so what is the best plans? buy all these vehicles?

OREAX tops FRIFX at: 1, 5 and 10 years (per Lipper). I wasn’t touting the fund, just commenting on the asset class overall. As you might recall, I have no brokerage accounts, Just some money directly with a few houses. Actually, now that Oppenheimer has been taken over by Invesco it appears my investment options have broadened quite a bit.

@hank You commented...

I’ll say I continue to be amazed by the performance of real estate funds. Maintain a small “nibble” in OREAX - and the danged thing is up 19% YTD (20% after today) - following on the heels of several other good years. I keep expecting it to fall off a cliff - but hasn’t yet.

It looks like OREAX lost about 6% in 2018 when there was increased concern about rising interest rates. That concern has faded this year. Maybe REITS will continue to make sense as long as we remain in a low interest rate world.....

Is there a link here?

I’m curious what the reasons for the surge in money market funds might be. The return seems paltry. Over past year, money market mutual funds returned an average 1.97%. VG’s did slightly better at 2.35%. https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/profile/overview/VMMXX (Need to click on “Price & Performance”.)
Geez - Give me anything but one of these .... A night in Vegas? Online poker? Clean the attic and sell some antiques?
A couple alternatives to money market funds for folks with at least a few years time horizon and able to live with some principal fluctuation: TRBUX- one year 3.51%, DODIX - one year 8.17%

Inflated bond ratings were one cause of the financial crisis. A decade later, there is evidence they persist. In the hottest parts of the booming bond market, S&P and its competitors are giving increasingly optimistic ratings as they fight for market share.
All six main ratings firms have since 2012 changed some criteria for judging the riskiness of bonds in ways that were followed by jumps in market share, at least temporarily, a Wall Street Journal examination found. These firms compete with one another to rate the debt of borrowers, who pay for the ratings and have an incentive to pick rosier ones.
There are signs some investors are skeptical. Some bonds in markets where ratings criteria have been eased don’t trade at the high bond prices their ratings suggest they should. Investors have also shown skepticism about ratings on some corporate and government bonds.
“We don’t trust the ratings,” says Greg Michaud, director of real estate at Voya Investment Management, which holds $21 billion in commercial-real-estate debt.
The problem is particularly acute in the fast-growing market for “structured” debt—securities using pools of loans such as commercial and residential mortgages, student loans and other borrowings. The deals are carved into different slices, or “tranches,” each with varying risks and returns, which means rating firms are crucial to their creation.
The Journal analyzed about 30,000 ratings within a $3 trillion database of structured securities issued between 2008 and 2019. The Journal’s analysis suggests a key regulatory remedy to improve rating quality—promoting competition—has backfired. DBRS, Kroll and Morningstar were more likely to give higher grades than Moody’s, S&P and Fitch on the same bonds. Sometimes one firm called a security junk and another gave a triple-A rating deeming it supersafe.
Two fast-growing structured-bond sectors are commercial mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS, and collateralized loan obligations, or CLOs. CMBS fund deals for hotels, shopping malls and the like. CLOs are backed by corporate loans to risky borrowers, typically to fund buyouts.
In a May speech, Federal Reserve Chairman Jerome Powell compared CLOs to precrisis mortgage-backed debt: “Once again, we see a category of debt that is growing faster than the income of the borrowers even as lenders loosen underwriting standards.”
Behind the ratings inflation is a long-acknowledged flaw Washington didn’t fix: Entities that issue bonds—state and local governments, hotel and mall financiers, companies—also pay for their ratings. Issuers have incentive to hire the most lenient rating firm, because interest payments are lower on higher-rated bonds. Increased competition lets issuers more easily shop around for the best outcome.
Rating analysts say their firms have lost deals because they wouldn’t provide the desired ratings.
In the first half of 2015, S&P’s share of ratings in the $600 billion CLO market hit a five-year low. That fall S&P changed its methodology to make it easier for CLOs to get higher ratings. When S&P again proposed loosening its criteria this year, a group representing more than 100 professional bond investors wrote a letter to the company, reviewed by the Journal, saying the changes “will lead to a weakening of credit protection for investors at a time where we need it most.” S&P proceeded.
Moody’s ratings on riskier slices of these multi-borrower deals often weren’t as favorable as those of its competitors. By 2015, issuers “essentially stopped soliciting our ratings” on those slices, according to a January commentary from the company. In October 2015, Moody’s eased its rating methodology for single-asset CMBS deals.
In 2016 Fitch [gave] itself wider latitude to use easier rating assumptions.
Investors say ratings inflation is most evident in commercial-mortgage-backed securities, or CMBS, of which investors hold about $1.2 trillion. When rating a security higher than their three big competitors, Morningstar, Kroll and DBRS were around two rungs more generous, on average. Some ratings were a dozen or more rungs higher, potentially the difference between junk bonds and triple-A.
A group of professional investors in 2015 complained about inflated ratings to the Securities and Exchange Commission. Adam Hayden, who manages a $13 billion securities portfolio at New York Life Insurance Co.’s real-estate-investment arm, was among the investors who met with the SEC. He said inflated ratings were a risk to market stability, according to a meeting memo obtained by the Journal.
The SEC didn’t implement their recommendations.