It looks like you're new here. If you want to get involved, click one of these buttons!
I suspect that the nature of the fund's strategy might cause the guys to be a bit chary about publishing a single number but the complexity of the compliant explanation required for yield/worst versus yield/maturity versus SEC yield and the probability that effective yield lies somewhere in between might explain the lack of a single number on-site. Morty did not say that. I'm guessing.The 30-day SEC yield as of May 31 was 4.47% Retail and 4.72% for Institutional class. We estimate the yield-to-worst at 5.2% and the yield-to-maturity at 6.6% (both gross of expenses) and an average of the two, or 5.9% would be a good approximation. The portfolio is on the short side of our maturity range, with an effective average maturity of only a little over 2 years. We expect to generate returns in excess of the yield as we have historically.
...or category drift, mis-categorization, or survivorship bias, etc.No indication if a manager has departed, or if the strategy has changed, or what the expense ratio is, stewardship, capital gain implications, etc, etc.
Smead Value (SMVLX) will soon be getting cheaper.............Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies (MASNX) won't. Representatives of the fund seemed surprised that anyone thought they were overpriced. Their contention was that they charge fees below the Morningstar multi-alternative group average.David, thanks very much for addressing the expense ratio issue with them, and for your analysis. Very much appreciated. Looks like they are a bit clueless and moderately in denial regarding their fees, and also playing the game that 'if others charge a lot, we can charge a lot'. They say they charge less than the M* multi-alternative group average, yet M* says their expense ratio is "above average!" They have 4 management teams sub-contracted to run the fund, Jeffrey Gundlach, the FPA Crescent team, a Loomis Sayles Team, and the Water Island Capital/Arbitrage team. And there's nothing that these 4 teams are doing that warrants an expense ratio of 1.91%. The proof of the pudding is found in looking at the expense ratios of these team members' own individual mutual funds. They have no problem executing their strategies on their own with reasonable expenses........Insert "uhhhh" about here.
David
But you gave it a very admirable, old college try. Thanks.
Love the Never Never Index, but Open Table got bought by Priceline, which I totally don't understand. To me, Open Table just feels like someone else could come along and invade that space. Even the website is kind of....blah. It's not slick or interesting.
As for Whitebox planning, put this in your travel folder:
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-06-10/whitebox-shorting-never-never-stocks-in-graham-reversal.html
.
I wouldn't expect anything more than low-to-mid single digit returns from Merger Arb funds. May be worse lately from the standpoint of you have traditionally the idea of shorting the company buying and buying the company being bought. In this market, everything is going up. So, while you may get some minor gains from the company being bought, you're losing if the company doing the buying that you're short goes up anyways.Thanks David.
For the Arbitrage Fund crew.....don't know how you would ask this....but the fund seems to be 'dead in the water' with respect to performance. Not a happy shareholder. Their 2013 total return: 0.85%. 2012 return: 0.27%. No complaints about 2011. 2010: 1.44%. Not focusing on the category, but on an absolute return basis, can't they do better?
Do you have a tool or financial calculator that you use to determine the total return of any mutual fund using whatever start and end date you want?Of the value-oriented ones, it's interesting how very much better FLPSX does than HWMIX if you start in the summer of 2007, which is what I always advise.
© 2015 Mutual Fund Observer. All rights reserved.
© 2015 Mutual Fund Observer. All rights reserved. Powered by Vanilla