This week is why I always maintain small cap exposure in my portfolio. My small cap fund (FDSCX) has made huge gains this week, over 3% today alone. Big gains (and losses) tend to happen very quickly with small cap funds.

It's "only" 290% behind QQQ in the last 10 years.
https://schrts.co/QCSnsXdn

”There is speculative excess today relative to recent years.” - David Giroux, T. Rowe Price …
Giroux’s Picks: Aurora Innovation / AUR, Danaher / DHR, Revvity / RVTY
And he still likes utilities.

AUR up 38% since this was posted by @hank

I’ll believe anything @Mark. The 2 mid-caps I sold Friday, locking in a couple 8-10% short-term gains, have both advanced another 7-10% apiece in the 2 days since I sold. Silly me!

This week is why I always maintain small cap exposure in my portfolio. My small cap fund (FDSCX) has made huge gains this week, over 3% today alone. Big gains (and losses) tend to happen very quickly with small cap funds.

Here's hoping you waited for my reply?
Ah, so finally some real, however badly dated (June 2020) and at first swipe, marginally useful support. If you were an auditee of mine, I'd just STOP my review here and kindly ask you to, you know, try again.
But given you ain't, I trudged on, and glad I did because it's an eye-opener...
"Marshfield Equity Composite Positions" (MECP) does not appear to be defined. Maybe I missed it but I looked pretty hard. Without that, as reader of this data, I STOP right there and find out WTH is included in that word salad and its data. I then massage that data and carve out whatever data might be relevant.
Scary footnote at t/m "*" on the bottom of Pages 6-10 about MECP Gross data that above is compared to the S&P data: (paraphrasing) "MECP Gross does not reflect the payment of advisory fees and other expenses. Go to Appendix B."
Say what?
Lost further interest in this dated data there and almost skipped looking at Appendix B. But alas, at Appendix B, TR is shown net of fees. So, why then...Ugh!
(NOTE: IF on this thread you have been unknowingly quoting Gross MECP performance data, you will find significantly LOWER MECP TRs Net of Fees on Page 19, Top Left, Col 3.)
So I looked at Page 10. It shows splits for periods that a prospective investor really doesn't care about in relation to the notions purported on this thread and does nothing to answer the salient question of MECP performance being predictive of MRFOX performance given those splits.
What you need to show to support your notion that MECP (again, whatever that is) performance (paraphrasing) "will probably predict" (and more importantly, DID predict, since we have 8 1/2+ years of MRFOX performance data) is the respective performance data NET OF ALL FEES for (and again, ALL of the MECP data could be irrelevant until it is known what is actually in MECP data) :
MECP: Inception (?) to 12/27/15 (date before MRFOX inception)
I have no data available to calculate that
S&P: MECP Inception to 12/27/15
I would need to know the exact MECP inception data
MRFOX: 12/28/15-Current +277%
S&P (using eg FXAIX): 12/28/15-Current +221%
And let's see what you get, eh?
Good luck carving that out!
Bottom Line: This (to me at least) is an unnecessary exercise for any prospective MRFOX investor as we already have 8 1/2+ YEARS of MRFOX performance, we have no idea WTH is in MECP, and the data this entity provides APPEARS TO SHOW all comparisons to the S&P at Gross (until you get to Appendix B and do your own math). IF that truly is the case, they got no shot at any of my investment dollars.
Disclaimer: Sorry, if I was still back in the mode of running audit departments, I would have been far more thorough with my review! But it's a start, eh?
I'll wait for your reply!

Factoid City dinky linky:

“Hedge funds and traders held record short positions in small cap stocks going into last week’s CPI report and were caught off guard by the lower than expected inflation,” said Cole Wilcox, chief executive officer of Longboard Asset Management. “This sparked the violent rally in small caps.”
Data on Russell 2000 futures show that traders had pushed their exposure to the most net-short since 2023. About 25% of the $68 billion iShares Russell 2000 ETF’s free float is held short, compared with 9.9% for the $564 billion SPDR S&P 500 ETF Trust and 7.6% for the $302 billion Invesco QQQ Trust Series 1, according to data from S3 Partners.
[snip]
The earnings outlook for small caps has started to improve as well. Consensus revenue and net income growth forecasts for the Russell 2000 show a strong recovery in late 2024, with it approaching the S&P 500, according to an analysis by RBC Capital Markets. The rate of Russell 2000 earnings estimates getting revised higher has also started to move back to parity with the S&P, strategists led by Lori Calvasina found.

I've been looking to dump NUSC and FSSNX from the IRA, but I think I'll let them run a little.

BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, has just launched an ETF that offers 100% downside protection to investors. The new ETF (MAXJ) will have its maximum gains capped at 10.6% while protecting against the downside for a duration of 12 months. 0.5% ER
https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/savingandinvesting/how-good-is-blackrock-s-new-100-downside-hedge-etf/ar-BB1pdRfO?ocid=BingNewsSerp

Hearing stuff like that makes me wonder if we’re approaching a market top? “Risk-free equity investing” (So easy a cave man could do it).
I confess to not understanding the finer workings of these funds very well. That may be a plus. As I suspect a lot of people pouring money in don’t understand them (or equity investing in general) very well either. Never mind that the guarantee appears to last only 12 months. To some that’s an eternity. Hell, might “hit the jackpot” well before the term expires! Bail out at 364 days and let the next greater fool investor buy it.

Sold my large holding of CMS preferreds at breakeven. They were bouncing all over the place in large ways in recent weeks (moreso than any other preferred I've owned) and more to the point, Schwab never could get the income projections or cost basis right on them, which was annoying me no end.
Also in the process of selling HESM for 10% or so gains. Lots of insider selling due to the CVX-HES merger and uncertainty over how the CVX-HESM relationship might look once the HES deal goes through.
Both turned out to be short-term trades.
Money going into SGOV until I find other uses for it in the QDI space.

Thanks BaluBalu.
I extracted the paragraphs below from our 2021 MICUS report. A bit dated, but I believe M* has continued to grow its business even higher in the 3 years since.
The Business
If attendance at Morningstar The Conference was down this year, it does not reflect the success of Morningstar The Business, in spite of COVID or perhaps helped by it. Since Kapoor took over CEO in 2017, employees have doubled, as have MORN’s valuations. The company’s market cap has nearly quadrupled.
Adding to its acquisition of private equity tracker Pitchbook, the company acquired credit rating firm DBRS in 2019 and ESG rating firm Sustainalytics in 2020.
Since most people probably think of Morningstar as just the “Good Housekeeping” of the fund industry, it’s probably worth listing all their current products:
• DBRS Morningstar – Independent rating services and …
• Morningstar Advisor Workstation – Investment research, financial planning, client reporting …
• Morningstar Data – Global equity, managed investments, and market data …
• Morningstar Direct – Advanced portfolio analytics and performance reporting …
• PitchBook – Data, analysis, industry news, and in-depth reports on the private and public markets …
• ESG Investing Solutions – Assessments of ESG risks and opportunities across asset classes …
• Financial Planning Solutions – Web-based financial planning tools for advisors
• Sustainalytics – Sustainable investment strategies and security-level ESG research and ratings …
• Morningstar Office – Web-based portfolio and practice management …
• Morningstar Research – Independent, comprehensive evaluations on equities, funds …
• Morningstar Annuity Intelligence – Annuity research for professional investors
• Morningstar ByAllAccounts – Account-aggregation and financial-management tools…
• Morningstar Commodities & Energy – Research and data in the commodities and energy sectors …
• Morningstar Credit Information and Analytics – Credit tools and research …
• Morningstar Enterprise Components – Configurable, ready-to-integrate enterprise software …
• Morningstar Essentials – Investment statistics and ratings for institutional marketing professionals
• Goal Bridge – Goal-setting and investment planning for financial advisors
• Morningstar Investment Research Center – Comprehensive investment resources for library patrons
• Morningstar Reporting Solutions – Marketing materials, regulatory documents, and other custom …
• Manager Selection Services – Manager selection and investment analysis for financial advisors
• Morningstar Total Rebalance Expert – Tax-aware rebalancing for financial advisors
• Morningstar Indexes – Product benchmarking & creation for financial institutions and asset managers
• Managed Portfolios – Mutual fund, stock, and exchange-traded fund portfolios …
• Morningstar Retirement Manager – Workplace retirement account service for plan sponsors
• Advisor Managed Accounts – Managed accounts for registered investment advisors
• Morningstar Fiduciary Services – Investment selection, portfolio monitoring, and portfolio reporting …
• Morningstar Plan Advantage – Comprehensive retirement-plan management …
• Target-Date Solutions – Target-date funds for plan sponsors
• Morningstar Premium – Analysis of stocks, funds, and markets, plus tools …
• Morningstar Investor Newsletters – Investment strategies and in-depth analysis …
Morningstar’s founder and chairman, Joe Mansueto, retains about 45% of outstanding shares, representing a current value of about $5 billion. If there is someone vested in Chicago’s recovery, it would be him. He purchased the historic Wrigley Building in 2018 and most recently the Waldorf Astoria Chicago. He owns Major League Soccer’s Chicago Fire. He remains a large donor to the University of Chicago, his alma mater.

One of the businesses Morningstar entered just under three years ago was their own brand of mutual funds, which replaced other funds in its Managed Portfolios business. The nine funds have accumulated $5.3B in AUM, or about $44M in additional fees for Morningstar.
At the time, it seemed awkward to us [here’s David’s Take] and it remains awkward for Morningstar to offer its own competing funds. What’s worse is that so far they have performed unremarkably, as can be seen in the table below. As a fiduciary, I would be hard-pressed to defend why these funds were chosen over others recommended by Morningstar’s own research teams. None of the funds will qualify for Morningstar’s “5 Star” rating when they soon reach the 3-year mark. Morningstar is also a sub-advisor of five other funds for ALPS. These five ETF asset-allocation portfolios suffer even worse performance; in fact, Morningstar itself ranks the ALPS family “Below Average.”

Baby bonds (I believe) are bonds that are traded on exchanges in denominations less than $1,000….usually $25, although some are $50 and some are $100 (or other par prices). There are also preferred stocks that trade similarly (in denominations, exchanges, etc.), but baby bonds are higher in the capital stack, have call and due/maturity dates, and generally trade more muted (lower volatility) than preferred stock (which are closer to equity—or the bottom—of the capital stack).
I know trading individual baby bonds (or any other security) can be a PITA, but if you spend some time looking at individual baby bonds, you can get yields easily of 6% or higher (usually called stripped or current yield), with built in capital gains if buying under par, that adds to the return (usually called yield to maturity or yield to call).
PIMCO also has a fund that invests in baby bonds and preferreds….PFANX is the A share version of it.
I have invested in several individual preferreds and baby bonds, so am happy to answer any more questions; usually ETF or mutual fund versions that hold these funds have several limitations (usually liquidity and excessive exposure to financial companies because these are the most likely to issue these securities) that hurt longer term returns.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1771146/000199937124008566/roar-485apos_071224.htm
Excerpt:
Principal Investment Strategies
The Fund is an actively managed exchange-traded fund (“ETF”). Under normal circumstances, the Fund invests at least 80% of its net assets (plus the amount of borrowings, if any, for investment purposes) in catastrophe bonds. Catastrophe bonds, also known as event-linked or insurance-linked bonds, are structured securities whereby insurers or reinsurers transfer specific risks, typically those associated with severe events such as catastrophes or natural disasters, to capital market investors. These investments also may cover risks such as mortality, longevity and operational risks. For purposes of the Fund’s 80% test, catastrophe bonds include other forms of insurance-linked securities (“ILS”), including quota share instruments (a form of proportional reinsurance in which an investor participates in the premiums and losses of a reinsurer’s portfolio of catastrophe-oriented policies), bonds or notes issued in connection with excess-of-loss, stop-loss, or other non-proportional reinsurance (“Excess of Loss Notes”), collateralized reinsurance investments and industry loss warranties, event-linked swaps, and other insurance-and reinsurance-related securities.
Trigger Events
Trigger events with respect to the Fund’s investments typically relate to natural disasters or events, including hurricanes, windstorms, tornados, fires, floods, and other weather-related phenomena. Trigger events may also include earthquakes and tsunamis. In addition, catastrophe bonds may have trigger events that are non-natural catastrophes, such as plane crashes, or other events resulting in a specified level of physical or economic loss, such as mortality or longevity (life-span). The Fund does not expect to invest significantly in such securities.
Trigger events are typically defined by three criteria: an event; a geographic area in which the event must occur; and a threshold of economic or physical loss (either actual or modeled) caused by the event, together with a method to measure such loss. In order for a trigger event to be deemed to have occurred, each of the three criteria must be satisfied while the bond is outstanding. The Fund has no limit as to the types of natural catastrophes, geographic areas or thresholds of loss referenced by event-linked bonds in which it can invest. Generally, the event is a natural peril of a kind that results in significant physical or economic loss.
https://www.artemis.bm/news/brookmont-launch-exchange-traded-cat-bond-fund-catastrophic-bond-etf/

It doesn't matter whether there is 1 manager or multiple managers.
The fund firm matters a lot. For example, Fido managers have great institutional support whether a fund has star manager (FCNTX, FDGRX) or a crowd (FBALX - a graveyard of former Fido managers that Fido wants to keep). Manager transitions matter less at Fido, Pimco, Price, Vanguard, etc - despite the mistakes they may have made.
This is why some managers don't succeed when they move away from their original firm. Even the so-called bond-guru Bill Gross couldn't do it after he was out at Pimco (his fund at JHG was a disaster).
Some firms such as American Funds/Capital Group have a policy of multiple managers to avoid the star-manager problem.
Investors should be wary of fund boutiques (BRUFX, etc) with 1-2-3 funds. There are several posts at MFO about such concentrated/focused, hot-hand funds (old or new). Mutual funds rely on the separation of fund administration, management and distribution for "safety", but those functions may overlap a lot at boutique funds - and this required separation may be barely legal at boutique firms.
Bruce Berkowitz (FAIRX) has mostly his and family's money in the fund. He also gets to run JOE, and his interests are NOT aligned with the other public holders of FAIRX. In a way, he is using other-people's-money (OPM) for his own interests. So, while some fund ownership by managers is desirable, too much of it may be BAD.

So the outperformance of the Marshfield equity composite from late 1989 thru mid 2020 vs sp500 was 283bps annually. Looking briefly at MRFOX vs sp500 since inception of the mutual fund was approx 260 bps. That outperformance over time is huge.
So from where I sit, seems to me that is similar outperformance. Now, the real question is if it's repeatable or not?

@stillers - look up performance of Marshfield equity composite...Mr Niemszewski was managing the fund back in late 89' (do your own homework, not like I spent 10 hours researching this)...absolutely blows away SP500...from 12/89 thru 6/2020 composite returns were ~ 3530% vs 1568% SP...I'd say that was outperformance...
https://issuu.com/biglehart2016/docs/marshfield_associates_for_rbc_june_2020_equity_bro

Ugh.
I apparently already did more research on MFROX than it appears you have, yet you seem to want to glorify it for 30 year performance THAT NEVER HAPPENED!
Maybe YOU should re-read my post as YOU didn't answer my very simple question.
Let me try to make it even more clear:
MRFOX did not EXIST prior to 12/28/15. (See my prior post that provides pretty clear evidence of that FACT.)
So why are you referencing ANY period or performance prior to 12/28/15 in a discussion specifically about MRFOX?
Either clearly answer that specific question or don't bother posting anything else in response.
Guessing where you're coming from here:
Managers often manage a lot of different funds over their tenures. But their respective performances are fund-specific, NOT aggregate. Duh.
Oh, and your link was worthless in relation to this question.

@stillers - look up performance of Marshfield equity composite...Mr Niemszewski was managing the fund back in late 89' (do your own homework, not like I spent 10 hours researching this)...absolutely blows away SP500...from 12/89 thru 6/2020 composite returns were ~ 3530% vs 1568% SP...I'd say that was outperformance...
https://issuu.com/biglehart2016/docs/marshfield_associates_for_rbc_june_2020_equity_bro

XMHQ is something I will be keeping in the IRA. The current strategy is only good for the past five years. As of yesterday, it is leading SPY over the past five, three, one, and YTD periods. I also own it in the taxable. It is just about 15% tech.
FMIMX is another I am keeping in the IRA. It is currently the largest holding in my IRA since LC's are split between funds. The recent interest in small caps has bumped it ahead of FBALX and PRWCX for now.
I have been looking at XMMO for the taxable for a while. As with XMHQ, the strategy has only been in place the last five years. I don't know why M* and Lipper don't account for this, but they don't.
XMMO has also been running ahead of SPY for five years now, and well ahead over the last twelve months and YTD. Given its makeup, it is likely susceptible to capital gains as holdings graduate to the 500 index. It is 15% tech. I have been holding off due to an unpleasant experience with PTH, a momentum health fund.
Like a lot of SMID's these funds are coming off three-month doldrums and are slightly under 52 week highs.

The Week in Charts (07/12/24)
The most important charts and themes in markets, including...
00:00 Intro
00:15 Topics
01:11 Down Goes Inflation
08:23 Here Come the Rate Cuts
16:50 The Rotation Heard Round the World
22:58 An All-Time High a Day
24:50 Last 10 Years: Fundamental Gains vs. Share Price Gains
27:25 Costco's Highest Valuation Ever
29:45 Nike's Biggest Drawdown Since 2000
31:29 The Most Important Chart in an Economy
Video

A quick update -
June Fund Facts and commentary are out.
https://marshfieldfunds.com/fund-facts/
https://marshfieldfunds.com/commentary/
25% cash
"While the cash we now hold . . . clips our wings a bit in terms of our ability to keep pace with the currents propelling today’s market, we don’t care. In taking the long view, we choose to embrace discretion over temporary gains, happy to exchange probabilistically fleeting prices for the optionality of cash and the relative safety of lower altitudes and reduced turbulence."
(Is there a middle finger image in there I missed?!)
Managers do not disclose how much they invest in the fund, except to state that they own more than $1M - pretty standard language. I was looking to find the actual amount invested / owned - a few fund managers do such a disclosure, though not common.
This fund managers also manage separate accounts with total assets of $4.8B spread over 5,200 accounts. The fund AUM is <$900M. Not sure why we had a discussion about the fund potentially closing around $1B - it does not really matter.
https://marshfieldfunds.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/2023-1229-Marshfield-SAI-final.pdf

Reviewing the etf performance link from above; about every U.S. equity and bond sector performed well throughout the entire day. A few sectors closed a tiny bit lower, than their opening; while a few others moved up a bit. Bonds pretty much held steady, with decent price gains, from the opening; and with long term bonds recovering from early losses to positive gains. Everyone should have made money today with U.S. exposures, be it Mag 7 (many growth funds) and related growth or value funds.
I'll give today a 3 smiles kinda day. :) :) :)

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1500604/000139834424012582/fp0089127-2_497.htm
497 1 fp0089127-2_497.htm
Janus Detroit Street Trust
Janus Henderson International Sustainable Equity ETF
Supplement dated July 11, 2024
to Currently Effective Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”)
The Board of Trustees of Janus Detroit Street Trust (the “Trust”) approved a plan to liquidate and terminate Janus Henderson International Sustainable Equity ETF (the “Fund”), effective on or about October 15, 2024 (the “Liquidation Date”). After the close of business on or about October 10, 2024, the Fund will no longer accept creation orders. Trading in the Fund will be halted prior to market open on or about October 11, 2024. Proceeds of the liquidation are currently scheduled to be sent to shareholders on or about October 16, 2024. Termination of the Fund is expected to occur as soon as practicable following the liquidation.
Prior to and through the close of trading on NYSE Arca, Inc. (“NYSE”) on October 10, 2024, the Fund will undertake the process of winding down and liquidating its portfolio. This process may result in the Fund holding cash and securities that may not be consistent with its investment objectives and strategies. Furthermore, during the time between market open on October 11, 2024 and the Liquidation Date, because the shares will no longer be traded on NYSE, there may not be a trading market for the Fund’s shares.
Shareholders may sell shares of the Fund on NYSE until the market close on October 10, 2024 and may incur typical transaction fees from their broker-dealer. Shares held as of the close of business on the Liquidation Date will be automatically redeemed for cash at the then current net asset value. Proceeds of the redemption will be paid through the broker-dealer with whom you hold shares of the Fund. Shareholders will generally recognize a capital gain or loss on the redemptions. The Fund may or may not, depending upon its circumstances, pay one or more dividends or other distributions prior to or along with the redemption payments. Please consult your personal tax advisor about the potential tax consequences.
Please retain this Supplement with your records.

This fund has beaten VOO since its 2020 inception and is ahead YTD by more than a point. Any fans/detractors/owners of this fund? Any comments from Fidelity clients or others considering it?