The writer is a monthly columnist for the WSJ. I can find no corresponding working paper through the writer's website.
Unannounced to their investors, mutual-fund managers will often lend the shares they hold ...
Unannounced?

Securities lending is a well-established practice whereby U.S. registered funds, such as mutual funds, make loans of securities to seek an incremental increase in returns for fund shareholders. This paper explains the basics of securities lending, outlines the benefits and risks for investors, and describes BlackRock’s leading approach to securities lending.

BlackRock Securities Lending, Blackrock, January 2021

Vanguard’s securities-lending program—which lends equities under the same philosophy and approach today as it has since well before the global financial crisis—is unique in its exclusive focus on benefiting our investors and not our bottom line. We adhere strictly to a "value-lending" philosophy, managing our counterparty credit limits and collateral pool internally through [Vanguard Fixed Income Group] FIG.

How well did your asset manager weather the market storm? Vanguard, Sept. 2020
Moving on:
- Do US growth, US value, US large cap, int'l, and EM really encompass all funds? ("I looked at the full sample of actively managed equity mutual funds"). What defines these categories and where do small cap blend funds or global funds fall?
- Is "average" unweighted, dollar weighted, or median: "The average percent lent out by active funds was 0.80%." An unweighted average would be propped up by a few funds lending over 20% of assets (see next item).
- "we see over 2% of funds ... lending out an average of more than 20% of their underlying holdings each year—coming close to SEC guidelines." Coming close?
From Barron's (see cite below): "Legally, exchange-traded and mutual funds can lend out as much as 50% of their unlevered securities’ portfolios to borrowers who pay them interest."
I can offer another possible explanation for his figures. It is well known (read: find sources on your own) that high ER funds tend to be more aggressive hence more volatile, in attempting to overcome their higher costs. If these funds also are more aggressive in their lending, then one would see what he is reporting: higher rates of security lending correlating with poorer performance (due to higher ERs) and higher volatility.
Related to covering costs is the question of how much of the lending revenue goes back into the fund vs. how much lines the pockets of the fund company? You can pretty well guess what Vanguard does. Other companies are less considerate of their investors. The writer did not attempt to correct for this factor. Nor did he attempt to control for ERs, e.g. by looking at gross rather than net returns.
There's an excellent piece in Barron's (by some guy going by the name of @LewisBraham) discussing this and more, albeit in the context of index funds and ETFs.
ETFs’ Hidden Source of Return—Securities Lending, Barron's April 7, 2018.

The Ulcer Index measures the length and duration of the maximum drawdown over a period of time which in this case was three years including the 2020 bear market.
Each bear market is unique, but I believe that it is a great relative risk indicator. Over the past three years the S&P 500 had an UI of 5.2.

“Retail investors keep pouring money into markets, even as many of their favorite meme stocks and cryptocurrencies have languished. In June, so-called retail investors bought nearly $28 billion of stocks and exchange-traded funds on a net basis, according to data from Vanda Research’s VandaTrack, the highest monthly amount deployed since at least 2014. That even trumped the amount retail traders spent in January during the first meme-stock frenzy.
“The activity underscores the enduring influence of ordinary investors in markets. When the Covid-19 pandemic ushered in a wave of first-time traders, many market observers suspected these investors would retreat when the economy reopened. Instead, individual investors have grown in number: More than 10 million new brokerage accounts are estimated to have been opened in the first half of this year, according to JMP Securities. That is around the total for all of 2020 …
“Retail investors’ enthusiasm is in contrast to professional money managers’ growing and ease about the market outlook. This has risen as markets on the surface appear placid but volatility has grown around individual stocks … (One) gage of retail traders’ sentiment currently shows that the group is nearly 70% confident that the US stocks will keep rising over the next three months. Meanwhile, professional traders are only about 44% confident that stocks will rally during that period.”
WSJ July 6, 2021

Lynn, thanks so much for sharing your thoughts, especially on GAVAX. I look forward to reading your commentary on non correlated assets. Your articles have really helped me, and I’m using MFO screeners more and more. I feel indebted.

Rick, Here is what I started doing. I divide my funds into three groups 1) Mixed Asset, 2) Uncorrelated, and 3) the tactical sleeve. The first two categories are buy and hold and as long as the quality of the fund is intact, I don't worry about performance. For the tactical funds, I track the previous month return, three month trend, and flows. If they are negative, I have to ask myself why? Is the fund peaking or is it blip.
On GAVIX/GAVAX, which is an uncorrelated fund, see below. The Ulcer Index is about half of the S&P 500 meaning half as risky. The average three year return is 7.4% which is good for a conservative fund. The Composite MFO Rating is 2 which is below average (3). It is not very consistent, which is not a major flaw, and it's capital preservation is good. The one month return is down as is the three month trend, and money is flowing out. The yield is 2.2%. What I like is that the correlation to the S&P 500 is only 0.58 which is low, and the downside capture is only 9.7 which is why it has a good capital preservation rating of 4.
APR 7.4
Ulcer Index 2.9
Martin Ratio 2.13
Composite Rating 2
Consistency 1
Preservation 4
1 Month -1.87
Trend -0.6
Flow -1.8
Yield 2.24
Correlation SP500 0.58
Down Cap S&P 500 9.7
The stats are good for GAVIX. I track 81 uncorrelated funds, and GAVIX rates 58. The composite rating of 2 is the only thing that I don't like. For my next MFO article, I identify six potential uncorrelated funds to own. These are COTZX, ARBIX, DEVDX, RLSIX, SPEDX, and SUBFX. I am still researching these, but already own COTZX and ARBIX.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908802/000139834421014025/fp0066718_497.htm
497 1 fp0066718_497.htm
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e) and Rule 497(k)
under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended
File Registration No.: 033-65632
SCHRODER SERIES TRUST
(the “Trust”)
Schroder Long Duration Investment-Grade Bond Fund
(the “Fund”)
Supplement dated July 6, 2021
to the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (the “SAI”), each dated March 1, 2021, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
The Board of Trustees of the Trust, at the recommendation of Schroder Investment Management North America Inc. (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser of the Fund, has approved a plan of liquidation providing for the liquidation of the Fund’s assets and the distribution of the net proceeds pro rata to the Fund’s shareholders. In connection therewith, the Fund is closed to new investments. The Fund is expected to cease operations and liquidate on or about September 30, 2021 (the “Liquidation Date”). The Liquidation Date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.
Prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders may redeem (sell) their shares in the manner described in the “How to Sell Shares” section of the Prospectus. For those shareholders that do not redeem (sell) their shares prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will distribute to each such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date.
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, the Adviser may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate the Fund’s orderly liquidation, such as by holding cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
The liquidation distribution amount will include any accrued income and capital gains, will be treated as a payment in exchange for shares and will generally be a taxable event for shareholders investing through taxable accounts. You should consult your personal tax advisor concerning your particular tax situation. Liquidation costs will be accrued on the date of this Supplement and shareholders remaining in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will not be charged any additional fees by the Fund associated with the liquidation. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
SCH-SK-015-0100

'' Palm Valley Capital (Eric Cinnamond) must not be trustful of the waters. "
No new news there !
Derf

Well, Hussman is still the king of perma-bears. Does anybody hold any of his mutual funds? Even his defense is questionable, and there is no offense.

'' Palm Valley Capital (Eric Cinnamond) must not be trustful of the waters. "
No new news there !
Derf

@msf, thanks for your insights on EIXIX, and the fund's lack of clarity. Its a Legacy bond fund with a short history. I may be reaching a bit for that yummy yield.
Another defensive play is small cap fund PVCMX, which supposedly held an 80% cash position at 3-31-2021. Palm Valley Capital (Eric Cinnamond) must not be trustful of the waters.

“Red flag special” MWFSX
It’s so new Lipper hasn’t yet created a scorecard for it. 105% in bonds means they’re borrowing to exercise leverage. Yahoo doesn’t show duration or credit quality. But, @msf has indicated 25% below B Yikes!
Here’s Moody’s rating scale from Wikipedia Hopefully, I got the cut and paste of the chart correct. Not all junk is created equal. Some good income funds (DODIX) dabble in the BB area. Few decent funds want to go below B, although some of their BB will occasionally fall to the B level.
B2 B B B3 B− B− Highly speculative
Caa1 CCC+ C CCC C 5 Substantial risks
Caa2 CCC Extremely speculative
Caa3 CCC− Default imminent with little prospect for recovery
Most experienced investors are aware the junk bond market is not very liquid. Even daily pricing is suspect and sometimes inaccurate. During good times a fund like this can sail along posting nice returns. On those rare eventful occasions (2008 and early 2020 come to mind) these funds can submerge literally overnight. Per Warren Buffett: "It's only when the tide goes out that you learn who's been swimming naked."
One of the better threads we’ve had in a while. Thanks to @lynnbolin2021 for joining in / sharing considerable knowledge and data.

Was looking for a HY bond fund that had held up decently ("defensive?") in 1Q 2020. Found EIXIX with a 5.5% SEC Yield.
I took only a cursory look at EIXIX so all I've got are lots of questions, not clear statements:

• What is the average credit rating for this fund? Is it really "high yield" aka "junk"? The annual report says:

  These securities that the Fund invests in are at or near the top of the capital structure, which make them relatively insulated from losses by the deal structure’s credit enhancement (i.e. preference over bonds junior to the respective tranche we are buying)

  It makes it sound like it's investing in the most senior tranches - the ones rated AAA before the GFC.
  
• The annual report also says that it "invests primarily in ... non-agency residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) that were created pre-crisis", i.e. legacy RMBS. By definition they're not issuing more of these. What is the size of that pool? How will the fund invest going forward?
  
• What is the average duration of the portfolio? The latest semiannual report seems to show most of the holding having non-fixed rates. That would suggest a very short duration. In addition, both the annual and semiannual report tell of a smattering (< 5%) interest only securities. They have negative duration, further shortening the portfolio's average duration.
  
• If most of the holdings are variable rate, which generally trade near par (little interest rate risk), what accounts for the average weighted price being just 82% of par (per M*)? This is why the SEC yield is so high - it's building in an increase in price as bonds approach maturity. (M* notes that "neither TTM nor SEC yields reflect the potential impact of future defaults.")
  Is the credit risk so severe? The annual report suggests that it is: "Legacy non-agency RMBS have measurable credit risk." It reports 18.2% of the underlying loans are 60+ days delinquent.

I haven't read up on legacy non-agency RBMSs. So all I can do is raise these questions. I don't know which numbers are most meaningful for this type of holding or what sort of risk profile they present. As I said, questions, not answers.
With respect to the 1Q20 performance, EIXIX had a drawdown of 13.76% between March 5 and March 25 (per M* interactive chart tool). M* provides tabular monthly data, that shows EIXIX losing 8.30% in March. Looking at an entire quarter gives you information about speed of recovery but less insight into the magnitude of risk.
http://performance.morningstar.com/fund/performance-return.action?t=EIXIX
For better 1Q20, March 2020, and max drawdown (daily) figures, I might look at MWFSX. It went up in 1Q20 by 1.23% (vs EIXIX dropping 6.79%). It went down in March by 1.92% (vs. EIXIX dropping 8.30%). And it's max drawdown in 2020 was 5.57% between March 5 and March 25.
All that said, it's fairly similar to EIXIX, and thus suffers from some of the same risk factors. Except that it has much greater transparency (you can find its portfolio statistics here), is more diversified ("only" 2/3 in securitized debt), and is managed by a first rate, well known team.
Portfolio Visualizer comparison.

TGHNX lost 6.8 % in 1Q 2020.

Thanks, Carew.

TGHNX lost 6.8 % in 1Q 2020.

Was looking for a HY bond fund that had held up decently ("defensive?") in 1Q 2020. Found EIXIX with a 5.5% SEC Yield. $2,500 min at VGD (TF). May be my newest addition.
Looked at GAVAX, gave up quickly on that. Sold my SWAN and DRSK. Not sure that TMSRX is going to be a keeper.
Holding onto my ARBIX and HRSAX.
Recently bought some SVARX and SFHYX (Fido).
Will keep adding to CTFAX (a keeper).
Hiding out in various bond funds (DAAIX, EXCPX, PEGAX, FPFIX, MWFSX, etc) in the hopes equities peel back. Won't hold my breath, though.
Merger arb is stalling a bit this month, but that sleeve will remain (BALPX, MERFX, HMEAX) intact.
Still liking HEGD, just wish average daily volume would increase. Will add here.
D-E-F-E-N-S-E

@Rickrmf - I don’t know anything about ARBIX (but that’s never stopped me from voicing an opinion).
M* doesn’t appear to have a rating for it
It scores very well on Lipper. Be aware their “rating” is actually a reflection of recent performance.
- Performance 4/5
- Total Return 4/5
- Capital Preservation 5/5
(Lipper does knock it down on expenses giving it just 1/5 in that area.)
What I think is significant is that the “chainsaw gang” over at Max Funds
rates it fairly highly by their standards:
Good +74/100
What’s really “wild” IMHO is that if you click the “Holdings” tab at Lipper you’ll see that ARBIX has a negative 50% weighting in stocks. That’s some shorting. I’ve never seen anything quite like it.

Great point. The FAANG stocks (Facebook, Amazon, Apple, Netflix, and Google (Alphabet)) have dominated the broader US index for the past 10 years while the value stocks trailed by sizable margin until late 2020.
As @hank suggested above, it would be a good idea to review the top 10 holdings in each funds in your portfolio on a regular basis. Case in point, the value oriented Wellington fund, VWELX, now holds: Alphabet Inc, Microsoft, Facebook and Apple among the top 10 holdings per 5/31/2021 reporting. The fund is now categorized as blend according to M*. In the same period, Wellesley Income, VWINX holds more the traditional financial, pharma and consumer staples stocks. Also Global Wellington holds only Microsoft as #4 position. Likely I will move fund away from Wellington.

Here's a more detailed history of AMG:
https://www.referenceforbusiness.com/history2/13/Affiliated-Managers-Group-Inc.html
Until I checked, I also thought: "Affiliates operate independently" and "AMG invests in independent investment managers and allows them to remain independent". But it surely can't be coincidence that a large number of AMG branded funds had complete management changes and sometimes radical objective changes in or around March.
M* (human) analysis of parent AMG, Nov 2020: While AMG's stronger affiliates have held up relatively well, net outflows have caused the firm and its affiliates to liquidate or merge subscale offerings, including AMG GW&K US Small Cap Growth and AMG River Road Dividend All Cap Value. In another instance, affiliate Chicago Equity Partners shuttered its business entirely, spurring a subadvisor and name change on AMG GW&K Global Allocation. Recent challenges in AMG's quantitative offerings have contributed most substantially to outflows, with shops such as AQR suffering the most.
Here's AMG's current 55 fund lineup. Lots of recent "independent" changes this year. Maybe it's a one-off and AMG is done tinkering for awhile. (See more under Brandywine below.)
https://www.amgfunds.com/products.html
M* (automated) individual fund analyses:
Beutel Goodman funds
ADBLX (formerly AMG Managers DoubleLIne CorePlus Bond Fund, formerly ASTON/DoubleLine Core Plus Fixed Income Fund) - Although this strategy was incepted in July 2011, its listed management team turned over completely two months ago. Therefore, the fund’s historical team data is largely no longer applicable, as it’s not representative of the current strategy.
APINX (formerly AMG Managers Pictet Int'l, formerly ASTON/Pictet Int'l) - Although this strategy was incepted in April 2014, its listed management team turned over completely two months ago ...
Brandywine funds(Proxy Statement, April 2021): The proposed changes for the Funds, which have been approved by the Board of Trustees, are part of a strategic repositioning of the AMG Funds complex for greater alignment with AMG, in which each fund not currently subadvised by an AMG Affiliate will be transitioned to an AMG Affiliate subadviser ...
BRWIX (formerly Brandwine fund) - Even though this strategy’s track record dates back to December 1985, there has been a high degree of turnover on the management side recently, resulting in a thorough overhaul of its listed team two months ago. Therefore, the fund’s historical team data is largely no longer applicable.
BLUEX (formerly Brandywine Blue) - This strategy underwent a complete overhaul of its listed management team two months ago. And even though their record dates back to January 1991, it's difficult to analyze the new team until they spend more time on the strategy.
GW&K funds
MGFIX (formerly AMG Managers Loomis Sayles Bond) - Even though this strategy’s track record dates back to June 1984, there has been a high degree of turnover on the management side recently, resulting in a complete overhaul of its listed team two months ago ...
MBEAX (formerly AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced) - The team that took over this fund in April 2020 lacks proven expertise in several elements of this strategy.
MGGBX (formerly Managers Global Income Opportunity) - Even though this strategy’s track record dates back to March 1994, there has been a high degree of turnover on the management side recently, resulting in a complete overhaul of its listed team five months ago ...
MECAX (formerly Managers Cadence Emerging Companies) - This strategy underwent a total overhaul of its listed management team seven months ago. And even though their record dates back to June 1993, it's difficult to analyze the new team until they spend more time on the strategy.
SKSEX (formerly Skyline Special Equities) - Although this strategy was incepted in April 1987, its listed management team turned over completely five months ago. ...
ASCTX (formerly ASTON/Silvercrest Small Cap) - This strategy underwent a total overhaul of its listed management team two months ago. And even though their record dates back to December 2011, it's difficult to analyze the new team until they spend more time on the strategy.
ACWDX (formerly AMG Managers LMCG Small Cap Growth, formerly ASTON Small Cap Growth, formerly ASTON/Crosswind Small Cap Growth) - Even though this strategy’s track record dates back to November 2010, there has been a high degree of turnover on the management side recently, resulting in a complete overhaul of its listed team two months ago. ...
Harding Loevner - majority owned by AMG, this family has been unscathed.
(Managers) Montag & Caldwell
MCTFX (formerly AMG Managers Montag & Caldwell Growth Fund, formerly ASTON/Montag & Caldwell Growth fund) - This strategy underwent a total overhaul of its listed management team two months ago. And even though their record dates back to November 1994, it's difficult to analyze the new team until they spend more time on the strategy.
Pantheon - CEF, accredited investors only, acquired by AMG in 2010, not worth further investigation
Renaissance - some funds liquidated: AMG Renaissance Int'l Equity RIEIX (2018), Masters Renaissance Large Cap Equity (2006)
MLRTX - in 2017, AMG merged its AMG Managers Cadence Capital Appreciation Fund MPRFX into this fund.
River Road funds
FQUAX (formerly AMG FQ Long-Short Equity, formerly AMG FQ U.S. Equity) - This strategy underwent a total overhaul of its listed management team two months ago. And even though their record dates back to August 1992, it's difficult to analyze the new team until they spend more time on the strategy.
CHTTX (formerly AMG Managers Fairpointe Mid Cap, formerly ASTON/Fairpointe Mid Cap) - Although this strategy was incepted in September 1994, its listed management team turned over completely two months ago ...
TimesSquare - majority owned by AMG since 2004, this family has been unscathed
Tweedy Browne - majority owned by AMG since 1997, this family has been unscathed. Oddly, AMG lists only one of its funds, TBGVX, in its list of current offerings.
Veritas funds
MGSEX (formerly Managers Special Equity) - This strategy underwent a total overhaul of its listed management team two months ago. And even though their record dates back to June 1984, it's difficult to analyze the new team until they spend more time on the strategy.
MMCFX (formerly AMG Managers Emerging Opp) - [M* human analysis] AMG Managers Emerging Opportunities will soon undergo a complete overhaul under a new subadvisor, changing from a U.S. microcap fund to a China fund. ... As of May 21, 2021, AMG is replacing this fund's three current subadvisors with Veritas Asset Management, a London-based global investing boutique majority-owned by AMG.
MFQAX (formerly AMG FQ Tax-Managed U.S. Equity, formerly First Quadrant Tax-Managed Equity) - Although this strategy was incepted in December 2000, its listed management team turned over completely zero months ago ....
BLUEX - see under Brandywine, above.
Yacktman funds - unscathed

@Dennis,
Thanks for bringing this planned acquistion to our attention!
Jerome Dodson retired from active management last year and the Parnassus sale allows him to cash out.
Since ESG funds are currently popular, this may have been an an opportune time to sell the firm.
Being a PRILX shareholder, I'm glad that Todd Ahlsten and Ben Allen will remain with the firm.
AMG provides support services to acquired mutual fund companies but otherwise allows them to operate with great autonomy.
Here's the AMG business description from an M* Equity Analyst Report dated 04/06/2021.
"Affiliated Managers Group offers investment strategies
to investors through its network of affiliates. The firm
typically buys a majority interest in small to midsize
boutique asset managers, receiving a fixed percentage
of revenue from these firms in return. Affiliates operate
independently, with AMG providing strategic,
operational, and technology support, as well as global
distribution. At the end of 2020, AMG's affiliate network-
-which includes firms like AQR Capital Management,
BPEA and Pantheon in alternative assets and other
products (which accounted for 30% of AUM), Artemis,
Genesis, Harding Loevner, and Tweedy Browne in global
equities (39%) and Frontier, River Road, and Yacktman in
U.S. equities (14%)--had $716.2 billion in managed
assets."

AMG is effectively a holding company. You may be familiar with at least a few of their funds, e.g. YACKX, TCMPX (mentioned by a few posters here as recently as 2020), BRWIX (formerly Brandywine), MGSEX (" Effective March 19, 2021, AMG Managers Special Equity Fund ... changed its name[] to AMG Veritas Asia Pacific Fund"), etc.
Though as noted with that last fund, AMG seems to have recently overhauled a few Managers Funds. And while one can ignore the earlier name change of BRWIX, M* observed that the entire management team was just replaced in March rendering its past history meaningless.
https://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/series?sc=companyseries&type=N-PX&company=AMG

Complete text of article from Barron's: Affiliated Managers Group, the big holding company for asset managers, has agreed to buy Parnassus Investments, the socially responsible investment firm, for $600 million, according to a person knowledgeable about the transaction.
The move demonstrates the popularity of environmental, social, and governance, or ESG, investing. In recent years, Parnassus, based in San Francisco, has grown swiftly as the vogue for sustainable investing strengthened and as the firm developed a reputation for reliably good performance. It has five mutual funds, all fossil-fuel free.
Sustainable investing, also known as ESG investing, has been a huge and steady trend in recent years. In 2020, nearly a quarter of all fund flows went into sustainable funds. That could gain strength as U.S. retirement plans open up to sustainable investing.
About a third of the $51.4 trillion of U.S. assets under management is sustainably managed, according to US SIF, the trade group for the sustainable-investment industry. Indeed, a survey by investment manager Schroders found that 69% of retirement-plan participants said they would or might increase their overall contribution rate if their plan offered ESG options.
Both Parnassus and AMG (ticker: AMG) declined to comment or confirm the terms of the transaction. The transaction is subject to the agreement of Parnassus fund shareholders.
Parnassus is approximately 35% owned by its employees and 65% by the founder, Jerome Dodson, and his family. It oversees $47 billion. AMG invests in independent investment managers and allows them to remain independent while providing capital, distribution, and other capabilities to affiliates such as AQR Capital Management and Yacktman Asset Management. It has roughly $720 billion in assets under management.
In recent years, some of the most venerable names in U.S. sustainable investing have been purchased by larger entities. Calvert Research & Management was acquired by Eaton Vance in 2016, which in turn was bought by Morgan Stanley (MS) this year. In 2018, Pax World Management was acquired by Impax Asset Management (IPX.London). Trillium Asset Management was purchased last year by Australian financial services company Perpetual. This year, AMG bought 15% of Boston Common Partners, while Boston Common’s management team and principals retained 85%.
AMG has agreed to pay Parnassus $400 million in cash on closing and an additional $200 million one year later. There is an additional performance fee, according to the person familiar with the transaction. As part of the transaction, Parnassus CEO Ben Allen and chief investment officer Todd Ahlsten, both longtime employees, are signing contracts to remain with the firm. Ahlsten is also a member of the Barron’s Roundtable.
Founder Dodson, 78, a longtime star investor, stepped back last year, leaving Parnassus Endeavor Fund (PARWX) and the funds’ board of trustees. Dodson founded Parnassus in 1984 with $350,000 from friends and family.
Write to Leslie P. Norton at [email protected]

“Where is the evidence that the market could "slap (you) in the face" soon? There is none. With respect, the very person who recently told us to ignore speculative comments like this has just made one himself! The facts all point to continued growth in the US stockmarket for the foreseeable future. There is absolutely zero evidence supporting the recession theory, let alone the crash theory.”
- Posted by @Simon - January 2020
Nobody could have foreseen the market swoon that befell us only weeks after that comment was posted. A bloody time for stocks, gold, commodities - even corporate bonds until the Federal Reserve stepped in and shored up the BBB markets. Had you been light on risk assets at the time you could have made out like a bandit buying them up in the aftermath. Possibly, the “old f’s” that hang out here were on to something with their cautious note. You’re never too old or too young to learn - young from old and old from young.
March 9, 2020 Market Crash