gosh, maybe this is wrong too!
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/03/opinion/biden-republicans-debt.html
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/14/opinion/biden-economy.html
maybe we should not spend and should cut services instead, seriously so
why does someone as gifted as you claim to be present as unserious so often?

Studzinski in this month's commentary sounds unusually out of touch about these matters, imo
He does not read Krugman and all his economic peers about an economy simply growing out of its gov debt, without need ever to 'pay it back'.
And the caps here appear to mean 'you must take this on faith and my sayso':
Given that the amounts of goods and services in the economy did not change much in 2020, and if you had cash sitting in a CD or money market fund, that cash also did not change much, YOU HAVE ROUGHLY 20% LESS PURCHASING POWER TODAY THAN YOU DID A YEAR AGO.
I really wonder what is up with so smart an investment adviser.

"Highland Capital Management LP, once a giant in high-yield debt markets, filed for bankruptcy protection Wednesday as investors and former employees seek more than $200 million from the firm for alleged improprieties."
...
If anybody has more up to date information on the fund advisor's bankruptcy status, I would appreciate hearing from you.

The fund advisor is Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors LP. As the WSJ later wrote:

Highland [Capital Management LP] is one of several investment platforms under the same ownership, including Highland Capital Management Fund Advisors LP and NexPoint Advisors LP, which didn’t file for bankruptcy.

https://www.wsj.com/articles/highland-capital-management-lp-co-founder-out-under-deal-with-creditors-11577738959

Her argument is that by pushing up the stock prices of dicey companies it makes it cheaper for them to access capital, and that affects the bond market's pricing. It seems rather tangential and too much of a reach, given just a handful of companies involved and the immensity of the bond market.

While some deep value and/or companies with too much debt may be impacted by some form of Reddit inspired trading; unless the bond market place becomes overwhelmed by bond slayers, I'm not concerned about potential impact; with the exception of pockets of disruption in some single issues that are junk or borderline corporate junk. I'm not saying these companies do not exist, they surely do. A Reddit traders big test would be to go after Ford or a similar company with a lot of debt, to discover their power OR not.
Estimated global bond value as of August, 2020 is $128.3 Trillion.
My 2 cents worth.
Catch

I have been looking at Highland Capital Management with respect to their NexPoint Merger Arbitrage fund (HMEZX). In the process, I came across an article in the Wall Street Journal from October 16, 2019 that indicated that the firm filed for bankruptcy.
HMEZX has a very good record, but I was curious why the fund had only attracted $68 million in assets since it opened in September 2016. The answer may be found in this article:
"Highland Capital Management LP, once a giant in high-yield debt markets, filed for bankruptcy protection Wednesday as investors and former employees seek more than $200 million from the firm for alleged improprieties.
The Dallas-based firm founded by Jim Dondero helped pioneer trading of corporate loans rated below investment-grade and managed about $39 billion in 2007, but it took heavy losses during the financial crisis and has been embroiled in lawsuits ever since. The company had been trying in recent weeks to settle some of the litigation it faces, warning its adversaries that it would seek bankruptcy protection if they didn’t compromise, people familiar with the matter said.
Highland entered chapter 11 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del., listing as its largest debt a disputed $189 million claim from investors in Highland Crusader Fund, a hedge fund that has been in liquidation since the financial crisis. The second-largest creditor is Patrick Daugherty, a former Highland portfolio-manager who has been in personal and legal conflict with Mr. Dondero since 2012 and has an $11.7 million claim against Highland, according to its bankruptcy filing.
A group of investors in Crusader sued Highland in 2016 in Delaware Chancery Court, demanding Highland be fired as manager for delaying the fund’s liquidation and claiming that Highland wrongfully paid itself $30 million. The group subsequently won an arbitration award that Highland has yet to pay, court documents show.
In a statement, Highland said the bankruptcy filing was made “in consideration of its liquidity profile” and stems from a potential judgment in favor of a committee of Crusader Fund investors."

I don't know the current status of of the bankruptcy filing, but, needless to say, I am no longer interested in HMEZX as a potential investment opportunity.
If anybody has more up to date information on the fund advisor's bankruptcy status, I would appreciate hearing from you.
But, buyer beware.
Fred

I have been looking at Highland Capital Management with respect to their NexPoint Merger Arbitrage fund (HMEZX). In the process, I came across an article in the Wall Street Journal from October 16, 2019 that indicated that the firm filed for bankruptcy.
HMEZX has a very good record, but I was curious why the fund had only attracted $68 million in assets since it opened in September 2016. The answer may be found in this article:
"Highland Capital Management LP, once a giant in high-yield debt markets, filed for bankruptcy protection Wednesday as investors and former employees seek more than $200 million from the firm for alleged improprieties.
The Dallas-based firm founded by Jim Dondero helped pioneer trading of corporate loans rated below investment-grade and managed about $39 billion in 2007, but it took heavy losses during the financial crisis and has been embroiled in lawsuits ever since. The company had been trying in recent weeks to settle some of the litigation it faces, warning its adversaries that it would seek bankruptcy protection if they didn’t compromise, people familiar with the matter said.
Highland entered chapter 11 in U.S. Bankruptcy Court in Wilmington, Del., listing as its largest debt a disputed $189 million claim from investors in Highland Crusader Fund, a hedge fund that has been in liquidation since the financial crisis. The second-largest creditor is Patrick Daugherty, a former Highland portfolio-manager who has been in personal and legal conflict with Mr. Dondero since 2012 and has an $11.7 million claim against Highland, according to its bankruptcy filing.
A group of investors in Crusader sued Highland in 2016 in Delaware Chancery Court, demanding Highland be fired as manager for delaying the fund’s liquidation and claiming that Highland wrongfully paid itself $30 million. The group subsequently won an arbitration award that Highland has yet to pay, court documents show.
In a statement, Highland said the bankruptcy filing was made “in consideration of its liquidity profile” and stems from a potential judgment in favor of a committee of Crusader Fund investors."
I don't know the current status of of the bankruptcy filing, but, needless to say, I am no longer interested in HMEZX as a potential investment opportunity.
If anybody has more up to date information on the fund advisor's bankruptcy status, I would appreciate hearing from you.
But, buyer beware.
Fred

He has been analyzing fund flow on asset classes (not individual MF/ETF) in previous articles. Trending Is discussed in details this month on specific funds. Fidelity has been discussing trends and rotation as early as September 2020.

Charles Bolin is contributor to the MFO monthly commentary since early 2020. You can go back every month to see his articles. Also he writes for Seeking Alpha. I have been following his writing/advice since I discovered his approach on risk management.

I held AKREX from 7/2016, eventually it was my number 1 holing. By early 2020, I detected weakness in this fund. Started selling in April 2020 and nothing left on 6/29/2020. I know Mr. Charles Akre since the time he managed a small cap fund specialize in Finance sector and was # 1 for many years. he sold it to other mutual fund. Made lots of money from that fund. Then AKREX was formed. In my post dated 7/27/2020, I suggested to dump this fund for several reasons....Now, Mr Akre has retired.

For our portfolio:
We slowly added more VWO and mathew asia past few days/week.
added GM & QQQ last wk
401k 80/20 still. [all aboard full streams ahead]
-------------------------------------------------
For Mama portfolio [retired] all new monies divs go to fidelity 2020 fund and BND FBND
In Texas ~ 25%s economy dependent on energy sectors. Maybe much more pains /sufferings ahead. we see at least 10% of shops small business/big business closing in our town near Austin. Hope we don't see more bankrupcies or see 1980s /2008s marketlike conditions [Main street issues overflow to Wall Streets]
Kind regards
JNN

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/915802/000139834421001942/fp0061786_497.htm
497 1 fp0061786_497.htm
FINANCIAL INVESTORS TRUST: GRANDEUR PEAK FUNDS
Grandeur Peak Global Contrarian Fund
Grandeur Peak Global Reach Fund
(the “Funds”)
SUPPLEMENT DATED FEBRUARY 1, 2021 TO THE SUMMARY PROSPECTUSES, PROSPECTUS AND STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR THE FUNDS DATED AUGUST 31, 2020
Effective January 22, 2021, Keefer Babbitt is no longer serving as a co-portfolio manager of the Funds. Therefore, all references to Mr. Babbitt in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information are hereby deleted as of that date.
INVESTORS SHOULD RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.

One can research ownership info on M*. Each company's page has an "Ownership" tab, e.g. https://www.morningstar.com/stocks/xnys/gme/ownership
In addition to showing individual funds and fund complexes/institutions holding the largest number of shares, one can find the funds with the highest concentration of shares.
Theoretically an institution with a large number of shares can move the stock price, but this assumes it has the flexibility to do so (i.e. the shares are not in index funds with stringent constraints). What matters to fund investors is the ownership concentration in funds they own.
For example, SPDR S&P Retail ETF XRT has 19.34% of its assets in GME (per M*). According to the fund's web page, as of January 29th, that was 19.47% of the fund.
What Schwab Fundamental Large Company ETF FNDX is doing with 2½% (per M*) of its portfolio in GameStop is beyond me. I guess one has to read index providers' definitions carefully. According to Schwab, as of Jan 28, the fund's 1½% allocation to GME was its 5th largest, nestled between JPMorgan Chase (JPM) and AT&T (T).
Reuters may have confused Lipper data regarding two different Fidelity funds that are clones of each other. Fidelity Series Intrinsic Opportunities FDMLX is a $13.7B fund, while Fidelity Flex Intrinsic Opportunities FFNPX is a tiny $36M fund.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-retail-trading-funds-idUSKBN29X0LZ
As of their latest quarterly reports (posted Dec 29, 2020), the Flex fund did have 0.639% of its assets in GME, but in such a tiny fund that amounted to nothing ($161K). The larger Series fund held 44x as much stock, but that constituted 0.59% of the fund. Close, the funds are clones, but not the same.
The Fidelity Series funds are for use by other Fidelity funds. So even the small 0.59% ownership is further diluted by its inclusion in other funds.
The Intrinsic Opportunities funds (both of them) are managed by Tillinghast. FLPSX's position in GME amounts to just 0.09% of the fund, as of its latest quarterly report.

@Derf,
It appears that enough FPA shareholders approved the merger. Found this filing by Bragg Capital this morning:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1170611/000110465921009595/a21-4366_1497.htm
Here is footnote concerning the merger:
"... Includes compensation from the Funds, FPA Capital Fund, Inc., (reorganized into Queens Road Small Cap effective February 1, 2021)..."
Checked my FPA Capital account this morning...my shares were switched to FPA Queens Road Small Cap Instl. shares as of this morning; shares were adjusted for the lower NAV of the FPA Queens Road Small Cap Instl NAV price than the FPA Capital NAV.
Just found these news releases:
https://fpa.com/docs/default-source/FPA-News-Documents/fpa-qr-capital-merger-press-release-final.pdf?sfvrsn=2
https://finance.yahoo.com/news/fpa-announces-completion-fpa-capital-143000983.html

Reuters: The Fidelity Intrinsic Opportunities fund, for instance, owns 9.75% of GameStop’s outstanding shares, according to Lipper data. Yet that position accounts for just 0.64% of the fund’s assets. The fund is up 5.6% for the year-to-date, approximately 1.5 percentage points less than the benchmark Russell 2000 index.
The BlackRock Advantage Small Cap Core fund holds 0.03% of its assets in GameStop, according to Lipper.
Overall, BlackRock, the world’s largest asset manager, owned about 9.2 million shares in GameStop as of Dec. 31, 2020, spread over several funds. If BlackRock has not since sold any of those shares, its stake’s value is up $2.4 billion since the start of the year.

If you evaluate these funds through the full market in 2020, the list may get considerable smaller. FMI funds, for example, was 3 alarm funds last years as noted on this discussion board

Really crazy performance history of feast or famine. MSSMX has been the #1 ranked in its cat 3x including 2020 and this year, but in 2014-2016 threw up a string of 99-96-96.
On the shorts issue...keep in mind that MSSMX was UP 150% in 2020. The big squeeze problems seem to be a 2021 thing, with GME for example being a January spectacle. Also, it does not appear to use leverage, and if so, the big risk then would be downside protection when all heck breaks loose on any of the squeeze targets. If so, trusting MS to be all over that. Welcome further comments.
All that said, its closest domestic SCG peer (via Fido menu) is behind a whopping 20% YTD TR, UP a mere 13.5%.
There's something happening here
What it is ain't exactly clear
-Stills

MSSGX is a spectacular fund, I own it as a small part of my portfolio. But I continue trying to understand the source of its incredible outperformance. I was watching performance of the companies at its top five positions according to its latest report of 09/30/2020. Two of them, OSTK and SFIX, are up 60% during the last month. Then I decided to see whether the recent hero GameStop (GME) is also there, and I found it way down the list at only 0.92% of portfolio weight. It looks inconsequential. But this was 4 months ago. According to M*, during the last 4 months GME was up about 3000%. What was 0.92% 4 months ago could easily grow to become about 20% of the MSSGX portfolio. I doubt that the managers would allow a single stock to grow that much, but a potential impact of GME could explain some part of performance of MSSGX.

OK...MSSMX UP 150% in 2020. UP 30% YTD.
Read it again slowly and try to understand it.
On the short squeeze question, speaking generally to all readers/posters...
I would caution limiting one's concerns about this issue to just SCs and/or any specific fund, e.g., MSSMX. This is potentially a very large, diverse problem that could affect investors in many ways, yet TBD, and may be affecting some/sevral of your holdings unbeknownst to you right now. That said...
Most recent portfolio data, even on the MS site, is from 09/30/20. It does NOT appear any of the short squeeze companies*** are held by MSSMX, at least not in the top ~50%-60% of its holdings. Invite others to look for some as well - could have missed one.
***UPDATE: SFIX is on both the Fido holdings and Short Squeeze company lists below (as a 5.21% holding per Fido list) but not sure if it's a problem child short.
Also note:
(1) These are dated holdings lists and much could have changed in the 4th Qtr and/or Jan 2021. Unless there were significant changes, does NOT appear to be a problem. (If it is, it's currently a GOOD problem to have. Just sayin'.)
(2) Keep in mind this is Morgan Stanley we're talking about here. If anybody stands a chance of being on the right side of how these squeezes turn out, I like my chances teaming up with them.
(3) I am NOT recommending that any readers/posters BUY/HOLD this fund. If you are considering doing so, do so after your own DD and at your own risk/peril. Like all MFs, it does NOT come with a warning label and "Nobody rings a bell" when it's time to consider getting out. (Thanks Art Cashin!)
(4) If you do BUY it, note that Dramamine is not included with your purchase.
(5) Lastly, and FWIW, it is an (intended, at least) LT hold for me and like they say, I'm "Enjoy(ing) the ride!"
https://www.morganstanley.com/im/en-us/registered-investment-advisor/product-and-performance/mutual-funds/us-equity/inception-portfolio.shareClass.I.html
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/61744J614?type=o-NavBar
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/here-are-the-biggest-short-squeezes-in-the-stock-market-including-gamestop-and-amc-11611842270
@Graust I recall you helping me several times over the years. Happy to have reciprocated at least in part. Be sure to Buckle Up on this one.

Grantham. Excellent reputation. But my own "cup of meat" is more along the lines of Barry Ritholtz and the ones connected to his firm. I know you cannot just OPINE your way into making things true, the way you want them to be. (Cue the QAnons in this slot, here.) But Ritholtz is refreshingly direct, savvy and with wisdom gained from a lot of experience:
• "And in the End . . . How does this spasm of speculation conclude? I have a high degree of confidence in my answer: The same way it always does.
There will be tears, massive losses by some and big gains by others. There will be lives ruined and lessons learned among the claims of a rigged market, insider trading, and fraud. Maybe even people go to jail (maybe not). As Wall Street runs red with proverbial blood, a few clever bastards will notice the “generational buying opportunity” — the fourth such rare entry point over the past 20 years."
https://ritholtz.com/