Forgive me if I'm repeating a piece of the puzzle that's already been stated but I think the Venture Capital Fund is leveraged a bit more than 2:1 and that's what's driving the outsized returns, that's the secret sauce. I haven't quite figured out how they managed to only lose 22 or 23% at the end of 2018 but I guess that suggests they did a good job picking stocks or they cut their leverage in between public reporting dates and we can't see that anywhere. At the end of Q3 2018 they were something like 217% long and at the end of Q4 2018 they were more like 270% long, which is probably why they recovered from the drawdown so quickly.
M* reports the portfolio exposures incorrectly because they account for the swaps the fund uses in the "other" investments but they don't account for the notional value of those swaps. M* counts the fund's asset allocation to these swaps based on the profit or loss the fund has on the swaps but the notional value is what really matters, not just the profit or loss. You can see the notional values of the swaps by looking at the fund's quarterly schedule of portfolio holdings at sec.gov/edgar.
Just my humble opinion but because of the leverage the Leland fund uses you can't really do a performance comparison with the Primecap fund, which uses no leverage, and call it apples to apples. I'm also not sure what you intended to compare, @openice, because POAGX started in 2004, not 1984 (that was Vanguard Primecap, VPMCX), POAGX has more than $10 billion of AUM, VPMCX has more like $69 billion, and I can't figure out what period of time your performance figures relate to, the roughly 9.5% for each of the 3 funds you were comparing. It doesn't seem to be the 3 years I thought you were suggesting for either POAGX or VPMCX.

https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/is-the-60-40-stock-bond-rule-stupid-2020-01-21
Is The 60/40 Stock/Bond Rule Stupid?
Ron Surz
PUBLISHED
JAN 21, 2020 11:24AM EST
The 60/40 Stock/Bond Rule is ubiquitous, and that’s stupid because it’s just not right for everyone.
Asset allocation is the most important decision, and is designed to achieve objectives. Risk preference needs to be controlled by risk capacity.
It’s easy to be smarter than 60/40

@msf, Aren’t Treasury’s federal tax-exempt?

But let’s go back 20 years to early 2000, when the S&P 500 was at roughly 1500.
If you had bought then and held until now, that works out to be an average annual return of just 4%.
4% is better than zero… but it’s hardly anything to write home about.
[This return doesn’t factor in dividends, taxes, fund management fees, or inflation… but those effects all largely offset one another.]
...since 2000, the S&P 500 has returned just 4%, while a 20-year government bond would have paid you 6.9% over the same period. That’s a HUGE difference of nearly 3%.

A most slanted "analysis".
The nominal rate of return of VFINX, including dividends and management fees was about 6.2%. (A $10K investment on 1/22/2000 would have been worth $33,232.15 on 1/21/2020 according to this

M* chart.)
The article notes that the S&P 500 figures would have been lower after taxes. Mysteriously though, it doesn't likewise take note of the ordinary income taxes that would have been owed on interest paid year in, year out by long term bonds.
Sure, VFINX spins off taxable divs, and they're significant. A fact that article chose to ignore. Still, only part of VFINX's gain would have been taxed annually. In addition, starting in 2003 those divs would have been qualified, thus taxed at the lower cap gains rate. As would its appreciation have been taxed as cap gains upon sale at the end of 20 years.
Now let's talk about reinvestment risk. Had you purchased a Treasury in 2000, you would have received taxable interest of 6.9% on that principal each year. But you would not have gotten 6.9% on your reinvested interest. You would have ridden the yield curve all the way down to 2% over the next couple of decades.
Put together the taxes and the decline of rates on reinvested interest, and that 6.2% return on VFINX begins to look pretty good. And that's including the (lack of) returns through the "lost decade".

But let’s go back 20 years to early 2000, when the S&P 500 was at roughly 1500.
If you had bought then and held until now, that works out to be an average annual return of just 4%.
4% is better than zero… but it’s hardly anything to write home about.
[This return doesn’t factor in dividends, taxes, fund management fees, or inflation… but those effects all largely offset one another.]
...since 2000, the S&P 500 has returned just 4%, while a 20-year government bond would have paid you 6.9% over the same period. That’s a HUGE difference of nearly 3%.

A most slanted "analysis".
The nominal rate of return of VFINX, including dividends and management fees was about 6.2%. (A $10K investment on 1/22/2000 would have been worth $33,232.15 on 1/21/2020 according to this M* chart.)
The article notes that the S&P 500 figures would have been lower after taxes. Mysteriously though, it doesn't likewise take note of the ordinary income taxes that would have been owed on interest paid year in, year out by long term bonds.
Sure, VFINX spins off taxable divs, and they're significant. A fact that article chose to ignore. Still, only part of VFINX's gain would have been taxed annually. In addition, starting in 2003 those divs would have been qualified, thus taxed at the lower cap gains rate. As would its appreciation have been taxed as cap gains upon sale at the end of 20 years.
Now let's talk about reinvestment risk. Had you purchased a Treasury in 2000, you would have received taxable interest of 6.9% on that principal each year. But you would not have gotten 6.9% on your reinvested interest. You would have ridden the yield curve all the way down to 2% over the next couple of decades.
Put together the taxes and the decline of rates on reinvested interest, and that 6.2% return on VFINX begins to look pretty good. And that's including the (lack of) returns through the "lost decade".

https://www.capitalists.com/blog/2020/01/21/the-investment-that-destroyed-the-sp-500/
2020The investment that destroyed the S&P 500
The year was 1990, and the Soviet Union was on the verge of collapse. The Berlin Wall was still in the process of being destroyed, and East and West Germany were set to reunify later in the year.

https://seekingalpha.com/article/4318061-federal-reserve-bank-is-buying-t-bills-and-you-should-too
The Federal Reserve Bank Is Buying T-Bills And You Should Too
Jan. 21, 2020 11:45 AM ETiShares Short Treasury Bond ETF (SHV)5 Comments
Summary
Investors should heed warning from the latest Fed move and consider purchasing the iShares Short Treasury Bond ETF.
SHV offers investors a safe return on short-term cash with a 30-day yield of 1.5% and a negative beta. The SHV is a very conservative way invest short-term capital.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York added $60.7 billion in treasury bill purchases last week within the repo market

@BenWP
Ben: The “secret sauce” that you are looking for is a calculation that’s IP (intellectual property), and so Refinitiv is unable to disclose more than what is publicly available (PE Research Methodology and VC Research Methodology) to avoid any duplication effort.
This calculation is not even available to the managers of the fund.
The funds are not investing in VC/PE start-ups, IPOs or in venture capital backed and privately held companies.
But looking at private deals and their valuation, the TR Research Index (TRVC) uses proprietary econometric models like swaps, leverage, and beta matching to find public companies within the sectors, weights, and liquidity to construct the TR Venture Capital Index (TRVCI Index), which the fund is trying to track.
The managers are not picking these names.
The beta adjustments are driven by the consensus forecast of 20 proprietary models.
The sector beta refinement matches beta at the sector level, tightens the tracking to the two portfolios, and thereby offsets in aggregate that the net adjustment at the portfolio level is effectively zero.
When I wrote in my previous commentary, “The overall success of these funds may result primarily from the ability of the managers in the alternative class space to match the performance of their bogy with well-chosen public companies,” I was addressing you personally because you raised a very important issue.
What I’ve added now may be of some value. If you have additional questions, you might speak with the Leland team directly.

(link)
See quotes below:
Recession risks, which had been elevated during the middle part of 2019, have diminished in recent months...As a consequence, we are now more confident in our baseline forecast that the current window of weakness for global growth will give way to a moderate recovery during 2020.
We will tend to favor U.S. duration over global alternatives, given the relative value and potential for capital gains in U.S. Treasuries and the scope for further Fed easing in the event of a weaker-than-expected macro outcome. While we are broadly neutral on the U.S. dollar versus other G10 currencies, we generally will favor long yen positions in accounts where currency exposure is appropriate
In addition, in asset allocation portfolios, we will look to be overweight large cap over small cap equities.
We favor both U.S. agency mortgage exposures and non-agency exposures. We believe agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS) offer attractive valuation, reasonable carry, and an attractive liquidity profile in comparison with other spread assets. We see non-agency mortgages as offering relatively attractive valuation along with a more defensive source of credit and carry and better market technicals than generic corporate credit exposure. We will also look to have select commercial MBS (CMBS) exposures. U.K. residential MBS (RMBS) also looks attractive on a relative valuation basis.
In currency strategy, we look to be overweight a basket of emerging market currencies versus the U.S. dollar and the euro.
We will tend to favor curve steepening positions in the U.S. and in other countries. U.S. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) look attractive on a valuation basis
we continue to expect real U.S. GDP growth to slow to a 1.5% to 2.0% range in 2020, from an estimated 2.3% pace in 2019...We look for a modest U.S. reacceleration in the second half of 2020. China’s commitments in the Phase 1 trade deal to purchase $200 billion of additional U.S. exports over the next two years should also support growth in the second half of 2020.
We see euro area growth at around 1.0% in 2020. On balance, we see core inflation remaining close to 1.0%.
The U.K. is set to formally leave the E.U. at the end of January...we expect U.K. GDP growth of 0.75% to 1.25% in 2020,
Japan: We expect GDP growth to slow to a 0.25% to 0.75% range in 2020 from an estimated 0.9% this year...Inflation is expected to remain low in a 0.25% to 0.75% range
China: We see GDP growth slowing into a 5.0% to 6.0% range in 2020 from an estimated 6.1% in 2019.

End of Quote.
======================
What the above means to me?
1) Load on securitized bonds which I have been doing for years (PIMIX,VCFIX,IOFIX,EIXIX. For cash sub use SEMMX)
2) Continue to use US LC as my main equity position which I have been doing for years already
3) If you want to invest in equities abroad go with EM.
4) I will not use TIPS and I don't believe that curve steepening will affect my Multisector funds that much.

a journo friend reports

Kiplinger was bought by a PE firm last January, and line eds, factcheckers and other recent hires, features and investigative, eventually got chopped. It will be surprising if the print edition lasts a year.

This got me curious who was doing the chopping. Kiplinger's was bought by Dennis Publishing, a British firm that was bought by Exponent, a British venture capital operation.
More about Dennis and Exponent at the dinky linky.
And here's Exponent's home page.
Buying Kiplinger's seems like an odd choice for what I'm guessing is the first foray into the USA for Dennis and Exponent.

https://www.dallasnews.com/business/personal-finance/2020/01/19/three-cheers-for-sloth-and-simplicity/
Three cheers for sloth and simplicity! 2019 another fruitful year for investing the Couch Potato way
/We have a work ethic problem. Too much of it.
Lots of people think that if they work hard and long, if they grunt and puff, if they demonstrate serious mental effort, if they read copiously and take notes — if they do all those things — they will be successful investors./
We have been following Scott Burns for quite sometimes l. He usually have good inputs regarding index Investmenting/funds

Hi @dtconroe
As to the Kiplinger list; and your notation, " Over time, I have had to continually assess the amount of "risk" I am willing to take, to generate the "returns" I am willing to make." Yes, we all have to assess our risk based upon many factors.
I'm only aware of the age range of a few here at MFO; but attempt to consider the age ranges of those who may only read here and never comment. So, I consider this thread to have more value for some age groups and their risk assessments, versus others.
My only particular problem with the list, is the inclusion of "front load" funds; although many of these are available at some platforms without the load. Past this, I'm not going to challenge the list, nor other sector candidates that probably, "almost" made the list.
From a personal point for our household investments, our backgrounds are in tech. and healthcare; and from this exposure in particular, we were in a constant continuing education mode, as both areas were and continue to be, in full and never ending change.
Our investment slant has always had focus to these two growth sectors in particular; with exceptions being limited by choices via an employer offering. Yes, these areas have their quiet, lazy and sideways periods.
Overall, we still prefer growth to other investment styles; although the "risk" of a potential bigger face slap from a market pullback is present, due in part, to the larger potential gains obtained with these types of holdings.
Your point regarding risk is always valid, relative to investor "X's" overall financial circumstance.
For the young ones today, with what ever amount they can dedicate into company plans and/or a Roth, go full ahead with growth in favored sectors or broad-based. Their young age will allow them to survive a market melt/mean reversion, as their investment friend will be compounding with time in the markets and ability to continue to contribute monies going forward.
As always, remain curious in life,
Catch

"Derf">@dtconroe: Thanks for your reply. I wasn't interested in the amount in her IRA, as that isn't any of my business. More to my question is, did she take a RMD & if so did total distribution all go into a taxable bond fund ? Thank you again for your time, Derf
Yes, she took her RMD out of the MWCIX fund, and then we split the balance between MWCIX and IISIX in her IRA for 2020. I decided to give you the total amount of her IRA, because we would use more than 2 funds, if it was much larger. I don't want to suggest any IRA holder only use one or two funds for a larger IRA. The IRA RMD distribution from my wife's IRA, and the much larger RMD distribution from my IRA, both went into our joint taxable account, where we immediately reinvested it into our existing bond oefs.

@dtconroe; You said, {Back to some investing topics! My wife has a traditional IRA, and in 2020 she is required to begin her RMD process. Our approach to RMDs, is to take the total RMD amount at the beginning of the calendar year, transfer it to our taxable account, and then make a reinvestment decision about this RMD transfer to our taxable account. My wife is even more conservative than I am, would put it in a tin can in the back of the yard if it was totally up to her, but has agreed to a conservative bond oef in her IRA account. Currently, she is totally invested in MWCIX, but I think we will diversify a little more into her account starting in 2020. IISIX is a fund that I am considering adding to her MWCIX fund for a little more total return, but still be supportive of her very low risk tolerance. We will try to produce enough TR in her account, to recoup the RMD withdrawal each year. }
I was wondering where you parked your wife's RMD & how you divided it % wise if more than one investment was picked.
Thanks for your time, Derf

https://www.marketwatch.com/story/how-fund-giant-vanguard-is-misleading-investors-about-a-proposed-tax-on-stock-trades-2020-01-16
Opinion: How fund giant Vanguard is misleading investors about a tax on stock trades
_financial-transaction tax would not harm Main Street investors, as Vanguard contends_
Be very careful out there and sometimes very helpful to read between fine prints

Hello
Thx for commentary
Added to preferred stock Allypra, vti, and opened positions in Telsla few days ago
Cut positions in several bonds - Att and tmobile
bonds also matured / short called at vanguard acct, all these positions were transferred to an primecapcore, vti, lifecycle2040, and vgstx
Don't have magic wands but think we maybe heading higher at end of year depending what happens in Washington impeachment/2020 election, and truce in china trade wars

Can someone explain why High Yield / Floating are kinda being lumped together above. I'm reading high yield not good place to be but what about floating rate?
Asking because have some of my MIL's money in PRFRX and I viewed it as conservative investment.

I'm quoting from the article the whole narrative "(2) High Yield / Floating Rate: Also called the non-investment grade bond market, high yield or junk bonds, the area of the market performed well in 2019. However, one has to remember where they started. Going into the fourth quarter of 2018, bond spreads were tight, equating with little return for the risk assumed. When the bear market/correction of Q4 2018 occurred, spreads blew out as investors sold out and ran to the safety of Treasuries and cash. As noted above, spreads were well above 500 bps. Today, they are down to ~350 bps which are very tight levels. At these levels, we would say investors in high yield are coupon clippers, meaning that you are likely to receive the yield only with little to no capital gains. The risk is to the downside."
HY correlate to stocks more than other bond categories. If stocks correct then HY probably will too.
Floating rate(=Bank Loans) are still junk bond with very short duration but they might go down too just as they did in Q4 of 2018, see (chart)
Usually, bank loans do better than most other bond categories when rates go up rapidly but rates are not expected to go up rapidly soon. I use BL funds as a trade when I'm convinced rates will go up and why I prefer to use mostly Multisector bond fund see 3 year (chart).
For conservative bond funds I prefer SEMMX,IISIX over PRFRX. See 5 year (chart) and how PRFRX was down much more than these 2 funds in the second half of 2015 and Q4 2018.

I may be slow, so help me out. LDVAX aims to replicate an index by taking positions in companies not in the index. I get CAPE and MOAT, which I own, because they invest in stocks that are part of their relative indices. CAPE does it indirectly through instruments I don't fully understand, but MOAT defines its index members quarterly and buys equal weights of the components. Both CAPE and MOAT do really well matched against SPY and I sometimes trade in and out of these ETFs depending on market conditions. I don't understand how LDVAX's managers can examine VC/PE activity for the previous quarter and translate those findings into buys or sells of companies not the subject of the activity. I recognize that existing listed companies might be receiving new infusions of capital though VC/PE, thereby making them candidates for purchase. However, for start-ups or brand new ideas, there won't be a listed stock and, more importantly, if the newby has some truly revolutionary idea or technology, there won't be a similar stock to buy. I can't argue with LDVAX's results, but they need to be put in the context of a perfect recent market environment for growth and an apparent need to trade furiously. S/T CG have risen over the fund's three-year history, so there are tax consequences. I'm hoping a board member understands better than I what the secret sauce is that juices the returns. My problem may be that I'm like the HS football team I played on: we were small, but we were slow.

I enjoyed the reads... very thorough, simple investment advice.
Keep it simple. DCA into VBINX...move on to other things...check back in 40 years.
7-rules-for-a-wealthy-retirement

The equally weighted oef that I like that is comprised of the top 100 US companies is VYCAX (Corporate Leaders 100 Fund). I have owned this fund off and on over the past ten years, or so, and have at times used it as one of my spiff (special investment) positions. One of the reasons I like this fund is that it usually has a good distribution yield. Last year its distribution yield was 9.3% which includes capital gain distributions. Although, it is an equity fund I consider it an income generating fund as well. Not only will it grow your principal through the years it will put some spiff in your poscket if you take all distributions in cash as I do.
Another equally weighted oef that I have used in the past as a spiff position is VADAX (Equally Weighted S&P 500 Fund). It has had some good distribution payouts as well; but, generally, lower than what VYCAX produces.

"As I said earlier, D&C is a good shop but I was always able to find better risk/reward funds than D&C."
That is figuratively and literally your bottom line. Though what you're looking at is volatility, not risk. SD is a measure of volatility. Sharpe ratio is a ratio of return to volatility (SD). Sortino ratio "measures the return to 'bad' volatility." Then there's the Treynor ratio, " known as the 'reward-to-volatility ratio'".
Sortino: https://www.morningstar.com/InvGlossary/sortino_ratio_definition_what_is.aspx
Treynor: https://www.morningstar.com/articles/384148/article
Sure, look at all of these measures, and more. Just realize that they're all variations on the same theme - equating volatility with risk. When cash flow is a concern, volatility does create risk. But you dismissed that.
DODFX vs VFINX? Yes, foreign investments have done worse than domestic for the past ten years. I'll guess that was a typo and that you meant to write DODGX.
Recognizing that DODGX is a value fund, value has likewise underperformed for the past ten years (link). The comparison says more about the relative performances of the market segments than the funds. Still, since you did mention mean regression, it might be helpful to look at a quote from an article praised in another thread:

Value stocks may finally do better than growth stocks thanks to the steeper yield curve. The thesis of owning growth stocks during a flattening yield curve and value stocks during steepening could prove true here.