I oversee a cybersecurity graduate program and related research institute - was quoted in that BBC article you posted the other day about the Treasury hack, actually :)
(back to Buy/Sell now!)
Order placed on a zero-cost protective options collar on my TRP position thru February - just to ensure gains ahead of any post-coronation/annointment tariff drama.

Price converted my Investor Class funds to I Class. This was supposed to have no tax consequences. I received some rather large (and unexpected) LT distributions for some of the funds (especially TBCIX). Anyone else get similar surprises?

Aren't these these just another iteration of the buffer ETFs from 2020?

Hmmm... Years ago, Horrocks was a genius, and Lou Rukheyser interviewed him as Manager of the year. Was it M* that selected him for the honor? I owned MACSX. Since then, I wonder if he has become the sand in the gears? Is the problem child making his exit? Or just moving to a different desk in the office?

If I had to make a guess: problem child finally getting ousted. I met Robert a few times over his tenure, once when he first joined matthews in 2009. He was energetic and passionate about the opportunity in Asia. I last met him in 2018 and it seemed he had gotten quite lazy, didn't really provide in depth answers and had an attitude of "couldn't be bothered". I got the sense he made his money and was just coasting.
Under his leadership as CIO at Matthews, a number of talented PMs left for other firms. Artisan in particular took a number. I recall Capital Group also taking one of their lead PMs for Japan equity. You gotta wonder why they'd leave a boutique like Matthews given their backgrounds and areas of interest. My guess? Poor leadership and lack of belief in the company. Remember, these are investment people. They likely were getting some of their compensation in company stock.
Matthews assets are now below $8bn. They were $30bn only 3 years ago. Looks like the PMs that departed were smart assuming they were able to get their equity out of the firm before it started sinking.

"Excellent" observations by the quacks.
I didn't beat the SP500 in 2023-4. Not even close, and I don't need it.
It's all at (https://fd1000.freeforums.net/post/446)
I know that none of you can do it; just keep quacking. I already have heard it for at least 15 years.
Remember, I was told that I don't have a clue; I will never retire, I will never make it in retirement and timing + low SD could not be done.
The reality is completely different. I only need about 1% from my portfolio to keep my nice lifestyle for decades without any pension or an inheritance.
Observant1: hindsight?
FD: It's much easier to throw stones. Many of my trades and analysis are on my site. You may learn something.
I also have several trades I made in the past several years where I sold before major meltdowns in 2020 and 2022 and when I bought back.

NOTE: This is the FINAL report for 'The week that was'. All numbers for the shortened week and final totals for the 2024 year ending data is accurate, to the best of my knowledge, from sources.
FOR YOUR USE: Most of you are familiar with M* and the performance page. This LINK is set with FDGRX. Scroll down to the 'Trailing Returns' section for the most current data. BE SURE to verify the DATE of the data. Usually, the new data is available within 8 hours of the markets closing.
ADD: This is directed towards possibilities into the new government period arriving January 20, and monetary/fiscal actions.
--- Bond vigilantes are investors who sell government bonds or threaten to do so to force policy changes and discipline excessive government spending:
--- Explanation
Bond vigilantes use their market power to drive up borrowing costs for the government. This can happen when they protest against expansionary monetary or fiscal policy.
--- Origin
The term was coined by economist Ed Yardeni in the 1980s to describe traders who sold Treasury bonds to protest Federal Reserve policies that were considered too inflationary.
--- Example
In the "Great Bond Massacre" from 1993 to 1994, US 10-year yields increased from 5.2% to over 8% due to concerns about federal spending. The Clinton administration and Congress responded by reducing the deficit, and 10-year yields dropped to around 4% by 1998.
NOTE:

My intention, at this time; is to present the data for the selected bond sectors, as listed; through the end of the year (2024). This 'end date' will take us through the U.S. elections period, pending actions/legislation dependent upon the election results, pending Federal Reserve actions and market movers trying to 'guess' future directions of the U.S. economy. As important during this period, are any number of global circumstances that may take a path that is not expected; and/or 'new' circumstances.

FIRST: NOTHING TO ADD/ALTER regarding 'Never-Never Land'. The pre-DC world shift of January, 2025 remains 'interesting' at this time! We're in a 'Never-Never Land' (events you never imagined) of potential large impacts upon various economic functions emanating from a central government in the coming months and years. What comes next for the investing world of bonds is not yet known or fully understood, except for those have a better guessing system than I. I can only watch and listen a little bit and let the numbers try to bring forth meaningful directions.
W/E December 31 , 2024. Bond NAV's Most positive. FINAL REPORT
--- 'Course, all the bond sectors in the list find their reasons for price movements, and we find most bond sectors HAD SMALL GAINS for this 2 day week's pricing to END the 2024 year. The majority of bond sectors were UP for the 2 days of the week. So, depending on where you're 'hanging' your bond market monies, the pricing this week, was mostly UP. The MINT etf, to the best of my recall, has maintained a positive price for the year, each and every week; and this remains for this week/year.
A few numbers for your viewing pleasure.
NEXT:
*** UST yields chart, 6 month - 30 year. This chart is active and will display a 6 month time frame going forward to a future date. Place/hover the mouse pointer anywhere on a line to display the date and yield for that date. The percent to the right side is the percentage change in the yield from the chart beginning date for a particular item. You may also 'right click' on the 126 days at the chart bottom to change a 'time frame' from a drop down menu. Hopefully, the line graph also lets you view the 'yield curve' in a different fashion, for the longer duration issues, at this time. Save the page to your own device for future reference. NOTE: take a peek at the right side of this graph to find the yield swings of the past week, and for the current yields for the last business day.
For the WEEK/YTD, NAV price changes, December 30 - December 31, 2024
***** This week (Wednesday), FZDXX, MM yield continues to move with Fed funds/repo/SOFR rates; and ended the week at 4.28% yield (+4 basis points for the week). Fidelity's MM's continue to maintain decent yields, as is presumed with other vendors similar MM's. SO, one is still obtaining a decent MM yield. MOST MM's found a positive .04 basis change in yield for the week.
--- AGG = +.27% / +1.31% (I-Shares Core bond), a benchmark, (AAA-BBB holdings)
--- MINT = +.08% / +5.94% (PIMCO Enhanced short maturity, AAA-BBB rated)
--- SHY = +.21% / +3.92 % (UST 1-3 yr bills)
--- IEI = +.39% / +1.81% (UST 3-7 yr notes/bonds)
--- IEF = +.40% / -.64% (UST 7-10 yr bonds)
--- TIP = +.17% / +1.65% (UST Tips, 3-10 yrs duration, some 20+ yr duration)
--- VTIP = +.17% / +4.74% (Vanguard Short-Term Infl-Prot Secs ETF)
--- STPZ = +.25% / +4.30% (UST, short duration TIPs bonds, PIMCO)
--- LTPZ = +.15% / -4.80% (UST, long duration TIPs bonds, PIMCO)
--- TLT = +.27% / -8.06% (I Shares 20+ Yr UST Bond
--- EDV = +.67% / -12.74% (UST Vanguard extended duration bonds)
--- ZROZ = +.37% / -16.13% (UST., AAA, long duration zero coupon bonds, PIMCO
--- TBT = -.61% / +27.55% (ProShares UltraShort 20+ Year Treasury (about 23 holdings)
--- TMF = +.65% / -35.93% (Direxion Daily 20+ Yr Trsy Bull 3X ETF (about a 2x version of EDV etf)
*** Additional important bond sectors, for reference:
--- BAGIX = +.31% / +1.85% Baird Aggregate Bond Fund (active managed, plain vanilla, high quality bond fund)
--- USFR = +.06% / +5.46% (WisdomTree Floating Rate Treasury)
--- LQD = +.18% / +.86% (I Shares IG, corp. bonds)
--- MBB = +.26% / +1.31% (I-Shares Mortgage Backed Bonds)
--- BKLN = +.10% / +8.20% (Invesco Senior Loan, Corp. rated BB & lower)
--- HYG = +.13% / +7.97 % (I Shares High Yield bonds, proxy ETF)
--- HYD = +.56%/+4.94% (VanEck HY Muni)
--- MUB = +.26% /+1.31% (I Shares, National Muni Bond)
--- EMB = +.28%/+5.54% (I Shares, USD, Emerging Markets Bond)
--- CWB = -1.07% / +10.06% (SPDR Bloomberg Convertible Securities)
--- PFF = +.67% / +7.24% (I Shares, Preferred & Income Securities)
--- FZDXX = 4.28% yield (7 day), Fidelity Premium MM fund
*** FZDXX yield was .11%, April,2022. (For reference to current date)
Comments and corrections, please.
Remain curious,
Catch

Only money market fund and treasury will not loss value in severe drawdowns. There is always risk investing in stocks and bonds. The realistic question is what is the recovery duration. During spring 2020 COVID drawdown, just about all bonds fell. Many fully recovered within one to six months after the FED cut the rate by 75 bps. Without the cut, the recovery would take take much longer.

https://www.axios.com/2024/12/31/stock-market-2024-gains-sp500-nasdaq
-The S&P 500 was up 24% in 2024, compared to a 24.2% rise in 2023. It was the strongest two-year performance since the late 1990s.
-The tech-heavy Nasdaq climbed 30.8%, versus 43.4% last year.
-The Dow Jones Industrial Average was up 12.8%, compared to 28.4% in 2023.
-The Russell 2000, an index of small-cap stocks, gained 10.9%, compared to 2023's 15.1%.

M* under People for EXDAX says this:
Privately owned for decades, the firm went public in 2011. Following a period of outflows and two waves of personnel turnover, the firm appeared to stabilize in 2020 when cofounder Bill Manning sold his ownership stake back to the firm. But in October 2022, Callodine Group--a hands-off asset manager founded in 2018 by former Fidelity fund manager James Morrow--acquired the firm at a 41% premium and returned it to private ownership. In the wake of this news, Ebrahim Busheri, who served as head of investments, announced his departure and a couple of analysts left. Still, this acquisition means the firm won’t face public-markets ire, and Morrow, who has roots and resources in upstate New York, sees himself as a long-term holder of the firm.

M* has what looks like an absolute risk scale (1-100) for funds. Unlike its category risk scale (low, below average, ..., high), funds are not measured against their peers.
The methodology talks about target allocation benchmarks, but from what I've seen these "portfolio risk scores" are not rescaled according to fund type. Equity funds are inherently more risky and thus always seem to rate mid to high scores. Ultrashort funds seem to always score in the single digits regardless of their risk relative to peers.
RPHIX - 4
CBLDX - 5
DHEAX - 6
This ordering comports with my understanding of their relative risks. The Dave Sherman funds are managed to have very little volatility.
CBLDX has a longer effective maturity (1.01 years) and higher volatility (1.57) than RPHIX (2.7 - 6.8 months and 0.80 respectively).
DHEAX has a higher standard deviation of 2.38, and an effective duration of 1.47 years. Even without considering that a fund's duration is shorter than its maturity, this is already longer (worse) than CBLDX's 1 year effective maturity. It had a worse drawdown in March 2020 and lost money in 2022 while the other funds have never had a losing calendar year.
Portfolio Visualizer confirms the relative rankings, Feb 2018-Nov 2024, the funds' std deviations are 0.92, 2.76, and 4.27 respectively, while max drawdowns are 1.09%, 5.50%, and 9.74% respectively.

There weren’t many investment grade CLOs available at retail prior to 2020 when JAAA opened. HSRT came up in a web search. It gained +3.77% in 2020. I would never recommend one as a cash substitute. I confess to having misread the original post as at least opening the door for something “more active” (aggressive) then the safety of cash. If you want safety, short-term T-Bills are usually regarded as the safest investment, with insured bank / credit union accounts a close second. How a chaotic government shutdown (budget related) might upset that assumption is sometimes a topic of conversation.
True, cash is what one desires for absolute safety, especially if it’s to fund near term commitments (housing, medical care, child support, etc.) As an investor I have sometimes “stretched” the definition of cash as a part of a diversified portfolio. ”Relatively safe” compared to most other investments I hold works for me. Willing to take a short term haircut in pursuit of longer term goals. Like OJ, I’m getting up there in years, so “long term” still exists but in a different way. My current risk perameters allow me to hold about 5% in JAAA alongside 5% in a money market fund. But that’s not for everyone.
As @Junkster says, CLOs are not substitutes for cash (as defined in the strictest sense). I’d submit that neither is the River Park fund often mentioned. And he is correct that CLOs took a brief clobbering in March 2020 and for a few months beyond. Even my quite respectable ultra-short fund (TRBUX) at the time got knocked down. Truth is corporate bonds of every stripe got hit hard for a short period until the Fed stepped in and took the unprecedented step of backing investment grade debt. A black-swan like the Covid affair can strike at any time. They’re all different and usually unexpected. As bad as the hit was for CLOs for a month or two, equities got hit much harder. My p/m mining fund fell out of bed overnight. I’d go back and check how much it lost in a day or two, but it would be too painful.

Regarding CLOs, what is conveniently not mentioned is like most everything else in Bondland they melted down too during the Covid meltdown. Investment grade CLOs from AAA to BBB had drawdowns from 10% to 30% while below investment grade drawdowns were 40% to 45%. As recently as 2022, while investment grade CLOs eked out a small gain (JAAA) of under 1% below investment grade lost money. The longest tenured bond fund primarily into CLOs ( an interval fund) lost money 4 years since its 2014 inception. In 2020 it had a multi week drawdown of 30%. As recently as 2022 this CLO fund lost 4.48%. 2023 and 2024 just happened to be “the right place right time” for CLOs. I hold slightly under 50% in CLOs but I am more than cognizant of the risks. A substitute for cash they certainly aren’t.

What is cash? If one is thinking "checking account" (instant liquidity w/o loss), then even CDs don't qualify.
On the other end of the spectrum there is cash as an investment - locking up cash in fixed rate investments for longer periods of time (typically years). You can still get at that cash for emergencies, but at a cost. However, the cost is much less than the risk of investing in the market, and the cost is often known in advance (e.g. CD early withdrawal penalty).
Representing the first perspective is this piece by M*: Why Ultrashort Bond Funds Aren’t Cash Substitutes. "[I]n 2008 ... the average ultrashort bond fund dropped 8.4%. ... [In 2020] [w]hile most investment-grade bond categories posted positive returns during the market’s flight to quality, the average ultrashort bond fund lost about 1.8% in the first quarter.
And the 2020 losses peak to trough (March 6 - March 23) were much greater.
These relatively extreme (for their category) losses occur when the economy experiences severe jolts (GFC, pandemic). For "checking account" type cash, even these short lived, though sharp, jolts are unacceptable. For longer term "investment cash", the short term disruptions may be acceptable.
A difference between ultrashort bond funds and IG CLOs is that the CLOs are more complicated investments. In theory, AAA tranches should hold up well in any environment other than one where everything gets hit. And they should recover better. There's some solace in JAAA doing just that in 2022. But that's only one stress test and there are many ways the economic system can get jolted.
Junkster mentioned CLOs doing poorly in 2020. Was their behavior distinctive or just in line with (though more severe than) the rest of the IG market? That is, can we glean anything about their special risks from 2020? If not, then all we can say is that, yes, bonds of all ilk can get hit by system shocks and recover similarly.
If that is unacceptable, only invest in guaranteed principal vehicles (Treasuries, CDs, credit union time deposits, bank accounts, etc.).

Yesterday, 12/26, NRDCX had YE distribution (0.07c) of cap gains and dividends and reinvested those distributions at $10.10 per share (10/26 NAV). Its NAV on 12/23 and 12/24 was also $10.10. In other words, the fund did not mark down the NAV by the amount of the distribution but today, 12/27, the fund marked down the NAV by 0.06c (which I took to include a correction of yesterday's error (-0.07c) plus a mark up of 0.01c reflecting today's market prices) for a NAV price of 10.04.
After today's NAV price, it may seem like the YE distribution is a wash, but the shareholders who participated in the dividend reinvestment plan (NAV $10.10) were worse off than the shareholders who took the distributions in cash and reinvested the cash themselves into new shares of NRDCX today (NAV $10.04).
We should ask Crossingbridge to fix this error so the NAV price as of 12/26 is properly reduced by the amount of distribution.
The above issue is not there for CBLDX, which correctly reduced its NAV on 12/26 by the amount of distribution.
@davidsherman?

Thanks msf! I have a CD in my IRA account maturing in a few days. I am tempted to reinvest it in 2 year callable CD, treating it like a 6 month noncallable CD. If it is called, I think I will still be able to get a 4% replacement callable CD, and if it is not called then I am fine with that callable rate for the length of the CD.
Regarding MMs, I am expecting all categories of MMs to fall below 4% in 2025--I will continue holding MMs but may reduce the amount I will keep in them.

@dtconroe. a very prudent decision for someone not into risk/drawdown and who is not a trader. Regarding CLOs, what is conveniently not mentioned is like most everything else in Bondland they melted down too during the Covid meltdown. Investment grade CLOs from AAA to BBB had drawdowns from 10% to 30% while below investment grade drawdowns were 40% to 45%. As recently as 2022, while investment grade CLOs eked out a small gain (JAAA) of under 1% below investment grade lost money. The longest tenured bond fund primarily into CLOs ( an interval fund) lost money 4 years since its 2014 inception. In 2020 had a multi week drawdown of 30%. 2023 and 2024 just happened to be “the right place right time” for CLOs. I hold slightly under 50% in CLOs but I am more than cognizant of the risks. A substitute for cash they certainly aren’t.

Thanks for your comment Junkster. These threads invite a wide array of responses, from posters with a wide array of investing preferences, and a wide array of personal financial circumstances that are the background to their financial decision making. I try to sort through the posted information, to see how much applicability it has to my personal investing criteria. This thread has led to a large variety of posters and posted information. I don't have any interest in CLOs, and I "currently" don't have any interest returning to the bond oef world of trading and momentum based decision making. I don't care for annuities and unique risks/rewards. CDs have been paying a very nice 5+% return for the last year, but that seems to be on the decline. I have never used callable CDs, but they do offer a better interest rate than noncallable CDs, for about 6 months and possibly longer. I am inclined to invest some maturing CD cash into a local Credit Union Share Certificate that pays about a half percent more than I can get at Schwab or my local bank. Different strokes for different folks, and their varied financial strategies and circumstances.

Thanks msf! I have a CD in my IRA account maturing in a few days. I am tempted to reinvest it in 2 year callable CD, treating it like a 6 month noncallable CD. If it is called, I think I will still be able to get a 4% replacement callable CD, and if it is not called then I am fine with that callable rate for the length of the CD.
Regarding MMs, I am expecting all categories of MMs to fall below 4% in 2025--I will continue holding MMs but may reduce the amount I will keep in them.

@dtconroe. a very prudent decision for someone not into risk/drawdown and who is not a trader. Regarding CLOs, what is conveniently not mentioned is like most everything else in Bondland they melted down too during the Covid meltdown. Investment grade CLOs from AAA to BBB had drawdowns from 10% to 30% while below investment grade drawdowns were 40% to 45%. As recently as 2022, while investment grade CLOs eked out a small gain (JAAA) of under 1% below investment grade lost money. The longest tenured bond fund primarily into CLOs ( an interval fund) lost money 4 years since its 2014 inception. In 2020 it had a multi week drawdown of 30%. As recently as 2022 this CLO fund lost 4.48%. 2023 and 2024 just happened to be “the right place right time” for CLOs. I hold slightly under 50% in CLOs but I am more than cognizant of the risks. A substitute for cash they certainly aren’t.

T-Notes are 1+ to 10 year maturities.
T-Bonds are 10+ to 30 year maturities. They have high duration, so high rate sensitivity. You can have large gains or haircuts when selling before maturity. They will pay par on maturity - that is guaranteed by the US Treasury.

DT: FD, I get your position. You are not a CD investor, you will never be a CD investor, and you will continue your trading approach that does not include CDs, which requires liquidity in your holdings. My original post was directed toward existing CD investors, deciding what those particular investors will do with their maturing CDs, not directed toward investors who will never hold CDs. If you want to "convert" the rest of us CD sinners, you will do it without restraint on this thread.

I'm not trying to convert or influence anyone. I'm stating generic comments.
I don't know anyone that invests only in 100% safe CDs and treasuries, and over the years I discussed investments with many people. I also don't like callable CDs and now have to find a new solution.
This is not a judgement, just an observation.
I switched to only/mostly bond funds because I could generate more performance than allocation funds with much lower risk.
To the questions, what would you if...? My approach has been tested in a recession, high inflation, and very quick rising rates, and it went well. Why change it?
I want to control my portfolio at all times. At anytime I can own MM,CDs, Treasuries if I want, but they have to be the best idea I have in that moment based on market conditions. It already did. From 01/2022 to early 11/2020 I was at 99+% MM, except very short (hours-days) several trades.
You should do what works for you. Good luck in the future.
I just don't believe we should stay on a narrow discussion. Annuities brought up, and I believe in low-volatility bond funds that might interest some posters.

An insurer can "fail" without ever being insolvent.
Never underestimate the ignorance of the investing public.

In 1991, Executive Life Insurance Company of New York (ELNY), the stressed but solvent subsidiary of its insolvent parent, Executive Life Insurance Company of California, was placed in rehabilitation in New York to protect it from cash surrenders becoming “a run on the bank.”
...
When ELNY’s parent was placed in receivership in California, the New York Insurance Department determined that an “increase in surrenders had caused a material erosion of ELNY’s assets to the detriment of policyholders with nonsurrenderable policies, primarily structured settlement annuities.” As a result, New York’s Superintendent of Insurance sought and obtained an order of rehabilitation in April 1991

https://www.pbnylaw.com/articles/THE TROUBLE WITH ELNY.pdf
It may not have been a "run", perhaps more of a fast walk, but investors spooked by problems with the parent company created a problem with ELNY that otherwise wouldn't have existed.
New York State regulates insurers more stringently than does the rest of the country. Insurers' investments can't be as risky, capital requirements are higher, and so on. This is the reason why you often see insurers operate in 49 states with a separate subsidiary in New York. Insurance companies don't want to be held to New York's higher safety standards in the rest of the country.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/253661 (Login via library/school required)
As far as the deferred annuities were concerned,

A year later, in March 1992, ... ELNY’s traditional whole life, term life and deferred annuity books of business were transferred to Metropolitan Life Insurance Company with substantially all the supporting statutory reserve assets. ... Neither the 1991 rehabilitation order or the 1992 order approving the rehabilitation plan declared ELNY to be insolvent.

Bond rating and insurer ratings have very different criteria. And different things happen in cases of failures.
If a company issuing bond goes under, bond investors are in line with other creditors depending on where the bond is in the capital structure. They can get something or nothing.
If an insurer goes under, its state regulator works as the lead regulator with the other state regulators to come up with a rescue/rehabilitation plan.
State regulators don't have ready reserves to pay out like the (underfunded) FDIC does for banks.
So, a failed bank may be shut on Friday and account access may resume on Monday. Forget about anything like that for failed insurers.
When my 403b plan insurance MBL-NJ went under (I think with AAA rating & 150 years of existence), all of our 403b annuity accounts were frozen. We could immediately withdraw/shift at 40% haircut (i.e receive 60c for $1), or wait for things to settle. While waiting, the frozen funds earned m-mkt rates that were about half of what MBL was paying. The money was unfrozen after 4-5 years. Technically, there was no loss, but only the lost opportunity. In my asset allocation at the time, I treated this frozen money as forced-cash.

I have followed this thread, but had only 2 short posts on T-Note quotes & FRN USFR.
IMO, good CD alternatives are T-Bills/Notes (noncallable). All these can be held to maturity without incurring losses. The CD & Treasuries investors are quite different from fund investors because funds have duration and they never mature, so there may be gains or losses at sale.
As for annuities, there are basic fixed-term and lifetime SPIA that have low-costs and may be fine for many. Any guarantees are from the insurance company, so stick with highly rated companies.
TIAA offers many low-cost annuities - for retirement or taxable accounts.
A big issue with annuities is that one is stuck with annuity rules - while tax-deferral is good, withdrawal penalties apply before 59.5. Taxes also apply on withdrawals.
Insurers know that & can offer attractive rates to captive clients. They also publicize those offers aggressively along with luring initial incentives.
One can do 1035 exchanges between annuities, but it isn’t a simple online process.
IMO, first exhaust all other tax-deferral options - IRAs, 401k/403b, 529, etc. When these options weren’t available, annuities were very popular.