@Derf...point taken...that is why I selected the Total Stock Market Fund as a wash-sale choice...obviously one would bone up on these rules and select appropriate wash-sale securities or just wait 30 days...

If you sold an S&P 500-indexed ETF to realize losses, purchasing an ETF that tracks the Dow Jones or Russell 1000 would maintain your market exposure while decreasing the chances that you trigger a wash sale.

https://fidelity.com/learning-center/personal-finance/wash-sales-rules-tax

I wonder if this might be a potential strategy regarding capital tax losses and Roth conversions.
Let say I want to manage Roth conversions during market sell offs (think back to March 2020).
the-case-for-roth-conversions-in-market-downturns
Let's say I have two accounts, A T-IRA and a taxable brokerage account. They are both invested in the S&P 500 On Jan 1. 2020. Each has $10K as a starting balance. By Mar 31, 2020 they are both worth $8,037.
I take the following actions:
I convert the T-IRA to a Roth and lock in the March 31, 2020 value of $8037. On April 1, 2020 the T-IRA is now in Roth Status (conversion competed) and New Roth account continues to be invested in the S&P500. By years end the Roth value is $11,825. In April of 2021, I will owe taxes on the conversion ($8037 * my tax bracket)
In the 12% bracket I will owe $964.44
In the 22% bracket I will owe $1768.14
In the 24% bracket I will owe $1928.88
In a separate taxable account, I sell the very same investment on the same day I completed the Roth conversion and book a $1963 tax loss on that sale. On Apr 1, 2020, I re-invest back into the Total Stock Market (or appropriate wash-sale security). My $8037 by years end grows to $1287. Obviously this works perfect in hindsight. Equity markets can endure long stretches of under performance.
In April of 2021, I have a tax loss of $1963 that I can apply to my 2020 tax year or carry forward to future tax years...future Roth conversions.
tax-loss-carryforward
If I had I done nothing , both accounts would have lost and subsequently regained their losses. But by timing both a Roth conversion in the T-IRA and harvesting a tax loss in a taxable account at a pull back in the market", I have used a tax loss to "pay for" a Roth conversion.

For anyone considering recognizing more gain or doing more Roth conversions this year, I ran across a couple of quirks in the way gains may be taxed.
Suppose you have short term gains (say, $3000) and long term losses (say -$1000), so that you're net positive (+$2,000 short term). Not a common situation, but here added long term gains can get taxed at short term (ordinary income rates).
In this example, if you generate an extra $500 in long term gains, that reduces the LT loss by $500, thus increasing the net short term gains by $500: Net LT loss = $500, net gain (short term) = $3000 - $500 = $2500.
----
If your income is in the region where some but not all cap gains are taxed at 0%, then adding $1 of ordinary income can increase your taxes by 27¢, i.e. it's taxed at 27%. Kitces has an excellent piece on this; see examples 3 and 4.
https://www.kitces.com/blog/long-term-capital-gains-bump-zone-higher-marginal-tax-rate-phase-in-0-rate/
He discusses how in this situation it is preferable to generate long term gains (even if taxed at 15%) as opposed to doing Roth conversions (even if nominally taxed at 12%). Going further, if one doesn't have much in cap gains/qualified divs, ISTM that it can still make sense to convert all the way up to the next tax bracket. A small amount will get taxed at 27%, but with little in cap gains, most will get taxed "normally". But if one has lots of cap gains that would get pushed into the 27% bracket, it pays to defer converting.
This suggests a multiyear strategy for planning periodic sales of assets and Roth conversions. It can be advantageous to lump them into alternating years. One year you take two year's worth of gains (taxed at 0% or 15%). The next year you work to minimize your cap gains (so there are few gains to get taxed at 27%) and convert more retirement money. Even if those conversions push you into the 22% bracket, that's still better than having a lot of cap gains taxed at 27%.
One needs to look at how much in gains one expects to recognize (including fund distributions), how much one wants to convert, other ordinary income, to see if this lumping strategy helps.

Excellent reply @msf. Thanks.
The only fund of funds I ever considered buying was CTFAX (but did not buy). During my review, I called the fund and asked among other things about duplication of management fees and the rep who I spoke with said NONE. We can forgive him for a 10 bps error. I have found most reps are limited in their knowledge - may be they are over worked or may be they hold temporary jobs to invest their time! Talking to the managers / fund investment professional is the best but usually one has to be an RIA or a big investor in the fund before that access is given.
Good to know this year NICHX expenses have come under the cap - efficiencies of scale I suppose going from $550M AUM at Oct 2020 to $1.35B at Nov 2021. Nice of them not to use up the disclosed cap. (I used to work in professional services and my team never gave any part of the fee cap back to the clients!) Given the current year claw back was only 0.07% and the charged expenses were below the cap, is it reasonable to assume that all the previous waivers are now clawed back and no claw back of historic waiver would be needed in the future years? I am guessing yes, but thought I would ask in case you know the answer off hand.
More importantly, thank you for bringing to light Vanguard's clever way to charge fees (I am sure they disclosed!), considering how much chest thumping it does about fees. Thankfully, I never invest at Vanguard for their presumed low fees; high fees never stopped me from an investment, though I like to know / understand how much I am paying.

CTFAX is an example of a fund that tacks a management fee (0.10%) on top of its expenses including its acquired fund expenses (0.40%). It has put a temporary cap of 0.50% on fees excluding the acquired fund fees. When you add back the acquired fund fees of 0.40% to the capped expenses of 0.50% (including 0.10% for the second layer of management), you get to 0.90%. That's the current ER.
Absent that cap, the fees (excluding acquired fund fees) would be 0.56% and the total ER would be 0.96%.

Columbia Thermostat Summary prospectus.
Extra management fees can be instead added surreptitiously by using an excessively costly share class of underlying funds. That's what Vanguard does with its funds of funds (e.g. STAR). Instead of utilizing Admiral or Institutional class shares, these funds purchase more expensive investor class shares of underlying funds. In fact, Vanguard eliminated the more expensive investor class shares of its index funds except for use in its funds of funds.
An expense cap usually reduces current expenses. In order to satisfy a cap, a fund's management company waives some of its fees. Later, the fund may operate more efficiently (e.g. economies of scale) or a cap may still be in place but with a higher expense limit. Either way, it can happen that actual expenses are below the stated cap. At that point, the cap appears to be moot.
But then the management is allowed to "claw back", i.e. recover, the fees that it originally waived. At least so long as the actual expenses plus the claw back don't exceed the current expense cap. Usually a claw back is limited to three years - management can only recover fees that it waived in the past three years.
Your question about how ERs work with caps is where the twist comes in. Total expenses of NICHX are 1.78% (per prospectus). Excluding the expenses that don't count toward the cap (such as acquired fund expenses) brings the ER well below 1.45%. So the management is allowed to claw back previously waived fees.
The annual report shows that the clawback for the year ending April 2021 amounted to 0.07%. That plus the prospectus' 1.78% ER (including underlying fund expenses) gets one to 1.85%.
Finally, it may be worth noting that the way NICHX handles fees of underlying funds that are affilitates is to disclose the conflict of interest rather than to adjust for double dipping. Again from the prospectus (Conflicts of Interest section):

The Fund may also invest ... in affiliated entities or accounts that may directly or indirectly benefit the Investment Manager or its affiliates, including Underlying Funds managed by affiliates of the Investment Manager.

Un-Intuitively, the fund did not lose until March 23, 2020 when both monetary and fiscal stimulus was announced. It lost about 1% TR Which it did not recover from until sometime in May 2020 - it was down for 2 months.
At inception, each manager invested between $5 and 15 million. Forms 4 are posted on the fund website. May be they started the fund to invest their own money and then must have attracted clients from their previous job where all three managers worked concurrently for a number of years. Manager bios are on the fund website - seems they have always been outsourcing managers, rather than being selectors of securities and trading them.

@msf, Fund of funds like CTFAX use funds from their own family and as such no duplication of fees. I have never studied fees calcs for funds that acquire external funds. Also, while every fund that waives fees mentions about potential claw backs, I have never seen before any fund apply claw back to understand how the mechanics work.
If you do not mind, perhaps, explain to us the ER again. If there is a cap of 1.45% plus acquired fund level ER of 0.57%, that is a total of 2.02%. How do I get to 1.85%?
How does the current waiver impact future ER, especially if the fund loses AUM?

Additional links can be found in the link I included below:

“The Chain”
As you’ll see in the P.S., we’re trying something new in the blogosphere. We’re “Building A Chain” of blog articles, where different bloggers are sharing their detailed Drawdown Strategy. To help keep track, I’ll edit this post as new “links” are added in the chain. Eventually, we’re planning on compiling these into an e-book, and donating all proceeds to charity. Thanks to the following bloggers who have joined “The Chain Gang”!!
Anchor: Physician On Fire: Our Drawdown Plan in Early Retirement
Link 1: The Retirement Manifesto: Our Retirement Investment Drawdown Strategy
Link 2: OthalaFehu: Retirement Master Plan
Link 3: Freedom Is Groovy: The Groovy Drawdown Strategy
Link 4: The Green Swan: The Nastiest, Hardest Problem In Finance: Decumulation
Link 5: My Curiosity Lab: Show Me The Money: My Retirement Drawdown Plan
Link 6: Cracking Retirement: Our Drawdown Strategy
Link 7: The Financial Journeyman: Early Retirement Portfolio & Plan
Link 8: Retire By 40: Our Unusual Early Retirement Withdrawal Strategy
Link 10: Early Retirement Now: The ERN Family Early Retirement Captial Preservation Plan
Link 11: 39 Months: Mr. 39 Months Drawdown Plan
Link 12: 7 Circles: Drawdown Strategy – Joining The Chain Gang
Link 13: Retirement Starts Today: What’s Your Retirement Withdrawal Strategy?
Link 14: Ms. Liz Money Matters: How I’ll Fund My Retirement
Link 15a: Dads Dollars Debts: DDD Drawdown Part 1: Living With A Pension
Link 15b: Dads Dollars Debts: DDD Drawdown Plan Part 2: Retire at 48?
Link 16: Penny & Rich: Rich’s Retirement Plan
Link 17: Atypical Life: Our Retirement Drawdown Strategy
Link 18: New Retirement: 5 Steps For Defining Your Retirement Drawdown Strategy
Link 19: Maximize Your Money: Practical Retirement Withdrawal Strategies Are Important
Link 20: ChooseFI: The Retirement Manifesto – Drawdown Strategy Podcast
Link 21: CoachCarson: My Rental Retirement Strategy
Link 22: Accidently Retired: How I Planned my Early Withdrawal Strategy
Link 23: Playtirement: Playtirement Preservation Stage

Find the above links within this link (found at the end of article):
our-retirement-investment-drawdown-strategy

Regarding the 1.85% fee - there's actually a cap in place of 1.45%. But this excludes the cost of acquired funds (0.57%). That's enough to drop the remaining expenses below the cap which in turn allows the fund to claw back previously waived fees. This is why on the fact sheet that Lewis linked to the gross ER is 1.78% while the net ER is higher, at 1.85%. (Usually net is lower than gross because of fee waivers.)
Regarding stale and stable prices - this likely goes a long way in explaining where the high Sharpe ratio comes from. Sort of like looking at a Madoff portfolio. I'm not suggesting anything improper here (unlike with Madoff), just agreeing with Lewis that the pricing can be misleading. It's doubly risky here because for the acquired funds, this fund relies on the acquired funds' managers to price their own illiquid investments and suggest their NAVs. From the prospectus:

The Fund bases its NAV on valuations of its interests in Underlying Funds provided by the managers of the Underlying Funds and/or their agents. These valuations involve significant judgment by the managers of the Underlying Funds and may differ from their actual realizable value. ... The Board, the Investment Manager and the Valuation Committee may have limited ability to assess the accuracy of these valuations.

It wasn't that many years ago when a number of posters were complaining about fair market valuations, which often meant valuing foreign securities with prices stale by hours, not days or weeks. Pricing here is much more uncertain.

It seems like an interesting fund, but the lack of liquidity and high fees--1.85% expense ratio on a debt fund--could prove problematic down the road. Often funds with illiquid assets mask hidden risks, as the prices of their portfolios seems very stable as the portfolio essentially doesn't trade with the rest of the market. In other words, the prices of these securities can be stale and not reflect sometimes the underlying reality of the portfolio or the external reality of the world. If there is a sudden liquidity crunch and investors start to withdraw money from such funds, those stale prices can suddenly become live in painful ways as managers are forced to sell and take significant markdowns on illiquid assets. We saw this happen with non-agency mortgage bonds last year. The interval structure can help deal with a flood of redemption requests in volatile markets but it can also facilitate the masking of stale prices. It is a bit of a double-edged sword in this particular case if you ask me.

“So quit worrying so much about that unlikely event ( really old and broke)”
Suppose we’ll get blasted for straying OT. Appreciate the takes of everyone. @Junkster doesn’t comment often enough. As he has mentioned before, the longer we’re invested the faster the stash appreciates in nominal terms owing to compounding. . And, considering one’s ever increasing financial knowledge and skill-set, that $$ should appreciate even faster than it did in earlier years (at least on a risk-adjusted basis).
Now the other side. I was terrible managing money up until near age 50. A good job kept me afloat. (and a bad marriage nearly done me in). The “catch-up” provisions in our workplace tax-deferred plan saved my a** in hind-sight. But I will say, having at least glimpsed both conditions, it’s a thin line between “rags” and “riches”. Die rich? Die broke? They’re not really comparable - the former being much more endurable ISTM.
I’ve no answer to the dilemma. You could annuitize everything and really splurge in those luxurious later years. Just be sure that annuity has a generous inflation rider - because inflation is the big unknown - and probably the reason we over-save.

@MikeM
Yes....don't have a clue, of course. Hopefully, not a 2018 December puke.
Dec. 1 thru the bottom on Xmas eve produced a -15.6% for SPY, with recovery even level price on Feb. 20, 2019.

Well, that red didn't last to long. S&P 500 up 3.2% from it's Monday low. Russel 2000 up 4.8% from it's low. Everything is above Mondays open.
Santa Clause rally?

NICHX/UNIQX has interval structure and that means that you can buy it anytime but redemptions are limited to small % per redemption window (5-25% of NAV per quarter).

Wondering if the legal issues connected to HMEZX have been cleared up-specifically the Jim Dondero bankruptcy, etc ?

I'm guessing somebody like Dondero maximizes his litigation efforts and makes sure it all gets buried, a la 45. A decent (and highly paid) legal team can do that.

Couple thoughts...
1) Leveraged rail-car leases?
2) Your health? Adult USA population only ~12% have NO metabolic issues (cholestrol, high blood pressure, overweight, high blood sugar) What are YOU doing to take care of yourself? Getting ill is very expensive!
Best,
Baseball Fan

#2 above simply blew my mind. So I looked it up and below is the link to your statement. The study was from 2018 so more than likely is even less than 12% now. I would wager many/most not in that 12% are overestimating their longevity believing they will live to 100 or longer. In the process they will continue to accumulate, accumulate and die with far more assets than needed. All the while not enjoying the precious present.
Edit: Reminds me of something I read on Bogleheads. Investors under estimate the risk of death. Hence you are more likely to be dead before you become (really) old and broke. So quit worrying so much about that unlikely event ( really old and broke)
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2018/11/181128115045.htm

The immediate consequences of switching index provider is that VIGI distributed 6.5% cap gains. Luckily, the switch did not result in VIG needing to trigger any cap gains or it had sufficient prior cap losses to soak up any cap gains triggered from the switch. VIG has net realized (and unused) cap losses as of 11/30/2021 which as a percentage of NAV amounted to 2.65%. Any ETF other than the ones that are tracking broad indices like SPY, QQQ, etc. always runs the risk of triggering cap gains because the sponsor can switch the underlying index provider (and shareholders vote in favor without recognizing the cost to them). This happened to me on another ETF 5-6 years ago. In any case, I will not be adding to VIG / VIGI anymore or for that matter buy any new Vanguard ETFs that are just a different class of their mutual funds because cap gains triggered by mutual fund redemptions can be allocated to the separate class ETFs.
Below is the M* article re the switch.
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1040749/dissecting-vanguards-new-dividend-indexes
Note: M* quote page for VIGI has inaccurate info for December 2021 distributions. It overstates dividend (income) distribution by approx the size of the cap gain. Per share total distribution for December quarter per Vanguard is approx $5.4; whereas, M* shows $10.6

Here is the summary prospectus for Global Explorer Fund:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/915802/000139834421024162/fp0071172_497k.htm

@BaluBalu :Here is the link.
https://seekingalpha.com/news/3781285-jpmorgan-chase-to-pay-200m-to-settle-probes-on-employee-communications?lctg=60e5bff2d935fc51cb3d2067&mailingid=26105343&messageid=wall_street_breakfast&serial=26105343.1518283&userid=54611039&utm_medium=email&utm_source=seeking_alpha

The 80+% bond allocation is well positioned for further stock decline. Majority of the bond is high quality, AAA and some in BBB. Duration is 5.5 years so it is reasonable for the rising rate in 2022.