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Active Performance Investing

Hi Guys,

“Yet, many clients continue to believe that their managers can and will outperform. (The triumph of hope over experience is clearly not confined to repetitive matrimony.) Even though no major manager has done so, the average US institutional client somehow expects its chosen group of active investment managers to outperform annually, after fees, by a cool 100 bps.”

So too do individual investors although I suspect their outperformance expectations vastly exceed the 100 basis points that institutional agencies seek.

This extended quote is from Charles Ellis’ paper “The Rise and Fall of Performance investing”. That paper was the primary reference that supported the article by Scott Burns that Ted linked earlier today. I always prefer to examine the primary source directly whenever possible. Here is a repost of the Ellis link:

http://www.cfapubs.org/doi/pdf/10.2469/faj.v70.n4.4

Ellis concluded that “ Often blinded by optimism, clients continued to see the fault as somehow theirs and so gamely continued to try to find Mr. Right Manager, presumably believing there were no valid alternatives. ………. And active managers continue to fail to outperform. Table 1 shows the grim reality of how few funds have outperformed their indices after adjusting for survivorship bias over the 15 years to year-end 2011.”

This article motivated me to explore the potential return penalties that might be coupled to our search for superior active fund managers. I used the data reported in various parts of the Ellis paper.

Roughly one-third of active managers outdo their benchmarks by about 1.0 % annually. Two-thirds of active managers underperform their benchmarks by about 1.5% annually. These asymmetric outcomes are based on a recent 10-year summary period. Cost drag is a major factor.

Therefore, simply put, the average net Excess Returns for a single actively managed mutual fund is: (1/3 X 0.010) – (2/3 X 0.015) = -0.00667 or -0.667% annually.

To illustrate the impact of this average negative Excess Return on a portfolio consider a few scenarios like 1 or 3 active fund positions on a totally active portfolio or on a portfolio with a 50/50 split between active and Index holdings.

If an all Index equity portfolio delivers an 8.00% annual reward, the 1 and 3 unit active fund components for an all actively managed portfolio will generate 7.33% and 6.00% annually on average. For the 50/50 mixed active/passive portfolio, the annual returns would be 7.67% and 7.00%, respectively. On average, such is the price for seeking positive Excess Returns from risky actively managed mutual funds.

To overcome this penalty, the investor must seek and find active managers who reliably and persistently generate positive Alpha. That’s a tough task. As Ellis highlights, such winners most often do not repeat.

In doing this analysis, another question surfaced. Picking an average active fund manager is a losing tactic. How much better does the selection screen have to be to secure a positive Excess Return? What are odds? Using the same data and the same net Excess Returns equation, it appears that the screen must eliminate almost two-thirds of all active fund managers (60% by calculation). That seems like a workable task. But again, performance persistency remains a dubious challenge.

Thank you Ted for posting the primary reference. I encourage all MFOers to read the Ellis document. It rings a bell. Active mutual fund investing is an uphill battle.

Best Regards.

Comments

  • Thank you @MJG for this. Charlie Ellis is a good source of learning for everyone.
  • @MJG: For your infromation, I linked the Ellis document along with the Scott Burns article. What's the point?
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/16176/scott-burns-the-performance-management-lottery-ticket/p1
  • He posted this as an addition to whatever you posted and referenced that at the end of his comment.

    So what's the issue?
  • Thanks for posting this, MJG, and thanks for your summary and analysis, both were very interesting.
  • @MJG, thanks for an interesting read even if I find myself depressed. I'll admit I dream every day of beating the S&P 500 with my collection of investments and convincing myself that even if I don't I would hate to go through life without trying.

    One thing I find interesting is that so many people, including lots of people who spend their lives studying the past, are great at telling us that past performance is no guarantee of future results while we're also told that buying index funds and never selling is your best bet (at least if you use history as a guide!).

    What I wonder is why no one says that choosing an index fund might be your best option as long as you can choose the right index, or even the right collection of indexes. After all, if you had chosen some combination of the S&P 500, MSCI EAFE and Barclays Agg Indexes at the turn of the century you'd be kicking yourself for not having an Emerging Markets index or a small cap index.

    No matter what you do you're making some sort of bet on the future. If an index fund helps you trade less, keeps your expenses low and lets you sleep at night, more power to you. Just don't think that its the proverbial pot of gold at the end of the rainbow.
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