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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Vanguard Said to Shutter Business in China, Exit Ant Venture
    Excerpt from Bloomberg,
    A complete retreat would follow Vanguard’s surprise move two years ago to scrap plans for a mutual-fund management license in China to focus on the BangNiTou tie-up with Ant that was launched in 2020.
    Fidelity and Neuberger Berman Group have recently joined BlackRock in launching onshore funds through new wholly-owned units, while Manulife Financial Corp., JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Morgan Stanley have gained approvals to buy out local partners to gain full control of existing ventures.
    The race for fund advisory is heating up with more players coming in, hurting profitability. Vanguard’s venture, which has been offering only products from competitors, booked a loss in 2021 that was much higher than an internal forecast made after it was set up in 2019, Bloomberg reported last year. Vanguard owns 49% of it.
    https://bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-03-21/vanguard-plans-to-shutter-business-in-china-exit-ant-jv?srnd=premium-europe&leadSource=uverify%20wall
  • Janet Yellen to Reassure Bankers
    NO BANK is totally immune to a run in deposits. It's simply the innate nature of the beast. It's a bug, not a feature, and this is not a secret.
    From Matt Levine, in his Bloomberg Money Stuff column:

    Banking is a confidence trick. You put money in the bank today because you are confident you can take it out tomorrow; to you, a dollar that you have deposited in the bank is just as good — just as much money — as a dollar bill in your wallet. If you show up at the ATM at any time of day or night, you expect it to give you your dollars.
    But the bank doesn’t just put your dollars in a box and wait for you to take them out; the bank uses its depositors’ money to make loans or buy bonds, and just keeps a little bit around for people who need cash. If everyone asked for their money back tomorrow, the bank wouldn’t have it.
    But everyone is confident that, if they ask for their money back tomorrow, the bank will have it. So they mostly don’t ask for it, so when they do, the bank does have it. The widespread belief that banks have the money is what makes it true.
    This is obvious stuff. Also obvious, and famous, is that it is an unstable equilibrium. If people stop believing it, it stops being true. If everyone stops believing in a bank, they will all rush to get their money out, and the bank won’t have it, and their lack of belief will be retrospectively justified. Whereas if they had kept believing, their belief would also have been justified.
    Isn’t this ridiculous? But there is a deep social purpose to the confidence trick. Banking is a way for people collectively to make long-term, risky bets without noticing them, a way to pool risks so that everyone is safer and better-off.
    You and I put our money in the bank because it is “money in the bank,” it is very safe, and we can use it tomorrow to pay rent or buy a sandwich. And then the bank goes around making 30-year fixed-rate mortgage loans: Homeowners could never borrow money from me for 30 years, because I might need the money for a sandwich tomorrow, but they can borrow from us collectively because the bank has diversified that liquidity risk among lots of depositors.
    Or the bank makes small-business loans to businesses that might go bankrupt: Those businesses could never borrow from me, because I need the money and don’t want to take the risk of losing it, but they can borrow from us collectively because the bank has diversified that credit risk among lots of depositors and also lots of borrowers.
    But the basic problem remains: the confidence trick, where trust in banks makes them trustworthy and distrust in banks makes them fail.
    Bankers and bank regulators tend not to talk in these terms... because talking about it ruins the magic. But they know it in their bones; at a deep level they understand that preserving that confidence is their most important job.
    More specifically they know that if there is a run on a bank, and that bank goes bust and doesn’t pay depositors, then there will be a run on other banks. And they know that the run can start with a bank that is bad, that is undercapitalized and made poor decisions and in some sense deserves to fail, but that it can spread to other banks that are good.
    And they know that “good” and “bad” are not really the things that matter: What makes a bank good is not just its capital ratios and liquidity position but also confidence, and however good the ratios it is hard for a bank to survive a loss of confidence. They know that they are all interconnected, that they are players in an essentially social game, and that the goal of the game is not to win but to keep playing.
    The above are edited excerpts from Matt Levine's Money Stuff column of March 17, 2023. Text emphasis has been added.
  • Don't believe --- Bruce Fund
    From @NumbersGal linked article:
    Bruce Fund (BRUFX)
    Inception date: 3/20/1968
    Capital gain in 2022: 58.7%
    This fund invests in domestic stocks and bonds, along with zero-coupon government bonds. It currently has about $505 million in assets, and its price declined 20% last year. With a current NAV of $520, an investor with 10 shares worth would have a capital gains bill of about $3,100 to then pay taxes on.
    Per M*:
    BRUFX had a loss of (8.76%) while the Category average was a loss of (14.96%).
    NAV can be impacted by distributions. BRUFX distributed both LT gains and a dividend but $3100 on 10 shares? This article seems a bit off. More Like $1000 on 10 shares. Maybe the author is a ChatGPT 'bot?
    Interestingly, the last time BRUFX had an NAV of $520 (aside from the COVID hiccup) was 2/4/2019. Yesterday its NAV was $520, but had you owed the fund over that time period you would have gained almost 35%. I personally own this fund in an HSA so I pay no taxes on these gains.
    image
    BRUFX, long term, has been berry berry good to me.
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  • Don't believe --- Bruce Fund
    A new article at https://www.fa-mag.com/news/you-re-facing-a-big-tax-bill-if-you-hold-these-mutual-funds-72481.html, which claims the data is from Bloomberg and Morningstar, alleges that the Bruce fund had a 58.70% capital gains distribution in 2022 ---- in fact it was $58.70
  • PIMCO and Invesco Among Biggest Losers in Credit Suisse AT1 Bond Write Down
    Swiss regulator FINMA declared a credit-event during the negotiations to trigger default of AT1/CoCo (contingent-convertible) bonds that are AHEAD of common stock in the capital structure. The rescue left some residual equity.
    That of course, caused a selloff in ALL CoCo bonds in Europe.
    The EU - ECB, SRB, EBA issued statements that what happened in Switzerland CANNOT happen in the EU (meaning that in the EU, the equity must be wiped out first, and then only the AT1/CoCo bonds). The BOE also issued a similar statement for the UK. But damage has been done to this CoCo class of bonds.
    Jeffery Gundlach of DoubleLine wasn't into these bonds and tweeted LINK (with great hindsight):
    "Jeffrey Gundlach
    @TruthGundlach
    ·
    Mar 19
    Bloomberg reports the gunslingers who foolishly kept holding Credit Suisse’s bail-in bonds are angry they are being wiped out. Seriously? Put on your big boy pants and look in the mirror. That’s where the “blame” lies. Learn how to manage risk!"
  • Clough Global Long/Short Fund to liquidate
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1638872/000139834423006380/fp0082174-7_497.htm
    497 1 fp0082174-7_497.htm
    CLOUGH FUNDS TRUST
    Supplement dated March 20, 2023
    to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information, each dated
    February 28, 2023
    On March 16, 2023, the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of the Clough Funds Trust (the “Trust”), based upon the recommendation of Clough Capital Partners L.P. (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser to the Clough Global Long/Short Fund (the “Fund”), a series of the Trust, approved a Plan of Liquidation for the Fund (the “Plan”). Effective as of the close of business on March 20, 2023, the Fund will cease selling shares and the Adviser will begin the process of liquidating the Fund’s investments under the terms of the Plan. The Adviser anticipates that the assets of the Fund will be fully liquidated and all outstanding shares redeemed on or about April 24, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”).
    Pursuant to the Plan, the Fund will liquidate its investments and thereafter redeem all of its outstanding shares by distribution of its assets to shareholders in amounts equal to the net asset value of each shareholder’s Fund investment after the Fund has paid or provided for all of its charges, taxes, expenses and liabilities. Although the Fund will be closed to new purchases, you may continue to redeem your shares, including reinvested distributions, as provided in the section of the Prospectus entitled “Buying and Redeeming Shares.” The Liquidation date may be changed without notice to shareholders, as the liquidation of the Fund’s assets or winding up of the Fund’s affairs may take longer than expected. Any shareholders who have not redeemed their shares of the Fund prior to the Liquidation Date will have their shares redeemed automatically as of the close of business on the Liquidation Date.
    As a result of the anticipated liquidation of the Fund, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies and will no longer pursue its stated investment objective. The Fund will begin liquidating its portfolio and will hold cash and cash equivalents, such as money market funds, until all investments have been converted to cash and all shares have been redeemed. During this period, your investment in the Fund may not experience the gains (or losses) that would be typical if the Fund were still pursuing its investment objective.
    As is the case with any redemption of fund shares, these liquidation proceeds will generally be subject to federal and, as applicable, state and local income taxes if the redeemed shares are held in a taxable account and the liquidation proceeds exceed your adjusted basis in the shares redeemed. If the redeemed shares are held in a qualified retirement account such as an IRA, the liquidation proceeds may not be subject to current income taxation under certain conditions. You should consult with your tax adviser for further information regarding the federal, state and/or local income tax consequences of this liquidation that are relevant to your specific situation.
    All expenses incurred in connection with the transactions contemplated by the Plan, other than the brokerage commissions associated with the sale of portfolio securities, will be paid by the Adviser.
    Please retain this supplement with your Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
    Statement of Additional Information.
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    From John Authers' Points of Return newsletter today:
    “'Additional Tier 1' capital was a category introduced under the Basel III banking accords that followed the GFC, with the intention of providing banks with more security.
    Holders of the bonds were to be behind other creditors in the event of problems.
    In the first big test of just how far behind they are, we now know that AT1 bondholders
    come behind even shareholders."

    "Credit Suisse’s roughly 16 billion Swiss francs ($17.3 billion) worth of risky notes are now worthless.
    The deal will trigger a complete writedown of these bonds to increase the new bank’s core capital — meaning that these creditors have had a worse deal than shareholders, who at least now have some stock in UBS."

    "This follows the logic of the post-crisis approach, and it limits moral hazard.
    The question is whether anyone will want to hold AT1 bonds after this.
    The market response will be fascinating, and it remains possible that the regulators
    have avoided repeating one mistake only to make a new one."
  • Warren Buffett talking to Biden administration on banking crisis
    Morningstar’s take on Buffet potential help with the regional banks.
    Any Berkshire Action Would Like Be Capital Injection, Not Acquisition
    With all of that in mind, we would expect any action on the part of Berkshire-Buffett in the near term, with regards to the U.S. regional banks, to involve the same kind of capital injection (and Buffett seal of approval). This would be in exchange for high-coupon preferred stock (which is more tax efficient for an insurer) and warrants to buy common stock if anything happens at all. As such, that lifeline will not come cheap for those interested in going that route.
    What we do not expect to see is Berkshire stepping in and buying a bank. The firm has shown no interest in holding more than a 10%-15% stake in a U.S. bank primarily because ownership above that threshold comes with reporting requirements and oversight from the regulators that Berkshire is not all that interested in adhering to.
    https://morningstar.com/articles/1144873/another-banking-crisis-another-call-to-buffett
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    You may hear about the controversial wipeout of $17 billion CS AT1/CoCo bonds.
    These (AT1) bonds are contingent-convertible (CoCo) bonds common in Europe and Asia. In good times, these convert into equity. But in bad times, forced conversion can be done at loss, or the entire amount could be written down. So, they pay higher-yields. These count as Tier 1 capital.
    What confused the investors in Europe was that AT1/CoCo bonds are ABOVE the common stock in the capital structure. So, how can there be ANY equity left, but ZERO for AT1/CoCo bonds? That is where the Swiss Government stepped in - it said, "because it says so". Oops! There goes an entire bond structure (CoCo) down the tube! This category may be damaged.
    They aren't used in the US. But to count as Tier 1 in the US, a bank convertible in the US must be noncumulative.
    https://www.fidelity.com/news/article/top-news/202303191646RTRSNEWSCOMBINED_KBN2VL0GX-OUSBS_1
  • How much fear is in the air about SVB and the greater implications?

    Chyron on BBG right now: "POWELL. YELLEN SAY CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY OF US BANKS ARE STRONG"
    Shades of Sunday evenings circa 2008....
    Whether you agree with him not, Bill Fleckenstein comes up with some great captions for his daily Market Rap commentaries (subscription required).
    Friday’s caption - ”Yellen Fire in a Crowded Bank”
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    Thanks for sharing that data point @yogibearbull. Didn't realize we were that far from the lows on both bank etfs. its a good point. Its interesting that tech rallied so much last week in response to the drop in interest rates. But I really wonder whether those gains can hold when this banking crisis increases the odds of a recession.
  • How much fear is in the air about SVB and the greater implications?

    Chyron on BBG right now: "POWELL. YELLEN SAY CAPITAL AND LIQUIDITY OF US BANKS ARE STRONG"
    Shades of Sunday evenings circa 2008....
  • News: UBS to buy CS.
    I am watching both bank KBE and regional bank KRE. But their Covid 2020 lows are still -42% down from here. So, the banking selloff has been sharp but it doesn't seem to be a washout. I may not wait for -42% down, but it seems too early to bottom fish now.
  • UBS Agrees to Buy Credit Suisse for More Than $3 Billion
    @LewisBraham, when Dutch giant ING got into trouble during the GFC 2008-09 and had to be rescued by the Dutch government, one condition was to refocus on core businesses. It ended up divesting its US operations (noncore):
    ING insurance and asset management businesses (US) went to Yoya Financial/VOYA.
    ING Direct (US online bank, that itself had origin in the failed online NetBank in GA) went to Capital One/COF. Unluckily or luckily, I stayed through all these transitions after my early find years ago that NetBank offered FREE wire transfers - that didn't last long!
    We don't know all details of the UBS takeover of CS, but there may be similar conditions by the government or by UBS. CS in the US already had a lot of controversial M&A history - First Boston, Warburg Pincus (asset management unit), Donaldson Lufkin Jenerette.
    https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Credit_Suisse
  • UBS Agrees to Buy Credit Suisse for More Than $3 Billion
    "has agreed"... (as in "an offer that cannot be refused")
    Credit Suisse, the battered Swiss banking giant, has agreed to a takeover by Switzerland’s largest bank, UBS — a move aimed at staving off immediate concerns of a disorderly bankruptcy and stemming panic about global financial turmoil.
    UBS has agreed to buy Credit Suisse in an emergency deal that ties up two of Europe’s largest banks, Swiss authorities announced Sunday.
    Swiss authorities are planning to speed up the process by circumventing laws that would require a shareholder vote, the Financial Times reported earlier Sunday. The Financial Times also reported that the value of the all-share deal was more than $2 billion, but that figure was not officially confirmed by the Swiss authorities.
    A “swift and stabilizing solution was absolutely necessary,” Alain Berset, president of the Swiss Confederation, said in a Sunday afternoon news conference. The UBS deal, he said, was “the best solution for restoring the confidence that has been lacking in financial markets recently.”
    In a joint statement Sunday afternoon, Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen and Federal Reserve Chair Jerome H. Powell said that they “welcome” the announcement.
    “The capital and liquidity positions of the U.S. banking system are strong, and the U.S. financial system is resilient,” Yellen and Powell wrote. “We have been in close contact with our international counterparts to support their implementation.”
    Credit Suisse and UBS did not immediately respond to requests for comment.
    The takeover caps more than a week of speculation over the Swiss giant’s fate amid growing fears of a global financial crisis, after two U.S. regional banks suddenly failed earlier this month. Although U.S. regulators have taken sweeping steps, including backstopping deposits at Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank of New York, those measures have done little to assuage fears of a cascading banking crisis.
    Those concerns went global this week, after Credit Suisse warned of “material weaknesses” in its financial reporting. On Thursday, the bank received $53.7 billion in emergency funds from Switzerland’s central bank, but it wasn’t enough to restore confidence in the bank’s viability. Shares of Credit Suisse have tumbled more than 20 percent in the past week, and more than 35 percent this year.
    The past week has raised new questions on what it will take to avert another crisis. On Sunday, Sen. Elizabeth Warren (D-Mass.) called on Congress to lift the federal insurance cap for bank deposits above $250,000. She also urged lawmakers to repeal a provision of the 2018 law that had loosened restrictions on banks with $50 billion or more in assets, saying the latest tumult in the financial system underscored her belief that the Fed has fallen short on its core duties.
    The above is a complete and unedited transcript of a current article in The Washington Post.
  • Why People Are Worried About Banks
    image
    Banks are teetering as customers yank their deposits. Markets are seesawing as investors scurry toward safety. Regulators are scrambling after years of complacency.
    The sudden collapses of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank — the biggest bank failures since the Great Recession — have put the precariousness of lenders in stark relief. The problem for SVB was that it held many bonds that were bought back when interest rates were low. Over the past year, the Federal Reserve has raised interest rates eight times. As rates went up, newer versions of bonds became more valuable to investors than those SVB was holding.
    The bank racked up nearly $2 billion in losses. Those losses set off alarms with investors and some of the bank’s customers, who began withdrawing their money — a classic bank run was underway.
    Even before SVB capsized, investors were racing to figure out which other banks might be susceptible to similar spirals. One bright red flag: large losses in a bank’s bond portfolios. These are known as unrealized losses — they turn into real losses only if the banks have to sell the assets. These unrealized losses are especially notable as a percentage of a bank’s deposits — a crucial metric, since more losses mean a greater chance of a bank struggling to repay its customers.
    At the end of last year U.S. banks were facing more than $600 billion of unrealized losses because of rising rates, federal regulators estimated. Those losses had the potential to chew through more than one-third of banks’ so-called capital buffers, which are meant to protect depositors from losses. The thinner a bank’s capital buffers, the greater its customers’ risk of losing money and the more likely investors and customers are to flee.
    But the $600 billion figure, which accounted for a limited set of a bank’s assets, might understate the severity of the industry’s potential losses. This week alone, two separate groups of academics released papers estimating that banks were facing at least $1.7 trillion in potential losses.
    image
    Midsize banks like SVB do not have the same regulatory oversight as the nation’s biggest banks, who, among other provisions, are subject to tougher requirements to have a certain amount of reserves in moments of crisis. But no bank is completely immune to a run.
    First Republic Bank was forced to seek a lifeline this week, receiving tens of billions of dollars from other banks. On Thursday, the U.S. authorities helped organize an industry bailout of First Republic — one of the large banks that had attracted particular attention from nervous investors.
    The troubles lurking in the balance sheets of small banks could have a large effect on the economy. The banks could change their lending standards in order to shore up their finances, making it harder for a person to take out a mortgage or a business to get a loan to expand.
    Analysts at Goldman believe that this will have the same impact as a Fed interest rate increase of up to half a point. Economists have been debating whether the Fed should stop raising rates because of the financial turmoil, and futures markets suggest that many traders believe it could begin cutting rates before the end of the year.
    On Friday, investors continued to pummel the shares of regional bank stocks. First Republic’s stock is down more than 80 percent for the year, and other regional banks like Pacific Western and Western Alliance have lost more than half their values.
    Investors, in other words, are far from convinced that the crisis is over.
    The above section contains excerpts from a lengthy article in The New York Times, which was heavily edited for brevity.
  • Summary of David Sherman’s 3/15/2023 web call
    David and all: I occasionally read the board and I appreciate the insights. Junkster, RiverPark Strategic Income Fund is in th eprocess of being adopted by CrossingBridge. Upon completion, CrossingBridge would welcome your capital and not ban you. Obviously, no manger wants day traders but those that have a change of heart or see other uses for their capital are free to come and go; it's a daily liquidity product.
  • Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund name change and investment policy amendment
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1766436/000138713123003557/lft_497-031723.htm
    497 1 lft_497-031723.htm SUPPLEMENT
    Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund
    Institutional Shares: LCTIX
    Investor Shares: LCTRX
    Supplement dated March 17, 2023
    to the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated September 30, 2022,
    each as may be amended from time to time
    The Board of Trustees of Leader Funds Trust approved various changes to the Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund (the “Fund”). These changes include changing the Fund’s name and adding Class A shares. Because the Fund’s name change impacts its 80% investment policy, the Fund is providing shareholders with at least 60 days’ notice of the name change and revised 80% investment policy.
    Name Change
    Effective May 16, 2023, the Leader High Quality Floating Rate Fund is renamed the “Leader Capital High Quality Income Fund.”
    Revised 80% Investment Policy
    As stated in the Fund’s prospectus, the Fund may change its 80% investment policy without shareholder approval upon 60 days’ written notice. This supplement notifies shareholders that, effective May 16, 2023, the Fund’s Principal Investment Strategies on page 2 of the summary prospectus, including its 80% investment policy, are revised as follows.
    Principal Investment Strategies: Under normal circumstances, the Fund invests at least 80% of its net assets, plus any amount of borrowings for investment purposes, in high-quality debt securities. For the purposes of the Fund’s 80% investment policy, the Fund defines high-quality as being rated at the time of purchase as no lower than the A category by Standard & Poor’s Ratings Group, Moody’s Investors Service, or Fitch Ratings, Inc. The debt securities in which the Fund invests include the following U.S. dollar-denominated domestic and foreign securities:
    · bonds and corporate debt;
    · agency and non-agency commercial mortgage-backed securities (“CMBS”) and residential mortgage-backed securities (“RMBS”);
    · collateralized loan obligations (“CLOs”) that are backed by domestic and foreign debt obligations;
    · collateralized debt obligations (“CDOs”) that are backed by domestic and foreign debt obligations; and
    · U.S government securities.
    The Fund normally invests in debt securities with an interest rate that resets quarterly based London Inter-Bank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) or indexes designed to replace LIBOR such as the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”), Effective Federal Funds Rate (“EFFR”), or Overnight Bank Fund Rate (“OBFR”). The Fund allocates assets across debt security types without restriction, subject to its 80% investment policy.
    While the Fund invests without restriction as to the maturity of any single debt security, the Fund’s portfolio average effective duration (a measure of a security’s sensitivity to changes in prevailing interest rates) will be up to 15. The Fund’s average effective duration will change depending on market conditions. The Fund uses effective duration to measure interest rate risk.
  • Summary of David Sherman’s 3/15/2023 web call
    On rather short notice, Cohanzick invited people to listen to David Sherman talk about the significance of “recent developments.” Reportedly, 90 people called in. No slides, just David at his desk talking through two topics and fielding questions.
    Highlights:
    1. none of his funds have exposure to banks or thrifts. Early in his career, at Leucadia, he was taught that this additional financial sector focus offered “incremental gains that were not worth the risk.”
    2. in a “moral hazard” sort of way, institituions worldwide have “adopted an umbrella policy: avoid any failure at all cost.”
    3. Sherman’s policy preference would be a 1-2 bps / year charge for insurance on accounts over $250k with an opt-out provision and some sort of preferential payments scheme (akin, I think, to what happens in a bankruptcy liquidation) to avoid runs on the bank. (James Mackintosh, in Friday's WSJ, speculates on investment regulations to pursue the same end; he suggests requiring banks to invest only in short-term Treasuries as backing for regular deposits, with greater flexibility for special high-yield accounts.)
    4. He believes interest rates will remain higher for longer than commonly expected, unless the fed has to accommodate a systemic risk. A fed “pivot” now would be “ a bad sign regarding speculation and future inflation.”
    5. the commercial real estate market, which is reliant on floating rate securities, is a major and generally unrecognized risk. High quality lenders like BlackRock “are handing the keys back to the bank.” Eventually the government will need to pursue a solution like the Resolution Trust (1989-1995) to work to resolve the savings & loan crisis.
    6. Q: is the banking system close to melt-down? A: No. With the exception of a few incidents involving insolvent micro banks, there are no “FDIC-regulated banks where uninsured depositors didn’t get their money back.”
    7. Q: are you positive on high yield this yield? A: we don’t speculate but “In general, active HY will outperform stocks over the next couple years based on valuations.”
    8. Q: has the risk-return equation become more compelling? Are you playing offense or defense now? A: “I love this question. Compliance hates it. We love markets like this, even if they’re frustrating, difficult or stressful because they create volatility and volatility creates opportunity. Things were more shaky a year ago ... we’ve become more offensive over the past several months Dry powder not diminished but new money is getting invested at substantially higher returns. Dry powder (at year’s end his funds were 30% and 70% “dry powder”) reflects view that we’ll have more opportunities and we will not be forced to take duration risk. We’re avoiding highly stressed or distressed issuers whose business model is questionable relative to other opportunities. We think there will be more of opportunities; commercial RE will raise its ugly head to create them.”
    9. Q: where do you get such great ideas? A: swiped one from a student in my Global Value Investing class at NYU. (Roughly.)

    10. Q: Has the opportunity set changed since 1/1/2023? A: "We focus on business model, the group tried to be disciplined in our credit work in all periods though everyone occasionally gets out of their lane. We’re focusing on staying at the highest level of the capital structure. Social media makes everything worse. Investors do less work, act more in reaction to events, and since it’s easier to move money, it’s also easier to over-react. Across portfolios, we have the highest level of leveraged loan ownership in years. LLs significantly higher return than the bonds, assuming no rate collapse.”
    David either reads the board or has a news alert set for his name, so I’m confident that if I’ve materially misrepresented his words, he’ll help guide us back to the light.
    For what that’s worth, David
  • Settlement period & trading question
    Question 1 - If in the illustration below, funds for the purchase of a security were from a sale of another security prior to market close on the same day (Tuesday), can the newly acquired security be sold at market open on the second day (Thursday) without violating the SEC rule? Put in simpler terms, is Thursday at market open in the attached photo the first day the security purchased Tuesday can be sold per the rules? Or is it Friday?
    Question 2 - If one already owned a sizable number of shares of the newly acquired security (bought with settled funds) and only acquired one additional share with unsettled money on Tuesday, does the ban on selling apply to all previously owned shares of the security or only to the most recently purchased one?
    Thanks for any answers / insights.
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