@JonGaltill: I had a somewhat similar experience with BCSIX, a long-time SCG holding that had a miserable year. I reduced exposure but kept a small bit because it is a closed fund. The fund had drifted into MCG territory, although that is not a problem with MSSMX. Brown Capital has concentrated funds that trade infrequently. They do well with SC stocks, but their record with MC stocks is middling. MSSMX seems to be invested in hot stocks that just went belly-up this year. I do look at my tax situation before selling to see if shedding a loser will raise or lower my CG.
We own two MS funds, MGGPX and GLCAX, Kristian Heugh funds. I reduced MGGPX, but increased GLCAX in a tax deferred account just after a huge ST and LTCG distribution in hopes that 2021 was just one bad year. Our initial purchase was really badly timed, not the first time that’s happened. I’m not sure if my approach, admittedly scattershot, can give you any insight. BTW, that’s a handsome chart from Fidelity.

I suspect we are now beyond the 2020 crash rebound period, and I think we will have to accommodate more rising interest rate impact. I don't have strong predictions about particular funds, but I am expecting bond oefs like IOFIX will come back down to earth and have more "normal" returns.

Giroux (46) has been with PRWCX since mid-2006 (he was only 31 then). So, he has been through the Great Financial Crisis (2007-09), the Covid selloff (2020) and other minor selloffs in between. He may have 2-3 decades ahead of him unless he gets bored. But his new roles at Price should keep things interesting for him. PRWCX is closed to new investors, but those who hold it don't have to worry about manager change any time soon.

It’s been mainly value for me with a bit of growth just to participate and scratch the itch. 2020 was a fun ride for tech, but I left it in Sept and spent the majority of time in DODGX through my 401k and some other value based funds in a couple IRAs - MXXVX, PARWX, DHPAX, LZFOX. I have had some GPGCX and recently decided to load up on GPGEX as my main world stock fund. I don’t see another wild tech rally for a while outside from some IPOs in the next year that keep up their sales numbers.

https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1073089/how-did-the-6040-portfolio-do-in-2021
"'The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated,' says the asset-allocation standard.....through the end of November, the 60/40 has returned about 15%, and I'm using just a generic stock and bond 60/40 portfolio for an example here. So, about 15%. And so, real return after you adjust for inflation, even with high inflation, that's about an 8% real return, which is pretty great. I looked at the rolling 12-month real returns for the 60/40 since 2000. The median over that last 21 years is about 7.5%. So, it's actually outperformed its median real return over that time period. So, even though all this doom and gloom came true, it didn't derail the 60/40.....I think it's definitely not something for a short-term investment. With 60% stocks, you're going to have volatility. You could have drawdowns. In 2008, 2020 drawdowns were a little north of 20%. So, that's your downside risk. So, if you're investing for something six, 12, even 18 months from now, a 60/40 is probably a little too volatile for that. But I think if you have a long time horizon, it's a very good starting point, and it's proven very difficult to beat because the stocks and bonds, when it's like an investment-grade bond portfolio, really balance each other out nicely. And unless that correlation between those two really significantly changes, which it's hard to see how it would, though it could over shorter periods, I think it's a really good long-term investment, and it's definitely been a very hard benchmark to beat....."
And for those who want to venture out some more, look at evolving MULT-ASSET funds that include stocks-bonds-alternatives in the mix.

I feel that the perceived decline in fund fees is largely illusory once one controls for: payment to advisors (which has been externalized, moving the source from 12b-1 fees and loads out of the funds to separate wrap fees); the increase in the relative number of index funds (which reduces the industry average cost but not the cost of each fund); the belated rotation by investors from higher cost funds to lower cost funds (thus reducing the dollar weighted industry average cost).
The ICI writes: "The decline in the average expense ratios of equity, hybrid, and bond mutual funds in 2020 primarily reflects a long-running shift by investors toward lower-cost funds or fund share classes."
https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/per27-03.pdf
To a lesser extent, there have been cost reductions due to economies of scale. That's a double edged sword, as larger funds have less agility and less ability to take advantage of small opportunities.
Certainly index fund costs have come down and for them agility is not a key concern. And the ability to invest in lower cost institutional class shares albeit with transaction fees, is a fairly recent improvement.
But if costs have come down so much, why don't we see more fund companies like American Funds or D&C focused on low cost funds? For example, in 1992, the ER of FCNTX was (per prospectus) 0.87%%. That was with around $6B in assets. Thanks to economies of scale - the fund now has $146B in assets - the ER has dropped to .... 0.86% (from Fidelity's current page for the fund).

Hi guys,
FWIW: As I stated above CTFAX carries a weighting of 12% within my portfolio's income sleeve. I have some other multi-sector income funds held in this sleeve that also holds some equity. The 12% weighting for CTFAX was chosen so that it could weight up to 80% in equity and not throw the sleeve beyond its 15% equity cap. So, for me, it stays within this sleeve even if it sould go equity heavy in a stock market downdraft and load equities thus reducing its allocation to bonds.
Another fund that I like and that I own is CFIAX (Columbia Flexible Capital Income) which is held in my hybrid income sleeve. It sports about a 4% yield.

Hi @MikeM - thanks for your message. What I meant to say, and did so incompletely was that COTZX has these S&P *trigger* points where they will then buy or sell based on how the market shows up. I have my own *trigger* points to buy (from bonds or cash), based on market dips/drops (not as defined as COTZX) and harvest gains (to bonds or cash) when my stock percentage moves beyond a threshold. In my opinion, that’s what COTZX does. The difference is, as @CecilJK noted, it’s automated for you.
If you have a portfolio of $5-10 million (which I do not), a 2% investment still comes out to be a hefty chunk of change ($100 - 200K), though not a big impact overall.
So one question I ask myself is, am I willing to pay the extra *er* fees for a service that I currently enjoy and still think (relatively) competent doing?

@hank: as you know, I let TMSRX go. I just took a look at the fund's allocation stats on M* and I am a bit perplexed. If the PMs are really holding 59% in cash with a 10% short position on US equities, it's no wonder the thing acts like a MMF. They cannot be doing what they did in 2019 and 2020. Thanks for finding that benchmark which helps explain what has been going on.

Just moved a hefty chunk of VTSAX and VDADX to VUSFX to take some gains off the table for 2022. I continue to work with a 33-36% stock allocation range, but am considering a reduction to 30-33%.

Recent activities? I been watching capital gains distributions and its' been a wild ride in the markets as well. I put 10% of my 401k into ASDVX for near term yield instead of earning 'zilch' in a Money Market Fund. Recently purchased TRAIX as part of the new TRP Summit Program...put 10% of my Rollover in that fund. I have added DSCPX to my small cap allocation...
Other moves I'm considering and would like some feedback on...May sell LBSAX and buy SCHD. .90 bps difference in ER and SCHD has beaten LBSAX on YTD, 1, 3, 5, and 10 year time periods. I also like Schwab's new offering, SCHY, because not many investors allocate to Int'l Value or they don't speak about that style often. The style has been challenged long term as has US Value (until recently)

I wonder if this might be a potential strategy regarding capital tax losses and Roth conversions.
Let say I want to manage Roth conversions during market sell offs (think back to March 2020).
the-case-for-roth-conversions-in-market-downturns
Let's say I have two accounts, A T-IRA and a taxable brokerage account. They are both invested in the S&P 500 On Jan 1. 2020. Each has $10K as a starting balance. By Mar 31, 2020 they are both worth $8,037.
I take the following actions:
I convert the T-IRA to a Roth and lock in the March 31, 2020 value of $8037. On April 1, 2020 the T-IRA is now in Roth Status (conversion competed) and New Roth account continues to be invested in the S&P500. By years end the Roth value is $11,825. In April of 2021, I will owe taxes on the conversion ($8037 * my tax bracket)
In the 12% bracket I will owe $964.44
In the 22% bracket I will owe $1768.14
In the 24% bracket I will owe $1928.88
In a separate taxable account, I sell the very same investment on the same day I completed the Roth conversion and book a $1963 tax loss on that sale. On Apr 1, 2020, I re-invest back into the Total Stock Market (or appropriate wash-sale security). My $8037 by years end grows to $1287. Obviously this works perfect in hindsight. Equity markets can endure long stretches of under performance.
In April of 2021, I have a tax loss of $1963 that I can apply to my 2020 tax year or carry forward to future tax years...future Roth conversions.
tax-loss-carryforward
If I had I done nothing , both accounts would have lost and subsequently regained their losses. But by timing both a Roth conversion in the T-IRA and harvesting a tax loss in a taxable account at a pull back in the market", I have used a tax loss to "pay for" a Roth conversion.

For anyone considering recognizing more gain or doing more Roth conversions this year, I ran across a couple of quirks in the way gains may be taxed.
Suppose you have short term gains (say, $3000) and long term losses (say -$1000), so that you're net positive (+$2,000 short term). Not a common situation, but here added long term gains can get taxed at short term (ordinary income rates).
In this example, if you generate an extra $500 in long term gains, that reduces the LT loss by $500, thus increasing the net short term gains by $500: Net LT loss = $500, net gain (short term) = $3000 - $500 = $2500.
----
If your income is in the region where some but not all cap gains are taxed at 0%, then adding $1 of ordinary income can increase your taxes by 27¢, i.e. it's taxed at 27%. Kitces has an excellent piece on this; see examples 3 and 4.
https://www.kitces.com/blog/long-term-capital-gains-bump-zone-higher-marginal-tax-rate-phase-in-0-rate/
He discusses how in this situation it is preferable to generate long term gains (even if taxed at 15%) as opposed to doing Roth conversions (even if nominally taxed at 12%). Going further, if one doesn't have much in cap gains/qualified divs, ISTM that it can still make sense to convert all the way up to the next tax bracket. A small amount will get taxed at 27%, but with little in cap gains, most will get taxed "normally". But if one has lots of cap gains that would get pushed into the 27% bracket, it pays to defer converting.
This suggests a multiyear strategy for planning periodic sales of assets and Roth conversions. It can be advantageous to lump them into alternating years. One year you take two year's worth of gains (taxed at 0% or 15%). The next year you work to minimize your cap gains (so there are few gains to get taxed at 27%) and convert more retirement money. Even if those conversions push you into the 22% bracket, that's still better than having a lot of cap gains taxed at 27%.
One needs to look at how much in gains one expects to recognize (including fund distributions), how much one wants to convert, other ordinary income, to see if this lumping strategy helps.

Excellent reply @msf. Thanks.
The only fund of funds I ever considered buying was CTFAX (but did not buy). During my review, I called the fund and asked among other things about duplication of management fees and the rep who I spoke with said NONE. We can forgive him for a 10 bps error. I have found most reps are limited in their knowledge - may be they are over worked or may be they hold temporary jobs to invest their time! Talking to the managers / fund investment professional is the best but usually one has to be an RIA or a big investor in the fund before that access is given.
Good to know this year NICHX expenses have come under the cap - efficiencies of scale I suppose going from $550M AUM at Oct 2020 to $1.35B at Nov 2021. Nice of them not to use up the disclosed cap. (I used to work in professional services and my team never gave any part of the fee cap back to the clients!) Given the current year claw back was only 0.07% and the charged expenses were below the cap, is it reasonable to assume that all the previous waivers are now clawed back and no claw back of historic waiver would be needed in the future years? I am guessing yes, but thought I would ask in case you know the answer off hand.
More importantly, thank you for bringing to light Vanguard's clever way to charge fees (I am sure they disclosed!), considering how much chest thumping it does about fees. Thankfully, I never invest at Vanguard for their presumed low fees; high fees never stopped me from an investment, though I like to know / understand how much I am paying.

Un-Intuitively, the fund did not lose until March 23, 2020 when both monetary and fiscal stimulus was announced. It lost about 1% TR Which it did not recover from until sometime in May 2020 - it was down for 2 months.
At inception, each manager invested between $5 and 15 million. Forms 4 are posted on the fund website. May be they started the fund to invest their own money and then must have attracted clients from their previous job where all three managers worked concurrently for a number of years. Manager bios are on the fund website - seems they have always been outsourcing managers, rather than being selectors of securities and trading them.

The immediate consequences of switching index provider is that VIGI distributed 6.5% cap gains. Luckily, the switch did not result in VIG needing to trigger any cap gains or it had sufficient prior cap losses to soak up any cap gains triggered from the switch. VIG has net realized (and unused) cap losses as of 11/30/2021 which as a percentage of NAV amounted to 2.65%. Any ETF other than the ones that are tracking broad indices like SPY, QQQ, etc. always runs the risk of triggering cap gains because the sponsor can switch the underlying index provider (and shareholders vote in favor without recognizing the cost to them). This happened to me on another ETF 5-6 years ago. In any case, I will not be adding to VIG / VIGI anymore or for that matter buy any new Vanguard ETFs that are just a different class of their mutual funds because cap gains triggered by mutual fund redemptions can be allocated to the separate class ETFs.
Below is the M* article re the switch.
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1040749/dissecting-vanguards-new-dividend-indexes
Note: M* quote page for VIGI has inaccurate info for December 2021 distributions. It overstates dividend (income) distribution by approx the size of the cap gain. Per share total distribution for December quarter per Vanguard is approx $5.4; whereas, M* shows $10.6

I own the institutional class (COTZX). Frankly, its the only fund I am thinking about adding to prior to year-end.
It all comes down to one's view of the market though. If one is eager to embrace risk of one's capital in pursuit of another 20% up year in 2022, CTFAX would NOT be the place to be.
OTOH, if one is risk-averse, and is seeking a disciplined approach to adding risk (i.e. it buys more as the market crashes), then CTFAX would be ideal. --- Just don't buy before it goes ex-div!

update:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/889284/000139834421024111/fp0071142_497.htm
497 1 fp0071142_497.htm
STERLING CAPITAL FUNDS
SUPPLEMENT DATED DECEMBER 20, 2021
TO THE
CLASS A AND CLASS C SHARES PROSPECTUS AND THE
INSTITUTIONAL AND CLASS R6 SHARES PROSPECTUS,
EACH DATED FEBRUARY 1, 2021, AS SUPPLEMENTED
This Supplement provides the following amended and supplemental information and supersedes any information to the contrary in the Class A and Class C Shares Prospectus and the Institutional, Class R6 Shares Prospectus, each dated February 1, 2021 (collectively, the “Prospectuses”), with respect to Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund and Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund:
Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund
Effective immediately, George Shipp will cease to serve as co-portfolio manager of the Fund, due to his upcoming retirement from the Adviser as disclosed July 12, 2021. Accordingly, the “Management—Portfolio Managers” section in the Prospectuses with respect to Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:
Portfolio Managers
Joshua L. Haggerty, CFA
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since July 2021
(formerly, Associate Portfolio Manager from February 2016 – July 2021)
Daniel A. Morrall
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since December 2021
(formerly, Associate Portfolio Manager from July 2021 – December 2021)
Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund
Effective immediately, George Shipp will cease to serve as co-portfolio manager of the Fund, due to his upcoming retirement from the Adviser as disclosed July 12, 2021. Accordingly, the “Management—Portfolio Managers” section in the Prospectuses with respect to Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund is hereby deleted and replaced with the following:
Portfolio Managers
Adam B. Bergman, CFA
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since July 2021
(formerly, Associate Portfolio Manager from February 2016 – July 2021)
Charles J. Wittmann
Executive Director of Sterling Capital and Co-Portfolio Manager
Since December 2021
(formerly, Associate Portfolio Manager from July 2021 – December 2021)
The following replaces the description of the Portfolio Managers set forth under “Fund Management—Portfolio Managers” in the Prospectuses with respect to the Sterling Capital Special Opportunities Fund and Sterling Capital Equity Income Fund:
Special Opportunities Fund and Equity Income Fund. Joshua L. Haggerty, CFA, Executive Director, joined the CHOICE Asset Management team of BB&T Scott & Stringfellow in 2005, which integrated with Sterling Capital in January 2013. He has investment experience since 1998. He has been Co-Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund since July 2021 and was Associate Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund from February 2016 to July 2021. Josh is a graduate of James Madison University where he received his BBA in Finance. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Adam B. Bergman, CFA, Executive Director, joined the CHOICE Asset Management team of Scott & Stringfellow in 2007, which integrated with Sterling Capital Management in January 2013. He has investment experience since 1996. He has been Co-Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund since July 2021 and was Associate Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund from February 2016 to July 2021. Adam is a graduate of the University of Virginia’s McIntire School of Commerce where he received his BS in Commerce. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Charles J. Wittmann, CFA, Executive Director, joined Sterling Capital Management in 2014 and has investment experience since 1995. He has been Co-Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund since December 2021 and was Associate Portfolio Manager of the Equity Income Fund from July 2021 to December 2021. Prior to joining Sterling Capital, he worked for Thompson Siegel & Walmsley as a portfolio manager and (generalist) analyst. Prior to TS&W, he was a founding portfolio manager and analyst with Shockoe Capital, an equity long/short hedge fund. Charles received his B.A. in Economics from Davidson College and his M.B.A. from Duke University's Fuqua School of Business. He holds the Chartered Financial Analyst® designation.
Daniel A. Morrall, Executive Director, joined Sterling Capital Management in 2014 and has investment experience since 2001. He has been Co-Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund since December 2021and was Associate Portfolio Manager of the Special Opportunities Fund from July 2021 to December 2021. Prior to joining Sterling Capital, he worked as an equity analyst for Harber Asset Management and S Squared Technology LLC, technology-biased long/short funds. Dan received his B.S. in Business and Economics from Washington and Lee University, his M.B.A. from Columbia Business School, and his M.S.I.T. from Capella University.
SHAREHOLDERS SHOULD RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT
WITH THE PROSPECTUSES FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
SUPP-1221
-2-

This Omicron situation reminds everyone when the 2020 pandemic started. Even with the COVID vaccines, antibody and antiviral treatments, one would expect we would be in a much better situation but sadly we are not. I am not surprised that market futures are all red, indicating there is more downside to come in 2022.
Not so pretty on Monday morning. Holland has imposed lockdown while the rest of Europe has restricted travel across the boarder. Other part of the world is undergoing similar measures. Will have to wait if this take the same path as 2020. It took about a month to cut interest rate to 0.25% and buying $bullion of bonds monthly. Question is what is left in the tank?

No problem or offense taken. While Vanguard utilized Chartwell at one time, Chartwell funds has been sold possibly for monetary and marketing reasons. Chartwell acquired Berwyn which was a growing advisory firm until it was sold. The discussion has shown how an actively managed fund advisory has sold out to a firm for possibly monetary and marketing reasons.
Hancock Whitney Corp. is a BHC which sold its mutual funds earlier this year. Chartwell Funds was a subsidiary of TriState Capital Holdings, Inc, a BHC in PA.