BNY has been updated
https://im.bnymellon.com/us/en/documents/manual/tax-forms/2021-early-estimated-capital-gains-november-2021.pdf
Dodge and Cox (new)
https://www.dodgeandcox.com/pdf/shareholder_services/dc_estimated_year_end_distributions_2021.pdf
Evermore (new)
https://evermoreglobal.com/our-products/global-value-fund-distributions/
Harbor Mid Cap Growth is paying 40% (But I think they switched strategies/managers this year) https://www.harborfunds.com/docs/Dividend_Estimates_HMCGF.pdf
Harbor Capital
https://assets.harborcapital.com/docs/Dividend_Estimates_2021.pdf
FPA
https://fpa.com/docs/default-source/tax-dividend-info/all-fund-year-end-2021-distributions-estimates.pdf?sfvrsn=e2d9919d_3&utm_medium=email&_hsmi=176507488&_hsenc=p2ANqtz-_pVNDZGWeFi77zgEJdgzwsWk6FOCm1LAz373HAYaS_3Rsc1zSzI2mRqVNIS7x02olDuTg4Ft4U8N2ZL6qRG8bChq3NfQ&utm_content=176507488&utm_source=hs_email

update:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908802/000139834421019444/fp0069092_497.htm
497 1 fp0069092_497.htm
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e) and Rule 497(k)
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
File Registration No.: 033-65632
SCHRODER SERIES TRUST
(the “Trust”)
Schroder Long Duration Investment-Grade Bond Fund
(the “Fund”)
Supplement dated September 30, 2021
to the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”), each dated March 1, 2021, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
On July 6, 2021, the Trust filed a supplement (the “Original Supplement”) disclosing that the Board of Trustees of the Trust approved the liquidation of the Fund and that the liquidation was scheduled to occur on or about September 30, 2021. The Fund’s liquidation has been delayed to occur on or about October 21, 2021. Accordingly, the Original Supplement has been reproduced below with this new liquidation date.
The Board of Trustees of the Trust, at the recommendation of Schroder Investment Management North America Inc. (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser of the Fund, has approved a plan of liquidation providing for the liquidation of the Fund’s assets and the distribution of the net proceeds pro rata to the Fund’s shareholders. In connection therewith, the Fund is closed to new investments. The Fund is expected to cease operations and liquidate on or about October 21, 2021 (the “Liquidation Date”). The Liquidation Date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.
Prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders may redeem (sell) their shares in the manner described in the “How to Sell Shares” section of the Prospectus. For those shareholders that do not redeem (sell) their shares prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute to each such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date.
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, the Adviser may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate the Fund’s orderly liquidation, such as by holding cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
The liquidation distribution amount will include any accrued income and capital gains, will be treated as a payment in exchange for shares and will generally be a taxable event for shareholders investing through taxable accounts. You should consult your personal tax advisor concerning your particular tax situation. Liquidation costs will be accrued on the date of this Supplement and shareholders remaining in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will not be charged any additional fees by the Fund associated with the liquidation. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
SCH-SK-016-0100

@Old_Joe,
I think I have 14 shares and a fraction in total. I am sure I picked up the 98% of them when I first purchased it with a $250 initial investment. I am sitting on a huge amount of capital gains but I am not going to sell it. I think I will wait until I see a split or huge pullback on it.

Comparing Portfolios such as the Golden Butterfly to others, especially during the SWR (Safe Withdrawal Rate) period of life:
(note: this is discussed as if you were a UK investor)
drawdown-strategy

I sold TTRCX in 6/2015 when I discovered a sizeable allocation to Ukrainian debt, which scared the **** out of me ! At that point, return of capital outweighed return on capital . ( Templeton A shares still carried loads then)

There's a difference between liquidating a fund position because one has lost faith in the fund and adjusting the holding because of performance. (Part of the original question included the example: "sell 25% of holding for each 20% gain in a year".)
Performance based adjustments can be done mechanically, based on one's target allocations.
I generally concur with observant1's approach, though I'm more inclined to let a "loser" ride longer, say three years. How much history I use depends on how the fund is managed.
If a fund has a distinctive style, I'll tend to give it more slack. One reason is that it would be difficult to replace. Another more important reason is that because of its style, it may be more likely to do better, or worse, over extended (multi-year) periods.

---

Here's a good exercise, given that "everyone" thinks M* should have downgraded TPINX before now. When would you have sold it, and why?
The fund had great years through 2010, so let's look at the past decade. Here's a M* page with that data. Pay attention to the benchmark index (world gov bond index) rather than the category returns since the fund was not in that category until recently.
http://performance.morningstar.com/fund/performance-return.action?t=TPINX
In relative terms it was only in 2017 that performance began to fall apart. While it beat its index by 2½% in 2018, it underperformed substantially in 2017 (-5%+), 2019 (-5%+), and hugely in 2020 (-14½%).
After its great 2012, in 2013 and 2014 the fund returned very little (2%, 1½%). Would you have sold even though on a relative basis it did great (2013) and average (2014)?
Would you have sold at the end of 2015 after those two low return years followed by 2015 when the fund landed squarely in the middle of the pack and fell just short of its benchmark?
Surely you would not have sold after 2016, which was a fine year (6%+ vs 1.6% for its benchmark).
Would you have sold after 2017 which was the first really clear bad year on a relative basis? Or would you have waited to see what would happen?
If you did wait, would you have felt comforted by the 2018 performance when the fund again beat most of its peers and beat its benchmark by over 2%? Or would you have looked at the absolute performance of 1.27% and said to yourself: this is even worse than 2017 where it returned just 2.35%. I don't care about relative performance, I'm out?
After 2019's relative disaster, would you have called it quits, perhaps because two of the previous three years (2017, 2019) were very bad (each 5%+ under the benchmark)?
Or would you have waited for two successive bad years relative to its benchmark? It took until 2019-2020 for that to happen.

SOXL QQQ or Asml could be good for intermediate to long term. Been trading these recently with good gains
Held QQQ since 2012 very happy with it
May add more ASML tomorrow/maybe on sale

Yes, that's the way that I see it also. Back in 2020 I had owned 50 shares, and sold them for what I thought was a decent 5k profit. Totally stupid move. I'm going to stick around this time. Will buy more if it continues downward.
Thanks again- appreciated your thoughts.
OJ

I appreciate the honesty of posters acknowledging losses as well as gains: you win some, you lose some.

Part of my point anyway was that over 5+ quarters I have had no losses from simply going with my gut. No repeatable or 'point-outable' skill for these repeated gains, just my sense about buying diplets, and then, surely, luck, such has been the continuing and ever-returning strength of the bull sentiment that always plows over and past dips.
Possibly, indeed probably worse outcome than buy-hold. But it is for me way less nerve-racking. I am not about to formalize it w arithmetic trigger criteria.

I appreciate the honesty of posters acknowledging losses as well as gains: you win some, you lose some.
One theory of market timing, and let's be frank here this is timing, is that while it may not improve returns it should reduce volatility. One may not get out at the top or in at the bottom, but that's the point - one is getting a smoother ride by lopping off peaks as well as avoiding deep valleys.
But one of the articles I cited (the one quoting Sam Lee) stated that " it turns out the buy-the-dip strategy [described in the piece] would earn a third of return of a buy-and-hold strategy with much higher volatility."
Thinking that this increased volatility might just be a result of the particular trigger threshold selected, I dug up this 2021 WSJ article writing about a new study:

Although active investors tend to “chase stability”—they are trying to minimize volatility by market timing—they end up doing the exact opposite, according to the research, as they invest in stocks after past volatility is low and before future volatility is high. ... Such investors are chasing safe winners, but they’re actually getting risky losers.

WSJ, Jan 23, 2021 A New Reason Investors Shouldn’t Try to Time the Stock Market
It's worth contrasting this with the Fidelity page bee cited. That also talks about buying less volatile stocks. But unlike the WSJ piece that concerns active traders, the Fidelity page appears to be more about long term positioning of one's portfolio. It gives 30 year performance figures. It discusses how a defensive portfolio performs over a full market cycle as opposed to getting defensive stocks in one part of a cycle and going aggressive in another.
In the interest of full disclosure, I haven't yet read the paper discussed by the WSJ.

Below is some hasty / lazy work for me to show myself my actual practice since covid onset and I sold off nearly everything after return to breakeven summer '20 (as I was sure covid would be this bfd hit to all markets).
- All dip buying and selling were done by feel, not by percentage or any defensible criterion other than 'ooh, ooh, it just went down pretty sharply', ... just because it eventually hit me over the head that p/e be damned, this market was just too strong and kept returning to strength, for all the reasons already mentioned by others.
- I am too chicken to figure out if buy-hold woulda been better, but I suspect so, given said unstoppable market strength.
What the below activity did was make me feel better about my fairly quick / short 'defensive' darts in and out of the traffic.
buys and sells of VON_, AOR, and/or CAPE, plus a TRP mfund
(gains; no losses; all Roth, so no tax consequence)
bot 6/11/20 and sold the next day, >1%
bot 10/28/20 and sold 11/13/20, 10%
bot 2/25/21 and sold 4/9/21, 7%
bot 4/22/21 and sold 5/6/21, >3%
bot 5/12/21 and sold 5/14/21, <3%
bot 6/18/21 & 7/6/21 and sold 9/22/21, <3%
bot 7/2/21 and sold 9/2/21, <1%
bot 7/19/21 and sold 8/3/21, >2%
bot 8/4/21 and sold 8/11-2/21, 1%
bot 8/18/21 and sold 9/1/21, 5%
bot 9/20/21 and sold 9/23/21, 3%
I am again now almost completely out of equities.
And of course the kick-myself revenge makeup motive going on here was to try and recoup the hundreds of thou lost by my summer 2020 selloff decisions, after the big covid dip. If I had stayed the equities course (duh) we would have enough extra now to half-forgive kids' debts to us, lavish on grandchildren education funding, replace a car and roof and such, and give way more seriously to a few charities and colleges.

Since people were writing about the current "dip" (less than 4%) I used current data. I would have gone back only through 2021 except that there was no dip in 2021 worth mentioning. So I looked at a full year (12 months of monthly investing).
Since people were considering a trigger of less than 4% here, and since I'm not going to do every combo, I did only the 3% 2020 trigger comparison:
Lump sum: 17.37% gain if invested Jan 2.
Lump sum: 18.22% gain if invested Feb 24th (after 4.7% drop from Feb 19):
Gains through 12/31/2020 when $100 invested on first trading day of month:
$17.37 + $17.56 + $23.36 +
$54.04 + $34.26 + $24.11 +
$21.54 + $14.80 + $7.07 +
$11.54 + $13.81 + 2.69 = $242.15
Gains through 12/31/2020 when $100 invested on the day market dips 3%+ (dip period in paren):
$18.41 (Jan 17-31) + $18.22 (Feb 19-24) + $26.03 (Mar 4 - Mar 5) +
$54.04 (Mar 26-Apr 1) + $34.66 (May 11-13) + $26.25 (June 8-11) +
$9.26 (Sept 2-3) + $9.26 (Sept 2-3) + $9.26 (Sept 2-3) +
$9.97 (Oct 12-19) + $0 (no 3% dips after Oct) + $0 (no 3% dips after Oct) = $215.36
This isn't even close. BTD helped a little in Jan, Feb, Mar, and June. But in the second half of the year as the market resumed its climb, it was months until there was another noticeable dip. That was in Sept. So a lot of ground was lost by waiting months to invest more money. And with no dips worth notice after October, $200 (the Nov and Dec allocations) remained univested.
FWIW:

• Jan dip was just over 3% for the dates indicated and market didn't go down further.
  
• Feb dip was 4.7% for dates indicated and continued down in Feb for a total of over 12%, so Feb allocation would have been invested at some point regardless of the trigger.
  
• March dipped over 12% by March 9th, so regardless of the trigger, BTD would have bought. And it would have been way too soon. The market continued to drop a total of over 28% in March before rebounding in the last week of the month.
  
• April 1 was the end of a 6%+ decline.
  
• May dip was 3.7% and didn't go down further.
  
• June dip was over 7% and didn't go down further.
  
• Sept dip was 3½% and continued to go down for a total of 9½% through the third week of Sept.
  
• Oct dip was just 3%, but after a 1% bounce, the market resumed its decline for a total of 7½% through the end of Oct.

Only when the market falls by 5% and if I think the market is overreacting, I used to start getting interested in adding. If the draw down continues to 6-7% or more, I used to start buying. My last buy the dip was a measly 3% increase in equities on October 30, 2020, after having bought equities massively in March-April and dripping in through August. 2021 has been a year of buy the diplets (not dips). I will never understand why the same smart guys allowed the market to dip 8% in October 2020 while a 2-3% drop now is considered a buying opportunity. The peak of economic growth rate was sometime in March and by April-May, India had already shown us what to expect from Covid variants. I am not trying to fight the market or win investing championships - I am trying to understand it to better sync with its rhythms - of course, I have been out of sync in 2021.

Long dissertation there about BTD, little of which is applicable to our specific situation.
If the poster was directing all that at me, maybe ask me some simple questions first next time, like, "What is the source(s) of your BTD funds?" and "What parameters, if any, do you you set?"
My answers would have been...We keep very little cash. 2020 and 2021 BTD funds came/come from the small % of cash on hand, selling bond OEFs, and/or maturing CD proceeds. We don't set ranges for the depth of the dip. We don't buy it every time and sometimes we buy bigger chunks than others. We had no funds available for the mid-Aug 2021 dip and chose to NOT sell any bond OEFs that time around. So EVERY 2020 and 2021 dip BUY we made has a positive TR. More importantly and relevant to any analysis of this issue though, the TR of EVERY BTD trade is incrementally-to-exponentially greater than its TR had the funds stayed where they were. So, enough of all that stuff.

@msf : Are you cherry picking ? Do the year 2020 & let me know how that works out .
Thank you in advance , Derf

BTD sounds good in theory, but then so does "buy low, sell high". Easier said than done.
1. Where does the cash come from?
2. When does one pull the trigger, i.e. how much does the dip need to be to buy?
The examples below are not intended to "prove" that BTD doesn't work. Sometimes it does, sometimes it doesn't. Obviously if one waits for too large a dip before buying, one is stuck holding cash forever. And if one pulls the trigger on small dips, one risks losing a little bit on most buys - there are frequent small dips that don't bring the market back down to below where you started.
So I'm curious about how people choose their thresholds and where they get their cash.

---

Here are some sample scenarios starting on Oct 1, 2020 (roughly a year ago), comparing BTD with "buy when cash is available". I use VFIAX as the investment vehicle and market proxy. Red font indicates longer delays (more than a month) before investing on a dip.
For Q1 (where does the cash come from), I have worked through two hypotheticals:
a) One starts with $1200 on Oct 1
b) One has a spare $100 (perhaps from income) at the beginning of each month ($1200 total)
For Q2 (when to buy the dip), I've worked through 1%, 2%, 3%, 4%, 5%, 6%, 7% triggers. There were no dips of 8% or more over the past year.
Lump sum investing: 33.6844% gain on $1200 = $404.21 gain (returns from M*)
Lump sum, invest on dip (on day fund drops specified percentage):
1% dip (Oct 12-Oct 14): 29.4760% gain on $1200 = $353.71 gain
2%, 3% dips (Oct 12 - Oct 19): 31.8043% gain on $1200 = $381.65 gain
4% dip (Oct 12 - Oct 27): 33.1892% gain on $1200 = $398.27 gain
5%, 6%, 7% dips (Oct 12 - Oct 28): 38.0612% on $1200 = $456.73 gain; these are winners
To come out ahead in this time frame with a lump sum and waiting for a dip, one must wait for a 5% - 7% dip. Any faster trigger and one gains less. Any slower trigger, i.e. waiting for an 8%+ dip that never comes, and one is left holding cash and losing out on a $400 gain.
Monthly $100 investing (not waiting for dip):
Oct 1: 33.68% x $100 = $33.68 gain
Nov 2: 36.40% x $100 = $36.40 gain
Dec 1: 23.07% x $100 = $23.07 gain
Jan 4: 21.64% x $100 = $21.64 gain
Feb 1: 19.13% x $100 = $19.13 gain
Mar 1: 15.08% x $100 = $15.08 gain
Apr 1: 11.56% x $100 = $11.56 gain
May 3: 6.87% x $100 = $6.87 gain
June 1: 6.47% x $100 = $6.47 gain
July 1: 3.45% x $100 = $3.45 gain
Aug. 2: 1.78% x $100 = $1.78 gain
Sept. 1: -1.44% x $100 = -$1.44 (loss)
Total gain: $177.69
----------------------
Monthly $100 investing, waiting for a 1% dip:
Oct 1, dip Oct 12-14, 29.48% x $100 = $29.48 gain
Nov 2, dip Nov 16-18, 26.40% x $100 = $26.40 gain
Dec 1, dip Dec 8 -11, 22.97% x $100 = $22.97 gain
Jan 4, dip Jan 8 - 15, 19.38% x $100 = $19.38 gain
Feb 1, dip Feb 12-22, 15.87% x $100 = $15.87 gain
Mar 1, dip March 1 - 3, 17.37% x $100 = $17.37 gain
Apr 1, dip April 16 - 20, 8.39% x $100 = $8.39 gain
May 3, dip May 7 - 10, 6.94% x $100 = $6.94 gain
June 1, dip Jun 14 - 18, 7.30% x $100 = $7.30 gain
July 1, dip July 12 - 16, 3.23% x $100 = $3.23 gain
Aug 2, dip Aug 16 - 18, 1.39% x $100 = $1.39 gain
Sept 1, dip Sep 2 - 10, -0.29% x $100 = - $0.29 (loss)
Total gain: $158.43
----------------------
Monthly $100 investing, waiting for a 2% dip:
Oct 1, dip Oct 12-19, 31.80% x $100 = $31.80 gain
Nov 2, dip Jan 25 - 27, 19.92% x $100 = $19.92 gain
Dec 1, dip Jan 25 - 27, 19.92% x $100 = $19.92 gain
Jan 4, dip Jan 25 - 27, 19.92% x $100 = $19.92 gain
Feb 1, dip Feb 12-25, 17.27% x $100 = $17.27 gain
Mar 1, dip March 1 - 3, 17.37% x $100 = $17.37 gain
Apr 1, dip May 7 - 12, 10.23% x $100 = $10.23 gain
May 1, dip May 7 - 12, 10.23% x $100 = $10.23 gain
June 1, dip Jun 14 - 18, 7.30% x $100 = $7.30 gain
July 1, dip July 12 - 19, 4.89% x $100 = $4.89 gain
Aug 2, dip Sept 2 - 14, 0.30% x $100 = $0.30 gain
Sept 1, dip Sept 2 - 14, 0.30% x $100 = $0.30 gain
Total gain: $159.45
----------------------
Monthly $100 investing, waiting for a 3% dip:
Oct 1, dip Oct 12-19, 31.80% x $100 = $31.80 gain
Nov 2, dip Jan 25 - 29, 21.08% x $100 = $21.08 gain
Dec 1, dip Jan 25 - 29, 21.08% x $100 = $21.08 gain
Jan 4, dip Jan 25 - 29, 21.08% x $100 = $21.08 gain
Feb 1, dip Feb 12-26, 17.82% x $100 = $17.82 gain
Mar 1, dip March 1 - 4, 19.12% x $100 = $19.12 gain
Apr 1, dip May 7 - 12, 10.23% x $100 = $10.23 gain
May 1, dip May 7 - 12, 10.23% x $100 = $10.23 gain
June 1, dip Sept 2 - 20, 2.25% x $100 = $2.25 gain
July 1, dip Sept 2 - 20, 2.25% x $100 = $2.25 gain
Aug 2, dip Sept 2 - 20, 2.25% x $100 = $2.25 gain
Sept 1, dip Sept 2 - 20, 2.25% x $100 = $2.25 gain
Total gain: $161.44
----------------------
Monthly $100 investing, waiting for a 4% dip:
Oct 1, dip Oct 12-27, 33.19% x $100 = $33.19 gain
There are no 4% or greater dips after October, so $1100 remains uninvested
Total gain: $33.19
----------------------
Monthly $100 investing, waiting for 5%, 6%, 7% dip:
Oct 1, dip Oct 12-28, 38.06% x $100 = $38.06 gain
There are no 4% or greater dips after October, so $1100 remains uninvested
Total gain: $38.06

@stillers
I would add that there are way less outstanding shares/co's to purchase over the past 10-12 years..due to private co's having easier access to capital no need to go public, sure buybacks, different less capital intensive co's such as software based need less capital so no rush to go to market, etc.
So would it be wrong to say that this is an "inflationary scenario" causing the market to continusouly rise due to supply/demand....more money chasing less product....
"Transitionary"...who knows??
Baseball Fan

"There must be some phenomenon market pundits have not been able to explain that is causing an overriding sentiment to keep the market in an upward trajectory and they are describing the symptom (BTD) as the cause."
No need to look for a phenomenon.
The list is pretty endless, and somewhat obvious.
Thinking out loud in no particular order...
1. Liquidity - a FED juiced market
2. Most bonds ain't worth the risk
3. Endless supply of new money - trillions of dollars on the sidelines
4. Inflation - while others worried/worry about it, we reallocated higher %'s to stocks starting late 2020 (We weren't/aren't alone in that strategy
5. Duh, the US stock markets have historically been/are still the best investments on the planet
6. Oh those millenials https://www.yahoo.com/finance/news/hard-bearish-stock-market-risk-121500864.html
7. Add any of a number of other reasons
Alternatively...
https://fifthperson.com/why-the-stock-market-keeps-rising/

Really like HNDL, the others meh except for HIPS which is a train wreck.

Man, what does this tell you? :
HNDL, which is a fund-of-funds, has a target distribution strategy that you often find in the closed-end fund universe.
... On the downside, the fund's distribution is dependent upon the performance of the fund. If the share price goes down, your dividend also goes down.
... The fixed distribution strategy is the unique feature and must be watched closely because it has the potential to be good or bad. Because it aims to distribute an annualized rate of 7% of assets, HNDL needs to generate that type of total return in order for it to "stay above water".
The fund will, of course, distribute any income that is generated, but any shortfall from the 7% target needs to be made up by the fund's net assets. That could include capital gains generated by the fund or what's considered a "return of capital", which is essentially returning the investor's initial investment. ...

The ETF launched on Tuesday under SOC.
"SPC is a renter, not an owner," said CrossingBridge's Founder and Portfolio Manager, David Sherman. "In other words, we aim to capture the fixed income nature of pre-merger SPACs purchased at a discount-to-collateral value with a potential equity pop from shareholders reacting favorably to an announced deal. But we are not interested in being an equity investor post-business combination – that is a whole different ballgame."
According to CrossingBridge, SPACs offer very similar characteristics to fixed income securities, which include:
· SPACs have a liquidation date which is equivalent to a bond's maturity date.
· SPAC common stock shareholders have a full-redemption right upon a business combination, similar to a change-of-control put provision found in corporate debt indentures.
· SPACs are fully collateralized by U.S. government securities for the benefit of SPAC common stock shareholders to be released upon a redemption or liquidation. Hence, when an investor purchases SPAC common stock below its pro rata trust account value and holds the security to redemption or liquidation date, the investor will receive a positive yield, similar to a fixed income security's yield to maturity.
· SPACs may have equity upside by participating in an attractive business combination. This upside is similar to a convertible bond with the added feature that SPAC investors may redeem their common shares for their collateral value rather than continue ownership post-transaction.
SPACs are not a new asset class for Sherman; he made his first SPAC investment over 15 years ago. Given the increased popularity and capital flowing into SPACs, Sherman has significantly increased the firm's exposure to SPACs during the past few years. CrossingBridge believes the market is now large and liquid enough to effectively manage SPAC-dedicated strategies.
"Our guiding principle has been, and will continue to be, that return of capital is more important than return on capital," emphasized Sherman