The largest chunk by far of our investments have been in TRAIX/PRWCX for the past ~16-17 years, so the recent move to reduce some of those holdings was a bit difficult because of the emotional attachment as well as the FOMO on future equity gains. We are now roughly 50/50 equity/fixed income---still sufficient equity exposure for growth and nice dividend income from the MM/bond side. Our equity exposure had already been down the past 1 1/2 years as some money my wife inherited had been placed in fixed income rather than TRAIX/PRWCX.
Would be interested to know at what age many of you started reducing equity exposure as you neared retirement? I am 60 very soon.

@Roy,
I'm the same age as you. I started reducing my equity exposure gradually in 2020 or so.
Last year the stock market "helped" to decrease my equity allocation a bit! :-(
Portfolio on 12-31-2019
73% Stocks
22% Bonds
5% Cash
Portfolio on 06-30-2023
66.0% Stocks
19.4% Bonds (DOXIX & TIPS)
14.4% Cash (MM funds)
I periodically review Vanguard and T. Rowe Price target-date fund portfolios for reference.
Mostly, I pay attention to the overall stock/bond split. I don't attempt to replicate these target-date funds.
For example, I don't have dedicated exposure to global/foreign bonds, convertibles, or preferred stocks.
Portfolio allocations for Vanguard Target Retirement and T. Rowe Price Retirement funds are listed below.
Please note that T. Rowe Price offers three distinct target-date fund series.
VTTVX on 05-31-2023
US Stock - 32.8%
Foreign Stock - 21.7%
US Bond - 28.9%
TIPS - 4.2%
Foreign Bond - 12.4%
TRRHX on 05-31-2023
US Stock - 39.11%
Foreign Stock - 18.44%
US Bond - 25.88%
Foreign Bond - 10.45%
Cash - 5.31%
Convertibles - 0.51%
Preferred Stock - 0.25%
Other 0.05%
VTHRX on 05-31-2023
US Stock - 38.2%
Foreign Stock - 25.3%
US Bond - 25.5%
TIPS - 0.0%
Foreign Bond - 11.0%
TRRCX on 05-31-2023
US Stock - 46.16%
Foreign Stock - 21.83%
US Bond - 18.32%
Foreign Bond - 7.97%
Cash - 4.80%
Convertibles - 0.58%
Preferred Stock - 0.30%
Other 0.04%

Would be interested to know at what age many of you started reducing equity exposure as you neared retirement? I am 60 very soon.
I had been shifting to more bonds and less equities between 2020-21. Then the spam hit the fan.
I know you love PRWCX. Me, too. In spite of myself, it has grown to 39 percent of my total right now. I try to follow the "rules of thumb," but not with much effort. Those "rules" don't apply to our house in many ways.
I'm at 50 US stocks.
8 foreign stocks
35 bonds.
...The rest is "other" or cash held by the funds. Oops, I do own a few single stocks, now.
I'm 69 later this month.
Everyone's situation is different. I'm investing primarily for my primary heirs: my son and my wife---his stepmother. He is all of 30, come October. She just turned 50. And she will go back to the Philippines when I'm gone. Much cheaper to live there. We already have a new house already built on the property where she grew up. It was necessary. The old one just fell down into decay.
One of my biggest priorities is to continue to grow the portion of the portfolio that is not tax-sheltered. Just to increase the amount that is easier for her to get at without all the blessed, lovely, amazing, beautiful, fart-brained tax rules. (I know that INHERITED IRAs are a horse of a different color.)
In the meantime, I'm not adding any stocks from foreign lands. I have seen the brokerage report to me that a chunk of the dividends "were taxed and held at the source." NHYDY. I don't want to be paying foreign governments, when my portfolio can make money HERE, and because of our specific circumstances, we've owed zero tax for many years, anyhow. I'll hold onto Norsk Hydro. It's been good to me, though the share price has lately dropped. Aluminum. They even mine their own bauxite. And green energy. And they're trying trying trying to buy a Polish recycling outfit. One of the largest aluminum concerns in the world.
Bond funds: yes. I bought junk at just the wrong time. With patience, I'm seeing it rise, now. The dividends are better than the safer stuff, so I'm riding it back up. My foray into ETFs has been less than satisfactory. I choose-----against my best interest, maybe---- to stay with TRP. Their trading platform and rules can suck spooge, I've found out. ("If you're not going to let me use the "Good Till Canceled" option, you maybe perhaps ought to LET ME KNOW!!!!!.... I.T. doink-brains.) .... With a $5k minimum to trade non-TRP funds, I'll stick with the best of TRP's mediocre bond lineup. So, when I sell my ETFs, that will go into PRSNX. What I already own bond-wise (in T-IRA) is TUHYX and PRCPX.
Break a leg! My junk is performing very well. But maybe you don't want to own junk. LOTS of places have better bond funds than TRP. I hope you find them. :)

@Roy, think you are doing the right thing by reduce equity risk as you approach retirement. Five years out is not far away. Shifting more to balanced/allocation funds is another way to increase bond allocation. My high yield and bank loan funds have done well this year; YTD is about 5%. Likely these funds will have a solid year by year end. The rest of short term high quality bond funds are moving along well yielding 5%.
Watching if the market will broaden out more to smaller caps and cyclicals. If the recession strikes this year, bonds will serve as a ballast when stocks will fall.

The largest chunk by far of our investments have been in TRAIX/PRWCX for the past ~16-17 years, so the recent move to reduce some of those holdings was a bit difficult because of the emotional attachment as well as the FOMO on future equity gains. We are now roughly 50/50 equity/fixed income---still sufficient equity exposure for growth and nice dividend income from the MM/bond side. Our equity exposure had already been down the past 1 1/2 years as some money my wife inherited had been placed in fixed income rather than TRAIX/PRWCX.
Would be interested to know at what age many of you started reducing equity exposure as you neared retirement? I am 60 very soon.

@Observant1: I’m finding it’s not just the volatility of small caps, especially SCV. Good past performers BRSVX and RWJ have struggled this year, while a couple of newcomers (which I own) are doing fine. Most of you probably don’t buy new funds, even from established managers, but I have been pleased with SMOT and DSMC. The moat discipline works for domestic stocks (i.e., MOAT) and now SMOT, while the global MOTG and international MOTI don’t impress. From Distillate Capital comes DSTL with a distinguished record; DSMC is the new SMID version of that LCV fund. Their overseas version, DSTX, does OK, but trails old favorite international value FMIJX. I don’t know why value metrics that work for domestic stock managers appear not to function as well when applied to international portfolios. Probably opacity, accounting standards, less actionable information, and a reduced commitment to enhancing shareholder value make security analysis more of a challenge for international PMs. I believe the challenges are even greater when selecting small-cap international stocks.

@BenWP,
Thanks for the compliment! Here is a news release from Tekla.
https://www.teklacap.com/news/tekla-capital-management-llc-announces-proposed-transaction.
Here is an excerpt from that article:
...Following the proposed transaction, the Funds will continue to be managed in accordance with their existing investment objectives and strategies, by the same team of Boston-based investment professionals pursuing the same investment philosophy and employing the same investment process that has served the Funds well through the years...
Not sure whether this helps, but it does state that it will continue to be managed by the same team of professionals.
Any changes may occur once the reorganization is complete.

@TheShadow knows everything about fund changes! The old Hambrecht and Quist (until 1999), and then the Tekla is Capital Management healthcare CEFs have been acquired by a bigger closed-end operation, the former Aberdeen, now known as the vowel-less mouthful, abdrn. (Is this name progress?) I was a fan of HQL, until ETFs made it much easier to do sector investing. HQL and HQH, like many beleaguered CEFs, had to adopt a generous distribution policy to offset the persistent discounts. As a result, these sector funds became something much more akin to equity-income funds. Volatility remained a problem, however.
I'm curious to know if the lynchpin of TCM, Daniel Olmstead, who started his career at Merck while doing his PhD, is motoring on into retirement or if a more unpleasant departure is in store. OTOH, maybe the buyout has terms favorable to current management. This post is pure wonk, if anyone has read this far…

TIPS should perform well during periods where inflation is higher than expected.
Breakeven rates can be used to compare TIPS to nominal Treasuries of the same term.
There was a 5-year TIPS auction on 06/22/2023.
From David Enna on Tipswatch.com:
"At the auction’s close at 1 p.m. EDT, a 5-year Treasury note was trading with a nominal yield of 4.03%,
creating an inflation breakeven rate of 2.2% for this TIPS.
That is the lowest auctioned breakeven rate for this term since an auction in December 2020.
Although 2.2% is a relatively 'highish' breakeven rate by historical standards,
it seems quite reasonable at a time when U.S. inflation is running at 4.0%.
In indicates that this TIPS is cheaply priced versus the nominal Treasury of the same term."

There were substantial TIPS ETF inflows from May 2020 through December 2021.
Like many other bond funds, moderate and high duration TIPS ETFs experienced large declines in 2022.
For example, 2022 returns for TIP, SCHP, and LTPZ were -12.24%, -12.02%, and -31.68% respectively.
It's not surprising that investors were disappointed with TIPS performance last year when inflation was high.
"Nearly $17 billion has exited from Treasury-inflation securities ETFs over 10 consecutive months of outflows, an unprecedented streak in data going back to 2016, Bloomberg Intelligence data show."
"That rush to the exits follows a bruising stretch of underperformance for the asset designed to protect against inflation. While TIPS weather against price erosion, real yields — which strip out the impact of inflation — have soared over the past year, shredding returns even as price pressures remain stubbornly high. That’s soured the appetite of investors who piled into TIP and similar ETFs to curb inflation."
"The distaste for TIPS-tracking ETFs contrasts with reignited demand for the securities in the primary market. Investors snatched up about 96% of the $19 billion in Treasury Inflation Protected Securities auctioned last week, leaving less than 4% to firms authorized as primary dealers."
Link
(Bloomberg subscription may be required)

Stress tests
If you are a risk manager at a big bank, you might want to run some stress tests examining how your bank will perform under stressful scenarios. If you are creative and good at your job, you will have fun thinking up the scenarios. You will get in a room with some of your subordinates, and ideally with some front-line traders and managers, and brainstorm bad stuff that might happen.
Your brainstorming might include some history: “What if 2008 happens again?” “What if 1929 happens again?” “What if LTCM happens again?” It might include some simple numerical questions: “What if the S&P falls by 20%?” “What if the Fed raises rates to 7%?” “What if the Fed lowers rates to 0%?” You might think about social and geopolitical and technological questions and try to translate them into economic scenarios: “What if nobody goes back to the office and office rents fall 50%?” “What if artificial intelligence causes mass unemployment?” “What if Russia’s war in Ukraine keeps pushing up oil prices?” You might think about scenarios specific to your bank’s operations: “What if our CEO gets run over by a bus?” “What if our CEO steals the corporate treasury?”
Have fun, go nuts, be creative. Think of lots of scenarios. Then model how those scenarios will translate into market prices, how they will affect your funding costs and the cash flows from your assets. Then model how much capital and liquidity you will have in each scenario. Part of the goal here is to make sure that you will have plenty of capital and liquidity in a wide range of stressful scenarios. Part of the goal is to figure out which scenarios will be worse for you, so you can know what to worry about and hedge: If your model tells you that you’ll be fine if the Fed raises rates and bankrupt if it lowers rates, maybe you should do something about that.
If there is some specific event that you are worried about — some new worry that crops up — you might sit down and design a stress test for that event to make sure that you’d survive it. But your overall approach to stress testing will be something like “let’s constantly think of new things to worry about, and test for those.” It will not be “let me think of the one biggest thing to worry about, and test only for that.” Lots of things can go wrong in different directions! If you only worry about one thing, you will miss the other things.
Also separately the Federal Reserve conducts annual stress tests for big US banks, but those are … different. The Fed’s stress tests were created after the 2008 crisis, basically to shore up confidence in the banks so that they could raise capital. The Fed is in the business of supervising big banks, and as part of that business it prods the banks to consider various risks, to prepare for different scenarios, to build a robust culture of stress testing and risk management. But the Fed’s official stress tests are a public exercise designed to make sure — and tell everyone — that the banking system could survive another 2008.
And so each year the Fed sits down and thinks something like “what is the most plausible way for 2008 to happen this year,” and then it writes one stress-test scenario[1] that is basically “there’s a recession and real estate prices collapse,” and the banks run their models to see how much money they would lose in that scenario, and generally the answer is “a certain amount, but not enough to leave us undercapitalized,” and the banks pass the stress tests.
This became slightly awkward in 2020 when the stress-test scenario involved the US unemployment rate peaking at 10%, while the actual stress of Covid-19 caused unemployment to peak at 14.7%. If you ask questions like “can banks survive another 2008,” you will not quite get an answer to the question “can banks survive a global pandemic?” The answer to that question, however, turned out to be yes: For a combination of reasons (supportive government policy and Fed lending, but also profiting on volatility), the big banks did pretty well in Covid.
It also became slightly awkward this year when the Fed released its stress-test scenario in February, and it went like this:

The severely adverse scenario is characterized by a severe global recession accompanied by a period of heightened stress in both commercial and residential real estate markets, as well as in corporate debt markets. The U.S. unemployment rate rises nearly 6½ percentage points from the starting point of the scenario in the fourth quarter of 2022 to its peak of 10 percent in the third quarter of 2024. The sharp decline in economic activity is also accompanied by an increase in market volatility, widening corporate bond spreads, and a collapse in asset prices, including a 38 percent decline in house prices and a 40 percent decline in commercial real estate prices. …
The rising unemployment rate and the rapid decline in aggregate demand for goods and services significantly reduce inflationary pressures. …
Short-term interest rates, as measured by the 3-month Treasury rate, fall significantly to near zero by the third quarter of 2023 and remain there for the remainder of the scenario. Long-term interest rates, as measured by the 10-year Treasury yield, fall by nearly 3¼ percentage points by the second quarter of 2023, and then gradually rise in late 2023 to about 1½ percent by the end of the scenario.

Fine, right, recession, real-estate collapse, corporate credit blows out, rates go to zero, the 2008 of 2023. But then in March a couple of US banks failed, and many others came under a lot of stress, for exactly the opposite reason: Inflation was persistently high, interest rates went up, and those banks had to pay more on deposits even as their holdings of Treasury bonds lost value. Silicon Valley Bank was not subject to the Fed’s stress tests, as a mid-sized bank, but if it had been it would have done great! It did not do great in real life.
Anyway yesterday the 23 big banks subject to the stress tests all passed. Here are the Fed’s press release and the full results. One of the banks that passed is the US arm of Credit Suisse Group AG, which survived the Fed’s hypothetical stress scenario just fine but which vanished due to the stress of real life. From the Fed’s press release:

"Today's results confirm that the banking system remains strong and resilient," Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr said. "At the same time, this stress test is only one way to measure that strength. We should remain humble about how risks can arise and continue our work to ensure that banks are resilient to a range of economic scenarios, market shocks, and other stresses."

Yes.
Now, this year’s stress test did include another scenario for the eight biggest banks, which (1) is different from the regular stress test and (2) is closer to what actually happened:

In February 2023, for the first time, the Federal Reserve published an additional, exploratory market shock component that applied only to U.S. G-SIBs. The purpose of the stress test is to understand a firm’s resilience to a range of severe but plausible events, and the exploratory component furthers that purpose by posing a different set of risks than is probed by this year’s global market shock component.
In contrast to this year’s global market shock component, which was characterized by a severe recession with fading inflation expectations, the exploratory market shock is characterized by a less severe recession with greater inflationary pressures induced by higher inflation expectations, increases in interest rates, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and increases in commodity prices.

This scenario doesn’t count for bank capital requirements — “Consistent with the nature of an exploratory exercise, the exploratory market shock will not contribute to the capital requirements set by this year’s stress test” — but it is intellectually interesting. Broadly speaking the big banks did a little better in this scenario than in the severe-recession scenario.
But also, in real life, the big banks did fine in the scenario that actually happened (except Credit Suisse!): The problems at US regional banks seem to have driven deposits into the biggest banks, as depositors got nervous about small banks and fled to the safety of big banks. (Look how safe they are, they keep passing the stress tests.) The actual world of 2023 was different from the hypothetical world of the stress tests, and in some ways more stressful for the US banking system, but it worked out fine for the biggest banks.
A general feature of the Fed’s stress tests is that, when the Fed serves up a “severely adverse” stress scenario to the banks, the banks go off and model the effect it would have on their business, and if they come back to the Fed and say “actually this would be good for us,” the Fed gets mad at them. You’re not supposed to say that! Goldman Sachs Group notably did this in 2020, arguing that its trading business was countercyclical, and that in a stressful scenario it would simply make a ton of money trading derivatives; the Fed was not amused. But sometimes it is true! Some hypothetical scenarios would be very bad for the big banks, other hypothetical scenarios would be good for the big banks, and it’s perfectly plausible that some scenarios would be bad — for the world, for the economy, for the banking system — while also being good for the big banks. The way to manage this risk is to think about lots of scenarios and make sure the banks would survive all of them.

Real wages are still higher than they were in three out of the four years of the previous administration prior to the Covid outbreak, and it's false to say every month. They just started to rise this year:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q
Meanwhile, the 3.7% unemployment rate is close to an all-time low:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE

It's funny how 2 people look at the same numbers https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q and come up with different opinions.
The biggest wage increase since 1980 happened during Trump which reached the highest point. Covid brought it down and the current administration is far from the peak.
Here are the numbers based on the stlouisfed chart. During the Trump years: Q4/2016=349....Q2/2020=393 (that is 12.6% real wage increase in just 3.5 years). Trump finished in Q4/2020=377. There is nobody else that came close to a 12.6% real wage increase. Since 1980 the second biggest increase during any other presidency was about 5%.
The last number from Q1/2023=263 is still far from the top. This is after trillions of support and a waste of money for the next generation.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1014913/000110465923075579/tm2319682d1_497.htm
497 1 tm2319682d1_497.htm 497
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e)
Registration No. 333-07305
1940 Act File No. 811-07685
FRONTIER FUNDS, INC.
Supplement to Prospectus Dated October 31, 2022
Frontier MFG Select Infrastructure Fund
Institutional Class Shares (FMSIX)
Service Class Shares (FMSSX)
The Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Frontier Funds, Inc. (the “Company”), based upon the recommendation of Frontegra Asset Management, Inc. (“Frontegra”), has determined to liquidate the Frontier MFG Select Infrastructure Fund (the “Fund”). Frontegra is the Fund’s investment adviser and MFG Asset Management is the Fund’s subadviser. After considering a variety of factors, the Board concluded that it would be advisable and in the best interest of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be closed and liquidated as a series of the Company, effective as of the close of business on the liquidation date, August 23, 2023.
The Board approved a Plan of Liquidation that determines the manner in which the Fund will be liquidated. Pursuant to the Plan of Liquidation and in anticipation of the Fund’s liquidation, the Fund will be closed to new purchases, additional investments and incoming exchanges, except for purchases made through an automatic investment program or the reinvestment of any distributions or a purchase exception that is approved by the officers of the Company, effective after market close on June 29, 2023. After the Fund is closed to new investments, shareholders will be permitted to exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of the other available Frontier Funds or to redeem their shares of the Fund, as provided in the Fund’s prospectus, until the liquidation date. No redemption fees will be imposed by the Fund in connection with redemptions or exchanges; however, please note that your financial intermediary may charge fees in connection with redemptions or exchanges.
Prior to the August 23, 2023, liquidation date, the Fund will no longer actively pursue its stated investment objective, and MFG Asset Management will begin to liquidate the Fund’s portfolio. The Fund’s portfolio managers will likely increase the Fund’s assets held in cash and cash equivalents in order to prepare for an orderly liquidation and to meet anticipated redemption requests. As a result, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment objective, policies and strategies.
Pursuant to the Plan of Liquidation, any shareholder who has not exchanged or redeemed their shares of the Fund prior to the liquidation date of August 23, 2023, will have their shares redeemed in cash and will receive one or more payments representing the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the liquidation date, after the Fund has paid or provided for all taxes, expenses and any other liabilities, subject to any required withholdings. The automatic redemption of Fund shares on the liquidation date will generally be treated the same as any other redemption of Fund shares for tax purposes, so that shareholders (other than tax-exempt accounts) will recognize gain or loss for income tax purposes on the redemption of their Fund shares in the liquidation. In addition, the Fund and its shareholders will bear transaction costs and tax consequences associated with the disposition of the Fund’s portfolio holdings prior to the liquidation date. The Fund expects to have declared and paid a distribution or distributions, which, together with all previous such distributions, will have the effect of distributing to the Fund’s shareholders all of the Fund’s investment company taxable income and net capital gain (after reductions for any available capital loss carryforward), if any, realized in the taxable periods ending on or prior to the liquidation date. The distribution or distributions will include any additional amounts necessary to avoid federal income or excise tax. Shareholders should consult their tax adviser for further information about federal, state and local tax consequences relative to their specific situation.
Important Information for Retirement Plan Investors
If you are a retirement plan investor, you should consult your tax adviser regarding the consequences of a redemption of Fund shares. If you hold your Fund shares through a tax-deferred retirement account, you should consult with your tax adviser or account custodian to determine how you may reinvest your redemption proceeds on a tax-deferred basis. If the redeemed shares are held in a qualified retirement account such as an individual retirement account (IRA) and you have made no election regarding tax withholding, the redemption proceeds may be subject to a 10% federal income tax withholding and any applicable state required withholding. If you will receive a distribution from an IRA or a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA that is terminating as a result of the liquidation of the Fund, you must either roll the proceeds into another IRA within 60 days of the date of the distribution in order to avoid having to include the distribution in your taxable income for the year, if applicable, or request that the distribution be made directly to another IRA or eligible retirement plan. Please note you can make only one tax-free rollover of a distribution you receive from an IRA to another (or the same) IRA in any 12-month period, regardless of the number of IRAs you own. If you receive a distribution from a 403(b)(7) custodial account (tax-sheltered account) or a Keogh account, you must roll the distribution into an eligible retirement plan within 60 days in order to avoid disqualification of the plan and inclusion of the distribution in your taxable income for the year. If you are the trustee of a qualified retirement plan or the custodian of a 403(b)(7) custodial account (tax-sheltered account) or a Keogh account, you may reinvest the proceeds in any way permitted by its governing instrument.
This supplement should be retained with your Prospectus for future reference.
The date of this Supplement to the Prospectus is June 28, 2023.

According to LCORX's Fact Sheet, its investment objective is: "Capital appreciation and income while maintaining prudence in terms of managing exposure to risk. Investment guidelines are 30%-70% equity exposure and 30%-70% fixed income." What is the value in comparing it to a 100% equity fund like SPY after the longest equity bull market in history just ended? PRWCX is a fairer comparison as is VBIAX, and PRWCX has been a terrific fund.

I compared LSLTX(99+% in stocks) to SP500 and LCORX(60+% stocks) to PRWCX.
Leuthold funds have high ER and small AUM.

My “Transfer-in-Kind” request went through Monday. Took around 10 days to complete. Previous transfers (D&C to Fido) were done after first liquidating the fund. Those executed faster - in 5-7 days. Today I logged in to direct Fido to “reinvest dividends & cap gains.” Interestingly, they’d already set it that way for me. (Must have carried over from D&C.) Looks like DODBX kicked out a quarterly dividend today. So I’ll get a definitive answer to my question by week’s end. Not expecting any problem. No plans to sell any of this fund. Suspect that could lead to charges if done too early.

According to LCORX's Fact Sheet, its investment objective is: "Capital appreciation and income while maintaining prudence in terms of managing exposure to risk. Investment guidelines are 30%-70% equity exposure and 30%-70% fixed income." What is the value in comparing it to a 100% equity fund like SPY after the longest equity bull market in history just ended? PRWCX is a fairer comparison as is VBIAX, and PRWCX has been a terrific fund.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1438681/000158064223003318/alphamarksupplement.htm
497 1 alphamarksupplement.htm 497
Supplement dated June 26, 2023
to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”) of AlphaMark Fund (the “Fund”)
ALPHAMARK FUND
Ticker Symbol: AMLCX
This Supplement provides new and additional information beyond that in, and should be read in conjunction with, the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
The Board of Trustees of AlphaMark Investment Trust (the “Trust”), after notice of the Advisor’s termination of the investment advisory agreement and based on information provided by AlphaMark Advisors, LLC (the “Advisor”), has determined that it is in the best interest of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be liquidated. In connection therewith, the Board has approved a Plan of Liquidation and Dissolution (the “Plan”) for the Fund. Effective immediately, the Fund will cease to pursue its investment objective, will cease selling shares, and the Fund’s investment manager, AlphaMark Advisors, LLC, may begin liquidating the Fund’s investments.
Pursuant to the Plan, the Fund will liquidate its investments and thereafter redeem all of its outstanding shares by distribution of its assets to shareholders in amounts equal to the net asset value of each shareholder’s Fund investment after the Fund has paid or provided for all of its charges, taxes, expenses and liabilities. The Advisor anticipates that the assets of the Fund will be fully liquidated and all outstanding shares redeemed on or about July 31, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”). This date may be changed without notice to shareholders, as the liquidation of the Fund’s assets or winding up of the Fund’s affairs may take longer than expected.
Until the Liquidation Date, you may continue to freely redeem your shares, including reinvested distributions, in accordance with the section in the Prospectus entitled “How to Redeem Shares.” Unless your investment in the Fund is through a tax-deferred retirement account, a redemption is subject to tax on any taxable gains. Please refer to the “Dividends, Distributions and Taxes” sections in the Fund’s Prospectus for general information. You may wish to consult your tax advisor about your particular tax situation.
As a result of the anticipated liquidation of the Fund, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies and will no longer pursue its stated investment objective. The Fund will begin liquidating its portfolio and will hold cash and cash equivalents, such as money market funds, until all investments have been converted to cash and all shares have been redeemed. During this period, your investment in a Fund may not experience the gains (or losses) that would be typical if the Fund were still pursuing its investment objective.
Any capital gains will be distributed as soon as practicable to shareholders and reinvested in additional shares prior to distribution, unless you have previously requested payment in cash.
ANY SHAREHOLDERS WHO HAVE NOT REDEEMED THEIR SHARES OF THE FUND PRIOR TO THE LIQUIDATION DATE WILL HAVE THEIR SHARES REDEEMED AUTOMATICALLY AS OF THE CLOSE OF BUSINESS ON THE LIQUIDATION DATE. THE PROCEEDS OF ANY SUCH REDEMPTION WILL BE EQUAL TO THE NET ASSET VALUE OF SUCH SHARES AFTER THE FUND HAS PAID OR PROVIDED FOR ALL OF ITS CHARGES, TAXES, EXPENSES AND LIABILITIES. ANY LIQUIDATING DISTRIBUTION, WHICH MAY BE IN CASH OR CASH EQUIVALENTS EQUAL TO EACH RECORD SHAREHOLDER’S PROPORTIONATE INTEREST OF THE NET ASSETS OF THE FUND, DUE TO THE FUND’S SHAREHOLDERS WILL BE SENT TO THE SHAREHOLDER’S ADDRESS OF RECORD. IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS OR NEED ASSISTANCE, PLEASE CONTACT YOUR FINANCIAL ADVISOR DIRECTLY OR THE FUND AT 1-866-420-3350.
IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTORS
If you are a retirement plan investor, you should consult your tax advisor regarding the consequences of a redemption of Fund shares. If you receive a distribution from an Individual Retirement Account or a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA, you must roll the proceeds into another Individual Retirement Account within sixty (60) days of the date of the distribution in order to avoid having to include the distribution in your taxable income for the year. If you receive a distribution from a 403(b)(7) Custodian Account (Tax-Sheltered account) or a Keogh Account, you must roll the distribution into a similar type of retirement plan within sixty (60) days in order to avoid disqualification of your plan and the severe tax consequences that it can bring. If you are the trustee of a Qualified Retirement Plan, you may reinvest the money in any way permitted by the plan and trust agreement. If you have questions or need assistance, please contact your financial advisor directly or the Fund at 1-866-420-3350.
This Supplement and the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI provide relevant information for all shareholders and should be retained for future reference.

@MikeW, for LSLTX (seems the only class) Fido shows AUM range of $9.50 (2020) - $19.86 (2017) million for 2014-23; now $11.89 million.
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/view-all/527289201?type=sq-NavBar

I have great respect for Leuthold and think they may well be right in this particular case, but having been to Vanguard's offices, I can't help remembering this framed poster described here:
https://ritholtz.com/2014/02/the-best-investment-advice-youll-never-get-2/

In July 1971, the first index fund was created by McQuown and Fouse with a $6 million contribution from the Samsonite Luggage pension fund, which had been referred to Fouse by Bill Sharpe, who was already teaching at Stanford. It was Sharpe’s academic work in the 1960s that formed the theoretical underpinning of indexing and would later earn him the Nobel Prize. The small initial fund performed well, and institutional managers and their trustees took note.....
...But even in San Francisco, as in the country’s other financial centers, Fouse and McQuown’s findings were not a welcome development for brokers, portfolio managers, or anyone else who thrived on the industry’s high salaries and fees. As a result, the counterattack against indexing began to unfold. Fund managers denied that they had been gouging investors or that there was any conflict of interest in their profession. Workout gear appeared with the slogan “Beat the S&P 500,” and a Minneapolis-based firm, the Leuthold Group, distributed a large poster nationwide depicting the classic Uncle Sam character saying, “Index Funds Are UnAmerican,” implying that anyone who was not trying to beat the averages was nothing more than an unpatriotic wimp. (That poster still hangs on the office walls of many financial planners and fund managers.)

I suspect that poster might be a collector's item now. Bogle welcomed the challenge and found it amusing.

Notice the typical IRS equivocating language: certain rights or benefits. Not all.
Here's the 12 month rule for intangibles:

Paragraph (f) of [26 CFR § 1.263(a)-4] provides a 12-month rule intended to simplify the application of the general principle to certain payments that create benefits of a brief duration. ...
(f) 12-month rule—(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in this paragraph (f), a taxpayer is not required to capitalize under this section amounts paid to create (or to facilitate the creation of) any right or benefit for the taxpayer that does not extend beyond ... 12 months

26 CFR § 1.263(a)-4
You can go reading through all the exceptions and draw a legal conclusion, or you can apply some common sense. Virtually all bonds with coupon payments make payments at least annually. So if you buy a bond between interest dates, it is nearly certain that there will be a coupon payment within a year that more than covers any accrued interest you paid to the seller.
Consequently, if we assume that the 12-month rule applies to your bond, then it applies to virtually all bonds bought with accrued interest. So it is curious that the Sched B instructions say only that you can declare prepaid interest there if you get a 1099-INT.

When you buy bonds between interest payment dates and pay accrued interest to the seller, this interest is taxable to the seller. If you received a form 1099 for interest as a purchaser of a bond with accrued interest, follow the rules earlier under Nominees to see how to report the accrued interest. But identify the amount to be subtracted as “Accrued Interest.”

https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/i1040sb--2022.pdf
I don't think you can willy nilly enter items on a tax Schedule when there's no instruction for it. You can't decide that you'll put your capital losses on Schedule B, though that would reduce your taxes. Instructions say what you can or must put on a schedule. They don't say what you can't or mustn't include. That's just common sense.

Purchased 5 Yr. TIPS (06/22 auction) for inflation protection and capital preservation.

The estimate Lewis Braham wrote:

An imperfect alternative is to find a substitute for a closed fund that either ... is run by the same manager. This March, T. Rowe filed for a prospectus for the Capital Appreciation Equity ETF, run by the same manager as the mutual fund ... the ETF will give investors a chance to access Giroux’s stock picks, but only those. In the mutual fund, Giroux also buys unusual bonds and bank loans. Moreover, the ETF ...will hold 100 stocks, while Giroux typically holds only 30 to 40.

That from his article on dealing with access to closed funds.