It looks like HFCSX has a history of not being tax efficient. Its tax cost ratio, not counting the current distribution (figures are through Nov. 30th) is 2.29% for one year and 2.18% for three years. Though funds in its category, MCG, are typically not tax efficient. On average they lost 1.85% to taxes annually over the past three years.
Last year HFCSX distributed about 10% of its NAV (click on 2019 box here). 2020 was a great year for growth funds, so one would not be surprised to see cap gains distributions double or triple that of last year's.
For example, one of the handful of other mid cap growth funds with mid cap blend portfolios, HMDYX, had a cap gains distribution in 2019 of 2.28%, while its estimate for 2020 is 10.62%.
"They don't deserve to have my funds."
Is it because of their cap gains distribution this year, though last year's 10% was tolerable? Or is it at least in part because of the fund's recent anemic performance of 4.45% YTD? None of the MCG funds with MC blend portfolios did better than average for the category; still HFCSX's performance was way under that of its peers.
"I'll be liquidating in 30 days."
If you're worried about wash sales, your net gain (or loss) will come out the same regardless since you're liquidating. Or are you thinking about postponing any remaining gain in your shares until 2021? (That would be 23-24 days.)

Additional side effects are surfacing with regard to the Pfizer vaccine that were not observed during trails (individuals with allergy sensitivities at greater risk to negative side effects). This may slow its deployment.
Allergy-risk-Pfizer-jab-TWO-patients-fall-ill
MA reporting today that 64% of all state deaths are still occurring in senior care facilities. Many of these residents leave the care facility to be treated by area hospitals and then are being sent back to the facility where special wings are being setup when possible. Contracting Covid-19 complicates the already compromised health of this population.
Using MA data, that means 36% of Covid-19 related deaths are occurring outside of these facilities. Again, do some / most of these individuals often have compromised health issues? The vaccines (with all there potential side effects) may be the best response for both of these populations.
We hear a lot about positivity rates which is important when dealing with the problem of transmission, but does anyone have numbers on the death rate of "healthy" individuals? Herd immunity...which is a thing... will play a part in this population because we mingle more in herds.
Seniors home residents seem to be our top priority going forward, then our general population that have preexisting conditions.
coronavirus & preexisting conditions
Masks, vaccines, and common sense behavior all play a part for the rest of us
As far as the economy is concerned. Senior facility have little impact. E-commerce has entered into a perfect storm and should emerge stronger than ever. Home based businesses will grow. Small businesses (in- store retail) are being tested, while big box retail gains market share. Travel and leisure businesses are in full stress test mode. For individuals whose jobs are going away we'll need re-training programs, Shifting resources toward construction and infrastructure projects would make good sense.

Permanent Portfolio Aggressive Portfolio has estimated a $10+ distribution; some of T. Rowe Price Funds (New Horizon and New America Growth) have estimated large distributions also. Grandeur Peak Micro Cap Fund has estimated a total payout of about $1.50.
Here is M*'s November article with fund families and their largest offenders:
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1009922/capital-gains-roundup-2020-edition

My worst offender this year is BCSIX despite M* saying its turnover is only 17%. My other two Brown Capital funds are really light on the distributions, however.

And how do you invest when you finally "have won the game"...some thoughts here:
https://awealthofcommonsense.com/2020/12/how-to-invest-when-youve-already-won-the-game/

There are many wise and thoughtful contributions from several of the varsity team here on MFO. When I held one of the Fidelity Asset Manager funds way back when, then OAKBX, and then BRUFX, I believed (probably naïvely) that what I had were "all-weather" funds. The past few years have demonstrated that allocation funds work great when markets are "behaving" as they usually have. Interest rates and rates of inflation rose and fell with a certain regularity. Value stocks and growth stocks alternated with being the flavor of the year or two, but there was an alternation. Nowadays, interest rates remain far below historical levels and value securities can't find even hold-the-nose buyers. My thought is that the weather has changed so drastically that it's pointless to expect a balanced fund to thrive in this climate.
While I hold PTIAX and TMSRX in my taxable portfolio, what I expect from them is not that their managers hedge their stock holdings as a balanced fund manager might do, but that they will provide a steady stream of income or capital appreciation that does not depend on the performance of my stocks and equity funds. I have a small slice of RPGAX, but no other allocation fund in my taxable portfolio. As for my TIAA retirement account, I let Vanguard's retirement target fund managers decide what bonds to buy. The only decision I make is on the year (2025, 2030, etc.). Those mixed asset funds-of-funds represent approximately 40% of the portfolio, which is tilted farther towards equities than most 78-year-olds can tolerate. Not advice, just observations.

Laziness is not a virtue. :) - I’ve now taken the effort to Google the referenced column (November 2020 Mutual Fund Observer). I think in fairness to Ed I should post his exact words:
“ When I left Harris Associates in January of 2012, the Oakmark Equity and Income Fund had, on 12/31/2011, $18.9B in assets. Performance over the long-term had been above the relevant benchmarks. As of 10/31/2020, per Morningstar, the fund’s assets are at $7.2B, and performance has been lagging benchmarks for the last 1, 3, and 5 years.
What is the problem? Has my former colleague Clyde McGregor lost his touch? No, certainly not that I can see. The equity portion of the portfolio is a classic Harris Associates’ value portfolio, and it looks very interesting to me looking forward over a three to five-year time horizon.
There are two areas of issue. Please recognize that I am speaking about balanced funds, which is the class of investment I am most familiar with, having managed the same for more than twenty-five years at a national bank trust department as well as at Harris Associates. The first competitive issue is fees. When Fidelity’s Balanced Fund shows a 53-basis point expense ratio and Vanguard’s Wellington Fund shows a 25-basis point expense ratio (and the Vanguard Admiral share class drops that fee to 17 basis points). A 25 to 35 basis point fee disadvantage is a lot of baggage to overcome consistently in terms of its detrimental impact upon performance. If the fee disparity is larger, making up the differential becomes nigh on impossible. I will leave it to others to address the issue of the fee disadvantages relative to exchange traded funds.
The other area of disadvantage currently is fixed income as an asset class for a balanced portfolio. With rates where they are and where they are likely to be for the foreseeable future, it is almost impossible to add any value in the fixed income area without taking on extreme amounts of risk. Money market rates, when not negative, are running from zero to perhaps eight basis points. Maturities beyond two years are not compensating you for the risk you are taking on (if you are lucky, you can find 1% on a credit union’s three-year insured certificate of deposit).
I will leave aside the issue of value being out of favor as opposed to growth. Those of us who are value investors are prepared to wait through those periods of underperformance. That said, the goalposts for various asset classes have shifted. Small cap was equities with a market capitalization of $500M to $1B. Now, the range is extended up to $2.5B. And one must consider the extent to which other asset classes impinge on your allocation decisions. An article on the “Seeking Alpha” website was making an argument not too long ago that the better way to achieve portfolio diversification going forward was to pair an S&P 500 Index Fund with one of the publicly-traded C-Corporation private equity firms. It is an interesting question to think about.”
The End of Many Eras

Thanks for the pointer to the column. You can find a list of Ed Studzinski's pieces here, including his November post:
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2020/11/the-end-of-many-eras/
Your memory is perfect, right month, and 3/3 on his reasons. (More on that below.) I appreciate your additional thoughts about the quality of bonds used (Ed also commented on this in his column, saying that one can't add value without adding excessive risk). Interesting observation about using the energy sector.
Value vs. growth does seem to be a major factor. I looked at all 50%-70% allocation funds at M*. Of the 40 distinct funds with value portfolios, the number in the top half over the past five or three years can be counted on two hands. Of the 38 with star ratings, just 5 manage even four stars, with more having two stars than three. The four star fund people will recognize is BRUFX.
Cost would seem to be a smaller factor, though it could be why DODBX retains three stars. The difficulty in finding value in bonds helps explain poor absolute performance of balanced funds, but it doesn't help explain relatively poor performance. All of OAKBX's peers face this same problem.
Apparently value vs. growth has more of an impact on funds in this category than I suspected.

I'm sounding like a broken record here, but 2020 was an unusual year. Take a look at its performance since inception through 2019 instead. Over the 7¾ years, it achieved an annualized return of 5.156% vs its peers' 3.936%. Still impressive, but far from the 7% advantage you're seeing to date.
Inception to Dec 31, 2019 chart. IMHO this chart really puts this fund into perspective.
Irrespective of the fact that most of the figures you gave are long term (multi-year) results, what they're really showing you is short term performance. That's because the past year has so distorted the longer term averages. So the next question is why did it do so well on a relative basis this year?
Look at its portfolio (again in the context of the 2020 market). It's nearly off the scale on the growth side. (YTD, VIGAX has returned 36.89% vs. 16.13% for VFINX.) Was this a matter of skill, that the management took the fund to the right part of the market at the right time, or was it luck? The fund has always been growth leaning (check its portfolio history). Its peers are a much tamer group (look at the "Value and Growth Measures" section of the M* portfolio page for the fund.)
I tend to look just as much at year by year performance as cumulative performance. Especially this year, one good year can skew the numbers. Likewise, while growth has tended to do better than value or blend for a long time, it hasn't had a year like this since the dot-com bubble burst.
https://www.longtermtrends.net/growth-stocks-vs-value-stocks/
Difference in annual returns of growth and value (from Vanguard)

Thank you for all your diligent work on downside protection. Look like we will revisit March 2020 again in coming months as the pandemic rages on.

Both of you are mincing words to avoid my point and to support your brethren. The fact is that Mark DIRECTLY blamed Florida's "moronic" governor for the death of his friends in Florida who were healthcare workers. He wrote: "I have lost friends in FL because of the moronic way the governor and money grubbing crowd in that state have chosen to deal with Covid." We can debate how bad California has done on Covid in light of its policies (even "morons" know that if you lock everything down you will reduce covid) but the FACT is that many healthcare workers in California still died even with "smart" policy. It's simply not a fair debate if you ignore the social impact of lockdowns. That's where reasonable people can disagree and it is a fair point of debate. Mark also said on the heels of MSF's post softening Cuomo's blame for the nursing home fiasco that Cuomo, unlike DeSantis "did as the scientific and medical advisors suggested." This is also untrue. Cuomo himself did not defend his decision based on science. He essentially though falsely said he followed Trump's CDC guidance (according to PolitiFact https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/jun/13/andrew-cuomo/new-yorks-nursing-home-policy-was-not-line-cdc/) Just as clearly, Cuomo did not follow the "science." The day after Cuomo issued his directive the AMDA responded that it was "over-reaching, not consistent with science, unenforceable, and beyond all, not in the least consistent with patient safety principles." https://paltc.org/sites/default/files/Statement on the March 25 NYSDOH Advisory.pdf

My impression is that he is rather inflexible in his bond investing. Never quite understand his love of thinly traded junk bonds. Also the large asset base does not help either. Drawdown in 2008 and spring 2020 showed the downside risk.

Read: "130,000 – 210,000 AVOIDABLE COVID-19 DEATHS – AND COUNTING – IN THE U.S.”
https://ncdp.columbia.edu/custom-content/uploads/2020/10/Avoidable-COVID-19-Deaths-US-NCDP.pdf

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773757/000119312520311432/d33073d497.htm
Columbia Multi-Asset Income Fund
Columbia Pacific/Asia Fund
497 1 d33073d497.htm COLUMBIA FUNDS SERIES TRUST I
Supplement dated December 7, 2020
to the Prospectuses, Summary Prospectuses and Statement of Additional Information (SAI), each as supplemented (as applicable), of the following Funds (each a Fund and together the Funds):
Fund Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI Dated
Columbia Funds Series Trust I
Columbia Multi-Asset Income Fund----Prospectus and Summary Prospectus: 9/1/2020; SAI: 12/1/2020
Columbia Pacific/Asia Fund-----------Prospectus and Summary Prospectus: 8/1/2020; SAI: 12/1/2020
The Board of Trustees of the Funds has approved a Plan of Liquidation and Termination (the Plan) pursuant to which the Funds will be liquidated and terminated.
Effective at the open of business on January 11, 2021, the Funds will no longer be open to new investors. Shareholders who opened and funded an account with the Funds as of the open of business on this date (including accounts once funded that subsequently reached a zero balance) may continue to make additional purchases of Fund shares, including purchases by an existing retirement plan that has a plan-level or omnibus account with the Transfer Agent or other omnibus accounts relating to new or existing participants seeking to invest in the Funds. Effective January 11, 2021, any applicable contingent deferred sales charges will be waived on redemptions and exchanges out of the Funds.
Under the terms of the Plan, it is anticipated that the Funds will be liquidated on or about February 5, 2021 (the Liquidation Date) at which time the Funds' shareholders will receive a liquidating distribution in an amount equal to the net asset value of their Fund shares. For federal income tax purposes, the liquidation of the Funds will be treated as a redemption of Fund shares and may cause shareholders to recognize a gain or loss and pay taxes if the liquidated shares are held in a taxable account. You should consult with your own tax advisor about the particular tax consequences to you of the Funds' liquidation. Shareholders of the Funds may redeem their investments in the Funds or exchange their Fund shares for shares of another Columbia Fund at any time prior to the Liquidation Date (as described in the next paragraph). If the Fund has not received your redemption request or other instructions prior to the Liquidation Date, your shares will be automatically liquidated on the Liquidation Date.
As of the close of business on the business day preceding the Liquidation Date, the Funds will no longer accept any orders for the purchase of or exchange for shares of the Funds. Orders for the purchase of or exchange for shares of the Funds may, in the Funds' discretion, be rejected prior to the Liquidation Date, including for operational reasons relating to the anticipated liquidation of the Fund.
During the period prior to the Liquidation Date, the Funds' investment manager, Columbia Management Investment Advisers, LLC (the Investment Manager), may depart from the Fund’s stated investment objectives and strategies to reduce the amount of portfolio securities and hold more cash or cash equivalents to liquidate the Funds' assets in a manner that the Investment Manager believes to be in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders. Shareholders remaining in the Funds may bear increased transaction fees incurred in connection with the disposition of the Funds' portfolio holdings. Any such transaction costs would reduce any distributable net capital gains.
Shareholders who hold their Fund shares through a retirement plan or account (such as a 401(k) plan or individual retirement account) and who receive a distribution of liquidation proceeds will be subject to taxes and, if under 59½ years of age, applicable early withdrawal penalties, unless the distribution proceeds are reinvested as a rollover in an eligible retirement plan or account within 60 days after the proceeds are received.
The Funds will seek to pay out all distributable net income and net capital gains prior to the Liquidation Date. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
Shareholders should retain this Supplement for future reference.

"Sorry you lost friends, but in Florida that was very likely a result of choices THEY made, unlike Cuomo who gave nursing home residents none."
Yes, they decided to become doctors and nurses. So stupid.

70% of COVID related deaths in CT occurred in nursing homes...Our elderly parents...and workers (more often low wage nursing home workers).
https://ctpost.com/news/coronavirus/article/Data-70-of-CT-coronavirus-linked-deaths-have-15271386.php
On Cuomo's executive orders:

Cuomo, who received praise for his early and high-profile response to the pandemic, has come under fire from state Senate Republicans, industry advocates and others for his administration’s handling of the outbreak at nursing homes and adult care facilities.
“Obviously the way it rolled out here was pretty disastrous for people — for residents and their families. … This hit us, perhaps, harder than it should have,” Richard J. Mollot, executive director of the Long Term Care Community Coalition, told POLITICO. “Some of this was avoidable, preventable — some of it still is if we take the appropriate actions.”

https://politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/05/06/cuomo-under-fire-for-response-to-covid-19-at-nursing-homes-1282821

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/917469/000168386320014977/f7564d1.htm
LOOMIS SAYLES FUNDS
LOOMIS SAYLES BOND FUND
LOOMIS SAYLES FIXED INCOME FUND
LOOMIS SAYLES INSTITUTIONAL HIGH INCOME FUND
LOOMIS SAYLES INVESTMENT GRADE FIXED INCOME FUND
(each a "Fund" and together the "Funds")
Supplement dated December 7, 2020 to the Loomis Sayles Funds' Summary Prospectuses, Statutory Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI"), each dated February 1, 2020 as may be revised or supplemented from time to time.
Effective March 1, 2021, Daniel J. Fuss will take a significant step back from portfolio management and will no longer serve as a Portfolio Manager of the Funds. This is the latest phase of the Loomis Sayles portfolio management team's succession plan, which has been in place for more than 20 years.
Accordingly, effective March 1, 2021, all references to Mr. Fuss as a Portfolio Manager of the Funds in the Summary Prospectuses, Statutory Prospectus and SAI are hereby deleted.
Matthew J. Eagan, Brian P. Kennedy and Elaine M. Stokes will remain as Portfolio Managers of the Loomis Sayles Bond Fund, Loomis Sayles Fixed Income Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund.
Matthew J. Eagan and Elaine M. Stokes will remain as Portfolio Managers of the Loomis Sayles Institutional High Income Fund.
Change to Fiscal Year End of Loomis Sayles Bond Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund
The Board of Trustees of Loomis Sayles Funds I has approved a change to the fiscal year end of Loomis Sayles Bond Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund from September 30th to December 31st. The implementation of the change to the fiscal year end and the expected disposition and realignment of certain foreign currency-denominated positions over the next few weeks are likely to result in additional trading costs, increased realized capital losses and currency losses from the sales of portfolio securities, and increased audit, printing and mailing expenses for the Funds in the short term. Further, these changes are expected to reduce the future impact of currency exchange losses on taxable monthly distributions and reduce the amount of currency-related losses available to offset future taxable ordinary income for Loomis Sayles Bond Fund and Loomis Sayles Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund shareholders. Increased monthly income distributions going forward may result in an increased tax liability for shareholders who are subject to state and federal income taxes on their income distributions from the Funds.
LOOMIS SAYLES HIGH INCOME OPPORTUNITIES FUND
Supplement dated December 7, 2020 to the Summary Prospectus, Statutory Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") of the Loomis Sayles High Income Opportunities Fund (the "Fund"), each dated February 1, 2020 as may be revised or supplemented from time to time.
Effective March 1, 2021, Daniel J. Fuss will take a significant step back from portfolio management and will no longer serve as a Portfolio Manager of the Fund. This is the latest phase of the Loomis Sayles portfolio management team's succession plan, which has been in place for more than 20 years. Accordingly, effective March 1, 2021, all references to Mr. Fuss as a Portfolio Manager of the Fund in the Summary Prospectus, Statutory Prospectus and SAI are hereby deleted.
Matthew J. Eagan, Brian P. Kennedy, Elaine M. Stokes and Todd P. Vandam will remain as Portfolio Managers of the Fund.

Right, @JoJo26. If it’s not « cherchez la femme, » it must be the pursuit of ill-gotten gains.

@wxman123 - who said "I don't have any great ideas on how we could have dealt with Covid any better." So you think that denying that it even existed, calling it names (China virus), calling it a hoax and stating that it would just magically disappear was the way to go huh? How has that worked out so far?
You also said "How many lives were saved by shutting hair salons and gyms?" How would you even quantify this since the intent was to stop the spread of the virus between folks who don't frequently share their life's activities outside these venues. The same goes for wearing of the masks. I have lost friends in FL because of the moronic way the governor and money grubbing crowd in that state have chosen to deal with Covid. Unlike you I consider their choices as idiocy.
Edited Sunday morning to add:
Trump’s Operation Warp Speed promised a flood of covid vaccines. Instead, states are expecting a trickle.
So maybe just a 10th as brilliant.

So what approach worked well (outside of a few islands)? Gun to your head: had Hilary or Biden been in office do you think we'd fall more on the New Zealand side of the ledger or closer to the UK, France, Spain? Same question on the vaccine, do you think Hilary or Biden would have done better? Was Cuomo genius as DeSantis was "moronic"? Now, after one of the fastest vaccines in history is developed the liberal media is criticizing the speed with which it will get distributed, and before it even happens? Sorry you lost friends, but in Florida that was very likely a result of choices THEY made, unlike Cuomo who gave nursing home residents none.

All ratings have been updated on MFO Premium site, including MultiSearch, Great Owls, Fund Alarm (Three Alarm and Honor Roll), Averages, Dashboard of Profiled Funds, Portfolios, Quick Search, and Fund Family Scorecard. The site now includes several analysis tools, including Correlation, Rolling Averages, Trend, Ferguson Metrics, Calendar Year and Period Performance.
November marked the second time this year that the S&P 500 posted a greater than 10% return. The other month was April, the beginning of the current bull market … 8 months ago … or was that 80 years ago?
There are about 2,400 mutual funds and ETFs in the US Equity category (aka SubType). Their average 8-month return is nearly 50% and 24 of these funds have more than doubled, as described here.

> I tried VBILX, for YTD old M* chart was close at 9.05, new chart 8.77%, real number 9.06
Real number? According to whom? Morningstar? That's a secondary source.
>Chuck says VBILV 9.04 YTD I say I can live with .04, .05, or .06 !
Consider chucking Chuck.
That's a tertiary source: "Except as noted below, all data provided by Morningstar, Inc."
(Footnote on Chuck's page for VBILX)
Primary source, Vanguard: 9.05% YTD (Recent investment returns table, YTD as of 12/4/20 column)
https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/profile/performance/vbilx
Of course Vanguard is correct. You can prove it yourself.
Start with 100 shares purchased on 12/31/2019. Calculate the dollar amount of the divs paid each month and how many shares that buys based on the end of month reinvestment price. (Vanguard provides a table with all this data here.) Add those shares, rinse and repeat. After 11 months (divs for Jan-Nov), you'll have 102.107 shares.
Add to the current (12/4/20) value of those shares the accrued divs for four days. One can approximate that by taking: 4/30 x Nov div/share x 102.107 shares = 28¢
The increase in value (from $1181.00 to $1287.85) , is 9.05% of the original value.

Per share	Record/		Reinv	Bought	Total 	Share		Accrued
dividend	reinvest 	price	Shares	Shares	Value		Divs
(Now)		$12.61 			$1,287.57 	$0.284
$0.020830	11/30/2020	$12.66 	0.168	102.107		
$0.021910	10/30/2020	$12.55 	0.178	101.939		
$0.021760	9/30/2020	$12.65 	0.175	101.761		
$0.022890	8/31/2020	$12.66 	0.183	101.586		
$0.023520	7/31/2020	$12.75 	0.187	101.403		
$0.023540	6/30/2020	$12.59 	0.189	101.216		
$0.024980	5/29/2020	$12.47 	0.202	101.027		
$0.024320	4/30/2020	$12.34 	0.198	100.825		
$0.025300	3/31/2020	$12.10 	0.210	100.627		
$0.024390	2/28/2020	$12.30 	0.199	100.417		
$0.026390	1/31/2020	$12.09 	0.218	100.218		
$0.026630	12/31/2019	$11.81 	100.000	100.000	$1,181.00 	
(Share value + accrued divs - original purchase) / original purchase = 9.05%	

BTW, the new chart shows 9.0584% from 12/31/19 to 12/4/20. Take a closer look.