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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Target return of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX / RPHIX)?
    I searched the fund and found volumes of discussions dating way back to July, 2011.
    Hear’s one of the earliest - Riverpark Short-Term High Yield Fund Looks Like A Great Place to Park Money: https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/748/riverpark-short-term-high-yield-fund-rphyx-looks-like-a-great-place-to-park-money
    Another early discussion - Riverpark Short-Term High Yield Fund - What Role in Your Portfolio?: https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/3384/rphyx-riverpark-short-term-high-yield-what-role-in-your-portfolio
    With the proviso that I’ve never owned this fund and have only a limited understanding of the methodology employed, I’ll nonetheless venture a few thoughts:
    - Short term rates have risen since 2011 - albeit not by much. Compared to a half-percent back in 2011, the near 1%* available in money market funds today makes them appear better in comparison than in 2011. (*near 1.5% corrected to near 1%)
    - New SEC rules governing money market funds have made them safer in comparison with RPHYX than they might have appeared back in 2011.
    - Both equities and high yield bonds have appreciated greatly since than. I haven’t heard a knowledgeable observer dispute for months that spreads between investment grade debt and high yield are about as narrow today as they’ve ever been.
    Re #3 above - A manager in a distressed debt fund likely has been confronted with two choices since 2011: (1) reach for yield and compromise portfolio quality, or (2) settle for lower (relative) returns while maintaining portfolio quality. Some of the comments regarding “underperformance” of RPHYX suggest to me, anyway, that the fund’s managers have elected the second choice in order to preserve investor capital.
    While I don’t follow RPHYX closely, I periodically compare returns against TRBUX (investment grade ultra short) which I own. RPHYX has consistently outperformed my fund (though with a higher risk profile).
    Is RPHYX still a good investment? As @msf and others have noted, it all depends on your overall investment aporoach and time horizon. How much additional risk are you willing to take on in your cash / cash alternative sleeve in pursuit of incrementally higher yield on that portion of your investments? Personally, I could construct a portfolio in which RPHYX would meet a need. Presently it doesn’t fit.
  • Cash Alternatives
    For me cash is cash ... and, there are few subsitutes for it. I also consider CD's as a form of cash and pehaps some short term treasuries as well. In a low interest rate environment I have barbelled an equal amount of cash on one side and growth funds on the other. When the two are averaged my return year-to-date on the barbell is about 13%. So as a stand alone asset, not counting what my mutual funds hold in cash, my cash position is about 15% of my overall portfolio ... and, like wise my growth area is about the same. For 2017 it is estimated that capital gain distributions on the growth side of the barbell will be somewhere between four to seven percent while the cash side will yield a little better than one percent. With this, form my perspective, this makes the barbell a good income generator with an anticipated payout of somewhere between 2.5% to 4% range. And, a thirteen percent year-to-date return is not too shabby on a 50/50 mix. In addition, this return (and yield) compares favorablely to some of my better performing hybrid funds found in the income and growth & income areas of my portfolio. Year-to-date my mutual fund portfolio (as a whole) has returned about 12% according to Morningstar's Portfolio Manager.
    Morningstar's Instant Xray analysis reflects overall that I am currently at about 19% cash including what my mutual funds hold.
  • Will These New Retirement Funds Catch On?
    @MikeM, In the article the author mentioned that the "newness" of TRLAX will rely upon the rolling average of TRRBX to determine its 5% payout. At least that is how I read it.
    Quote:
    Since the fund is new, it initially will base payouts on the five-year NAV history of T. Rowe Price Retirement 2020 Fund, a 15-year-old target-date fund that uses the same underlying strategy.
  • Consuelo Mack's WealthTrack: Guest: Richard Bookstaber, University Of California Pension
    FYI:
    Regards,
    Ted
    October 12, 2017
    Dear WEALTHTRACK Subscriber,
    This week marked the 30th anniversary of the October 19th, 1987 market crash when the blue chip Dow plummeted nearly 25%, behaving like the shakiest of emerging markets. It’s a stark contrast to the market’s current behavior which is eerily subdued and trading at record highs.
    What caused the Dow to drop 508 points on that single day, now forever known as Black Monday? As Ben Levisohn wrote in his excellent article in Barron’s titled Black Monday 2.O: The Next Machine-Driven Meltdown:
    “…experts found a culprit: so-called portfolio insurance, a quantitative tool designed to use futures contracts to protect against market losses. Instead, it created a poisonous feedback loop, as automated selling begat more of the same.”
    Fast forward 30 years, and that type of automated trading program seems almost quaint. Quantitative, rules-based systems known as algorithms, computer- based trading programs and strategies have grown exponentially in number, trading volume and complexity since then. And as Barron’s Levisohn wrote: “…bear a resemblance to those blamed for Black Monday.”
    How risky are the markets now?
    That is the focus of this week’s WEALTHTRACK and our guest, a leading expert on risk. We’ll be joined by Richard Bookstaber, Chief Risk Officer in the Office of the Chief Investment Officer for the $110 billion University of California Pension and Endowment portfolios. Bookstaber has had chief risk officer roles at major investment firms ranging from hedge funds Bridgewater and Moore Capital to investment banks Morgan Stanley and Salomon Brothers. From 2009 to 2015 he switched to the public sector, working at the SEC and U.S. Treasury. Among his projects was helping build out the risk management structure for the Financial Stability Oversight Council and drafting the Volcker Rule which restricts proprietary trading by banks.
    Bookstaber is also an author of two highly regarded books on financial risk. His most recent is The End of Theory: Financial Crises, The Failure of Economics, and the Sweep of Human Interaction. His first, A Demon of Our Own Design: Markets, Hedge Funds and the Perils of Financial Innovation, published in 2007 presciently warned of the perils of the explosion of financial derivatives, some of which he helped create.
    In a 2007 WEALTHTRACK appearance he alerted us about the twin risks of high leverage and complex financial instruments. How right he was. On this week’s show we will discuss the new risks he sees in the markets now, some created by regulations created to solve the old ones!
    If you’d like to see the show before it airs, it is available to our PREMIUM subscribers right now. We also have an EXTRA interview with Bookstaber about his new book, which can be seen exclusively on our website. Also, a reminder that WEALTHTRACK is available as a YouTube Channel, so if you are unable to join us for the show on television, you can watch it on our website, WealthTrack.com, or by subscribing to our YouTube Channel.
    Have a great weekend and make the week ahead a profitable and a productive one.
    Best regards,
    Consuelo

  • anyone have thoughts about PDI slumping?
    Something to add to the reading list: a good article from Alpha Gen Cap on Pimco CEFs: see the part about GAAP accounting's limited applicability to funds that are more total return-oriented/positioned, e.g., with big slugs of non-agency mortgages ... which dovetails with the point above about Pimco NAV gains.
    Hat tip to HiddenPointe on the M* forum for the catch; I'd given up on Alpha GC based on what seemed to be mostly advertising articles (for a paid service they offer) without a lot of substance - I've signed back up now to receive their pieces again.
  • TD Ameritrade's Expanded Commission-Free ETF Program
    @MSF I see your point, but it's $6.95 to sell an ETF outside the NTF platform, not $50, as shares are treated as stocks for commission purposes. Instead of selling, probably the best strategy would be to find a reasonable substitute in the new list to existing ETF positions and just add to your position with that ETF while holding onto the old one--an annoyance for record keeping admittedly, but you wouldn't have to realize any additional capital gains too soon. I agree there is a bit of marketing shenanigans here, but I also think there are some interesting new options on this list and it is true that costs have declined for a number of broad bread and butter index style SPDR ETFs such as total market, emerging, agg bond, small cap, etc that are now transaction free. I don't see it nearly as negatively as the Financial Buff does.
    Transfer your taxable assets to Robinhood and you're all set.
  • T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation & Income Fund Summary prospectus
    A couple of key elements are missing from this so far, like equity/bond weighting, if strictly domestic and what equity cap size. It does talk a lot about investments in more risky bond types fwiw. Anything TRP is worth watching in my opinion.
    MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE FUND’S PRINCIPAL INVESTMENT STRATEGIES AND ITS PRINCIPAL RISKS
    Consider your investment goals, your time horizon for achieving them, and your tolerance for risk.
    The fund seeks to balance the potential capital appreciation of equity securities with the income and relative stability of bonds and fixed income instruments over the long term. The fund’s focus on risk-adjusted returns is intended to reduce the fund’s overall risk profile and volatility relative to that of the broader stock market. In addition, the fund’s ability to seek income opportunities outside the stock market may also aid performance when stocks are declining. While there is no guarantee, spreading investments across different types of assets could reduce the fund’s overall volatility since prices of stocks and bonds may respond differently to changes in economic conditions and interest rate levels. A rise in bond prices, for example, could help offset a fall in stock prices.
    The addition of high yield bonds, bank loans, foreign securities, and derivatives provides the opportunity for capital appreciation and higher income and the ability to better adapt to changing market conditions when compared to funds with less flexible investment programs. The fund’s investments in high yield securities may include securities that are unrated but deemed to be below investment grade by T. Rowe Price. In addition, bank loans with floating interest rates and certain other holdings could help to moderate the fund’s price decline when interest rates rise because they may be less sensitive to interest rate movements. As with all funds, the fund’s share price can fall because of weakness in the broad stock or bond markets, a particular industry, or specific holdings.
    While high yield corporate bonds are typically issued with a fixed interest rate, bank loans have floating interest rates that reset periodically (typically quarterly or monthly). Bank loans represent amounts borrowed by companies or other entities from banks and other lenders. In many cases, the borrowing companies have significantly more debt than equity and the loans have been issued in connection with recapitalizations, acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, or refinancings. The loans held by the fund may be senior or subordinate obligations of the borrower, and may or may not be secured by collateral. The fund will primarily acquire bank loans as an assignment from another lender who holds a floating rate loan, but the fund has flexibility to also acquire bank loans directly from a lender or through the agent, or as a participation interest in another lender’s floating rate loan or portion thereof.
    In addition to investing in a wide array of bonds and other debt instruments, the fund also uses interest rate futures; interest rate, credit default, and currency swaps; and forward currency exchange contracts as part of its principal investment strategies. Interest rate futures and interest rate swaps are typically used to manage the fund’s duration and overall interest rate exposure, but futures may also be used as a tool to help manage significant cash flows into and out of the fund. Currency swaps and forward currency exchange contracts are used to protect the fund’s non-U.S. dollar-denominated holdings from adverse currency movements by hedging the fund’s foreign currency exposure back to the U.S. dollar, as well as to gain exposure to a currency believed to be appreciating in value versus other currencies. Credit default swaps are used to protect against a negative credit event (such as a bankruptcy or downgrade) or an expected decline in the creditworthiness of an issuer, to hedge the portfolio’s overall credit risk, or to efficiently gain exposure to certain sectors or asset classes (such as high yield bonds or bank loans).

  • anyone have thoughts about PDI slumping?
    @davidmoran, two things:
    (1) Some investors have had Pim multisector CEFs in general close to hair trigger for a few months now, because the monthly UNII/earnings reports have been showing lower distribution coverage - and this month's (which came out on Monday) was somewhat more brutal, with UNII falling quite a bit for several funds. PCI's been one that's been hit the hardest on that score. There's been a nice runup since the first very short-lived selling bout earlier that was an apparent response to one of those earlier data disclosures, so there'd prob'ly been some short-term valuation concern building after the recent runup.
    (2) There was a really silly article on Seeking Alpha (which if I recall right, also came out on Monday) by some "advisor" who demonstrated in the piece that he doesn't understand CEFs or Pimco's strategies. It cast a shadow on PCI specifically. Appeared it was widely read, so it may have had an influence.
    So the selloff started w/PCI but has since spread most of the way across the Pimco multi landscape, presumably because most have had lower distro coverage from income lately. (The average CEF investor is an individual investor who's in 'em for the income, so selloffs based on fears of income cuts are common.)
    However, given the continuing, large NAV gains of '17, quite a bit higher than the sum of the distributions, there shouldn't be much doubt that most or all of the funds can meet the stated distributions for quite a while before there's a real question about it. They've likely got good cap gains on non-agency mortgages and other assets they can bring into the distribution stream if and when they want.
    A lot of this stuff gets discussed on the M* CEF board.
    -- AJ
    P.S. The selloff started in the only Pimco multisector then trading at a discount.
  • RNDLX
    Yeah - If that shown 1.74% ER at Lipper is accurate, that’s a whale of an ER biting into your returns. Only way it could possibly be justified (perhaps in part) would be if this is some type of exotic fund which utilizes short selling and/or foreign currencies. Those types of income funds would be expected to cost a little more. I don’t know enough about this one to determine that.
    As others have suggested, many fine income funds have ERs far below 1.74%. I happen to like DODIX, which had an ER of around .43% last time I checked. If you’re a bit more aggressive, their DODLX has a higher, but still competitive ER. You won’t see the ER reflected on your statement. It’s mostly hidden from view, but still detracts from fund returns. Worse, some managers will take undue risk with a high ER fund in an effort to compensate for the high ER.
    Interestingly, Lipper scores your fund favorably, giving it 4 (out of 5) for total return, consistent return and preservation of capital (but knocks it on expense). Possibly, Lipper knows something I don’t. MaxFunds, on the other hand, rates the fund 32% (poor). Max suggests a best case for the fund in the next year to be +9% and worst case -12%. Consider those to be educated guesses, at best. I’m not telling you to sell it, but think you are correct in looking at similar funds having lower ERs and also questioning whether this kind of fund best meets your needs.
  • TD Ameritrade's Expanded Commission-Free ETF Program
    @MSF I see your point, but it's $6.95 to sell an ETF outside the NTF platform, not $50, as shares are treated as stocks for commission purposes. Instead of selling, probably the best strategy would be to find a reasonable substitute in the new list to existing ETF positions and just add to your position with that ETF while holding onto the old one--an annoyance for record keeping admittedly, but you wouldn't have to realize any additional capital gains too soon. I agree there is a bit of marketing shenanigans here, but I also think there are some interesting new options on this list and it is true that costs have declined for a number of broad bread and butter index style SPDR ETFs such as total market, emerging, agg bond, small cap, etc that are now transaction free. I don't see it nearly as negatively as the Financial Buff does.
  • TD Ameritrade's Expanded Commission-Free ETF Program
    My issue isn't with the State Street changes, but with TDA promoting a new and improved, expanded list, when in fact it had nothing to do with the State Street improvements and dropped funds (not only Vanguard but iShares (what's the excuse there?).
    It's the age old claim of "new and improved", where the changes are minimal and potentially harmful to existing customers. At $50 to sell existing ETF shares and possible taxable gains in the process, it could take years or decades for current customers to "benefit" from a drop of a few basis points.
  • TD Ameritrade's Expanded Commission-Free ETF Program
    The first link says that State Street switched indexes on existing ETFs (potential albeit small cap gains for existing shareholders), renamed the funds, and gave them new tickers. This happened on Oct 16th, before the TDA switch.
    That explains why the new tickers (e.g. SPDM for THRK) already appeared on the old TDA list. The new list is effective today, Oct. 17.
    You're getting hoodwinked into thinking that TDA did anything to bring down prices, at least based on the SPDR changes.
  • The Closing Bell: Wall St. Inches Up With Financials, Energy
    My diversified mix of funds ended flat - as were many of my individual funds. Bloomberg’s talking heads were yacking in the morning about the big surge in commodities. If it existed, it didn’t show up in the related funds I own. If fact, gold had an off-day. A bit unusual to see the DJ climb 85 points and yet end the day flat. Guessing those market gains must have been narrowly confined.
    FWIW - HSGFX continued to slide, falling .31% for the day to close at $6.36.
  • Reviewing Allocation Funds in a Retirement Portfolio
    @Old_Skeet...lots to ponder...longer response coming.
    @Ted, yes. They have been and should be good investments for growth going forward.
    @Derf, yes. I looked at these retirement funds as glide path funds for the 5 year increment / spending needs in retirement.
    I never pull the trigger on this idea, but it would go something like this:
    Yr/Date----Age---Hold Retirement/Income Fund
    2020 ------60----2020 Fund
    2025-------65----2025 Fund
    2030-------70----2030 Fund
    2035-------75----2035 Fund
    Etc
  • Reviewing Allocation Funds in a Retirement Portfolio
    @ bee: At one time didn't you throw out the idea to use target date funds to accomplish this in a retirement portfolio ? Ret. income, 2020, 2025, 2030.
    @ Old Skeet; You bring up a point of interest. How much to put in each pot so to speak?
    Derf
  • Reviewing Allocation Funds in a Retirement Portfolio
    One strategy that I have attempted to include as part of my portfolio review and yearly reallocation is to use "allocation funds" as the destination for other funds that need paring back. I consider these allocation funds as having attributes that served my goals well when I started investing and I now see them as serving a different goal in retirement.
    I began my investing (call this my 30's) by first owning well diversified allocation funds such as VGSTX, OAKBX, VWINX, VWELX, DODBX, PRPFX, PRWCX, and others. These funds provided me with a way to funnel small contributions into one or a few of these funds based mainly on their availability to my workplace retirement plan. It exposed "my meager, but dear savings" into what I consider a long term well managed (hopefully), well diversified investment. These funds often had a history of good risk / reward, solid management, were reasonably priced (low ER ratio) and made "staying the course" pretty certain.
    As my savings increased and my knowledge base grew (call it my 40-50's) I began realizing that I could create my own personal portfolio allocation using not only these funds, but a combination of "non-equity" funds (Bonds, RE, Commodities) and equity funds that had an "alpha/growth" strategy (sector, size, class, valuation, manager, etc.). These "fund combos" provided me with the biggest momentary losses and the largest momentary gains, but in the end have kept me up at night more often than the allocation funds I also still owned.
    I began to discipline myself to trust my fund choices to "stay the course" and use these momentary ups and downs in the market to reallocate between the "non-equity" portion and the "equity" portion of these investments, but as I reach my 60's, 70's and beyond I see myself developing a third approach.
    I see some of my low risk / low return "non-equity" funds along with some very conservation allocation funds as serving a roll in holding a portion of my portfolio for short term needs. (1-3 year, call these PONDX, PTIAX, CBUZX) for distributions of income, RMD, emergencies and retirement "fun".
    I see the higher risk / higher reward "non-equity" funds along with the higher risk / higher reward "equity" funds as serving a roll in maintaining long term growth. (10 years and longer), and I'll place my stallions here (POAGX, VGHCX, FSRPX, etc). Note to self: "I have too many of these..."
    I see my conservative, moderate & aggressive allocation funds as having a larger and key place in my retirement portfolio as the core of my holdings will occupy this space. These are investments have a (3-9 year) holding period that provide good portfolio diversification as well as "growth and income" to reallocate and "feed" ongoing (1-3 years) needs.
    The Conservative Allocation fund (3-5 year) needs in VWINX, GLRBX or CBUZX.
    The Moderate Allocation fund (5-7 year) needs in JABAX or OAKBX.
    The Aggressive Allocation fund (7-9 year) in PRWCX or BTBFX).
    Each of these allocation funds will periodically "feed" the 1-3 year funds over time.
    Each of the long term funds (10 years or more) "feed" the allocation funds.
    Hopefully there will be enough "feed" to go around.
    If you have any thought on this approach or suggestions for potential candidates for:
    1-3 year funds -
    3-5 year funds -
    5-7 year funds -
    7-9 year funds -
    10 and longer funds -
    I'd appreciate it.
  • It Would Take An ‘Immaculate Conception’ To Create Bear Market In Stocks Right Now:
    Mixing religious concepts with the tawdry business of pricing paper in the capital markets is probably not a good idea.
    Well said, Edmond. I agree. But the curious juxtaposition has at times made for some great literature.
    From Washington Irving’s The Devil and Tom Walker,
    Tom was the universal friend to the needy, and acted like "a friend in need"; that is to say, he always exacted good pay and security. In proportion to the distress of the applicant was the hardness of his terms. He accumulated bonds and mortgages, gradually squeezed his customers closer and closer, and sent them at length, dry as a sponge, from his door.
    As Tom waxed old, however, he grew thoughtful. Having secured the good things of this world, he began to feel anxious about those of the next ... He became, therefore, all of a sudden, a violent church-goer. He prayed loudly and strenuously, as if heaven were to be taken by force of lungs. Indeed, one might always tell when he had sinned most during the week by the clamor of his Sunday devotion.
  • It Would Take An ‘Immaculate Conception’ To Create Bear Market In Stocks Right Now:
    Probably Mr. Ramsey could have used a more apropos metaphor than 'immaculate conception'. Mixing religious concepts with the tawdry business of pricing paper in the capital markets is probably not a good idea. While I am not a religious person, using a term which connotes a unique miracalous event as the possible cause for a negative event (a decline in equity values), strikes me an offputting juxtaposition.
    Perhaps Mr. Ramsey might consider instead citing a "Black Swan" or "exogenous- or geopolitical-shock"...
    As to the gist of Mr. Ramsey's thoughts, I was immediately reminded of the following quote by then Yale economist Irving Fisher:
    “Stock prices have reached what looks like a permanently high plateau,”