Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
Support MFO
Donate through PayPal
BlackRock Supports Fewer Shareholder Requests for Climate Risk Disclosures
"In the past, both BlackRock and Vanguard have expressed a preference for such 'direct engagement'".
We've discussed the problems with this before. At least currently, Vanguard is the largest shareholder in WFC, and Blackrock is number 2. Either they've been asleep at the wheel, or "direct engagement" (at least with Wells Fargo) has left something to be desired.
"Meanwhile, the report broke out Fidelity's index funds run by subsidiary Geode from its active ones."
More to the point, the M* report broke out proxy votes for Fidelity's main (sole?) subadvisor. Did it do a similar breakout for Vanguard? The reason for this question is that Vanguard said it would start delegating proxy voting authority to its subadvisors. You write that Vanguard's votes on providing climate risk disclosures improved somewhat this year. A breakdown would help to see whether the improvement was due in part to the delegation of voting, or whether the delegation and the vote improvements were merely coincidental.
Interesting about Geode. Regarding breaking out Vanguard's actively managed funds, the report didn't but I did ask about them. The author did send me the data on that. It is somehwat complicated though as most active Vanguard funds have multiple subadvisers, which can vote differently from each other. Regarding "direct engagement," I and others have found little evidence that it is superior to supporting public shareholder proposals. In other words, I agree with you.
Comments
We've discussed the problems with this before. At least currently, Vanguard is the largest shareholder in WFC, and Blackrock is number 2. Either they've been asleep at the wheel, or "direct engagement" (at least with Wells Fargo) has left something to be desired.
"Meanwhile, the report broke out Fidelity's index funds run by subsidiary Geode from its active ones."
A quibble then a real question. Geode was spun off from Fidelity in 2003.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB106003396490241400
More to the point, the M* report broke out proxy votes for Fidelity's main (sole?) subadvisor. Did it do a similar breakout for Vanguard? The reason for this question is that Vanguard said it would start delegating proxy voting authority to its subadvisors. You write that Vanguard's votes on providing climate risk disclosures improved somewhat this year. A breakdown would help to see whether the improvement was due in part to the delegation of voting, or whether the delegation and the vote improvements were merely coincidental.
Regarding "direct engagement," I and others have found little evidence that it is superior to supporting public shareholder proposals. In other words, I agree with you.