Hi Guys,
A few days ago I was shocked by the number of mutual funds owned by a wise and loyal MFO member. I didn’t examine the incremental diversification benefits accrued by the overall funds or their individual investment philosophies; I simply counted.
I’m sure the owner had excellent reasons and logic when these funds were originally added to his portfolio. I’m equally sure that the styles and the strategies deployed by such a competitive group tend to cancel each other out and neutralize a potential high excess returns.
Diversification is a cardinal investment rule; it is the stuff of successful investing. Well maybe, but more likely it must be exercised prudently; it has its own set of limits. Safety in numbers is a residual human characteristic from our hunter-gatherer days.
J. Paul Getty opined that “Money is like manure. You have to spread it around to make things grow”. Warren Buffett proffered the other viewpoint with “Buy two of everything in sight and you end up with a zoo instead of a portfolio”. Economist and financial advisor Mark Skousen summarized both sides with this wealth-linked compromise: “To make it concentrate, to keep it diversify”.
Assembling a huge number of actively managed mutual funds in multiple categories is almost a 100% guarantee of underperformance relative to any reasonable benchmark. That failure guarantee is mostly tied to active fund management fees. It is true that some superior fund managers do overcome the fees hurdles, but these are few in number and even this minority subset is further eroded by persistency problems over time.
A recent study that illuminates this issue was released by Rick Ferri a year or so ago. It is a Monte Carlo-based parametric study that has been referenced on MFO earlier. Here is a Link to it:
http://www.rickferri.com/WhitePaper.pdfYou can use these study results to estimate your likelihood of selecting a group of active fund managers that potentially might outdistance a passive portfolio, and importantly, by how much.
The overarching findings from this extensive analysis is that the odds are not especially satisfying, and that the likely excess returns are negative. Notwithstanding these unhealthy findings, they do not completely close the door for active portfolio elements. However, these results do put a hard edge on the low probabilities and the negative expectations.
To illustrate, assume that an investor has somehow increased his likelihood of choosing a positive Alpha fund manager to 70 percent by applying an undefined meaningful fund manager selection process. That’s actually quite high given the poor historical record of individual investors. Using Ferri’s numbers for a 3-component portfolio (40% US equity, 20% International equity, 40% Investment grade bonds), the likely outperformance median return is 0.52% while the underperformance median is -1.25%. That asymmetry reflects cost and fee drags.
The prospective excess returns coupled to a 70% chance of selecting a superior active manager is (0.7 X 0.52) + (0.3 X -1.25) = -0.011. So, an investor needs to have a higher than 70% active fund manager selection probability before he can anticipate a net positive excess return for his efforts. That’s a tough task.
The situation deteriorates rapidly as more active managers are added to the mix within each investment category. In the sample scenario, the likelihood of hiring two successful active fund managers is simply 0.7 X 0.7 = 0.49 without impacting the median expected excess return numbers.
The probabilities of generating excess rewards from active management falls from neutral to bad to worse very rapidly. The bottom-line is that hiring a ton of active fund managers adds to investment risk without substantially enhancing the rewards side of the equation. Charles Ellis might well characterize this as a Losers game.
Twenty years ago the investment game was a lot easier to play. Market efficiency has improved over time and has reduced the opportunities for excess profits just like improvements in baseball pitching staff depth has improved to lower overall batting averages.
At that time, it was investor against investor on trades; today the trades are much more commonly executed on an institution against institution basis. And these institutions are populated by well educated, smart professionals who are supported by extensive research staff and super computers for numbers crunching. The chances for an individual investor to outplay these titans has dimmed over the decades.
I don’t mean to say that it can’t happen because it does happen. But it’s not an easy chore. Institutional agencies have their own set of hobgoblins to battle. Since retirement, I have been benchmarking my private portfolio against an Index benchmark that I vary as my asset allocation changes, and against a nice pension that is tied to a portfolio maintained by a highly regarded financial service organization.
Anecdotally, over most of my retirement, my personal portfolio was dominated by active fund holdings. I slightly underperformed the Index benchmark, but I frequently outperformed my pension portfolio. I don’t have access to the pension portfolio’s specific allocations, but I suppose they are more widely and more conservatively distributed than my personal portfolio. They have access to alternate investment products that I can not touch.
One takeaway from all this is that some active managers can deliver the goods, but they are a rare breed. So choose carefully, monitor diligently, and very definitely limit the number of active managers that you hire for your portfolio(s). That’s just my amateurs opinion.
Simplifying is wonderful. It will certainly add to your free time; it will likely enhance your portfolio returns, especially if you use active fund management.
Best Regards.
Comments
Simplicity does have its place. I know I
could never monitor 50 + funds. I have 9 holdings and that's enough for me.
As far as the argument of which type of investment plan works best, it's a wash. There are too many variables. It is easy to pick out funds on each side to make one side look better than the other. It's the old passive versus active argument.
In this case I would say that both you and the other poster are right.
Item 1) In reviewing IRNIX which was presented by the Vintage Freak although it is a fund of funds it does carry a four star M* rating and has a duration on 3.35 years. So with this it appears good performance can be had form a fund of funds just as good performance can be had form my sleeve system that holds a number of funds … usually three to six. I expect this fund to continue to perform well and if one or even a few of the funds that it holds falters then there are the others that can still propel the fund. Its turnover ratio is 43% so it appears some active trading and positioning occurs. In 2008 it lost about one half of what its category lost.
Item 2) Some say I have way too many funds … perhaps so, perhaps not! In comparing my portfolio’s performance to Morningstars Moderate Target Risk as a benchmark … well I have handily bettered the benchmark. The results follow listed by period with the portfolio being listed first within the results and then the benchmark for a market close of August 1, 2014 in its current configuration.
1 Week) Portfolio -1.8%, benchmark -1.8% … 1 Month) -2.1%, -2.0% … 3 Month) 1.5%, 1.4% … YTD) 5.0%, 3.7% … 1 Year) 11.9%, 9.6% … 3 Year) 10.7%, 9.4% … 5 Year) 12.5%, 10.9% … 10 Year) 8.4%, 6.6%.
Closing comment: With this, there seems to be some added value by using the sleeve system along with selecting only quality funds and when one of them does falter replacing it with another. Seems this is what IRNIX might be doing and it seems to be doing it just fine as it only lost about one half of what the average strategic income fund lost in 2008.
I think one needs to ask themselves this question ... Does your portfolio meet your needs? And, if it does, from my thoughts, then the rest really does not matter if you are happy.
Have a good day … and, most of all I wish all … “Good Investing.”
Old_Skeet
"then the rest really does not matter if you are happy"