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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Interesting fund - Event Driven Opportunities - FARNX
    Get in, sit down, shut up and hold on it may be a wild ride. Fund has passed the $50 mil mark in assets.
    Professionals would not invest in this for at least 3 years - but I am not a professional and have invested a few coins (about 0.5%) in this fund.
    FARNX is 6 months old and has $64 mil. in assets and looks like it's gaining traction. It is a small blend fund.
    Reviewed past postings and I thank Ted and others for their input, I put it on My possible list some time back .
    Would like to see this fund grow to about $400 mil and close.
    But what do I know!!!
  • The most inclusive, broadbased U.S. equity ETF/index is ???
    The way Vanguard does things is that you have the Investor share class, typically with a $2,500 minimum to get in and a slightly higher ER. Then you have the Admiral Share Class, often with a $10,000 minimum to get in, and a lower expense ratio. Then the exchange traded fund, with the same super low ER as the Admiral shares, and of course traded on an exchange, so no minimum
  • The most inclusive, broadbased U.S. equity ETF/index is ???
    Does SCHB fit your requirements? Can't beat that ER.
    That one has 1,998 stocks.
    He posted "Broad market cap exposure is the deciding factor".
    Of course, 1,998 stocks stills gives you very broad market exposure, but not nearly as many small and microcap stocks as the other funds I mentioned, VTI or VTSAX, or the Fidelity offering, FSTVX
    By the way, the Fidelity offering I mentioned has a $10K minimum. For a slightly higher ER, you can purchase another share class with a $2,500 minimum: Fidelity Spartan Total Market Idx Inv FSTMX
  • The most inclusive, broadbased U.S. equity ETF/index is ???
    If I remember correctly, SCHD had about 2500 holdings. That 0.4% ER is really low.
    Sounds like you have some answers Catch.
  • The most inclusive, broadbased U.S. equity ETF/index is ???
    5 basis points expense ratio for VTI. The Admiral Shares also have 5 basis points expense ratio, with $10K minimum to get in, VTSAX
  • The most inclusive, broadbased U.S. equity ETF/index is ???
    Ok, we have money in VITPX in a 529, but can not buy this in any of our retirement accounts.
    VITPX holds 3,300 U.S. issues, whereas VTI is also broadbased, but with only 1,700 or so holdings.
    OPPS....my bad, don't know why I noted 1,700 holdings. rjb112 is corrrect with the higher number (3,677)noted below.
    Any suggestions for a very broadbased U.S. equity etf/index holding many issues across all cap sizes.
    Growth, value or whatever type is not a deciding condition. Broad market cap exposure is the deciding factor, and of course "cheap" all that much better for E.R.
    We've looked through a list at etfdatabase; but perhaps you have a favorite for very good reasons.
    We have access to just about whatever via Fido brokerage.
    Thank you for your thoughts.
    Catch
  • Ok. Let's talk a little about Third Avenue Value Fund -- TAVFX
    Spoke to them on several occasions. Last time was in 2005. They were absurdly overweight the FIRE sector and preaching that as "safe and cheap". It wasn't.
    Marty was brilliant. I read his book. As one commenter said, "lost their way".
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    Hi rjb112,
    Definitions matter every bit as much as costs matter when making investment decisions.
    I appreciate that you are a careful researcher, so this observation is likely to be totally unnecessary. However, when consulting any financial article, be sure to understand the precise definition of whatever statistic is being quoted.
    The Price to Earnings ratio is one such statistic that has plenty of special definitions that could be misleading or misinterpreted if not properly recognized. Is the Price component based on current closing price or the monthly average? Is the Earnings component based on current level or is it a trailing 12 month average? Most importantly, are those Earnings the historical values or are they future projections?
    I say most importantly because an estimate of future earnings is simply a forecast prone to error. My position on forecasts has been consistent: I am basically skeptical of most financial forecasts and generally distrust them. As you correctly inferred in your post, the likely explanation for the disparity in P/Es reported is that they were generated from the various sources that you cited.
    When using the P/E ratio as part of the investment decision, it is hazardous to use future estimates. These estimates are often based on optimistic guesstimates, false assumptions, and/or behavioral biases. I believe it is a far safer approach to use the historical P/E ratio.
    Nobel laureate Robert Shiller recently introduced the 10-year average of real (inflation-adjusted) earnings as the Earnings denominator. That’s his Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) formulation. That smoothing operation helps to tame the wild oscillations caused by point data anomalies. That too is a good concept.
    Again historically, the current levels, like those exhibited by the S&P 500 Index, are a bit on the high side of the long-term trendline, but the trendline itself has been slowly increasing over time. Nothing is constant; the constituent makeup of the S&P 500 units slowly morphs.
    As always, you alone get to interpret these data in your investment decision making.
    I would caution you not to get too upset about rather small disparities in reported financial statistics. Given the dynamic nature of the marketplace, these are all subject to rapid changes anyway. As other MFOers have offered, don’t be frozen into paralysis by hyper analyses.
    Good luck and Best Wishes.
  • FundX monthly newsletter
    I subscribed to FundX for a few years before 2008. My experience with the recommendations was generally good, but depending on how you try to follow the newsletter and what your transaction costs are it gets a bit unwieldy. In all the cases I remember I was able to hold funds past the point at which I would be penalized for frequent trading, but there were some cases where my brokerage, E*Trade, didn't offer the funds so I skipped it or bought the next one on the list.
    I have seen the same on their more recent performance, which surprises me a little. I think their system should do better in trending markets and if the past 5 years hasn't been a pretty consistent trend I'm not sure what would work better for them.
    For my own account, I eventually decided I would rather play the momentum game with individual stocks or ETF's that were liquid and easy to trade so I let my subscription expire.
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs

    Summary:
    1. The overall stock market, the total market, has a forward P/E of roughly 17.3 to 17.4
    2. Small cap growth has a forward P/E of roughly 22.5 to 25
    3. Small cap overall (value plus growth) has a P/E of roughly 19.6 to 20.4
    4. Small cap value has a P/E of roughly 16.65 to 17.5 to 18.75, depending on the source of the information. Don't have a great consensus on that one. Would need to study this more to get a better handle on why the figures vary so much.

    Interesting about these P/Es.
    Regarding the forward P/E for the S&P 500, I'm getting 3 different results that are a bit surprising with respect to the differences:
    Morningstar says the forward P/E of the S&P 500 is 17.01, as of 5/31/14
    Standard & Poor's [they ought to know, right??] says it is 15.64 as of 5/30/2014
    The Wall Street Journal online says that it is 16.58 as of 6/27/2014
    What's up with that?!
    I guess we have some significant disagreements regarding the forward earnings estimates?
  • American Century Equity Income Fund reopens
    Hmm...WTF fore? It closed for a reason, and that reason could not have changed in a bull market. I smell an American rat stinking up this century, someone thinks this a cash cow. I have this fund in a 401k and own some of it instead of all S&P 500 index, but I think I'm going to fix that at first opportunity.
  • American Century Equity Income Fund reopens
    http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/908186/000143774914012033/accp20140619_497.htm
    American Century Capital Portfolios, Inc.
    Summary Prospectus and
    Prospectus Supplement
    Equity Income Fund
    Supplement dated July 1, 2014 ■ Summary Prospectus and Prospectus dated July 26, 2013
    As of August 1, 2014, the fund will be open to all investors.
    The following changes are effective August 1, 2014:
    The first paragraph under Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares on page 4 of the summary prospectus and page 5 of the prospectus is deleted.
    The section entitled Closed Fund Policies on page 17 of the prospectus is deleted.
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    >> Small caps are wildly overvalued and will likely lead the next decline. I would never advise initiating or adding to SC exposure here.
    I have been reading this every six months or so for the last several years. Just graphed PENNX, FSCRX, WEMMX, and GABSX 10/9/8/7/6/5/4/3/2/1y to calm myself down.
  • Praising and Occasionally Not Praising Caesar
    Hi Guys,
    Based on my earlier posts, I’m sure many of you recognize that I’m extremely skeptical about market forecasting. There are too many moving parts and unknown interactions.
    When Alfred Cowles 3rd asked the question in 1932 “Can Stock Market Forecasters Forecast ?” he answered in the negative. I share similar doubts. My doubts magnify as the forecasting time horizon expands.
    So I don’t respond too aggressively when a market wizard projects returns for next year. Barron’s annual roundtable forecasting party amply demonstrates the popularity of the ritual. It’s reliability is highly suspect. Here is a Link to an article that addresses “Forecast Fatigue”:
    http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2012/01/12/forecast-fatigue-whats-the-value-of-annual-market-predictions/
    As you know, Jeremy Grantham has been a member of the forecasting crowd since about 2000. Unlike most everyone else, he makes a forecast for a 7 year period. His original forecasts were for a 10 year time horizon so he has shortened his foresight timeframe.
    His most recent projections are scary indeed for US equities. If you believe he possesses the Wisdom of Solomon you might completely abandon the US equity marketplace and embrace foreign holdings. Here’s a Link that provides a summary chart:
    http://www.gurufocus.com/news/248085/gmo-7year-asset-class-forecast--getting-bullish-on-emerging-markets-january-2014
    Most folks consider Grantham to be the gold standard in terms of forecasters. I’m likely swimming against the prevailing strong tide, but I’m not convinced.
    He did not generate especially sterling results for the 7 year period just ending. I completed specific analyses as an acid test. Way back in July 2007, he projected real negative returns for both large cap and small cap US stocks similar to today’s predictions.
    Adjusting for inflation (Grantham makes real return estimates), his 2007 projections for June 30, 2014 become marginally positive, but well below US Treasury expectations. His forecasts were definitely off-target. Stocks outperformed bonds in this 7 year period by a considerable percentage, and small caps marginally outperformed large caps which also contradict the 7-year predictions. Yes, forecasting is certainly hazardous to a reputation.
    Although in this instance I take issue with the trustworthiness of his specific long range projections, I do admire the process embedded within Grantham’s work, his meta-market modeling approach, his work ethic, and the man himself. He is both smart and humble, a rare set of qualities in the investment guru world.
    Allow me to take liberties with Shakespeare and reverse a few key words: “I have come here to (praise) Caesar, not to (bury) him”. I write to praise Jeremy Grantham, not to criticize him. He is a true giant and superstar in the investment community. When he speaks, I respectfully and intensely listen. A few times we part ways.
    I am particularly fond of Grantham’s “10 Shakespearian Rules of Investing”. Here is a Link to a short summary of his rules followed by a Link to a quarterly Grantham letter that details them in the first 3 pages of his long letter:
    http://www.businessinsider.com/jeremy-grantham-gmo-quarterly-letter-polonius-2012-2?op=1
    http://www.gurufocus.com/news/163788/jeremy-granthams-q4-longest-quarterly-letter-ever
    Jeremy Grantham is a true believer in the investment iron law of a regression-to-the-mean. So am I.
    I especially like the closing section of his tenth rule, so I’ll repeat it here:
    ……..“On the other hand, if you have patience, a decent pain threshold, an ability to withstand herd mentality, perhaps one credit of college level math, and a reputation for common sense, then go for it. In my opinion, you hold enough cards and will beat most professionals (which is sadly, but realistically, a relatively modest hurdle) and may even do very well indeed.”
    I believe many MFO members easily qualify by satisfying the attributes Grantham cited.
    Good luck and Best Regards to all. Have a great summer.
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    I call " bullsh@t" on the claimed forward PE of the Vanguard offering. Small caps are wildly overvalued and will likely lead the next decline. I would never advise initiating or adding to SC exposure here.
    @MarkM: Let's make a distinction between small cap overall, and small cap value.
    When you say "Small caps are wildly overvalued", you may be referring to small cap stocks as a group, or especially small cap growth. iShares Russell 2000 IWM has a forward P/E of 19.63, versus the S&P 500 forward P/E of 17.01, per Morningstar. Vanguard S&P Small-Cap 600 Index etf VIOO has a forward P/E of 20.39. Vanguard Small Cap Growth etf VBK has a forward P/E of 25.09. Is that what you are referring to? iShares S&P Small-Cap 600 Value IJS has a forward P/E of 18.75.
    iShares Russell 2000 Value IWN has a P/E of 17.51. That doesn't seem "wildly overvalued" compared to the stock market overall. iShares Russell 2000 Growth IWO has a P/E of 22.54. iShares Core S&P Total US Stock Mkt ITOT P/E 17.33
    The Wall Street Journal lists the forward P/E of the Russell 2000 as 19.6; the S&P 500 as 16.58; and the Dow as 15.05. @MarkM: perhaps the Dow 30 suits you better, with a P/E of 15.05. Seems like a very reasonable P/E to me, and perhaps a place to put some money, on the eft DIA
    Summary:
    1. The overall stock market, the total market, has a forward P/E of roughly 17.3 to 17.4
    2. Small cap growth has a forward P/E of roughly 22.5 to 25
    3. Small cap overall (value plus growth) has a P/E of roughly 19.6 to 20.4
    4. Small cap value has a P/E of roughly 16.65 to 17.5 to 18.75, depending on the source of the information. Don't have a great consensus on that one. Would need to study this more to get a better handle on why the figures vary so much.
  • Ok. Let's talk a little about Third Avenue Value Fund -- TAVFX
    What is going on at Third Avenue Value Fund does not inspire confidence. The old manager, Ian Lapey, is out with still no explanation or information. The new manager's start date I believe, was June 10th. Not much to go on. (Why does Jang Sung-taek keep coming to mind?)
    The new manager, Chip Rewey, is new to Third Avenue. Who knows? One can only surmise, guess and assume.
    My guess is simply that Ian Lapey got fired because Marty Whitman was disappointed in him or his performance, for some unknown reason or reasons. If Marty still makes these decisions, that is. Do we know?
    I certainly have no criticism for anyone who decides to cut and run right now.
    This is how I am handling it, and why.....
    TAVFX is now on the shortest of short leashes. Currently, its YTD gain of 7.82% puts it in the 17th percentile in M*'s World Stock category, and it is in the 72nd percentile for the past 12 months. If and when the YTD percentile number becomes 51% or greater, I sell. On January 1, 2015 I switch to the 12 month percentile number.
    That's the what. Here's my "why".
    1. Inaction is always to be preferred over action, so it's time to just calm down and wait a little.
    2. I have had this fund for many years, enjoy reading Marty's letters, and believe it offers a unique strategy that adds both safety and diversification (recent 70% peak to trough decline duly noted)
    3. I learned from Janus Contrarian (JSVAX) that sometimes sudden management changes can lead to great results. The old manager the left for a bigger better deal I guess. It was disgusting at the time, but since the new manager started he has been absolutely kicking butt and taking names.
    4. I asked rhetorically on M* board a while back "If I hold TAVFX until its 15-year percentile rank is below average, do you reckon I'll ever sell it?". Of course I don't know the answer to that question, and neither does anyone else. I hate to sell a fund that might end up being exactly what I am looking for in a fund -- above average over the long term.
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    @rjb112 Here is a GMO "white paper" on quality. If you can't open it (I have a registration at GMO.com) try googling 'Profits for the Long Run: Affirming the Case for Quality' by Chuck Joyce and Kimball Mayer. They lean towards corporate profitability, which they claim is predictable and safe. You could probably throw in cash flow and ROE as good proxy measures.
    We believe, and have to date demonstrated, that the best ex-ante indicator of low forward absolute risk is found not by studying historical market price data, but through the study of corporate profits. This harks back to the way in which Ben Graham talked of risk. He argued that real risk was “the danger of a loss of quality and earnings power through economic changes or deterioration in management.”
    Following this logic would argue for a portfolio constructed of companies with high and stable profits, which should, by controlling “real risk,” result in low and stable “price risk.” Hence one needs a framework for identifying future corporate profitability.
    ...
    Standard orthodoxy such as the positive relationship between leverage and profitability is demonstrably backwards. Contrary to modern corporate finance theory, higher returns to corporations and equity holders result from unassailable corporate moats, not from corporate leverage. This is the world as described by Warren Buffett, not Modigliani-Miller.
    At the end of the day, the returns (or lack thereof) earned by stock investors are entirely a function of the underlying corporate profits of the stocks held in a portfolio. The exchanges offer no more than a pass-through of earnings to investors. In the absence of earnings, there will eventually be abysmal returns and no dividends. If there are earnings, any price volatility will ultimately net out, delivering those earnings to investors with a long-term time horizon.
    This argues strongly for a risk and investing framework focused on the survivability of corporate profits under any scenario. Companies with high and stable profits do not go bankrupt. Companies with exceptional profitability generate exceptional returns. Likewise, those with low profits will fare poorly
    To take this back to the SCV discussion, because it wraps up the distinctions in the positions very neatly, compare this quote with MJG's last post:
    Small size often makes the company more vulnerable to unexpected perturbations. Typically their product line is more focused and not as diverse as a Large firm. Another risk factor is that growing businesses are often not geography dispersed. Their marketing is regional, not international, so localized disturbances more directly impact their sales.
    The accessible funding line for these smaller outfits is more fragile with lower reserves and less access to loans and at higher interest rates when they can be secured. Large companies have survived their growing phase and are more stable; smaller firms are more subject to business model failures and exogenous disruptions (a new competitor or invention) with bankruptcy a higher probability.
    See how these two theories of outperformance are saying exactly opposite things?
    VISVX has outperformed VFINX since inception. But small caps haven't over longer time frames (1979-present), and especially in the period from 1984-1999. They also fell much harder in 2008. I'm agnostic to why, but there is another side to this from what the financial orthodoxy says that is very compelling.
    As to "quality" funds, I would suspect that the usual suspects are in play: VIG, MOAT, USMV, SPLV, VDIGX, SEQUX, PRBLX (I own), LEXCX, and BRK.B. I think some of the smart-beta folks might be coming up with "quality" oriented small cap funds. There are some small cap OEFs that seem to try to do this as well, like VVPSX, MSCFX, and Walthausen.
    Thanks for the chance to ramble in this thread. I enjoyed it. Now back to Series 7 land.
  • Motif Aims To Disrupt Discount Brokers, Mutual Funds
    FYI: This is a three page article, unfortunately the printer-friendly version of SFGate has not worked for some time.
    Regards,
    Ted
    http://www.sfgate.com/business/networth/article/Motif-aims-to-disrupt-discount-brokers-mutual-5587094.php
    Previous MFO Discussions Of Motif:
    http://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/search?Search=motif
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    FWIW, here the newest GMO 7 year forecast has U.S. Quality @ 2.3%, U.S. large cap @ -1.5%, and U.S. Small Cap @ -4.5% annual after inflation.
    I'm also dubious of M*'s Vanguard figures because they only update by the quarter. IJS, which is updated daily lists a P/E of 18.75 vs. ITOT which has a P/E of 17.33.
    Take with whatever grains of salt you like.
    @mrdarcy or anyone else who knows: Can we get a clear, unambiguous definition of what GMO means by "U.S. Quality"? What mutual funds and exchange traded funds are there that focus on what GMO calls "U.S. Quality"? Note from above that U.S. Quality is not the same as U.S. large cap.
    Also, I think GMO may be using the Shiller CAPE 10 price to earnings ratio to determine these expected 7-year returns. There are exchange traded funds and one mutual fund that specifically choose low Shiller CAPE 10 ratios. For example, Barclays ETN+ Shiller CAPE ETN CAPE ; also the exchange traded fund GVAL specifically chooses only countries that have low Shiller P/E ratios, and currently the portfolio has a P/E of 11.5 per Morningstar. Also DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced CAPE N DSENX