@Junkster Loans?
Many HY funds continue touching Ytd and multi-year highs.Here's Sept 30th commentary from two such funds.
ARTFX +13.28 Ytd
Total Assets
$ 1.8 bil
Portfolio Composition (% of total portfolio)
TOTAL 100.0%
Cash and Equivalents 5.8
Bank Loans 21.6
Corporate Bonds 72.6
Since February 2016, there has been a substantial rally in the non-investment grade credit space,particularly in the beleaguered energy and metals/mining sectors. As a result, today there is no obvious area of significant value as almost everything is trading rich. However, we believe there are pockets of dislocation in the market in a variety of sectors, including energy and the lower-rated portion of the universe that continue to offer opportunity that is idiosyncratic and credit specific. We hold that this requires considerable caution and a focus on the underlyin business quality of each respective business. In addition, with the potential for rising interest rates, we believe the ability to flex into loans and away from bonds will act as a helpful risk mitigant.
https://www.artisanpartners.com/content/dam/documents/monthly-commentary/vr/2016/sep/ARTFX-APDFX-MCommentary-0916-vR.pdf
HYOAX +14.19 Ytd
Total Assets
$ 45.5 mil
Increase in LIBOR rates has created strong technical demand for loans ...over 50% of leveraged loans now trading above par
Low worldwide G bond yields will continue ..demand for HY and levered loans..
https://az768132.vo.msecnd.net/documents/22438_2016_10_18_08_51_54_627.gzip.pdf
RPHYX
And more on LIBOR from RiverPark/David Sherman and the Cohanzick Team
LIBOR has risen to 0.85% at the end of 3Q16,a level near, or in some cases above, the LIBOR floor for many loans. At the same time, credit spreads for high yield bonds have narrowed since their 1Q16 peak such that we are now seeing a convergence of yields between leveraged loans and high yield bonds ...
The increase in loans in our portfolio may temper market volatility and provide modest price appreciation if some potential technical changes play out.
We are neither bulls nor bears. That being said, we have decidedly become defensive in our portfolios. We are “not in Kansas anymore”. The confluence of mixed signals and everincreasing exogenous risk leads us to be cautious. We are optimistic about the quality and return of our portfolios consistent with the funds’ mandates. Further, we remain nimble to take advantage of the unintended consequences resulting from government action.
http://www.riverparkfunds.com/downloads/8340_RiverPark-Cohanzick 3Q16 Shareholder Letter.pdf

line 1 in my risk profile ---ffrhx rphyx PRFRX whgix rsivx dlfrx DBLTX ostix gabcx WSHNX
-- Thanks Charles for your reply.
How would I delete one or more of the above symbols or the entire line from the Risk Profile tool to avoid duplication with other lines or clutter? I have several lines of fund symbols.
Thanks
Ralph

What you're describing isn't a Roth conversion at all. It's a distribution (counting toward your RMD) and a separate contribution to a Roth. There's no connection whatsoever. Unlike a conversion, here you don't have to show that the Roth money came from a traditional IRA.
Often funds that close will say something about whether existing shareholders are allowed to open new accounts. For example, RPHYX prospectus:

Existing shareholders ... may purchase additional ... shares of the Fund through existing or new accounts ...

In contrast, PRWCX's prospectus says:

New T. Rowe Price IRAs in the fund may be opened only through a direct rollover from an employer-sponsored retirement plan. ...The fund reserves the right, when in the judgment of T. Rowe Price it is not adverse to the fund’s interests, to permit certain types of investors to open new accounts in the fund ...

So the ability to do a Roth conversion into a new Roth IRA account is at the discretion of T. Rowe Price. I've used both of the paths above (for another fund, not PWRCX) - a direct rollover from a 401(k), and a Roth conversion (at the discretion of TRP).
As you wrote, you'll have to ask Seafarer what its policy is.

The question that arises for me is, "Do you need quick access to this cash?" If you participate in a fund supermarket, you may not be able to liquidate an MF bond fund holding for quite some time without paying a penalty. The ETF route may make more sense, but you've got to factor in commissions. For me, I'm willing to pay Schwab and TDA supermarket fund fees in exchange for the convenience of margin,commission-free ETFs, and quick transfers to my checking account if a bill has to be paid. I hold little "cash," but I have plenty of cash at my disposal. I have short-term bond holdings in RPHYX and PTIAX that were established more than 180 days ago, so I can treat them as cash and let Chuck figure out the small amount of tax I owe on a sale.

Wording - you're right, I meant to match your word, i.e. it's been miscategorized.
A slight difference in what we're saying - I'm suggesting that it cannot be properly categorized unless it is put in a class by itself, or arguably a class so small as to make rankings meaningless. That statement is perhaps equivalent to saying that no one knows what category to put it in.
Out of curiosity, what funds do people feel would be good to compare RPHYX with? Remember that if you pick just three, then only one fund will be in the top quintile, none in the second quintile, one in the third quintile, one in the fourth quintile, and one in the bottom quintile. Not the most useful statistics.

Re: "Regarding RPHYX, I think saying that it's been mischaracterized is a bit harsh."
Actually, I used "miscategorization" (which my spell-checker doesn't like).
Not a huge difference. But I think we're in agreement that M* doesn't know what category to compare it to.
Thanks for the response.

I think Morningstar is pretty clear that star ratings are scorecards, while medals are buy recommendations. Neutral and negative seem to be hold and sell recommendations, respectively. So I wouldn't try to map star ratings into buy/sell/hold. An analyst (medal) rating can turn on a dime (e.g. if a manager leaves), while a star rating is unaffected by recent changes.
"[Star ratings are] strictly a historical, backward-looking measure of risk-adjusted performance. In contrast, the Morningstar Analyst Ratings are are a qualitative, analyst-driven rating based on what we feel investors could expect from a fund's performance going forward"
http://beta.morningstar.com/videos/591905/What-Are-Morningstar-Medalist-Funds.html
FWIW, I find the star ratings to be a good roll-up of past performance, while I view the analyst ratings as a beauty contest. M* has what seems to me a well earned reputation of doting too long on certain funds.
Regarding RPHYX, I think saying that it's been mischaracterized is a bit harsh. It is, if not a unique fund, a very unusual one with no (or few) good peers with which to compare. You can't rate a fund that's in a class by itself, so it winds up in a class with only distantly related funds.
Great Owls uses Morningstar categories, so it evidences some of the same category distortions. (I like comparing M* and Lipper scoring because Lipper tends to have more focused categories, though its downside is that this can result in small numbers of peer funds.)

@MSF - Understood. So at M* would 3-stars constitute the "hold" opinion / 4&5 the "buy" / and 1&2 the "sell"?
While we're on the subject, RPHYX seems to be all over the place. MFO puts it in the Great Owl category. M* gives it 3 (hold I presume). Lipper's ratings are scattered by attribute, but generally average around 3. MaxFunds gives it only 60 on a 100 point scale - but than classifies it "fair" That 60 looks to me like maybe Ol Max isn't quite sure whether it's a sell or a hold. (However, that might constitute a 4th opinion.) And Fund Mojo apparently hasn't yet formulated an opinion.
I've followed the discussions on RPHYX and am aware that much of the divergence of opinion relates to the catagorization (or rather miscategorization) of that fund.
Added: Can't quite get my head around the idea that there can only be 3 possible opinions expressed about a fund. There's so many things observers can evaluate beyond a simple buy, sell, hold proclamation. Are the fees appropriate? What category does the fund belong in (G&I, Balanced, Moderate Allocation, etc). How flexible are the fiduciary's exchange privileges? What are the best/worst case scenarios under bull/bear market conditions? Seems to me a prudent investor would want to seek out viewpoints on all of these before adding a fund to his portfolio.

"a low tolerance for risk"
Ummm ... you might reflect on that conclusion in light of the positioning of my portfolio, which I publish annually. In the non-retirement portfolio, about 50% of my money is in equities and 50% in income-producing securities. Within the equity sleeve, 50% is international and within international more than 50% is a combination of small, emerging and frontier. Domestic is overweight small- to micro-cap which a distinct value pitch. I have no savings account (0.01% APR does nothing for me) but instead balance very conservative income-oriented investments (the aforementioned RPHYX) with quite aggressive ones.
It might be a bit misleading to point to one fund and generalize from it. I mean, really, why is substituting RPHYX and RPSIX for CDs and a savings account "risk averse"?
My self-description would be closer to this: "I will accept no risk unless I perceive a serious assymetry, in which the probable upside is substantially greater than the probable downside." One measure of the ability of a manager to achieve that goal is to look at a risk-return ratio over a meaningful period of time. My default is Sharpe over a full market cycle. The FMC orientation simply reflects the fact that I have better things to do than try to time my portfolio; I have neither the interest nor the discipline to pull that off. Some folks do, although the evidence suggests a far larger number simply thinks they do.
So, if you start with my premise - high risk-return ratio over meaningful periods - which small caps should I be looking at? When I screen for open, retail small cap funds - domestic, global, international - no-load or load-waived at Scottrade and sort by descending Sharpe, the top ones are:
1. Intrepid Endeavor, first by a lot. ARIVX is a near-clone in terms of risk-return but it doesn't have a full cycle record.
2. Westwood Mighty Mites
3. Homestead Small Cap
4. Pinnacle Value
5. Tributary Small Cap.
If you play with the risk-reward measure (Sortino, Martin, Ulcer Index) you get a slight shuffle of the top ten with the addition of Queens Road SCV and Royce Special.
I'm not enamored with the Royce or Gabelli organizations. Love Homestead's low minimum initial investment ($500), don't love the $1.2 billion size as much. Queens Road is very much worth a look. Tributary really would qualify as "in the shadows." And still the numbers point most consistently to ICMAX and the much-derided ARIVX.
I bet you're wondering why I buy and sell funds so rarely. Briefly, I go through this sort of pondering with every single one.
David

"In May we’re also hoping to provide new profiles of two old friends: Aston River Road Independent Value and Matthews Asian Growth & Income."
My take: no passive or actively managed fund should become an "old friend." Such attachment may result in holding on to an underperforming fund for too long. Hope is not a strategy in politics or investing. Hanging on to poor performing funds with relatively high expenses is all too common among common investors, and that is why such investors routinely underperform passive funds over long periods.
As I see it, ARIVX continues to be the poster child for indexing, and any attractive risk metric it has is largely due to its crazy-high cash position, which is currently 82%. This fund cannot objectively be compared with true SCV equity funds due to its historically high cash position. Currently, this is a MMF which is dabbling in SCV stocks, and primarily provides the diversification of MMF but not SCV equities.
And when fund managers say that cash positions have increased due to decreased investment opportunities, they are in fact engaging in market timing and nothing more sophisticated. And as we all know, market timing has never worked over long periods. I hate to be so down on this fund, but I firmly believe such funds are not in the best interest of long-term investors, and I would never own such a fund or recommend such a fund to friends or family. And as much as I respect Dr. Snowball for all of his wonderful contributions at FA and MFO, I continue to be bewildered by his support for ARIVX.
As for MACSX, this is a rock-solid fund which remains true to its investment objective, and does not try to time the market with high cash positions.
Kevin

Some really nice commentary/insights kevindow I concur about the respect for the professor and his contributions here primarily the fact that he keeps this site running as a freebie and he doesn't rule with a heavy hand. He can chime in but he appears to have a low tolerance for risk (witness also RPHYX among others ) and a long time horizon (RSIVX) and I can't fault him for those traits.

------ M* PORTFOLIO ALERT = RPHYX & FPACX
Portfolio Name: all
04/05/2016
FPACX: FPA Crescent
The Morningstar Star Rating for this fund has changed from 4 stars to 5 stars. For details, click here
RPHYX: RiverPark Short Term High Yield Retail
The Morningstar Star Rating for this fund has changed from 4 stars to 3 stars. For details, click here

Hi, Ted.
You can get a sense of how close the call is when you visit Morningstar. The retail share class (RPHYX) now appears as three stars on its Morningstar profile page which the institutional share class (RPHIX) remains at four.
David

Ted, you often link to US News and World Report rankings. Do you know the dates of their data? They still show a 4 star M* rating for RPHYX, while the current rating at M* is 3 stars.
So that should give you a small window for the downgrade.
Note: RPHIX was (according to USNews) and remains (according to M*) a four star fund.

@MFO Members: Once again I ask the question when was RPHYX downgraded from four to three stars, and where on M* Website does it indicate the downgrade. I checked both January and February downgrades, nothing about RPHYX
Regards,
Ted

As David wrote, here you have an ultrashort bond fund thrown in with typically long duration funds because that's the only collection of taxable junk bonds. RPHYX has to be included somewhere, else it's in a collection with no other funds which makes for a useless collection.
American Century Calif. High Yield Muni (BCHYX) is an example of the flip side (mixing grades rather than maturities) - a junk bond fund thown in with typically investment grade funds because that's the only collection of long California-specific muni funds.
If what attracts one to a fund is something unique, then one has to live with the fact that the fund is incomparable, literally.

Right, the change simply reflects the fact that the average high-yield bond fund made 2.5% in the first quarter while RPHYX made 1%. As it turns out, this fund has virtually nothing in common with the average high-yield fund (the correlation between the two is 0.09), so its star ratings - high or low - are perpetually misleading.
David

Ralph, you do understand, don't you, that M*'s star ratings are purely quantitative, based on return and risk within the M* category, and have nothing whatsoever to do with a recommendation for or against a fund?

FROM 4 STAR TO 3 STAR

Thanks so much David_Snowball for providing some valuable and interesting insights about RSIVX! Like MikeM, I would have loved to get into RPHYX, but since that wasn't an option, I decided to puchase RSIVX in order to get exposure to another David Sherman fund based on my research at the time.

I heard about it here, so I can't take credit. FWIIW, I also heard of RPHYX and RPSIX here.