio.
Mr. Buffett’s conglomerate has purchased $8.6 billion in stock in Verizon Communications Inc., the largest U.S. mobile carrier, and $4.1 billion in Chevron Corp. according to a snapshot of investments held in the quarter ended Dec. 31.
In 2020, Chevron had its worst year since 2016, and Verizon’s fourth-quarter profit fell after it booked higher costs and gained fewer new customers than usual.
It isn’t clear whether Mr. Buffett made the decision to invest in the two firms or if the decision was made by Berkshire money managers Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. The two are expected to take over all of Berkshire’s investments once Mr. Buffett is no longer in the top job.
Berkshire adjusted some of its drugmaker investments bets. The conglomerate sold off its $136 million investment in the Covid-19 vaccine maker Pfizer Inc., while increasing stakes in the pharmaceutical brands AbbVie Inc., Merck & Co. and Bristol Myers Squibb Co.
It also continued to cut back from financial firms, selling off its remaining $93 million investment in JPMorgan Chase & Co., and whittling away at its stake in Wells Fargo & Co. by $1.4 billion.
Last year Berkshire Hathaway sold stakes in airlines, including United Airlines Holdings Inc., American Airlines Group Inc., Delta Air Lines Inc. and Southwest Airlines Co. Mr. Buffett said he thought consumer behavior regarding travel had changed for the long term.

Additionally, I believe that in the past few days I read an article reporting that Berkshire had significantly cut back it's investments in Apple, but I'm unable to locate that source at this time.

House hearing marks first time major figures have all been forced to publicly reckon with trading saga
Following are edited excerpts from a current article in The Guardian:

Frenzied trading in the shares of GameStop and other companies will be the subject of what is expected to be a fiery hearing in Congress on Thursday, when US politicians get their first chance to quiz executives from the trading app Robinhood, Reddit and other players in the saga.
The House financial services committee will hold a hearing at noon in a first step to untangling the furore surrounding trading in GameStop, AMC cinemas and other companies whose share values soared to astronomical levels as small investors piled into the stocks.
Shares in GameStop, a troubled video games chain store, soared 1,600% in January, as an army of small investors, many using the trading app Robinhood, appeared to have bet that Wall Street hedge funds had overplayed their hand when betting the stock price would collapse – a practice known as short-selling. Spurred on by meme-toting members of the Reddit forum WallStreetBets, investors kept buying the shares, driving up the price and triggering huge losses for some hedge funds.
Robinhood briefly suspended trading in GameStop and other hot stocks at the end of January and sparked allegations that the hedge funds and others may have pushed Robinhood and other trading platforms to stop the rout.
Among those testifying are: Robinhood’s CEO, Vlad Tenev, Reddit’s CEO, Steve Huffman, Gabe Plotkin, founder of the Melvin Capital Management hedge fund (which was forced into a rescue after retail traders crushed its bets against GameStop), Ken Griffin, billionaire CEO of Citadel, an investment firm that executes Robinhood clients’ trades and also helped to bail out Melvin, and Keith Gill, a trader variously known online as "Roaring Kitty" and "DeepFuckingValue" and a longtime GameStop booster.
The associate director for economic policy at the Center for American Progress, said: “The GameStop drama raised quite a few public policy questions but first it’s important for members of Congress to understand how events played out.”
More broadly, he said, GameStop had highlighted many crucial issues for regulators, including the role and regulation of hedge funds, whether or how Wall Street is using social media to drive investment strategy, the “gamification” of investing by trading apps and the economic incentives at play for the trading platforms.
“What would have happened if Robinhood had failed? What would have been the knock-on effects for financial markets?” he asked. “These are huge investor protection questions.
The hearing will not be the last inquiry that the executives at the center of the controversy will face. Federal prosecutors have begun an investigation, according to the Wall Street Journal, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, the US’s top financial watchdog, is reportedly combing through social media posts for signs of potential fraud.
In the meantime, evidence has emerged that small investors were not the largest buyers of GameStop and other hot companies. According to an analysis by JP Morgan, institutional investors may have been behind much of the dramatic rise in the share price: “Although retail buying was portrayed as the main driver of the extreme price rally experienced by some stocks, the actual picture may be much more nuanced”.

For those of you who like to study information like this. I found it a bit of a surprise that their top three holdings are at ~63% of the entire portfolio although Mr. Buffett has often mused that diversification is for wimps.
Portfolio end of quarter 4, 2020

I did receive my 1099 concerning IOFIX; my shares are held with the transfer agent; not a brokerage.
We receive a Form 2439 (Notice to Shareholder of Undistributed Long-Term Capital Gains) for the same company; one is from the transfer agent and the other one is from the brokerage. Form 2439 from the transfer agent is generally received weeks ahead of the one from the brokerage.