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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Warren Buffett talking to Biden administration on banking crisis
    Morningstar’s take on Buffet potential help with the regional banks.
    Any Berkshire Action Would Like Be Capital Injection, Not Acquisition
    With all of that in mind, we would expect any action on the part of Berkshire-Buffett in the near term, with regards to the U.S. regional banks, to involve the same kind of capital injection (and Buffett seal of approval). This would be in exchange for high-coupon preferred stock (which is more tax efficient for an insurer) and warrants to buy common stock if anything happens at all. As such, that lifeline will not come cheap for those interested in going that route.
    What we do not expect to see is Berkshire stepping in and buying a bank. The firm has shown no interest in holding more than a 10%-15% stake in a U.S. bank primarily because ownership above that threshold comes with reporting requirements and oversight from the regulators that Berkshire is not all that interested in adhering to.
    https://morningstar.com/articles/1144873/another-banking-crisis-another-call-to-buffett
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    You may hear about the controversial wipeout of $17 billion CS AT1/CoCo bonds.
    These (AT1) bonds are contingent-convertible (CoCo) bonds common in Europe and Asia. In good times, these convert into equity. But in bad times, forced conversion can be done at loss, or the entire amount could be written down. So, they pay higher-yields. These count as Tier 1 capital.
    What confused the investors in Europe was that AT1/CoCo bonds are ABOVE the common stock in the capital structure. So, how can there be ANY equity left, but ZERO for AT1/CoCo bonds? That is where the Swiss Government stepped in - it said, "because it says so". Oops! There goes an entire bond structure (CoCo) down the tube! This category may be damaged.
    They aren't used in the US. But to count as Tier 1 in the US, a bank convertible in the US must be noncumulative.
    https://www.fidelity.com/news/article/top-news/202303191646RTRSNEWSCOMBINED_KBN2VL0GX-OUSBS_1
  • How much fear is in the air about SVB and the greater implications?

    Chyron on BBG right now: "POWELL. YELLEN SAY CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY OF US BANKS ARE STRONG"
    Shades of Sunday evenings circa 2008....
    Whether you agree with him not, Bill Fleckenstein comes up with some great captions for his daily Market Rap commentaries (subscription required).
    Friday’s caption - ”Yellen Fire in a Crowded Bank”
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    Thanks for sharing that data point @yogibearbull. Didn't realize we were that far from the lows on both bank etfs. its a good point. Its interesting that tech rallied so much last week in response to the drop in interest rates. But I really wonder whether those gains can hold when this banking crisis increases the odds of a recession.
  • How much fear is in the air about SVB and the greater implications?

    Chyron on BBG right now: "POWELL. YELLEN SAY CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY OF US BANKS ARE STRONG"
    Shades of Sunday evenings circa 2008....
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    I am watching both bank KBE and regional bank KRE. But their Covid 2020 lows are still -42% down from here. So, the banking selloff has been sharp but it doesn't seem to be a washout. I may not wait for -42% down, but it seems too early to bottom fish now.
  • UBS Agrees to Buy Credit Suisse for More Than $3 Billion
    @LewisBraham, when Dutch giant ING got into trouble during the GFC 2008-09 and had to be rescued by the Dutch government, one condition was to refocus on core businesses. It ended up divesting its US operations (noncore):
    ING insurance and asset management businesses (US) went to Yoya Financial/VOYA.
    ING Direct (US online bank, that itself had origin in the failed online NetBank in GA) went to Capital One/COF. Unluckily or luckily, I stayed through all these transitions after my early find years ago that NetBank offered FREE wire transfers - that didn't last long!
    We don't know all details of the UBS takeover of CS, but there may be similar conditions by the government or by UBS. CS in the US already had a lot of controversial M&A history - First Boston, Warburg Pincus (asset management unit), Donaldson Lufkin Jenerette.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_Suisse
  • UBS Agrees to Buy Credit Suisse for More Than $3 Billion
    "has agreed"... (as in "an offer that cannot be refused")
    Credit Suisse, the battered Swiss banking giant, has agreed to a takeover by Switzerland’s largest bank, UBS — a move aimed at staving off immediate concerns of a disorderly bankruptcy and stemming panic about global financial turmoil.
    UBS has agreed to buy Credit Suisse in an emergency deal that ties up two of Europe’s largest banks, Swiss authorities announced Sunday.
    Swiss authorities are planning to speed up the process by circumventing laws that would require a shareholder vote, the Financial Times reported earlier Sunday. The Financial Times also reported that the value of the all-share deal was more than $2 billion, but that figure was not officially confirmed by the Swiss authorities.
    A “swift and stabilizing solution was absolutely necessary,” Alain Berset, president of the Swiss Confederation, said in a Sunday afternoon news conference. The UBS deal, he said, was “the best solution for restoring the confidence that has been lacking in financial markets recently.”
    In a joint statement Sunday afternoon, Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell said that they “welcome” the announcement.
    “The capital and liquidity positions of the U.S. banking system are strong, and the U.S. financial system is resilient,” Yellen and Powell wrote. “We have been in close contact with our international counterparts to support their implementation.”
    Credit Suisse and UBS did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
    The takeover caps more than a week of speculation over the Swiss giant’s fate amid growing fears of a global financial crisis, after two U.S. regional banks suddenly failed earlier this month. Although U.S. regulators have taken sweeping steps, including backstopping deposits at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank of New York, those measures have done little to assuage fears of a cascading banking crisis.
    Those concerns went global this week, after Credit Suisse warned of “material weaknesses” in its financial reporting. On Thursday, the bank received $53.7 billion in emergency funds from Switzerland’s central bank, but it wasn’t enough to restore confidence in the bank’s viability. Shares of Credit Suisse have tumbled more than 20 percent in the past week, and more than 35 percent this year.
    The past week has raised new questions on what it will take to avert another crisis. On Sunday, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) called on Congress to lift the federal insurance cap for bank deposits above $250,000. She also urged lawmakers to repeal a provision of the 2018 law that had loosened restrictions on banks with $50 billion or more in assets, saying the latest tumult in the financial system underscored her belief that the Fed has fallen short on its core duties.
    The above is a complete and unedited transcript of a current article in The Washington Post.
  • Why People Are Worried About Banks
    image
    Banks are teetering as customers yank their deposits. Markets are seesawing as investors scurry toward safety. Regulators are scrambling after years of complacency.
    The sudden collapses of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank — the biggest bank failures since the Great Recession — have put the precariousness of lenders in stark relief. The problem for SVB was that it held many bonds that were bought back when interest rates were low. Over the past year, the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates eight times. As rates went up, newer versions of bonds became more valuable to investors than those SVB was holding.
    The bank racked up nearly $2 billion in losses. Those losses set off alarms with investors and some of the bank’s customers, who began withdrawing their money — a classic bank run was underway.
    Even before SVB capsized, investors were racing to figure out which other banks might be susceptible to similar spirals. One bright red flag: large losses in a bank’s bond portfolios. These are known as unrealized losses — they turn into real losses only if the banks have to sell the assets. These unrealized losses are especially notable as a percentage of a bank’s deposits — a crucial metric, since more losses mean a greater chance of a bank struggling to repay its customers.
    At the end of last year U.S. banks were facing more than $600 billion of unrealized losses because of rising rates, federal regulators estimated. Those losses had the potential to chew through more than one-third of banks’ so-called capital buffers, which are meant to protect depositors from losses. The thinner a bank’s capital buffers, the greater its customers’ risk of losing money and the more likely investors and customers are to flee.
    But the $600 billion figure, which accounted for a limited set of a bank’s assets, might understate the severity of the industry’s potential losses. This week alone, two separate groups of academics released papers estimating that banks were facing at least $1.7 trillion in potential losses.
    image
    Midsize banks like SVB do not have the same regulatory oversight as the nation’s biggest banks, who, among other provisions, are subject to tougher requirements to have a certain amount of reserves in moments of crisis. But no bank is completely immune to a run.
    First Republic Bank was forced to seek a lifeline this week, receiving tens of billions of dollars from other banks. On Thursday, the U.S. authorities helped organize an industry bailout of First Republic — one of the large banks that had attracted particular attention from nervous investors.
    The troubles lurking in the balance sheets of small banks could have a large effect on the economy. The banks could change their lending standards in order to shore up their finances, making it harder for a person to take out a mortgage or a business to get a loan to expand.
    Analysts at Goldman believe that this will have the same impact as a Fed interest rate increase of up to half a point. Economists have been debating whether the Fed should stop raising rates because of the financial turmoil, and futures markets suggest that many traders believe it could begin cutting rates before the end of the year.
    On Friday, investors continued to pummel the shares of regional bank stocks. First Republic’s stock is down more than 80 percent for the year, and other regional banks like Pacific Western and Western Alliance have lost more than half their values.
    Investors, in other words, are far from convinced that the crisis is over.
    The above section contains excerpts from a lengthy article in The New York Times, which was heavily edited for brevity.
  • Summary of David Sherman’s 3/15/2023 web call
    David and all: I occasionally read the board and I appreciate the insights. Junkster, RiverPark Strategic Income Fund is in th eprocess of being adopted by CrossingBridge. Upon completion, CrossingBridge would welcome your capital and not ban you. Obviously, no manger wants day traders but those that have a change of heart or see other uses for their capital are free to come and go; it's a daily liquidity product.
  • Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund name change and investment policy amendment
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1766436/000138713123003557/lft_497-031723.htm
    497 1 lft_497-031723.htm SUPPLEMENT
    Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund
    Institutional Shares: LCTIX
    Investor Shares: LCTRX
    Supplement dated March 17, 2023
    to the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated September 30, 2022,
    each as may be amended from time to time
    The Board of Trustees of Leader Funds Trust approved various changes to the Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund (the “Fund”). These changes include changing the Fund’s name and adding Class A shares. Because the Fund’s name change impacts its 80% investment policy, the Fund is providing shareholders with at least 60 days’ notice of the name change and revised 80% investment policy.
    Name Change
    Effective May 16, 2023, the Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund is renamed the “Leader Capital High Quality Income Fund.”
    Revised 80% Investment Policy
    As stated in the Fund’s prospectus, the Fund may change its 80% investment policy without shareholder approval upon 60 days’ written notice. This supplement notifies shareholders that, effective May 16, 2023, the Fund’s Principal Investment Strategies on page 2 of the summary prospectus, including its 80% investment policy, are revised as follows.
    Principal Investment Strategies: Under normal circumstances, the Fund invests at least 80% of its net assets, plus any amount of borrowings for investment purposes, in high-quality debt securities. For the purposes of the Fund’s 80% investment policy, the Fund defines high-quality as being rated at the time of purchase as no lower than the A category by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group, Moody’s Investors Service, or Fitch Ratings, Inc. The debt securities in which the Fund invests include the following U.S. dollar-denominated domestic and foreign securities:
    · bonds and corporate debt;
    · agency and non-agency commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) and residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”);
    · collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) that are backed by domestic and foreign debt obligations;
    · collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) that are backed by domestic and foreign debt obligations; and
    · U.S government securities.
    The Fund normally invests in debt securities with an interest rate that resets quarterly based London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) or indexes designed to replace LIBOR such as the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”), Effective Federal Funds Rate (“EFFR”), or Overnight Bank Fund Rate (“OBFR”). The Fund allocates assets across debt security types without restriction, subject to its 80% investment policy.
    While the Fund invests without restriction as to the maturity of any single debt security, the Fund’s portfolio average effective duration (a measure of a security’s sensitivity to changes in prevailing interest rates) will be up to 15. The Fund’s average effective duration will change depending on market conditions. The Fund uses effective duration to measure interest rate risk.
  • Summary of David Sherman’s 3/15/2023 web call
    On rather short notice, Cohanzick invited people to listen to David Sherman talk about the significance of “recent developments.” Reportedly, 90 people called in. No slides, just David at his desk talking through two topics and fielding questions.
    Highlights:
    1. none of his funds have exposure to banks or thrifts. Early in his career, at Leucadia, he was taught that this additional financial sector focus offered “incremental gains that were not worth the risk.”
    2. in a “moral hazard” sort of way, institituions worldwide have “adopted an umbrella policy: avoid any failure at all cost.”
    3. Sherman’s policy preference would be a 1-2 bps / year charge for insurance on accounts over $250k with an opt-out provision and some sort of preferential payments scheme (akin, I think, to what happens in a bankruptcy liquidation) to avoid runs on the bank. (James Mackintosh, in Friday's WSJ, speculates on investment regulations to pursue the same end; he suggests requiring banks to invest only in short-term Treasuries as backing for regular deposits, with greater flexibility for special high-yield accounts.)
    4. He believes interest rates will remain higher for longer than commonly expected, unless the fed has to accommodate a systemic risk. A fed “pivot” now would be “ a bad sign regarding speculation and future inflation.”
    5. the commercial real estate market, which is reliant on floating rate securities, is a major and generally unrecognized risk. High quality lenders like BlackRock “are handing the keys back to the bank.” Eventually the government will need to pursue a solution like the Resolution Trust (1989-1995) to work to resolve the savings & loan crisis.
    6. Q: is the banking system close to melt-down? A: No. With the exception of a few incidents involving insolvent micro banks, there are no “FDIC-regulated banks where uninsured depositors didn’t get their money back.”
    7. Q: are you positive on high yield this yield? A: we don’t speculate but “In general, active HY will outperform stocks over the next couple years based on valuations.”
    8. Q: has the risk-return equation become more compelling? Are you playing offense or defense now? A: “I love this question. Compliance hates it. We love markets like this, even if they’re frustrating, difficult or stressful because they create volatility and volatility creates opportunity. Things were more shaky a year ago ... we’ve become more offensive over the past several months Dry powder not diminished but new money is getting invested at substantially higher returns. Dry powder (at year’s end his funds were 30% and 70% “dry powder”) reflects view that we’ll have more opportunities and we will not be forced to take duration risk. We’re avoiding highly stressed or distressed issuers whose business model is questionable relative to other opportunities. We think there will be more of opportunities; commercial RE will raise its ugly head to create them.”
    9. Q: where do you get such great ideas? A: swiped one from a student in my Global Value Investing class at NYU. (Roughly.)

    10. Q: Has the opportunity set changed since 1/1/2023? A: "We focus on business model, the group tried to be disciplined in our credit work in all periods though everyone occasionally gets out of their lane. We’re focusing on staying at the highest level of the capital structure. Social media makes everything worse. Investors do less work, act more in reaction to events, and since it’s easier to move money, it’s also easier to over-react. Across portfolios, we have the highest level of leveraged loan ownership in years. LLs significantly higher return than the bonds, assuming no rate collapse.”
    David either reads the board or has a news alert set for his name, so I’m confident that if I’ve materially misrepresented his words, he’ll help guide us back to the light.
    For what that’s worth, David
  • Settlement period & trading question
    Question 1 - If in the illustration below, funds for the purchase of a security were from a sale of another security prior to market close on the same day (Tuesday), can the newly acquired security be sold at market open on the second day (Thursday) without violating the SEC rule? Put in simpler terms, is Thursday at market open in the attached photo the first day the security purchased Tuesday can be sold per the rules? Or is it Friday?
    Question 2 - If one already owned a sizable number of shares of the newly acquired security (bought with settled funds) and only acquired one additional share with unsettled money on Tuesday, does the ban on selling apply to all previously owned shares of the security or only to the most recently purchased one?
    Thanks for any answers / insights.
    image
  • Just noticing such tremendous VOLATILITY in the Markets, "that is all."
    I’m confident @Crash can handle it. :) - But some sage advice.
    What makes sense to me about the heightened volatility comes from Bloomberg media reports this evening: (1) There is a liquidity shortage, (2) As a consequence some hedge funds have had to limit or halt redemptions, (3) The ability to make large transactions is now concentrated in a limited number of hands - far fewer than in normal times. (While Bloomberg identified only one hedge fund that has halted redemptions, they seemed confident others have also halted or restricted them.)
    I generally try not to allow macroeconomics to influence my investment decisions. But I think it would behoove everyone to pay attention to what’s going on in banking and to the words and actions of government officials here and abroad - in particular the central banks.
    Banks Borrow $164.8 Billion from Fed in Rush to Backstop Liquidity
    ”All told, the emergency loans reversed around half of the balance-sheet shrinkage that the Fed has achieved since it began so-called quantitative tightening — allowing its portfolio of assets to run down — in June last year. And the central bank’s reserve balances jumped by some $440 billion in a week — which ‘basically reversed all the Fed’s QT efforts,’ according to Capital Economics.”
    Bair on PBS Frontline - Sheila Bair served as the chair of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) from 2006 to 2011.
  • Just noticing such tremendous VOLATILITY in the Markets, "that is all."
    2008 09 credit housing crash, 2012 near double dip, 2015 -16 downturn/flat returns, 2000 crashes (decade 000 returns), 2020 Covid crashes also bad....
    Just hold on to the ride
    Drink lots wine/ weekend relaxation
    Keep buying when ItS strikingly low.
    You will be very happy 10 yrs from now if no WW3 and global warming won't kill us
  • Bond Volatility MOVE
    I was tempted to bottom fish in regional bank KRE. BUT its Covid 2020 low is STILL -44% down from here, and there is hardly any support between here and there. So, just watching for now.
  • Bond Volatility MOVE
    @catch22, MOVE is not only a blend but it is normalized, so it doesn't have a direct meaning as VIX.
    But we can look at past values and ranges.
    All-time high 264.60 (GFC, 2008), all-time low 36.62 (Covid, 2020).
    Covid 2020 range 36.62-163.70.
    Now 198.71 (3/15/23 EOD). So, well above its high during the credit-freeze of early-2020.
  • American Beacon AHL TargetRisk Core Fund is to be liquidated
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/809593/000113322823001332/abatrcf-html6116_497.htm
    497 1 abatrcf-html6116_497.htm AMERICAN BEACON AHL TARGETRISK CORE FUND - 497
    American Beacon AHL TargetRisk Core Fund
    Supplement dated March 15, 2023
    to the
    Prospectus, Summary Prospectus, and Statement of Additional Information, each dated May 1, 2022
    The Board of Trustees of American Beacon Funds has approved a plan to liquidate and terminate the American Beacon AHL TargetRisk Core Fund (the “Fund”) on or about July 7, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”), based on the recommendation of American Beacon Advisors, Inc., the Fund’s investment manager.
    In anticipation of the liquidation, effective immediately, the Fund is closed to new shareholders. In addition, in anticipation of and in preparation for the liquidation of the Fund, AHL Partners LLP, the sub-advisor to the Fund, may need to increase the portion of the Fund's assets held in cash and similar instruments in order to pay for the Fund’s expenses and to meet redemption requests. The Fund may no longer be pursuing its investment objective during this transition. On or about the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute cash pro rata to all remaining shareholders. These shareholder distributions may be taxable events. Thereafter, the Fund will terminate.
    The Fund will be liquidated on or about July 7, 2023. Liquidation proceeds will be delivered in accordance with the existing instructions for your account. No action is needed on your part.
    Please note that you may be eligible to exchange your shares of the Fund at net asset value per share at any time prior to the Liquidation Date for shares of the same share class of another American Beacon Fund under certain limited circumstances. You also may redeem your shares of the Fund at any time prior to the Liquidation Date. No sales charges, redemption fees or termination fees will be imposed in connection with such exchanges and redemptions. In general, exchanges and redemptions are taxable events for shareholders.
    In connection with its liquidation, the Fund may declare distributions of its net investment income and net capital gains in advance of its Liquidation Date, which may be taxable to shareholders. You should consult your tax adviser to discuss the Fund’s liquidation and determine its tax consequences.
    For more information, please contact us at 1-800-658-5811, Option 1. If you purchased shares of the Fund through your financial intermediary, please contact your broker-dealer or other financial intermediary for further details.
    ***********************************************************
    PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
  • Meta to Layoff Another 10,000 Workers
    Didnt it occur to them that the pandemic would not last forever, and their payroll would have to drop back to more normal levels?
    NPR's "doubling" figure likely represented the growth of full-time employees from 2019 (44,942) through 2022 (86,482). Data from Statistia. Confirmed by WP:
    Between the end of 2019 and its peak headcount in 2022, the company nearly doubled in size to some 87,000 employees.
    Data from Statista. Sometimes Statista provides full data w/o subscribing, sometimes not. So here's the data it presented me:
    2004: 7
    2005: 15
    2006: 150
    2007: 450
    2008: 850
    2009: 1,218
    2010: 2,127
    2011: 3,200
    2012: 4,619
    2013: 6,337
    2014: 9,199
    2015: 12,691
    2016: 17,048
    2017: 25,105
    2018: 35,537
    2019: 44,942
    2020: 56,604
    2021: 71,970
    2022: 86:482
    https://www.statista.com/statistics/273563/number-of-facebook-employees/
    Rolling three year hiring rates:
    2007: 64x (2004-2007, 450/7)
    2008: 57x
    2009: 8x
    2010: 5x
    2011: 4x
    2012: 4x
    2013: 3x
    2014: 3x
    2015: 3x
    2016: 3x
    2017: 3x
    2018: 3x
    2019: 3x (2.64)
    2020: 2x (2.25)
    2021: 2x (2.03)
    2022: 2x (1.92)
    Seems pretty "normal" to me. That last hiring rate was not out of line. The rate was not due to the pandemic, but during the pandemic. Parts of the WP piece support the idea that this has to do with tech sector hubris.
    The [Meta] hiring sustained its ambitious (and in some cases seemingly ill-fated) projects like its big bet on the metaverse. ...
    [T]he deep cuts ... reflect a deeper shift in thinking about the metrics that matter in a tech sector that has long been able to make up its own rules.
    During the pandemic, as tech CEOs accelerated their empire building, a massive and growing headcount somehow became equated with a company’s overall health — a sign that it had cash, clout and big ambitions.
    that it had cash - cross check that with SVB and why startups were pulling cash out of their bank accounts. Their cash spigots were drying up.
  • US Plans Emergency Measures To Backstop Banks after SVB
    @WABAC
    But the chance for an average saver to get a safe return of 5-6% on their money will raise Maggie Thatcher from the dead, legitimize neocolonial revanchism, bring back the Cold War order, destroy unions that no longer exist, and, wait for it, throw people out of work.
    Never said any of that, merely pointed out as the article did that the Volcker cure for inflation wasn't all that, and had definite negative consequences. Nor can it be said that only one group of people wants lower rates. Most poor people in the U.S. have little to no savings to collect interest on, and actually have more variable-rate credit card debt that increases their burden as rates rise:https://bankrate.com/banking/savings/emergency-savings-report/#over-1-in-3
    Over a third (36 percent) of people have more credit card debt than emergency savings, the highest percentage in 12 years of Bankrate asking this survey question. In comparison, 22 percent of people had more credit card debt in January 2022, while 28 percent of people had more credit card debt in January 2020, before COVID-19 began to affect the U.S.
    Ultimately, rate cuts are economically stimulative while raising rates constricts. There needs to be consideration on both sides of the consequences. And you yourself by acknowledging labor has little power today compared to the 1970s have pointed out the reason we shouldn't perhaps be too fixated on raising rates too high.
    Given the choice, I would rather see targeted fiscal stimulus than monetary stimulus to help the specific areas of our economy that are struggling via government programs, and tax hikes to constrict things when we get overstimulated. But there are obvious political roadblocks to fiscal stimulus. Interest rates are a blunt instrument that helps and hurts multiple parties.
    As for SVB, I am fine with making all depositors whole just so long as the rich people getting bailed out stop complaining about the "moral hazard" of helping poor people. Moreover, the capital standards from Dodd Frank need to be restored and SVB should be nationalized, and the government collect all future profits to give back to taxpayers.