Sven - While officers in companies with publicly traded stock can hold shares of their stocks, their trading in that stock is restricted, and they need to (in theory at least) restrict their trading to periods in which material public information has been disclosed.
If they don't, and it can be shown that they traded on "insider" information, the SEC can force them to "give back" their trading gains, and can also impose penalties, etc.
Wiki link, with references, below. Check out 'Notes' at bottom of page for numerous references to various incidents.
Previously, Fed restrictions on Fed President stock trading had focused upon their trading in the stocks of regulated institutions, i.e., big banks, under the now quaint notion that bank stocks were the primary asset class influenced by the Fed's (regulatory) activities.
The Fed's COVID asset purchases - and Kaplan and Rosengren's trading activity - demonstrate the folly of the original trading restrictions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insider_trading
FWIW, when Alan Greenspan was Fed Chairman (and already wealthy), his personal investments were primarily short term treasury bills, to avoid any apparent conflict of interest. Link to 1998 WSJ article below.
Greenspan Says His Investments Are in Short-Term Treasury Bills
By Jacob M. Schlesinger WSJ | Aug. 18, 1998
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB903395355927059500

Yes, sometimes managers make comments outside SEC disclosures about their direct economic participation. I was asking folks to share if they are aware of such information.
I read this AM the M* analyst report for this fund. M* gives a Neutral rating, only one level above Negative, but gushes over with "[Managers] invest heavily in the strategy alongside fundholders." Who knows what the "heavily" means but hopefully not just the over $1M disclosed in the SAI (SEC filing).
Evidently, the current four managers have been with this fund for at least 10 years, which includes 2015-16.
The above is just an FYI.

The SEC requires disclosure of portfolio managers' ownership in the following ranges: none, $1–$10,000, $10,001–$50,000, $50,001–$100,000, $100,001–$500,000, $500,001–$1 million, and over $1 million.
Unless managers with more than $1 million invested in funds publicly reveal a specific amount or threshold, it may be difficult to ascertain this information.

That makes sense, David.
Since there seems to be keen interest in this fund on this board, do we know what is the max any current manager has invested in the fund? M* says more than a million dollars, which does not impress me as I think that would be less than 1 yr of compensation for each of the managers. M* reports from SAI. I would like to see 3-5 yrs of annual compensation before putting any positive weight on managers’ economic participation. I get that having too much of managers’ wealth could be a detriment too but 3-5 years of annual comp is not too much, given a lot investors put 5-10% of their wealth in a fund.
P.S.: I have never invested in this fund but am open to investing in it, not withstanding its misadventures in 2015-16.

Yahoo reports FXAIX's median market cap as $186.1B vs. the $32.1B figure reported by S&P for the underlying S&P 500 index. Given Yahoo's "non-standard" use of median (which it doesn't define), it makes you wonder what other terms Yahoo is fooling around with.
S&P uses what you call the "standard" definition of mean. But it seems to be the only one calculating the S&P 500 average market cap this way. While it reports an average of $79.9B, the S&P 500 index funds reporting give their average market cap as over $500B.
It makes one wonder what other terms the whole fund industry (not just Vanguard) is fooling around with. Or in the alternative, whether S&P is the one out of step in how it calculates a portfolio's average market cap. Because it seems that the standard way of calculating a portfolio's aggregate statistics is to weight its holdings.
A few sample figures for S&P 500 index fund average market caps:
Fidelity FXAIX - $539.7B (June)
Vanguard VFIAX - $543.1B (June)
Franklin SBSPX - $545.9B (July)
iShares WFSPX $608.4B (August)
Schwab goes these funds one better, by giving two very different figures:
$518.7B in its April 30, 2021 semi annual report, where it labels this a weighted average, and
$204.8B on its fund's webpage (July 31, 2021).
Since Schwab doesn't say that this figure is weighted, surely that must mean that this average is unweighted? No, it's weighted also, but it's calculated using a "non-standard" formula.
Is Vanguard really the one that is playing fast and loose with figures?

My rough formula for capacity starts with the smallest firm that they would like to include in the portfolio. Currently, that's Rolls Royce. You don't want to own more than 5% of the float or you become a controlling owner, which complicates the manager's life. So 5% of Rolls is $600 million in stock. If you want a concentrated portfolio (and they do), I multiple the maximum size of their smallest firm's holding by the target number of companies in the portfolio. $600M x 30 = $18B.
That's rough because (1) there can be other constraints on the managers in terms of their internal capacity, (2) part of the strategy capacity can be committed to SMAs or other vehicles, and (3) the managers could choose to underweight their smaller companies. I tend not to make the latter assumption with concentrated go-anywhere portfolios because it's equally likely that they would want to overweight the smallest firm.
When we publish a fund's strategy capacity, it's almost always based on a conversation with the adviser who sometimes (Grandeur Peak) has it down to the dollar and other times, they just laugh and exclaim "as if!"
If you're smallest firm is $100B and you're targeting 50 names, this particular match does give you effectively unlimited strategy capacity: $250 billion or so.
For what that's worth,
David

(we know how to define median) ... (Vanguard probably doesn't know how to define median.)
Vanguard knows how to define median and gives its definition right on its website:

median market capitalization

---

An indicator of the size of companies in which a fund invests; the midpoint of market capitalization (market price x shares outstanding) of a fund’s stocks, weighted by the proportion of the fund’s assets invested in each stock. Stocks representing half of the fund’s assets have market capitalizations above the median, and the rest are below it.

https://retirementplans.vanguard.com/VGApp/pe/Glossary?Term=medianmarketcapitalization
Vanguard weights a fund's holdings when calculating its median market cap, just as Vanguard weights a fund's holdings when calculating its mean.
Do we really all know how to define these terms? How about average market cap? For the S&P 500, Fidelity FXAIX reports $539.7B (June 30), M* FXAIX reports $204.8B (July 31), and S&P reports $79.9B (Aug 31). They can't all be right, or can they?
S&P is reporting an unweighted arithmetic mean, Fidelity is reporting a weighted arithmetic mean, and M* is reporting a weighted geometric mean.
S&P 500 fact sheet: navigate to sheet from this page.
Fidelity FXAIX quarterly fund review.
M* portfolio page for FXAIX.
M* definition of average market cap as weighted geometric mean
Getting back to fund median market cap. The Fidelity quarterly report for FXAIX gives both the weighted and unweighted medians: $187.6B and $30.2B respectively. S&P gives "the" median as $32.1B (it's two months more recent than Fidelity's figure). That's a spread not much different from the Vanguard discrepancy.
It's best to be careful when comparing apples and oranges before declaring one of them wrong.

Barrons link: [paywall?]
https://www.barrons.com/amp/articles/will-the-stock-market-climb-or-drop-10-heres-one-trade-to-handle-both-scenarios-51631291769

Like series I savings bonds, series EE savings bonds cannot be redeemed until a year after purchase. Between one and five years, you lose the last three months of interest if you cash out. No penalty after five years.
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eeredeem.htm#when
With EE series savings bonds, there's another implicit penalty. For savings bonds held 20 years, the value of the bond is adjusted to twice its purchase price. Using the rule of 72, that's an annual rate of approximately 72/20 = 3.6%.
But if you cash out earlier, you'll earn just the stated rate on the savings bonds. For newly purchased EE savings bonds, that's a piddly 0.10%. So you "lose" 3.5% in interest annually if you sell before waiting 20 years.
https://www.treasurydirect.gov/indiv/research/indepth/ebonds/res_e_bonds_eeratesandterms_eebondsissued052005andafer.htm#buy

https://investor.vanguard.com/mutual-funds/profile/overview/VDADX/portfolio-holdings
BaluBalu - Sorry, to make a long story short, the median market cap of VDADX is not $169B. It is about $13B. The Vanguard data page is wrong - no surprise.
The reason that M* did not discuss differences between the medians of the two indices is that they are not, in fact, very different, and that (again) the Vanguard data page is wrong,
If you go to the link above, you will see that the mutual fund VDADX holds 247 holdings. Half of 247 is about 123. So if you page forward, 30 stocks at a time, until you see stocks #ing 120 - 150, and take the 123 stock (Whirlpool [WHR] or Hasbro [HAS]; 3rd or 4th from the top, doesn't really matter), you can look up their market caps.
I did look it up. Vanguard (effectively) did not.
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/WHR/
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/HAS/
Yahoo links above. According to Yahoo, the market cap of WHR is $13.528B, and HAS is $13.496B. Roughly $13.5B.
According to page 3 of the S&P (we-know-how-to-define-median) factsheet, the median market cap of their index is $13.322B, as of 08-31-21.
So, the VDADX median market cap (at $13.5B) is close enough to the S&P new-index median (at $13.3B). Again, the Vanguard median market cap info is wrong. (Vanguard probably doesn't know how to define median.)
If you don't know the definition for median, you might want to apply for a position at Vanguard, since they won't care if you know or not. If you'd like a definition of median, see below.
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/m/median.asp
PS: Makes you wonder about what else is wrong on the Vanguard page, doesn't it?

It is a large cap growth fund with $5B AUM. It can grow 10 fold before I would worry about capacity constraints. It has had net outflows for each of the past 9 years. If it reaches capacity constraints in the next 10 years means the fund becomes enormously successful, a good problem to have.

Here is the PRWCX portfolio as of 8/31/2021 from the TRP website.
Portfolio
$52.23 billion
Total Net Assets as of 8/31/2021
Asset
Allocation
Domestic Stock
68.90%
Other
28.00%
Domestic Bond
1.40%
Foreign Stock
0.90%
Convertibles
0.80%
Top 10 Holdings 8/31/2021
Microsoft
6.90%
Amazon.com
5.70%
GE
4.43%
Alphabet Class C
3.29%
Danaher
3.24%
Marsh & McLennan
3.16%
PNC Financial Services Group
3.12%
Yum! Brands
3.07%
UnitedHealth Group
3.02%
Thermo Fisher Scientific
2.78%

Some of the discussions on the MFO Discussion Board about tax efficiency of some of the funds that I have written about inspired me to write the following article:
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4454723-best-tax-efficient-funds

Another Nod for Emerging Market from Arnott

From SPGlobal.com -
"The S&P U.S. Dividend Growers Index is designed to measure the performance of U.S. companies that have followed a policy of consistently increasing dividends every year for at least 10 consecutive years. The index excludes the top 25% highest-yielding eligible companies from the index."
The benchmark index used prior to the change to SPGlobal does not appear to have such an exclusion. https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/Methodology_DVG.pdf
https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/Index/Overview/DVG
I wondered how the differences in methodologies might effect the composition of the fund as a result of the change. The median market cap appear to go from $169B (Vanguard Portfolio page) to $13B - that is way too drastic change and I wish somebody checks me on this to make sure I have not goofed up. Weight of top 10 components does not change much (goes down from 31.5% to 30.5%) - i.e., well diversified (expect that from Vanguard). Dividend yield does not appear to change much - goes from 1.85% (M* info) to 1.74% - there are probably calc differences to call the 11 basis points a material difference, without digging in further.
VDADX short term and long term total return performances appear not impressive. There seem to be large blend funds from Vanguard that have much better performance and not attracted as much AUM as VDADX ($64B). What is the attraction of VDADX as a large blend fund? Can not possibly be the current dividend yield of 1.75%.

Baird is not a fund company that comes to mind when looking for equity funds. It is replacing the manager for these two funds with (as noted above) an affiliate of Baird (which owns 75%-100%).
Here's what little I can find on Greenhouse - it's indirectly owned by Baird (via ownership by Joseph M and Kirsten T Milano). It does not manage any OEFs, but manages $628M for eight clients including three hedge funds.
https://wallmine.com/adviser/235960/greenhouse-funds-lllp
About seven years ago, Baird floated the idea of a microcap fund managed by Greenhouse. It would own 50-100 companies, compared with 25-50 here.
https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/20043/greenhouse-microcap-discovery-fund-bcdsx
What caught my eye in that prospectus is that Joseph Milano had been manager of T. Rowe Price New America Growth Fund (now All Cap Opportunities Fund) PRWAX for a decade.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1282693/000089418921006543/bairdsmidcapvaluesupplemen.htm
497 1 bairdsmidcapvaluesupplemen.htm BAIRD SMIDCAP VALUE 497E
Registration No. 333-40128
1940 Act File No. 811-09997
Filed Pursuant to Rule 497(e)
BAIRD FUNDS, INC.
Baird Small/Mid Cap Value Fund
Investor Class (BMVSX)
Institutional Class (BMVIX)
Supplement Dated September 9, 2021 to the Summary Prospectus and Prospectus
dated May 1, 2021, each as supplemented,
and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated May 1, 2021
On September 7, 2021, the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Baird Funds, Inc. (the “Company”) approved the reorganization of the Baird Small/Mid Cap Value Fund (the “SMID Fund”) with and into the Baird SmallCap Value Fund, each a series of the Company, subject to approval by shareholders of the SMID Fund at a special meeting to be held in the fourth quarter of 2021. The Baird SmallCap Value Fund (the “Acquiring Fund”) is to be renamed the Baird Equity Opportunity Fund as further discussed below. Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated (the “Advisor”) serves as the investment advisor to both Funds and is proposed to continue to serve as investment advisor to the Acquiring Fund.
The Board approved an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) that provides for the acquisition of the assets and liabilities of the SMID Fund by the Acquiring Fund in exchange for shares of the Acquiring Fund. Shareholders of the SMID Fund would become shareholders of the Acquiring Fund, receiving shares of the Institutional Class of the Acquiring Fund equal in value to their shares of the Investor Class or Institutional Class of the SMID Fund held immediately prior to the reorganization. The reorganization is intended to qualify as a tax-free transaction for federal income tax purposes. The Advisor recommended the reorganization in connection with the proposed retention of a new subadvisor for the combined Fund, as discussed below.
Shareholders of record of the SMID Fund will receive a combined proxy statement/prospectus in the coming weeks, which describes and seeks approval of the proposed reorganization. Assuming shareholders of the SMID Fund approve the Plan, the reorganization is expected to close in December of 2021.
The Board also approved the retention of Greenhouse Funds LLLP (“Greenhouse”) as subadvisor to the Acquiring Fund and a related subadvisory agreement, subject to approval by the shareholders of the Acquiring Fund at a special meeting to be held in the fourth quarter of 2021. Greenhouse is a registered investment advisory firm based in Baltimore, Maryland and an affiliate of the Advisor. The Advisor recommended the retention of Greenhouse because it believes Greenhouse’s management will allow the combined Fund to pursue an investment strategy that could result in enhanced net of fees returns to shareholders while continuing to invest generally in smaller companies.
In connection with the proposed retention of Greenhouse, the Board also approved (1) a new investment advisory agreement authorizing the Advisor to delegate the day-to-day portfolio management to one or more subadvisors such as Greenhouse and (2) the reclassification of the Acquiring Fund from a “diversified” to a “non-diversified” fund within the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940, subject to approval of the shareholders of the Acquiring Fund. Subject to shareholder approval of the new advisory and subadvisory agreements, Greenhouse will assume day-to-day management responsibilities of the Acquiring Fund and the Acquiring Fund will be renamed the Baird Equity Opportunity Fund.
Assuming shareholders of the Acquiring Fund approve the appointment of Greenhouse as subadvisor to the Acquiring Fund, the principal strategies of the Acquiring Fund will change to reflect Greenhouse’s investment philosophy and the new name of the Fund, including the following changes:
•The Acquiring Fund will normally invest at least 80% of its net assets in equity securities, including common stocks, ordinary shares, ADRs, ETFs, preferred stocks and options whose reference assets are equity securities and equity indices;
•The Acquiring Fund will invest in companies with small to medium market capitalizations, defined as companies of market capitalizations of less than $20 billion;
•The Acquiring Fund is expected to hold a more limited number of investments, typically 25-50 holdings;
•The Acquiring Fund would be permitted to purchase and sell options for hedging purposes and to enhance returns; and

Like @Griffin, I am a longtime follower, but first-time poster. I felt compelled to chime in on this thread because it concerns two of my very favorite funds. I have held substantial positions in both AKRIX and EGFIX for several years and am very pleased with both. I wish the expense ratios were lower, but that is my only complaint and I was able to access the institutional shares at Fidelity so they are 1.05 and 1.00, respectively.
I tend to prefer high active share, concentrated funds, which led me to the aforementioned pair, as well as the somewhat tamer PRBLX and JENSX.
I am not at all concerned about Chuck Akre’s retirement because I have faith that the portfolio managers John Neff and Chris Cerrone have learned a lot from their mentor. And the fact the fund has such a low turnover rate means they will not be called upon to do a lot of trading, anyways. If you are looking for high active share and low downside capture, you will be hard pressed to find a better fund.
I first learned of Edgewood Growth when I saw it listed as one of the top performing large growth funds over the past 5 and 10 years in a table posted online by Kiplinger’s. The thing that stood out to me was that out of the 10 funds listed in each of the tables it was the only one listed that did not have a volatility ranking of 9 or 10. (It was a 5).
I like the fact this fund is not discussed too much on these kinds of forums. It keeps it a sort of hidden gem. But with total assets of more than $35 billion, it has obviously caught the attention of a lot of (I think smart) investors.

Hi, Guy.
I'll ask Ed on your behalf.
On the capacity question, no. Being an ANT does not reduce any capacity constraints the strategy might otherwise have. That being said, it looks like they're running at $3 billion below their former peak. It appears as if Rolls Royce is their smallest cap name at $12 billion. If that's as small as they want to get, then a rough calculation gives them $18 billion in strategy capacity. (That's based on the assumption that they don't want to own more than 5% of the float for their smallest name, and that each name could represent one-thirtieth of the portfolio.)
David

+1 Thanks @sma3
Shorting stocks is fraught with peril. Simple reason being a stock has no limit (theoretically) on how high it can go. Losses could be indefinite. However, in the hands of an experienced trader, fund manager, etc. short sales can add one dimension to the overall approach. As you note, there are ways to hedge that theoretical loss if you’re experienced enough. In defense of shorts, DODBX’s last semiannual report mentioned their holding a 5% short position on the S&P.
Guessing market direction is always tough - and we’re usually wrong. From my experience you’ve got only perhaps a 1 in 10 chance of getting it right at any given time. I think whether to own one of the short etfs you mention, or a fund like TMSRX or an inverse fund has a lot to do with age, circumstance and willingness to take risk. For a younger or even mid-50s worker who is socking $$ away for retirement, they should stay as far away from the short / inverse gimmicks as possible. But for an oldster looking to protect a substantial nest egg these “gimmick” approach’s might help buffer against severe unexpected loss. As with insurance, there is a price to be paid - likely muted returns over the long haul compared to not using them.