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Will the "all seeing" POTUS get push-back ???

edited April 2018 in Off-Topic
1. I will totally assume, as I don't have access to congressional email; that "x" number of folks have contacted their reps/senators with an "expletive" type email as to the impact upon the agri sector of the U.S., let alone whatever else from the tariff plan. Agriculture has already been noted here (several weeks ago) as an impact area when the first tariff chit-chat began.

The POTUS and his "shall we play" policy(s) for the U.S. economy, is not the same as a casino bankruptcy in a New Jersey community, by a private company.

2. I do not dismiss that problems may exist within trade policy on a global scale. This is not new and should be an ongoing discovery. But, the methodology to attain some form of balance is critical, too.

3. The current (March 4) impact upon global equity continues to be "interesting". Where is the money from equity sales traveling? Over the past several weeks, a normal path for equity sales monies during a risk off would have traveled to Treasury stuff. Not the case. Very little in the price movement to the upside in this investment grade area.
A wild guess could be some monies going to the "cash" holdings tank, eh?

4. Forward equity directions......don't know; but will do the presume function. Most of the tariff start period will become "dust in the wind"; especially, if there is a valid push-back from congress. Sadly, a U.S. president may do as they choose regarding tariff policy. Fair, rigged or other; I'm having a problem discovering a "pure win" for the U.S. having a trade war with China.
Got to believe that the big money houses have assumed a "this shall pass" forward view.

Got to do coffee number 2, the big cup!

Hey, offer some guidance with all of this, please; as to whether I will need to eat my electronic words here.



  • Pushback? Sure, from Napa (28%/64%) and Sonoma (22%/69%) wineries.
  • That was a pretty long winded way of saying "comparative advantage".
  • edited April 2018
    make market inefficiencies great again ...
  • >> longwinded

    because attempting to drill down a bit into costs and other consequences

    (I am however somewhat used to reading, sometimes editing, this length of wind: )
  • @davidrmoran
    I read the CFIUS document among the others listed. I have Google Alerts set for "chinese investments in the U.S." as well as "China silk road initiative".
    Lots of stuff going on all of the time, eh?
    The gentleman in the link is related to you; yes?
  • edited April 2018
    yeah, older bro :)

    been editing him for decades, though like the good writers here he needs little from me (except trying to understand the subtleties)

    His other articles, some of them, are rather more interesting in that regard, and in addition to being a prof and some sort of director at Gtown he does trade and econ development consulting to EM countries and China.

    PIIE is quite the outfit and does really interesting and clear-enough work.
  • edited April 2018
    Deeper contexts for comparative advantage ramifications and negations, in the context of the present state of play, from Larry Summers in FT. Also how the dopiness and ignorance by current admin make it all muddier.

    Donald Trump trade threats lack credibility

    US bluster has caused most of the world to rally to China’s side

    As the possibility of a trade war between the US and China looms, threats and counterthreats are hurled back and forth and markets gyrate, economic logic and truth appear to be an early casualty. There are certain points of fact on which there should be no disagreement.

    First, globalization and trade have caused significant disruption to the US economy but this has had little to do with trade agreements of the last generation. It is now clear that increased imports especially from China have inflicted substantial burdens on manufacturing workers, particularly in the the north central part of the country. Where too much conventional analysis goes wrong is in attributing this to trade agreements and in failing to recognize offsetting job gains from exports.

    The reality is that the US economy was largely open by the 1980s and that every major trade agreement has reduced other nations’ trade barriers by far more than it altered any American trade barriers. This is most true of China’s 2001 accession to the WTO, in which the US committed only to continuing to keep its markets open on the most favorable nation terms that had already been ratified each year for more than a decade but won major changes in Chinese economic policy.

    The real reason for economic disruption was not trade agreements but the emergence of emerging markets as major participants in the global economy. This is not something the US could stop or, given its export interests and broader interests in global cooperation, could plausibly aspire to contain.

    Second, much of President Trump’s rhetoric notwithstanding, it is wrong to say nothing has been achieved through negotiation with China. Only a few years ago, China’s current account surplus was the largest relative to GDP among significant countries, it was holding its currency down to maintain demand for its exports, and most software used on its personal computers and videos on sale in its major cities were pirated.

    Today China’s global surpluses are far below past US negotiating targets of a few years ago, China has spent about $1tn propping up its currency, and IP protections are far better-enforced than a few years ago for major US software and video producers. Of course major issues remain but the view that multilateral pressure without bluster is ineffective is belied by experience.

    Third, extraction of IP through joint venture requirements is largely a problem for companies outsourcing production from the US and not for American workers. Corporations headquartered in the US often complain bitterly that if they wish to enter the Chinese market they must enter into joint ventures with Chinese counterparts who demand transfer of intellectual property and then operate on their own.
    These complaints are often accurate. Notice, however, that they typically involve cases where the company in question produces for China in China and so have little impact on US employment. In many cases a substantial number of the company’s shareholders are foreign and it pays taxes to many governments. It is more than a little ironic that an administration that condemns outsourcing should make standing up for those who move production to China so central a priority.

    Fourth, bilateral trade bluster is not an effective strategy for the US. While most countries feel somewhat threatened by Chinese trade and business practices, it has been the unfortunate accomplishment of US trade policy in recent months to cause most of the world to rally to China’s side because of our disregard for the WTO and the global system.

    Not only does having many others on its side make it easier for China to resist the US, it also undercuts the effectiveness of our sanctions. China can still export to other markets and US producers who use Chinese inputs lose competitiveness when only they are forced to pay tariffs. History is clear that moments of high trade truculence like that pursued against Japan in the early 1990s accomplished very little while imposing substantial costs.

    Fifth, threats have to be credible to be effective. In recent weeks, every time the US has pushed its strategy, markets have had mini-collapses, and every time it has appeared to pull back, markets have rallied. How in such a world can it seem credible that the US will actually carry through on its threats? And without credibility, why should one expect strong responses from China? I returned from a recent meeting with senior Chinese officials with the clear sense that they are more bemused than alarmed by what they see as a boomeranging US approach.

    The US can do much better for itself and for the global economy, but that is the subject for a subsequent column.
  • "It is more than a little ironic that an administration that condemns outsourcing should make standing up for those who move production to China so central a priority."

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