In the current market environment, preserving capital is more important than seeking return on capital.
Fred

While I agree that the scenario is unlikely, it's still a valid hypothetical question and I don't know the rule that handles this.
That said, I really like the idea of redemption in kind. Normally that's a pain for the retail investor, but here, where there's a single stock (or two) distributed, it's a very good thought. Even better (for the investors) because redemptions in kind make cap gains go poof. That's the loophole that ETFs use, and it's a generic loophole for all types of funds.
26 U.S. Code § 852(b)(6):

Section 311(b) [saying that funds recognize gains when they sell holdings] shall not apply to any distribution by a regulated investment company to which this part applies, if such distribution is in redemption of its stock [fund shares] upon the demand of the shareholder.

I would suspect in such a circumstance the fund wouldn't wait until December to make a distribution, but to pay special distributions earlier, closer to the time of the redemptions. It is also possible for a fund to pay in-kind redemptions in securities within the portfolio. That would be one way I imagine to get the gains out of the portfolio, just give redeeming shareholders shares of Tesla, and they would have to liquidate it and pay the gains on it themselves if they chose. The other reason this scenario is so unlikely is that shareholders don't make those kinds of redemptions unless the fund is doing poorly. A more probable scenario is the fund goes down say 20% first and shareholders sell a lot but there are still significant gains embedded in the portfolio the fund must distribute. So shareholders who stick around have a loss for the year in the fund plus a hefty gain distributed to them to pay taxes on.

It's hard to think of this as a mutual fund when 50% is in one stock. The other issue I could image is the potential tax liability if the fund starts experiencing redemptions and the manager has to sell appreciated stock. Given that, if one is a Tesla fan, why not just buy Tesla directly? According to the fund's June 30, 2021 semiannual report--https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1217673/000119312521257076/d171358dncsrs.htm#cov171358_33--the fund had $5.6 billion of unrealized capital gains in its $6.9 billion portfolio. One could easily imagine the fund distributing some hefty taxable distributions if some of those unrealized gains have to be realized because of shareholders selling the fund.

This situation suggests an interesting problem which I've never researched. What happens if the realized gains in a fund exceed the assets in the fund?
To see how this could happen, suppose the fund bought TSLA at $0 (or for a penny if it makes people more comfortable). Assume that the fund's holding in the company is now worth $5.6B; the other $1.3B are in assets that have not appreciated.
Fund shareholders redeem $5.6B worth of shares. The fund, perhaps foolishly, decides to satisfy the redemptions by selling all its TSLA stock. The fund is left with $1.3B in assets and a gain of $5.6B. When December rolls around, what does the fund distribute in the way of cap gains dividends?
One possibility is for the fund to distribute $1.3B in divs, and carry forward the remaining gains. The pragmatic problem with that solution is that no one would buy shares of a fund that would immediately distribute 100% of the investment back as a cap gain. Talk about buying a dividend! I don't know the real answer to what the rule is.

yeah
the OP quoted from Barron's
Most of its recent gains came from just one stock, Tesla (TSLA), which accounts for 50% of its portfolio.

so I was not seeing the problem, not seeing any problem. Then you posted
It's hard to think of this as a mutual fund when 50% is in one stock.

(and the answer to your question 'Why not just buy that stock?' is that you still want active management, presumably.)
A colleague who writes European prospectuses ventured:
... if an investment policy violation occurs (over a maximum, under a minimum, bond downrated to below credit threshold, etc.), the manager must make it a priority to resolve the problem as soon as possible within the normal course of business. So you don't have to suddenly dump so many now-junk bonds on the market that you push down the price you get for them, because that is not in the shareholders' best interest --- which is the paramount test for anything a fund does or doesn't do, though somehow they've managed ways to persuade regulators that giant fees are in the shareholders' best interest.
But yes, you gotta ditch the stuff or, as likely, offset some of the exposure through short sales or derivatives or whatever. This is an actual reg, not just a policy, and is about diversification and smoothing out volatility, and it is so heart-and-soul a mutual fund feature that you gotta follow it, eventually.

It's hard to think of this as a mutual fund when 50% is in one stock. The other issue I could image is the potential tax liability if the fund starts experiencing redemptions and the manager has to sell appreciated stock. Given that, if one is a Tesla fan, why not just buy Tesla directly? According to the fund's June 30, 2021 semiannual report--https://sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1217673/000119312521257076/d171358dncsrs.htm#cov171358_33--the fund had $5.6 billion of unrealized capital gains in its $6.9 billion portfolio. One could easily imagine the fund distributing some hefty taxable distributions if some of those unrealized gains have to be realized because of shareholders selling the fund.

Something that pops out when one looks at these funds is that they all had management overhauls within the past couple of years. M* lists each fund's average manager tenure as just one year. The former managers of these three funds, Christopher Vincent and Paul Sularz (all but BIFIX) appear to have retired in 2020 and 2021 respectively.
William Blair rebooted its fixed income program. It hired Ruta Ziverte in 2019 to "develop[] and execute[] [its] fixed-income growth strategy (in conjunction with other members of the team), team leadership, and select portfolio management." (From M*). One might surmise that the company wasn't thrilled with the short term progress and decided to pull the plug on this relatively small corner of the company (no fund with over $300M AUM).
Until it was shut down in Nov. 2015 the company did have a MMF - Ready Reserves Fund (RRFXX / WBRXX). Kathleen M. Lynch, the new lead manager of WBLIX co-managed Ready Reserves from 2010 until its demise in 2015; the aforementioned Vincent was the lead manager since 2003. The fund's inception was June 22, 1988.
The Macro Allocation Fund (WMCIX / WMCNX) has been co-managed by the same two people, Singer and Clarke, since its inception in 2011. The fund does not have a manager dedicated to fixed income. Between 2011 and 2016, Singer and Clarke co-managed PMFIX (as part of a team with more senior managers).

@yogibearbull,
I'm not very familiar with technical analysis.
How reliable of an indicator is the 50-Day / 200-Day SMA death cross?
Do you know if there were death cross patterns for the S&P 500 prior to sell-offs in 2000 - 2002, 2008, 2018 Q4, and 2020 Q1?
Thank you!

@BenWP, short-term nature of futures leads to high realized gains (and distributions) in strong years. There may be some loss-carryovers to offset those. But the ETF structure alone isn't any help in this case.

"Old" Sam Stovall may be in late-60s. He used to be at S&P but then in 2016 S&P spun off its equity research unit to CFRA. His father Robert Stovall, a well-known Wall Street analyst, passed away in 2020.
Son/Sam Stovall https://www.linkedin.com/in/sam-stovall-34153988#:~:text=Sam is the author of,flagship weekly newsletter The Outlook.
Father/Robert Stovall https://www.legacy.com/us/obituaries/nytimes/name/robert-stovall-obituary?id=12891994

I have no opinion on “transitory” or “non-transitory”. Nor have I any opinion what folks should buy if it turns out to be the former or the latter. But Barron’s this week seems to confirm what I’ve been seeing for about a year when I grocery shop. (I like to eat. I eat very well. But I don’t eat ice cream.)
“The January consumer-price index confirmed what consumers have known for some time. Prices are rising across the economy, and fast, with the overall index up 7.5% from a year ago from a 7% pace in December. The narrative around reopening bottlenecks keeping inflation contained, if persistent, within a tight group of predictable, pandemic-affected areas has been stale for some time; January's report makes it worth shredding. From a year earlier, bread, meat, and eggs rose by double digits, gasoline surged 40%, and even banking services jumped 14%. As Grant Thornton chief economist Diane Swonk put it: ‘The only thing that looks like a good deal is ice cream.’ “
Excerpted from “Forecasts” - by Lisa Beilfuss / Barron’s (print edition) February 14, 2022
Yet another pundit in the same Barron’s issue writes …
“In the inflation forecasting Olympics, Team Transitory missed the first gate, fell on the first jump, slipped at the first corner … We now expect headline CPI to average more than 6% this year before fading to just below 3% in 2023, both a long, long way from the 1.7% average in the decade prior to the pandemic.“ (Credited to BMO Capital Markets)

“The top-performing growth fund since the end of 2019 is $7.6 billion Baron Partners (BPTRX). The fund gained 149% in 2020—just a hair behind ARK Innovation's 157%—and an additional 31% in 2021, while ARK lost 23%. This year, the Baron fund has also held up better than the ARK ETF, as growth stocks have tumbled. Investors should be cautious about the Baron fund, however: Most of its recent gains came from just one stock, Tesla (TSLA), which accounts for 50% of its portfolio. The fund bought Tesla shares between 2014 and 2016, and instead of selling to keep its weighting in check as the stock rose exponentially, the fund let it run.”
(I guess it depends on your definition of “fund”.)
Excerpted from Barron’s (print edition) February 14, 2022

QREARX surprised its skeptics. Its best description is private-equity real estate. Its NAV declined less than 2% in 2020 and then started its strong move up. The feared collapse in top tier real-estate never happened. Some rents/leases were delayed under government mortgage forbearance program but values held. QREARX has a mix including offices (weak), malls (weak), apartments (v strong), industrial properties (strong) and the overall portfolio held well. It also made some minor adjustments in its portfolio. There were many discussions on M* TIAA forum, several posters got out in early'-2020, but then several got back in late-2020. Its annual 2021 10-K is due in 2-3 weeks and, for those interested, I track them at LINK.

Who said anything about civil war? You are are surely aware of the chaos in Canada’s capital Ottawa and at the U.S. Canadian border crossings at Detroit and Port Huron, Mi.? There’s already a severe shortage of trucks and drivers which is affecting the U.S. / North American economy. One hardly needs to produce links to document that ongoing issue.
Here’s the story I was referencing: https://www.newsweek.com/truckers-california-protest-super-bowl-over-school-mask-mandate-1677777
The USA Truck Convoy, which posts under the tag TruckersForFreedom, announced on the social media instant messaging site Telegram their intent to "shut down" the Super Bowl, moving forward with the plan after "94% from 4500 votes" in the group shared their support for the action and 10 percent said they could come.
"Everyone be ready and tell everyone about the: SUPER BOWL PROTEST! Officials will host a Super Bowl while forcing kids to mask. End the mandates! LET'S SHUT THIS THING DOWN!" a post wrote. "Shut the SUPER BOWL DOWN!!! Surround SoFi Stadium with Trucks!!!"
Pure conjecture whether this type of protest spreads or become commonplace. I sincerely regret if my comment alarmed anyone unnecessarily. Just musing. Will try to be more careful.

May be the OP can indicate what screen found it.
AUXFX is a focus fund with 101 holdings (not so focused?) but with 40% in top 10 (that is focused). AUM at $277 million remains small for an old fund (mid-1999 inception; same manager, Jeff Auxier). M* Quote page shows persistent outflows (concern?). U/D CR is so-so 81/103, so doesn't shine in downside protection. Drawdown in 2020 was bit below category and benchmark index. M* auto-rating (Q-rating) is poor (Neutral). Mentions GARP (a term from old times) in Yahoo Profile (below). Boutique firm has only 1 fund but also runs private accounts. Ed Auxier is an analyst (son? relative?) - see team link below. It is no-load/NTF at Fido and Schwab.
"The fund invests primarily in a diversified portfolio of equity securities that the adviser believes offer growth opportunities at a reasonable price. The adviser will pursue an investment blend of equity securities of growth companies and value companies. Although the fund may invest in companies of any market capitalization, the adviser intends to focus its investments in the equity securities of medium to large U.S. companies (defined by the adviser as companies with market capitalizations above $1 billion at the time of investment)."
Team at website https://auxierasset.com/managed-accounts/team/

I think standard deviation matters a great deal, in particular recent standard deviation, as recent volatility levels may persist. But looking at the numbers without further analysis is a mistake. Why did the volatility or lack-of-volatility occur, and do the same conditions that caused that exist now or are things different? The Sharpe ratio is interesting to look at in the past, but is as the article points not an indicator of the future in the aggregate. But it can provide clues to do further research. Oh, this manager has a high Sharpe/Sortino ratio and handled bad market conditions well before. What did he do to handle those bad conditions? Are the same conditions in existence today? Consider, in March of 2020 we had a pandemic crash in which the world had to switch to virtual distance employment. No surprise, tech stocks and growth funds held up well in that environment and funds with growth tilts had high Sharpe ratios coming out of that crash.. Do the same conditions for market volatility exist today? Not exactly. Inflation and interest rate worries seem to be driving volatility more. Growth stocks with high valuations don't fare well historically as rates go up.

*what else do we have to go on besides looking at past performance.

As I already stated, fees, fees, fees. That expense ratio is like a toll road and the manager is generally going to collect it no matter what. Say you have an index fund with a 0.03% expense ratio and it metaphorically is a $3 toll road you could drive on or there is another road run by a fund manager with a 1.50% expense ratio charging $150 to drive through. That other $150 toll road better be 50 times smoother, safer or faster than the $3 one or you're losing out.

@Lewis
Good callout on investor psychology around upside gains with no downside pains. This is why I prefer Sortino ratio over Sharpe ratio when evaluating fund historical performance.
While manager skin does have some signal value, the challenge here is separating the signal from the noise. I.e. A 30 year old bond fund manager having no skin is noise. I don't know how old Cathy is but if she is in 60's let's say and has no skin in ARKK that is noise too imo.

Not a critique of anybody here -
Personally, if M* says a manager invests $1M+ in a $B AUM fund, it does not impress me. More often than not a Manager's yearly compensation from the fund far exceeds their investment in the fund. (Some fund managers start a fund with $5M of their own money and I can treat that as constituting informational value.)
Mutual fund prospectus mandates are usually very broad. Even when they say small cap, they can still drift to the edge of mid cap or into micro cap.
Why some managers are found not to do a better risk management job than the rest of us? They suffer from the same human limitations as the rest of us. Moreover, obtaining knowledge and acting on it are entirely different skills.
IMO, it is better to find managers that do a better job than others. As an aside, I am willing to give managers a pass for their performance in 2020.
As an example, I would say David Giroux does a good risk management job. Of course, he has to contend with the size of PRWCX, a limitation.

Not a user of DejaOffice, but on search, Dropbox backup/restore feature was added in December 2020. https://www.dejaoffice.com/iphoneapp/notes.html