@msf, in showing how wrong additive decomposition of factors is, are you also making a point about this conclusion?

A couple, at least.
That his relying on people's intuition that the factor weightings should sum to 100% is wrong. So his factor weighting column must be wrong. And thus the way he calculated it must be wrong.
That the assertion that this resulted in being off by merely a few basis points is sleight of hand. The misdirection comes about in switching from the time frame used in most of the column, 45 years, 3 months (542/12 years), to a single year toward the end. Calling that single year "annualized" enhanced the illusion, as it makes it seem that the factor weighting (percentages) are the same over time.
That's not true. Over time, the discrepancies compound just like the returns. What may be a rounding of a few basis points over one year becomes a large deviation over decades.
Here's a simple example to illustrate. Take two factors, one that adds 2% to the return per year and one that adds 3%. Call them inflation and earnings if it helps make things more concrete.
Over one year (i.e. annualized), the increase in value is:
(1+ 2%) x (1 + 3%) - 1 = 5.06% ≈ (2% + 3%) = 5% (give or take 6 basis points)
Using addition rather than multiplication isn't significant at first. But over 45 years, 3 months we get, first using the correct (multiplicative) annual return of 5.06% and then the rounded (additive) return of 5%:
(1 + 5.06%) ^ (542/12) - 1 = 8.2951 = 829.51% increase in nominal value
(1 + 5%) ^ (542/12) = 8.0584 = 805.84% increase in value
That's a difference of 2,367 basis points. Not just "a few basis points". Swept under the rug by redirecting attention from a decades long time span to a time span of a single year.

Lots of talk, a grand total of one stock as the "one investment," and never a word about mutual funds that own "quality."

That's interesting. The show took me to funds that have a large position in BRK.A or BRK.B. For example FCNTX owns both share classes.
Berkshire holds a slew individually publicly traded stock (ie KO, MMM) that they hold "forever in the Berkshire Ecosystem". For example, Berkshire owns 9.28% of KO stock which makes up 7.8% of Berkshire's Stock.
I don't think of Berkshire purely as a stock. Maybe more like a conglomerate stock...a companies that owns many companies. Berkshire is diversified across sectors (consumer, RE, Finance, etc). BRK.A or BRK.B seems much like a mutual fund.
If you own BRK.X stock it comes with a management team that eat their own cooking and charges an ER of Zero. Reminds me of maybe even a Hedge Fund since it owns entire companies that are not traded publicly (GEICO, See Candy).
Berkshire is a conglomerate stock. What assets does it hold? Lots.
List_of_assets_owned_by_Berkshire_Hathaway
berkshire-hathaway-portfolio
top-5-shareholders-berkshire-hathaway-brka-brkb
Lastly,
Buffett Shaped Berkshire As An All-Weather Conglomerate

tnx, OJ, that was my point, sort of. Have winner faith, hang in.
Obvious, if not to some.
Let us propose that in the late 1980s or early 1990s we were persuaded, from press or elsewhere, that this guy Tillinghast was worth giving some money too.
30 years later --- which is not all that long for those of us older investors --- guess how his work compares w other wise touts of that time: DODGX, VFIAX, PENNX (old sc), DFCIX (old mc) ?
Oops --- his returns are more than 40% higher than the best of them. Whoa. Well over double SP500, no less.
One manager, one method, one fund. Snowball's insight is true!
Ah, there is a same-house fund that has matched or beaten Tillinghast: FCNTX. With several managers. So you could even argue, sometimes and with hindsight, for having constant faith in a house and its LCG sector aggressively implemented.
(If we had stuck with those two, instead of fretting and tracking and reading and trading, well, we could be giving a lot more to charity and kids these days!)

As of 6/30/21, PRWCX holds high % in utility (11%) and cash (10%). Still he managed to gain 13% YTD and leads the balanced fund category. The fund is well in position when the market corrects when the Fed starts to taper later this year.
https://fundresearch.fidelity.com/mutual-funds/composition/77954M105?type=o-NavBar

I swear, in the CNBC interview, at 1:28, he says he’s lowered his equity allocation “100-200 BIPS”. What is that? The FT article says from 70% equities down to mid 50s. So, there you go, a BIP is 0.1%. Give or take.

I've had one taxfree OEF reinvesting on itself since the 1980s when I was a teenager. I've got several AF's that I've held nonstop since mid-2006. I've got some stocks that I've held since 1996 ... and one stock position that's inherited that was originally purchased in the 1950s.
I like boring investments. ;)

Pg M5, OPTIONS. MicroStrategy/MSTR offers a way to play Bitcoin – it owns $4.6 billion worth of Bitcoin and will be buying more from a bond sale (an interesting or crazy twist to issue bonds to buy Bitcoin). Short interest is high at 25%. Selling puts is recommended for aggressive investors.

As Rbrt pointed out, the effects of various factors are multiplicative, not additive. It is an error to try to hammer the question into an additive one. This mistake permeates the column. Not only in the "straw men" as John put it, but in the "real" answer.
Percentages assume that the effect of returns from different factors are additive (so that they can be summed, presumably to 100%). That's an erroneous assumption, and it's why I gave my geometric (square) example.
Try to allocate the factor weightings (for height and length) in that example yourself. We assume that height of the square doubles (100% rate of increase) and length triples (200% rate of increase) in a year. Thus the area expands sixfold (500% increase).
What portion of the 500% increase is due to the 100% increase in height, and what portion is due to the 200% increase in length? And remember that the two portions have to sum to 100%.
It's an absurd question. Yet that's the calculation being performed in the table above where factor weightings are assigned. Further, one doesn't need factor weightings at all to answer the original question posed: if one factor (e.g. inflation) were excluded, what would the return be?
You can see how to answer this from my square example. If we exclude the increase in height, then the area triples in size. So the "return", excluding height growth, is 200%. Clean, simple, answers the question, and doesn't go into the weeds with additive percentage factor weights.
Finally, to illustrate just how deeply this conflating of multiplicative and additive effects goes, we can look at the hypothetical in the column where inflation runs at 51% and nominal return runs at 50%/year. With a 50% rate of return, a dollar invested would be worth $92,924,336.24. That's multiplicative (1+50%) x (1+ 50%) x ...
The gain, an additive quantity, would be a dollar less, $92,924,335.24, i.e. an increase of 9,292,433,524%. But what is written is: "investors would have gained 9,292,433,624%". Significant? Not numerically, but conceptually.

Aug 28th Episode

Yes, a smaller asset base might result in a higher ER, but M*'s speculation was that the higher fee was also due to its higher return potential.
The full sentence reads: "Its fees are likely to come down as assets scale, but the higher levy also likely reflects Vanguard Advice Select Dividend Growth's greater return potential. "
Also, given the fact that this fund is just pruning an already concentrated portfolio of about 40 stocks in VDIGX down somewhat, the cost of this incremental effort would seem to be minuscule. So I'm not even sure that a small asset base would necessarily entail significantly higher costs.
Given that VDIGX has already closed in the past, and a concentrated version of it would tend to have more stringent capacity limits, I don't see the Advice Select sibling being offered generally. In fact, when VDIGX closed, it was a very hard close. Unlike funds like Primecap (VPMCX), Vanguard didn't let even Flagship customers open new VDIGX accounts when the fund was closed.
Compare, VDIGX closing:

Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund is closed to all new investors (with the exception of (1) investors who are added and invest in the Fund only through technology-driven model portfolios and (2) participants who invest in the Fund only through defined contribution plans that offer the Fund as an existing option).

with VPMCX closing:

New or current Vanguard PRIMECAP Fund (the Fund) shareholders may not open new accounts or contribute to existing Fund accounts, except as described in this supplement. Clients enrolled in Flagship Services™ and Vanguard Asset Management Services™ may open new Fund accounts, investing up to $25,000 per year as described ...

Starting to read The Intelligent Investor for the first time.
- Interest rates will be a head wind for both stocks and bonds (especially LT bonds)...when interest rates rise.
- Graham Consistently recommends a 50/50 portfolio. High grade bonds and index like equities.

ER is only 1.05% for I class shares. Proof of conviction may be evidenced by how much the managers invest in the fund right out of the gate. The website has not populated much info, not even daily price changes.

This is always a very in depth report:
https://usfunds.com/investor-library/investor-alert

Powell did just enough to preserve the view that his goals align with investors’: growth that is fast enough to boost hiring and earnings but not inflation, and an approach to stimulus that avoids shocks and leaves actual interest rates alone.
-- one week of smooth sailing doesn’t mean there are no storms ahead. Still, for anyone worried that the first tangible signs of withdrawn stimulus spelled doom for investors, the latest stretch is reason for encouragement.

a Taper Without Much Tantrum

August 23 Episode:

The Intelligent Investor:

I read the first edition of this book early in 1950, when I was nine-teen. I thought then that it was by far the best book about investing ever written. I still think it is.
To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a stratospheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information.What’s needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework. This book precisely and clearly prescribes the proper framework. You must supply the emotional discipline.
-Warren Buffet

The_Intelligent_Investor

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/892071/000119312521258957/d158365d497.htm
TCW Funds, Inc.
Supplement dated August 27, 2021 to the
Prospectus dated March 1, 2021 (the “Prospectus”)
For current and prospective investors in the TCW Core Fixed Income Fund, the TCW Enhanced Commodity Strategy Fund, the TCW Global Bond Fund, the TCW Short Term Bond Fund, the TCW Total Return Bond Fund (each a “Fund” and together, the “Funds”)
TCW Investment Management Company LLC, the investment adviser to each Fund (the “Adviser”), has announced that Tad Rivelle, one of the portfolio manager for the Funds, will retire from the Adviser at year-end. The remaining portfolio managers for those Funds will continue to have responsibility for managing the Funds after his retirement.
The Adviser has provided the following statement regarding Tad Rivelle’s retirement:
“We are writing today to provide you news on developments that we have long prepared for in the management of our business and the trusted oversight of our client portfolios. Committing ourselves as we have over the years to a team approach to managing assets, focused on process, we have tapped the collective best thinking of our investment professionals and established redundancies that serve the essential need for consistency of approach.
It is against this backdrop that we announce forthcoming changes to our Generalist team, first that Tad Rivelle, following nearly 35 years in the industry, will retire from TCW Investment Management Company LLC, the Funds’ adviser, at year-end, and that Laird Landmann, Steve Kane and Bryan Whalen will continue as Generalist portfolio managers, with Steve and Bryan assuming Co-CIO roles for the Fixed Income team beginning in the fourth quarter 2021. The Specialist portfolio managers that comprise such a key element of our team and process, remain in place, and continue to guide the management of their sectors, supported by well-built out trading and research functions, in which TCW continues to make considerable commitments from a resource and systems standpoint.
Says Tad Rivelle: “We recognized very early on that asset management businesses are built on trust and competence. The enduring success of the team and of the TCW fixed income enterprise has been predicated not only on delivering the pattern of returns as represented but also on an unwavering commitment to transparency with our clients. I have had the pleasure and honor of working with a team of Specialist managers of unrivalled competence, led by a team of Generalists, for now some 20 to 30 years, who have first, last and always placed client interests above all else.”
As an additional dimension to these changes, longtime Senior Analyst to the Generalists Ruben Hovhannisyan has been promoted to a newly-established Associate Generalist position. Expectations are that these functions will scale over time, as a commitment to evergreen management and to building a deep bench of investment talent, as well as in response to business demands and emerging opportunities.
Naturally, change in our industry is one that brings with it plenty in the way of questions and we stand ready to address inquiries about this and all aspects of our business. We appreciate your ongoing partnership and look forward to those opportunities.”
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus for future reference.
From Metropolitan West:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1028621/000119312521258954/d160297d497.htm
497 1 d160297d497.htm 497
Metropolitan West Funds (the “Trust”)
Supplement dated August 27, 2021 to the
Prospectus dated July 29, 2021 (the “Prospectus”)
For current and prospective investors in the Metropolitan West AlphaTrak 500 Fund, the Metropolitan West Intermediate Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Investment Grade Credit Fund, the Metropolitan West Low Duration Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Strategic Income Fund, the Metropolitan West Total Return Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Ultra Short Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Unconstrained Bond Fund, the Metropolitan West Flexible Income Fund and the Metropolitan West Opportunistic High Income Credit Fund (each a “Fund” and together, the “Funds”)
Metropolitan West Asset Management, LLC, the investment adviser to each Fund (the “Adviser”), has announced that Tad Rivelle, one of the portfolio manager for the Funds, will retire from the Adviser at year-end. The remaining portfolio managers for those Funds will continue to have responsibility for managing the Funds after his retirement.
The Adviser has provided the following statement regarding Tad Rivelle’s retirement:
“We are writing today to provide you news on developments that we have long prepared for in the management of our business and the trusted oversight of our client portfolios. Committing ourselves as we have over the years to a team approach to managing assets, focused on process, we have tapped the collective best thinking of our investment professionals and established redundancies that serve the essential need for consistency of approach.
It is against this backdrop that we announce forthcoming changes to our Generalist team, first that Tad Rivelle, following nearly 35 years in the industry, will retire from Metropolitan West Asset Management, LLC, the Funds’ adviser, at year-end, and that Laird Landmann, Steve Kane and Bryan Whalen will continue as Generalist portfolio managers, with Steve and Bryan assuming Co-CIO roles for the Fixed Income team beginning in the fourth quarter 2021. The Specialist portfolio managers that comprise such a key element of our team and process, remain in place, and continue to guide the management of their sectors, supported by well-built out trading and research functions, in which TCW continues to make considerable commitments from a resource and systems standpoint.
Says Tad Rivelle: “We recognized very early on that asset management businesses are built on trust and competence. The enduring success of the team and of the TCW fixed income enterprise has been predicated not only on delivering the pattern of returns as represented but also on an unwavering commitment to transparency with our clients. I have had the pleasure and honor of working with a team of Specialist managers of unrivalled competence, led by a team of Generalists, for now some 20 to 30 years, who have first, last and always placed client interests above all else.”
As an additional dimension to these changes, longtime Senior Analyst to the Generalists Ruben Hovhannisyan has been promoted to a newly-established Associate Generalist position. Expectations are that these functions will scale over time, as a commitment to evergreen management and to building a deep bench of investment talent, as well as in response to business demands and emerging opportunities.
Naturally, change in our industry is one that brings with it plenty in the way of questions and we stand ready to address inquiries about this and all aspects of our business. We appreciate your ongoing partnership and look forward to those opportunities.”
Please retain this Supplement with your Prospectus for future reference.
LEGAL_US_W # 109241964.2

There's no question that in its early days when FLPSX was a small cap fund, it was virtually peerless. But that changed after it drifted into mid-cap territory. Performance was readily exceeded by several of the funds you list here. Perhaps you would have been better off changing horses in midstream.
The reclassification dates to about 10/31/2005. I derive that date from the M* analyst report of 1/31/2006:

Since 2000, the fund's stakes in mid-caps and large caps has shot up significantly, while its allocation to small and micro-caps has dropped sharply. We therefore recently moved the fund into our mid-blend category from our small-blend category to better reflect the fund's true composition.

That report discusses the portfolio report of 10/31/2005, so that's a reasonable date to use.
From that date through yesterday, the cumulative returns are:
SPECX: 837.91%
FCNTX: 572.63%
PRBLX: 552.48%
JENSX: 447.40%
VOO: 408.88%
FLPSX: 254.22%
FAIRX: 197.66%

Question for the math inclined - he has simply added these rates, should he multiply each component? IE: (1+a/100)(1+b/100)etc…-1?
You're right. Further, this fundamental flaw permeates the column, so I wouldn't look at any of the numbers. (I didn't even read much past the second paragraph because it was apparent that Rekenthaler was trying to turn a multiplicative question into an additive one.)
Consider how he calculates the contribution of multiple expansion. He calculates the multiple expansion at roughly 2.66 (31.5/11.8). He tries to back out this factor by saying that if we divide it out, we would have the remaining S&P growth. Dividing 100% by 2.66% leaves 37% for "everything else". So, obviously (and obviously wrong), multiple expansion accounts for 63% of the S&P growth.
This is so wrong that it left me scratching my head about where he got 63% for quite awhile until I saw what his simplistic calculation was. BTW, the 31.5 figure he used was wrong also. He erroneously transcribed the 30.5 figure that one gets from the data he cited.
I think I can illustrate the problem simply:
Consider a 1x1 square. Its area is 1. Suppose its height doubles (100% growth) and its length triples (200% growth). Its area is now 6 (500% growth).
Would you say that 50% of the growth was due to the height doubling? After all, had the height not doubled, the area would have grown just half as much (to 3 instead of 6). According to his reasoning, the trebling of the length thus must likewise account for half the growth.
It's nonsense because it ignores the cross terms - the effect that one factor growing has on the other factor growing. The (1+a/100) effect.
He starts with junk arithmetic. From there we're off to the races. It only gets worse after that, I assume (not having the stomach for the rest).

In retrospective mood tonight, I plotted the $10k-growth of several funds I used to be seriously interested in and most of which I owned off and on since Labor Day 2000. (Many of them before then, too, since the 1980s, when my career turned toward high tech.) It seemed a v tough time, fall 2000, hangover from the latest highflying tech phase. SPECX, FAIRX, more-sensible things like TWEIX and JENSX and PRBLX. VOO of course. FCNTX.
Anyway, I compared them all w old stalwart FLPSX, one man, one machine since seemingly forever (and Tillinghast is only mid-60s!). It was of him David Snowball famously wrote (maybe it was in email to me) something like 'I have never sold FLPSX and not regretted it.'
Of course these funds are not properly comparable. Still.
Check it out. Stay the course. Don't trade longterm winners even in slumps.

Vanguard Advice Select Dividend Growth will be managed by Donald Kilbride of Wellington.
This fund will be a more concentrated version of Vanguard Dividend Growth which Mr. Kilbride has managed since 2006.
Vanguard Advice Select International Growth will be comanaged by James Anderson* and Lawrence Burns. Both managers are part of the Baillie Gifford team which runs 70% of Vanguard International Growth.
Baillie Gifford invests with a venture capital approach which has generated high returns along with high volatility.
*Mr. Anderson will leave Baillie Gifford in April 2022 after nearly four decades with the firm.
Link