The problem with the 4% rule is that what sticks in most people mind is the 4% and not the 50% equity allocation it is based on. Lots of retirees, myself included, do not allocate 50% to stocks and as my 4th year of retirement grinds to an end I have not regrets that I don’t qualify for the 4% plan. Just my opinion.

@Baseball_Fan -
What is your advice for a 25 year old working individual who has a 401-K tax deferred option available at work and who does not expect to need to withdraw any funds for at least 40 years and who likely will not need all the funds for at least 50 years, assuming you would not advise investing a large portion, if any, in equities?
Where are you going with the lengthy diatribe directed towards equities? Would you advise such an individual to invest his or her retirement money instead in cash? In bonds? Divide it into cash, bonds and equities? Or to seek to time the markets? Would that all of us at 25 were so blessed with those market timing skills that we might glide easily in and out of the most “profitable” investments of the day over the next half century.
For some reference - 50 years ago the DJI was around 750. The hand held calculator hadn’t yet appeared on store shelves. Most of us watched black and white TV and the cassette player was about to replace the 8-track as state of the art music. A gallon of gas cost 25 cents. $3500 bought you an upscale sedan off a new car lot. A modest home in many areas sold for $20,000 - $25,000. Computers were the size of a room and generated immense heat - yet were less powerful than an iphone today. Your 1970s dollar’s buying power today? One shudders to think.

The fund has a soft close. Exceptions are listed in document --> https://www.invenomic.com/_files/ugd/8592d8_a1ac66bac0af4f1fa27aa3aa0577f808.pdf

Couple things to ponder re "stocks for the long run"...
article in Marketwatch, Statman, June 2017...
Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Samuelson argued that the advocacy of time-diversification is built on framing errors that mislead investors into an illusory happy ending, as if the probability of losses over the long run is zero.
To understand the nature of these framing errors, consider an investor who invests $1,000 in a portfolio with a 50–50 chance to gain 20% or lose 10% each year, as laid out in Figure 1. The investor has a 50% probability of losing money if her horizon is one year, but she has only a 25% probability of losing money if it is two years.
If risk is framed as the probability of losing money, risk declines as the horizon increases, but if risk is framed as the amount of money that can be lost, risk increases as the horizon increases. The investor might lose $100 after one year, but she might lose more, $190, after two years.

from Wishful Thinking About the Risk of Stocks in the Long Run: Bodie, March 2020
By looking at the average rate of return rather than the amount of wealth at the end of the holding period, the impression is created that risk declines with the length of one’s time horizon. The standard deviation of the average rate of return declines with the length of the time horizon because it is an average.
The problem is that, although the principle of diversification works across securities and
asset classes, it does not work over time. Even a highly diversified portfolio of stocks does not become safe in the long run. Yet here is the kind of thing customers are told on a typical website: Invest in stocks, either individually or in mutual funds, for long-term growth. While in any given year stocks can be more volatile than other investments, over time, they have typically outperformed all other types of investments while staying ahead of inflation. Stocks should be the core of a long-term investing strategy. If stocks are so great for the long run, then why don’t the same firms offering this advice offer a performance guarantee to pay at least what a customer contributes to a diversified equity portfolio adjusted for inflation? After all, the firm managing the fund is in a much better position to evaluate and manage the risk than the customer is. If the firm believes what it is saying, it ought to offer a free guarantee for its product. That’s what other industries do. Of course, option-pricing theory shows that such a guarantee is far from free.
My thoughts/questions/concerns"
If stocks are "safer" in the long run why Puts cost more, the longer the strike date is?
We as humans are not generally wired to hold thru large downdrafts...I saw many corporate types happlily retire in 06' then come crawling back begging for their old jobs in 09'...they weren't real happy, nor real motivated to say the least...
Why sit thru the downdraft? Who cares if you leave some schekels on the table getting back in
Even if I was 25 years old, I would max hold 65% stocks..first downdraft, you will sell, saw it over and over in 07', 08' with younger colleagues at work
Markets since early 70s, have seen relatively political stability, rule of law, etc...things are looking kind of squirrely now at best...who knows what will happen

@Lewis -- I would argue that ARKK also engages in a form of value investing if you broaden the definition of value as paying for something today that you expect to sell for higher tomorrow. ARKK is obviously using growth and discount rate assumptions different than what "classic" value investors do but it's all value investing the way I see it
@Balu, @Dennis -- I bought at Schwab through a grandfathered eligibility situation which might not be available to everybody. I've been watching this fund since February when I just missed buying into it before it publicly closed. Strategy is quant + fundamental as described at https://www.invenomic.com/_files/ugd/8592d8_c3a2c82a2bdd4701b77dcfdf2100a230.pdf Currently net 25% long positioning which I'm good with. Invenomic provides monthly commentary which is not common. Standpoint's Eric Crittenden provides monthly commentary too
Per portfolio visualizer inception to date performance is over 22% vs. SPY which is over 9%. 3Y performance numbers starting 10/01/2019 are 34% and 8% respectively. Any performance numbers below 3 years I don't pay much attention too but BIVIX has been on fire in 2022 YTD 30% vs. -23% for SPY

The fund is still closed to new investors.
From their website:
https://www.invenomic.com/ (See soft closed sticker)
https://www.invenomic.com/_files/ugd/8592d8_a1ac66bac0af4f1fa27aa3aa0577f808.pdf

From JohnN’s above post:
“ … long term investors absolutely need dca /buy now.”
I suppose it depends on your definition of “long term investors” - among other things.
- If 25 years or more from retirement / needing the money one might ask why they are not already 100% in good equity funds.
- If we shorten the definition to mean 7-10 years from needing the money, I’d still argue for adding some equities at today’s levels, the degree of which dependent on the individual’s risk tolerance.
- Some folks consider only 3-5 years “long term”. With that short a time horizon the prospect of adding equities at today’s (still arguably elevated) valuations becomes much dicier. I probably would, but it’s far from a done deal.
(Not intended as advice)

The fund website indicates about 150 companies each on the short and long side. That is 300 companies. They use technology to screen companies to hold in the portfolio. Is it fair to call this a long-short quant fund?
If you readily have the links, could you please direct me to info that confirms the fund strategy is long value companies and short growth companies? M* does show the fund in the value box for all years since inception.
The fund's performance since inception is good, though the fund's negative performance since June 8, 2022 gives me a pause if in a malaise whether cash is not a better option. If we are already getting closer to the bottom of the current bear market, is this the right fund to be in to spring up. I think this is a good fund but I will have to think if now is a good time to get into it, giving up cash.
With current money market fund yields in the 3-4% range, the fund should be able to cover its ER from the cash it holds (net long seems to vary 20-30%).

I remember Ken Heebner back in his heyday.
He was quite the gunslinger!
IIRC, CGMFX short-term performance was frequently either near the top or bottom of its category.
Also, I was invested in a Mutual Series fund (Beacon?) in the mid 90s when Michael Price managed it.
You're absolutely correct that manager risk is real.
I was invested in RCTIX (multisector bond fund) from late 2021 to early 2022.
I was aware of key-man risk but nevertheless invested in the fund since it was only ~4.5% of my portfolio
and the risk/reward profile was favorable.
George Jikovski, RCTIX manager since inception, left unexpectedly in March 2022.
Mr. Jikovski was in his early/mid 40s.
There wasn't a good succession plan in place.

Ken Heebner has managed CGM Realty Fund (CGMRX) since its inception in 1994 and CGM Focus Fund (CGMFX) since its 1997 inception. Both funds have above-average/high expense ratios and above-average/high risk according to M* (CGMRX may be miscategorized).
CGMFX has considerably lagged the S&P 500 for the 5 yr. and 10 yr. periods ending on 12/31/21.
CGMRX lagged the S&P U.S. REIT Index significantly for the 1 yr., 5 yr., and 10 yr. periods ending on 12/31/21.
The environment for active fund managers will continue to be challenging.
Many investors will not tolerate paying high expenses to receive lower returns when passive funds are available.

@Mona No, those two funds are very different. PQTIX is a managed futures fund that can go long or short entire securities markets—U.S. or Foreign stocks or bonds, commodities or currencies. It follows price trends in these individual markets. HSGFX is U.S. stock focused, owns individual stocks on the long side and shorts the S&P 500. It also factors stock valuations into its decision making as well as price trends. PSTIX Is just a short fund always betting against the market.

A year ago on WEALTHTRACK, in September of 2021, Research Affiliates’ Rob Arnott made two macro observations. One, he predicted there were “very high odds” of a resurgence in inflation. Two, that the multi-year outperformance of growth over value stocks was probably finally over. He dated the turn to August of 2020.
He proved prescient on the inflation call and so far seems to have gotten value’s comeback right.
Rob Arnott is Chairman of the Board and Founder of Research Affiliates, which is celebrating its 20th anniversary this year. Research Affiliates describes itself as a “research-intensive asset management firm that focuses on innovative products.”
Among the many funds that Arnott created and now co-manages is the PIMCO All Asset Fund, also celebrating its 20th anniversary this year.
In this interview, Arnott shares his outlook on inflation, value stocks, and his cheap diversifiers strategy.

M* classifies HSGFX as long-short equity, which from the portfolio, it is. He's basically short the broad market and long his specific picks. If his picks do better than the indices, like this year, it works: up ~ 15% ytd. HSAFX is for sure less volatile, but it's gone nowhere this year, and it's also not available at some brokerages, e.g., Fidelity.
But the redemption fee on top of a transaction fee limits the attractiveness of HSGFX, even in the rare year it works. IMHO, trend-following managed futures funds and inverse funds are a better deal in wipeouts like this year, and there are plenty of options in those categories (OEFs and ETFs) these days.

Are PSTIX and PQTIX similar funds to HSGFX?

And now there's this possibility. Can you begin to imagine the effects on the financial markets?
Vladimir Putin’s latest frightening gambit lies at the bottom of the ocean

"Once is happenstance, twice is coincidence... three times, it’s enemy action.” As European politicians and security agencies ponder the explosions in the Nord Stream pipelines they may find this adage of Ian Fleming’s helpful in resolving their doubts about who was responsible.
The strange thing about Putin’s assault on Ukraine was that he clearly hadn’t consulted Valery Gerasimov, the guy who in 2013 had radically reconfigured Russian military doctrine at his behest (and is now chief of the Russian armed forces). Gerasimov’s big idea was that warfare in a networked age should combine the traditional kinetic stuff with political, economic, informational, humanitarian and other non-military activities.
Putin’s invasion in February ran directly counter to this doctrine. Instead the assault was a 1940s-style blitzkrieg. And it hasn’t worked. So as he returns to the drawing board, it’s conceivable that the Russian leader has, finally, been talking to Gerasimov. If that’s the case, then their conversations will have rapidly turned to topics such as deniability, asymmetric warfare and identifying the critical weaknesses of their western adversaries.
Which in turn means that they will be thinking less about pipelines and much more about the undersea fibre-optic cables that now constitute the nervous system of our networked world. There are now about 475 of them and they carry more than 95% of all the data traffic on the global internet – $10tn money transfers and at least 15m financial transactions every day. The Telegeography site maintains a terrific up-to-date map of them all.
These cables are the critical infrastructure of the western world. They are funnelled into the sea via often poorly protected entry points on remote ocean coastlines. The cables mostly belong to a largish number of private companies, and so – up to now at least – have been largely neglected or ignored by governments.
Lying on the ocean floor, cables are obviously vulnerable to accidental damage. One industry source claims that only about 100 breaks a year are caused by fishing boats and trawlers. Until 2017 it seems that malicious attacks were rare. In that year there were two on transatlantic cables – UK to US and France to US – which were, er, under-reported at the time, but which may have been the trigger for a study written by none other than Rishi Sunak for the thinktank Policy Exchange, which concluded that the vulnerability of the undersea cable network was deeply troubling and that the danger of an attack on the system was “nothing short of existential”.
In his foreword to the report, Admiral James Stavridis, a former Nato supreme allied commander, pointed out that “Russian submarine forces have undertaken detailed monitoring and targeting activities in the vicinity of North Atlantic deep-sea cable infrastructure”. Which is interesting for two reasons. One is the conversations that are now doubtless going on in the Kremlin. The second is that Stavridis is the co-author of a fascinating thriller, 2034: A Novel of the Next World War, in which the trigger for catastrophe comes when a Russian ship severs 30 undersea cables, thereby cutting the US off from the world. I doubt that President Putin has read it. But I bet General Gerasimov has.

Preceding are abridged excerpts from an article by John Naughton in The Guardian.

M* classifies HSGFX as long-short equity, which from the portfolio, it is. He's basically short the broad market and long his specific picks. If his picks do better than the indices, like this year, it works: up ~ 15% ytd. HSAFX is for sure less volatile, but it's gone nowhere this year, and it's also not available at some brokerages, e.g., Fidelity.
But the redemption fee on top of a transaction fee limits the attractiveness of HSGFX, even in the rare year it works. IMHO, trend-following managed futures funds and inverse funds are a better deal in wipeouts like this year, and there are plenty of options in those categories (OEFs and ETFs) these days.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/60335/000092963822001509/form497.htm
497 1 form497.htm
CGM FOCUS FUND
CGM MUTUAL FUND
CGM REALTY FUND
(each, a “Fund”)
SUPPLEMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 30, 2022
TO EACH FUND’S SUMMARY PROSPECTUS, PROSPECTUS
AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
DATED MAY 1, 2022
Capital Growth Management Limited Partnership, the Funds’ investment adviser, has determined to cease operations. Accordingly, the Funds’ Board of Trustees has approved a proposal to terminate and liquidate each of the Funds.
The Funds are expected to cease operations on or about November 30, 2022 (the “Liquidation Date”). Before that date, each Fund’s assets will be liquidated at the discretion of the investment adviser and the Fund will cease to pursue its investment objective.
The Funds will be closed to new purchases as of the close of market on the date of this supplement, except for the reinvestment of dividends and distributions, if any.
Shareholders who elect to redeem their shares prior to the Liquidation Date will receive in the ordinary course redemption proceeds equal to the net asset value per share of the Fund as of the redemption date.
Shareholders who remain in a Fund until the Liquidation Date will receive promptly following the Liquidation Date a liquidation distribution equal to the net asset value of the shares of the Fund that such shareholder then holds.
The liquidation of the Funds may result in one or more taxable events for shareholders subject to federal income tax. The redemption of shares prior to the Liquidation Date will generally cause a redeeming shareholder to realize a capital gain or loss depending on the shareholder’s tax basis in the shares. Similarly, liquidation proceeds paid to a shareholder as of (or prior to) the Liquidation Date will generally give rise to capital gain or loss depending on the shareholder’s tax basis in the shares. In addition, on or prior to the Liquidation Date, a Fund may declare taxable distributions attributable to its net investment income and net short- and/or long-term capital gain (including capital gains, if any, from the liquidation of the Fund’s assets) in advance of the Fund’s regular distribution schedule. All or a portion of any such distributions may be taxable as ordinary income.
Shareholders should consult a personal tax adviser with respect to the effects of the liquidation and of any associated distributions.
Shareholders who hold their shares through an IRA should consult their tax advisers concerning the tax implications of a distribution, their eligibility to roll over a distribution and the procedures applicable to such rollovers. Caution: If you hold shares through an IRA and do not reinvest liquidation or redemption proceeds through your IRA (i.e., if you cash a check representing those proceeds or deposit or reinvest them in a different account), such proceeds may be subject to a 10% penalty and taxed as ordinary income in the year of receipt. Additional information relevant to shareholders who, to the knowledge of the Funds, hold shares through IRAs or other tax-advantaged accounts will be sent separately.
If you have any questions, please contact CGM Shareholder Services at 800-345-4048 between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. ET.
Please retain this supplement for future reference.
From CGM's website:
https://cgmfunds.com/

Shareholders might notice that this fund appears to have raised its monthly dividend by almost 20% (which sounds a lot more impressive than saying it increased from 4.6 cents to 5.5). That's what happened in September anyway. It was last raised in June; a lot has changed since then in the world of interest rates.

@crash, Thanks for the suggestion and congrats on your port’s PRWCX size. I have a lot more room in PRWCX. BRUFX $ 500m AUM is very enticing but the constant redemptions gives me a pause.

Maybe check out MAPOX:
https://www.morningstar.com/funds/xnas/mapox/quote

@crash, Thanks for the suggestion and congrats on your port’s PRWCX size. I have a lot more room in PRWCX. BRUFX $ 500m AUM is very enticing but the constant redemptions gives me a pause.