Brent futures never went negative. They are settled in cash.
WTI (light/sweet crude) futures did go negative in 2020. They are settled in physical oil. Cushing, OK ran out of storage. Buyers near the furures contract expiry were stuck with physical oil that they didn't know what to do with. Exchange wasn't monitoring positions well. New procedures should avoid repeat of that fiasco, hopefully.

On Friday May 13 ARKK rose nearly 12% bringing its YTD return to -53.9% according to Lipper. That’s still substantially worse than the -45% reported by the WSJ in this earlier excerpt. I will no longer be updating the return here as I’ve done now for several weeks. However, you can check the performance at Lipper. Thanks for reading my post.
(Extended excerpt)
Cathie Wood’s ARK Innovation exchange-traded fund keeps falling, but investors aren’t jumping ship. Shares of the popular ETF, which is known by its ticker ARKK, have declined 45% so far in 2022—including 21% in April alone—as rising interest rates punish stocks that are valued on the prospect of robust future growth. Those are just the type of companies that ARKK targets through its investment theme of “disruptive innovation.”Its big holdings include Tesla Inc., Zoom Video Communications Inc., Roku Inc., Teladoc Health Inc. and Coinbase Global Inc. With the exception of Tesla, those stocks have all fallen more than 35% this year. The S&P 500 has dropped 10% over the same period, while the tech-heavy Nasdaq Composite has retreated 18%.
Ms. Wood and her fund shot to prominence in 2020, when its shares soared nearly 150% as the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates to near zero and investors loaded up on risk. The S&P 500, by comparison, rose 16% that year. Since then, it has been tough going. While the S&P 500 gained 27% in 2021, ARKK shares slumped 24%, stung as rising government bond yields prompted a flight from high-growth stocks. The downdraft has continued this year as the fund sticks to its strategy of buying and holding companies it believes offer the greatest potential for innovation. Many of them haven’t yet achieved consistent profitability. Despite the drawdown, investors haven’t fled ARKK. Instead, they have funneled more than $658 million into the fund this year, according to FactSet data through Thursday, including about $59 million in the latest week. That is even as investors yanked $2.3 billion year-to-date from the Invesco QQQ Trust, a prominent ETF tracking the Nasdaq-100 index …
From: The Wall Street Journal April 25, 2022
Article was published Monday morning. So numbers are a couple days out of date. I also wonder about the conclusion here that money hasn’t fled. My hunch is that a lot fled and a lot of new money has raced in hoping to buy near bottom. Other thoughts welcome.

If one is interested in talking about a company’s social responsibility, I would prefer it is discussed in the context of the entire industry in which it operates
If other utilities were emitting GHGs at a rate that would lead to 5°C increase in global temperatures, then would a utility emitting gasses at a rate raising temps just 4°C be a responsible company? Or if a utility operated coal plants more efficiently than others, so that it lost less money per KWh, would that be good for investors or just less bad?
But all we're talking about here are disclosure proposals. So here's a look at BH's disclosures in the context of the entire industry in which it operates.

The investor-led initiative Climate Action 100+, whose members manage more than $54 trillion in assets, has been trying to cut through companies’ greenwashing statements by demanding uniform disclosures about their decarbonization plans. The group released its first-ever scorecard of climate-related disclosures in March [2021], and many utilities performed poorly — but none so poorly as Berkshire Hathaway, which failed by every metric.

Since that was written, the March 2022 benchmark report was released. BH still failed every metric.
For completeness only, coal fired plants are today uncompetitive with newly constructed renewable power plants (from my Environmental Economics class notes yesterday, among other sources). Also, of the twenty private or investor-owned utillties generating the most electricity in the US, BH ranks in the worse half for CO₂, SO₂ NOx emitted per KWh (per MJ Bradley's latest air emission benchmark report).

@rforno Capital International Group has a 560M stake and Blackrock a 700M stake in MSTR. MSTR owns almost 1% of all available Bitcoin at a low cost basis. While I'm not a personal fan of leveraging Bitcoin to buy more Bitcoin (as they have recently in a big way), it's being done with full board approval and transparently. I don't like their debt to equity ratio.
It's a software company that generates huge cash flow that instead of placing that cash in a bank and earning negative interest, they buy Bitcoin. So far, that gamble has paid off handsomely. Free cash flow has grown dramatically in the last couple of years. The point I was trying to make is the direct correlation of MSTR to Bitcoin with lower costs.
To MSTR, Bitcoin is just a better store of value. I do own a tiny bit.
@Anna imho my answers are: No, No, Depends if you meant speculative vs. contrarian.

FD1000
+1
Is the Schmeissing just getting started?
Inquiring minds want to know...

I have a special style. You can see it (here). Since 2013, I have been practicing sell to cash at certain conditions (proprietary). Since retirement in 2018, my selling rules are tighter, I never lost more than 1% from any last top. Going to cash depends on big picture analysis + current conditions and why it's different from others. I missed all the big meltdown of Q4/2018, 03/2020 and YTD. I can be wrong, it happened twice since 2013, I was back within 3-4 days.
Remember, it's more important to miss the worse days than the best(link).
I posted several ideas YTD on other sites:
1) Best wide range category so far in 2022 is VALUE(VTV), posted in mid-January. See (chart). In my world, it means most of the stocks would be in value.
2) I'm in cash for weeks because high risk conditions were met. It's the longest I have been in cash since 2013. Based on that, I only allowed to make short-term (hours to 2-3 days) trades.

Happened upon the new quarterly letter which, inter alia, states the rather obvious:
"We’re sure you are well aware that our portfolios have not been immune to this shift in market sentiment; we have delivered the worst relative (to our benchmarks) quarterly performance in our history. We’ll address this in more detail later in this letter, but at the heart of the problem is that for the past 10 years, with the exception of a few short periods in 2015 and 2018, the market has rewarded Growth Assets with ever expanding valuations. By November 2021, valuations for Growth Assets had become extremely stretched across most markets. For most of the Grandeur Peak portfolios, this ballooning of valuation was a key driver of our strong outperformance in 2020 and 2021. But now the pendulum is swinging back the other way. While the corrections in valuations we’re seeing across the portfolios isn’t surprising in hindsight, unfortunately we just didn’t position ourselves very well for it because the fundamentals of our underlying holdings have been so strong."

From Matt Levine's newsletter:

Twitter’s biggest shareholders, according to Bloomberg’s holders page, are the Vanguard Group, Elon Musk, Morgan Stanley, BlackRock Inc., State Street Corp., Aristotle Capital Management, Fidelity, Jack Dorsey, ClearBridge LLC and Geode Capital Management.
Tesla Inc.’s biggest shareholders are Elon Musk, Vanguard, BlackRock, Capital Group, State Street Corp., Larry Ellison, Geode and Fidelity. Tesla is a much bigger company than Twitter.
Vanguard’s Tesla stake is worth about $62.5 billion, versus about $4.5 billion for its Twitter stake. Morgan Stanley’s 8.8% stake in Twitter is worth about $3.6 billion at Musk’s deal price, versus $3.7 billion for its 0.36% stake in Tesla. It seems clear that a majority of Twitter’s stock is owned by shareholders who own more Tesla stock.

Several experienced Wellington managers retired in the last 5 years. But Wellington have deep bench where newer managers typically have more than 5 years severing as co-managers in similar funds. Wellington is also advisors to Hartford funds and you can find the track record of these managers. Google their names and trace their prior track record.
I pick VGWAX since the bond manager has long track record whereas the stock manager has several years experience running two Hartford funds. The oversea exposure is limited to developed market. Through 2020 till now, the downside risk is better than average. Also I want a global allocation fund for lowering the risk.

VGWAX is a good fund which I did previously consider.
However, I have a strong preference for holding separate stock and bond funds.
I also looked at VZICX shortly after it became available.
Wellington is a great investment firm but the VZICX lead manager didn't seem
to have much relevant experience with international equities.
That was a good move reducing EM and growth in late 2020!
Unfortunately, it appears that bonds may continue to decline for a while...

My mistake, it is VGWLX, Global Wellington. A global version of Wellington.
Wellington also manages International Core Stock fund, VWICX. I reduced my EM and growth exposure in late 2020 as part of risk reduction. Now bonds are falling as well.

Interest on bonds is conceptually straightfoward, though not simple. Even though the detailed calculations can be a bit of a nightmare.
When one buys a bond from an issuer, one is buying a fixed rate of interest for the life of the bond (until maturity or call). That interest may be paid periodically or when the bond is redeemed (bought at one price and redeemed at a higher price at maturity, like a CD) or a combination of both. Regardless of the form the income takes, it is all interest and for munis, generally all tax-free.
Consider a "vanilla" muni issued with a coupon paying market rate, so the bond is priced at par. If market rates go up, the price of the bond will drop. It drops so that the net return, coupon plus "appreciation" to maturity yields the market rate of interest.
Now, instead of that discount coming from the issuer, it's coming from the market. The buyer is still buying a bond with a fixed rate of interest (combination of coupon and "appreciation"), so all the income is treated as interest, not gain. But since that extra interest comes from the secondary market seller, not from the original municipality issuer, that extra interest is taxable.
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A few numbers may help here. For clarity, I'll work with simple interest and ignore the effects of compounding. Say the market rate on 5 year munis is 4%. A muni might be issued with a 2% coupon and a price of $90.
(2% coupon + 2% price increase/year = 4% yield, give or take.)
After a year, the price has gone up to $92 and the buyer has received 2% in coupon payments. A total of 4%. The adjusted basis of the bond is $92, accounting for the accretion at 2%/year. And the buyer declares 4% in tax-free interest. This goes on for another four years until maturity. The adjusted cost basis is then $100, there is no gain upon redemption, and the buyer has declared 4% tax-free interest each year.
Suppose after a year the rate on the bond increases to 5%. That could be because market rates generally have increased, or because the particular bond had a credit event such as a technical default. It doesn't matter.
The bond is now priced at $88, so that in the four remaining years it pays
($100 - $88) + 4 x 2% coupon = $12 + $8 = $20, or 5%/year.
If the owner sells now, there will be capital loss of $4: $88 sale price - $92 adjusted basis.
The buyer of that bond is getting a bond with $8 remaining OID (adjusted basis is $92) and $4 of market discount. The seller, not the municipality, is paying that extra $4 of income. So, to maturity $8 of accretion is tax-free, $4 is taxable.
Most of these effects are the same whether held by an individual or by a mutual fund, which simply passes through the taxes. (Though as noted before, it can't pass through a capital loss, though it can carry it forward.)
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Take the same example, except instead of the bond yield rising to 5% it falls to 3%. As before, this could be the result of general market rate declines or because the bond issuer is recovering from a credit event. It doesn't matter.
The bond is now priced at $96, so that in the remaining four years it pays
($100 - $96) + 4 x 2% coupon = $4 + $8 = $12, or 3%/year.
The adjusted cost basis after a year is still $92, but the buyer is paying $96. That $4 is called acquisition premium. The buyer is still paying below par; nevertheless, there's a market premium, not a market discount. This is why I was interested in seeing a specific CUSIP. One isn't necessarily buying at a market discount simply because a bond is priced below par.
In summary:

• Market discount, which is relative to the adjusted cost basis, is treated as taxable interest, generally upon sale. (Owner has option to declare annually.)
  
• OID discount is treated as tax-free interest, declared annually, and used to increase adjust cost basis (much as reinvested divs change the cost basis of your mutual fund).
  
• Market premium (price in excess of adjusted cost basis) for munis must be amortized; it reduces the annual amount of tax free interest declared and also reduces the adjusted cost basis.
  
• Sale of a bond may be above or below the adjusted cost basis, resulting in a capital gain or loss.

All the examples above use simple interest. The actual calculations are significantly more complex. I've also disregarded de minimis treatment of market discount.

We need to be precise here. In considering "appreciation coming out of a credit event", ISTM your focus is on the change in market discount due to something other than accretion. Bond or bond fund, no difference, that's a cap gain (or loss) either way.
In muni funds at least, one will rarely have imputed interest, because muni funds are managed so as not to distribute taxable income:

[M]any mutual fund companies, which control around one third of investments in municipal bonds, deliberately avoid market discount transactions even though purchasing these bonds would be good deals for their investors. Many investors in municipal mutual funds place their money with these funds expecting to receive distributions entirely exempt from tax, or perhaps expecting to pay capital gains tax, which may be evidence of superior bond picking ability by the mutual fund manager.

Ang, Bhansali, and Xing, Taxes on Tax-Exempt Bonds, Sept 10, 2008.
https://www.ruf.rice.edu/~yxing/muni.pdf
I suspect that at best one may find a footnote in an annual report but nothing quantified, e.g.

Amortization of premium and accretion of discount on debt securities are included in interest income.

Note 1(h) to Financial Statements, Franklin Mutual Shares Annual Report and Shareholder Letter, Dec 31, 2021.
https://www.franklintempleton.com/forms-literature/download/474-A
N.B. This footnote includes premiums, so we're talking about more than OID. It also includes market discounts/premiums.

Thanks, msf. May be I should have elaborated in my previous post - my focus was on market discount. In your example, instead of the bond, if I buy a representative bond fund, when I sell the bond fund, would not I recognize the $2 also as a cap gain? For example, if I bought ARTFX, instead of the underlying bonds, ARTFX passes through the coupon (minus expenses), and when I sell ARTFX, I recognize cap gains for all the appreciation coming out of a credit event - there is no imputed interest income in excess of the coupon (minus expenses) I have ever seen a bond fund report. Now, if the same applies to a Treasury bond versus a Treasury bond fund, the results are even more skewed, as the narrowing of a market discount is strictly due to change in interest rates.
On your comment of short term cap gains being passed through as ordinary income, I think a lot of investors do not pay attention to the consequences of that recharacterization but they can be real.

It is initially the Zeo employees, not the management firm (Zeo Capital Advisers) and not the funds that are moving to Osterweis Capital Management (OCM).
According to the prospectus supplement, the funds have reached a short term (150 day) agreement that OCM will serve as investment adviser, and that the same people will continue to manage the funds through their new employer. "The terms of the Interim Agreement are identical in all material respects to those of the Previous Advisory Agreement."
There is one immediate change to the fees:
"Also, effective May 1, 2022, the Funds will be discontinuing the redemption fee on Fund shares redeemed within 30 days of purchase."
The funds remain series of Northern Lights Trust, the board of directors does not change. That should change in the fall, when the funds themselves are acquired by Osterweis.
Prospectus supplement:
https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/Archives/edgar/data/1314414/000158064222002125/zeofunds497.htm

April 23, 2022

What do you do when your flagship fund goes from the top of its class to close to the bottom in a matter of weeks? From market trouncing to market lagging? That is the challenge facing this week’s guest.
Alex Umansky, Portfolio Manager of the Baron Global Advantage Fund which he launched at the firm of legendary growth manager Ron Baron in 2012. Umansky oversees about $2.4 billion dollars in assets at Baron Capital including $1.7 billion at his flagship Baron Global Advantage Fund.
However, in mid-November of 2021, the bottom fell out for the majority of its holdings. Global Advantage went from a 20% plus gain to a less than one percent gain by year-end, while its benchmark and competition fared much better. So far this year the fund is down 33% and lagging badly.
In a wide-ranging discussion, Umansky discusses what’s changed and what in his mind hasn’t, which is why he is doubling down on some of his hardest-hit holdings and is convinced they will be long-term winners.

It is interesting that all market discount is treated as ordinary income (ignoring timing or deminimus amount).
Gains in excess of imputed interest (typically using constant yield to maturity) are taxed as cap gains. For example, suppose a bond is purchased at $90 with a 2% yield (disregarding coupons), and it is sold a year later for $92. 2% x $90 = $1.80, so the extra 20¢ appreciation is taxed as a capital gain.
Mutual funds are pass through entities. Broadly speaking, you get taxed as if you owned the securities. (There are some special case pass-through rules for funds, such as passing short term gains through as ordinary income.)

Thanks, msf. It is interesting that all market discount is treated as ordinary income (ignoring timing or deminimus amount). I guess US Govt wants to treat all return on principal of a fixed income instrument as ordinary income. But gains on fixed income funds are properly treated as cap gains. Seems like coming out of a credit event, one is better off buying a fund rather than individual bonds if buying in a taxable account.

@AndyJ, Yes, it is not so convenient to find the auto invest info if you do not already own the fund. River Canyon fund does not participate. I have been buying 2 Yr & 3 mo Treasuries. I am not buying them for cap gains but for yield while waiting for MM rates to go up or deploy into spread products.

Close below 33,000 on monthly chart would spell trouble: Chris Kimble
The stock market's Friday plunge will have market bulls looking for the Dow Jones Industrial Average to hold important support tied to the market's gyrations all the way back to the 2007-09 financial crisis, technical analyst Chris Kimble said on Friday.
https://www.google.com/amp/s/www.marketwatch.com/amp/story/a-dow-close-below-33-000-would-spell-bad-news-for-stock-market-bulls-chart-watcher-11650651066
How low can you go?!
I keep buying slowly cautiously
Acct -9.7%% now . all gains previously subsiding
Maybe starting nosedive
Feds /inflation/ stagnation growth expects Ukraine....c19...too many hits for stocks to take to recover?
Maybe dji 27k by mid end summer

This should improve availability of Price funds at Schwab. But PRWCX and its classes remain open only to existing customers.
https://riabiz.com/a/2022/4/19/t-rowe-price-gains-house-brand-level-status-on-schwabs-active-fund-platform-and-will-pay-up-to-10-million-yearly-for-the-honor-but-the-deal-is-not-without-potential-conflicts-of-interest