When did PRPFX become a collectibles fund or was it always considered one. Guess I'll be paying the 28% cap. gains.
Thanks for your replies.

Hello,
This is a fund that I have owned for better than four years. As I had CDs that matured, in a low interest rate environment, this is one of the vehicles that I moved four positions of my twenty position CD ladder into. Over the past four plus years it has provide the target six percent distribution plus capital apperception of about two percent per year for a total annual return of a little better than eight percent. It is probably not for everyone but it has meat my expectations.
To meet its distribution target it uses four strategies. They are dividends form its stock positions, coupons form its bond positions, proceeds form its call writing strategy, and harvestings of capital gains from the selling of securities.
Thus far, I have been a happy camper with this investment vehicle.
I wish all “Good Investing.”
Old Skeet

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
Copy & Paste Barron's Dimitra Defotis
Investors packed the Metropolitan Club in Manhattan Thursday to hear from experts on master limited partnerships. After a decade of beating the stock market, MLPs—which are mostly energy infrastructure companies—lagged in 2012 and produced a total return of about 28% last year, just behind the broader market. Investors prize them for their juicy, tax-advantaged yields, but valuations are getting a bit rich, as noted in Barron's latest MLP roundtable.
Still, investors continue to flock to new MLPs and MLP funds. One big reason: an average payout of about 6%. Plus, they offer exposure to the boom in North American oil-and-gas production, and with billions in planned infrastructure spending over the next decade, the best players should continue to do well.
Against that backdrop, Barron's asked two money managers presenting at Capital Link's Master Limited Partnership Investing Forum for their top MLP picks now. Two themes emerged: first, the desirability of crude oil and natural gas liquids, over natural gas; second, the importance of diversity, geographic and otherwise.
Opening the festivities at the club was Kyri Loupis, head of energy and infrastructure at Goldman Sachs Asset Management, who manages MLP portfolios and two publicly traded funds. He likes smaller MLPs with strong growth prospects, healthy balance sheets and small distribution obligations to general partners. His picks:
• Oiltanking Partners (ticker: OILT): $2.9 billion market value. It is in the crude-oil logistics business. With major crude-oil delivery bottlenecks, Oiltanking's positions in the Houston ship channel are valuable. Its yield, at 2.7%, is less than half the MLP average, but Loupis expects distribution growth of 18% annually over three years, and its distribution coverage ratio—the partnership's cash flow after maintenance capital spending and general-partner payments, divided by current distributions—is very strong at 1.9 times. A number above 1 is considered healthy. Debt, at 1.3 times earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization, is about one-third that of other MLPs.
• Lehigh Gas Partners (LGP): $404 million market value; 7.5% yield. It owns and leases real estate tied to retail fuel distribution at 700 locations in the Northeast, Florida and Ohio. Loupis expects distribution growth of 8% annually over the next three years as Lehigh expands its wholesale distribution network. The coverage ratio is 1.46 times, and a low percentage of total distributions goes to the general partner. It is still undiscovered, and not part of the benchmark Alerian MLP index.
• EQT Midstream Partners (EQM): $3.1 billion market value; 2.8% yield. It is focused on natural gas gathering, transmission and storage, mostly in the Appalachian basin. It was carved in 2012 from parent EQT (EQT). Loupis believes that the parent company could—and should—sell pipelines and other midstream assets to the MLP, which would unlock more value in the limited partner. Loupis projects distribution growth of 15% to 20% or more annually over the next three years, supporting yield growth.
One interesting note: Loupis does not hold any Kinder Morgan businesses in his two funds. The four companies in the Kinder empire— Kinder Morgan Energy Partners (KMP), Kinder Morgan Management (KMR), Kinder Morgan Inc. (KMI) and El Paso Pipeline Partners (EPB)—were the subject of a recent Barron's cover story. Barron's wrote that Kinder Morgan makes aggressive assumptions in its accounting. (See "Kinder Morgan: Trouble in the Pipelines," Feb. 22.)
Dan Spears, a portfolio manager at Swank Capital, a Dallas-based asset manager with an MLP focus, still likes large pipeline players (including some Kinder-related stocks). His top picks:
• Access Midstream Partners (ACMP): $10.8 billion market value; 3.9% yield. It owns gas gathering and processing assets and has leadership positions in some less-developed fields with growing production. Spears expects distribution growth of 15% to 20% per year. Distribution coverage is strong at about 1.5 times. It has budgeted $3.5 billion for capital spending between 2013 and 2015, which should boost volumes and expand desirable fixed-fee contracts.
• Energy Transfer Equity (ETE): $25 billion market value; 3.1% yield. It is a leading natural gas pipeline operator. But acquisitions of natural gas liquids (NGL) and crude logistics businesses have diversified its operations. There is strong demand for gas liquids, which contain propane, from industrial and retail customers. Spears thinks ETE's price should rise at least 20% to reflect the value of these businesses. Distribution growth looks steady.
• NGL Energy Partners (NGL): $3 billion market value; 5.9% yield. Acquisitions have diversified the business, and were accomplished at good prices since NGL's public offering in 2011. It is in the crude oil, propane and water service business, but is not well covered by analysts. Spears thinks there are growth opportunities in dealing with wastewater and providing water used in drilling. Good distribution growth and distribution coverage.
How long can the MLP profits keep flowing? A skeptic in the audience, apparently fatigued with industry bullishness, asked Spears a sobering question: Who is not positioned well in the energy space? Spears named three areas: Broadly, Europe loses because it doesn't have cheap natural gas as a feedstock to compete in refining and manufacturing. In the U.S., natural gas producers will see low prices for a while. And some long-distance pipelines face obsolescence, unable to match supply with demand.
"Expectations need to come down a little bit for MLP returns from last year. We expect total returns of between 8% and 12% in 2014," Spears told Barrons.com. "But MLPs are not necessarily expensive if you look at their investing and growth prospects."
.
.

You know, death may or may not trigger some taxes, and depending on how one's account is registered, there may be a need to retitle the account or move the assets.
But actually, death will have no affect on the performance of one's mutual funds.
In fact, it can be said that because of their inactivity in the capital markets, the dead would certainly be above-average fund investors.

Biotech is behaving like a retail venture capital fund because of barbell return characteristics of the products.
Technically, this is still within the 4-6% expected pull back from the last high as I had posted earlier and so not yet a concern. IBB should find support around 255 IF it declines further and could be a buying opportunity. My recommendation earlier was a stop limit about 7% from the highs which is about 252 for IBB.

Wintergreen 2013 Annual Report:

Dear Fellow Wintergreen Fund (Trades, Portfolio) Shareholder,
2013 seemed to be the year when the quality, valuations, and risks of businesses ceased to matter to most stock market participants. The Standard & Poor's 500 Composite Index ("S&P 500 (INDEXSP:.INX)") remarkable rise for the year was its best return since 1997 during the run-up of the technology bubble. The ten best performing names in the S&P 500 had extremely high returns, while carrying an average price-to-earnings multiple of 58. Among these top performers were a struggling retailer (Best Buy Co., Inc. (NYSE:BBY)), a recently bankrupt airline (Delta Air Lines, Inc. (NYSE:DAL)), a brokerage still digging itself out from the finanacial crisis (E TRADE Financial Corporation (NASDAQ:ETFC)), a biotechnology company (Celgene Corporation (NASDAQ:CELG)), and two poster children of a potential new internet bubble (Netflix, Inc. (NASDAQ:NFLX) and Facebook Inc (NASDAQ:FB)). We believe the extraordinary returns on securities we view as highly speculative names are a microcosm of the broader market in 2013 - market participants moving down the quality spectrum in search of returns, without regard for and understanding of risks and valuations. We believe overseas securities languished and emerging markets became the scapegoat of popular opinion.The widespread appetite for risk has been fueled in part by years of artificially low interest rates in most developed markets around the world. When safe high-quality assets yield a fraction of one percent, it isn't surprising to see many investors flock to high-risk, high-reward investments, be it junk bonds or speculative equities. This is exemplified by high-yield bond spreads approaching historical lows, sub-prime mortgages being bid up 17% in the past year, and speculative equities posting triple-digit gains. Classic fundamental analysis of business values, a keystone in true investing, was replaced with an insatiable desire for returns at any cost and often a failure to acknowledge the inherent risk of many investment vehicles.
There is a popular Wall Street notion that momentum trading (i.e., buying stocks that have recently risen in price solely because they have recently risen in price) allows someone to hop from trend to trend as if they are a surfer riding the crest of a wave, and that this will enable one to trade their way to wealth. This "quick and easy" approach to speculating, which has been sold to investors in a relentless media blitz accompanying the latest bull market, is seldom successful in the long-run. More often, people don't get just wet, but financially soaked.

http://www.wintergreenfund.com/downloads/wintergreen_fund_annual_report_20131231.pdf

Ted, I have owned the 10 funds marked with an asterisk for 15+ years. Yes, I suppose I could prove it if I had to. But I'm not trying to brag, just trying to understand.

Are you claiming that you only owned those 10 funds (in equities) the last 15+ years and no other fund you bought/sold during that time?
There are two different questions here, one whether a mutual fund can beat a relevant index over a long period of time and two if you were able to exactly pick only those funds that over performed and nothing else.
The answer to the first question is very simple and easy to verify. There are many funds that beat their indices especially over market cycles. This is from a combination of stock selection and reducing drawdowns. Indices that stay fully invested even during long bear markets have a disadvantage relative to a manager that is able to go defensive and also be aggressive in bull markets. Yactman is a good example of such a manager. However, since that kind of timing cannot be perfect, they will not beat the index every year which is what the indexing studies try to hold them to for their conclusions.
Bogle's statements always have to be taken with some understanding rather than as gospel by the cult. If you have a primarily bull market, it is very difficult for a manager to beat the index over a long period in such a market by stock picking alone. The higher the ER, more difficult. We have had many such periods and therefore when you average it over all such periods and so over representing bull markets, the indexes come out better with a few exceptions. This is a mathematical conclusion based on averages than on what might happen to you.
The second question is whether you or anyone can reliably pick the managers that over perform their indices.
Again, the studies which answer in the negative average over all funds or pick them at random or some such not real world criterion. I suspect that people here with the kind of analysis available to them to select funds will do much better than that but even then it won't be a perfect record. But it doesnt need to be perfect to cone out ahead over a period of time.
No one has studied what would happen if people selected funds based on some due diligence, so that is still an open question as to how different due diligence criterion (not some dumb criterion like recent performance) would portend a successful fund for the future. People who do these studies are usually vested in the indexing approach to ask questions that might potentially disturb that view.
My personal opinion is that this whole beating the index thing is moot. You buy an ndex fund to get full exposure to the market without any drag and is suitable for early years if investing because you can ride out market downturns. As you build up your portfolio and have less years to ride out potential bear markets, you gradually transition to managers that have proven records of capital preservation. I prefer this to traditional beta exposure changes by altering equity/bond mix which lag too much if there aren't significant bear markets.
Are you just posting these as link bait to your blog? There is nothing there that could not have been posted in its entirety as a post here.

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-05/buffett-s-book-pick-guides-fuss-to-marks-beating-market.html
Buffett's Book Pick Guides Fuss to Marks Beating Market

Warren Buffett, in his annual letter to shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (BRK/A) last week, said the best investment he ever made was buying a copy of "The Intelligent Investor" by Benjamin Graham.
The billionaire isn't the only prominent investor who considers the 1949 book money well spent. Daniel Fuss of Loomis Sayles & Co., Oaktree Capital Group LLC's Howard Marks and David Herro of Harris Associates LP credit the text with shaping their thinking about how markets work and what it takes to succeed.

Both great funds. The differences aren't just in the equity sleeves, though. VWELX seeks capital growth with current income a secondary objective, so holds mega/large dividend payers and lots of treasuries in a set 60/40 split. PRWCX seeks capital growth through stock-market like returns with preservation a secondary objective, so holds value priced stocks with corporate and some junk bonds. PRWCX also offers a little more tactical breathing room to its manager, who can hold some foreign equities and change the equity/bond allocation as well. PRWCX is higher risk, higher reward, but still with less volatility than the market in general. Both make fine core holdings.
Both funds also have attracted large amounts of AUM because of their success ($80BB for VWELX, over $20BB for PRWCX), and recently the manager of PRWCX appears to have sold out of the fund, though there could be many reasons for that. So at the risk of complicating this again, let me suggest an alternative for each:
MAPOX is a fantastic traditional 60/40 income fund specializing in midwestern American stocks with a flexible bond sleeve. It holds some mid and small caps, and has very slightly better numbers than VWELX with a fraction of the AUM. It also costs twice as much, though is still relatively cheap, and has zero NTF brokerage availabilty. There are worse things, though, than a Roth held at Mairs and Power, and eventually your daughter could branch out into the excellent growth or small cap funds.
VILLX is a quirky fund based in New Orleans that holds growthier mid and small cap fare and corporate bonds, though not much junk right now. The managers still have an eye for value, though, and the fund has a small amount of turnover. Think of a Primecap balanced fund. I believe they can alter the allocation tactically, but am not sure. VILLX is definitely the youngest, most volatile and priciest of the four funds, but it has thebstrongest upside of any of the four (check out the results for the past five years).
All four are MFO "Great Owl" funds, for whatever that is worth, and any would make a fine core holding. In terms of risk/return they'd rank VILLX/PRWCX/MAPOX/VWELX. I think eventually you could even pair VWELX/MAPOX with PRWCX/VILLX with a catch all foreign fund for a decent enough, simple three fund port.

Charles, many thanks for these graphs. It reinforces my conclusion that I don't need HUSIX with the other two. I am just waiting for April so I can take LT cap gains instead of ST. I just hope the market doesn't crash before then.
I don't know if I would buy CIPSX today, but I'd take a small tax hit on selling it, and since over the life of the fund, as your graph shows, it has overperformed the S&P by an average of 4 p.p. a year while having a smaller maximum drawdown, there seems no rush to sell it despite its current 2 star rating from M*.
But at the next correction I will add to BRUSX.
Shadow, yes, that's how I got into BRUSX as well! I'd been waiting for such an opportunity for years. I previously had some other Bridgeway small cap funds as well as BRAGX, which I still hold.

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303704304579383224190021540#printMode
M* Snapshot Of HSGFX: http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/hsgfx

Yes, the same Moose that trounced the S&P over the past 7,8,9,10,11,12, and 13 years.
$100K invested in the S&P back in 2000 would be worth a little less than $163K today. If you retired back in 2000 counting on the S&P 500 to help you pay to keep your lights on...well,
"Bless your heart."
Conversely, a $100K invested in the "Moose calls" starting in 2000 is now worth $1.2M. That's what I call staying ahead of inflation.
I find it interesting and telling that the Moose has held SPY for a brief 3 months over the last 6 years that Junkster referenced. Possibly it's the author's inability to comprehend the magintude of the FEDs influence and support of Military / Industrial complex or maybe a desire to perserve capital. The Moose held cash and LT Treasuries quite often over the last 6 years a nod (I believe) for preservation of capital.
In shear numbers, the Moose's total portfolio value grew over the last 6 years by $300K (from $896K to $1.2M) which is close to double the total value of the entire 13 year of the S&P 500 portfolio. It wasn't hard to beat the S&P 500 between 2000 - 2008...cash woud have beaten it. When the sh*t hit the fan a second time in 5 years (Tech Bubble / Housing Bubble) lots of other things (contango, commodities, credit risk) lost their shine and the light returned to the real market (productive companies).
The author (William Dirlam) at Decision Moose is reviewed by CXO:
cxoadvisory.com/2663/economic-indicators/the-decision-moose-asset-allocation-framework/#more-2663
It's real value may be in it's beta to the market (SPY).

Consider RiverPark Strategic Income (RSIVX) - Same manager, slightly more 'adventurous', slightly better return :-) , and from what I've seen so far, not too badly subject bond volatility. The per/share price just goes up (due to Capital Gains?), with the exception of two mid-month penny dips and adjustments for its monthly dividend.
edit: I'd like to note that RSIIX, normally a $1Million minimum, is available at Schwab as a for-fee ($76/buy,$0/sell) fund with a $2,500 minimum ($1000 minimum in an IRA). And no short-term holding fees. The Institutional shares (RSIIX) have an expense ratio 0.25% less than RSIVX, making the one-year break even about $30,400.
For the MFO review, see http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2014/01/riverpark-strategic-income-fund-rsivx-january-2014
And this months commentary ( http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/2014/03/march-1-2014 ) It's half-way down... Search (Ctl-F) for 'RSIVX'
For more info on David Snowball's take on it, see: http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/comment/36261/#Comment_36261
[ Long both RPHYX (for my monthly/annual needs) and RSIVX/RSIIX for my near-out years. ]

Here is the SEC filing concerning the change:
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/107606/000093247114004939/mergedwindsorii.htm
497 1 mergedwindsorii.htm SUPPLEMENTS
Vanguard WindsorTM II Fund
Supplement to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Dated February 26, 2014
Restructuring of the Investment Advisory Team
The board of trustees of Vanguard Windsor II Fund has restructured the Fund’s investment advisory team, removing Armstrong Shaw Associates Inc. (Armstrong Shaw) as an investment advisor and reallocating the assets managed by Armstrong Shaw to Hotchkis and Wiley Capital Management, LLC (Hotchkis and Wiley), one of the Fund’s existing advisors. Barrow, Hanley, Mewhinney & Strauss, LLC (Barrow, Hanley), Lazard Asset Management LLC (Lazard), Sanders Capital, LLC (Sanders), and The Vanguard Group, Inc. (Vanguard), also remain as advisors to the Fund. All references to Armstrong Shaw and all other details and descriptions regarding its management of certain assets of the Fund in the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus are deleted in their entirety.
Barrow, Hanley; Lazard; Sanders; Hotchkis and Wiley; and Vanguard each independently select and maintain a portfolio of common stocks for the Fund. In addition, as with other Vanguard funds that use a multimanager structure, Vanguard will continue to invest a small portion of the Fund’s assets to facilitate cash flows to and from the Fund’s advisors.
The Fund’s investment objective, primary investment strategies, and primary risks are not expected to change.
© 2014 The Vanguard Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
Vanguard Marketing Corporation, Distributor. PS 73 032014

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/916488/000091648814000004/p-10314.htm
497 1 p-10314.htm 490 P-1 03-14
490 P-1 03/14
SUPPLEMENT DATED MARCH 3, 2014
TO THE CURRENTLY EFFECTIVE PROSPECTUS
OF
Templeton Asian Growth Fund
(Templeton Global Investment Trust)
The Prospectus is amended as follows:
The following paragraphs are added to the “Fund Summary” and “Fund Details” sections:
On February 25, 2014, the Board of Trustees of Templeton Global Investment Trust on behalf of Templeton Asian Growth Fund approved a proposal to terminate and liquidate the Fund.
Effective at the close of market on March 18, 2014, the Fund is closed to new investors. Existing investors who had an open and funded account on March 18, 2014 can continue to invest through exchanges and additional purchases. Effective at the close of market on May 13, 2014, the Fund will be closed to additional investments from existing shareholders, except for purchases made through reinvestment of dividends or capital gains distributions. Re-registration of accounts held by existing investors, if required for legal transfer or administrative reasons, will be allowed.
The liquidation is anticipated to occur on or about May 20, 2014 (Liquidation Date). Except for retirement plan accounts, shareholders with accounts in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will have their accounts liquidated and the proceeds will be delivered to them.
Shareholders may exchange their Fund shares for shares of other Franklin Templeton funds, consistent with the Fund’s prospectus, prior to the Liquidation Date. An exchange out of the Fund prior to the Liquidation Date, or liquidation, may be considered a taxable transaction for nonretirement plan accounts. Shareholders should consult their tax advisor regarding the effect of the Fund’s liquidation in light of their individual circumstances. Participants in retirement plan accounts will receive further information regarding the handling of the liquidation. In considering new purchases or exchanges, shareholders may want to consult with their financial advisors to consider their investment options.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Fund reserves the right to modify this policy at any time.
Please keep this supplement for future reference.

Many thanks, all, for your thoughts and suggestions. Dryflower -- you were right, except I did not even wait till the next day to check back! My tentative plan is to wait a few weeks until I can make the cap gains long term, then sell HUSIX, hold the cash, and add to BRUSX next correction.
Good investing, all!

Dear expatsp,
You are obviously a sophisticated mutual fund investor, and you are more familiar with these funds than I am, so I'm not sure if I can help you or not, but let's talk about it a little.
BRUSX is your favorite, so you're not going to sell that one anyway. I like Bridgeway and I like John Montgomery. I think he applies his craft diligently, and with humility. I also think he brings a rare level of frankness and openness in his communications with investors. Additionally, I like the sliding scale for management fees which actually tosses extra money into the fund after the performance has been poor enough.
Having said all that, as you no doubt realize, you may have to hold Bridgeway funds even longer than the average mutual fund to fully benefit from their gains. I follow Bridgeway Aggressive Growth (BRAGX) as one of the 30 funds on my blog. It comes in dead last for ten year performance at #30, but when I run the 15 year numbers it tops everything else and finishes #1.
And speaking of 15 year numbers, your BRUSX is off the charts wonderful at 17% annualized. That turned $10,000 into $105,000 over a fifteen year period.
As for the other two funds, you clearly know them better than I do. It gets very tricky deciding which of 2 funds to part with. We would like to sell the one than will do worse and keep the one that will do better. Mathematically your odds of being correct should be at least 50-50. In venturing to choose, one must feel that his odds are at least materially better than that. Do you feel that you would have a 2/3 chance of choosing correctly? A 3/4 chance? This is a thicket that I am just not comfortable wading into.
If you were going to offer me an investment in 2 of these funds, I would choose BRUSX and CIPSX, but that may say more about me than about the funds. I am risk averse, and I eschew funds with high fees.
You are first going to have to decide if you do in fact need to raise cash. Personally, I agree with Bruce Berkowitz that a good investor never runs out of cash, but only you can decide what is enough for you. If you do need to be holding more cash, you might consider redeeming a few shares from all 3 of the funds.
In considering this whole business, I am reminded of Warren Buffet's "forth law of motion":
“Long ago, Sir Isaac Newton gave us three laws of motion, which were the work of genius. But Sir Isaac’s talents didn’t extend to investing: He lost a bundle in the South Sea Bubble, explaining later, “I can calculate the movement of the stars, but not the madness of men.” If he had not been traumatized by this loss, Sir Isaac might well have gone on to discover the Fourth Law of Motion: For investors as a whole, returns decrease as motion increases.”
Having quoted that quote, you may be able to guess that the choice which most immediately appeals to me is your #4
"4) Do nothing, keep these 3 good funds, stop thinking about this stuff obsessively, and come back next year."
Although I am guessing you may be a little like me. While you may well be able to keep these three good funds, you will not stop thinking about these things obsessively, and you will most certainly not wait until next year to come back. Heck, you'll be back tomorrow morning!
dryflower

Too many people think this is a buying opportunity and short term to make it a good buying opportunity today. Less than 1% drop in futures is not even close to alarm. It is more like buyers waiting and so there will.be some sell pressures to start with.
Most likely, there will be some profit taking in the recent highfliers and if the standoff continues with no shots fired, the markets may even recover today itself or tomorrow for a very small loss.
The only people that will make money may be those that stocked up on Gold, oil, etc last week and sell into the rally today. This might include Putin selling Gold.
For there to be panic selling that creates a buying opportunity, shots will need to be fired and a narrative has to emerge which will say why the Western countries will suffer such as Russia cutting off oil or gas supplies even if it hurts themselves to retaliate. This is possible but impossible to predict.
There is no reason for shots to be fired at the moment since the areas Russia is occupying mostly want Russia to be there and see themselves as Russians. Putin may be a cold chess player but he is not dumb. He won't advance into western Ukraine. So there will be a lot of posturing from the West and Russian markets will take a hit but they will think it is short term too and a.buying opportunity.
Seems like just a sideshow at the moment as far as markets are concerned.
Have GLL and TBT on my shopping list for short term trading gains in play money portfolio for now.

I currently own 3 small cap domestic equity funds. I am considering cutting that down and would welcome advice. I own the following:
BRUSX (my favorite): great long term returns despite a horrible 2008-09, 1.17% expenses which strike me as a bargain for a microcap fund with only $157 million in assets that is closed to new investors.
CIPSX: Lousy 5 year returns, but holds up well in down markets. Its outperformance in 2008 means it (and me, since I bought it in 2006) are well ahead of its benchmark and the S&P for the time period that I have owned it. I am disappointed it did not do better during the dip at the start of the year, but long-term it is a fund that outperforms during weak markets (2011 tpp.) 1.38% expenses, which I think a little high considering it has $1.2 billion in assets, but I guess that's about average for small cap funds.
HUSIX: Great 5 year returns, a disaster in 2008-09, but like BRUSX it has made up for it since. I bought it about a year ago (with funds raised from closing out ARIVX). 1.85% expenses, which I find very high considering the firm has (including private accounts) over a billion in this strategy, but it is extraordinarily tax efficient which takes some of the bite out of expenses.
I also own GPIOX for foreign small cap exposure.
Looking at 5 year returns it seems that dropping CIPSX is a no brainer, but had I bought all the funds at the start of 2007, CIPSX would have been the outperformer until about October last year, when HUSIX finally overtook it. Preserving capital in a crash is a powerful thing. If I had not proved to myself that I have the guts to add to good funds when they are crashing it should probably be my only fund.
My thoughts are either to
1) Sell HUSIX and keep the cash in case there is a correction. Keeping BRUSX (a high beta quant fund) and CIPSX (a low beta fundamental fund) might provide good diversity.
2) Sell CIPSX and put part in HUSIX and part in cash (a mix of high beta funds + cash in case they crash could be effective).
3) Obey the "the fewer funds, the better) mantra," sell HUSIX and CIPSX, add half of the money raised to BRUSX, keeping it as my only small cap fund, and have a lot of cash in case of correction.
4) Do nothing, keep these 3 good funds, stop thinking about this stuff obsessively, and come back next year.
Thoughts? The tax hit of all changes is acceptable.

The Russian markets had a tough day as their central bank adjusted rates from 5.5 to 7% resulting in a ten percent correction.
http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-02/yen-gains-with-oil-on-ukraine-as-s-p-500-futures-retreat.html