Below are extensive excerpts from a current article in The Economist. The article focuses on the parallels with the Soviet Union under Stalin. I've seriously abridged the article to include some of the more serious points that it makes.
Of those points, I think that this is one of the most important: "American army doctrine says that to face down an insurgency—in this case, one backed by NATO—occupiers need 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 people; Russia has a little over four."

When Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine, he dreamed of restoring the glory of the Russian empire. He has ended up restoring the terror of Josef Stalin. That is not only because he has unleashed the most violent act of unprovoked aggression in Europe since 1939, but also because, as a result, he is turning himself into a dictator at home.
Consider how the war was planned. Russia’s president thought Ukraine would rapidly collapse, so he did not prepare his people for the invasion or his soldiers for their mission. After two terrible weeks on the battlefield, he is still denying that he is waging what may become Europe’s biggest war since 1945. He has shut down almost the entire independent media, threatened journalists with up to 15 years in jail if they do not parrot official falsehoods, and had anti-war protesters arrested in their thousands.
And to gauge Mr Putin’s paranoia, imagine how the war ends. Russia has more firepower than Ukraine. It is still making progress, especially in the south. It may yet capture the capital, Kyiv. And yet, even if the war drags on for months, it is hard to see Mr Putin as the victor.
Suppose that Russia manages to impose a new government. Ukrainians are now united against the invader. Mr Putin’s puppet could not rule without an occupation, but Russia does not have the money or the troops to garrison even half of Ukraine. American army doctrine says that to face down an insurgency—in this case, one backed by NATO—occupiers need 20 to 25 soldiers per 1,000 people; Russia has a little over four.
The truth is sinking in that, by attacking Ukraine, Mr Putin has committed a catastrophic error. He has wrecked the reputation of Russia’s supposedly formidable armed forces, which have proved tactically inept against a smaller, worse-armed but motivated opponent. Russia has lost mountains of equipment and endured thousands of casualties, almost as many in two weeks as America has suffered in Iraq since it invaded in 2003.
And, as Stalin did, Mr Putin is destroying the bourgeoisie, the great motor of Russia’s modernisation. Instead of being sent to the gulag, they are fleeing to cities like Istanbul, in Turkey, and Yerevan, in Armenia. Those who choose to stay are being muzzled by restrictions on free speech and free association. They will be battered by high inflation and economic dislocation. In just two weeks, they have lost their country.

Those of you with good memory, could please share how (Fed, fiscal, turn in business cycle, or simple exhaustion) we snapped out of the 2015/2016 correction / bear market?

Hmmm … Not to make too fine a point of it, but the S&P lost less than 1% in 2015. It was preceded in 2014 by an 11% gain and followed in 2016 by a 9.5% gain. There may have been a bear market in there somewhere, but I don’t remember it.
- 2007-2009 was one of the worst bear markets in history based on peak to trough. But one of the shortest based on duration.
- A more recent nasty stretch was in 2018 when the S&P lost 6.24% for the year, most of that in the 4th quarter.
- Than there was the first quarter of 2020 when we fell off a cliff. However, by year end markets had recovered.
Why we snapped out of recent bears or corrections I can’t answer. But I’d say your “Fed, fiscal, turn in business cycle, or simple exhaustion” are all somewhat correct. To pick just one, I’d guess the highly accommodative Fed was the single biggest contributor. Therein lies the problem today. With short term rates so low and inflation rising the Fed might not be able to ride to the rescue next time as it has in the recent (10-15 year) past.
S&P Performance By Year

I understand tthat shale oil producers learned a hard lessonthe last time they over committed capital to drill wells that only produce a year away, but $89 a barrell is adequate for them to make a profit, especially since they can lock that price in
But you can't help but wonder if this is also a FU move, telling environmentalists " Since you want to drive me out of business, let's see how much you like it when I won't pump now"

From the same WSJ Article. Photo of economist and former U.K. central banker Charles Goodhart
who in March 2020 predicted inflation of 5-10% post pandemic.
Looks believable to me.

The answer is "no". At least in 2020, with reduced income and economic impact checks coming from the Treasury due to the pandemic, every state was a "winner". That doesn't mean states fared equally well, nor is this a situation that will persist.

For the 2020 federal fiscal year, all 50 states came out ahead. That included New York, which got a return of $1.59 for every tax dollar sent to Washington, a dramatic increase from the 91 cents it received in 2019...
Every state – and particularly hard-hit New York – received large sums of COVID-era relief at the height of the pandemic, buoyed by programs like the Payroll Protection Program for businesses and nonprofits. States also received a boost in unemployment benefits for out-of-work Americans. The extra federal funds contributed to a projected $5 billion surplus in New York’s budget this year.
It was a period that saw Congress and then-President Donald J. Trump pass the CARES Act, a $2.2 trillion package that authorized $1,200 direct stimulus payments to most Americans. ...
While New York netted $7,236 per resident on a per-capita basis, 39 states fared better. New Mexico ranked best at $16,999; New Jersey ranked last at $4,454.
... While various COVID relief programs have continued into 2021 and 2022 – helping bolster the state government’s financial footing – they will ultimately run out and return New York to its status as a “donor state.”

https://gothamist.com/news/new-york-is-no-longer-a-donor-state-at-least-for-now

Here are all bond mutual funds, excluding Specialty Income, that are above water (month ending February), sorted by return, highest on top:
Fairholme Focused Income (FOCIX)
Eaton Vance Short Duration Inflation-Protected Income I (EIRRX)
Northeast Investors Trust (NTHEX)
American Century Short Duration Inflation Protection Bond Inv (APOIX)
Fidelity Series 0-5 Year Inflation-Protected Bond Index (FSTZX)
T Rowe Price Limited Duration Inflation Focused Bond (TRBFX)
SEI Real Return A (RRPAX)
Franklin Templeton Floating Rate Daily Access A (FAFRX)
SEI Real Return F (SRAAX)
Franklin Templeton Global Bond A (TPINX)
Catalyst Stone Beach Income Opportunity I (IOXIX)
BlackRock iShares Short-Term TIPS Bond Index K (BKIPX)
Invesco Sh Dur Infl Prot R5 (ALMIX)
Sit Quality Income (SQIFX)
River Canyon Total Return Bond Inst (RCTIX)
T Rowe Price US Limited Duration TIPS Index I (TLDUX)
Advisors Preferred Quantified Government Income Tactical Inv (QGITX)
Franklin Templeton International Bond Adv (FIBZX)
CrossingBridge Low Duration High Yield Inst (CBLDX)
Catalyst Enhanced Income Strategy I (EIXIX)
Regan Total Return Income Inst (RCIRX)
Invesco Senior Flt Rate Fd A (OOSAX)
Lord Abbett Inflation Focused F (LIFFX)
RiverPark Short Term High Yield Inst (RPHIX)
DFA Short-Duration Real Return Portfolio Inst (DFAIX)
CrossingBridge Ultra-Short Duration Inst (CBUDX)
Weitz Ultra Short Government (SAFEX)
CM Advisors Fixed Income (CMFIX)
Pacific Funds Floating Rate Income I (PLFRX)
Putnam Ultra Short Duration Income Y (PSDYX)
SEI Conservative Income F (COIAX)
AMF AAAMCO Ultrashort Financing Y (REPYX)
Brinker Capital Destinations Low Duration Fixed Income I (DLDFX)
Rational Special Situations Income Inst (RFXIX)
Advisors Preferred Quantified Tactical Fixed Income Inv (QFITX)
CBIS Catholic Responsible Investments Ultra Short Bond (CRHSX)
Ed actually shared with me recently that this could be a good year for FOCIX. Berkowitz's JOE does indeed seem to be paying off, finally.

WTI shorts made lot of money in 2020 when futures went below deeply below 0. Problem was entirely local - WTI futures contracts have physical delivery (unlike Brent futures that are settles with money only), WTI contracts were expiring and Cushing, OK was out of storage capacity.
Real risk for shorts is that the underlying keeps going up and their brokers will issue margin calls or just liquidate positions before their accounts totally blow up. It is myth/urban-tale that one could lose infinite amounts by shorting.

Perhaps if prices rise sufficiently, lease and permit holders in the US might be encouraged to actually drill.
"Historically, the United States has been a net importer of petroleum. During 2020, COVID-19 mitigation efforts caused a drop in oil demand within the United States and internationally. International petroleum prices decreased in response to less consumption, which diminished incentives for key petroleum-exporting countries to increase production. This shift allowed the United States to export more petroleum in 2020 than it had in the past.
Also in 2020, the difference between U.S. crude oil imports and exports fell to its lowest point since at least 1985. Net crude oil imports subsequently rose by 19% in 2021 to an average of 3.2 million barrels per day (b/d) as crude oil consumption increased in response to rising economic activity. We forecast that the United States will continue to import more crude oil than it exports in 2022, reaching an estimated annual average of 3.9 million b/d. However, we expect net imports to fall to 3.4 million b/d in 2023 as domestic crude oil production increases to an all-time high of 12.6 million b/d.
Since 2010, the United States has exported more refined petroleum products, including distillate fuel oil, hydrocarbon gas liquids, and motor gasoline, among others, than it has imported. Net exports of refined petroleum products grew to 3.3 million b/d in 2020 and remained about the same in 2021. We expect petroleum product net exports will reach new highs of 3.6 million b/d in 2022 and 3.8 million b/d in 2023."
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=51338

Only 3 Multi-Sector Income mutual funds above water so far this year: RCTIX, EIXIX, DLDFX. Each have a healthy dividend and held-up pretty well in March 2020.
Dennis Baran profiled River Canyon Total Return Bond Fund Institutional Class (RCTIX) for MFO in 2019.
David Sherman of Cohanzick Management is one of the subadvisors on DLDFX.
Nice performance summary table here.

Some of our mutual funds are down significantly YTD. This might not be a bad time to consider executing a Roth conversion if you were planning on doing one.
roth-ira-conversions-in-a-down-market-6-things-to-consider

According to a March 2020 report from Fidelity Investments, in the year after the “trough” of a bear market, the S&P 500 has gained an average of 47%. That is in comparison to the little over 8% per year on average that the S&P 500 has returned over the last 20 years*. To go back to my example of a $50k conversion, let’s assume you did that when the market was at the low on March 23rd of this year. The S&P 500 is up 44.54%* from March 23rd through yesterday, July 28th, so that $50k grew to just over $72k in about 4 months, $22k of tax-free growth.

getting-the-most-bang-for-your-buck-roth-conversion-during-a-market-pullback/

A Roth conversion may not always be in a
taxpayer’s best long-term economic interests if:
• The current tax cost of the conversion is prohibitively high. A Roth conversion, in
its simplest sense, is a trade-off between paying taxes now vs. paying taxes later.
For the strategy to be impactful, the current tax cost of the conversion should not
be so expensive that it outweighs the benefit of any expected future tax-free
investment growth.
• The taxpayer is making regular and material withdrawals from their pre-tax IRA.
• The taxpayer does not have the cash to pay the tax due on conversion.
Tip:
We recommend converting shares of investment positions rather than selling investments in
the IRA and then converting cash proceeds. This ensures that the taxpayer continues to have
market exposure during the conversion process, and also saves on the transaction fees that
may be levied when selling an investment position.

2020_was_the_Perfect_Year_for_a_Roth_Conversion

Shale oil production was cut back drastically in 2020. Now the US shale oil producers are not rushing in to produce when they see huge backwardation in the oil futures market (it takes several months for new shale oil to bring to the market), with WTI for April $117.21, May $113.13,..., December $91.57,..., June 2023 $84.88.
I think that a temporary solution for the US to replace Russian heavy/dirty crude is with Canadian (friendly) or Venezuelan (unfriendly) crude. The US WTI is sweet/light, and the old US refineries have to mix it with some heavy/dirty crude for processing.
https://www.cmegroup.com/markets/energy/crude-oil/light-sweet-crude.quotes.html

@lynnbolin2021 posted an article about alternatives and recession. You may find it helpful.
https://mutualfundobserver.com/2020/09/alternative-and-global-funds-during-a-global-recession/#more-14509

In highly volatile markets, minimum volatility ETFs end up on the wrong side, or rebalance inappropriately. If it was a fluke in 2020, well, it is happening again. Of course, they are not adjusting in real-time, so this is understandable, but their names sound more reassuring.
Shorter-term YTD view from Stockcharts, LINK1
Longer-term 3-Yr view from PV, LINK2

The Anatomy of a Recession (AOR) program is designed to help you stay on top of the business cycle and provide thoughtful insights through our exclusive risk and recovery dashboards. Updated monthly, AOR offers a concise, practical look at what the key indicators are saying about the United States economy and the potential impact on the equity markets. The data suggests that the economy exited the COVID-19 recession around mid-year 2020. As we move into 2021, investor focus has shifted to the possibility of a double dip recession which is why ClearBridge has re-introduced the Recession Risk dashboard. Click on each tab for a different view of the dashboard data.

perspectives/anatomy-of-a-recession

(To see what I did, "quote" this post; that will show you the HTML.)
https://ibb.co/DVX5yDM

Name				 Ticker	  %TR YTD   %TR 5 Year   %TR 10 Year
William Blair Large Cap Growth I LCGFX 	  -21.08       19.62	    16.55
Akre Focus Retail 		 AKREX 	  -18.4        16.49	    15.23
Jensen Quality Growth J 	 JENSX 	  -12.88       15.57	    14.59
Parnassus Core Equity Investor 	 PRBLX 	  -11.95       14.79	    14.42
Vanguard 500 Index Investor 	 VFINX 	  -11.65       14.05	    14.08
Vanguard Health Care Inv 	 VGHCX 	   -9.13        9.59	    13.84
Conestoga Small Cap Investors 	 CCASX 	  -18.81       14.2	    13.59
Grandeur Peak Global Opp Inv 	 GPGOX 	  -22.38       13.17	    12.94
Mairs & Power Small Cap 	 MSCFX 	  -10.37        7.86	    12.41
T. Rowe Price Capital App	 PRWCX 	   -7.79       12.25	    12.16
T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value 	 TRMCX 	   -1.1         9.49	    12.06
Wedgewood Retail 	  	 RWGFX 	  -19.05       14.82	    12.04
Artisan Small Cap Investor 	 ARTSX 	  -26.13       12.73	    11.89
AMG Yacktman Focused N 	  	 YAFFX 	   -5.99       12.17	    11.59
AMG Yacktman I 	  	  	 YACKX 	   -5.55       12	    11.54
Manning & Napier Disc Value I 	 MNDFX 	   -5.1        10.6	    11.42
Meridian Growth Legacy 	  	 MERDX 	  -15.53       11.6	    11.3
T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Value 	 PRSVX 	  -11.01        9.61	    11.11
Amana Income Investor 	  	 AMANX 	  -11.49       10.97	    11.03
Walthausen Small Cap Value 	 WSCVX 	   -7.27        7.06	    10.32
Osterweis 	  	  	 OSTFX 	  -13.03       11.42	    10.31
Fidelity Advisor® Small Cap I	 FSCIX 	  -16.18        9.97	    10.07
FPA Queens Road Small Cap Value  QRSVX 	   -6.81        9.64	    9.68
Fairholme 	  	  	 FAIRX 	    4.21       10.44	    9.44
Vanguard Balanced Index Inv 	 VBINX 	   -9.02        9.39	    9.24
Auxier Focus Inv	 	 AUXFX 	   -5.04        9.24	    9.23
Janus Henderson Small Cap Val T	 JSCVX 	   -7.67        5.1	    8.66
Oakmark Equity And Income Inv	 OAKBX 	   -6.33        8.2	    8.46
Artisan International Value Inv	 ARTKX 	  -10.86        6.98	    8.35
DCM/INNOVA High Eq Inc Innovt	 TILDX 	  -12.74        7.52	    7.98
FPA Crescent	 	 	 FPACX 	   -8.32        6.96	    7.96

Need to fix formatting.
Standouts are
Name Ticker "%TR YTD" "% TR 5 Year" "%TR 10 Year"
T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation PRWCX -7.79 12.25 12.16
T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value TRMCX -1.1 9.49 12.06
Vanguard Health Care Inv VGHCX -9.13 9.59 13.84
AMG Yacktman Focused N YAFFX -5.99 12.17 11.59
AMG Yacktman I YACKX -5.55 12 11.54
Manning & Napier Disciplined Value I MNDFX -5.1 10.6 11.42

Name Ticker "%TR YTD" "% TR 5 Year" "%TR 10 Year"
William Blair Large Cap Growth I LCGFX -21.08 19.62 16.55
Akre Focus Retail AKREX -18.4 16.49 15.23
Jensen Quality Growth J JENSX -12.88 15.57 14.59
Parnassus Core Equity Investor PRBLX -11.95 14.79 14.42
Vanguard 500 Index Investor VFINX -11.65 14.05 14.08
Vanguard Health Care Inv VGHCX -9.13 9.59 13.84
Conestoga Small Cap Investors CCASX -18.81 14.2 13.59
Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities InvGPGOX -22.38 13.17 12.94
Mairs & Power Small Cap MSCFX -10.37 7.86 12.41
T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation PRWCX -7.79 12.25 12.16
T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value TRMCX -1.1 9.49 12.06
Wedgewood Retail RWGFX -19.05 14.82 12.04
Artisan Small Cap Investor ARTSX -26.13 12.73 11.89
AMG Yacktman Focused N YAFFX -5.99 12.17 11.59
AMG Yacktman I YACKX -5.55 12 11.54
Manning & Napier Disciplined Value I MNDFX -5.1 10.6 11.42
Meridian Growth Legacy MERDX -15.53 11.6 11.3
T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Value PRSVX -11.01 9.61 11.11
Amana Income Investor AMANX -11.49 10.97 11.03
Walthausen Small Cap Value WSCVX -7.27 7.06 10.32
Osterweis OSTFX -13.03 11.42 10.31
Fidelity Advisor® Small Cap I FSCIX -16.18 9.97 10.07
FPA Queens Road Small Cap Value QRSVX -6.81 9.64 9.68
Fairholme FAIRX 4.21 10.44 9.44
Vanguard Balanced Index Inv VBINX -9.02 9.39 9.24
Auxier Focus Inv AUXFX -5.04 9.24 9.23
Janus Henderson Small Cap Value T JSCVX -7.67 5.1 8.66
Oakmark Equity And Income Investor OAKBX -6.33 8.2 8.46
Artisan International Value Investor ARTKX -10.86 6.98 8.35
DCM/INNOVA High Eq Inc Innovt TILDX -12.74 7.52 7.98
FPA Crescent FPACX -8.32 6.96 7.96

DS:
The purpose of MSTR [[ in-house synonym: 'MSTR seeks to invest in “non-market sources of return,” that is, returns that can be delivered whether the market rises or not. That’s possible by choosing investments that are intrinsically uncorrelated ... ' ]] is to diversify your portfolio, not be your portfolio. Many investors overdiversify, adding one stock (or bond) fund after another with each new addition adding less and less to the robustness of the entire portfolio. At base, investors just add more exposure to the same sets of risks and the same return drivers. MSTR diversifies by tapping into other sources of alpha which is reflected in its relatively low correlation to the S&P 500 (0.58), very low correlation to the bond market (0.16), and low downside capture ratio (0.12) against the S&P 500.

Investors looking for a way out of high levels of volatility and inconsistent returns should add T. Rowe Price Multi-Strategy Total Return to their due-diligence list, just as many investment professionals at Price itself seem to have done.

By way of full disclosure: I reallocated a substantial fraction of my retirement investments to TMSRX in May 2020 and disclosed that allocation in our June 2020 issue.
underlining added
Wonder if DS has bailed too.

“The strategies currently available to the managers include Macro and Absolute Return; Fixed Income Absolute Return; Equity Research Long/Short; Quantitative Equity Long/Short; Volatility Relative Value; Style Premia; Dynamic Global FX; Dynamic Credit; and Global Stock. Mr. Hubrich explains that “there is a spectrum, where on one end you have strategies (like Style Premia) that are ‘born’ as absolute return strategies and require no additional hedging at all, while on the other end you have strategies (like global stock) where a traditional long-only investment is paired with an explicit, meaningful hedge.” While the constellation of strategies included in the portfolio changes with evolving market conditions, the goal remains to provide an absolute return portfolio throughout.”
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2020/07/t-rowe-price-multi-strategy-total-return-tmsrx/
I’ve been under the (possibly mistaken) impression that each strategy had / has its own management team doing research, analysis and making decisions. From the quoted passage by Dr. Snowball it appears the 2 managers may be attempting to implement the 5-7 different investment strategies. (No wonder they’re having problems.) I did attempt to phone them twice. Both times resulted hold times in excess of 20 minutes after which I gave up.
Since I’m in the process of selling this fund, I’ll leave it to those who remain behind to continue the thread. No point in beating a dead horse.

The discrepancy between the performance of the stated fund share price and the performance of the portfolio may be due to fair value pricing.
https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2020-302
Morningstar provides last trade price, which for Russian stocks was Feb 25. A bit stale.
Rerunning the numbers, assuming that TRP completely wrote off all Russian stocks, one gets a loss of around 77%. If TRP "marked down" some non-Russian securities as well, that could account for the other 9% in losses.
Assuming that's what is going on, it is instructive to compare with EUROX. That fund, as of start of year, had over 56% invested in Europe. So if it had written off its Russian holdings, the fund would have dropped in fair value price at least 56%. Yet its YTD loss is a much smaller 42%.
(The fund did have a few winners that may have boosted its YTD return by a couple of percent, but these were well outweighed by its non-Russian losers.)
What this suggests is that how a fund prices its holdings can make a huge difference in its stated performance. Also, that the fund's board does matter. While funds can delegate pricing to third parties, the board retains oversight and is ultimately responsible for the prices.
See thread on Mairs and Power proxy vote (in large part a vote to change to a new board).
https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/59232/mairs-power-proxy-vote-on-murkiness