Jason Hsu and Vivek Viswanathan of Research Affiliates have posted an essay on the RA site with some data demonstrating how poorly value investors fail to capture the value premium that should be captured with this investment stategy. The average value investor doesn't earn anywhere near the reported value premium, under-performing the S&P 500 by -92bps,
even before taking fees into account. The dollar-weighted return vs. buy-and-hold is even worse: -131 bps. There are several factors at play that contribute; if value investors hope to capture the premium, they need to get their act together, remember that the value premium itself is mean-reverting, and stop trend chasing.
http://www.researchaffiliates.com/Our Ideas/Insights/Fundamentals/Pages/365_Woe_Betide_the_Value_Investor.aspx
Comments
Jeremy Grantham calls it "career risk." Value investors tend to get fired before deep value investments play out, so they don't make those investments.
As a result, most value investors are "relative value" guys: fulled invested, often buyers of "the best of a bad lot." Here's a quick test of my guess: I used Morningstar's fund screener to identify all US stock funds in the "value" equity box then looked at (1) where their portfolio centroid - on Morningstar's stylebox grid, it's the black dot representing the placement of the heart of the portfolio from micro to mega and deep value to rocket growth - was and (2) how much cash they had.
574 value funds. I picked the first fund listed on each of the first 15 pages of results. Here they are:
AAM/Bahl & Gaynor Income Growth: value/blend border, 6% cash
American Beacon The London Co Inc Eq: value/blend border, 6% cash
Artisan Small Cap Value: value/blend border, 7% cash
Boston Partners All Cap Value: value/blend border, 0% cash
Columbia Dividend Income: value/blend border, 3% cash
Delaware Mid Cap Value: value/blend border, 0% cash
Dunham Alternative Income: value/blend border, 3% cash
Fidelity Advisor® Value: value/blend border, 5% cash
Franklin Balance Sheet Investment: value/deep value border, 10% cash
Great-West Putnam Equity Income: value/blend border, 2% cash
Hennessy Large Value: middle of the value box, 0% cash
Invesco Exchange: value/blend border, 1% cash
JPMorgan Value Advantage: value/blend border, 8% cash
Manning & Napier Equity Income: middle of the value box, 2% cash
Nationwide US Small Cap Value: value/blend border, 0% cash.
Of a sample of 15 value funds, just one is positioned to invest in the sorts of deep value stocks that most of the research isolates.
There are just two self-proclaimed "deep value" equity options: Towle Deep Value TDVFX (value/deep value border, 2% cash) and Deep Value E T F DVP (solidly deep value, 0% cash). Of the funds we've covered, only Pinnacle Value PVFIX (deep value, 43% cash) strikes me as seriously pursuing the value premium: Mr. Deysher buys only when a stock is at historic lows but the business seems sound, which leaves him with investors' disdain and the best risk ratios (Sortino, Martin and so on) around.
For what thought fodder that offers,
David
Regards,
Ted
Growth vs. Value Investing:
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/mutual-funds/growth-vs-value-investing
Value funds vs. Growth Funds IBD:
http://news.investors.com/investing-mutual-funds/030615-742276-top-performing-value-funds.htm
Internationally the situation is far better for deep value. Plenty of smallcap and emerging markets. Going further up the capitalization scale, Brandes and DFA seem to be solid value shops. After that you can go to Homestead or Longleaf Partners.
I've got the feeling that Fairholme and Goodhaven and Longleaf Partners will invoke exclamations of deep disgust from many on these boards, which may be an example of why deep value has produced a major premium in the long run.