The fund is of the Tax-Managed, Buy-Write Option type.
From their M* profile: "The Fund intends to sell index options that qualify for treatment as section 1256 contracts on which capital gains and losses are generally treated as 60% long-term and 40% short-term, regardless of holding period. Options strategy of writing (selling) index call options on the S&P 500 (at least 80%) and the NASDAQ-100 (at least 80%) will be employed. Up to 10% of its total assets may be invested in securities of non-U.S. issuers, including up to 5% of issuers located in emerging markets."
Makes it easier to see where those capital gains are coming from.

"it’s tricking folks into missing out on big dividends (I’m talking yields of 8.6%+) and upside."
ETV is a managed payout fund where 93.5% of those "yields" is return of capital.
(The payout amount was apparently set so that it would match divs + cap gains in the 4th quarter, but in the other 3 quarters, you're basically just getting your own cash back.)
From Fidelity, the last 9 quarters of distributions. Cap gains are in orange. All the purple is return of capital. And if you squint carefully, you can see a smidgeon of green at the bottom of the bars - that's the income divs it is passing through.
(If image doesn't show, click on "From Fidelity" link above.)

"it's tricking folks ..."

FYI: U.S. stock index futures were mixed on Thursday morning as investors gear up for a busy day of earnings.
Around 5 a.m. ET, Dow futures pointed to a gain of 26 points at the open, while the S&P 500 was seen fractionally higher and the Nasdaq looked set to slide.
European stocks followed Asian indexes higher ahead of the European Central Bank meeting later today, where hints of fresh stimulus to boost the eurozone economy are widely expected.
The Stoxx Europe 600 was up by 0.4%, led by gains in the health care and food and beverage sectors. Asian stocks were broadly up, with South Korea’s Kospi the exception with a decline of 0.4%.
The yield on 10-year German bunds was at minus 0.436%, near its all-time low after weaker-than-expected European manufacturing data.
In the U.S., the yield on 10-year Treasurys fell to 2.030%, from 2.052% Wednesday. Yields fall when bond prices rise. The WSJ Dollar Index, which measures the currency against a basket of peers, was flat.
On the earnings front, financial firms Lazard , Invesco and KKR will report Thursday, as will tech giants Alphabet Inc. and Amazon.com Inc.
A series of better-than-expected earnings reports have recently supported markets. Facebook Inc. on Wednesday brushed off a record-setting privacy fine to post strong earnings and revenue growth. Shares gained 0.9% in after-hours trading.
U.S. durable goods data for June are due later Thursday, which will give an indication of the health of American manufacturing.
In commodities, the global oil benchmark Brent crude was up by 0.5% to $63.47 a barrel, as European powers struggled to cooperate on a plan to secure the Persian Gulf. Gold edged up 0.2%.
Regards,
Ted
WSJ:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/global-stocks-rise-ahead-of-ecb-policy-decision-11564041309
Bloomberg
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-07-24/asian-stocks-set-for-muted-open-treasuries-gain-markets-wrap
IBD:
https://www.investors.com/market-trend/stock-market-today/dow-jones-futures-facebook-stock-volatile-tesla-stock-servicenow-xilinx-ford-fall/
CNBC:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/us-stock-futures-tech-regulation-nasdaq.html
Reuters:
https://uk.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economy/u-s-housing-manufacturing-sectors-mired-in-weakness-idUKKCN1UJ1UZ
U.K.
https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-stocks/astrazeneca-guides-ftse-100-higher-buyout-powers-cobham-idUKKCN1UK0RO
Europe:
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-stocks/lvmh-inbev-lift-european-shares-to-one-year-highs-ahead-of-ecb-meeting-idUSKCN1UK0SO
Asia:
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/asian-markets-little-changed-as-investors-await-central-bank-decisions-2019-07-24/print
Bonds:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/treasury-yields-fall-key-central-bank-meetings.html
Currencies:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/forex-markets-euro-european-central-bank-in-focus.html
Oil:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/oil-markets-global-demand-in-focus.html
Gold:
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/25/gold-markets-dollar-ecb-in-focus.html
Cuirrent Futures:
https://finviz.com/futures.ashx

Owned brk.a for decades have over 7 figure gain never paid capital gain tax aint’ sellin’!

2019 contribution limits are:
401(k): $56K + $6K (catch up) = $62K
SEP: $56K (no catch up provision)
https://www.irs.gov/retirement-plans/cola-increases-for-dollar-limitations-on-benefits-and-contributions
The IRS has not yet announced 2020 figures for retirement plans. If Vanguard provided contribution limits for 2020, they were projections.
Projected for 2020:
401(k): $57K + $6.5K (catch up) = $63.5K
SEP: $57K (no catch up provision)
https://thefinancebuff.com/401k-403b-ira-contribution-limits.html
Again, see Schwab example cited above for comparison between SEP and DB plan. (For a fair comparison, you need to account for the earnings that are added to the DB plan but not to the SEP. This significantly reduces the gap between the two.)

Hi msf thx... What firms do you recommend for db plans? Vanguard
Hi ema
I believe you can have 401k and distribution 18 or 20k annually and you can buy higher aggressive stocks funds in these
My tax adivesor states same as your thoughts have to be 5 or 6% annually returns or you may run into tax issues irs issues
If you don't like plans you can switch to sep-ira 5 yrs later this is what Vanguard advisor told me (56k distribution 2020)

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/856119/000085611919000019/fvitp10719.htm
497 1 fvitp10719.htm FVIT P1 07/19
FVIT P1 07/19
SUPPLEMENT DATED JULY 19, 2019
TO THE PROSPECTUS DATED MARCH 1, 2019
OF FRANKLIN VALUE INVESTORS TRUST
(Franklin MicroCap Value Fund)
Effective July 19, 2019, the prospectus is amended as follows:
I. The following replaces the first paragraph of the “Fund Summaries – Franklin MicroCap Value Fund” section of the prospectus:
Effective on or about September 19, 2019 (the “Re-Opening Date”), the Fund will re-open to new investors. Through the date before the Re-Opening Date, the Fund is closed to new investors, except certain Funds of Funds of Franklin Fund Allocator Series and new participants in employer sponsored retirement plans invested in the Fund as of February 19, 2013. The Franklin MicroCap Value Fund reserves the right to modify this policy at any time. For more information, please turn to "Fund Details - Franklin MicroCap Value Fund" beginning on page 26 of this Prospectus.
II. The following replaces the “Portfolio Manager” section in the “Fund Summaries – Franklin MicroCap Value Fund” section of the prospectus:
Portfolio Managers
Bruce C. Baughman, CPA
Portfolio Manager of Franklin Mutual and portfolio manager of the Fund since inception (1995).
Oliver Wong, CFA
Portfolio Manager of Franklin Mutual and portfolio manager of the Fund since July 2019.
Bruce C. Baughman will be retiring on December 31, 2019. Effective December 31, 2019, it is anticipated that he will no longer be a portfolio manager of the Franklin MicroCap Value Fund, and Mr. Oliver Wong will become the sole portfolio manager.
III. The following replaces the first paragraph in the “Fund Details – Franklin MicroCap Value Fund” section of the prospectus:
Effective on or about September 19, 2019 (the “Re-Opening Date”), the Franklin MicroCap Value Fund (MicroCap Value Fund) will re-open to new investors. Through the date before the Re-Opening Date, the MicroCap Value Fund is closed to all new investors, except certain Funds of Funds of Franklin Fund Allocator Series. If you are an existing investor in the MicroCap Value Fund, you can continue to invest through exchanges and additional purchases, including purchases made through reinvestment of dividends or capital gains distributions. Employer sponsored retirement plans invested in the MicroCap Value Fund as of February 19, 2013 may open new accounts in the MicroCap Value Fund and invest on behalf of new participants in those retirement plans. Re-registration of accounts held by existing investors, if required for legal transfer or administrative reasons, will be allowed. The MicroCap Value Fund reserves the right to modify this policy at any time.
IV. The following replaces the ““Fund Details – Management – Bruce C. Baughman” section of the prospectus:
Bruce C. Baughman, CPA Portfolio Manager of Franklin Mutual
1
Mr. Baughman has been a lead portfolio manager of the MicroCap Value Fund since inception. He joined Franklin Templeton Investments in 1988.
Oliver Wong, CFA Portfolio Manager of Franklin Mutual
Mr. Wong has been a lead portfolio manager of the MicroCap Value Fund since July 2019. He joined Franklin Templeton Investments in 2012.
V. The following replaces the “Fund Details – Management – MicroCap Value Fund” section of the prospectus:
MicroCap Value Fund
Bruce C. Baughman and Oliver Wong. As co-lead portfolio managers, Messrs. Baughman and Wong are jointly and primarily responsible for the investments of the Fund. They have equal authority over all aspects of the Fund's investment portfolio, including but not limited to, purchases and sales of individual securities, portfolio risk assessment, and the management of daily cash balances in accordance with anticipated investment management requirements. The degree to which each portfolio manager may perform these functions, and the nature of these functions, may change from time to time.
Bruce C. Baughman will be retiring on December 31, 2019. Effective December 31, 2019, it is anticipated that he will no longer be a portfolio manager of the Franklin MicroCap Value Fund, and Mr. Oliver Wong will become the sole portfolio manager.
Please keep this supplement with your prospectus for future reference.
2

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/825063/000082506319000015/msp30719.htm
MS P3 07/19
SUPPLEMENT DATED JULY 18, 2019
TO THE PROSPECTUS DATED MAY 1, 2019
OF
FRANKLIN MUTUAL INTERNATIONAL FUND
(a series of Franklin Mutual Series Funds)
The Board of Trustees of Franklin Mutual Series Funds recently approved a proposal to reorganize the Franklin Mutual International Fund (the “Fund”) with and into the Franklin Mutual Global Discovery Fund, each a series of Franklin Mutual Series Funds.
It is anticipated that in the third quarter of 2019, shareholders of the Fund will receive a proxy card and a Prospectus/Proxy Statement requesting their votes on the reorganization. If approved by the Fund’s shareholders, the transaction is currently expected to be completed on or about February 21, 2020, but may be delayed if unforeseen circumstances arise.
Effective at the close of market (1:00 p.m. Pacific time or close of the New York Stock Exchange, whichever is earlier) on August 27, 2019, the Fund will be closed to all new investors except as noted below. Existing investors who had an open and funded account on August 27, 2019 can continue to invest in the Fund through exchanges and additional purchases after such date. The following categories of investors may continue to open new accounts in the Fund after the close of market on August 27, 2019: (1) clients of discretionary investment allocation programs where such programs had investments in the Fund prior to the close of market on August 27, 2019; and (2) Employer Sponsored Retirement Plans or benefit plans and their participants where the Fund was available to participants prior to the close of market on August 27, 2019. The Fund will not accept any additional purchases or exchanges after the close of market on or about February 19, 2020. The Fund reserves the right to change this policy at any time.
Please keep this supplement with your prospectus for future reference.

Good article. I particularly like the one about market highs signaling an imminent crash. A lot of investors fall victim to this reasoning and miss a lot of gains.

In my large/mid cap sleeve, found in the growth area of my portfolio, I own SPECX, AGTHX & AMCPX in the large cap growth space. All three of these funds are long term holdings, for me, with sizeable capital gains exposure should I choose to sell. However, I'm liking ESEAX which Ted posted an article on this morning as it appears to have the type of upside (and downside) capture ratios I favor plus it has low turnover. Atlanta Capital has a great small/mid cap growth fund (EAASX), closed to new investors, that has performed well over the years.

I don't keep up with the various offerings from all of the fund families (especially funds like these, being more of a DIY person myself), so I hadn't looked into TRLAX.
Apparently T. Rowe Price rebooted the fund two years ago, changing it from a target date fund into a managed payout fund. So the short answer is that this fund isn't much different from other managed payout funds now, but it used to be.
https://retirementincomejournal.com/article/t-rowe-price-reopens-the-market-for-payout-funds/
Viewing 4% as a "safe" withdrawal rate, that's what Vanguard targets. It adjusts the amounts periodically based on performance (as do virtually all managed payout funds). As @hank noted, T. Rowe Price fund targets 5%, while pointing out that it is designed to pay out more early in retirement and less later on (possibly not keeping up with inflation). That's not necessarily a bad idea; generally retirees are expected to spend more in early retirement while they are still more active.
You're not giving up flexibility with managed payout funds. As T. Rowe Price notes on the overview page, you have the "Freedom to withdraw additional funds", and to "Increase (or reduce) your monthly payouts ... by adding or removing investment assets."
The expense ratio does seem high, and is due to "other expenses", not management fees. I don't know why Price isn't operating more efficiently. In theory, you could mimic the fund yourself (it's a fund of funds), except that (a) you'd pay more than the 0.47% it pays for the aqcuired funds because you can't buy institutional class shares, and (b) some of the funds it uses are closed. Using retail class shares (if you could) would bring your expenses up to around 0.60%. (That's about the same as Fidelity charges for its 2020 RMD fund.)
Can one do better on one's own? Maybe. ISTM this question is not much different from asking: why invest in any allocation fund; can't one do better by investing one one's own in separate large cap, small cap, investment grade, junk bonds, international? Or would one do better by paying that same 0.71% and just buying PRWCX?

Anytime I see “may” in a headline like this I’m wary of the actual substance of argument. But it’s a good read. TRP appears to offer a Target Income Fund. It appears quite new. Structurally, how would this differ from the target payout fund (VG and others) mentioned by @msf?
- Overview: https://www.troweprice.com/personal-investing/mutual-funds/target-date-funds/income-funds.html
- Detailed look: https://www.troweprice.com/personal-investing/tools/fund-research/TRLAX
Interestingly, the NAV for TRLAX appears quite stable (for now anyway) at around $10. I assume that was the opening value. It’s also noteworthy they appear to target a 5% annual payout from the fund. I recently locked away my anticipated cash needs for 2020 (in the face of strong first-half market returns) and 5% pretty much covers the projected 2020 needs (in addition to SS and pension).
The fund’s “real” ER is around 1.2% , which sounds extraordinarily high for this type of fund. After a fee wavier, it’s .71%. That still seems high.
I can’t see where this would be any better than investing on your own conservatively within a sheltered plan and than withdrawing a predetermined amount yearly. I suspect you could do better on the ER and have more flexibility in the needed withdrawal amounts (which will likely vary from year to year). You also may / may not do somewhat better at timing the withdrawals to coincide with more favorable market conditions.

Here's a clear, more in-depth explanation of leverage, especially as used by CEFs.
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/closed-end-funds/leverage
A couple of numbers in the original article caught my eye, as they were presented without explanation:
"According to the Investment Company Institute, the average leverage ratio for bond funds stood at 28% last year; for equity funds the leverage ratio was 22%."
What's an "average leverage ratio"? Is the numerator (what's being averaged) all leverage or just "stuctural", aka "1940 Act" leverage? Is the denominator (which funds are being counted) all funds or just the funds that actually use leverage?
I didn't find the ICI 2018 figures, but I did find the 2015 figures, which are similar. The ICI explains what exactly these averages represent. For 2015, "Among closed-end funds employing structural leverage, the average leverage ratio for bond funds was somewhat higher (27.3 percent) than that of equity funds (22.0 percent)."
https://www.ici.org/pdf/per22-02.pdf
However, as Fidelity notes "Leverage is leverage. Regardless of the source of the leverage, it has the same effects on a portfolio ... This is why transparency of a fund's true leverage is so important. ... Fund families have wide discretion in how they choose to actively report non-'40 Act leverage. Their websites may say a fund is unleveraged, when it actually has a lot of non-'40 Act leverage."
The original article gives a second figure: "Closed-end funds’ use of leverage can be relatively safe 'if the underlying assets are of high quality and have volatility of around 3% to 4%, commensurate with stable assets such as high-quality bonds,'"
What's volatility, and how does that relate to the safety of leverage? I'm guessing that the figure presented is standard deviation of a portfolio. The Bloomberg Barclays US Aggregate Bond Total Return Index is around 3 for various lengths of time (3 years to 15 years), per M*.
Is standard deviation a good way to measure safety of leverage? Here's an excerpt from a Schwab page from which one might infer that the low volatility of bonds is not necessarily comforting. (Consider my selection to represent confirmation bias, as it discusses what I regard as a significant risk of leverage - a flattening of the yield curve.)

Leveraged closed-end funds tend to benefit from a steep yield curve—that is, a large spread between short- and longer-term interest rates. By borrowing at lower short-term rates and investing at higher longer-term rates, the fund typically can generate higher income. ... [T]he spread has narrowed over the past few years.
Rising short-term interest rates can have a big impact on closed-end fund prices. In general, rising short-term rates will increase the cost of leverage for closed-end funds. If the yield curve flattens as rates rise, it can be a double whammy: The fund has to pay more to borrow, while the bonds in the fund may drop in value. If the spread between the cost of borrowing and the yield earned on the underlying bond investments narrows, some funds may not be able to generate as much income as in the past, leading to a cut in the income distribution.
When that happens, a fund’s price may fall, as investors may look elsewhere for income. In addition, leverage can increase the fund’s effective duration—that is, the sensitivity of its price to changes in interest rates. Consequently, closed-end funds can experience far greater price volatility than unleveraged funds.

https://www.schwab.com/resource-center/insights/content/closed-end-bond-funds-how-they-work-and-what-you-should-know-as-rates-rise
On the subject of risk, the original column talks about steady payment streams, but doesn't say anything about how CEFs do this or what the risk is: "the ability to distribute returns more equally throughout the year makes income more predictable and can help clients manage their taxes more efficiently."
The fund smooths out these "managed distributions" by estimating annual total return, including cap gains (both realized and unrealized) and paying that out monthly or quarterly. By distributing all return, the CEF hopes to maintain a steady price. Here's a page from Nuveen explaining how this works:
https://www.nuveen.com/understanding-managed-distributions
Nuveen notes that even if the estimates are accurate, part of the distributions may represent a return of capital (coming from the unrealized gains). Worse, if the fund overestimates total return, "some or all of the distribution represents return of capital that includes part of the shareholders’ principal."
As Fidelity notes, consistent use of this latter "destructive return of capital is a huge red flag, especially if the return of capital comprises the bulk of a distribution."
https://www.fidelity.com/learning-center/investment-products/closed-end-funds/return-of-capital-part-one

This is not the first time this fund has done this:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650149/000089418918006607/spt-equable_497e.htm
Equable Shares Small Cap Fund (Series 1)
(Class I EQSIX)
A Series of Series Portfolios Trust
December 3, 2018
Supplement to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated May 30, 2018
Effective December 17, 2018, shares of the Equable Shares Small Cap Fund (Series 1) (the “Fund”) will be offered for purchase.
Effective as of the close of business on December 19, 2018, the Fund will be closed to all new purchases. The Fund will remain open after December 19, 2018 to automatic reinvestment of dividends and capital gains distributions, as described under the section entitled “Distribution of Fund Shares – Dividends, Distributions and their Taxation” in the Prospectus.
The decision and timing for future opening or closing of the Fund will be at the discretion of the Fund’s investment adviser, Teramo Advisors, LLC.
For investor inquiries about the Fund, please call the Fund at (888) 898-2024.
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI for future reference.
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650149/000089418918004304/spt-equable_497e.htm
497 1 spt-equable_497e.htm SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
Equable Shares Small Cap Fund (Series 1)
(Class I EQSIX)
A Series of Series Portfolios Trust
August 10, 2018
Supplement to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated May 30, 2018
Effective as of the close of business on August 16, 2018, the Equable Shares Small Cap Fund (Series 1) (the “Fund”) will be closed to all new purchases. The Fund will remain open to automatic reinvestment of dividends and capital gains distributions, as described under the section entitled “Distribution of Fund Shares – Dividends, Distributions and their Taxation” in the Prospectus.
The decision and timing for future opening or closing of the Fund will be at the discretion of the Fund’s investment adviser, Teramo Advisors, LLC.
For investor inquiries about the Fund, please call the Fund at (888) 898-2024.
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI for future reference.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1650149/000089418919004102/eqsixsupplement792019.htm
497 1 eqsixsupplement792019.htm 497
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e)
Registration Nos. 333-206240; 811-23084
equablelogocolora04.jpg
Equable Shares Small Cap Fund
(Class I EQSIX)
A Series of Series Portfolios Trust
July 9, 2019
Supplement to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated February 28, 2019
Effective July 15, 2019, shares of the Equable Shares Small Cap Fund (the “Fund”) will be offered for purchase.
Effective as of the close of business on July 17, 2019, the Fund will be closed to all new purchases. The Fund will remain open after July 17, 2019 to automatic reinvestment of dividends and capital gains distributions, as described under the section entitled “Distribution of Fund Shares – Dividends, Distributions and their Taxation” in the Prospectus.
Shares of the Fund are currently not available for new purchases and will remain closed until the above referenced date. The decision and timing for future opening or closing of the Fund will be at the discretion of the Fund’s investment adviser, Teramo Advisors, LLC.
For investor inquiries about the Fund, please call the Fund at (888) 898-2024.
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and SAI for future reference.

The Momentum Trading Strategy (Finance)
https://what-when-how.com/finance/the-momentum-trading-strategy-finance/

A strategy that buys past winners and simultaneously sells past losers based on stock performance in the past 3 to 12 months is profitable in the U.S. and the European markets. This survey paper reviews the literature on the momentum strategy and the possible explanations on the momentum profitability.

The "Momentum Has Its Moments" paper I mentioned describes a strategy that sounds like this one on steroids - instead of selling past losers, one shorts them:

Momentum in the long run ... Buying winners and shorting losers has provided large returns of 14.46% per year, with a Sharpe ratio higher than the market. The winners-minus-losers strategy offers an impressive performance for investors. ... But ... momentum has a dark side. Its large gains come at the expense of ... a very fat left tail, this is a significant crash risk.

No entry or exit plan; just pure momentum.

Anyone here invested in Meridian Enhanced Equity Fund? It’s the number one fund listed by Baron’s in the large cap category. I invested when the fund was first opened under Meridian’s prior management. Back then it was a very tiny equity income fund. The new management put a former Janus manager in charge and lately its become very volatile (3% daily moves are not uncommon) that shorts the market and buys gold, in addition to holding dividend stocks. The volatility almost scared me into selling last fall. But the impressive gains have convinced me to let this manager do his thing. Unfortunately, the Meridian shareholder reports provide only a skimpy discussion of the new investment philosophy.

If you continually monitor the M*, Lipper*, etc. charts and keep shifting money away from the poorer performing funds into the better performing ones in each “category” (as a good many do), than I’d say you are a “closet momentum player” - though probably unaware of it.
A simple example of how the game can be played might be John Hussman’s HSTRX - which Lipper describes this way: “The Fund seeks to provide long-term total return from income and capital appreciation by investing fixed-income securities, such as U.S. Treasury bonds, notes and bills, Treasury inflation-protected securities, U.S. Treasury Strips, and other U.S. Government agency securities.”
Yet, a quick scan of top holdings indicates approximately 15% to consist of precious metals mining companies. As might be expected, this “conservative income fund” jumped about 8% in the last quarter. (It suffered a loss nearly as large in the 4th quarter.) If gold keeps rising, the fund may well flaunt a 15-20% gain by year’s end. While representing only a small % of the fund, the driver in terms of over and under performance has always been its investments in metals and mining - not its bond managing capabilities.
Hussman doesn’t disguise this very well - so most here are aware of the reason the fund might over or underperform its peers during shorter periods. But if you carry the logic a little farther, it shouldn’t be hard to recognize that other fund managers can play the same game - even improve on it - by adding hot momentum funds to their holdings during rising markets, causing their funds to outperform, drawing in even more investment dollars, and allowing them to buy even more of the hot momentum stocks .....
You might say this is a classic case of the elephant chasing his own tail.

FYI: In this piece, I'm going to introduce a new methodology for measuring the profitability and valuation of corporations. In applying the methodology, I'm going to encounter a massive discrepancy in corporate capital allocation. To explain the discrepancy, I'm going to attempt to show that reported company earnings are systematically overstated relative to reality. After identifying the likely causes of the overstatement, I'm going to explore their implications for individual stock selection and overall stock market valuation.
Regards,
Ted
https://osam.com/pdfs/research/The-Earnings-Mirage-Whitepaper-2019.pdf

FYI: Overlooking a strawberry field off the coast of California, Bernzott Capital Advisors doesn’t look much like a Wall Street firm. Portfolio managers dress in jeans, shorts, and flannel shirts. They sit in an open bullpen. Arranging meetings is simple: “We spin around in our chairs and talk to each other,” says Ryan Ross, an analyst and portfolio manager. “If you came in here you might think it’s a surf shop.”
Regards,
Ted
https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-best-mutual-funds-youve-never-heard-of-51562370354?mod=article_inline