It looks like you're new here. If you want to get involved, click one of these buttons!
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-brokers-fees/u-s-online-brokers-still-profiting-from-dumb-money-idUSKBN1WN1UD (Oct 8, 2019)It creates an incentive for brokers to send orders to whoever pays the most, rather than the place that might get the best outcome for customers. ...
Canada has banned the practice. The United Kingdom recently put it under review and said in September that nearly all UK-based brokerages acting in an agency capacity had stopped accepting payment for order flow.
For their part, market makers say they give, on average, a better price than the market is offering, usually a fraction of a penny per share.
Embedded in the column is a link internal to M*:Unlike Congress, the IRS has been working on the issue and took an important first step toward reducing RMDs for most retirees. ... Back in January, I observed that if the IRS recalculated these two-decade-old mortality tables and updated the rules, it would be modestly helpful but wouldn’t make that big a difference. ... Now that the IRS has formally proposed a change, it turns out this intuition was right. ... It seems very likely that this rule will become a final regulation sometime in 2020.
For a robust analysis, including copious links, see Kitces:One obvious thing to do would be to adjust the mortality assumptions that drive these RMDs, because they are going on 20 years old. In fact, President Donald Trump directed the Treasury Department to do just that, and when the government reopens, it will likely propose some adjustments. However, while life expectancy has increased, my back-of-the-envelope calculations reveal that such a change would not make much difference.
This is what I have in mind when I question portfolios that seem to do just a little bit better, until they don't. How are they levitating? They'll likely never have a problem, but if they do they may crash swiftly and steeply.That sounds good in principle, but managers began to manipulate the VaR by loading up on what Guldimann calls “asymmetric risk positions.” These are products or contracts that, in general, generate small gains and very rarely have losses. But when they do have losses, they are huge. These positions made a manager’s VaR look good because VaR ignored the slim likelihood of giant losses, which could only come about in the event of a true catastrophe. A good example was a credit-default swap, which is essentially insurance that a company won’t default. The gains made from selling credit-default swaps are small and steady — and the chance of ever having to pay off that insurance was assumed to be minuscule. It was outside the 99 percent probability, so it didn’t show up in the VaR number. People didn’t see the size of those hidden positions lurking in that 1 percent that VaR didn’t measure.
Nicely timed. Nice price too.
Added a big slug to PRBLX in my Roth IRA now that CGs are paid out for the year.
© 2015 Mutual Fund Observer. All rights reserved.
© 2015 Mutual Fund Observer. All rights reserved. Powered by Vanilla