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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Short Term High Yield vs. CDs vs. Treasuries vs. I-Bonds
    Large brokerages such as Fidelity offers one-yr non-callable brokered CDs yielding 4.85%. ... Bank CDs are not competitive for my $
    Depends on the month and the bank.
    Capital One - 5.00% 11 mo online CD
    Ally Bank - 5.00% 18 mo online CD
    BMO Harris Bank - 5.00% 12 mo online CD (rate depends on zip code)
    Perhaps "you should have a Harris Banker" (pre BMO acquisition)
  • Funds from Barron's, 2/20/23
    I’ll just note that (bullish) Gibson Smith manages a bond fund. :)
    Thanks Yogi. An interesting write-up. These rankings do wax and wane from year to year. Some like American (Capital Group), however, seem to defy gravity and receive top mention regularly ISTM.
  • Nope to the NOPE ETF
    @yogibearbull An "absolute return strategy" is a generic term that means trying not to lose money rather than beat a benchmark, so it can come in many forms, including strategies that don't use any hedging like short bets or derivatives. A manager can seek absolute returns by holding cash for instance when he/she doesn't see any attractive buying opportunities. Also, long-short and even market-neutral funds come in many forms. So, I wouldn't rule the strategies out completely. What I will say is that managers very often overcharge for these strategies, and that, ironically, sometimes leads to excessive risk taking to overcome high fee hurdles. One form that risk taking takes is excessive leverage, which has burned many, even talented managers, in the past. See Long-Term Capital.
  • Nope to the NOPE ETF
    I bet the Noble Absolute Return ETF's adviser is regretting this ETF's "NOPE" ticker symbol. According to the fund's web site--https://noble-funds.com/--it's: "An ETF built on the philosophy of saying NOPE to passive investing, NOPE to ignoring valuations, and NOPE to asset bubbles." The ETF has declined 63% so far in 2023: https://morningstar.com/etfs/arcx/nope/performance At first, before I saw the performance, I was intrigued by the strategy, and the fund's manager, but it's hard to imagine as experienced a manager going as wrong as this one:
    Mr. Noble is the Founder and Managing Member of Noble-Impact Capital, LLC, an investment advisor and sub-advisor for the Noble Absolute Return ETF.
    Prior to forming Noble-Impact Capital, Mr. Noble spent more than 40 years managing institutional investment portfolios.
    He began his career at Fidelity Investments in 1981, working closely with legendary fund manager Peter Lynch before becoming the initial portfolio manager of Fidelity’s international equity fund earning a top ranking spanning six years. Mr. Noble then went on to manage two separate hedge funds, each of which grew to more than $1 billion in assets.
    I sometimes think if you give an active manager too much freedom, they have just enough gunpowder to blow themselves and their shareholders to Kingdom Come. This is especially so if they have no one sitting in the board room to contradict them and say, "Wait a minute, are you sure that's a good idea?" The worst part is absolute return funds are supposed to be conservative in most cases, to generate positive returns in all market environments. Nope, not this one.
  • Vanguard ETFs
    The article singles VEDTX out for having a large cap gains distribution. Modest cap gains distributions are not all that unusual. Here's a piece on Vanguard's 2012 ETF distributions, reporting that all but one of Vanguard's bond ETFs distributed cap gains that year.
    https://www.etf.com/sections/features/15419-vanguard-sets-cap-gains-on-12-bond-etfs-.html
    It goes on to describe conditions in 2012 that led to bond ETF distributions, viz. "a post-crisis environment that has seen investors pile into fixed income in one-way traffic that has limited many managers’ ability to offset cap gains through sales of available low-cost-basis securities at the portfolio level." A storm perhaps, but apparently not, according to the M* piece you linked to, a perfect storm ("Such events have not occurred since [2009].")
    The 2012 "imperfect" storm affected pure bond ETFs as well as Vanguard's hybrids.
    Most recently, even Vanguard's broadest based bond fund, BND, had cap gains distributions in 2021 (Q2 and Q4) and 2022 (Q2).
    https://digital.fidelity.com/prgw/digital/research/quote/dashboard/distributions-expenses?symbol=BND
    Or take BNDX. In 2021, it had not only long term gains but short term gains.
    https://infomemo.theocc.com/infomemos?number=49817
    https://digital.fidelity.com/prgw/digital/research/quote/dashboard/distributions-expenses?symbol=BNDX
  • Blackstone Child Labor in Slaughterhouses and Low-Road Capitalism 2
    @larryB In aggregate, Wall Street doesn't care. Individual ESG managers do care, much like individuals of conscience throughout the world care about issues most overlook. It is also worth noting that deeply flawed though they may be, ESG ratings services do not rate either Blackstone or Norfolk Southern highly:
    https://morningstar.com/stocks/xnys/bx/sustainability
    https://morningstar.com/stocks/xnys/nsc/sustainability
    The answer to these problems I would say in the investment world is true stakeholder capitalism, a term that has become anathema to the right-wing: https://investopedia.com/stakeholder-capitalism-4774323
    Are there money managers who truly care about stakeholder capitalism? There are some. Most, though, merely play lip service to the idea. I would say one of the best fund shops that considers other stakeholders is Green Century Funds, especially when it comes to environmental issues:
    https://greencentury.com/about-us/
    Support of Environmental and Public Health Nonprofits: One hundred percent (100%) of the profits earned managing the Green Century Funds belong to our non-profit owners who run critical environmental and public health campaigns.
    The organizations which founded and own Green Century Capital Management Inc are: California Public Interest Research Group (CALPIRG), Citizen Lobby of New Jersey (NJPIRG), Colorado Public Interest Research Group (COPIRG), ConnPIRG Citizen Lobby, Fund for the Public Interest, Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (MASSPIRG), MOPIRG Citizen Organization, PIRGIM Public Interest Lobby, and Washington State Public Interest Research Group (WASHPIRG).
    We are one of the first fossil fuel free, diversified and environmentally responsible mutual funds.
    But the money management industry, especially in the U.S., has a long way to go before it takes what stakeholder capitalism means seriously. Shareholders will need to demand that it does for things to truly change. But also, there must be pressure outside the investment world on government to truly regulate business again, to give our regulators teeth, and insist they be utterly separate from industry with regard to influence.
    I would add that Teddy Roosevelt basically had the roots of stakeholder capitalism way back when he gave his State of the Union I linked previously:https://let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/theodore-roosevelt/state-of-the-union-1902.php
    We can do nothing of good in the way of regulating and supervising these corporations until we fix clearly in our minds that we are not attacking the corporations, but endeavoring to do away with any evil in them. We are not hostile to them; we are merely determined that they shall be so handled as to subserve the public good. We draw the line against misconduct, not against wealth. The capitalist who, alone or in conjunction with his fellows, performs some great industrial feat by which he wins money is a welldoer, not a wrongdoer, provided only he works in proper and legitimate lines. We wish to favor such a man when he does well. We wish to supervise and control his actions only to prevent him from doing ill.
    The notion that these companies will do what's best for society, consumers, labor and the environment, if they're unregulated is absurd to me. In reality, unregulated business isn't even just bad for labor, consumers, communities and the environment. It's bad for every stakeholder, even shareholders and capitalism itself. Unregulated businesses cut corners, do things for short-term profits and bonuses for executives at the expense of long-term shareholder value and brand value when the scandals are revealed. And CEOs are sometimes comfortable hurting every stakeholder, including investors, as well as the general public.
  • Vanguard ETFs
    Vanguard made the mistake of not licensing its "ETF class of funds" patents to anyone. By now, this idea is quite stale. Vanguard itself has launched some self-standing ETFs in the US, and in Europe, most of its ETFs are self-standing. The Australian firm Perpetual US/PGIA (not to be confused with the US PGIM) that has filed is for ACTIVE ETF classes of ACTIVE funds. Unclear if the Vanguard patent was limited to PASSIVE funds only, or whether it never bothered to do so with ACTIVE funds. Last few years have shown limitations of this idea - when there are heavy mutual fund outflows, then the related ETFs have the same CG distributions as all classes.

    @yogibearbull,
    The linked article mentions a 2009 capital gains distribution for VEDTX due to a "perfect storm."
    Which other Vanguard ETF share classes had capital gains distributions during the last few years?
  • Funds from Barron's, 2/20/23
    REVIEW. After doing well in FY 2021 (07/2020-06/2021), university ENDOWMENTS did poorly in FY 2022 (07/2021-06/2022) (but now is 02/2023! It takes that much tome to collect data from 678 institutions). Average allocations of 30% alternatives (some not marked to market, a concern) and 28% US equity meant that they outperformed the SP500. Gifts/donations remained strong.
    FUNDS. Best Fund Families are ranked based on performance in 8 fund categories and are asset-weighted.
    For 2022: 1-DFA, 2-Victory, 3-Neuberger Berman, 4-Capital Group/AF, 5-JPM,…, 18-Franklin Templeton,…, 21-Vanguard,…, 23-Pimco,…, 30-Fidelity, 31-Nuveen/TIAA,…, 36-Price.
    For 5 Years: 1-Fidelity, 2-MFS, 3-Putnam, 4-Mainstay, 5-Amundi US, 6-Pimco,…, 10-Neuberger Berman,…, 13-Capital Group/AF,. 14-JPM,…, 17-DFA, 18-Vanguard,…, 21-Price,…, 26-Victory, 30-Nuveen/TIAA,…, 41-Franklin Templeton.
    10-year rankings and rankings within the fund categories are also provided. (Too much detail to be included here, so access Barron’s online, at newsstand, or at local library)
    INCOME INVESTING. Be wary of higher-yielding EM debt, whether dollar-denominated (EMB) or in local currencies (EBND, LEMB). Many EM countries are at different stages of the rate cycle, and dollar can also have a significant impact.
    FUNDS. Gibson Smith, Smith Capital (core-plus SMTRX, etc); formerly, Janus Hendersen FI-CIO (JABAX, etc). After a disastrous 2022, BONDS in 2023 are the most attractive in a decade and may remain so for 12-24 months. Money is flowing into bond funds. The FED is near the tail end of its monetary tightening (rate hikes, QT). Remember that slowing economy or recessions are good for the bond market (true for investment-grade bonds, but not for spread products, HY, EMs, etc). He doesn’t like short-term bonds – yes, yields are attractive, but for how long? He likes IT/LT bonds and a BARBELL approach. Bond volatility will remain (Treasury MOVE 110.11). For corporates, he looks at company fundamentals first, and then invest in its bonds, investment-grade or HY. He also likes MBS and CMOs.
    (EXTRA) FUNDS. ETFs that are benefiting from higher rates include DIVO, DGRW, GCOW, LVHI, ROUS, TBF (short Treasuries).
    https://www.barrons.com/magazine?mod=BOL_TOPNAV
    https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/thread/403/barron-february-20-2023-2
  • Problems with Model Portfolios
    The problem with rebalancing via selling (in a non-IRA investment portfolio) is capital gains tax and possible fees if using a brokerage. Rebalancing via buying (without any selling) requires available money. Some planning, arithmetic and guessing is required.
  • Intl vs Domestic, Stocks vs Bonds: Barbara Reinhard, Voya Mgmt Head of Allocations
    one of the interesting points she mentioned re international funds...they make their gains rather quickly, and then always proceed to give them back. I had never read nor considered that before. I wonder is that is a phenomena of recent origin?
  • (JPM) Kolanovic: overweight bonds... and...
    “We think that one should be using the ytd gains to cut equity allocations, and to reduce portfolio beta,” Kolanovic wrote. “We believe international equities (China/EM, Japan and Europe) offer better risk-reward than US equities.”
    https://finance.yahoo.com/news/jpmorgan-kolanovic-urges-investors-ditch-202155191.html
  • Driehaus Global Fund in registration
    @BenWP
    You are correct. From the filing:
    Driehaus Global Fund (formerly, Driehaus Emerging Markets Opportunities Fund) (the “Fund”) seeks to maximize capital appreciation.
    I am disappointed as I own the Emerging Markets Opportunities Fund.
  • Day Hagan Smart Value Fund to liquidate
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1355064/000158064223000908/dayhagen_497.htm
    Day Hagan Smart Value Fund
    Class A: DHQAX Class C: DHQCX Class I: DHQIX
    (the “Fund”)
    Supplement dated February 15, 2023 to the Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information, each dated November 1, 2022.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    The Board of Trustees of Mutual Fund Series Trust has concluded that it is in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund cease operations. The Board has determined to close the Fund and redeem all outstanding shares on March 17, 2023 (“Liquidation Date”).
    Effective immediately, the Fund will not accept any new investments and may no longer pursue its stated investment objective. The Fund will begin liquidating its portfolio and will invest in cash equivalents until all shares have been redeemed. Any capital gains will be distributed as soon as practicable to shareholders and reinvested in additional shares, unless you have previously requested payment in cash. Shares of the Fund are otherwise not available for purchase.
    ANY SHAREHOLDERS WHO HAVE NOT REDEEMED OR EXCHANGED THEIR SHARES OF THE FUND PRIOR TO MARCH 17, 2023, WILL HAVE THEIR SHARES AUTOMATICALLY REDEEMED AS OF THAT DATE, AND PROCEEDS WILL BE SENT TO THE ADDRESS OR ACCOUNT OF RECORD. If you have questions or need assistance, please contact the Fund at 1-877-329-4246 (877-DAY-HAGN).
    IMPORTANT INFORMATION FOR RETIREMENT PLAN INVESTORS
    If you are a retirement plan investor, you should consult your tax advisor regarding the consequences of a redemption of Fund shares. If you receive a distribution from an Individual Retirement Account or a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA, you must roll the proceeds into another Individual Retirement Account within sixty (60) days of the date of the distribution in order to avoid having to include the distribution in your taxable income for the year. If you receive a distribution from a 403(b)(7) Custodian Account (Tax-Sheltered account) or a Keogh Account, you must roll the distribution into a similar type of retirement plan within sixty (60) days in order to avoid disqualification of your plan and the severe tax consequences that it can bring. If you are the trustee of a Qualified Retirement Plan, you may reinvest the money in any way permitted by the plan and trust agreement.
    You should read this Supplement in conjunction with the Prospectus, any Summary Prospectus and the Statement of Additional Information for the Fund, each dated November 1, 2022, which provide information that you should know about the Fund before investing. These documents are available upon request and without charge by calling the Fund toll-free at 1-877-329-4246 (877-DAY-HAGN) or by writing to 4221 North 203rd Street, Suite 100, Elkhorn, Nebraska 68022.
    Please retain this Supplement for future reference.
  • What to do?
    @davidrmoran: I don't know what happened to DEESX, either. I see from the charts that it reached its nadir on 3/22/2020, having fallen some 7 percentage points more than FXAIX at that point. It never really caught up and I can't devise a chart that shows it outperforming FXAIX. Maybe at exactly 9.5 years, as you say. I wrongly assumed as a shareholder of DSEEX that the bonds would serve as ballast in a down market; it seems the opposite was true and that the "secret bond sauce" appeared to accelerate the move downward. I was a CAPE fan and said so on MFO. I sold, disillusioned. Fortunately, MOAT has proven itself over the long haul. I've traded it, but have never been out. MOTI and SMOT, which adopt a similar "moat" methodology, have been welcome additions in recent months.
  • Sunbridge Capital Emerging Markets Fund has been liquidated
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1587982/000139834423000515/fp0081452-1_497.htm
    Sunbridge Capital Emerging Markets Fund
    Institutional Class (Ticker Symbol: RIMIX)
    A series of Investment Managers Series Trust II (the "Trust")
    Supplement dated January 10, 2023 to the currently effective
    Prospectus, Summary Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI").
    The Board of Trustees of the Trust has approved a Plan of Liquidation for the Sunbridge Capital Emerging Markets Fund (the "Fund"). The Plan of Liquidation authorizes the termination, liquidation and dissolution of the Fund. In order to perform such liquidation, effective immediately the Fund is closed to all new investment.
    The Fund will be liquidated on or about February 10, 2023 (the "Liquidation Date"), and shareholders may redeem their shares until the Liquidation Date. On or promptly after the Liquidation Date, the Fund will make a liquidating distribution to its remaining shareholders equal to each shareholder's proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund, in complete redemption and cancellation of the Fund's shares held by the shareholder, and the Fund will be dissolved.
    In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, Sunbridge Capital Partners LLC, the Fund's advisor, may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate its orderly liquidation, such as by raising cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
    Please contact the Fund at 1-877-771-7721 if you have any questions or need assistance.
    Please file this Supplement with your records.
    ******I had the institutional shares which were converted to the investor shares (the new institutional shares) only to have the shares liquidated.
    Share conversion filing as of 9/20/22:
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1587982/000139834422018768/fp0079714_497k.htm
  • Vanguard Alternative Strategies Fund to be liquidated
    https://corporate.vanguard.com/content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/who-we-are/pressroom/press-release-vanguard-to-streamline-fund-lineup-with-planned-merger-and-liquidation-021423.html
    or
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/313850/000168386323000713/f24245d1.htm
    497 1 f24245d1.htm ALTERNATIVE STRATEGY- LIQUIDATION 497


    Vanguard Alternative Strategies Fund
    Supplement Dated February 14, 2023, to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Dated February 25, 2022
    Important Changes to Vanguard Alternative Strategies Fund (the Fund)

    On February 14, 2023, the board of trustees of the Fund approved a proposal to liquidate and dissolve the Fund on or about April 19, 2023 (the liquidation date). In anticipation of the liquidation and dissolution, the Fund will be closed to new investors on February 14, 2023, and to new investments from existing investors on April 14, 2023.
    On the liquidation date, the Fund will redeem all of its outstanding shares at the net asset value of such shares. On the same date, all outstanding shares of the Fund will be canceled, and the Fund will cease operations as a mutual fund.
    In order to provide for an orderly liquidation and satisfy redemptions in anticipation of the liquidation, the Fund may deviate from its investment objective and strategies as the liquidation date approaches.
    Prior to the liquidation, the Fund may declare and pay its shareholders of record one or more dividends or other distributions of its investment company taxable income and may (but is not expected to) declare and pay shareholders of record one or more distributions of its net realized capital gains.
    The liquidation and dissolution are not expected to result in income tax liability for the Fund. The Fund may pay its liquidating distribution in more than one installment. Any liquidation proceeds paid to shareholders should generally be treated as received in exchange for their shares and will therefore generally give rise to a capital gain or loss, depending on their basis in the shares. Shareholders should consult their own tax advisors about any tax liability resulting from the receipt of liquidation proceeds.
  • Vanguard Managed Allocation Fund to be reorganized
    https://corporate.vanguard.com/content/corporatesite/us/en/corp/who-we-are/pressroom/press-release-vanguard-to-streamline-fund-lineup-with-planned-merger-and-liquidation-021423.html
    or
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/889519/000168386323000714/f24283d1.htm
    497 1 f24283d1.htm VANGUARD MANAGED ALLOCATION FUND MERGER
    Vanguard Managed Allocation Fund
    Supplement Dated February 14, 2023, to the Prospectus
    Reorganization of Vanguard Managed Allocation Fund into Vanguard LifeStrategy® Moderate Growth Fund
    The Board of Trustees of Vanguard Valley Forge Funds (the Trust) has approved an agreement and plan of reorganization (the Agreement) whereby Vanguard Managed Allocation Fund, a series of the Trust, would be reorganized with and into Vanguard LifeStrategy Moderate Growth Fund, a series of Vanguard STAR® Funds.
    The reorganization will consolidate the assets of the Funds and allow the Managed Allocation Fund shareholders to become shareholders of a significantly larger fund with a similar investment objective and lower expenses. The Board of the Trust along with the Board of Vanguard STAR Funds, after careful consideration, unanimously approved the Agreement, each concluding that the reorganization is in the best interests of their respective Fund and that the interests of the shareholders of each Fund will not be diluted as a result of the reorganization.
    The reorganization does not require shareholder approval and is expected to close on or about May 19, 2023. Prior to the closing, shareholders of the Managed Allocation Fund will receive a combined Information Statement/Prospectus, which will describe the reorganization, provide a description of the LifeStrategy Moderate Growth Fund, and include a comparison of the Funds. At the closing, shareholders will receive Investor Shares of the LifeStrategy Moderate Growth Fund in exchange for their Managed Allocation Fund Investor Shares, and after the closing, the Managed Allocation Fund will have no remaining assets and will be dissolved.
    The Managed Allocation Fund will restructure its portfolio in anticipation of the reorganization and is expected to deviate from its investment objective and strategies. Since the portfolio transition period may take a significant amount of time, there may be times when the Managed Allocation Fund is holding large amounts of uninvested cash. This may negatively impact the Managed Allocation Fund's performance.
    Although we anticipate that the reorganization will qualify as a tax-free reorganization under the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended, the reorganization will have tax consequences for certain shareholders. It is expected that approximately 47% of the Managed Allocation Fund's portfolio assets will be sold in advance of the reorganization in order to align the holdings of the Managed Allocation Fund with the holdings of the LifeStrategy Moderate Growth Fund. It is also expected that the Managed Allocation Fund will experience shareholder redemptions prior to the reorganization. In addition, Vanguard Alternative Strategies Fund, an underlying fund in which the Managed Allocation Fund invests, is scheduled to liquidate on or about April 19, 2023, which will also be treated as a sale of portfolio assets by the Managed Allocation Fund.
    When the sale of portfolio assets occurs at a price in excess of the initial purchase price, the transaction results in capital gains. As a result of the expected sales of approximately 47% of the Managed Allocation Fund's assets plus the liquidation of Vanguard Alternative Strategies Fund as well as any additional sales required to satisfy shareholder redemptions, the Managed Allocation Fund is expected to realize capital gains, which must be distributed along with any undistributed net income to the then-current shareholders prior to the consummation of the reorganization. For example, if the Managed Allocation Fund had sold the approximately 47% of its portfolio assets on January 31, 2023, the Managed Allocation Fund would have realized net capital gains of approximately $75 million, representing approximately 6% of the Fund's net assets or approximately $1.00 per share. The actual pre-reorganization capital gain distribution could be lower or higher and, while unlikely, could be substantially higher than such amount. For comparison, the Managed Allocation Fund's capital gains distributions have historically ranged from 0%-6.2% of NAV. The final distribution amount will be dependent on certain factors, including market performance and shareholder redemption activity. Gain distributions will be taxable to shareholders who hold their shares in taxable accounts.
    Shareholders should contact their tax advisors concerning the tax consequences of the reorganization and evaluate their individual cost basis and any potential tax liability resulting from investment decisions related to the reorganization, including redeeming their Managed Allocation Fund shares or exchanging them for shares of another fund prior to the consummation of the reorganization.
    Closed to New Accounts
    Effective immediately, the Managed Allocation Fund is closed to new accounts, and it will stop accepting purchase requests from existing accounts shortly before the reorganization.
    © 2023 The Vanguard Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
    PS 1498B 022023
    Vanguard Marketing Corporation, Distributor....
  • What to do?
    Some things can appear so obvious that they become difficult to explain, yet be so unclear to others. I watched an economics teacher struggle to explain something having to do with averages, I forget what. As a 3rd party observer, these different perspectives were visible to me. Perhaps what is happening here is like that and I'm not explaining things well.
    I wrote: there's a tendency for people to look at "what have you done for me lately" even when trying not to - sometimes it's baked into the numbers.
    Here's a paragraph from CBS News describing how "what have you done for me lately" is baked into M*'s ratings. On the surface, it looks like M* is biasing its ratings toward long term performance, because it weights 10 year performance at 50%, while weighting 5 year performance at 30%, and 3 year performance at just 20%. But something else is going on.
    Obviously, the past three years account for 30 percent of the past ten years, which means that they account for 15 percent of the overall rating (30 percent X 50 percent). They account for 18 percent of the five-year rating (60 percent X 30 percent); and 100 percent of the three-year rating. Sum them all up, and we find that the past three years account for 53 percent of a fund's overall long-term rating.
    https://www.cbsnews.com/news/whats-right-and-whats-wrong-with-morningstar-fund-ratings/
    There's a similar problem in looking at good 1/3/5/10 year figures and concluding that performance is somewhat uniformly good, especially over longer terms. The final year's performance is influencing (I would say skewing) all the numbers. We saw this effect clearly (though with respect to bad, not good, performance) in figures published after March 2020. Suddenly good (and not so good) funds looked terrible, even long term.
    Now I'm not expecting another once in a century pandemic anytime soon, nor do I think that nothing has been done to make economies more robust. So I'm inclined to discount (but not ignore) 2020 figures to the extent that they distort averages.
  • What to do?
    Mama largest holders are:
    * fidelity 2015 tdf FFVFX (bulk of her holdings)
    *Dodge cox and balance
    *Fidelity contrafund FCNTX
    *tlt and shy
    *Lots Corp/ private Bond %large companies ytm ~5 6%, Ave ytm 5 YRS.
    Portfolio moves upward like turtle since xmas but did not loose much last yr (-12%), think 5 7% from all time high
    Capital preservations are keys. She is happy w fixed 3 5% annually returns
    For mine very aggressive 15% in tsla + growth stocks
    * 35% in sp500 (spy spxl)
    *30s% in mid caps + small caps ( vo vong Tna soxl tqqq )
    *10% in overseas etf indexes (yinn FXI veu)
    *15% in private Corp Bonds.
    Few % in speculative plays and btc ethe silver 3xgold etf tmf labu Tsll Fngu + smallcaps plays VRM nvta bbig, ~3% daily tradings (short term p&l was up 33% last wk but now only +13%)
    Use 12% of margin powers for CSP
    Lots leap call or monthly cover calls contracts for Tsla bros nvda snow Rivn amaz goog brk.b O. Sold lots bonds last 6 months cover csp and assignments
    Mine overall portfolio is 10% down from all time high since dca aggressively past 6 wks
    I am happy w yearly 5 7%% returns but hard to say
    Hope bottoms don't fall out under
    PLS do critique thankyou
  • What to do?
    You're proving my point - it's all about "what have you done lately".
    Had you looked at the same figures at another point in time, say on SCHD's 10 year anniversary (10/31/2021), SCHD's cumulative performance would have underwhelmed:
    10 year: 309.10% vs 348.91% (FXAIX)
    5 year: 118.00% vs. 137.75%
    3 year: 71.20% vs. 79.20%
    1 year: 44.08% vs. 42.89%
    The fairly recent outperformance should be obvious from my table showing SCHD outperforming FXAIX by a cumulative 20% over the three past calendar years (2020-2022).
    Do you give any consideration to "regression to the mean"? The same table shows FXAIX outperforming SCHD by as much as 10% cumulative in other three year periods. With actively managed funds, there's a lot that can change. But with index funds, a "true buy & hold type" is going to need more than a one year anomaly to "sell & trade":
    2023 YTD: 1.67% (SCHD) vs. 6.71% (FXAIX)
    2022: -3.23% vs. -18.13% <-- 15% spread
    2021: 29.87% vs. 28.69%
    2020: 15.08% vs. 18.40%
    2019: 27.28% vs. 31.47%
    What's the theory for buying SCHD? That any time the market goes down, SCHD will win big? Or that we can expect, or at least hope for, another huge year (relatively speaking) for SCHD in the future? One that will make up for its typical slightly underperforming years?
    At least we can dispense with the former idea - that SCHD outperforms in down markets.
    2018: -5.56% (SCHD), -4.40% (FXAIX)
    2015: -0.31% (SCHD) vs. 1.38% (FXAIX)
    interestingly, FXAIX/IVV is on the honor roll too, and not SCHD
    This is a good example of why I continue to urge people to understand numbers, not just quote them. Honor roll status is based on raw performance relative to category, i.e. top quintile over 1,3,5 year spans. Immediately we see one potential issue - these are funds in different categories.
    At least as important is the fact that FXIAX's performance is being compared with that of (only) other S&P 500 funds. With a 2 basis point ER, it's a sure bet that FXIAX will always be in the top quintile of its narrow category of peers. Instant honor roll.
    SCHD is in Lipper's Equity Income category - a broad category, and SCHD doesn't always come out in the top 20%.
    The fact that FXAIX is a LC Blend fund (M* terminology) while SCHD is LCV goes far to explaining the 2022 split in relative performance. Value simply had a once in a generation (relative) banner year: VVIAX lost 2.08%, while VFIAX lost 18.15%. This 2σ+ fluke is hardly suggestive of future outperformance.
    To reiterate, SCHD is a fine fund. But a better long term fund? I wouldn't place heavy bets on one style of investing - value or otherwise. Sure, use SCHD, but then counter balance it.