Where will indexer find shares of Tesla...from Tesla of course:
tesla-equity-sale-comes-at-a-good-time-for-index-fund-trackers

A good friend, like many, is experiencing this first hand:

Today, Nordstrom corporate is doing all they can to get people to shop online. Meanwhile, they still pay their in-store employees on commission. Except, no one is in the store because of Covid fear-mongering and policy. Nordstrom corporate won’t change their pay policy to amend it for the new reality, and employees are suffering terribly. All employees in-store do is process returns. The overarching Covid policy combined with the corporate policy is bankrupting them.

corporations-and-civil-disobedience

April 20, 2020 Oil (WTI) hit a 138 year low price of (-$39).

At the start of 2020 the big industrial economies were healthy, investors were optimistic, and West Texas Intermediate was trading at about $60 a barrel. Prices began to fall in February after the first reports of the coronavirus. That accelerated as the outbreak turned into a pandemic. By the end of March, WTI futures were at $20, the lowest they’d been since after Sept. 11. Then, after tense negotiations, the big oil producers—led by Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the U.S.—agreed to reduce production by 10% to try to stabilize prices.
Then on April 20th, 2020 oil prices sank.
Here’s how it works: Imagine a trader sees that WTI is at $10 and predicts it’s going to end the day at $5. To capitalize, he buys 50,000 barrels in the TAS market, agreeing to purchase oil at wherever the price ends up by 2:30 p.m. At the same time, he starts selling regular WTI futures: 10,000 barrels for $10 and then, if the market is falling as predicted, 10,000 more at $9, and again at $8. As the settlement window approaches, the trader accelerates his selling, offloading a further 10,000 contracts at $7, then another chunk at $6, helping push the price lower until, sure enough, it settles at $5. By now he is “flat,” meaning he’s sold as many barrels as he’s bought and isn’t obliged to take delivery of any actual oil.
The trader’s bet has come off. His profit is $150,000, the difference between what he sold oil for (50,000 barrels at prices ranging from $10 to $6, for a total of $400,000) and what he bought it for in TAS contracts (50,000 barrels at $5 a barrel, or $250,000). All of this is perfectly legal, providing the trader doesn’t deliberately try to push the closing price down to an artificial level to maximize his profits, which constitutes market manipulation under U.S. law. Manipulation can result in civil penalties such as fines or bans, or even criminal charges carrying a potential prison sentence of up to 10 years. It’s also illegal in the U.S. to place trades during or before the settlement with “intentional or reckless disregard” for the impact.

Story Here:
stock-market-when-oil-went-negative-these-essex-traders-pounced

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/891190/000168386320015018/f7596d1.htm
(VUSXX)
497 1 f7596d1.htm VANGUARD TREASURY MONEY MARKET FUND 497
 
Vanguard Treasury Money Market Fund
Supplement Dated December 10, 2020, to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Dated December 20, 2019
Effective immediately, the investment minimum for Vanguard Treasury Money Market Fund (“Fund”) is lowered from $50,000 to $3,000. All references to the Fund’s minimum investment amount are hereby updated to reflect the new investment minimum.
  © 2020 The Vanguard Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
Vanguard Marketing Corporation, Distributor.PS 030K 122020

“We also started seven new positions in the equity portfolio. These can be divided into two principal groups: 1) high-quality businesses with valuations we had previously deemed to be too high, and 2) COVID-cyclical companies with stock prices that have declined sharply due to the pandemic. In the first category, we established positions in Facebook and Medtronic.”
From: Dodge & Cox Balanced Fund Semi-Annual Report - June 30, 2020
Just hope we don’t take a beating on this one. :(

Additional side effects are surfacing with regard to the Pfizer vaccine that were not observed during trails (individuals with allergy sensitivities at greater risk to negative side effects). This may slow its deployment.
Allergy-risk-Pfizer-jab-TWO-patients-fall-ill
MA reporting today that 64% of all state deaths are still occurring in senior care facilities. Many of these residents leave the care facility to be treated by area hospitals and then are being sent back to the facility where special wings are being setup when possible. Contracting Covid-19 complicates the already compromised health of this population.
Using MA data, that means 36% of Covid-19 related deaths are occurring outside of these facilities. Again, do some / most of these individuals often have compromised health issues? The vaccines (with all there potential side effects) may be the best response for both of these populations.
We hear a lot about positivity rates which is important when dealing with the problem of transmission, but does anyone have numbers on the death rate of "healthy" individuals? Herd immunity...which is a thing... will play a part in this population because we mingle more in herds.
Seniors home residents seem to be our top priority going forward, then our general population that have preexisting conditions.
coronavirus & preexisting conditions
Masks, vaccines, and common sense behavior all play a part for the rest of us
As far as the economy is concerned. Senior facility have little impact. E-commerce has entered into a perfect storm and should emerge stronger than ever. Home based businesses will grow. Small businesses (in- store retail) are being tested, while big box retail gains market share. Travel and leisure businesses are in full stress test mode. For individuals whose jobs are going away we'll need re-training programs, Shifting resources toward construction and infrastructure projects would make good sense.

Basically if you're under 60 and healthy there's a 99% chance you'll live. As you get older the risk of death increases greatly.

This could prove significant:https://cnn.com/2020/12/09/tech/facebook-antitrust-lawsuit-ftc-attorney-generals/index.html

I have been using great risk reward funds since 2000 but in the last several years and especially since retirement I just sell to cash when I see extreme market conditions. It's the only sure way to protect my portfolio. When a black swan shows up is years such as 2008,2009,2020 there is no way to know what will work and what used to work before may not work in the future.

Thank you, FD1000,
I agree that each bear market is different and they are less predictable with massive quantities of stimulus. I reduce my exposure to stocks to 25% following Benjamin Graham’s guidelines late in the business cycle. MFO has been great to identify lower risk funds. I am pleased with the low downturns in my portfolio which is rising slow and steady.

Hi Lynn, great article.
I have been using great risk reward funds since 2000 but in the last several years and especially since retirement I just sell to cash when I see extreme market conditions. It's the only sure way to protect my portfolio. When a black swan shows up is years such as 2008,2009,2020 there is no way to know what will work and what used to work before may not work in the future.
I have several criteria but the easiest one is the VIX, when...VIX>30 get ready...VIX>35 start selling...VIX>40 rapid selling. The catch of course is not to stay out for longer term. I have been out of the market about 3% of the times in the last 10 years.
As you said correctly: "All Weather" Permanent Portfolio created by Harry Brown in 1980's. It was made of four equal weighted assets of gold, cash, stocks, and long term treasuries. It's performance has worked well in some environments and not others. This portfolio performance was poor since 2010 (PRPFX isn't exactly it but close enough) compared to VBINX(60/40) and VWINX(40/60) see (link).

Does M* calculate fund metrics (for example risk and volatility measures or value and growth measures) themselves or is data provided by a third party?

M* site shows you several risk metrics see (this) or the old site was easier where you can compare several funds see (this)
PV is a great site with many metric and you can run different scenarios and trading dates, see (this)

It looks like HFCSX has a history of not being tax efficient. Its tax cost ratio, not counting the current distribution (figures are through Nov. 30th) is 2.29% for one year and 2.18% for three years. Though funds in its category, MCG, are typically not tax efficient. On average they lost 1.85% to taxes annually over the past three years.
Last year HFCSX distributed about 10% of its NAV (click on 2019 box here). 2020 was a great year for growth funds, so one would not be surprised to see cap gains distributions double or triple that of last year's.
For example, one of the handful of other mid cap growth funds with mid cap blend portfolios, HMDYX, had a cap gains distribution in 2019 of 2.28%, while its estimate for 2020 is 10.62%.
"They don't deserve to have my funds."
Is it because of their cap gains distribution this year, though last year's 10% was tolerable? Or is it at least in part because of the fund's recent anemic performance of 4.45% YTD? None of the MCG funds with MC blend portfolios did better than average for the category; still HFCSX's performance was way under that of its peers.
"I'll be liquidating in 30 days."
If you're worried about wash sales, your net gain (or loss) will come out the same regardless since you're liquidating. Or are you thinking about postponing any remaining gain in your shares until 2021? (That would be 23-24 days.)

Additional side effects are surfacing with regard to the Pfizer vaccine that were not observed during trails (individuals with allergy sensitivities at greater risk to negative side effects). This may slow its deployment.
Allergy-risk-Pfizer-jab-TWO-patients-fall-ill
MA reporting today that 64% of all state deaths are still occurring in senior care facilities. Many of these residents leave the care facility to be treated by area hospitals and then are being sent back to the facility where special wings are being setup when possible. Contracting Covid-19 complicates the already compromised health of this population.
Using MA data, that means 36% of Covid-19 related deaths are occurring outside of these facilities. Again, do some / most of these individuals often have compromised health issues? The vaccines (with all there potential side effects) may be the best response for both of these populations.
We hear a lot about positivity rates which is important when dealing with the problem of transmission, but does anyone have numbers on the death rate of "healthy" individuals? Herd immunity...which is a thing... will play a part in this population because we mingle more in herds.
Seniors home residents seem to be our top priority going forward, then our general population that have preexisting conditions.
coronavirus & preexisting conditions
Masks, vaccines, and common sense behavior all play a part for the rest of us
As far as the economy is concerned. Senior facility have little impact. E-commerce has entered into a perfect storm and should emerge stronger than ever. Home based businesses will grow. Small businesses (in- store retail) are being tested, while big box retail gains market share. Travel and leisure businesses are in full stress test mode. For individuals whose jobs are going away we'll need re-training programs, Shifting resources toward construction and infrastructure projects would make good sense.

Permanent Portfolio Aggressive Portfolio has estimated a $10+ distribution; some of T. Rowe Price Funds (New Horizon and New America Growth) have estimated large distributions also. Grandeur Peak Micro Cap Fund has estimated a total payout of about $1.50.
Here is M*'s November article with fund families and their largest offenders:
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1009922/capital-gains-roundup-2020-edition

My worst offender this year is BCSIX despite M* saying its turnover is only 17%. My other two Brown Capital funds are really light on the distributions, however.

And how do you invest when you finally "have won the game"...some thoughts here:
https://awealthofcommonsense.com/2020/12/how-to-invest-when-youve-already-won-the-game/

There are many wise and thoughtful contributions from several of the varsity team here on MFO. When I held one of the Fidelity Asset Manager funds way back when, then OAKBX, and then BRUFX, I believed (probably naïvely) that what I had were "all-weather" funds. The past few years have demonstrated that allocation funds work great when markets are "behaving" as they usually have. Interest rates and rates of inflation rose and fell with a certain regularity. Value stocks and growth stocks alternated with being the flavor of the year or two, but there was an alternation. Nowadays, interest rates remain far below historical levels and value securities can't find even hold-the-nose buyers. My thought is that the weather has changed so drastically that it's pointless to expect a balanced fund to thrive in this climate.
While I hold PTIAX and TMSRX in my taxable portfolio, what I expect from them is not that their managers hedge their stock holdings as a balanced fund manager might do, but that they will provide a steady stream of income or capital appreciation that does not depend on the performance of my stocks and equity funds. I have a small slice of RPGAX, but no other allocation fund in my taxable portfolio. As for my TIAA retirement account, I let Vanguard's retirement target fund managers decide what bonds to buy. The only decision I make is on the year (2025, 2030, etc.). Those mixed asset funds-of-funds represent approximately 40% of the portfolio, which is tilted farther towards equities than most 78-year-olds can tolerate. Not advice, just observations.

Laziness is not a virtue. :) - I’ve now taken the effort to Google the referenced column (November 2020 Mutual Fund Observer). I think in fairness to Ed I should post his exact words:
“ When I left Harris Associates in January of 2012, the Oakmark Equity and Income Fund had, on 12/31/2011, $18.9B in assets. Performance over the long-term had been above the relevant benchmarks. As of 10/31/2020, per Morningstar, the fund’s assets are at $7.2B, and performance has been lagging benchmarks for the last 1, 3, and 5 years.
What is the problem? Has my former colleague Clyde McGregor lost his touch? No, certainly not that I can see. The equity portion of the portfolio is a classic Harris Associates’ value portfolio, and it looks very interesting to me looking forward over a three to five-year time horizon.
There are two areas of issue. Please recognize that I am speaking about balanced funds, which is the class of investment I am most familiar with, having managed the same for more than twenty-five years at a national bank trust department as well as at Harris Associates. The first competitive issue is fees. When Fidelity’s Balanced Fund shows a 53-basis point expense ratio and Vanguard’s Wellington Fund shows a 25-basis point expense ratio (and the Vanguard Admiral share class drops that fee to 17 basis points). A 25 to 35 basis point fee disadvantage is a lot of baggage to overcome consistently in terms of its detrimental impact upon performance. If the fee disparity is larger, making up the differential becomes nigh on impossible. I will leave it to others to address the issue of the fee disadvantages relative to exchange traded funds.
The other area of disadvantage currently is fixed income as an asset class for a balanced portfolio. With rates where they are and where they are likely to be for the foreseeable future, it is almost impossible to add any value in the fixed income area without taking on extreme amounts of risk. Money market rates, when not negative, are running from zero to perhaps eight basis points. Maturities beyond two years are not compensating you for the risk you are taking on (if you are lucky, you can find 1% on a credit union’s three-year insured certificate of deposit).
I will leave aside the issue of value being out of favor as opposed to growth. Those of us who are value investors are prepared to wait through those periods of underperformance. That said, the goalposts for various asset classes have shifted. Small cap was equities with a market capitalization of $500M to $1B. Now, the range is extended up to $2.5B. And one must consider the extent to which other asset classes impinge on your allocation decisions. An article on the “Seeking Alpha” website was making an argument not too long ago that the better way to achieve portfolio diversification going forward was to pair an S&P 500 Index Fund with one of the publicly-traded C-Corporation private equity firms. It is an interesting question to think about.”
The End of Many Eras

Thanks for the pointer to the column. You can find a list of Ed Studzinski's pieces here, including his November post:
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2020/11/the-end-of-many-eras/
Your memory is perfect, right month, and 3/3 on his reasons. (More on that below.) I appreciate your additional thoughts about the quality of bonds used (Ed also commented on this in his column, saying that one can't add value without adding excessive risk). Interesting observation about using the energy sector.
Value vs. growth does seem to be a major factor. I looked at all 50%-70% allocation funds at M*. Of the 40 distinct funds with value portfolios, the number in the top half over the past five or three years can be counted on two hands. Of the 38 with star ratings, just 5 manage even four stars, with more having two stars than three. The four star fund people will recognize is BRUFX.
Cost would seem to be a smaller factor, though it could be why DODBX retains three stars. The difficulty in finding value in bonds helps explain poor absolute performance of balanced funds, but it doesn't help explain relatively poor performance. All of OAKBX's peers face this same problem.
Apparently value vs. growth has more of an impact on funds in this category than I suspected.

I'm sounding like a broken record here, but 2020 was an unusual year. Take a look at its performance since inception through 2019 instead. Over the 7¾ years, it achieved an annualized return of 5.156% vs its peers' 3.936%. Still impressive, but far from the 7% advantage you're seeing to date.
Inception to Dec 31, 2019 chart. IMHO this chart really puts this fund into perspective.
Irrespective of the fact that most of the figures you gave are long term (multi-year) results, what they're really showing you is short term performance. That's because the past year has so distorted the longer term averages. So the next question is why did it do so well on a relative basis this year?
Look at its portfolio (again in the context of the 2020 market). It's nearly off the scale on the growth side. (YTD, VIGAX has returned 36.89% vs. 16.13% for VFINX.) Was this a matter of skill, that the management took the fund to the right part of the market at the right time, or was it luck? The fund has always been growth leaning (check its portfolio history). Its peers are a much tamer group (look at the "Value and Growth Measures" section of the M* portfolio page for the fund.)
I tend to look just as much at year by year performance as cumulative performance. Especially this year, one good year can skew the numbers. Likewise, while growth has tended to do better than value or blend for a long time, it hasn't had a year like this since the dot-com bubble burst.
https://www.longtermtrends.net/growth-stocks-vs-value-stocks/
Difference in annual returns of growth and value (from Vanguard)

Thank you for all your diligent work on downside protection. Look like we will revisit March 2020 again in coming months as the pandemic rages on.