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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • PRWCX Cuts Equity Exposure
    Here is the PRWCX portfolio as of 8/31/2021 from the TRP website.
    Portfolio
    $52.23 billion
    Total Net Assets as of 8/31/2021
    Asset
    Allocation
    Domestic Stock
    68.90%
    Other
    28.00%
    Domestic Bond
    1.40%
    Foreign Stock
    0.90%
    Convertibles
    0.80%
    Top 10 Holdings 8/31/2021
    Microsoft
    6.90%
    Amazon.com
    5.70%
    GE
    4.43%
    Alphabet Class C
    3.29%
    Danaher
    3.24%
    Marsh & McLennan
    3.16%
    PNC Financial Services Group
    3.12%
    Yum! Brands
    3.07%
    UnitedHealth Group
    3.02%
    Thermo Fisher Scientific
    2.78%
  • VDADX / VIG change
    Thanks @Observant1. I still can not get over that the median market cap of the current index is $169B (Vanguard port page) while that of the new index is $13B (bottom of page 3 of fact sheet at https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/indices/strategy/sp-us-dividend-growers-index/#overview). M*'s examination of change in index did not mention about the median constituent cap size or sector allocation differences.
  • VDADX / VIG change
    M* examines the new indexes for Vanguard Dividend Appreciation Index (VIG) and Vanguard International Dividend Appreciation Index (VIGI).
    Link
  • VDADX / VIG change
    From SPGlobal.com -
    "The S&P U.S. Dividend Growers Index is designed to measure the performance of U.S. companies that have followed a policy of consistently increasing dividends every year for at least 10 consecutive years. The index excludes the top 25% highest-yielding eligible companies from the index."
    The benchmark index used prior to the change to SPGlobal does not appear to have such an exclusion. https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/Methodology_DVG.pdf
    https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/Index/Overview/DVG
    I wondered how the differences in methodologies might effect the composition of the fund as a result of the change. The median market cap appear to go from $169B (Vanguard Portfolio page) to $13B - that is way too drastic change and I wish somebody checks me on this to make sure I have not goofed up. Weight of top 10 components does not change much (goes down from 31.5% to 30.5%) - i.e., well diversified (expect that from Vanguard). Dividend yield does not appear to change much - goes from 1.85% (M* info) to 1.74% - there are probably calc differences to call the 11 basis points a material difference, without digging in further.
    VDADX short term and long term total return performances appear not impressive. There seem to be large blend funds from Vanguard that have much better performance and not attracted as much AUM as VDADX ($64B). What is the attraction of VDADX as a large blend fund? Can not possibly be the current dividend yield of 1.75%.
  • VDADX / VIG change
    Summary prospectus announcing the above change -
    https://personal.vanguard.com/pub/Pdf/sp602.pdf?2210173701
    Pg 2 -
    "The changes to the Funds’ target indexes are not expected to increase Fund
    expense ratios. The transition may cause each Fund to realize taxable capital
    gains. In the event the transition generates capital gains, the Funds may be
    required to distribute capital gains to shareholders.
    The Funds are expected to implement the index changes in the third quarter of
    2021. The Funds’ prospectuses will be updated at that time to reflect the
    changes. To protect the Funds from the potential for harmful “front running” by
    traders, the exact timing of the index changes will not be disclosed to investors.
    In the meantime, the Funds will continue to seek to track their current indexes."
  • VDADX / VIG change
    For now, just an FYI - I received the following Vanguard reply to my enquiry about changes to VDADX's benchmark index
    Vanguard has recently selected a new benchmark provider for Vanguard
    Dividend Appreciation Index Fund Admiral Shares (VDADX).
    VDADX will change its index to the S&P U.S. Dividend Growers Index (S&P
    DJI) from the Nasdaq US Dividend Achievers Select Index. The changes will
    take effect in the 3rd quarter of 2021.
    As part of Vanguard’s ongoing due diligence, we regularly analyze all our
    products to ensure that they are delivering on their investment objectives
    and giving investors the best chance for investment success. Recently, this
    process has highlighted the solid design of the funds, along with some
    opportunities for benchmark refinements.
    Vanguard has a longstanding partnership with S&P DJI, and employed S&P DJI
    benchmarks for 22 index or index-oriented offerings with $1.18 trillion in
    assets under management as of March 31, 2020. S&P DJI is a leading provider
    of benchmarks and investable indexes designed to help track market
    performance, evaluate portfolios, and develop investment strategies.
    S&P Dow Jones Indices is a market leader in dividend index strategies, with
    more than $91.7 billion in assets under management tracking its dividend
    indexes as of March 31, 2021. We believe that S&P DJI’s approach to
    dividend growth indexes closely aligns with our view, and that they are
    well positioned to administer the indexes for VDADX moving forward.
    While we feel that S&P DJI is the optimal partner for VDADX moving forward,
    we continue to maintain a significant relationship with Nasdaq, Inc., as a
    valuable partner across business lines, including the registration of 24
    ETFs encompassing $319.9 billion in assets under management on the Nasdaq
    exchange as of March 31, 2021.
  • Baird Small/Mid Cap Value Fund to be reorganized
    Baird is not a fund company that comes to mind when looking for equity funds. It is replacing the manager for these two funds with (as noted above) an affiliate of Baird (which owns 75%-100%).
    Here's what little I can find on Greenhouse - it's indirectly owned by Baird (via ownership by Joseph M and Kirsten T Milano). It does not manage any OEFs, but manages $628M for eight clients including three hedge funds.
    https://wallmine.com/adviser/235960/greenhouse-funds-lllp
    About seven years ago, Baird floated the idea of a microcap fund managed by Greenhouse. It would own 50-100 companies, compared with 25-50 here.
    https://mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/20043/greenhouse-microcap-discovery-fund-bcdsx
    What caught my eye in that prospectus is that Joseph Milano had been manager of T. Rowe Price New America Growth Fund (now All Cap Opportunities Fund) PRWAX for a decade.
  • Baird Small/Mid Cap Value Fund to be reorganized
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1282693/000089418921006543/bairdsmidcapvaluesupplemen.htm
    497 1 bairdsmidcapvaluesupplemen.htm BAIRD SMIDCAP VALUE 497E
    Registration No. 333-40128
    1940 Act File No. 811-09997
    Filed Pursuant to Rule 497(e)
    BAIRD FUNDS, INC.
    Baird Small/Mid Cap Value Fund
    Investor Class (BMVSX)
    Institutional Class (BMVIX)
    Supplement Dated September 9, 2021 to the Summary Prospectus and Prospectus
    dated May 1, 2021, each as supplemented,
    and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) dated May 1, 2021
    On September 7, 2021, the Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Baird Funds, Inc. (the “Company”) approved the reorganization of the Baird Small/Mid Cap Value Fund (the “SMID Fund”) with and into the Baird SmallCap Value Fund, each a series of the Company, subject to approval by shareholders of the SMID Fund at a special meeting to be held in the fourth quarter of 2021. The Baird SmallCap Value Fund (the “Acquiring Fund”) is to be renamed the Baird Equity Opportunity Fund as further discussed below. Robert W. Baird & Co. Incorporated (the “Advisor”) serves as the investment advisor to both Funds and is proposed to continue to serve as investment advisor to the Acquiring Fund.
    The Board approved an Agreement and Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”) that provides for the acquisition of the assets and liabilities of the SMID Fund by the Acquiring Fund in exchange for shares of the Acquiring Fund. Shareholders of the SMID Fund would become shareholders of the Acquiring Fund, receiving shares of the Institutional Class of the Acquiring Fund equal in value to their shares of the Investor Class or Institutional Class of the SMID Fund held immediately prior to the reorganization. The reorganization is intended to qualify as a tax-free transaction for federal income tax purposes. The Advisor recommended the reorganization in connection with the proposed retention of a new subadvisor for the combined Fund, as discussed below.
    Shareholders of record of the SMID Fund will receive a combined proxy statement/prospectus in the coming weeks, which describes and seeks approval of the proposed reorganization. Assuming shareholders of the SMID Fund approve the Plan, the reorganization is expected to close in December of 2021.
    The Board also approved the retention of Greenhouse Funds LLLP (“Greenhouse”) as subadvisor to the Acquiring Fund and a related subadvisory agreement, subject to approval by the shareholders of the Acquiring Fund at a special meeting to be held in the fourth quarter of 2021. Greenhouse is a registered investment advisory firm based in Baltimore, Maryland and an affiliate of the Advisor. The Advisor recommended the retention of Greenhouse because it believes Greenhouse’s management will allow the combined Fund to pursue an investment strategy that could result in enhanced net of fees returns to shareholders while continuing to invest generally in smaller companies.
    In connection with the proposed retention of Greenhouse, the Board also approved (1) a new investment advisory agreement authorizing the Advisor to delegate the day-to-day portfolio management to one or more subadvisors such as Greenhouse and (2) the reclassification of the Acquiring Fund from a “diversified” to a “non-diversified” fund within the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940, subject to approval of the shareholders of the Acquiring Fund. Subject to shareholder approval of the new advisory and subadvisory agreements, Greenhouse will assume day-to-day management responsibilities of the Acquiring Fund and the Acquiring Fund will be renamed the Baird Equity Opportunity Fund.
    Assuming shareholders of the Acquiring Fund approve the appointment of Greenhouse as subadvisor to the Acquiring Fund, the principal strategies of the Acquiring Fund will change to reflect Greenhouse’s investment philosophy and the new name of the Fund, including the following changes:
    •The Acquiring Fund will normally invest at least 80% of its net assets in equity securities, including common stocks, ordinary shares, ADRs, ETFs, preferred stocks and options whose reference assets are equity securities and equity indices;
    •The Acquiring Fund will invest in companies with small to medium market capitalizations, defined as companies of market capitalizations of less than $20 billion;
    •The Acquiring Fund is expected to hold a more limited number of investments, typically 25-50 holdings;
    •The Acquiring Fund would be permitted to purchase and sell options for hedging purposes and to enhance returns; and
  • Quality Growth: AKREX, POLRX, EGFFX
    Like @Griffin, I am a longtime follower, but first-time poster. I felt compelled to chime in on this thread because it concerns two of my very favorite funds. I have held substantial positions in both AKRIX and EGFIX for several years and am very pleased with both. I wish the expense ratios were lower, but that is my only complaint and I was able to access the institutional shares at Fidelity so they are 1.05 and 1.00, respectively.
    I tend to prefer high active share, concentrated funds, which led me to the aforementioned pair, as well as the somewhat tamer PRBLX and JENSX.
    I am not at all concerned about Chuck Akre’s retirement because I have faith that the portfolio managers John Neff and Chris Cerrone have learned a lot from their mentor. And the fact the fund has such a low turnover rate means they will not be called upon to do a lot of trading, anyways. If you are looking for high active share and low downside capture, you will be hard pressed to find a better fund.
    I first learned of Edgewood Growth when I saw it listed as one of the top performing large growth funds over the past 5 and 10 years in a table posted online by Kiplinger’s. The thing that stood out to me was that out of the 10 funds listed in each of the tables it was the only one listed that did not have a volatility ranking of 9 or 10. (It was a 5).
    I like the fact this fund is not discussed too much on these kinds of forums. It keeps it a sort of hidden gem. But with total assets of more than $35 billion, it has obviously caught the attention of a lot of (I think smart) investors.
  • the Sequoia ETF
    Hi, Guy.
    I'll ask Ed on your behalf.
    On the capacity question, no. Being an ANT does not reduce any capacity constraints the strategy might otherwise have. That being said, it looks like they're running at $3 billion below their former peak. It appears as if Rolls Royce is their smallest cap name at $12 billion. If that's as small as they want to get, then a rough calculation gives them $18 billion in strategy capacity. (That's based on the assumption that they don't want to own more than 5% of the float for their smallest name, and that each name could represent one-thirtieth of the portfolio.)
    David
  • Catastrophe Porfolio
    +1 Thanks @sma3
    Shorting stocks is fraught with peril. Simple reason being a stock has no limit (theoretically) on how high it can go. Losses could be indefinite. However, in the hands of an experienced trader, fund manager, etc. short sales can add one dimension to the overall approach. As you note, there are ways to hedge that theoretical loss if you’re experienced enough. In defense of shorts, DODBX’s last semiannual report mentioned their holding a 5% short position on the S&P.
    Guessing market direction is always tough - and we’re usually wrong. From my experience you’ve got only perhaps a 1 in 10 chance of getting it right at any given time. I think whether to own one of the short etfs you mention, or a fund like TMSRX or an inverse fund has a lot to do with age, circumstance and willingness to take risk. For a younger or even mid-50s worker who is socking $$ away for retirement, they should stay as far away from the short / inverse gimmicks as possible. But for an oldster looking to protect a substantial nest egg these “gimmick” approach’s might help buffer against severe unexpected loss. As with insurance, there is a price to be paid - likely muted returns over the long haul compared to not using them.
  • Catastrophe Porfolio
    There are lots of ETFs that try to move counter to the market ( SH) , or provide a floor under losses ( take your pick 5 9 13 % or higher BUFF) or buy puts ( TAIL) These should all do well during a correction.
    Inverse funds unfortunately drop to a smaller and smaller portion of your portfolio as the market moves higher. lowering their impact. It is unclear to me what an ETF that is structured to buffer a 5 to 15% loss will do in a 20% correction.
    Puts might be your best bet, as you know ahead of time how much you stand to give up, although you have to constantly maintain a position to continue the "protection".
    Usual advice is don't put money into the market you can't afford to loose. I am afraid this may also apply to the Bond Market now
    While conservative equities with a "margin of safety" are likely to eventually reclaim any significant correction, the P/Es on a number of high flyers may take years. I assume it would take an equally long time for a 1.5% coupon bond to recover, if ever.
  • Real Yields on European Junk Bonds Go Negative For First Time
    "Credit spreads in Europe haven’t been this tight this consistently since, again, the summer of 2007.
    In the credit market, unlike stocks, stability like this should ring alarm bells.
    Investment-grade issuers, and not just low-grade junk issuers, have rushed to issue more debt this week, locking in generously cheap funding while they have the chance.
    That means that that much more debt will have to be rolled over in future, creating that much more pressure on the Federal Reserve and other central banks to keep the liquidity flowing.
    If potential lenders aren’t able to refinance that debt in future, then we have the seeds of a Minsky Moment, the point at which investors recognize that debt is unsustainable and lose confidence."

    Link
  • Catastrophe Porfolio
    TMSRX only concern is that expense ratio is 1.29.
    You’re being generous if that’s your only concern. Some of that “fee” isn’t really related to management of the fund, but simply reflects some of the expenses peculiar to short selling. For many years they weren’t included in the ER. I’ll guess on the date. But I think it was around 2000 that the SEC began requiring these costs be disclosed in the ER and, as a result, the stated fees on such funds jumped.
    This article explains those costs - which simply stated are (1) Dividend expenses on short sales and (2) Interest expense on short sales
    Price’s ER is in line with similar funds and I’d expect the 1.29 ER to be lower in a few more years as assets increase. The fund (perhaps deservedly) has been subject to some brickbats. However, when it rains out (and equities nose dive) it holds up very well - a haven of sorts from the storm.
    I’m not trying to sell it. My own commitment is in the area of only 14-15% of portfolio.
  • Catastrophe Porfolio
    TMSRX only concern is that expense ratio is 1.29%
  • Templeton Global Bond
    The September 2021 Morningstar Fund Investor newsletter indicates that Templeton Global Bond (TPINX) was downgraded from Silver to Neutral.
    "This fund has stuck to Its guns, and that means it has
    been wrong for a long time. Manager Michael
    Hasenstab has been bullish on emerging markets and
    bearish on U.S. bonds. The fund kept duration near
    zero while maintaining outsize bets on Ukraine and
    other emerging markets. We stayed positive on the
    fund given Hasenstab’s past record, but eventually we
    have to conclude that he’s not as good as we thought."

    TPINX was one of the premier funds in the World Bond category years ago.
    Templeton Global Bond was different from most World Bond funds due to substantial emerging markets exposure and its currency bets. As of 01/31/16, the fund generated top 1% / top 2% category returns for the respective 10 Yr and 15 Yr trailing periods.
    Michael Hasenstab (M* 2010 Fixed-Income Manager of the Year) started co-managing TPINX on 12/31/2001.
    Several fund managers have come and gone since then.
    Templeton Global Bond was moved to the Nontraditional Bond category in 2019.
    I remember purchasing Templeton Global Income (GIM - CEF version of TPINX) in late 2013.
    GIM was trading with an attractive discount and it had a lower expense ratio than TPINX.
    Unfortunately, the discount widened and Mr. Hasenstab lost his mojo.
    I sold the CEF approximately five years later booking a small profit.
  • Catastrophe Porfolio
    ”I worry that standard 30/70 funds will do poorly when both bonds and stocks get hit badly”
    That’s a great point. Normally “the world turns over” every 24 hours. But when it comes to falling or very low interest rates, this has been going on now for 30-40 years - an obscenely long time.
    The temptation is to run to riskier assets and away from bonds. Yet, when markets really tank, stocks can stink up the joint a lot worse than bonds can. If nervous about interest sensitive bonds, consider short duration bonds or bond funds out to perhaps 3-5 years.
    I also worry about traditional “balanced” funds - be the ratio 60/40, 40/60, 30/70 or 60/30/10 (RPGAX). All are subject to the “double-whammy” of bonds & equities submerging together. That, I think, is why TRP brought out TMSRX which is capable of garnering a modest return even in a market marked by falling bond and equity prices. I have a couple others I think may offer similar benefits, but am not confident or versed enough in them to post or recommend.