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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Charlie Munger Interview Comments
    Hi Guys,
    A close friend asked for my thoughts on a Charlie Munger interview a few days ago. I replied. I thought you guys might be interested in my response so I’ll share. Here are my comments to my buddy without editing.
    I don’t know if you addressed it in earlier MFO exchanges. The interview that I reference is at the following Link:
    http://25iq.com/2013/01/16/charlie-munger-on-investment-concentration-versus-diversification/
    The Charlie Munger interview is wide ranging and is terrific. It provides many opportunities for comment, both positive and negative. I love the opportunity.
    Charlie Munger is Warren Buffett’s Tonto. Just as Tonto was the Lone Ranger’s faithful and trusted companion, Charlie Munger is Warren Buffett’s faithful and trusted companion.
    There is both a positive and a negative aspect to that relationship. The good part is that each partner contributes and adds gravitas to the other’s investment views. The bad part for Charlie is that he will always be remembered as Tonto-like, not the senior partner. Regardless, Charlie Munger is smart and wise enough to tower tall among the investment redwoods.
    Everyone touts consistency, yet many fail to satisfy this idealized behavior rule, especially in the investment world.. Buffett and Munger are no different in this regard.
    I see no problem in their investment morphing history. I surely have done so, As John Maynard Keynes stated: “ When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, Sir?”
    Buffett, in particular, has not been a paradigm of consistency throughout his legendary financial career. In his early days, he brutally cannibalized newspapers and suffered no qualms when firing staff to secure a positive cash flow. That’s just good hardnosed business.
    Please read Buffett’s cumulative letters to investors. Over decades, his investment ideas and concepts certainly morphed from (a) a buying dirt cheap small stocks preference based on statistical criteria to (b) a buying large firms with a strong management team in place game plan.
    Perceptions and preferences change. Buffett now advocates a hold forever business philosophy. For a time he abandoned, but again reverted to the buy cheap criterion. A while ago he jumped on the Index style bandwagon for most investors. It was not always so. But that’s what successful investors do; they accommodate a changing market environment. They learn from experience.
    Sir Francis Bacon remarked in the 17th century: “By far the best proof is experience”. He also cautioned that “Half of science is putting forth the right questions.”
    Ken Fisher, in his 2007 book “The Only Three Questions that Count”, is on Bacon’s wavelength in his Question One. He cautioned that what we thing we know is not really so. Fisher’s resolution to this fault is to examine the historical market using statistical correlation coefficient tools to test for suspect truisms.
    Buffett and Munger represent the miniscule apex of money managers. They are much more intuitive than most. With occasional missteps, their intuition is spot-on. Most of us are not blessed with that great faculty so a more orderly, disciplined, and statistically-based approach is our default operational mode.
    Munger often takes deadly aim at academia in his many writings. That’s okay, since academia has its share of faulty studies and shady participants. But I propose that these are few in number, much fewer than in many other disciplines. Unfortunately, incompetence and fraudulent practices find their way into highly prized professions like in medicine and in the law. The buyer must forever be skeptical when seeking opinions.
    Charlie Munger recognizes these limitations in all his pronouncements. Note that he constantly uses terms like “almost” and “some” as his qualifiers. He never makes a ubiquitous “all inclusive” statement.
    There is another side to Munger’s academic scorecard. It’s a mixed bag. Munger often acknowledges the many contributions made by the academic community when he cites the merits of limited diversification and some elements of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Remember, it’s merely a hypothesis. Most everyone accepts the fact that, carried to an extreme, the practical guidelines discovered by academic research can turn South.
    As Munger observed in the interview: “I think it is roughly right that the market is efficient, which makes it very hard to beat merely by being an intelligent investor. But I don’t think it’s totally efficient at all.” Most folks recognize that the market is not perfectly efficient.
    Given the behavioral biases of all investors, and the hyper-complexity of the interwoven, interactive market parts, no investment theory or correlation is ever perfect. Even if it is attractive for some period, it is subject to future refutation, again caused by an evolving marketplace.
    By the way, Gene Fama is the likely academic not identified in the article who has consistently increased his standard deviation estimate when characterizing the success story of Berkshire-Hathaway. Since he formulated the EMH, Fama himself is a 3-sigma supporter of it. Over the last year or two, Fama has softened his position on this matter just a tad – a very slight tad.
    Munger is spot on-target when he cites his race track analogy. An investor need commit his money only when he perceives an edge; that’s true in both the stock world and the race track realm. Buffett noted that a batter need not swing at every pitch, especially when it's not in his comfort zone.
    I knew a successful horse player who decided his favorites well before the race began. He never wagered immediately. He only placed a bet if the odds on the horse he selected increased before the closing bell; otherwise he abstained. Sometimes he spent the whole day at the track without ever committing a single dollar, but he earned his living with that discipline.
    Strange bedfellows, but Charlie Munger’s investment philosophy and rules are very similar to those recommended by the previously cited Ken Fisher. To oversimplify, buy when you uncover an edge that tilts the odds, and punt to an Index-like approach if an edge can not be uncovered. Of course, this unlikely pair part company in numerous other financial areas.
    The overarching presentation on EMH is a bit unfair. It presupposes an EMH goal that simply doesn’t exist. In so doing, it constructs a straw-man that is easily attacked. The false premise is that EMH is a market predictive tool. It is definitely not.
    EMH only proposes universal (or almost universal) market knowledge and its price determination. It says nothing about the interpretation or use of that information for future price discovery. It does not project pricing movements as suggested in the Munger article. That claim is a mischievous straw-man.
    Buffett observed that “Most investors, both institutional and individual, will find that the best way to own common stocks is through an index fund that charges minimal fees.” Munger observed that “index funds make the most sense for almost all investors. Whether they know it or not most all investors should be passive investors.” I trust the wisdom of these two investment giants.
    Well, that’s my scattered comments on this excellent interview. Charlie Munger always has simple market insights that an investor can exploit. What do you think?
    So ended my comments to my investment buddy.
  • Q&A With Craig Hodges, Manager, Hodges Small Cap Fund: Video Presentation
    I think the only thing investorz should be concernex about is the next 5 years in this fund. I would sell 1nd i think it would be the right thing to do
  • This Stock Bubble Is 'Beyond 1929 And 2007', Says John Hussman
    FYI Hussman’s funds have missed out on much of the strong equity gains in recent years, prompting some criticism of his investing style. The Hussman Strategic Growth Fund HSGFX is down 1.5% this year, compared to 7.2% gains on the S&P 500 index SPX , according to Morningstar. The other funds have fared a bit better: The Hussman Strategic Total Return Fund HSTRX is up 6.8%. The Hussman Strategic Growth Fund HSIEX is up 1.9%, while the Hussman Strategic Dividend Value HSDVX is up 0.2%.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://blogs.marketwatch.com/thetell/2014/07/27/this-stock-bubble-is-beyond-1929-and-2007-says-john-hussman/tab/print/
  • The Yale Endowment's Biggest ETF Investment And The Logic Behind It
    Lecture by David Swenson to Robert Shiller's Financial Markets class where Swenson explains why he feels the 60/40 model is broken for endowments and other portfolios with an unlimited time horizon.
  • The Yale Endowment's Biggest ETF Investment And The Logic Behind It
    I thought endowments generally invested conservatively?
    Me too.
    I thought the old standard was a 60/40 allocation.
    60% stocks. 40% bonds.
    Now that has been replaced with a lot of alternative investments like private equity, hedge funds, merger arbitrage, etc, but still JohnChisum's point remains.
    And the person in charge of the Yale endowment is David Swensen. He's a big believer in multiple asset classes that don't correlate well with each other.
    FWIW, he wrote a book for the non-professional investor, and recommended the following asset allocation:
    20% REIT
    15% TIPS
    15% US Treasury bonds
    30% US stocks
    20% foreign stocks (including a dedicated emerging markets allocation)
    all passively invested, meaning with index funds.
  • Former Janus Star Blaine Rollins Attempts A Mutual-Fund Comeback
    the prospectus shows a 5.75% sales fee, expenses at 2.79% (with a hefty waiver around .35%). how many times during the day does he look at the computer screen to tell him whether to sell or buy? the prospectus says this is team managed. why would anyone invest in this fund?
  • The Yale Endowment's Biggest ETF Investment And The Logic Behind It
    FYI: The ivory tower wizards running one of the U.S.'s largest university endowments have woefully lagged the stock market recently.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://license.icopyright.net/user/viewFreeUse.act?fuid=MTgzMjQ5ODI=
  • Collectibles Lag Equities
    FYI:
    The European academics found that between 1900 and 2012, art, stamps and violins underperformed the equity markets by a wide margin. Stocks posted real returns of 5.2% annually, while art, stamps, wine, diamonds and violins eked out between 2.4% and 2.8%, even though there were periods, such as in the inflationary 1970s, when such passion collectibles shot up in value. The good news for collectors, according to the academics, is that collectibles did beat fixed income and gold during the same period.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://blogs.barrons.com/penta/2014/07/25/collectibles-lag-equities/tab/print/
  • Jason Zweig: Should You Have To Pay A Fee To Fire An Adviser ?
    It's a bad practice that leaves a bad taste in customers mouths. Some years back I had to turn a airline ticket of $350 in for a refund. The airline, Northwest Orient, charged me a refund fee of $75.
    No matter which industry it is, when they charge you to give back your own money it is extortion as Crash stated. Some banks do it through fees to process your money. Sounds more like gangster tactics.
  • Former Janus Star Blaine Rollins Attempts A Mutual-Fund Comeback
    FYI: Blaine Rollins helped catapult Janus Capital Group to fame in the 1990s, earning a promotion in 2000 to captain of the Janus Fund, the family's $50 billion flagship.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://www.denverpost.com/Business/ci_26176640/Former-Janus-star-Blaine-Rollins-attempts-a-mutualfund-comeback
  • MCHFX (FXI) stuck in a three year sideways cycle
    The fund was up on Friday.
    I noticed that as well. As for Matthews Asia funds here's how they did on Friday:
    image
  • Managed-Futures Funds' Misery Continues
    FYI: Copy & Paste 7/26/14: Lawrence C. Strauss; Barron's
    Tiny gain in first half follows years of annual losses for hedge funds and mutual funds in this sector.
    Regards,
    Ted
    Many hedge funds specializing in managed futures have struggled with poor performance, to put it mildly.
    After shining during the financial meltdown of 2008 -- the HFR index tracking these funds returned an impressive 18.06%, versus a 37% loss for the Standard & Poor's 500 that year -- these funds have fallen on hard times. On average, they lost 3.54% in 2011, followed by negative performances of 2.51% and 0.87% in 2012 and 2013, respectively.
    As a result of this persistent underperformance, net outflows surged to nearly $6 billion in the first half of 2014, according to HFR. "Financial advisors are having a hard time persuading their clients to stay with it," says the manager of a large fund of funds.
    MANAGED-FUTURES FUNDS' ASSETS total about $230 billion, or roughly 8% of the $2.8 trillion invested in hedge funds, according to HFR. The good news is that there are small signs of an improving environment for these funds, which tend to be helped by more volatility and a macro environment in which there's a lot of divergence among asset prices. The unwinding of the Federal Reserve's quantitative-easing program should help. In the first half, the average return for managed-futures funds was 0.37%. That's not great, but it's better than it has been in the recent past.
    These funds rely heavily on futures contracts, usually to make calls on the direction of stocks, bonds, currencies, or commodities. Often with the help of computer algorithms, managers try to identify trends -- whether it's rising interest rates or declining gold prices. AQR Funds describes it in a recent shareholder letter as going long markets whose prices are rising and shorting those with falling prices.
    For managers who can correctly identify trends ahead of the pack, so much the better when it comes to performance. Especially good scenarios are when markets are going from good to very good or from bad to worse, as was the case in 2008. Later that year, stocks and commodities tanked, while gold and Treasuries rallied. All of which led to a stellar performance that these funds haven't come close to repeating.
    One of the trend-following strategy's selling points is that it's a good way to diversify a portfolio, thanks in part to low correlations to traditional assets like stocks and bonds. But with equities doing so well in recent years, many of these funds have been passed by. However, Pat Welton, co-founder of Welton Investment, which runs managed-futures strategies, points out that many of these managers don't take large positions in equities because "it's exactly what you've been hired to diversify away from." In addition, when markets flatten out -- as has been the case with interest rates, for example -- it's harder for managers to find trends and exploit them.
    Yao Hua Ooi, a portfolio manager of the $6.2 billion AQR Managed Futures Strategy fund (ticker: AQMNX), points to "how far you look back to determine whether a market is trending up or down" as a key factor. In the past few years, managers who use longer time horizons -- say at least a year -- have fared better than those who use a shorter window, typically one to three months, he observes. The AQR fund's managers blend shorter and longer time horizons to gauge trends, he adds.
    As if to illustrate how challenged performance has been for these funds, AQR Managed Futures Strategy has a three-year annual return of 1.2%, placing it near the top of its Morningstar category. It's a mutual fund, not a hedge fund, with an expense ratio of 1.50% -- pricey for a mutual fund but considerably cheaper than a typical hedge fund.
    Welton attributes these funds' performance difficulties to the flood of liquidity by central banks around the world, more or less in unison for many years. Low interest rates have been accompanied by lower spreads, making it hard to find good trends to follow, he adds.
    AN 18.73% RETURN in 2010 for the Welton Global Directional Portfolio was followed by three straight years of negative results, triggering outflows. In this year's first half, however, the fund was up 17.41%, having made money in equities, commodities, interest rates, and currencies. The portfolio also had success with so-called relative value strategies, an example of which would be going short one basket of stocks, while being long another.
    Several firms have studied the dismal performance of managed futures. Ooi, of AQR, contributed to a paper on that topic. With the help of financial simulations -- these funds weren't around in, say, the 1920s -- the paper concluded that "trend-following has delivered strong positive returns and realized a low correlation to traditional asset classes each decade for more than a century." Adds Ooi: "Just like any investment strategy, it has had underperformance, but that isn't predictive that the strategy will no longer generate returns going forward."
    Most of managed-futures funds, however, are in crying need of a sustained stretch of good performance -- and sooner rather than later.
    M* Snapshot Of Managed Futures Fund Returns: http://news.morningstar.com/fund-category-returns/managed-futures/$FOCA$13.aspx
  • Q&A With Craig Hodges, Manager, Hodges Small Cap Fund: Video Presentation
    This fund has not seen a bear market. A lot of funds also looked good from 1995 to 2000. Keeps outperforming...famous last words.
  • Jason Zweig: Should You Have To Pay A Fee To Fire An Adviser ?
    FYI: Copy & Paste 7/26/14: Jason Zweig: WSJ;
    Regards,
    Ted
    Even a "fiduciary" investment adviser may still be able to treat clients in ways that might surprise you.
    Someone who owes you a fiduciary duty must put your benefit ahead of his own; in practice, that should mean minimizing fees, eliminating all avoidable conflicts of interest and fully disclosing any other material conflicts. Unlike brokers—who need only ensure that their recommendations are "suitable," given your needs and circumstances—investment advisers are already required by law to meet that standard.
    Even so, many advisers impose "termination fees" on clients who leave the firm within a set period. It is appropriate for an adviser to recoup the cost of setting up and administering your account—and perhaps even to deter you from bolting the first time the market dips a little. But securities lawyers say that termination fees should be directly related to those costs. Otherwise such fees would seem to violate the spirit, if not the letter, of fiduciary duty.
    "If for any reason you don't trust your adviser anymore, or you don't like his performance, then terminating the contract is your only real way to protect your interest," says Robert Plaze, a partner at law firm Stroock & Stroock & Lavan in Washington who formerly regulated investment advisers at the Securities and Exchange Commission. "You shouldn't be penalized for doing that."
    Termination fees are fairly common. In its latest annual brochure, filed with the SEC in May, Horter Investment Management, a financial-advisory firm based in Cincinnati, says that it charges clients $200 if they exit some of the firm's strategies within 90 days. That is in addition to management fees that run up to 2.75% annually.
    The firm manages approximately $700 million, according to another form filed with the SEC. Drew Horter, head of the firm, was traveling this past week and no one else was authorized to comment, said an employee.
    The David J. Yvars Group, an investment-advisory firm in Valhalla, N.Y., says in its SEC brochure, filed in April, that "if an account terminates within one year of opening, a 1% termination fee will apply."
    A client with $1 million would thus pay $10,000 to leave Yvars Group within the first year, in addition to the firm's management fees, which run at a 2.6% annual rate for a stock-oriented account of that size.
    Yvars manages approximately $100 million, according to the brochure. David J. Yvars Sr., chief executive of the firm, didn't respond to several requests for comment.
    Regulators have taken the position in the past "that some termination fees may violate an investment adviser's fiduciary duty," says David Tittsworth, president of the Investment Advisers Association, a trade group in Washington. Such fees, he says, may be unfair if they "penalize a client just for terminating an adviser or keep a client from ending a bad advisory relationship."
    Other experts caution that the law in this area is ambiguous. The SEC, says Mr. Plaze, "should either enforce this or change the rules." A person familiar with the SEC's thinking says that the agency views each such situation based on the facts and circumstances.
    Brian Hamburger, president of MarketCounsel, a consulting firm in Englewood, N.J., that helps investment advisers comply with financial regulations, says advisers are increasingly insisting that clients give them 30 to 90 days of advance notice of a termination.
    In some cases, that might enable advisers to unwind complex or illiquid securities without hastily depressing their prices. But often, says Mr. Hamburger, it simply enables advisers to keep earning fees from clients who have already said they don't even want to work with them anymore.
    So bear in mind that the word "fiduciary" isn't a guarantee that an adviser will put you first.
    If an adviser's brochure says you could owe a termination fee, ask why he feels, as a fiduciary, that such a charge is in your best interest.
    "Clients often make the argument that a termination fee is inconsistent with how an adviser should operate," says Barry Barbash, a partner at law firm Willkie Farr & Gallagher in New York and former head of investment-management regulation at the SEC. "They say it makes them uncomfortable, so they'd like to see it struck from the contract."
    Finally, bear in mind that most advisers don't charge termination fees at all, and many will even refund a portion of your fees if you decide to leave the firm. So think twice before you hire someone who will charge you to fire him.
  • 5 Top Mutual Funds To Own From Janus Funds
    FYI: Janus Funds – which just reported second-quarter earnings[1] this week — is one of the biggest mutual fund families in the U.S. with $174 billion in assets under management at the end of 2013 … and you don’t acquire that much of a following without offering some of the top mutual funds on the market.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://investorplace.com/2014/07/5-top-mutual-funds-janus-funds/print
  • Q&A With Craig Hodges, Manager, Hodges Small Cap Fund: Video Presentation
    FYI: (Follow Up) According to a new study by S.&P. Dow Jones Indicies, only two out of 2,862 mutual funds managed to attain top-quartile performance for the five years between March 2010 and current day. One of those two funds was the family-run Hodges Small Cap Fund based in Dallas, Texas.
    Regards,
    Ted
    https://screen.yahoo.com/why-mutual-fund-manager-trouncing-154012095.html
    M* Snapshot Of HDPSX: http://quotes.morningstar.com/fund/hdpsx/f?t=HDPSX
    Lipper Snapshot OF HDPSX: http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/hdpsx
    HDPSX Is Ranked # 22 In The (SCB) Category By U.S. News & World Report:
    http://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/small-blend/hodges-small-cap-fund/hdpsx
  • Smallcaps: How To Get The Hard Part Right And Still Screw It Up
    FYI: Philip Murphy’s post on smallcaps S&P Dow Jones Indices’ Indexology blog this week is a notable illustration of how investors can get the hardest part right — predicting the market — and still miss the best returns.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2014/07/25/smallcaps-how-to-get-the-hard-part-right-and-still-screw-it-up/tab/print/