The path was a little more messy.
Rochedale Emerging Markets Portfolio, starting on Dec 11, 2011. It was reorganized into City National Rochedale Emerging Markets Fund on April 1, 2013.
It has been managed since inception by Anindya Chatterjee. On Dec 1, 2017 he (and the rest of his management team) moved to Fiera Capital, which the fund hired as subadvisor. The transaction completed on Jun 4, 2018 when Fiera Capital took over the entire fund, forming Fiera Capital Emerging Markets Fund.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1026977/000139834417015414/fp0029454_497.htm
Chatterjee formed Sunbridge Capital Partners LLC in February 2021. The Sunbridge is acquiring Fiera Capital Emerging Markets fund and Chatterjee will continue managing it. Hence the name change.
This is all inconsequential to fund investors. I checked only because name changes like this one often indicate restructurings/acquisitions.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1587982/000139834421014182/fp0066396_497k.htm
has new name, Sunbridge Capital Emerging Markets Fund, and other changes.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/896975/000119312521210622/d153325d497.htm
497 1 d153325d497.htm TWEEDY, BROWNE FUND INC.
TWEEDY, BROWNE FUND INC.
TWEEDY, BROWNE GLOBAL VALUE FUND
TWEEDY, BROWNE GLOBAL VALUE FUND II - CURRENCY UNHEDGED
(each, a “Fund” and, collectively, the “Funds”)
Supplement dated July 8, 2021
to the Prospectus (“Prospectus”) and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated July 29, 2020, each as supplemented or amended to date
Effective July 29, 2021, the Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund and Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund II – Currency Unhedged will change their names to “Tweedy, Browne International Value Fund” and “Tweedy, Browne International Value Fund II – Currency Unhedged,” respectively.
Accordingly, effective July 29, 2021, all references to Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund in the Prospectus and SAI shall be deemed to be references to Tweedy, Browne International Value Fund, and all references to Tweedy, Browne Global Value Fund II – Currency Unhedged shall be deemed to be references to Tweedy, Browne International Value Fund II – Currency Unhedged.
There are no changes to the Funds’ investment policies or other features, and the Funds’ CUSIP numbers and ticker symbols will remain unchanged.
The Funds have always been managed as international vehicles. Tweedy, Browne and the Funds’ board of directors believe that the change of the term “Global” to “International” in each Fund’s name better reflects the composition of the Fund’s portfolio, given that each Fund invests primarily in foreign equity securities.
This Supplement should be retained with your Prospectus and SAI for future reference.
TWB-Sup-July 2021-1

Hi @davidmoran
Sure, I can provide some clarity to some of the risk metrics. There is a nice tab in MFO Premium with the definition of most metrics. Here is a summary of a few:
STANDARD DEVIATION indicates the typical percentage variation above or below average return a fund has experienced in a year’s time.
Where standard deviation has limited value is that it does not measure direction. For example, the S&P 500 (SPY) will have a standard deviation that is very close to the inverse S&P 500 (SH).
DOWNSIDE DEVIATION measures a fund’s return below the risk-free rate of return, which is the 90-day T-Bill rate (aka cash).
DOWNSIDE CAPTURE compares the negative return of a fund, comprised of its negative month ending returns, to one of four indexes, over evaluation period specified, measured in percentage. So, compared to SP500, a Downside Capture of 80% means the fund retuned or "captured" only 80% of downside that the SP500 over the evaluation period specified.
ULCER INDEX measures both magnitude and duration of drawdowns in value. A fund with high Ulcer Index means it has experienced deep or extended declines, or both. Ulcer Index for money market funds is typically zero. Here is a link to a a good description of the Ulcer Index which also explains the flaws with using standard deviation (volatility) to measure risk.
MINIMUM ONE YEAR ROLLING RETURN: One of the metrics that I use are the rolling averages, specifically one or three year rolling minimum returns over the period. What this provides is the minimum return earned during the rolling time period. It is useful for comparing how well a fund recovered from some event such as the 2020 bear market.
For more information, please see:
https://www.tangotools.com/ui/ui.htm
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2017/10/rolling-averages-finally/
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2013/01/a-look-at-risk-adjusted-returns/
I hope this helps.
Regards, Lynn

Interesting analysis. If you want a contrary opinion, you’ve got it here. Rosenberg is a former chief economist at Merrill Lynch. (Bio) Excerpted judiciously. Here’s a link to the Article
“It is a good time for growth stocks, Treasury bonds, and rate-sensitive parts of the market”
The consensus is that U.S. equities will deliver strong performance as the economy recovers, and that higher inflation will drive rising interest rates. All of that is wrong, according to David Rosenberg. The Toronto-based Rosenberg started his own economic consulting firm in January 2020, Rosenberg Research & Associates, after working a decade as chief economist and strategist at Gluskin Sheff & Associates.
The “fiscal juice” from stimulus checks and the re-opening of the economy are outstripping supply, creating temporary inflation. Supply will catch up when demand subsides as the effect from the stimulus wanes, according to Rosenberg. That will happen before the end of the year.When the effect of stimulus checks expired last year, GDP declined by 2.5%. We will see a repeat of that this year, according to Rosenberg.
We don’t and won’t have a trend of inflation, Rosenberg said. Fed Chairperson Jay Powell will be right that inflation will be transitory, he said, just as deflation was a year ago when the pandemic began. Rosenberg recalled one of Bob Farrell’s classic market rules: When all the experts and forecasts agree, something else is going to happen. The consensus has never been more lopsided, he said, and that is reflected in asset allocations that heavily weight stocks relative to bonds. We are not going have a redux of the prior century’s “roaring 20s,” despite the covers of many business magazines. Rosenberg said that era had nothing in common with today; the debt-to-GDP in 1920s was 10%, which allowed for declines in personal tax rates, which will not happen in the 2020s.
When you strip out the government transfers, real personal spending is on a downward trend. The share of personal income from government spending is 28%; it has never been that high, according to Rosenberg. That is today’s “soup line,” he said, and it is temporary, based on borrowed money. Approximately 10% of the labor force is receiving government support. Economic growth has been four parts stimulus and one part reopening, according to Rosenberg.
-
Here’s a recent piece by Rosenberg …
“How to play commodities, semiconductors, COVID, tapering and the reflation trade”
Link

The writer is a monthly columnist for the WSJ. I can find no corresponding working paper through the writer's website.
Unannounced to their investors, mutual-fund managers will often lend the shares they hold ...
Unannounced?

Securities lending is a well-established practice whereby U.S. registered funds, such as mutual funds, make loans of securities to seek an incremental increase in returns for fund shareholders. This paper explains the basics of securities lending, outlines the benefits and risks for investors, and describes BlackRock’s leading approach to securities lending.

BlackRock Securities Lending, Blackrock, January 2021

Vanguard’s securities-lending program—which lends equities under the same philosophy and approach today as it has since well before the global financial crisis—is unique in its exclusive focus on benefiting our investors and not our bottom line. We adhere strictly to a "value-lending" philosophy, managing our counterparty credit limits and collateral pool internally through [Vanguard Fixed Income Group] FIG.

How well did your asset manager weather the market storm? Vanguard, Sept. 2020
Moving on:
- Do US growth, US value, US large cap, int'l, and EM really encompass all funds? ("I looked at the full sample of actively managed equity mutual funds"). What defines these categories and where do small cap blend funds or global funds fall?
- Is "average" unweighted, dollar weighted, or median: "The average percent lent out by active funds was 0.80%." An unweighted average would be propped up by a few funds lending over 20% of assets (see next item).
- "we see over 2% of funds ... lending out an average of more than 20% of their underlying holdings each year—coming close to SEC guidelines." Coming close?
From Barron's (see cite below): "Legally, exchange-traded and mutual funds can lend out as much as 50% of their unlevered securities’ portfolios to borrowers who pay them interest."
I can offer another possible explanation for his figures. It is well known (read: find sources on your own) that high ER funds tend to be more aggressive hence more volatile, in attempting to overcome their higher costs. If these funds also are more aggressive in their lending, then one would see what he is reporting: higher rates of security lending correlating with poorer performance (due to higher ERs) and higher volatility.
Related to covering costs is the question of how much of the lending revenue goes back into the fund vs. how much lines the pockets of the fund company? You can pretty well guess what Vanguard does. Other companies are less considerate of their investors. The writer did not attempt to correct for this factor. Nor did he attempt to control for ERs, e.g. by looking at gross rather than net returns.
There's an excellent piece in Barron's (by some guy going by the name of @LewisBraham) discussing this and more, albeit in the context of index funds and ETFs.
ETFs’ Hidden Source of Return—Securities Lending, Barron's April 7, 2018.

The Ulcer Index measures the length and duration of the maximum drawdown over a period of time which in this case was three years including the 2020 bear market.
Each bear market is unique, but I believe that it is a great relative risk indicator. Over the past three years the S&P 500 had an UI of 5.2.

“Retail investors keep pouring money into markets, even as many of their favorite meme stocks and cryptocurrencies have languished. In June, so-called retail investors bought nearly $28 billion of stocks and exchange-traded funds on a net basis, according to data from Vanda Research’s VandaTrack, the highest monthly amount deployed since at least 2014. That even trumped the amount retail traders spent in January during the first meme-stock frenzy.
“The activity underscores the enduring influence of ordinary investors in markets. When the Covid-19 pandemic ushered in a wave of first-time traders, many market observers suspected these investors would retreat when the economy reopened. Instead, individual investors have grown in number: More than 10 million new brokerage accounts are estimated to have been opened in the first half of this year, according to JMP Securities. That is around the total for all of 2020 …
“Retail investors’ enthusiasm is in contrast to professional money managers’ growing and ease about the market outlook. This has risen as markets on the surface appear placid but volatility has grown around individual stocks … (One) gage of retail traders’ sentiment currently shows that the group is nearly 70% confident that the US stocks will keep rising over the next three months. Meanwhile, professional traders are only about 44% confident that stocks will rally during that period.”
WSJ July 6, 2021

Lynn, thanks so much for sharing your thoughts, especially on GAVAX. I look forward to reading your commentary on non correlated assets. Your articles have really helped me, and I’m using MFO screeners more and more. I feel indebted.

Rick, Here is what I started doing. I divide my funds into three groups 1) Mixed Asset, 2) Uncorrelated, and 3) the tactical sleeve. The first two categories are buy and hold and as long as the quality of the fund is intact, I don't worry about performance. For the tactical funds, I track the previous month return, three month trend, and flows. If they are negative, I have to ask myself why? Is the fund peaking or is it blip.
On GAVIX/GAVAX, which is an uncorrelated fund, see below. The Ulcer Index is about half of the S&P 500 meaning half as risky. The average three year return is 7.4% which is good for a conservative fund. The Composite MFO Rating is 2 which is below average (3). It is not very consistent, which is not a major flaw, and it's capital preservation is good. The one month return is down as is the three month trend, and money is flowing out. The yield is 2.2%. What I like is that the correlation to the S&P 500 is only 0.58 which is low, and the downside capture is only 9.7 which is why it has a good capital preservation rating of 4.
APR 7.4
Ulcer Index 2.9
Martin Ratio 2.13
Composite Rating 2
Consistency 1
Preservation 4
1 Month -1.87
Trend -0.6
Flow -1.8
Yield 2.24
Correlation SP500 0.58
Down Cap S&P 500 9.7
The stats are good for GAVIX. I track 81 uncorrelated funds, and GAVIX rates 58. The composite rating of 2 is the only thing that I don't like. For my next MFO article, I identify six potential uncorrelated funds to own. These are COTZX, ARBIX, DEVDX, RLSIX, SPEDX, and SUBFX. I am still researching these, but already own COTZX and ARBIX.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908802/000139834421014025/fp0066718_497.htm
497 1 fp0066718_497.htm
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e) and Rule 497(k)
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
File Registration No.: 033-65632
SCHRODER SERIES TRUST
(the “Trust”)
Schroder Long Duration Investment-Grade Bond Fund
(the “Fund”)
Supplement dated July 6, 2021
to the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”), each dated March 1, 2021, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
The Board of Trustees of the Trust, at the recommendation of Schroder Investment Management North America Inc. (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser of the Fund, has approved a plan of liquidation providing for the liquidation of the Fund’s assets and the distribution of the net proceeds pro rata to the Fund’s shareholders. In connection therewith, the Fund is closed to new investments. The Fund is expected to cease operations and liquidate on or about September 30, 2021 (the “Liquidation Date”). The Liquidation Date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.
Prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders may redeem (sell) their shares in the manner described in the “How to Sell Shares” section of the Prospectus. For those shareholders that do not redeem (sell) their shares prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute to each such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date.
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, the Adviser may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate the Fund’s orderly liquidation, such as by holding cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
The liquidation distribution amount will include any accrued income and capital gains, will be treated as a payment in exchange for shares and will generally be a taxable event for shareholders investing through taxable accounts. You should consult your personal tax advisor concerning your particular tax situation. Liquidation costs will be accrued on the date of this Supplement and shareholders remaining in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will not be charged any additional fees by the Fund associated with the liquidation. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
SCH-SK-015-0100

'' Palm Valley Capital (Eric Cinnamond) must not be trustful of the waters. "
No new news there !
Derf

Well, Hussman is still the king of perma-bears. Does anybody hold any of his mutual funds? Even his defense is questionable, and there is no offense.

'' Palm Valley Capital (Eric Cinnamond) must not be trustful of the waters. "
No new news there !
Derf

@msf, thanks for your insights on EIXIX, and the fund's lack of clarity. Its a Legacy bond fund with a short history. I may be reaching a bit for that yummy yield.
Another defensive play is small cap fund PVCMX, which supposedly held an 80% cash position at 3-31-2021. Palm Valley Capital (Eric Cinnamond) must not be trustful of the waters.

“Red flag special” MWFSX
It’s so new Lipper hasn’t yet created a scorecard for it. 105% in bonds means they’re borrowing to exercise leverage. Yahoo doesn’t show duration or credit quality. But, @msf has indicated 25% below B Yikes!
Here’s Moody’s rating scale from Wikipedia Hopefully, I got the cut and paste of the chart correct. Not all junk is created equal. Some good income funds (DODIX) dabble in the BB area. Few decent funds want to go below B, although some of their BB will occasionally fall to the B level.
B2 B B B3 B− B− Highly speculative
Caa1 CCC+ C CCC C 5 Substantial risks
Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative
Caa3 CCC− Default imminent with little prospect for recovery
Most experienced investors are aware the junk bond market is not very liquid. Even daily pricing is suspect and sometimes inaccurate. During good times a fund like this can sail along posting nice returns. On those rare eventful occasions (2008 and early 2020 come to mind) these funds can submerge literally overnight. Per Warren Buffett: "It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked."
One of the better threads we’ve had in a while. Thanks to @lynnbolin2021 for joining in / sharing considerable knowledge and data.

Was looking for a HY bond fund that had held up decently ("defensive?") in 1Q 2020. Found EIXIX with a 5.5% SEC Yield.
I took only a cursory look at EIXIX so all I've got are lots of questions, not clear statements:

• What is the average credit rating for this fund? Is it really "high yield" aka "junk"? The annual report says:

  These securities that the Fund invests in are at or near the top of the capital structure, which make them relatively insulated from losses by the deal structure’s credit enhancement (i.e. preference over bonds junior to the respective tranche we are buying)

  It makes it sound like it's investing in the most senior tranches - the ones rated AAA before the GFC.
  
• The annual report also says that it "invests primarily in ... non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) that were created pre-crisis", i.e. legacy RMBS. By definition they're not issuing more of these. What is the size of that pool? How will the fund invest going forward?
  
• What is the average duration of the portfolio? The latest semiannual report seems to show most of the holding having non-fixed rates. That would suggest a very short duration. In addition, both the annual and semiannual report tell of a smattering (< 5%) interest only securities. They have negative duration, further shortening the portfolio's average duration.
  
• If most of the holdings are variable rate, which generally trade near par (little interest rate risk), what accounts for the average weighted price being just 82% of par (per M*)? This is why the SEC yield is so high - it's building in an increase in price as bonds approach maturity. (M* notes that "neither TTM nor SEC yields reflect the potential impact of future defaults.")
  Is the credit risk so severe? The annual report suggests that it is: "Legacy non-agency RMBS have measurable credit risk." It reports 18.2% of the underlying loans are 60+ days delinquent.

I haven't read up on legacy non-agency RBMSs. So all I can do is raise these questions. I don't know which numbers are most meaningful for this type of holding or what sort of risk profile they present. As I said, questions, not answers.
With respect to the 1Q20 performance, EIXIX had a drawdown of 13.76% between March 5 and March 25 (per M* interactive chart tool). M* provides tabular monthly data, that shows EIXIX losing 8.30% in March. Looking at an entire quarter gives you information about speed of recovery but less insight into the magnitude of risk.
http://performance.morningstar.com/fund/performance-return.action?t=EIXIX
For better 1Q20, March 2020, and max drawdown (daily) figures, I might look at MWFSX. It went up in 1Q20 by 1.23% (vs EIXIX dropping 6.79%). It went down in March by 1.92% (vs. EIXIX dropping 8.30%). And it's max drawdown in 2020 was 5.57% between March 5 and March 25.
All that said, it's fairly similar to EIXIX, and thus suffers from some of the same risk factors. Except that it has much greater transparency (you can find its portfolio statistics here), is more diversified ("only" 2/3 in securitized debt), and is managed by a first rate, well known team.
Portfolio Visualizer comparison.

TGHNX lost 6.8 % in 1Q 2020.

Thanks, Carew.

TGHNX lost 6.8 % in 1Q 2020.

Was looking for a HY bond fund that had held up decently ("defensive?") in 1Q 2020. Found EIXIX with a 5.5% SEC Yield. $2,500 min at VGD (TF). May be my newest addition.
Looked at GAVAX, gave up quickly on that. Sold my SWAN and DRSK. Not sure that TMSRX is going to be a keeper.
Holding onto my ARBIX and HRSAX.
Recently bought some SVARX and SFHYX (Fido).
Will keep adding to CTFAX (a keeper).
Hiding out in various bond funds (DAAIX, EXCPX, PEGAX, FPFIX, MWFSX, etc) in the hopes equities peel back. Won't hold my breath, though.
Merger arb is stalling a bit this month, but that sleeve will remain (BALPX, MERFX, HMEAX) intact.
Still liking HEGD, just wish average daily volume would increase. Will add here.
D-E-F-E-N-S-E

@Rickrmf - I don’t know anything about ARBIX (but that’s never stopped me from voicing an opinion).
M* doesn’t appear to have a rating for it
It scores very well on Lipper. Be aware their “rating” is actually a reflection of recent performance.
- Performance 4/5
- Total Return 4/5
- Capital Preservation 5/5
(Lipper does knock it down on expenses giving it just 1/5 in that area.)
What I think is significant is that the “chainsaw gang” over at Max Funds
rates it fairly highly by their standards:
Good +74/100
What’s really “wild” IMHO is that if you click the “Holdings” tab at Lipper you’ll see that ARBIX has a negative 50% weighting in stocks. That’s some shorting. I’ve never seen anything quite like it.

Great point. The FAANG stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google (Alphabet)) have dominated the broader US index for the past 10 years while the value stocks trailed by sizable margin until late 2020.
As @hank suggested above, it would be a good idea to review the top 10 holdings in each funds in your portfolio on a regular basis. Case in point, the value oriented Wellington fund, VWELX, now holds: Alphabet Inc, Microsoft, Facebook and Apple among the top 10 holdings per 5/31/2021 reporting. The fund is now categorized as blend according to M*. In the same period, Wellesley Income, VWINX holds more the traditional financial, pharma and consumer staples stocks. Also Global Wellington holds only Microsoft as #4 position. Likely I will move fund away from Wellington.