FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/warren-buffett-is-a-mutual-fund-2014-05-05/print?guid=BAA066FC-D446-11E3-A037-00212803FAD6

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140505/FREE/140509950?template=printart

FYI: (Click On Download)
Regards,
Ted
http://www.moneylifeshow.com/highlights.asp
M* Snapshot Of RSQVX: http://quotes.morningstar.com/fund/f?t=RSQVX&region=usa&culture=en-US

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://www.forbes.com/sites/baldwin/2014/05/05/forbes-mutual-fund-ratings-2014/print/

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20140505/FREE/140509951?template=printart

@Charles: AGG Down -(.04)% SPY up .19%. I like BAC, and so does Warren Buffett, at $15.00 and change I might take a position. One of my investing secrets is buy when now one else wants it.
Regards,
Ted

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/dow-reverses-triple-digit-loss-ends-higher-2014-05-05/print?guid=A3A6E57D-F0DA-469A-8F8E-18EA06B41A3D
Major Stock Indexes: http://markets.wsj.com/us

A 62.5% drop! Wow......surprising for a global stock fund run by value investors with a stellar reputation. I would not have guessed that. Of course this speaks much more to the devastating drawdown experienced by global stock markets themselves. I believe the US Stock market drawdown was approximately 55%. Don't have figures for the drawdown of the average world stock fund.

Ted said: : "You can't go wrong with this fund, Dodge & Cox Global Value." (Fund doesn't exist - but I think he meant Dodge and Cox Global Growth DODWX which he linked)
Always pains me to disagree with Ted. But sure, you CAN go wrong with DODWX as with any other fund. DODWX opened at $10.00 on May 1, 2008. By the following March (a mere 10 months later) its NAV had slipped to $3.75. Talk about a rude introduction! (Of course it's had a stellar run since than:-)
I like D&C for a lot of reasons - not the least of which is their consistently very low fee structure for actively managed funds. However, had you been reading this board's precursor (Fund Alarm) in early 2009, you would have learned that they can't do anything right. :-)

Another Tweedy, Browne product:
http://quotes.morningstar.com/fund/tbgvx/f?pgid=hetopquote&t=TBGVX

I think I'd call TBGVX more of an international fund than global. It's American holdings are quite limited. FMIJX would be similar. But TBHDX, as Charles pointed out, would be another good global choice, maybe a touch more conservative than the others.

TBGVX is Tweedy's international offering. TWBVX was formerly the US offering. In fact, however, TWBVX transitioned to a global offering a while back -- details are on their fact sheets where they show their rationale for benchmarking the fund against the S&P500 vs. a global index for a certain number of years before benchmarking to a global index.
That said, I have no idea why TBGVX as the "international" offering has always held a pretty good share of US stocks.
I own PGVFX, BTW, and almost dropped it. Requires a fair degree of patience, and there appears to have been some turnover in their analyst staff. I'm on the fence. It tends to have an unusual portfolio, and a strong mid-cap value tilt; does not tend to hold cash. Its earlier record seems to have been based on its sidestepping the dot-com bust. Did not hold up so well in aftermath of the 2008 bust, but is finally digging itself out.
FWIW.

I recently open an health svings account with The Bruce Fund. I will add to this hsa for the next 10 years (until age 65). The website leaves a lot to be desired, but I believe my occassional health care related reimbursements won't create too much of a hassle. It would be nice if Bruce accounts could be linked electronically to external bank accounts for dispursement. As mentioned by Mozart325, nice YTD performance.

Amazing, we've spend so much time on a fund with $15M AUM.
Regards,
Ted

Hey, one other thing...
Like Ted notes, it's a top 1% fund across 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 year periods, using a Morningstar's risk-adjusted-return metric.
But most of BRUFX's long-term performance comes from the 2000-2007 cycle, when it returned a breathtaking 24% per year:

In the 90's, it actually under-performed.
Interesting, no?

Thanks man.
I too remain cautiously optimistic for those very reasons. Anecdotally, I see a lot of construction locally here in central coast and places we visit.
The sell-offs in tech, for some IPOs, help as well...I think that is healthy for the market.
Now, monitoring valuations, list of stocks I track continues to get smaller.
My current allocation is roughly: 35% cash (net), 45% US stocks (mostly value), 10% foreign stocks (mostly EM), 10% bonds (mostly short term).
More conservatively allocated than you've posted. But if I were more aggressive today and the market "corrected" -20% tomorrow, I would be pissed, even though I recognize such corrections tend to be short-lived.
So, OK for now.
Fingers-crossed, our reluctant bull continues forward.

@cman
Thank you, as always; for your observations.
Perhaps I should have waited until Sunday morning (now) and not late night Saturday (too tired) for the write. I didn't place the thoughts as a rebuttal; but understand how this may be viewed, as such.
I just don't agree with the pronouncement that this particular method of investing with holding more than one active managed fund in a given sector is a worthless mode.
I did list XLV in the list with the other health sector funds for a compare.
As to my thoughts regarding the original write; well, there are many methods that are valid for many investors to obtain performance suited to their risk/reward and observations.
I did not note, and should have; that using perhaps 3-5 active managed funds for a given investment area is a hedge against "management malfunctions". Knowing that any given active managed fund holdings are not going to be an exact fit into a M* category may open the investment door further. This is where the investor must do their work to help determine, of what, a fund consists.
An example would relate to a few of our bond funds: LSBDX, PIMIX and FTBFX. These may be considered "total, multi-sector or choose a favorite word". The point being is that there is likely some overlap somewhere among these 3 funds; but I am not concerned. The 3 funds do operate in different bond worlds most of the time.
These 3 funds, their methods, holdings and management give us diversification in this investing sector.
Heck, in the end; with the consideration that investing in the U.S. moves one into the best of the "turd" piles globally, our house could place a 50/50 bet with something similar to VTI and AGG and let them ride forward, come hell or high water. Their averaged returns over the years would keep one above inflation and tax rates, for a small net gain.
Now, returning to home remodel.......a most fun sport.
Take care,
Catch

Couple observations: (1) It's quite possible two "same category" funds (per M*, Lipper or whomever) might actually exhibit markedly different approaches as glened by an investor's careful monitoring over time. An investor who's owned a fund for 5, 10 or 20 years likely possesses a much better feel for that fund than do the supposed experts. For that investor, owning two funds of the same "category" may add different complementary attributes to a portfolio. (If pressed here, I'd say most funds within a category exhibit fundamental differences in approach when followed carefully over time.)
(2) While I get the point about approximating "index fund" status as more funds are added, when carried to the logical extreme this would argue for owning just a single fund.

@MOZART325: Lousy website, but great performance numbers, in the 1st percentile most of it's history.
Regards,
Ted
http://performance.morningstar.com/fund/performance-return.action?t=BRUFX&region=usa&culture=en-US

Funds/strategies like this are so outside the needs/experiences of typical retail investors as may be represented here that a discussion can only be generic as posted so far in which everybody is right but all miss the point.
There are a number of "opportunistic capital preservation" money managers like Frank Martin running boutique funds primarily for high net worth (HNW) individuals via word of mouth and networking. Some of them try to create retail funds for reasons I will cover later on. I, personally, know a manager like this, so some of the following is not necessarily what you might hear from such managers in public.
In private money management, the typical investor in such funds is a HNW individual with a few millions that may be needed in 2-3 years for some investment like real estate or a new business, money that they do not want to lose or be tied up without liquidity. They definitely do not NEED the growth from that money for their retirement but wouldn't mind if somebody opportunistically made some money on it.
You can see this as an extreme capital preservation strategy where the drawdown is at or close to zero under any scenario. They are definitely not for the kind of capital growth needed by the 99% to make their retirement.
The strategies vary using different asset classes from equities to bonds but the math is usually similar. The managers choose the allocation of capital to the opportunistic classes calculating Value At Risk so that the worst case scenario drawdown even in the short term (and hopefully the expenses as well) is balanced by guaranteed returns in the safest asset classes such as holding treasuries to maturity. In other words, they have fully "hedged" the potential downside.
The upside of the opportunistic class can vary but it is typically more like high yield or equity like returns in 5-15% range in the best case scenario. Dumb bell return asset classes like venture capital can also be used but very little of the capital can be put to work to be able to fully hedge it and picking almost guaranteed winners opportunistically is not easy.
In most cases, the asset picking ability of such managers is overrated. They have the luxury of waiting with nothing invested and growing nothing unless the asset meets the draconian investment criterion they set up for themselves. They just have to wait for a deep correction in the asset class or some other event that creates massive pricing anomalies.
The upside is usually a function more of the type of market condition (like a crash) they encounter and the frequency of such events than the asset picking.
This is very different from the funds that stay at 60-80% invested with an eye towards capital protection but cannot afford to flatline their returns waiting for opportunities.
Is a money management strategy like this relevant for typical retail investors? In theory, yes. But not for typical portfolios designed for growth overall that is of necessity. Not even to reduce volatility or adjust risk or benefit from bear markets. The reason is that there is no allocation to such funds that makes mathematical sense If you allocate a large amount, the potential opportunity costs in the flat line scenarios put your needed growth at risk. If you just put in a small amount, the opportunistic upside won't make much difference. It is relevant only for money (or a bucket) that you do not want to lose under any circumstance - down payment for a house, cash buffer beyond the emergency requirements, etc.
In practice, most retail investors either put such money in FDIC insured assets or put it in some short term bond funds and forgo the potential for opportunistic upside.
So why do these managers create retail mutual funds? Because they need the money to grow the asset base and their revenues and it is easier to raise money from mutual funds especially if it becomes popular. They all look at funds like PRPFX (easiest money ever made by fund managers) and salivate and wonder why they are working so hard for just a few million.
Raising money from a few HNW individuals has many disadvantages. It is very labor intensive and pretty much like getting political contributions. So, it is difficult to scale. It is also very lumpy as a few individuals coming in or getting out changes asset base substantially. On average, you need about $20M in AUM for every person you want to hire. Most private managers plateau out with less than $50M in AUM and always under a threat to lose chunks of it quickly from withdrawals.
So, retail and institutional funds are the next step for anybody who is tired of private money management and has built up a record they can advertise. With increased assets, they can hire people and take a much less active role in day to day management. Most go the advisor route because marketing directly to investors is expensive and difficult for specialty funds like this whose purpose is never understood enough.
The success rate in raising assets is not very high but people like Hussman give them hope. Tom Forester of Forester funds is probably the one big success story (relatively speaking in the ability to raise AUM) with an approach similar to Frank Martin early on.

Good Day,
I am saddened to read the pronouncements in the statement(s) at the linked discussion; of the dismissal and demise of an investing style.
Of particular concern, to the consideration of new investors here; whom we do not know, who read this discussion board. For the more seasoned investor; the statement(s) are obviously, only an opinion; not an investment holy grail. @MikeM @Ted
Starting with: this discussion
As noted in the discussion: "Buying similar funds in the same category for diversification is hog-wash. Pick a good fund manager in the area you want to be in and go with him or her or that team."
>>> First. I don't agree with the presumption that active managed funds in a given category are all the same and can not offer diversification within a category/sector. If there is little difference in managed funds in a similar category; there is no good reason to invest in these, as an index or etf in that category would likely give the performance required. Secondly, one may always wish everyone well with their available manager choices; and that the managers (assuming a decent prior record used by the investor, for choice) will not trip and fall for some reason going forward with their assessment of market directions.
A sample of healthcare/medical, active managed funds;ranked YTD:

...... YTD..... 1YR..... 3YR..... 5YR
FPHAX +10% +34 +20.8 +26
FSPHX +5.9% +39.6 +23.2 +27.2
FSMEX +3.3% +29.1 +12.3 +18.8
PRHSX +2.8% +31.8 +24.3 +14.5
FSHCX + .2% +22.3 +11 +22.5
FBIOX -1.2% +28 +30.7 +28.9
XLV +4.5% +24 +19.8 +21.4

So, investor "x" feels this investment sector is appropriate for 20% of their portfolio. They had previously decided in 2013, to choose the top 4 funds in the above list, based upon 5 year returns, at that time; and place 5% of their portfolio into each of the four funds. Their fund choices were: FBIOX, FSPHX, FPHAX, FSHCX
The funds, as a blend; still have a decent return YTD, in spite of some stumbles in certain sectors. Whether the investor may have done better with just one broad based fund is only of value in hindsight; unless they have an impressive magic 8-ball device for future answers.
'Course, if buying similar funds in the same category is a waste of time, reportedly hog-wash; perhaps skipping an active managed fund and investing in an index or etf is an equally decent choice, especially if the e.r. is very small.
Confirmation of the variables of performance of active managed funds may be found at this health funds list. The list is sortable with the column year returns. All one has to do when choosing one fund with which to invest is; well, do your homework and hope that nothing changes with the management or style of the fund going forward, so that one may keep the faith.
Oh well, to each their own.
Take care of you and yours,
Catch

D&C team member at May party:
http://ricorambles.files.wordpress.com/2012/05/passed_out_drunk-12730.png