Category Archives: Mutual Fund Commentary

November 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

I had imagined this as the “post-storm, pre-cliff” edition of the Observer but it appears that “post-storm” would be a very premature characterization.  For four million of our friends who are still without power, especially those along the coast or in outlying areas, the simple pleasures of electric lighting and running water remain a distant hope.  And anything that looks like “normal” might be months in their future.  Our thoughts, prayers, good wishes and spare utility crews go out to them.

I thought, instead, I’d say something about the U.S. presidential election.  This is going to sting, but here it is:

It’s going to be okay.

Hard to believe, isn’t it?  We’re acculturated into viewing the election if as it were some apocalyptic video game whose tagline reads: “America can’t survive .”  The reality is, we can and we will.  The reality is that both Obama and Romney are good guys: smart, patriotic, obsessively hard-working, politically moderate, fact-driven, given to compromise and occasionally funny.  The reality is that they’re both trapped by the demands of electoral politics and polarized bases.

But, frankly, freed of the constraints of those bases, these guys would agree on rather more than they disagree on.  In a less-polarized world, they could run together as a ticket (Obomney 2020!) and do so with a great deal of camaraderie and mutual respect. (Biden-Ryan, on the other hand, would be more than a little bit scary.)  Neither strikes me as a great politician or polished communicator; that’s going to end up constraining – and perhaps crippling – whoever wins.

Why are we so negative?  Because negative (“fear and loathing on the campaign trail”) raises money (likely $6 billion by the time it’s all done) and draws viewers.  While it’s easy to blame PACs, super PACs and other dark forces for that state, the truth is that the news media – mainstream and otherwise – paint good men as evil.  A startling analysis conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism found that 72% of all character references to Messrs. Obama and Romney are negative, one of the most negative set of press portrayals on record.

I live in Iowa, labeled a “battleground state,” and I receive four to six (largely poisonous) robo-calls a day.  And so here’s the final reality: Iowa is not a battleground and we’d all be better off if folks stopped using the term.  It’s a place where a bunch of folks are worried, a bunch of folks (often the same ones) are hopeful and we’re trying to pick as best we can.

The Last Ten: T. Rowe Price in the Past Decade

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.  We started with Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches.  Sadly, the pattern of the last decade is clear and clearly worse: despite 154 fund launches since 2002, Fidelity has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price is a far smaller firm.  Where Fidelity has $1.4 trillion in assets under management, Price is under $600 billion.  Fidelity manages 340 funds.  Price has 110.  Fidelity launched 154 funds in a decade, Price launched 22.

Morningstar Rating

Category

Size (millions, slightly rounded)

Africa & Middle ★★★ Emerging Markets Stock

150

Diversified Mid Cap Growth ★★★ Mid-Cap Growth

200

Emerging Markets Corporate Bond

Emerging Markets Bond

30

Emerging Markets Local Currency

Emerging Markets Bond

50

Floating Rate

Bank Loan

80

Global Infrastructure

Global Stock

40

Global Large-Cap ★★★ Global Stock

70

Global Real Estate ★★★★★ Global Real Estate

100

Inflation Protected Bond ★★★ Inflation-Protected Bond

570

Overseas Stock ★★★ Foreign Large Blend

5,000

Real Assets

World Stock

2,760

Retirement 2005 ★★★★ Target Date

1,330

Retirement 2010 ★★★ Target Date

5,850

Retirement 2015 ★★★★ Target Date

7,340

Retirement 2025 ★★★ Target Date

9,150

Retirement 2035 ★★★★ Target Date

6,220

Retirement 2045 ★★★★ Target Date

3,410

Retirement 2050 ★★★★ Target Date

2,100

Retirement 2055 ★★★★★ Target-Date

490

Retirement Income ★★★ Retirement Income

2,870

Strategic Income ★★ Multisector Bond

270

US Large-Cap Core ★★★ Large Blend

50

What are the patterns?

  1. Most Price funds reflect the firm’s strength in asset allocation and emerging asset classes. Price does really first-rate work in thinking about which assets classes make sense and in what configuration. They’ve done a good job of communicating that research to their investors, making things clear without making them childish.
  2. Most Price funds succeed. Of the funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).
  3. Most Price funds remain reasonably nimble. While Fido funds quickly swell into the multi-billion range, a lot of the Price funds have remaining under $200 million which gives them both room to grow and to maneuver. The really large funds are the retirement-date series, which are actually funds of other funds.
  4. Price continues to buck prevailing wisdom. There’s no sign of blossoming index fund business or the launch of a series of superfluous ETFs. There’s a lot to be said for knowing your strengths and continuing to develop them.

Finally, Price continues to deliver on its promises. Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play. The success of that strategy is evident in Price’s domination of . . .

The Observer’s Honor Roll, Unlike Any Other

Last month, in the spirit of FundAlarm’s “three-alarm” fund list, we presented the Observer’s second Roll Call of the Wretched.  Those were funds that managed to trail their peers for the past one-, three-, five- and ten-year periods, with special commendation for the funds that added high expenses and high volatility to the mix.

This month, I’d like to share the Observer’s Honor Roll of Consistently Bearable Funds.  Most such lists start with a faulty assumption: that high returns are intrinsically good.

Wrong!

While high returns can be a good thing, the practical question is how those returns are obtained.  If they’re the product of alternately sizzling and stone cold performances, the high returns are worse than meaningless: they’re a deadly lure to hapless investors and advisors.  Investors hate losing money much more than they love making it.

In light of that, the Observer asked a simple question: which mutual funds are never terrible?  In constructing the Honor Roll, we did not look at whether a fund ever made a lot of money.  We looked only at whether a fund could consistently avoid being rotten.  Our logic is this: investors are willing to forgive the occasional sub-par year, but they’ll flee in terror in the face of a horrible one.  That “sell low” – occasionally “sell low and stuff the proceeds in a zero-return money fund for five years” – is our most disastrous response.

We looked for no-load, retail funds which, over the past ten years, have never finished in the bottom third of their peer groups.   And while we weren’t screening for strong returns, we ended up with a list of funds that consistently provided them anyway.

U.S. stock funds

Strategy

Assets (millions)

2011 Honoree or the reason why not

Fidelity Growth Company (FDGRX)

Large Growth

44,100

Rotten 2002

Laudus Growth Investors US Large Cap Growth (LGILX)

Large Growth

1,400

2011 Honoree

Merger (MERFX)

Market Neutral

4,700

Rotten 2002

Robeco All Cap Value (BPAVX)

Large Value

400

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Capital Opportunities (PRCOX)

Large Blend

400

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Growth (RPMGX)

Mid-Cap Growth

18,300

2011 Honoree

TIAA-CREF Growth & Income (TIIRX)

Large Blend

2,900

Not around in 2002

TIAA-CREF Mid-Cap Growth (TCMGX)

Mid-Cap Growth

1,300

Not around in 2002

Vanguard Explorer (VEXPX)

Small Growth

9,000

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Mid Cap Growth (VMGRX)

Mid-Cap Growth

2,200

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Morgan Growth (VMRGX)

Large Growth

9,000

2011 Honoree

International stock funds

American Century Global Growth (TWGGX)

Global

400

2011 Honoree

Driehaus Emerging Markets Growth (DREGX)

Emerging Markets

900

2011 Honoree

Thomas White International (TWWDX)

Large Value

600

2011 Honoree

Vanguard International Growth (VWIGX)

Large Growth

17,200

2011 Honoree

Blended asset funds

Buffalo Flexible Income (BUFBX)

Moderate Hybrid

600

2011 Honoree

Fidelity Freedom 2020 (FFFDX)

Target Date

14,300

2011 Honoree

Fidelity Freedom 2030 (FFFEX)

Target Date

11,000

Rotten 2002

Fidelity Puritan (FPURX)

Moderate Hybrid

20,000

2011 Honoree

Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Extended Term (MNBAX)

Moderate Hybrid

1,300

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Balanced (RPBAX)

Moderate Hybrid

3,400

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Balanced (TRPBX)

Moderate Hybrid

1,700

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Income (PRSIX)

Conservative Hybrid

1,100

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Retirement 2030 (TRRCX)

Target Date

13,700

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Retirement 2040 (TRRDX)

Target Date

9,200

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Retirement Income (TRRIX)

Retirement Income

2,900

Not around in 2002

Vanguard STAR (VGSTX)

Moderate Hybrid

14,800

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Tax-Managed Balanced (VTMFX)

Conservative Hybrid

1,000

Rotten 2002

Specialty funds

Fidelity Select Industrials (FCYIX)

Industrial

600

Weak 2002

Fidelity Select Retailing (FSRPX)

Consumer Cyclical

600

Weak 2002

Schwab Health Care (SWHFX)

Health

500

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Global Technology (PRGTX)

Technology

700

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Media & Telecomm (PRMTX)

Communications

2,400

2011 Honoree

Reflections on the Honor Roll

These funds earn serious money.  Twenty-nine of the 33 funds earn four or five stars from Morningstar.  Four earn three stars, and none earn less.  By screening for good risk management, you end up with strong returns.

This is consistent with the recent glut of research on low-volatility investing.  Here’s the basic story: a portfolio of low-volatility stocks returns one to two percent more than the stock market while taking on 25% less risk.

That’s suspiciously close to the free lunch we’re not supposed to get.

There’s a very fine, short article on low-volatility investing in the New York Times: “In Search of Funds that Don’t Rock the Boat” (October 6, 2012).  PIMCO published some of the global data, showing (at slightly numbing length) that the same pattern holds in both developed and developing markets: “Stock Volatility: Not What You Might Think” (January 2012). There are a slug of ETFs that target low-volatility stocks but I’d be hesitant to commit to one until we’d looked at other risk factors such as turnover, market cap and sector concentration.

The roster is pretty stable.  Only four funds that qualified under these screens at the end of 2011 dropped out in 2012.  They are:

FPA Crescent (FPACX) – a 33% cash stake isn’t (yet) helping.  That said, this has been such a continually excellent fund that I worry more about the state of the market than about the state of Crescent.

New Century Capital (NCCPX) – a small, reasonably expensive fund-of funds that’s trailing 77% of its peers this year.  It’s been hurt, mostly, by being overweight in energy and underweight in resurgent financials.

New Century International (NCFPX) – another fund-of-funds that’s trailing about 80% of its peers, hurt by a huge overweight in emerging markets (primarily Latin), energy, and Canada (which is sort of an energy play).

Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) – it hasn’t been a good year to hold a lot of Treasuries, and PRPFX by mandate does.

The list shows less than half of the turnover you’d expect if funds were there by chance.

One fund deserves honorable mentionT. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRCWX) has only had one relatively weak year in this century; in 2007, it finished in the 69th percentile which made it (barely) miss inclusion.

What you’ve heard about T. Rowe Price is true.  You know all that boring “discipline, consistency, risk-awareness” stuff.  Apparently so.  There are 10 Price funds on the list, nearly one-third of the total.  Second place: Fidelity and Vanguard, far larger firms, with six funds.

Sure bets?  Nope.  Must have?  Dear God, no.  A potentially useful insight into picking winners by dodging a penchant for the occasional disaster?  We think so.

In dullness there is strength.

“TrimTabs ETF Outperforms Hedge Funds”

And underperforms pretty much everybody else.  The nice folks at FINAlternatives (“Hedge Fund and Private Equity News”) seem to have reproduced (or condensed) a press release celebrating the first-year performance of TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF (TTFS).

(Sorry – you can get to the original by Googling the title but a direct-link always takes you to a log-in screen.)

Why is this journalism?  They don’t offer the slightest hint about what the fund does.  And, not to rain on anybody’s ETF, but their trailing 12-month return (21.46% at NAV, as of 10/18) places them 2050th in Morningstar’s database.  That list includes a lot of funds which have been consistently excellent (Akre Focus, BBH Core Select (closing soon – see below), ING Corporate Leaders, Mairs & Power Growth and Sequoia) for decades, so it’s not immediately clear what warrants mention.

Seafarer Rolls On

Andrew Foster’s Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income Fund (SFGIX) continues its steady gains.

The fund is outperforming every reasonable benchmark: $10,000 invested at the fund’s inception has grown to $10,865 (as of 10/26/12).  The same amount invested in the S&P’s diversified emerging markets, emerging Asia and emerging Latin America ETFs would have declined by 5-10%.

Assets are steadily rolling in: the fund is now at $17 million after six months of operation and has been gaining nearly two million a month since summer.

Opinion-makers are noticing: Andrew and David Nadel of Royce Global Value (and five other funds ‘cause that’s what Royce managers do) were the guests on October 26th edition of Wealth Track with Consuelo Mack.  It was good to hear ostensible “growth” and “value” investors agree on so much about what to look for in emerging market stocks and which countries they were assiduously avoiding.  The complete interview on video is available here.  (Thanks to our endlessly vigilant Ted for both the heads-up and the video link.)

Legg Mason Rolls Over

Legg Mason seems to be struggling.  On the one hand we have the high visibility struggles of its former star manager, Bill Miller, who’s now in the position of losing more money for more people than almost any manager.  Their most recent financial statement, released July 27, shows that assets, operating revenue, operating income, and earnings are all down from the year before.   Beside that, there’s a more fundamental struggle to figure out what Legg Mason is and who wants to bear the name.

On October 5 2009 Legg announced a new naming strategy for its funds:

Most funds that were formerly named Legg Mason or Legg Mason Partners will now include the Legg Mason name, the name of the investment affiliate and the Fund’s strategy (such as the Legg Mason ClearBridge Appreciation Fund or the Legg Mason Western Asset Managed Municipals Fund).

The announced rationale was to “leverage the Legg Mason brand awareness.”

Welcome to the age of deleveraging:  This year those same funds are moving to hide the Legg Mason taint.  Western Asset dropped the Legg Mason number this summer.  Clearbridge is now following suit, so that the Legg Mason ClearBridge Appreciation Fund is about to become just Clearbridge Appreciation.

Royce, another Legg Mason affiliate, has never advertised that association.  Royce has always had a great small-value discipline. Since being acquired by Legg Mason in 2001, the firm acquired two other, troubling distinctions.

  1. Managers who are covering too many funds.  By way of a quick snapshot, here are the funds managed by 72-year-old Chuck Royce (and this is after he dropped several):
    Since … He’s managed …

    12/2010

    Royce Global Dividend Value

    08/2010

    Royce Micro-Cap Discovery

    04/2009

    Royce Partners

    06/2008

    Royce International Smaller-Companies

    09/2007

    Royce Enterprise Select

    12/2006

    Royce European Smaller Companies

    06/2005

    Royce Select II

    05/2004

    Royce Dividend Value

    12/2003

    Royce Financial Services

    06/2003

    Royce 100

    11/1998

    Royce Select I

    12/1995

    Royce Heritage

    12/1993

    Royce Total Return

    12/1991

    Royce Premier

    11/1972

    Royce Pennsylvania Mutual

     

    Their other senior manager, Whitney George, manages 11 funds.  David Nadel works on nine, Lauren Romeo helps manage eight.

  2. A wild expansion out of their traditional domestic small-value strength.  Between 1962 and 2001, Royce launched nine funds – all domestic small caps.  Between 2001 and the present, they launched 21 mutual funds and three closed-end funds in a striking array of flavors (Global Select Long/Short, International Micro-Cap, European Smaller Companies).  While many of those later launches have performed well, many have found no traction in the market.  Fifteen of their post-2001 launches have under $100 million in assets, 10 have under $10 million.  That translates into higher expenses in some already-expensive niches and a higher hurdle for the managers to overcome.Legg reports progressively weaker performance among the Royce funds in recent years:

    Three out of 30 funds managed by Royce outperformed their benchmarks for the 1-year period; 4 out of 24 for the 3-year period; 12 out of 19 for the 5-year period; and all 11 outperformed for the 10-year period.

That might be a sign of a fundamentally unhealthy market or the accumulated toll of expenses and expansion.  Shostakovich, one of our discussion board’s most experienced correspondents, pretty much cut to the chase on the day Royce reopened its $1.1 billion micro-cap fund to additional investors: “Chuck sold his soul. He kept his cashmere sweaters and his bow ties, but he sold his soul. And the devil’s name is Legg Mason.”  Interesting speculation.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

Scout Unconstrained Bond (SUBFX): If these guys have a better track record than the one held by any bond mutual fund (and they do), why haven’t you heard of it?  Worse yet, why hadn’t I?

Stewart Capital Mid-Cap (SCMFX):  If this is one of the top two or three or ten mid-cap funds in operation (and it is), why haven’t you heard of it?  Worse yet, why hadn’t I?

Launch Alert: RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write Fund (RNBWX)

On  October 12, 2012, RiverNorth launched their fourth fund, RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write Fund.  “Buy-write” describes a sort of “covered call” strategy in which an investor might own a security and then sell to another investor the option to buy the security at a preset price in a preset time frame.  It is, in general, a defensive strategy which generates a bit of income and some downside protection for the investor who owns the security and writes the option.

As with any defensive strategy, you end up surrendering some upside in order to avoid some of the downside.  RiverNorth’s launch announcement contained a depiction of the risk-return profiles for a common buy-write index (the BXM) and three classes of stock:

A quick read is that the BXM offered 90% of the upside of the stock market with only 70% of the downside, which seems the very definition of a good tradeoff.

RiverNorth believes they can do better through active management of the portfolio.  The fund will be managed by Eric Metz, who joined RiverNorth in 2012 and serves as their Derivatives Strategist.  He’s been a partner at Bengal Capital, a senior trader at Ronin Capital and worked at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).   The investment minimum is $5000.  Expenses are capped at 1.80%.

Because the strategy is complex, the good folks at RiverNorth have agreed to an extended interview at their offices in Chicago on November 8th.  With luck and diligence, we’ll provide a full profile of the fund in our December issue.

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves.  Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Twenty-nine new no-load funds were placed in registration this month.  Those include three load-bearing funds becoming no-loads, two hedge funds merging to become one mutual fund, one institutional fund becoming retail and two dozen new offerings.  An unusually large number of the new funds feature very experienced managers.  Four, in particular, caught our attention:

BBH Global Core Select is opening just as the five-star BBH Core Select closes.  Core Select invests about 15% of its money outside the U.S., while the global version will place at least 40% there.  One of Core Select’s managers will co-manage the new fund with a BBH analyst.

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that “seek[s] total return and provide income [and] a relatively stable risk profile.”  The managers, John Gambla and Rob A. Guttschow, had been managing five closed-end funds for Nuveen.

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund, which will invest in 40-80 large caps that trade “at a significant discount to the present value of future cash flows,” will be run by Joseph Huber, who also manages the five-star Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX) and Huber Equity Income (HULIX) funds.

Oakseed Opportunity Fund is a new global fund, managed by Greg L. Jackson and John H. Park. These guys managed or co-managed some “A” tier funds (Oakmark Global, Acorn, Acorn Select and Yacktman) before moving to Blum Capital, a private equity firm, from about 2004-2012.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down about 50 fund manager changes, including the blockbuster announcement of Karen Gaffney’s departure from Loomis Sayles.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity conference call

Based on the success of our September conference call with David Sherman of Cohanzick Asset Management and RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, we have decided to try to provide our readers with one new opportunity each month to speak with an “A” tier fund manager.

The folks at RiverPark generously agreed to participate in a second conference call with Observer readers. It will feature Mitch Rubin, lead manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RLSFX), a fund that we profiled in August as distinctive and distinctly promising.  This former hedge fund crushed its peers.

I’ll moderate the call.  Mitch will open by talking a bit about the fund’s strategy and then will field questions (yours and mine) on the fund’s strategies and prospects. The call is November 29 at 7:00 p.m., Eastern. Participants can register for the conference by navigating to  http://services.choruscall.com/diamondpass/registration?confirmationNumber=10020992

We’ll have the winter schedule in our December issue.  For now, I’ll note that managers of several really good funds have indicated a willingness to spend serious time with you.

Small Funds Communicating Smartly

The Mutual Fund Education Alliance announced their 2012 STAR Awards, which recognize fund companies that do a particularly good job of communicating with their investors.  As is common with such awards, there’s an impulse to make sure lots of folks get to celebrate so there are 17 sub-categories in each of three channels (retail, advisor, plan participant) plus eleven overall winners, for 62 awards in total.

US Global Investors was recognized as the best small firm overall, for “consistency of messaging and excellent use of the various distribution outlets.”  Matthews Asia was celebrated as the outstanding mid-sized fund firm.  Judges recognized them for “modern, effective design [and] unbelievable branding consistency.”

Ironically, MFEA’s own awards page is danged annoying with an automatic slide presentation that makes it hard to read about any of the individual winners.

Congratulations to both firms.  We’d also like to point you to our own Best of the Web winners for most effective site design: Seafarer Funds and Cook & Bynum Fund, with honorable mentions to Wintergreen, Auxier Focus and the Tilson Funds.

Briefly Noted . . .

Artio meltdown continues.  The Wall Street Journal reports that Richard Pell, Artio’s CEO, has stepped down.  Artio is bleeding assets, having lost nearly 50% of their assets under management in the past 12 months.  Their stock price is down 90% since its IPO and we’d already reported the closure of their domestic-equity funds.  This amounts to a management reshuffle, with Artio’s president becoming CEO and Pell remaining at CIO.  He’ll also continue to co-manage the once-great (top 5% over 15 years, bottom 5% over the past five years) Artio International Equity Fund (BJBIX) with Rudolph-Riad Younes.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth Fund (SSETX) reopened to new investors on November 1, 2012. It’s a decent little fund with below average expenses.  Both risk and return tend to be below average as well, with risk further below average than returns.

Fidelity announced the launch of a dozen new target-date funds in its Strategic Advisers Multi-Manager Series, 2020 through 2055 and Retirement Income.  The Multi-Manager series allows Fidelity to sell the skills of non-Fidelity managers (and their funds) to selected retirement plans.  Christopher Sharpe and Andrew Dierdorf co-manage all of the funds.

CLOSINGS

The board of BBH Core Select (BBTEX) has announced its imminent closure.  The five-star large cap fund has $3.2 billion in assets and will close at $3.5 billion.  Given its stellar performance and compact 30-stock portfolio, that’s certainly in its shareholders’ best interests.  At the same time, BBH has filed to launched a Global Core fund by year’s end.  It will be managed by one of BBTEX’s co-managers.  For details, see our Funds in Registration feature.

Invesco Balanced-Risk Commodity Strategy (BRCAX) will close to new investors effective November 15, 2012.

Investment News reports that 86 ETFs ceased operations in the first 10 months of 2012.  Wisdom Tree announced three more in late October (LargeCap Growth ROI,  South African Rand SZR and Japanese Yen JYF). Up until 2012, the greatest number of closures in a single calendar year was 58 during the 2008 meltdown.  400 more (Indonesian Small Caps, anyone?) reside on the ETF Deathwatch for October 2012; ETFs with tiny investor bases and little trading activity.  The hidden dimension of the challenge provided by small ETFs is the ability of their boards to dramatically change their investment mandates in search of new assets.  Investors in Global X S&P/TSX Venture 30 Canada ETF (think “Canadian NASDAQ”) suddenly found themselves instead in Global X Junior Miners ETF (oooo … exposure to global, small-cap nickel mining!).

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Under the assumption that indecipherable is good, Allianz announced three name changes: Allianz AGIC Structured Alpha Fund is becoming AllianzGI Structured Alpha Fund. Allianz AGIC U.S. Equity Hedged Fund becomes AllianzGI U.S. Equity Hedged Fund and Allianz NFJ Emerging Markets Value Fund becomes AllianzGI NFJ Emerging Markets Value Fund.

BBH Broad Market (BBBIX) has changed its name to BBH Limited Duration Fund.

Effective December 3, 2012, the expensive, small and underperforming Forward Aggressive Growth Allocation Fund (ACAIX) will be changed to the Forward Multi-Strategy Fund. Along with the new name, this fund of funds gets to add “long/short, tactical and other alternative investment strategies” to its armamentarium.  Presumably that’s driven by the fact that the fund does quite poorly in falling markets: it has trailed its benchmark in nine of the past nine declining quarters.  Sadly, adding hedge-like funds to the portfolio will only drive up expenses and serve as another drag on performance.

Schwab Premier Income (SWIIX) will soon become Schwab Intermediate-Term Bond, with lower expenses but a much more restrictive mandate.  At the moment the fund can go anywhere (domestic, international and emerging market debt, income- and non-income-producing equities, floating rate securities, REITs, ETFs) but didn’t, while the new fund will invest only in domestic intermediate term bonds.

Moving in the opposite direction, Alger Large Cap Growth Institutional (ALGRX) becomes Alger Capital Appreciation Focus at the end of the year. The fund will adopt an all-cap mandate, but will shrink the target portfolio size from around 100 stocks to 50.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

The Board of Directors of Bhirud Funds Inc. has approved the liquidation of Apex Mid Cap Growth Fund (BMCGX) effective on or about November 14, 2012. In announcing Apex’s place on our 2012 “Roll Call of the Wretched,” we noted:

The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $192,546 – $100,000 below last year’s level.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 9.2% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

We’re hopeful he puts his remaining assets in a nice, low-risk index fund.

The Board of Trustees of Dreyfus Investment Funds approved the liquidation of Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Tax-Sensitive Equity Fund (SDCEX) on January 8, 2013.  Ironically, this fund has outperformed the larger, newly-reopened SSETX.  And, while they were at it, the Board also approved the liquidation of Dreyfus Small Cap Fund (the “Fund”), effective on January 16, 2013

ING will liquidate ING Alternative Beta (IABAX) on December 7, 2012.  In addition to an obscure mandate (what is alternative beta?), the fund has managed to lose money over the past three years while drawing only $18 million in assets.

Munder International Equity Fund (MUIAX) is slated to be merged in Munder International Fund — Core Equity (MAICX), on December 7, 2012.

Uhhh . . .

Don’t get me wrong.  MUIAX is a bad fund (down 18% in five years) and deserves to go.  But MAICX is a worse fund by far (it’s down 29% in the same period).  And much smaller.  And newer.

This probably explains why I could never serve on a fund’s board of directors.  Their logic is simply too subtle for me.

Royce Mid-Cap (RMIDX) is set to be liquidated on November 19, 2012. It’s less than three years old, has performed poorly and managed to draw just a few million in assets.  The management team is being dispersed among Royce’s other funds.

It was named Third Millennium Russia Fund (TMRFX) and its charge was to invest “in securities of companies located in Russia.”  This is a fund that managed to gain or lose more than 70% in three of the past 10 years.  Investors have largely fled and so, effective October 10, 2012, the board of trustees tweaked things.  It’s now called Toreador International Fund and its mandate is to invest “outside of the United States.”  As of this writing, Morningstar had not yet noticed.

In Closing . . .


We’ve added an unusual bit of commercial presence, over to your right.  Amazon created a mini-site dedicated to the interests of investors.  In addition to the inevitable links to popular investing books, it features a weekly blog post, a little blog aggregator at the bottom (a lot of content from Bloomberg, some from Abnormal Returns and Seeking Alpha), and some sort of dead, dead, dead discussion group.  We thought you might find some of it useful or at least browseable, so we decided to include it for you.

And yes, it does carry MFO’s embedded link.  Thanks for asking!

Thanks, too, to all the folks (Gary, Martha, Dean, Richard, two Jacks, and one Turtle) who contributed to the Observer in October.

We’ll look for you in December.

 

October 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

The trees have barely begun to change color here in Iowa. The days are warm, football is in the air (had I mentioned that my son Will had a running touchdown on offense and a nifty interception on defense this week?) and dentists everywhere are gearing up for Halloween. It’s an odd time, then, for investors to be concerned with Santa Claus.

Augustana in autumn

The Quad at Augustana College in early autumn

And yet they are. The broad market indexes are up 2.5% in September (typically a rocky month), 16.2% year-to-date and 30% over the past 12 months. In a normal year, investors would hold their breaths through October and then look with happy anticipation to the arrival of “the Santa Claus rally.” In 80 of the past 100 years, stocks have risen in December, generally by a bit more than 2%.

The question folks are raising this year seems worth pondering: will the intersection of a bull run with a fiscal cliff make for a distinctly Grinchy end of the year? Will even the suspicion of such an outcome make enough folks lighten their stock exposure to trigger a rare year-end market sag?

I don’t know, but the prospect makes me especially grateful for the opportunity to enjoy the company of my students and the fading warmth of the harvest season.

The Last Ten: Fidelity’s New Fund Launches Since 2002

“The Last Ten” will be a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.  We start this month with Fidelity, the Beantown Behemoth.

There was, at one time, few safer bets than a new Fidelity fund.  New Fido funds had two things going from them: (1) Fidelity could afford to buy and support the brightest young managers around and (2) older Fidelity funds might, by happenstance, choose to buy a stock recently purchased by the new fund.  The size of those purchases could cause a stock’s price to spike, much to the profit of its early owners.  The effect was consistent enough that it became the subject of newsletters and academic studies.

Which leads us to the question: when was the last time that Fidelity launched a compelling fund?  You know, one-of-a-kind, innovative, must-have, that sort of thing?

Might it have been New Millenium (FMILX), 20 years ago?  If not, what?

Here’s an easier question: when was the last time that Fidelity launched a fund which now carries a five-star rating from Morningstar?

Answer: five years ago, with the launch of Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX) in November of 2007. It’s a fund so low-profile that it doesn’t appear in any of Fidelity’s advertising and is not covered by any of Morningstar’s analysts.  The only other five star fund launched by Fido in a decade is an institutional bond index fund, Spartan Intermediate Term Bond Index (FIBIX), December 2005.

That’s not to say that Fidelity hasn’t been launching funds.  They have.  Hundreds of them.  They’re just not very good.

It’s hard to generate an exact count of Fidelity’s new fund launches because some apparently new funds are just older funds being sold through new channels, such as the launch of a Fidelity Advisor fund that’s just a version of an older Fidelity one.

That said, here’s a rough 10 year total.  Fidelity has launched 154 new mutual funds in a decade.  Those appear as Fidelity, Fidelity Advisor, Fidelity Series and Strategic Adviser funds.  Taking the various share classes into account, Fido made 730 new packages available in the decade.

That includes:

26 Fidelity funds for retail investors

18 Fidelity Series funds – which are available for purchase only by other Fidelity funds.  The most amazing development there is the imminent launch of new funds for Joel Tillinghast and Will Danoff.  Mr. T has brilliantly managed the $35 billion Low Priced Stock (FLPSX) since 1989.  He recently completed a sabbatical, during which time the fund was run by a team.  The team has been retained as co-managers as part of what Fidelity admits is “succession planning.”  He’ll now also manage Intrinsic Opportunities.  Will Danoff, who manages the $85 billion Contrafund (FCNTX) and $20 billion Advisor News Insights (FNIAX) funds, is being asked to manage Opportunistic Insights.

20 Strategic Advisers funds (e.g. SMid Cap Multi-manager) – which rely on non-Fidelity managers.

9 Spartan index funds, some of which overlap Series index funds.

58 Fidelity Advisor funds – some (Advisor Small Cap Value) of which are near-duplicates of other Fidelity funds. But, it turns out that a fair number are either unique to the Advisor lineup or are distinct from their Fidelity sibling. The 14 “Income Replacement” series, for example, are distinct to the Advisor line. Will Danoff’s Advisor New Insights fund, for example, is not a clone of Contrafund.  Advisor Midcap II A is sort of a free agent. Advisor Value Leaders is bad, but unparalleled.

13 “W” class Freedom Index funds are another distinct adviser-only set, which have the same target dates as the Freedom series but which execute exclusively through index funds.

How good are those funds?  They’re definitely “not awful.”  Of the 730 new fund packages, 593 have earned Morningstar ratings.  Morningstar awards five stars to the top 10% of funds in a group and four stars to the next 22.5%.  By sheer coincidence, you’d expect Fido to have fielded 59 new five-star funds.  They only have 18.  And you’d expect 192 to have four or five star ratings.  They managed 118.  Which is to say, new Fidelity funds are far less likely to be excellent than either their storied past or pure chance would dictate.

The same pattern emerges if you look at Morningstar’s “gold” rating for funds, their highest accolade.  Fidelity has launched nine “Gold” funds in that period – all are either bond funds, or index funds, or bond index funds.  None is retail, and none is an actively-managed stock or hybrid fund.

Why the apparent mediocrity of their funds?  I suspect three factors are at work.  First, Fidelity is in the asset-gathering business now rather than the sheer performance business.  The last thing that institutional investors (or even most financial planners) want are high-risk, hard-to-categorize strategies.  They want predictable packages of services, and Fidelity is obliged to provide them.  Second, Fidelity’s culture has turned cautious.  Young managers are learning from early on that “safe is sane.”  If that’s the case, they’re not likely to be looking for the cutting edge of anything.  The fact that they’re turning to overworked 25-year veterans to handle new in-house funds might be a sign of how inspiring the Fidelity “bench” has become.  Third and finally, Fidelity’s too big to pursue interesting projects.  It’s hard for any reasonably successful Fidelity fund to stay below a billion in assets, which means that niche strategies and those requiring nimble funds are simply history.

Bottom line: the “Fidelity new-fund effect” seems history, as Fidelity turns more and more to index funds, repackaged products and outside managers.  But at least they’re unlikely to be wretched, which brings us to …

The Observer’s Annual “Roll Call of the Wretched”

It’s the time of year when we pause to enjoy two great German traditions: Oktoberfest and Schadenfreude.  While one of my favorites, Leinenkugel’s Oktoberfest, was shut out (Bent River Brewery won first, second and third places at the Quad City’s annual Brew Ha Ha festival), it was a great excuse to celebrate fall on the Mississippi.

And a glass of Bent River’s Mississippi Blonde might be just what you need to enjoy the Observer’s annual review of the industry’s Most Regrettable funds.  Just as last year, we looked at funds that have finished in the bottom one-fourth of their peer groups for the year so far.  And for the preceding 12 months, three years, five years and ten years.  These aren’t merely “below average.”  They’re so far below average they can hardly see “mediocre” from where they are.

When we ran the screen in October 2011, there are 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $70 million.  In 2012 there were . . . 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $77 million.

Since managers love to brag about the consistency of their performance, here are the most consistently awful funds that have over a billion in assets.  Funds repeating from last year are flagged in red.

  Morningstar Category

Total Assets
($ mil)

BBH Broad Market Intermediate Bond

2,900

Bernstein International Foreign Large Blend

1,497

Bernstein Tax-Managed Intl Foreign Large Blend

3,456

CRA Qualified Investment CRA Intermediate Bond

1,488

DFA Two-Year Global Fixed-Income World Bond

4,665

Eaton Vance Strategic Income B Multisector Bond

2,932

Federated Municipal Ultrashort Muni National Short

4,022

Hussman Strategic Growth Long/Short Equity

3,930

Invesco Constellation A Large Growth

2,515

Invesco Global Core Equity A World Stock

1,279

Oppenheimer Flexible Strategies Moderate Allocation

1,030

Pioneer Mid-Cap Value A Mid-Cap Value

1,106

Thornburg Value A Large Blend

2,083

Vanguard Precious Metals and M Equity Precious Metals

3,042

Wells Fargo Advantage S/T Hi-Y High Yield Bond

1,102

   

37,047

Of these 13, two (DFA and Wells) deserve a pass because they’re very much unlike their peer group.  The others are just billions of bad.

What about funds that didn’t repeat from last year’s list?  Funds that moved off the list:

  1. Liquidated – the case of Vanguard Asset Allocation.
  2. Fired or demoted the manager and are seeing at least a short term performance bump – Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid Cap (FMCBX ), Fidelity Magellan (FMAGX), Hartford US Government Securities (HAUSX), and Vantagepoint Growth (VPGRX) are examples.
  3. They got lucky.  Legg Mason Opportunity “C”, for example, has less than a billion left in it and is doing great in 2012, while still dragging  a 100th percentile ranking for the past three and five years. Putnam Diversified Income (PINDX) is being buoyed by strong performance in 2009 but most of 2011 and 2012 have been the same old, sad story for the fund.

The most enjoyable aspect of the list is realizing that you don’t own any of these dogs – and that hundreds of thousands of poor saps are in them because of the considered advice of training financial professionals (remember: 11 of the 13 are loaded funds, which means you’re paying a professional to place you in these horrors).

Just When You Thought It Couldn’t Get Any Worse

I then refined the search with the Observer’s “insult to injury” criteria: funds that combined wretched performance with above-average to high risk and above average fees.  The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $192,546 – $100,000 below last year’s level.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 9.2% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

Likewise, with Prasad Growth (PRGRX) whose performance graph looks like this:

The complete Roll Call of Wretched:

  Morningstar Category

Total Assets
($ mil)

AllianceBern Global Value A World Stock 44
Apex Mid Cap Growth Small Growth <1
API Efficient Frontier Value Mid-Cap Blend 22
CornerCap Balanced Moderate Allocation 18
Eaton Vance AMT-Free Ltd Maturity Muni National Interm 67
Eaton Vance CT Municipal Income Muni Single State Long 120
Eaton Vance KY Municipal Income Muni Single State Long 55
Eaton Vance NY Ltd Maturity Muni Muni New York Intermediate 91
Eaton Vance TN Municipal Income Muni Single State Long 53
Legg Mason WA Global Inflation Inflation-Protected Bond 41
Litman Gregory Masters Value Large Blend 81
Midas Equity Precious Metals 55
Pacific Advisors Mid Cap Value Mid-Cap Blend 5
Pioneer Emerging Markets A Diversified Emerging Mkts 316
Prasad Growth World Stock <1
ProFunds Precious Metals Ultra Equity Precious Metals 51
ProFunds Semiconductor UltraSe Technology   4
Pyxis Government Securities B Intermediate Government 83
Rochdale Large Value Large Blend 20
SunAmerica Focused Small-Cap Value Small Blend 101
SunAmerica Intl Div Strat A Foreign Large Blend 70
SunAmerica US Govt Securities Intermediate Government 137
Tanaka Growth Mid-Cap Growth 11
Thornburg Value A Large Blend 2,083
Timothy Plan Strategic Growth Aggressive Allocation 39
Turner Concentrated Growth Investor Large Growth 35
Wilmington Large Cap Growth A Large Growth 89
    3,691

I have a world of respect for the good folks at Morningstar.  And yet I sometimes wonder if they aren’t being a bit generous with funds they’ve covered for a really long time.  The list above represents funds which, absent wholesale changes, should receive zero – no – not any – zilch investor dollars.  They couple bad performance, high risk and high expenses.

And yet:

Thornburg Value (a “Bronze” fund): “This fund’s modified management team deserves more time.”  What?  The former lead manager retired in 2009.  The current managers have been on-board since 2006.  The fund has managed to finish in the bottom 1 – 10% of its peers every year since.  Why do they deserve more time?

Litman Gregory Masters Value: “This fund’s potential is stronger than its long-term returns suggest.”  What does that mean?  For every trailing time period, it trails more or less 90% of its peers.  Is the argument, “hey, this could easily become a bottom 85th percentile fund”?

Two words: run away!  Two happier words: “drink beer!”

Chip, the Observer’s technical director, deserves a special word of thanks for her research and analysis on this piece.  Thanks, Chip!

RPHYX Conference Call

For about an hour on September 13th, David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC, manager of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Somewhere between 40-50 people signed up for the RiverPark call but only about two-thirds of them signed-in.  For the benefit of folks interested in hearing David’s discussion of the fund, here’s a link to an mp3 version of Thursday night’s conference call. The RiverPark folks guess it will take between 10-30 seconds to load, depending on your connection.  At least on my system it loads in the same window that I’m using for my browser, so you might want to right-click and choose the “open in a new tab” option.

http://78449.choruscall.com/riverpark/riverpark120913.mp3

When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.

The conference call was a success for all involved.  Once I work out the economics, I’d like to offer folks the opportunity for a second moderated conference call in November and perhaps in alternate months thereafter.  Let me know what you think.

Observer Fund Profiles:

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX): RPHYX has performed splendidly since inception, delivering what it promises, a cash management fund capable of generating 300 basis points more than a money market with minimal volatility.  This is an update of our September 2011 profile.

T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX): a Clark-Kentish sort of fund.  One moment quiet, unassuming, competent then – when inflation roars – it steps into a nearby phone booth and emerges as . . .

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves.  Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Each month, though, there are interesting new no-load retail funds and, more recently, actively managed ETFs.  This month’s funds are due to be launched before the end of 2012.  Two, in particular, caught our attention:

Buffalo Dividend Focus Fund will try to generate “current income” as its primary goal, through reliance on dividends.  That’s a rare move and might reflect some pessimism about the prospects of using bonds for that goal.  GMO, for example, projects negative real returns for bonds over the next 5-7 years.  It’s particularly interesting that John Kornitzer will run the fund.  John has done a really solid job with Buffalo Flexible Income (BUFBX) over the years and is Buffalo’s founder.

RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income Fund is the latest collaboration between RiverNorth and another first-tier specialist.  RiverNorth’s unmatched strength is in using an asset allocation strategy that benefits from their ability to add arbitrage gains from pricing inefficiencies in closed-end funds.  They’re partnering with Oaktree Capital Management, which is best known in the mutual fund world for its find work on Vanguard Convertible Securities (VCVSX).   Oaktree’s principals have been working together since the mid-1980s on “high yield bonds, convertible securities, distressed debt and principal investments.”  They’re managing $78 billion of institutional and private money for folks on four continents.  Their founder, Howard Marks, still writes frequent shareholder letters (a la Jeremy Grantham) which are thoughtful and well-argued (despite the annoying watermark splashed across each page).

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 40 fund manager changes, down from last month’s bloodbath in which 70 funds changed management.

WhiteBox, Still in the Box

A number of readers have urged me to look into Whitebox Tactical Opportunities (WBMAX), and I agreed to do a bit of poking around.

There are some funds, and some management teams, that I find immediately compelling.  Others not.

So far, this is a “not.”

Here’s the argument in favor of Whitebox: they have a Multi-Strategy hedge fund which uses some of the same strategies and which, per a vaguely fawning article in Barron’s, returned 15% annually over the past decade while the S&P returned 5%. I’ll note that the hedge fund’s record does not get reported in the mutual funds, which the SEC allows when it believes that the mutual fund replicates the hedge.  And, too, the graphics on their website are way cool.

Here’s the reservation: their writing makes them sound arrogant and obscure.  They advertise “a proprietary, multi-factor quantitative model to identify dislocations within and between equity and credit markets.”  At base, they’re looking for irrational price drops.  They also use broad investment themes (they like US blue chips, large cap financials and natural gas producers), are short both the Russell 2000 (which is up 14.2% through 9/28) and individual small cap stocks, and declare that “the dominant theories about how markets behave and the sources of investment success are untrue.”  They don’t believe in the efficient market hypothesis (join the club).

After nine months, the fund is doing well (up 13% through 9/28) though it’s trailed its peers in about a third of those months.

I’ll try to learn more in the month ahead, but I’ll first need to overcome a vague distaste.

Briefly Noted . . .

RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) continues to rock.  It’s in the top 2% of all large-growth funds for the past 12 months and has attracted $450 million in assets.  Manager David Rolfe recently shared two analyses of the fund’s recent performance.  Based on Lipper data, it’s the fourth-best performing large growth fund over the past year.  Morningstar data placed it in the top 30 for the past three months.  The fund was also featured in a Forbes article, “Investors will starve on growth stocks alone.”  David is on the short-list of managers who we’d like to draw into a conference call with our readers.  A new Observer profile of the fund is scheduled for November.

Small Wins for Investors

As we noted last month, on Sept. 4, Aston Funds reopened ASTON/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) to new investors after reallocating capacity to the mutual fund from the strategy’s separate accounts. The firm still intends to close the entire strategy at roughly $1 billion in assets, which should help preserve manager Eric Cinnamond’s ability to navigate the small-cap market.

In a “look before you leap” development, Sentinel Small Company Fund (SAGWX)  reopened to new investors on September 17, 2012.  Except for the fact that the fund’s entire management team resigned six weeks earlier, that would be solidly good news.

Brown Capital Management Small Company (BCSIX) reopened on Sept. 4, 2012.  Morningstar considers this one of the crème de la crème of small growth funds, with both five stars and a “Gold” rating.  It remained closed for less than one year.

CLOSINGS

Loomis Sayles Small Cap Growth (LCGRX) closed to new investors on Sept. 4, 2012.

AQR Risk Parity (AQRNX) will close to new investors on November 16. If you’ve got somewhere between $1 million and $5 million sitting around, unallocated, in your risk-parity investment pot, you might consider this high-minimum fund.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

American Century Inflation Protection Bond (APOAX) is now American Century Short Duration Inflation Protection Bond, which follows a strategy change that has the fund focusing on, well, short duration bonds.

The former BNY Mellon Mid Cap Stock Fund is now BNY Mellon Mid Cap Multi-Strategy Fund and its portfolio has been divided among several outside managers.

Federated Asset Allocation (FSTBX) will become Federated Global Allocation in December.  It will also be required to invest at least 30% outside the US, about 10% is non-US currently.  The fund’s bigger problem seem more related to a high turnover, high risk strategy than to a lack of exposure to the Eurozone.

Virtus Global Infrastructure (PGUAX) changed its name to Virtus Global Dividend (PGUAX) on September 28, 2012.

That same day, Loomis Sayles Absolute Strategies (LABAX) became Loomis Sayles Strategic Alpha Fund. Loomis had been sued by the advisors to the Absolute Strategies Fund (ASFAX), who thought Loomis might be trading on their good name and reputation.  While admitting nothing, Loomis agreed to a change.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Columbia has merged too many funds to list – 18 in the latest round and 67 since its merger with RiverSource.  Okay, fine, here’s the list:

      • Connecticut Tax-Exempt Fund
      • Diversified Bond Fund
      • Emerging Markets Opportunity Fund
      • Frontier Fund
      • Government Money Market Fund
      • High Yield Opportunity Fund
      • Large Cap Value Fund
      • LifeGoal Income Portfolio
      • Massachusetts Tax-Exempt Fund
      • Mid Cap Growth Opportunity Fund
      • Multi-Advisor International Value Fund
      • Portfolio Builder Moderate Aggressive Fund
      • Portfolio Builder Moderate Conservative Fund
      • Select Small Cap Fund
      • Small Cap Growth Fund II
      • Variable Portfolio – High Income Fund
      • Variable Portfolio – Mid Cap Growth Fund
      • Variable Portfolio – Money Market Fund

Dreyfus/Standish International Fixed Income Fund is slated to merge into Dreyfus/Standish Global Fixed Income Fund (DHGAX).

In an exceedingly rare move, Fidelity is moving to close three funds with an eye to liquidating them. The Dead Funds Walking are Fidelity Fifty (FFTYX), Fidelity Tax Managed Stock (FTXMX) and Fidelity 130/30 Large Cap (FOTTX). The largest is Fifty, with nearly $700 million in assets. Morningstar’s Janet Yang expressed her faith in Fifty’s manager and opined in April that this was a “persuasive option for investors.” Apparently Fidelity was not persuaded. The other two funds, both undistinguished one-star laggards, had about $100 million between them.

Janus Worldwide (JAWWX) is being merged into Janus Global Research (JARFX) at the start of 2013.  That seems like an almost epochal change: JAWWX was once a platform for displaying the sheer brilliance of its lead manager (Helen Young Hayes), then things crumbled.  Returns cratered, Hayes retired, assets dropped by 90% and now it’s being sucked into a fund run by Janus’s analyst team.

According to her LinkedIn page, Ms. Hayes is now an Advisor at Red Rocks Capital, LLC (their site doesn’t mention her),  Director at HEAF (a non-profit) and Advisor at Q Advisors, LLC (but only in the “advisory” sense, she’s not one of the actual Q Advisors).

Although it’s not mentioned on his LinkedIn page, George Maris – who managed JAWWX to a 5% loss during his tenure while his peers booked a 2% gain – will continue to manage Janus Global Select (JORNX), a desultory fund that he took over in August.

Chuck Jaffe used the Janus closing as a jumping-off point for a broader story about the excuses we make to justify keeping wretched funds.  Chuck does a nice job of categorizing and debunking our rationalizations.  It’s worth reading.

A bunch of small Pyxis funds have vanished: Short-Term Government (HSJAX) and  Government Securities (HGPBX) were both absorbed by Pyxis Fixed Income (HFBAX) which, itself, has a long-term losing record.  International Equity (HIQAX) merged into Pyxis Global Equity (HGMAX), and U.S. Equity (HUEAX) into Pyxis Core America Equity (HCOAX).  All of those funds, save Core America, have very weak long-term records.

Triex Tactical Long/Short Fund (TLSNX) closed on September 4, moved to cash and liquidated on September 27.  Not sure what to say.  It has just $2 million in assets, but it’s less than a year old and has substantially above-average performance (as of early September) relative to its “multialternative” peer group.

Turner Concentrated Growth Fund (yep – that stalwart from the “Roll Call of the Wretched,” above) is being merged into Turner Large Growth Fund (TCGFX).

In Closing . . .

For users of our discussion board, we’re pleased to announce the creation of a comprehensive Users Guide.  As with many of our resources, it’s a gift to the community from one of the members of the community.  In this case, Old Joe, who has many years of experience in technical writing, spent the better part of a month crafting the Guide even as chip and Accipiter kept tweaking the software and forcing rewrites.  OJ’s Guide is clear, visually engaging and starts with a sort of Quick Start section for casual users then an advanced section for folks who want to use the wealth of features that aren’t always immediately observable.

For which chip, Accipiter and I all say “thanks, big guy!  You did good.”

Since launch, the Observer has been read by 99,862 people and our monthly readership is pretty steadily around 8500.  Thanks to you all for your trust and for the insights you’ve shared.  Here’s the obligatory reminder: please do consider using (and sharing) the Observer’s link to Amazon.com.  While it’s easy to make a direct contribution to the Observer, only two or three folks have been doing so in recent months (thanks Gary, glad we could help! And thanks Carl, you’re an ace!) which makes the Amazon program really important.

We’ll look for you in November.  Find a nice harvest festival and enjoy some apples for us!

September 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to what are, historically, the two most turbulent months in the market.  Eight of the Dow’s 20 biggest one-day gains ever have occurred in September or October but so have 12 of the 20 biggest one-day losses.

And that might be a good thing.  Some exceedingly talented investors, like Eric “I Like Volatility” Cinnamond (see below), visibly perk up at the opportunities that panic presents.  And it will help distract us from the fact that, of all the things the two major political parties are about to launch (and they’re gonna launch a lot), the nicest is mud.

I wonder if this explains why the Germans have Octoberfest, but launch it in September?

Gary Black as savior?  Really?

Calamos Investments announced August 23 that they had appointed Gary Black as their new “global co-CIO.”  That was coincident with the departure of Nick Calamos from the co-CIO role.  Mr. Calamos had a sudden urge “to pursue personal interests.”

Gary Black?

That Gary Black? 

Gary Black

Black is most famous for serving for three years as CEO of Janus Investments.  During his watch, at least 15 equity managers left Janus and one won a $7.5 million lawsuit.  At the time of his dismissal (“amicable,” of course), he was reportedly trying to sell Janus to a larger firm.  The board disapproved, though we don’t know whether they disapproved of selling the firm or of Black’s inability to get an appropriate price for it.

A snapshot of Janus Capital Group’s balance sheet doesn’t exactly represent a ringing endorsement of Black’s tenure.

Black comes (12/05) Black goes (12/09)
Revenue $953 million $849 million
Operating expenses 712M 1526M
Operating income 240M (678)M
Earnings per share 0.40 (4.55)
Long-term debt 262 M 792M
Book value per share $11.97 $5.50
Assets under management $135 billion $135 billion

(source: Morningstar and the 2009 Janus annual report)

Some might summarize it as: “huge expense, huge controversy, rising debt, falling value.”

Do you suppose, in light of all of that, that the deposed Nick Calamos’s endorsement of Black might have had a tinge of “I hope you like what you get?”  He says, “The Calamos investment team is in good hands given Gary’s significant experience in leading investment teams on a global basis.”

Calamos, of course, is not hiring him as CEO.  Nope. That role is held by the firm’s 72-year-old founder.  They’re hiring him on the basis of his ability as chief investment officer.

How does he do as CIO?  Well, a lot of his retooled Janus funds absolutely cratered in the 2008 meltdown.  And his own investment firm doesn’t seem poised to appear on the cover of Barron’s quite yet.  Part of the agreement includes acquisition of Black’s investment firm, Black Capital Management.  Black Capital has a trivial asset base ($70 million) and a bunch of small separate accounts (average value: $370,000).  Black filed in March to launch his own long-short mutual fund, but it never got off the ground.

Aston / River Road Independent Value reopens

Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) is an exceptionally good young fund from Eric Cinnamond, a manager who has a great 16 year record as a small cap, absolute return investor.  The fund opened in December 2010, we profiled it with some enthusiasm in February 2011.  The fund quickly established its bona fides, drew a lot of assets and, in a move of singular prudence, was closed while still small and maneuverable.

On September 4, it reopens to new investors.  While that’s good news, it also raises a serious question: “you’re bigger than you were when you closed and you’re sitting at 50% cash, so why on earth is this time to reopen?”

Mr. Cinnamond’s answer comes in two parts.  First, the fund reserved $200 million in capacity for anticipated institutional inflows which never materialized.  At the same time, lots of advisors have been disappointed at getting shut off.  Eric writes:

Yes, the Independent Value Fund is opening again.  The rationale was simple.  The $200 million we set aside for possible institutional investors was not allocated.  In other words, institutional consultants (there are a few exceptions), remain committed to the relative world of investing — a world that has never made sense to me.  Meanwhile, we’ve had like-minded advisors who want to purchase the Fund.  So our capacity target of the Portfolio has not changed, but we have changed our expectation of mix between advisor (the fund) vs. institutional assets (separate accounts).  More advisor assets and fewer institutional assets.

Second, the fund’s cash level and capacity are separate issues.  Right now companies are achieving utterly unsustainable profit margins, which makes them look cheap and attractive.  He shares Jeremy Grantham’s belief (or Jeremy shares Eric’s) that this is a bubble and it will inevitably (and painfully) end when profit margins regress to the mean.  In a non-bubbled world, he would have use for several hundred million dollars more than the fund holds. Again, Mr. Cinnamond:

The other obvious question is, “If you have so much cash, why would you want to grow assets?”  The size of the fund doesn’t impact our cash levels. Our opportunity set drives cash. If the fund is $1 million or $1 billion, cash would be the same percentage of the portfolio. We are simply reopening the fund to fill remaining capacity that was not taken by institutions.

In order to get the get the fund fully invested, I’m going to need higher volatility and improved valuations. With what appears to be an experiment in unlimited balance sheet expansion at the Federal Reserve, the timing of the return of free markets and volatility remains unknown. However, as with the mortgage credit boom and the tech bubble before, what is not sustainable will not be sustained. I am confident of that and I am confident the current profit cycle will revert as all others before it (there has never been a linear profit cycle). As peak corporate margins and profits revert, I believe the fund is position well to take advantage of the eventual return of the risk premium and volatility.

To those who suspect that he or River Road or Aston is simply making an asset grab, he notes that they are not going to market the reopened fund and that they even suspect that they may lose assets as skeptics pull their accounts.

We may actually lose assets initially due to the reopening (it may be frowned upon by some), I really don’t know and have never been too concerned about AUM.  One of my favorite investment quotes of all time is “I would rather lose half of my shareholders than half of their money” (I think this was Jean-Marie Eveillard). I strongly believe in this. Also, we do not plan on actively marketing the fund and my focus will remain on small cap research/analysis and portfolio management. As far as portfolio management goes, I remain committed to not violating our investment discipline of only allocating capital when getting adequately compensated relative to risk assumed.

As he waits for those bigger opportunities, he’s reallocating money toward some attractively priced small cap exploration and production and energy service companies.

We’ve updated our profile of the fund for folks interested in learning more.

Writing about real asset investing: stuff in the ground versus stuff on the page

We’re currently working on an essay about “real asset” investing and the quickly growing pool of real asset investment vehicles.  Real assets are things that have physical properties: precious metals, commodities, residential or commercial real estate, farmland, oil and gas fields, power generation plants, pipelines and other distribution systems, forestland and timber.

Advocates of real asset investing tend to justify inclusion of real assets on either (or both) of two grounds: normal and apocalyptic.

The “normal” argument observes that inflation is deadly to long-term returns, silently eroding the value of all gains. If inflation were to accelerate, that erosion might be dramatic. Neither stocks nor (especially) bonds generate real returns in periods of high and rising inflation. Real assets do.

The “apocalyptic” argument observes that we might be entering a period of increasingly unmanageable imbalances between the supply of everything from food and fertilizer to energy and metals, and the demand for them. The market’s way of addressing that imbalance is to raise the price of the items demanded. That should stimulate production and decrease consumption. Some pessimists, GMO’s Jeremy Grantham prime among them, believe that the imbalance might well be irreparable which will make the owners of resources very rich at the expense of others.

Regardless of which justification you use, you end up with inflation. Investors have the option of addressing inflation through a combination of two strategies: investing in real or tangible assets or investing in inflation-linked derivations. In the first case, you’d buy oil or the stocks of oil producing companies. In the second, you might buy TIPs or commodity index futures. The first strategy is called “real asset” investing. The second is “real return” investing.

Gaining the advantages of real asset investing requires devoting a noticeable but modest portion of your portfolio (5% at the low end and 25% at the high end) to such assets, but doing so with the knowledge that they’ll lag other investments as long as inflation stays low.

While there is a huge discussion of this issue in the institutional investment community, there’s very little directed to the rest of us. There’s only one no-load real assets fund, T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX). The fund was launched for exclusive use in Price’s asset allocation products, such as their Retirement Date funds. It has only recently been made available to the public. There are a half dozen load-bearing funds, two with quite reasonable performance, one diversified real assets ETF and a thousand ETFs representing individual slices of the real asset universe.

I’d planned on profiling both real asset investing and PRAFX this month, but the research is surprisingly complex and occasionally at odds. Rather than rush to print with a second-rate essay, we’ll keep working on it for our October issue.

Note to Paul Ryan, Investor: Focus!

For someone professing great economic knowledge, Paul Ryan’s portfolio reflects the careful discipline of a teenager at the mall. That, at least, is one reading of his 2012 financial disclosure statements on file with the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. (The statement was amended a week later to add a million or so held by his wife in a trust.)

Highlights of his financials:

  • Ryan is a real assets investor. Woo-hoo! Among his largest investments are shares of a mining partnership (Ava O Limited), gravel rights to a quarry in Oklahoma (Blondie & Brownie, LLC – I’m sure Obama’s people are sniffing around that one), IPath Dow Jones UBS Commodity fund, Nuveen Real Estate Securities, and a bunch of assets (time, mineral rights, a cabin?, and land) through the Little Land Company LP.
  • In 2011, he was adding to his real asset holdings. He bought shares of a commodity ETF (and sold part four months later), Pioneer Natural Resources Co, a TIPS fund and (on three occasions) a real estate fund.
  • Directly or through family trusts, Ryan owns about three dozen mutual funds, mostly solid and unexceptional (think Artisan, Fido, Hartford, T Rowe).
  • He’s neither a fan of The Great Man theory of investing nor of passively managed investments. While he owns shares of Berkshire-Hathaway and PIMCO Total Return (PTTRX), the Berkshire holding is trivial ($1-15,000). The PIMCO one, mediated through two trusts, is under $50,000. Bill Gross tweeted approval (“Thanks Paul Ryan @RepPaulRyan @PaulRyanVP for investing in a PIMCO fund. Your reputation as a numbers guy is validated”), conceivably before he noticed that Ryan had been selling his shares in the fund. Other than the ETFs in his partnerships, he has no passive investments and he made 35 portfolio transactions in the year.
  • He hasn’t, for reasons political or economic, bought into the notion of emerging markets. While he has several global or international funds (Artisan, Hartford, Oakmark, Scout, Vanguard), he has just one small sliver of an emerging markets ETF inside a partnership.
  • He’s got a lot of economically inefficiently little investments. Footnotes to the financials reveal a fair number of holdings just above or just below the $1000 reporting threshold.
  • He’s taking care of his three children’s education through two fairly substantial accounts (on in the $50-100,000 range and the other in $100-250,000) in Wisconsin’s 529 plan. That warrants a second woo-hoo.

If you’d like to find out whether your Representative should be trusted with any amount greater than a $20 weekly allowance, all of the member reports are available at the House of Representatives’ financial disclosure page.

Another take on Ryan’s finances comes in a story by Stan Luxenberg at TheStreet.com. There’s a certain irony to the fact that Luxenberg decries Ryan’s jumbled portfolio in a muddled mess of an article. Ryan owns shares of four partnerships (CMR, Little Land Co., Ryan-Hutter Investment and Ryan Limited Partnership) and an IRA. Dramatically simplifying his fund holdings would likely require merging or liquidating those partnerships. Whether the partnerships themselves make sense or are just a tax dodge is a separate question.

Artio implodes?

Artio, formerly Julius Baer, is closing their domestic equity funds. On August 30, 2012, the Artio board voted to shut down Artio US Multicap, US Midcap, US Smallcap and US Microcap funds.

While the closures may have come as a surprise to many, BobC warned members of the Observer discussion board on August 8 of the impending decision. In following up on the lead, he discovered a more ominous problem: that Artio’s famous flagship fund is taking on water fast.

This caused us to probe a bit, and we discovered that Artio’s so-called flagship international funds (BJBIX, JETAX, JETIX, JIEIX) have been bleeding assets like a proverbial stuck pig, if not worse. For the oldest fund BJBIX, which was originally marketed as Julius Baer International Equity Fund in 1993, and where current managers Pell and Younes came aboard in 1995, fund assets peaked in 2007 at just under $11 billion. We started using the fund in the late 1990’s. Today, assets are under $1 billion. A similar disaster has occurred in the other international fund ticker symbols, but they do not have the long, storied history of BJBIX. This fund was once the best-performing international fund, but it never recovered from 2008, following that year’s average numbers by really awful relative performance in 2009-2011. And year to-date it is in the bottom 10%. We exited the fund several years ago when Pell and Younes would no longer take our calls. That’s usually a pretty big red flag that something is amiss.

But based on this, it would appear that Pell and Younes’ purchase of Bank Julius Baer’s U.S. fund management company was the beginning of the end.

Unfortunately, we are now concerned about Artio’s Total Return Bond Fund (JBGIX, BJBGX), which has a tremendous history and great management. If the asset bleed should occur there, for no other reason than perception of the future of Artio as a company, this would be a big problem for investors.

A lively discussion of the company’s future, alternatives and implications followed.  If you haven’t visited the board in a while, you owe it to yourself to drop by.  There’s a remarkable depth of information available there.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.

Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX), update: stubborn short-sightedness on the part of institutional account managers translates to a big win for small investors. When ARIVX closed, they reserved $200 million in capacity for institutional investors who didn’t show up.  That’s give you $200 million in room to add one of the industry’s most profitable and stable small cap value funds to your portfolio.

Northern Global Tactical Asset Allocation (BBALX), update: this formerly mild-mannered balanced fund is maturing into a fascinating competitor to Vanguard’s splendid STAR (VGSTX) fund. The difference may come down to Northern’s greater flexibility and reliance on (gasp!) index funds.

The Best of the Web

Our friend and collaborator, Junior Yearwood, is working to manage a chronic medical condition.  He won’t, for just a bit, we hope, be able to contribute to the Observer.  While he’s gone we’ll keep his “Best of” feature on hiatus. I wish Junior a swift recovery and encourage folks who haven’t done so to find our picks for best retirement income calculator, best financial news site, best small fund website and more at Best of the Web.

Launch Alert: Manning & Napier Strategic Income funds

Manning & Napier launched Strategic Income Conservative (MSCBX) and Strategic Income Moderate (MSMSX) on August 2, 2012.  They both combine shares of four other Manning & Napier funds (Core Bond (EXCRX), Dividend Focus (MNDFX), High Yield Bond (MNHYX) and Real Estate (MNRIX) in pursuit of income, growth, and risk management. Conservative will hold 15-45% in Dividend Focus and Real Estate while Moderate will hold 45-75%. Both have low investment minimums, reasonable fees and Manning’s very steady management team.

Launch Alert: William Blair International Leaders

William Blair & Company launched William Blair International Leaders Fund (WILNX) on August 16. The fund is managed by George Greig, who has an outstanding 25 year record and two very solid funds (International Growth WBIGX and Global Growth WGGNX) and Ken McAtamney, who is being elevated from the analyst ranks. The new fund will invest in “foreign companies with above-average returns on equity, strong balance sheets, and consistent, above-average earnings growth, resulting in a focused portfolio of leading companies.”  That’s an admirably Granthamite goal. $5000 investment minimum, reduced to $1000 for accounts with an automatic investing provision.  The expense ratio will be 1.45% after waivers. Grieg’s record is very strong and his main fund closed to new investors in June, so we’re putting WILNX on the Observer’s watch-list for a profile.

RiverPark Short-Term High Yield conference call

There are few funds to have stirred more conversation, or engendered more misunderstanding, than RiverPark Short-Term High Yield (RPHYX). It’s a remarkably stable, profitable cash management fund whose name throws off lots of folks.

Manager David Sherman of Cohanzick Asset Management and RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, have generously agreed to participate in a conference call with Observer readers. I’ll moderate the call and David will field questions on the fund’s strategies and prospects. The call is September 13 at 7:00 p.m., Eastern.

You can register for the conference by navigating to  http://services.choruscall.com/diamondpass/registration?confirmationNumber=10017662 and following the prompts.  If you’ve got questions, feel free to write me or post a query on the discussion board.

The Observer in the News

I briefly interrupted my August vacation to answer a polite question from the investing editor of U.S. News with a rant.

The question: “what should an investor do when his or her fund manager quits?”

The rant: “in 90% of the cases, nothing.”

Why?  Because, in most instances, your fund manager simply doesn’t much matter.  Some very fine funds are led by management teams (Manning & Napier, Dodge & Cox) and some fund firms have such strong and intentional corporate cultures (T. Rowe Price) that new managers mostly repeat the success of their predecessors.  Most funds, and most larger funds in particular, are managed with an eye to unobjectionable mediocrity.  The firm’s incentive is to gather and keep assets, not to be bold.  As a result, managers are expected to avoid the sorts of strategies that risk landing them outside of the pack.

There are, however, some funds where the manager makes a huge difference.  Those are often smaller, newer, boutique funds where management decisions are driven by ideas more compelling than “keep our institutional clients quiet.”  You can read the whole story in “What to Do When Your Fund Manager Quits,” US News, August 6, 2012.

If you’ve ever read the Observer and (understandably) wondered “who is this loon and what is he up to?” there’s a reasonable article written by a young local reporter about the Observer and me.  It’s a fairly wide-ranging discussion and includes pictures that led my departmental colleagues to begin a picture captioning contest.  Anya and Chip both weigh in. “Augustana professor attracts international attention with investment site,” Rock Island Argus and Moline Dispatch, August 20, 2012.

Briefly Noted . . .

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Effective September 4, 2012, The Brown Capital Management Small Company Fund (BCSIX) will re-open for investment to all investors. Morningstar designates this as one of the Gold small-growth funds. Its returns are in the top 10% of its peer group for the past 5, 10 and 15 years. It strikes me as a bit bulky at $1.4 billion but it continues to perform. Average expenses, $5000 minimum, low turnover. (Special thanks to “The Shadow” for posting to the discussion board word of the Brown and ARIVX re-openings.  S/he is so quick at finding this stuff that it’s scary.)

Jake Mortell of Candlewood Advisory writes to say that “One of the funds I am working with, The Versus Capital Multimanager Real Estate Income Fund (VCMRX) is reducing fees on the first $25 million in assets into the fund as a risk offset to early adopters. The waiver reduces fees from 95 bps to 50 bps on the first $25 million in assets to the fund for a period of 12 months.”  It’s a closed-end fund managed by Callan Associates, famed for the Callan Periodic Table of Investment Returns.

CLOSINGS

Invesco Van Kampen High Yield Municipal (ACTHX) will close on September 4, 2012. The fund is huge ($7 billion), good (pretty consistently in the top 25% of its peer group over longer periods) and has been closed before.

Touchstone Small Cap Core Fund (TSFAX) will close to new investments on September 21, 2012. It’s an entirely decent fund that has drawn almost $500 million in under three years.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

In November, two perfectly respectable AllianceBernstein funds get rechristened. AllianceBernstein Small/Mid Cap Growth (CHCLX) becomes AllianceBernstein Discovery Growth while AllianceBernstein Small/Mid Cap Value (ABASX) will change to AllianceBernstein Discovery Value.  Same managers, same mandate, different marketing.

AllianceBernstein Balanced Shares (CABNX) becomes AllianceBernstein Global Risk Allocation on Oct. 8, 2012. New managers and a new mandate (more global allocating will go on) follow.

Artio is changing Artio Global Equity’s (BJGQX) name to Artio Select Opportunities.

BlackRock Emerging Market Debt (BEDIX) will change its name to BlackRock Emerging Market Local Debt on Sept. 3, 2012. The fund also picked up a new management team (Sergio Trigo Paz, Raphael Marechal, and Laurent Develay), all of whom are new to BlackRock. .

In mid-August, Pax World Global Green Fund became Pax World Global Environmental Markets Fund (PGRNX, “pea green”?  Hmmm…). It also became almost impossible to find at Morningstar. Search “Pax World” and you find nothing. The necessary abbreviation is “Pax Wld Glbl.” While it might be a nice idea, the fund has yet to generate the returns needed to validate its focus.

I failed to mention that PineBridge US Micro Cap Growth Fund became the Jacob Micro Cap Growth Fund (JMCGX). With the same management in place, it seems likely that the fund will continue to pursue the same high expense, high risk strategy that’s handicapped it for the past decade.

WisdomTree International Hedged Equity ETF became WisdomTree Europe Hedged Equity Fund (HEDJ – “hedge,” get it?) at the end of August. The argument is that if you hedge out the effects of the collapsing euro, there are some “export-driven European-based firms that pay dividends” which are great businesses selling at compelling valuations. The valuations are compelling, in part, because so many investors are (rightly) spooked by the euro and euro-zone financial stocks. Hedge one, avoid the other, et voila!

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

John Houseman, Smith Barney spokesperson.

Smith Barney passed away at age 75. Morgan Stanley is dropping the name from its brokerage unit in favor of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management. The Smith (1892) and Barney (1873) brokerages merged in 1938, with the resulting firm operating under a half dozen different monikers over the years. Investors of a certain age associate Smith Barney primarily with John Houseman, the actor who served as their spokesman (“They make money the old-fashioned way. They earn it”) in the late 1970s and 1980s. The change is effective this month.

SmartMoney, the magazine, is no more. Originally (1992) a joint venture between Hearst and Dow-Jones, Dow bought Heart’s take in the magazine in 2010. The final print issue, September 2012, went on newsstands on August 14. In one of those fine bits of bloodless corporate rhetoric, Dow-Jones admitted that “[a]pproximately 25 staff positions for the print edition are being impacted.”  “Impacted.”  Uh… eliminated. Subscribers have the option of picking up The Wall Street Journal or, in my case, Barron’s.

American Independence is liquidating its Nestegg series of target-date funds. The five funds will close at the end of August and cease operations at the end of September 2012. They’re the fourth firm (after Columbia, Goldman Sachs and Oppenheimer) to abandon the niche this summer.

BMO plans to liquidate BMO Large-Cap Focus (MLIFX).

In what surely qualifies as a “small win” for investors, Direxion is liquidating its nine triple-leveraged ETFs (for example, Direxion Daily BRIC Bear 3X Shares BRIS) by mid-September.

Dreyfus plans to merge Dreyfus/Standish Fixed Income (SDFIX) into Dreyfus Intermediate-Term Income (DRITX) in January 2013. Same manager on both.

DWS Clean Technology (WRMAX) is liquidating in September 2012.

FocusShares announced plans to close and liquidate its entire lineup of 15 exchange-traded funds, all of which have minimal asset levels. The Scottrade subsidiary, which launched its ETFs last year, cited current market conditions, the funds’ inability to draw assets and their future viability, as well as prospects for growth in the ETFs’ assets, for the closing.

Guggenheim Long Short Equity (RYJJX) and Guggenheim All Cap Value (SESAX) are both slated for liquidation. Apparently the Long-Short managers screwed up:

Due to unfavorable market conditions, the Long Short Equity Strategy Fund (the “Fund”) has assumed a defensive investment position in an effort to protect the current value of the Fund. While the Fund is invested in this manner, it does not invest in accordance with certain of its investment policies, including its investment policy to invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of its net assets, plus any borrowings for investment purposes, in equity securities, and/or derivatives thereof.

With no assets, terrible returns and a portfolio turnover rate approaching 1000%, one hardly needed additional reasons to close the fund. All Cap Value is going just because it was tiny and bad.

Jones Villalta Opportunity Fund (JVOFX), managed by Messrs Jones and Villalta, is being liquidated on September 21. The fund had a great 2009 and a really good 2010, followed by miserable performance in 2011 and 2012. It never gained any market traction and the management finally gave up.

Marsico Emerging Markets (MERGX) will be liquidated on September 21, 2012. The fund, less than two years old, had a rotten 2011 and a mediocre 2012. One of its two managers, Joshua Rubin, resigned in July. Frankly, the larger factor might be that Marsico is in crisis and they simply couldn’t afford to deal with this dud in the midst of their other struggles. Star managers Doug Rao and Cory Gilchrist have both left in the past 12 months, leaving an awfully thin bench.

Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) will likely merge into Nuveen Dividend Value (FFEIX) in October 2012. Nuveen Large Cap Value’s assets have dwindled to less than $140 million after several years of steady outflows. The move also makes sense as both funds are run by the same management team. Owners of Nuveen Large Cap Value should expect to see fees drop by 5 basis points as a result of the merger.

The Profit Opportunity (PROFX) fund has closed and will be liquidated by the end of September.  It was minuscule (around $300,000), young (under two years) and inexplicably bad. PROFX is a small cap fund run by Eugene Profit, whose other small cap fund (Profit PVALX) is small but entirely first-rate. Odd disconnect.

Russell Investments is shutting down all 25 of its passively managed funds, with a combined total of over $310 million. The one ETF that will remain in operation is the Russell Equity ETF (ONEF) with $4.2 million in AUM. The shutdown will take place over the middle two weeks of October.

About the same time, Russell U.S. Value Fund (RSVIX) is merging in Russell U.S. Defensive Equity Fund (REQAX). They’re both closet index funds (R-squared of about 99) with mediocre records. The key difference is that REQAX is a large and reasonably profitable mediocre, closet-index fund.  RSVIX was not.

Sterling Capital Management has filed to liquidate the Sterling Capital National Tax-Free Money Market, Sterling Capital Prime Money Market Fund, and Sterling Capital U.S. Treasury Money Market Fund. The funds will be liquidated on December 14, 2012.

Touchstone Intermediate Fixed Income (TCFIX) has been liquidated after poor performance led to the departure of a major shareholder.

In Closing . . .

Each month we highlight changes in the fund world that you might not otherwise notice. This month we’ve found a near-record 69 fund manager changes. In addition, there are 10 new funds in registration with the SEC. They are not yet available for sale but knowing about them (say, for example, Wasatch’s new focused Emerging Markets fund) might help your planning. Most will come on the market by Thanksgiving.

In about a week the discussion board is undergoing a major software upgrade.  Chip and Accipiter have built some cool new functions into the latest version of Vanilla.  Chip highlights these:

  1. There’s an add-on that will let folks more easily format their posts: a hyperlink function (much requested) and easy images are part of it;
  2. A polling add-on that will allow us to quickly survey members;
  3. Enhancements to the administration of the discussion board;
  4. Pop up alerts, that you can choose to enable or disable, to notify you when certain content is updated or posts are responded to; and most importantly
  5. We’ll be able to take advantage of some of cool add-ons that Accipiter’s been working over the past months.

We might be offline for a couple hours, but we’ll post a notice of the exact time well in advance.

I’m often amazed at what goes on over there, by the way. There have been over 2.5 million pageviews and 3300 discussions launched. That’s made possible by a combination of the wit and generosity of the posters and the amazing work that Chip and Accipiter have done in programming and reprogramming the board to make it ever more responsive to folks’ needs (and now to Old Joe’s willingness to turn his considerable talents as a technical writer to the production of a User’s Guide for newcomers). Quiet thanks to you all.

Following from the enthusiasm of the folks on our discussion board, we’re scheduled to profile T. Rowe Price Real Assets PRAFX (waves to Polina! It’s sort of a “meh” fund but is looking like our best no-load option), Artisan Global Equity ARTHX (“hey, Investor.  I’ve been putting this one off because I was starting to feel like a shill for Artisan. They’ve earned the respect, but still …”) and the Whitebox funds (subject of a Barron’s profile and three separate discussion threads. Following our conversation with David Sherman at Cohanzick, we have an update of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) in the works and owe one for the splendid, rapidly growing RiverPark Wedgewood Growth (RPGFX) fund.

The following announcement is brought to you by Investor, a senior member of the Observer’s discussion community:

And speaking of fall, it’s back-to-school shopping time! If you’re planning to do some or all of your b-t-s shopping online, please remember to Use the Observer’s link to Amazon.com. It’s quick, painless and generates the revenue (equal to about 6% of the value of your purchases) that helps keep the Observer going.

My theory is that if I keep busy enough, I won’t notice either the daily insanity of the market or what happens next to the Steelers’ increasingly fragile O-line.

We’ll look for you then,

August 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to the Summer Break edition of the Mutual Fund Observer. I’m writing from idyllic Ephraim, Wisconsin, a beautiful little village in Door County on the shores of Green Bay. Here’s a quick visual representation of how things are going:

Thanks to Kathy Glasnap, a very talented artist who has done some beautiful watercolors of Door County, for permission to use part of one of her paintings (“All in a Row”). Whether or not you’ve (yet) visited the area, you should visit her gallery online at http://www.glasnapgallery.com/

Chip, Anya, Junior and I bestirred ourselves just long enough to get up, hit <send>, refill our glasses with sangria and settle back into a stack of beach reading and a long round of “Mutual Fund Truth or Dare.”  (Don’t ask.)

In celebration of the proper activities of summer (see above), we offer an abbreviated Observer.

MFO in Other Media: David on Chuck Jaffe’s MoneyLife Radio Show

I’ll be the first to admit it: I have a face made for radio and a voice made for print.  Nonetheless, I was pleased to make an appearance on Chuck Jaffe’s MoneyLife radio show (which is also available as a podcast).  I spoke about three of the funds that we profiled this month, and then participated in a sort of “stump the chump” round in which I was asked to offer quick-hit opinions in response to listener questions.

Dodge & Cox Global Stock (DODWX) for Rick in York, Pa.  It’s easy to dismiss DODWX if you’ve give a superficial glance at its performance.  The fund cratered immediately after launch in 2008 when the managers bought financial stocks that were selling at a once-in-a-generation price only to see them fall to a once-in-a-half-century price.  But those purchases set up a ferocious run in 2009.  It was hurt in 2011 by an oversized emerging markets stake which paid off handsomely in the first quarter of 2012.  It’s got a great management team and an entirely sensible investment discipline.  It’ll be out-of-step often enough but will, in the long run, be a really good investment.

Fidelity Emerging Markets (FEMKX) for Brad in Cazenovia, NY.  My bottom line was “it’s not as bad as it used to be, but there’s still no compelling reason to own it.”  If you’re investing with Fido, their new Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX) is a more much intriguing option.

Leuthold Core Investment (LCORX) for Scott in Redmond, Ore. This was the original go-anywhere fund, born of Leuthold’s sophisticated market analysis service.  Quant driven, quite capable of owning pallets of lead or palladium.  Brilliant for years but, like many computer-driven funds, largely hamstrung lately by the market’s irrational jerks and twitches.  If you anticipate a return to a more-or-less “normal” market where returns aren’t driven by fears of the Greeks, it’s likely to resume being an awfully attractive, conservative holding.

Matthews Asia Dividend Fund (MAPIX) for Robert in Steubenville, Ohio.  With Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), this fund has the best risk-return profile of any Asian-focused fund.  The manager invests in strong companies with lots of free cash flow and a public commitment to their dividend.  What it lacks in MACSX’s bond and convertibles holdings, it makes up for in good country selection and stock picking.  If you want to invest in Asia, Matthews is the place to start.

T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX) for Dennis in Strongsville, Ohio. PRWCX usually holds about 65% of the portfolio in large, domestic dividend-paying stocks and a third in other income-producing securities.  Traditionally the fund held a lot of convertible securities though David Giroux, manager since 2006, has held a bit more stock and fewer converts.  The fund has lost money once in a quarter century and a former manager chuckled over the recollection that Price’s internal allocation models kept coming to the same conclusion: “invest 100% in PRWCX.”

MFO in Other Media: David on “The Best Fund for the Next Six Months … and Beyond”

Early in July, John Waggoner wrote to ask for recommendations for “the remainder of 2012.”  Answers from three “mutual fund experts” (I shudder) appear in John’s July 5th column.  Dan Wiener tabbed PrimeCap Odyssey Aggressive Growth (POAGX) and Jim Lowell picked Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX).  I highlighted the two most recent additions to my non-retirement portfolio:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX), which I described as “one of the most misunderstood funds I cover. It functions as a cash management fund for me — 3% to 4% returns with (so far) negligible volatility. Its greatest problem is its name, which suggests that it invests in short-term, high-yield bonds (which, in general, it doesn’t) or that it has the risk profile of a high-yield fund (ditto).”

David Sherman, the manager, stresses that RPHYX “is not an ATM machine.”  That said, the fund returned 2.6% in the first seven months of 2012 with negligible volatility (the NAV mostly just drops with the month-end payouts).  That’s led to a Sharpe ratio above 3, which is simply great.  Mr. Sherman says that he thinks of it as a superior alternative to, say, laddered bonds or CDs.  While in a “normal” bond market this will underperform a diversified fund with longer durations, in a volatile market it might well outperform the vast majority.

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX), driven by the fact that Mr. Foster “performed brilliantly at Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), which was the least volatile (hence most profitable) Asian fund for years. With Seafarer, he’s able to sort of hedge a MACSX-like portfolio with limited exposure to non-Asian emerging markets. The strategy makes sense, and Mr. Foster has proven able to consistently execute it.”

SFGIX has substantially outperformed the average emerging-Asia, Latin America and diversified emerging markets fund in the months since its launch, though it trails MACSX.  The folks on our discussion board mostly maintain a “deserves to be on the watch-list” stance, based mostly on MACSX’s continued excellence.  I’m persuaded by Mr. Foster’s argument on behalf of a portfolio that’s still Asia-centered but not Asia exclusively.

Seafarer Overseas Piques Morningstar’s Interest

One of Morningstar’s most senior analysts, Gregg Wolper, examined the struggles of two funds that should be attracting more investor interest than they are, in “Two Young Funds Struggle to Get Noticed” (July 31, 2012).

One is TCW International Small Cap (TGICX) which launched in March 2011.  It’s an international small-growth fund managed by Rohit Sah.  Sah had “an impressive if volatile record” in seven years at Oppenheimer International Small Company (OSMAX).  The problem is that Sah has a high-volatility strategy even by the standards of a high-volatility niche, which isn’t really in-tune with current investor sentiment.  Its early record is mostly negative which isn’t entirely surprising.  No load, $2000 investment minimum, 1.44% expense ratio.

The other is Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX).  Wolper recognizes Mr. Foster’s “impressive record” at Matthews and his risk-conscious approach to emerging markets investing.  “His fund tries to cushion the risks of emerging-markets investing by owning less-volatile, dividend-paying stocks and through other means, and in fact over the past three months it has suffered a much more moderate loss than the average diversified emerging-markets fund.”  Actually, from inception through July 31 2012, Seafarer was up by 0.4% while the average emerging markets fund had lost 7.4%.

Mr. Wolper concludes that when investors’ appetite for risk returns, these will both be funds to watch:

At some point, though, certain investors will be looking for a bold fund to fill a small slot in their portfolio. Funds with modest asset bases have more flexibility than their more-popular rivals to own smaller, less-liquid stocks in less-traveled markets should they so choose. For that reason, it’s worth keeping these offerings in mind. Their managers are accomplished, and though there are caveats with each, including their cost, they feature strategies that are not easy to find at rival choices.

It’s What Makes Yahoo, Yahoo

Archaic, on the Observer’s discussion board, complained, “When I use Yahoo Finance to look at a particular fund … [its] Annual Total Return History, the history is complete through 2010 but ends there. No 2011. Anyone know why?”

The short answer is: because it’s Yahool.  This is a problem that Yahoo has known about for months, but has been either unable or unmotivated to correct.  Here’s their “Help” page on the problem:

I added a large arrow only because I don’t know how to add either a flashing one or an animated GIF of a guy slapping himself on the forehead.  Yahoo has known about this problem for at least three months without correcting it.

Note to Marissa Mayer, Yahoo’s new CEO: Yahoo describes itself as “a company that helps consumers find what they are looking for and discover wonders they didn’t expect.”  In this case, we’re looking for 2011 data and the thing we wonder about is what it says about Yahoo’s corporate culture and competence.  Perhaps you might check with the folks at Morningstar for an example of how quickly and effectively a first-rate organization identifies, addresses and corrects problems like this.

Too Soon Gone: Eric Bokota and FPA International Value (FPIVX)

I had the pleasure of a long conversation with Eric Bokota at the Morningstar Investment Conference in June.  I was saddened to hear that events in his private life have obliged him to resign from FPA.  The FPA folks seemed both deeply saddened and hopeful that one day he’ll return.  I wish him Godspeed.

Four Funds That Are Really Worth Your Time (even in summer!)

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features three newer funds and an update ING Corporate Leaders, a former “Star in the Shadows” whose ghostly charms have attracted a sudden rush of assets.

FPA International Value (FPIVX): led by Oakmark alumnus Pierre Py, FPA’s first new fund in almost 30 years has the orientation, focus, discipline and values to match FPA’s distinguished brand.

ING Corporate Leaders Trust (LEXCX): the ghost ship of the fund world sails into its 78th year, skipperless and peerless.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX): RiverPark’s successful hedge, now led by a guy who’s been getting it consistently right for almost two decades, is now available for the rest of us.

The Cook and Bynum Fund (COBYX): you think your fund is focused?  Feh! You don’t know focused until you’ve met Messrs. Cook and Bynum.

The Best Small Fund Websites: Seafarer and Cook & Bynum

The folks at the Observer visit scores of fund company websites each month and it’s hard to avoid the recognition that most of them are pretty mediocre.  The worst of them post as little content as possible, updated as rarely as possible, signaling the manager’s complete disdain for the needs and concerns of his (and very rarely, her) investors.

Small fund companies can’t afford such carelessness; their prime distinction from the industry’s bloated household names is their claim to a different and better relationship with their investors.  If investors are going to win the struggle against the overwhelming urge to buy high and leave in a panic, they need a rich website and need to use it.  If they can build a relationship of trust and understanding with their managers, they’ve got a much better chance of holding through rough stretches and profiting from rich ones.

This month, Junior and I enlisted the aid of two immensely talented web designers to help us analyze three dozen small fund websites in order to find and explain the best of them.  One expert is Anya Zolotusky, designer of the Observer’s site and likely star of a series of “Most Interesting Woman in the World” sangria commercials.  The other is Nina Eisenman, president of Eisenman Associates and founder of FundSites, a firm which helps small to mid-sized fund companies design distinctive and effective websites.

If you’re interested in why Seafarer and Cook & Bynum are the web’s best small company sites, and which twelve earned “honorable mention” or “best of the rest” recognition, the entrance is here!

Launch Alert: RiverNorth and Manning & Napier, P. B. and Chocolate

Two really good fund managers are combining forces.  RiverNorth/Manning & Napier Dividend Income (RNMNX) launched on July 18th.  The fund is a hybrid of two highly-successful strategies: RiverNorth’s tactical allocation strategy based, in part, on closed-end fund arbitrage, and Manning & Napier’s largely-passive dividend focus strategy.  Both are embedded in freestanding funds, though the RiverNorth fund is closed to new investors.  There’s a lively discussion of the fund and, in particular, whether it offers any distinct value, on our discussion board.  The minimum investment is $5000 and we’re likely to profile the fund in October.

Briefly Noted . . .

As a matter of ongoing disclosure about such things, I want to report several changes in my personal portfolio that touch on funds we’ve profiled or will soon profile.  In my non-retirement portfolio, I sold off part of my holdings of Matthews Asian Growth and Income (MACSX) and invested the proceeds in Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX).  As with all my non-retirement funds, I’ve established an automatic investment plan in Seafarer.  In my retirement accounts, I sold my entire position in Fidelity Diversified International (FDIVX) and Canada (FICDX) and invested the proceeds in a combination of Global Balanced (FGBLX) and Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX).  FDIVX has gotten too big and too index-like to justify inclusion and Canada’s new-ish manager is staggering around, and I’m hopeful that the e.m. exposure in the other two funds will be a significant driver while the fixed-income components offer some cushion.  Finally, also in my retirement accounts, I sold T. Rowe Price New Era (PRENX) and portions of two other funds to buy Real Assets Fund (PRAFX).  What can I say?  Jeremy Grantham is very persuasive.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

A bunch of funds have tried to boost their competitiveness by cutting expenses or at least waiving a portion of them.

Cohen & Steers Dividend Value (DVFAX) will limit fund expenses to 1.00% for A shares through June 2014.

J.P. Morgan announced 9 basis point cuts for JP Morgan US Dynamic Plus (JPSAX) and JP Morgan US Large Cap Core Plus (JLCAX).

Legg Mason capped expenses on Legg Mason BW Diversified Large Cap Value (LBWAX) at between 0.85% – 1.85%, depending on share class.

Madison Investment Advisors cuts fees on Madison Mosaic Investors (MINVX) by 4 bps, Madison Mosaic Mid Cap (GTSGX) by 10, and Madison Mosaic Dividend Income (BHBFX, formerly Balanced) by 30.

Managers is dropping fees for Managers Global Income Opportunity (MGGBX), Managers Real Estate Securities (MRESX), and Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced (MBEAX) by 11 – 16 bps.

Alger Small Cap Growth (ALSAX) and its institutional brother reopened to new investors on Aug. 1, 2012.  It was once a really solid fund but it’s been sagging in recent years so your ability to get into it really does qualify as a “small win.”

CLOSINGS

Columbia Small Cap Value (CSMIX) has closed to new investors. For those interested, The Wall Street Journal publishes a complete closed fund list each month.  It’s available online with the almost-poetic name, Table of Mutual Funds Closed to New Investors.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Just as a reminder, the distinguished no-load Marketfield (MFLDX) will become the load-bearing MainStay Marketfield Fund on Oct. 5, 2012.  The Observer profile of Marketfield appeared in July.

At the end of September, Lord Abbett Capital Structure (LAMAX), a billion dollar hybrid fund, will be relaunched as Lord Abbett Calibrated Dividend Growth, with a focus on dividend-paying stocks and new managers: Walter Prahl and Rick Ruvkun.  No word about why.

Invesco announced it will cease using the Van Kampen name on its funds in September.  By way of example, Invesco Van Kampen American Franchise “A” (VAFAX) will simply be Invesco American Franchise “A”.

Oppenheimer Funds is buying and renaming the five SteelPath funds, all of which invest in master limited partnerships and all of which have sales loads.  There was a back door into the fund, which allowed investors to buy them without a load, but that’s likely to close.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

BlackRock is merging its S&P 500 Index (MDSRX) and Index Equity (PNIEX) funds into BlackRock S&P 500 Stock (WFSPX).  And no, I have no idea of what sense it made to run all three funds in the first place.

DWS Clean Technology (WRMAX) will be liquidated in October 2012.

Several MassMutual funds (Strategic Balanced, Value Equity, Core Opportunities, and Large Cap Growth) were killed-off in June 2012.

Oppenheimer is killing off their entry into the retirement-date fund universe by merging their regrettable Transition Target-Date into their regrettable static allocation hybrid funds.  Oppenheimer Transition 2030 (OTHAX), 2040 (OTIAX), and 2050 (OTKAX) will merge into Active Allocation (OAAAX). The shorter time-frame Transition 2015 (OTFAX), 2020 (OTWAX), and 2025 (OTDAX) will merge into Moderate Investor (OAMIX).  Transition 2010 (OTTAX) will, uhhh … transition into Conservative Investor (OACIX). The same management team oversaw or oversees the whole bunch.

Goldman Sachs took the easier way out and announced the simple liquidation of its entire Retirement Strategy lineup.  The funds have already closed to new investors but Goldman hasn’t yet set a date for the liquidation.   It’s devilishly difficult to compete with Fidelity, Price and Vanguard in this space – they’ve got good, low-cost products backed up by sophisticated allocation modeling.  As a result they control about three-quarters of the retirement/target-date fund universe.  If you start with that hurdle and add mediocre funds to the mix, as Oppenheimer and Goldman did, you’re somewhere between “corpse” and “zombie.”

Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity II (TFEMX), a perfectly respectable performer with few assets, is merging into Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity (TEMAX). Same management team, similar strategies.

In a “scraping their name off the door” move, ASTON has removed M.D. Sass Investors Services as a subadvisor to ASTON/MD Sass Enhanced Equity (AMBEX). Anchor Capital Advisors, which was the other subadvisor all along, now gets its name on the door at ASTON/Anchor Capital Enhanced Equity.

Destra seems already to have killed off Destra Next Dimension (DLGSX), a tiny global stock fund managed by Roger Ibbotson.

YieldQuest Total Return Bond (YQTRX), one of the first funds I profiled as an analyst for FundAlarm, has finally ceased operations.  (P.S., it was regrettable even six years ago.)

In Closing . . .

Some small celebrations and reminders.  This month the Observer passed its millionth pageview on the main site with well over two million additional pageviews on our endlessly engaging discussion board (hi, guys!).  We’re hopeful of seeing our 100,000th new reader this fall.

Speaking of the discussion board, please remember that registration for participating in the board is entirely separate from registering to receive our monthly email reminder.  Signing up for board membership, a necessary safeguard against increasingly agile spambots, does not automatically get you on the email list and vice versa.

And speaking of fall, it’s back-to-school shopping time!  If you’re planning to do some or all of your b-t-s shopping online, please remember to Use the Observer’s link to Amazon.com.  It’s quick, painless and generates the revenue (equal to about 6% of the value of your purchases) that helps keep the Observer going.  Once you click on the link, you may want to bookmark it so that your future Amazon purchases are automatically and invisibly credited to the Observer. Heck, you can even share the link with your brother-in-law.

A shopping lead for the compulsive-obsessive among you: How to Sharpen Pencils: A Practical & Theoretical Treatise on the Artisanal Craft of Pencil Sharpening for Writers, Artists, Contractors, Flange Turners, Anglesmiths, & Civil Servants (2012).  The book isn’t yet on the Times’ bestseller lists, though I don’t know why.

A shopping lead for folks who thought they’d never read poems about hedge funds: Katy Lederer’s The Heaven-Sent Leaf (2008).  Lederer’s an acclaimed poet who spent time working at, and poetrifying about, a New York hedge fund.

In September, we’ll begin looking at the question “do you really need to buy a dedicated ‘real assets’ fund?”  T. Rowe Price has incorporated one into all of their retirement funds and Jeremy Grantham is increasingly emphatic on the matter.  There’s an increasing area of fund and ETF options, including Price’s own fund which was, for years, only available to the managers of Price funds-of-funds.

We’ll look for you.

July 1, 2012

By David Snowball

thermometer

photo by rcbodden on Flickr.

Dear friends,

“Summertime and the livin’ is easy”?

“Roll out those lazy, hazy, crazy days of summer,
Those days of soda and pretzels and beer”

“That’s when I had most of my fun back …
Hot fun in the summertime.”

“In summer, the song sings itself.”

What a crock.  I’m struck by the intensity of the summer storms, physical and financial.  As I write, millions are without power along the Eastern seaboard after a ferocious storm that pounded the Midwest, roared east and killed a dozen.  Wildfires continue unchecked in the west and the heat and drought in Iowa have left the soil in my yard fissured and hard.  Conditions in the financial markets are neither better nor more settled.  The ferocious last day rally in June created the illusion of a decent month, when in fact it was marked by a series of sharp, panicky dislocations.

I’m struck, too, by the ways in which our political leaders have responded, which is to say, idiotically.  Republicans continue to deny the overwhelming weight of climate science.  Democrats acknowledge it, then freeze for fear of losing their jobs.  And both sides’ approach to the post-election fiscal cliff is the same: “let’s get through the election first.”

It’s striking, finally, how rarely the thought “let’s justify being elected” seems to get any further than “let’s convince voters that the other side is worse.”

Snippets from MIC

I had the pleasure of attending the Morningstar Investment Conference in late June.  The following stories are derived from my observations there.  I also had an opportunity to interview two international value managers, David Marcus of Evermore and Eric Bokota of FPA, there.  Those interviews will serve as elements of an update of the Evermore Global Value profile and a new FPA International Value profile, both in August.

David Snowball at MIC, courtesy of eventtoons.com

BlackRock and the Graybeards

On Day One of the conference, Morningstar hosted a keynote panel titled “A Quarter-Century Club” in which a trio of quarter-centenarians (Susan Byrne, Will Danof and Brian Rogers) reflected in their years in the business.  All three seemed to offer the same cautionary observation: “the industry has lost its moral compass.”  All three referred to the pressure, especially on publicly traded firms, to “grow assets” as the first priority and “serve shareholders” somewhere thereafter.

Susan Byrne, chairman and founder of Westwood Management Corp., the investment advisor to the Westwood Funds, notes that, as a young manager, it was drilled into her head that “this is not our money.” It was money held in trust, “there are people who trust you (the manager) individually to take care for them.” That’s a tremendously important value to her but, she believes, many younger professionals don’t hear the lesson.

Will Danoff, manager of Fidelity Contrafund (FCNTX), made a thoughtful, light-hearted reference to one of his early co-workers, George.  “George didn’t manage money and he didn’t manage the business.  His job, so far as I can tell, was to walk up to the president every morning, look him in the eye and ask ‘how are you going to make money today for our shareholders?’ You don’t hear that much anymore.”

Brian Rogers, CIO of T Rowe Price made a similar, differently nuanced point: “when we were hired, it was by far smaller firms with a sense of fiduciary obligation, not a publicly-traded company with an obligation to shareholders. Back then we learned this order of priorities: (1) your investors first, (2) your employees and then (3) your shareholders.” In an age of large, publicly-traded firms, “new folks haven’t learned that as deeply.”

As I talk with managers of small funds, I often get a clear sense of personal connection with their shareholders and a deep concern for doing right by them. In a large, revenue-driven firm, that focus might be lost.

The extent of that loss has been highlighted by some very solid reporting by Aaron Pressman and Jessica Toonkel of Reuters.   Pressman and Toonkel document what looks like the unraveling of BlackRock, the world’s largest private investment manager. In short order:

  • Robert Capaldi, senior client strategist for Chief Executive Laurence Fink, left.
  • Susan Wagner, a founding partner and vice chairman, announced her immediate retirement.  Wagner had overseen much of BlackRock’s growth-through-acquisition strategy which included purchase of Barclay’s Global Investors and Merrill Lynch’s funds, a total of $2.4 trillion in assets.
  • Chief equity strategist Boll Doll announced his retirement (at 57) as evidence began to surface that his and BlackRock’s long-time claim of “proprietary” investment models was false.
  • Star energy fund manager Daniel Rice resigned in the wake of criticism of his decision to invest substantial amounts of his shareholders’ money into a firm in which he had a personal, if indirect, stake.  He did so without notifying anyone outside of the firm.  BlackRock, reportedly, had no explanation for investors.

Insiders report to Reuters that “further senior-level changes” are imminent.

BlackRock’s plans to double its mutual fund business in the next 18 months by targeting RIAs remain in place.  Why double the business?  Whose interests does it serve?  BlackRock has demonstrated neither any great surplus of investment talent nor of innovative investment ideas, nor can they plausibly appeal (at $4 trillion of AUM) to “economies of scale.”

No, doubling their business is in the best interests of BlackRock executives (bonuses get tied to such things) and, likely, to BlackRock shareholders.  There’s no evidence for why RIAs or fundholders are anything more than tools in BlackRock’s incessant drive from growth.  The American essayist and critic Edward Abbey observed, “Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.”  And, apparently, of the publicly traded megacorp.

Advice from a Conservative Domestic Equity Manager: Go Elsewhere

The Quarter Century panel of senior started talking about the equity market going forward. They were uniformly, if cautiously, optimistic. Rogers drew some parallels to the economy and market of 1982. I liked Susan Byrne’s comments rather more: “It feels like 1982 when you believed that any rally was a trap, designed to fool me, humiliate me and keep me poor.” Mr. Danoff argued that global blue chips “have absolutely flat-lined for years,” and represent substantial embedded value. They argued for pursuing stocks with growing dividends, a strategy that will consistently beat fixed income or inflation.

In closing, Don Phillips asked each for one bit of closing advice or insight. Brian Rogers, T. Rowe Price’s CIO and manager of their Equity Income fund (PRFDX) offered these two:

1. it’s time to remember Buffett’s adage, “be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful.”

and

2. “take a look at the emerging markets again.”

That’s striking advice, given Mr. Rogers’ style: he’s famously cautious and consistent, invests in large dividend-paying companies and rarely ventures abroad (5% international, 0.25% emerging markets). He didn’t elaborate but his observation is consistent with the recurring theme, “emerging markets are beginning to look interesting again.”

Note to the Scout Funds: “See Grammarian”

The marketing slogan for the Scout Funds is “See Further.”  Uhhh .. no.  “Farther.”  In this usage, “further” would be “additional,” as in “see further references in the footnotes.”  Farther refers to distance (“dad, how much farther is it?”) which is presumably what would concern a scout.

Scout’s explanation for the odd choice: “One of our executives wanted ‘See Farther’ but discovered that some other fund company already used it and so he went with ‘See Further’ instead.”

I see.

No, I don’t.  First, I can’t find a record for the “see farther” motto (though it is plausible) and, second, that still doesn’t justify an imprecise and ungrammatical slogan.

Kudos to Morningstar: They Get It Right, and Make It Right, Quickly

In June I complained about inconsistencies in Morningstar’s data reports on expense ratios and turnover, and the miserable state of the Securities and Exchange Commission database.

The folks at Morningstar looked into the problems quite quickly. The short version is this: fund filings often contain multiple versions of what’s apparently the same data point. There are, for example, a couple different turnover ratios and up to four expense ratios. Different functions, developed by different folks at different times, might inadvertently choose to pull stats from different places. Mr. Rekenthaler described them as “these funny little quirks where a product somewhere sometime decided to do something different.” Both stats are correct but also inconsistent. If they aren’t flagged so that readers can understand the differences, they can also be misleading.

Morningstar is interested in providing consistent, system-wide data.  Both John Rekenthaler, vice president of research, and Alexa Auerbach in corporate communications were in touch with us within a week. Once they recognized the inconsistency, they moved quickly to reconcile it.  Rekenthaler reports that their data-improvement effort is ongoing: “senior management is on a push for Morningstar-wide consistency in what data we publish and how we label the data, so we should be ferreting out the remaining oddities.”  As of June 19, the data had been reconciled. Thanks to the Wizards on West Wacker for their quick work.

FBR Funds Get Sold, Quickly

On June 26 2012, FBR announced the sale of their mutual fund unit to Hennessy Advisors.   Of the 10 FBR funds, seven will retain their current management teams. The managers of FBR’s Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap funds are getting dumped and their funds are merging into Hennessy funds. One of the mergers (Large Cap) is likely a win for the investors. One of the mergers (Mid Cap) is a loss and the third (Small Cap) has the appearance of a disaster.

FBR Large Cap (FBRPX, 1.25% e.r., 9.2% over three years) merges into Hennessy Cornerstone Large Growth (HFLGX), three year old large value fund, 1.3% e.r., 13.8% over 3 years. Win for the FBR shareholders.

FBR Mid Cap (FBRMX, 1.35% e.r., five year return of 3.0%) merges into Hennessy Focus 30 (HFTFX), midcap fund, 1.36% e.r., five year return of 1.25%. Higher minimum, same e.r., lower returns – loss for FBR shareholders.

FBR Small Cap (FBRYX, 1.45% e.r., five year return of 4.25%) merges into Hennessy Cornerstone Growth (HGCGX), small growth fund, 1.33% e.r., five year return of (8.2). Huh? Slightly lower expenses but a huge loss in performance. The 1250 basis point difference is 5-year performance does not appear to be a fluke. The Hennessy fund is consistently at the bottom of its peer group, going back a decade.   The fact that founder and CIO Neil Hennessy runs Cornerstone Growth might explain the decision to preserve the weaker fund and its strategy. This is a clear “run away!” for the FBR shareholders.

One alternative for FBRYX investors is into FBR’s own Small Cap Financial fund (FBRSX), run by Dave Ellison, FBR’s CIO. Ellison’s funds used to bear the FBR Pegasus brand. The fund only invests in the finance industry, but does it really well. That said, it’s more expensive than FBRYX with weaker returns, reflecting the sector’s disastrous decade.

The fate of FBR’s Gas Utility Index fund (GASFX) is unclear.  The key question is whether Hennessy will increase fees.  An FBR representative at Morningstar expressed doubt that they’d do any such thing.

The Long-Short Summer Series: Trying to Know if You’re Winning

As part of our summer series on long-short funds, we look this month at the performance of the premier long-short funds, of interesting newcomers, and of two benchmarks.

The challenge is to know when you’re winning if your goal is not the easily measurable “maximum total return.”  With long-short funds, you’re shooting for something more amorphous, akin to “pretty solid returns without the volatility that makes me crazy.”  In pursuit of funds that meet those criteria, we looked at the performance of long-short funds on one terrible day (June 1) and one great day (June 29), as well as during one terrible month (May 2012) and one really profitable period (January – June, 2012).

We looked at the return of Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index fund for each period, and highlighted (in green) those funds which managed to lose half as much as the market in the two down periods (May and June 1) but gain at least two-thirds of the market in the two up periods.  Here are the results, sorted by 2012 returns.

May 2012

(down)

June 1

(down)

June 29

(up)

2012, through July 1

Royce Opportunity Select

(6.3)

(4.0)

2.9

16.8

RiverPark Long Short Oppy

(5.3)

(2.0)

1.6

16.7 – mostly as a hedge fund

Vanguard Total Stock Market

(6.2)

(2.6)

2.6

9.3

Marketfield

(0.1)

(2.25)

1.2

8.8

Vanguard Balanced Index

(3.3)

(1.4)

1.5

6.5

Robeco Long Short

(0.6)

0.1

0.3

6.1

Caldwell & Orkin Market Oppy

0.1

(2.3)

1.5

4.7

ASTON/River Road Long Short

(3.1)

(0.2)

1.8

4.6

Bridgeway Managed Volatility

(2.4)

(1.8)

1.6

4.2

James Long Short

(3.0)

(0.9)

0.7

4.0

Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Research

 

(4.8)

1.25

3.8

RiverPark/Gargoyle Hedged Value

(5.5)

(2.2)

1.4

2.7 –  mostly as a hedge fund

Schwab Hedged Equity

(3.3)

(1.7)

1.9

2.5

GRT Absolute Return

(2.0)

(0.1)

1.4

1.7

Wasatch Long-Short

(6.3)

(1.3)

2.0

1.3

Forester Value

(0.5)

0.25

0.8

1.2

ASTON/MD Sass Enhanced Equity

(4.4)

(0.6)

1.5

1.1

Turner Spectrum

(2.5)

(0.6)

0.4

(0.1)

Paladin Long Short

(0.9)

(0.1)

0.1

(1.9)

Hussman Strategic Growth

2.8

1.3

(1.3)

(7.6)

As we noted last month, in comparing the long-term performance of long-short funds to a very conservative bond index, consistent winners are hard to find.  Interesting possibilities from this list:

RiverPark Long Short Opportunity (RLSFX), which converted from an in-house hedge fund in March and which we’ll profile in August.

Marketfield (MFLDX), the mutual fund version of a global macro hedge fund, which we’re profiling this month.

ASTON/River Road Long Short (ARLSX), a disciplined little fund that we profiled last month.

New on our radar is Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Research (BPRRX), sibling to the one indisputable gold-standard fund in the group, Robeco Long Short (BPLEX).  While the two follow the same investment discipline, BPLEX has a singular focus on small and micro stocks while BPRRX has a more traditional mid- to large-cap portfolio.

The chart below tracks BPPRX against its peer group average (orange) and the group’s top funds, including BPLEX (green), Marketfield (burgundy), and Wasatch (gold).  BPPRX itself is the blue line.

Since inception, BPRRX has been (1) well above average and (2) well below BPLEX.  It’s worth further research.

FundReveal perspective on Long-Short funds

Our collaborators at FundReveal are back, and are weighing-in with a discussion of long-short funds based on their fine-grained daily volatility and return data.  Their commentary follows, and is expanded-upon at their blog.


 

Nearly all of the Long-Short funds examined exhibit consistently low risk.  Many of them also beat the S&P 500’s Average Daily Returns.  Of the six funds analyzed by David (see bullets below) those rated as “A-Best” in one year most often beat the S&P in total returns the next year, a finding consistent with the out-of-sample forward testing that we have conducted for the entire market.

One thing that remains surprising is that the Long-Short funds great idea hasn’t really panned out.  It makes such sense to use all positive and negative information about companies and securities available when investing.   Doesn’t only investing long leave “money [information] on the table.”  But, in general, these funds have not delivered on that perceived potential.

BPLSX, Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Fund has been delivering.  We agree with David that it can be seen as the gold standard.  From FundReveal’s perspective, the fund has persistently delivered “A-Best” performance, beating the S&P on both risk and return measures. Since 2005 the fund has been rated A-Best six times and C twice.  This includes a whopping 82% total return in 2009.  In 2009, 2010, and 2011 positive total returns followed A Best risk return rating in the preceding year.  Don’t get too excited:  the fund is closed.

David has commented or will comment on the following funds in the Mutual Fund Observer.

  • ARLSX  – Aston/River Road Long/Short
  • FMLSX – Wasatch 1st Source Long/Short
  • MFLDX – Marketfield Fund
  • AMBEX – Aston/River Long/Short
  • JAZZX – James Advantage Long/Short
  • GRTHX – GRT Absolute Return Fund

Good:

The two funds with positive investment decision-making attributes based on the FundReveal model are FMLSX and MFLDX.  Both persistently deliver A-Best risk-return performance, and relatively high Persistence Ratings, a measurement of the likelihood of A performance in the future: FMLSX: 40%, and MFLDX: 44%.

Not so Good:

JAZZX has demonstrated high Volatility and low Average Daily Return relative to its peers and the S&P.   It has only been in existence a short time; we have data from 2011 and 2012 YTD, but it is not faring well.   A wait and see position is probably justified.

Some additional candidates for consideration garnered from the FundReveal “Best Funds List” (free the FundReveal site).

VMNFX Vanguard Market Neutral Fund.  A solid low risk fund with 45% Persistence.  It has not hit the ball out of the park, but the team is demonstrating good decision- making as inferred from FundReveal measurements.

ALHIX American Century Equity Market Neutral Fund.  A solid fund with 4% volatility, market beating Average Daily Return in 2011, and Persistence of 44%.

FLSRX Forward Long/Short Credit Analysis Fund.  This fund may not even belong in this discussion since the others are stock funds.  Morningstar classifies this as an alternative bond fund.  Its portfolio is nearly exclusively Muni Bonds.  It is 34% Short and 132% Long in the Muni Bonds that make up 99% of its portfolio.  It has low Volatility, high Average Daily Return, Persistence Rating of 44%, and extraordinary performance in down markets (32% above the S&P).

A complete version of this analysis with tables and graphics is available on the FundReveal blog.

Best of the Web: Our Summer Doldrums Edition

Our contributing editor, Junior Yearwood, in collaboration with financial planner Johanna Fox-Turner have fine-tuned their analysis of retirement income calculators, a discussion they initiated last month.  In addition, Junior added a review of Chuck Jaffe’s new MoneyLife podcast.  Drop by Best of the Web to sample both!

Two Funds and Why They’re Really Worth Your While

Each month, the Observer profiles between two and four mutual funds that you likely have not heard about, but really should have.  Our “Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers” do not yet have a long track record, but have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “stars in the shadows” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought. Two intriguing  funds are:

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX): Andrew Foster, who performed brilliantly as a risk-conscious emerging Asia manager for Matthews, is now leading this Asia-centric diversified emerging markets fund.  It builds on his years of experience and maintains its cautiousness, while adding substantial flexibility.

Marketfield (MFLDX): there are two reasons to read, now and closely, about Marketfield.  One, it’s about the most successful alternative-investment fund available to retail investors.  Two, it’s just been bought by New York Life and will be slapped with a front-end load come October.  Investors wanting to maintain access to no-load shares need to think, now, about their options.

Rest in Peace: Industry Leaders Fund (ILFIX)

I note with sadness the closing of Industry Leaders fund, a small sensible fund run by Gerry Sullivan, a remarkably principled investor.  The fund identified industries in which there was either one or two dominant players, invested equally in them and rebalanced periodically.  The idea (patented) was to systematically exclude sectors where leaders never emerged or were quickly overthrown.  The fund did brilliantly for the first half of its existence and passably in the second half, weighed down by exposure to global financial firms, but never managed any marketing track.

Sullivan continues as the (relatively new) manager of Vice Fund (VICEX), which has a long and oddly-distinguished record.

Briefly noted …

Several months ago we reported on the Zacks fund rating service, noting that it was sloppy, poorly explained, unclear, and possibly illogical.  Doubtless emboldened by our praise, Mitch and Ben Zacks have launched two ETFs: Zacks Sustainable Dividend ETF and Zacks MLP ETF.  There’s no evident need for either, an observation quite irrelevant in the world of ETFs.

Small Wins for Investors

Schwab reduced the expense ratio on Laudus Small-Cap MarketMasters (SWOSX) by 10 basis points and Laudus International MarketMasters (SWOIX) by 19 basis points.

Forward Frontier Strategy (FRNMX) has capped the fund’s expenses at 1.09 – 1.49%, depending on share class.

The three Primecap Odyssey funds (Stock POSKX, Growth POGRX and Aggressive Growth POAGX) have all dropped their 2% redemption fees.  That’s not really much of a win for investors since the redemption fees are designed to discourage rapid trading of fund shares (which is a bad thing), but I take what small gains I can find.

Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity (TEMAX) has reopened to new investors after 16 months.

Former Seligman Manager in Insider-Trading Case

The SEC announced that former Seligman Communications and Information comanager Reema Shah pled guilty to securities fraud and is barred permanently from the securities industry. The SEC says that Shah and a Yahoo (YHOO) executive swapped insider tips and that the Seligman fund she comanaged and others at the firm netted a $389,000 profit from trading based on insider information on Yahoo.

Farewells

Gary Motyl, chief investment officer for the Franklin, Templeton, and Mutual Series fund families, passed away.  Motyl was one of Sir John Templeton’s first hires and he’s been Franklin’s CIO for 12 years.  Pending the appointment of a new CIO later this summer, his duties are being covered by three other members of Franklin’s staff.

Closings

Delaware Select Growth (DVEAX) closed to new month on June 8th.

Franklin Double Tax-Free Income (FPRTX) initiated a soft close on June 15th and will switch to a hard close on August 1st.

Prudential Jennison Health Sciences (PHLAX) closed on June 29th after siphoning up $300 million in 18 months.

For those interested, The Wall Street Journal publishes a complete closed fund list each month.  It’s available online with the almost-poetic name, Table of Mutual Funds Closed to New Investors.

Old Wine, New Bottles

JPMorgan Asia Pacific Focus has changed its name to JPMorgan Asia Pacific (JASPX). The management of the team will be Mark Davids and Geoff Hoare.

Columbia Strategic Investor (CSVAX) will be renamed Columbia Global Dividend Opportunity. Actually it will become an entirely different fund under the guise of being “tweaked.”  I love it when they do that.  The former small cap and convertibles fund gets reborn as an all-cap global stock fund benchmarked against the MSCI All World Country Index. CSVAX’s managers have been fired and replaced by a team of guys who already run six other Columbia funds.

Ivy International Balanced (IVBAX) is being renamed Ivy Global Income Allocation.  It also picked up a second manager.

Off to the Dustbin of History

September will be the last issue of SmartMoney, a magazine once head-and-shoulders sharper and more data-driven than its peers.  According to a phone rep for SmartMoney, Dow is likely to convert SmartMoney.com into a pay site.  Dow will, they promise, “beef up” the online version and add editorial staff.  Plans have not yet been made final, but it sounds like SmartMoney subscribers will get free access to the site and might get downloadable versions of the articles.

It was a busy month for Acadia Principal Conservation Fund (APCVX).  On June one, the board cut its offensively high 12(b)1 fee in half (to an industry-standard 0.25%) and dropped its expense ratio by 10 basis points.  On June 25th, they closed and liquidated the fund.  On the upside, the fund (mostly) preserved principal in its two years of existence.  On the downside, it made no money for its investors and had a negative real return.  Still, that doesn’t speak to the coherence of their planning.

Effective June 1, Bridgeway Aggressive Investors 2 (which I once dubbed “Bridgeway Not Quite So Aggressive Investors”) and Micro-Cap Limited both ceased to exist, having merged into Aggressive Investors 1 (BRAGX) and Ultra-Small Company (BRUSX).  Both of the remaining funds had long, brilliant runs before getting nailed in recent years by the apparent implosion of Bridgeway’s quant models.

Fido plans to merge Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector All Cap (FARAX) into Fidelity Stock Selector All Cap (FDSSX), which would lead to an expense reduction for the Advisor shareholders.  By year’s end, Fidelity will merge Mid Cap Growth (FSMGX) into Stock Selector Mid Cap Fund (FSSMX). They’ve already closed Mid Cap Growth in preparation for the move.

JPMorgan Asia Equity (JAEAX) is being liquidated on July 20, 2012.  It’s a bad fund that has seen massive outflows.  The managers, nonetheless, will remain with JPMorgan.

Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) merges into Nuveen Dividend Value (FFEIX), also in October.  That’s a win for Large Cap shareholders: they get the same management team and a comparable strategy with lower expenses.

Oppenheimer Fixed Income Active Allocation (OAFAX) will merge into Oppenheimer Global Strategic Income (OPSIX) in early October, 2012.

Victory Value (SVLSX), which spiraled from mediocre to awful in the last two years, will liquidate at the end of August.  Friends and mourners still have access to Victory Special Value (SSVSX, a weak mid-cap growth fund) and Victory Established Value (VETAX, actually very solid mid-cap value fund).

I’m off to Washington for the Fourth of July week with family.  Preparation for that trip and ten days of often-hectic travel in June kept me from properly thanking several contributors (thanks!  A formal acknowledgement is coming!) and from completing profiles of a couple fascinating funds: Cook and Bynum (COBYX) and FPA International (FPIVX), one of which will be part of a major set of new profiles in August.

Until then, take care, keep cool and celebrate family!

June 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

I’m intrigued by the number of times that really experienced managers have made one of two rueful observations to me:

“I make all my money in bear markets, I just don’t know it at the time”

 “I add most of my value when the market’s in panic.”

With the market down 6.2% in May, Morningstar’s surrogate for high-quality domestic companies down by nearly 9% and only one equity sector posting a gain (utilities were up by 0.1%), presumably a lot of investment managers are gleefully earning much of the $10 billion in fees that the industry will collect this year.

Long-Short Funds and the Long, Hot Summer

The investment industry seems to think you need a long-short fund, given the number of long-short equity funds that they’ve rolled-out in recent years.  They are now 70 long-short funds (a category distinct from market neutral and bear market funds, and from funds that occasionally short as a hedging strategy).  With impeccable timing, 36 were launched after we passed the last bear market bottom in March 2009.

Long-short fund launches, by year

2011 – 12 13 funds
2010 16 funds
2009 7 funds
Pre-2009 34 funds

The idea of a long-short fund is unambiguously appealing and is actually modeled after the very first hedge fund, A. W. Jones’s 1949 hedged fund.  Much is made of the fact that hedge funds have lost both their final “d” and their original rationale.  Mr. Jones reasoned that we could not reliably predict short-term market movements, but we could position ourselves to take advantage of them (or at least to minimize their damage).  He called for investing in net-long in the stock market, since it was our most reliable engine of “real” returns, but of hedging that exposure by betting against the least rational slices of the market.  If the market rose, your fund rose because it was net-long and invested in unusually attractive firms.  If the market wandered sideways, your fund might drift upward as individual instances of irrational pricing (the folks you shorted) corrected.  And if the market fell, ideally the stocks you shorted would fall the most and would offer a disproportionately large cushion.  A 30% short exposure in really mispriced stocks might, hypothetically, buffer 50% of a market slide.

Unfortunately, most long-short funds aren’t able to clear even the simplest performance hurdle, the returns of a conservative short-term bond index fund.  Here are the numbers:

Number that outperformed a short-term bond index fund (up 3%) in 2011

11 of 59

Number that outperformed a short-term bond index fund from May 2011 – May 2012

6 of 62

Number that outperformed a short-term bond index over three years, May 2010 – May 2012

21 of 32

Number that outperformed a short-term bond index over five years, May 2008 – May 2012

1 of 22

Number in the red over the past five years

13 of 22

Number that outperformed a short-term bond index fund in 2008

0 of 25

In general, over the past five years, you’d have been much better off buying the Vanguard Short-Term Bond Index (VBISX), pocketing your 4.6% and going to bed rather than surrendering to the seductive logic and the industry’s most-sophisticated strategies.

Indeed, there is only one long-short fund that’s unambiguously worth owning: Robeco Long/Short Equity (BPLSX).  But it had a $100,000 investment minimum.  And it closed to new investors in July, 2010.

Nonetheless, the idea behind long/short investing makes sense.  In consequence of that, the Observer has begun a summer-long series of profiles of long-short funds that hold promise, some few that have substantial track records as mutual funds and rather more with short fund records but longer pedigrees as separate accounts or hedge funds.  Our hope is to identify one or two interesting options for you that might help you weather the turbulence that’s inevitably ahead for us all.

This month we begin by renewing the 2009 profile of a distinguished fund, Wasatch Long/ Short (FMLSX) and bringing a really promising newcomer, Aston / River Road Long- Short (ARLSX) onto your radar.

Our plans for the months ahead include profiles of Aston/MD Sass Enhanced Equity (AMBEX), RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RLSFX), RiverPark/Gargoyle Hedged Value (RGHVX), James Long-Short (JAZZX), and Paladin Long Short (PALFX).  If we’ve missed someone that you think of a crazy-great, drop me a line.  I’m open to new ideas.

FBR reaps what it sowed

FBR & Co. filed an interesting Regulation FD Disclosure with the SEC on May 30, 2012.  Here’s the text of the filing:

FBR & Co. (the “Company”) disclosed today that it has been working with outside advisors who are assisting the Company in its evaluation of strategic alternatives for its asset management business, including the sale of all or a portion of the business.

There can be no assurance that this process will result in any specific action or transaction. The Company does not intend to further publicly comment on this initiative unless the Company executes definitive deal documentation providing for a specific transaction approved by its Board of Directors.

FBR has been financially troubled for years, a fact highlighted by their decision in 2009 to squeeze out their most successful portfolio manager, Chuck Akre and his team.  In 1997, Mr. Akre became of founding manager of FBR Small Cap Growth – Value fund, which became FBR Small Cap Value, the FBR Small Cap, and finally FBR Focus (FBRVX). Merely saying that he was “brilliant” underestimates his stewardship of the fund.  Under his watch (December 1996 – August 2009), Mr. Akre turned $10,000 invested in the fund at inception to $44,000.  His average peer would have yielded $18,000.  Put another way: he added $34,000 to the value of your opening portfolio while the average midcap manager added $8,000.  Uhh: he added four times as much?

In recognition of which, FBR through the Board of Trustees whose sole responsibility is safeguarding the interests of the fund’s shareholders, offered to renew his management contract in 2009 – as long as he accepted a 50% pay cut. Mr. Akre predictably left with his analyst team and launched his own fund, Akre Focus (AKREX).  In a singularly classy move, FBR waited until Mr. Akre was out of town on a research trip and made his analysts an offer they couldn’t refuse.  Akre got a phone call from his analysts, letting him know that they’d resigned so that they could return to run FBR Focus.

Why?  At base, FBR was in financial trouble and almost all of their funds were running at a loss.  The question became how to maximize the revenue produced by their most viable asset, FBR Focus and the associated separate accounts which accounted for more than a billion of assets under management.  FBR seems to have made a calculated bet that by slashing the portion of fund fees going to Mr. Akre’s firm would increase their own revenues dramatically.  Even if a few hundred million followed Mr. Akre out the door, they’d still make money on the deal.

Why, exactly, the Board of Trustees found this in the best interests of the Focus shareholders (as opposed to FBR’s corporate interests) has never been explained.

How did FBR’s bet play out?  Here’s your clue: they’re trying to sell their mutual fund unit (see above).  FBR Focus’s assets have dropped by a hundred million or so, while Akre Focus has drawn nearly a billion in new assets.  FBR & Co’s first quarter revenues were $39 million in 2012, down from $50 million in 2011.  Ironically, FBR’s 10 funds – in particular, David Ellison’s duo – are uniformly solid performers which have simply not caught investors’ attention.  (Credit Bryan Switzky of the Washington Business Journal for first writing about the FD filing, “FBR & Co. exploring sale of its asset management business,” and MFWire for highlighting his story.)

Speaking of Fund Trustees

An entirely unremarkable little fund, Autopilot Managed Growth Fund (AUTOX), gave up the ghost in May.  Why?  Same as always:

The Board of Trustees of the Autopilot Managed Growth Fund (the “Fund”), a separate series of the Northern Lights Fund Trust, has concluded that it is in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund cease operations.  The Board has determined to close the Fund, and redeem all outstanding shares, on June 15, 2012.

Wow.  That’s a solemn responsibility, weighing the fate of an entire enterprise and acting selflessly to protect your fellow shareholders.

Sure would be nice if Trustees actually did all that stuff, but the evidence suggests that it’s damned unlikely.  Here’s the profile for Autopilot’s Board, from the fund’s most recent Statement of Additional Information.

Name of Trustee (names in the original, just initials here) Number of Portfolios in Fund Complex Overseen by Trustee Total Compensation Paid to Directors Aggregate Dollar Range of Equity Securities in All Registered Investment Companies Overseen by Trustee in Family of Investment Companies
LMB

95

$65,000

None

AJH

95

$77,500

None

GL

95

$65,000

None

MT

95

$65,000

None

MM

95

none

None

A footnote adds that each Trustee oversees between two and 14 other funds.

How is it that Autopilot became 1% of a Trustee’s responsibilities?  Simple: funds buy access to prepackaged Boards of Trustees as part of the same arrangement  that provides the rest of their “back office” services.  The ability of a fund to bundle all of those services can dramatically reduce the cost of operation and dramatically increase the feasibility of launching an interesting new product.

So, “LMB” is overseeing the interests of the shareholders in 109 mutual funds, for which he’s paid $65,000.  Frankly, for LMB and his brethren, as with the FBR Board of Trustees (see above), this is a well-paid, part-time job.  His commitment to the funds and their shareholders might be reflected by the fact that he’s willing to pretend to have time to understand 100 funds or by the fact that not one of those hundred has received a dollar of his own money.

It is, in either case, evidence of a broken system.

Trust But Verify . . .

Over and over again.

Large databases are tricky creatures, and few are larger or trickier than Morningstar’s.  I’ve been wondering, lately, whether there are better choices than Leuthold Global (GLBLX) for part of my non-retirement portfolio.  Leuthold’s fees tend to be high, Mr. Leuthold is stepping away from active management and the fund might be a bit stock-heavy for my purposes.  I set up a watchlist of plausible alternatives through Morningstar to see what I might find.

What I expected to find was the same data on each page, as was the case with Leuthold Global itself.

   

What I found was that Morningstar inconsistently reports the expense ratios for five of seven funds, with different parts of the site offering different expenses for the same fund.  Below is the comparison of the expense ratio reported on a fund’s profile page at Morningstar and at Morningstar’s Fund Spy page.

Profiled e.r.

Fund Spy e.r.

Leuthold Global

1.55%

1.55%

PIMCO All Asset, A

1.38

0.76

PIMCO All Asset, D

1.28

0.56

Northern Global Tact Alloc

0.68

0.25

Vanguard STAR

0.34

0.00

FPA Crescent

1.18

1.18

Price Spectrum Income

0.69

0.00

I called and asked about the discrepancy.  The best explanation that Morningstar’s rep had was that Fund Spy updated monthly and the profile daily.  When I asked how that might explain a 50% discrepancy in expenses, which don’t vary month-to-month, the answer was an honest: “I don’t know.”

The same problem appeared when I began looking at portfolio turnover data, occasioned by the question “does any SCV fund have a lower turnover than Huber Small Cap?”   Morningstar’s database reported 15 such funds, but when I clicked on the linked profile for each fund, I noticed errors in almost half of the reports.

Profiled turnover

Fund Screener turnover

Allianz NFJ Small Cap Value (PCVAX)

26

9

Consulting Group SCV (TSVUX)

38

9

Hotchkis and Wiley SCV (HWSIX)

54

11

JHFunds 2 SCV (JSCNX)

15

9

Northern Small Cap Value (NOSGX)

21

6

Queens Road Small Cal (QRSVX)

38

9

Robeco SCV I (BPSCX)

38

6

Bridgeway Omni SCV (BOSVX)

n/a

Registers as <12%

Just to be clear: these sorts of errors, while annoying, might well be entirely unavoidable.  Morningstar’s database is enormous – they track 375,000 investment products each day – and incredibly complex.  Even if they get 99.99% accuracy, they’re going to create thousands of errors.

One responsibility lies with Morningstar to clear up, as soon as is practical, the errors that they’ve learned of.  A greater responsibility lies with data users to double-check the accuracy of the data upon which they’re basing their decisions or forming their judgments.  It’s a hassle but until data providers become perfectly reliable, it’s an essential discipline.

A mid-month update:

The folks at Morningstar looked into these problems quite quickly. The short version is this: fund filings often contain multiple versions of what’s apparently the same data point. There are, for example, a couple different turnover ratios and up to four expense ratios. Different functions, developed by different folks at different times, might inadvertently choose to pull stats from different places. Both stats are correct but also inconsistent. If they aren’t flagged so that readers can understand the differences, they can also be misleading.

Morningstar is interested in providing consistent, system-wide data. Once they recognized the inconsistency, they moved quickly to reconcile it. As of June 19, the data had been reconciled. Thanks to the Wizards on West Wacker for their quick work. We’ll have a slightly more complete update in our July issue.

 

 

Proof that Time Travel is Possible: The SEC’s Current Filings

Each day, the Securities and Exchange Commission posts all of their current filings on their website.  For example, when a fund company files a new prospectus or a quarterly portfolio list, it appears at the SEC.  Each filing contains a date.  In theory, the page for May 22 will contain filings all of which are dated May 22.

How hard could that be?

Here’s a clue: of 187 entries for May 22, 25 were actually documents filed on May 22nd.  That’s 13.3%.  What are the other 86.7% of postings?  137 of them are filings originally made on other days or in other years.  25 of them are duplicate filings that are dated May 22.

I’ve regularly noted the agency’s whimsical programming.  This month I filed two written inquiries with them, asking why this happens.  The first query provoked no response for about 10 days, so I filed the second.  That provoked a voicemail message from an SEC attorney.  The essence of her answer:

  1. I don’t know
  2. Other parts of the agency aren’t returning our phone calls
  3. But maybe they’ll contact you?

Uhh … no, not so far.  Which leads me to the only possible conclusion: time vortex centered on the SEC headquarters.  To those of us outside the SEC, it was May 22, 2012.  To those inside the agency, all the dates in recent history had actually converged and so it was possible that all 15 dates recorded on the May 22 page were occurring simultaneously. 

And now a word from Chip, MFO’s technical director: “dear God, guys, hire a programmer.  It’s not that blinkin’ hard.”

Launch Alert 1: Rocky Peak Small Cap Value

On April 2, Rocky Peak Capital Management launched Rocky Peak Small Cap Value (RPCSX).  Rocky Peak was founded in 2011 by Tom Kerr, a Partner at Reed Conner Birdwell and long-time co-manager of CNI Charter RCB Small Cap Value fund.  He did well enough with that fund that Litman Gregory selected him as one of the managers of their Masters Smaller Companies fund (MSSFX).

While RPCSX doesn’t have enough of a track record to yet warrant a full profile, the manager’s experience and track record warrant adding it to a watch-list.  His plan is to hold 35-40 small cap stocks, many that pay dividends, and to keep risk-management in the forefront of his discipline.  Among the more interesting notes that came out of our hour-long conversation was (1) his interest in monitoring the quality of the boards of directors which should be reflected in both capital allocation and management compensation decisions and (2) his contention that there are three distinct sub-sets of the small cap universe which require different valuation strategies.  “Quality value” companies often have decades of profitable operating history and would be attractive at a modest discount to fair value.  “Contrarian value” companies, which he describes as “Third Avenue-type companies” are often great companies undergoing “corporate events” and might require a considerably greater discount.  “Smaller unknown value” stocks are microcap stocks with no more than one analyst covering them, but also really good companies (e.g. Federated Investors or Duff & Phelps).  I’ll follow it for a bit.

The fund has a $10,000 investment minimum and 1.50% expense ratio, after waivers.

Launch Alert 2: T. Rowe Price Emerging-Markets Corporate Bond Fund

On May 24, T. Rowe Price launched Emerging Markets Corporate Bond (TRECX), which will be managed by Michael Conelius, who also manages T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond (PREMX).  PREMX has a substantial EM corporate bond stake, so it’s not a new area for him.  The argument is that, in a low-yield world, these bonds offer a relatively low-risk way to gain exposure to financially sound, quickly growing firms.  The manager will mostly invest in dollar-denominated bonds as a way to hedge currency risks and will pursue theme-based investing (“rise of the Brazilian middle class”) in the same way many e.m. stock funds do.  The fund has a $2500 investment minimum, reduced to $1000 for IRAs and will charge a 1.15% expense ratio, after waivers.  That’s just above the emerging-markets bond category average of 1.11%, which is a great deal on a fund with no assets yet.

Launch Alert 3: PIMCO Short Asset Investment Fund

On May 31, PIMCO launched this fund has an alternative to a money-market fund.  PIMCO presents the fund as “a choice for conservative investors” which will offer “higher income potential than traditional cash investments.”  Here’s their argument:

Yields remain compressed, making it difficult for investors to obtain high-quality income without taking on excess risk. PIMCO Short Asset Investment Fund offers higher income potential than traditional cash investments by drawing on multiple high-quality fixed income opportunity sets and PIMCO’s expertise.

The manager, Jerome Schneider, has access to a variety of higher-quality fixed-income products as well as limited access to derivatives.  He’s “head of [their] short-term funding desk and is responsible for supervising all of PIMCO’s short-term investment strategies.”  The “D” class shares trade under the symbol PAIUX, have a $1000 minimum, and expenses of 0.59% after waivers.  “D” shares are generally available no-load/NTF at a variety of brokerages.

Four Funds and Why They’re Really Worth Your While

Each month, the Observer profiles between two and four mutual funds that you likely have not heard about, but really should have.  Our “Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers” do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought. Two intriguing newer funds are:

Aston / River Road Long-Short (ARLSX). There are few successful, time-tested long-short funds available to retail investors.  Among the crop of newer offerings, few are more sensibly-constructed, less expensive or more carefully managed that ARLSX seems to be.  It deserves attention.

Osterweis Strategic Investment (OSTVX). For folks who remain anxious about the prospects of a static allocation in a dynamic world, OSTVX combines the virtues of two highly-flexible Osterweis funds in a single package.  The fund remains a very credible choice along with stalwarts such as PIMCO All-Asset (PASDX) and FPA Crescent (FPACX).  This is an update to our May 2011 profile.  We’ve changed styles in presenting our updates.  We’ve placed the new commentary in a text box but we’ve also preserved all of the original commentary, which often provides a fuller discussion of strategies and the fund’s competitive universe.  Feel free to weigh-in on whether this style works for you.

The “stars in the shadows” are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX). Huber Small Cap is not only the best small-cap value fund of the past three years, it’s the extension of a long-practice, intensive and successful discipline with a documented public record.  For investors who understand that even great funds have scary stretches and are able to tolerate “being early” as a condition of long-term outperformance, HUSIX justifies as close a look as any fund launched in the past several years.

Wasatch Long Short (FMLSX).  For folks interested in access to a volatility-controlled equity fund, the case for FMLSX was – and is – remarkably compelling.  There’s only one demonstrably better fund in its class (BPLSX) and you can’t get into it.  FMLSX is near the top of the “A” list for those you can consider. This is an update to our 2009 profile.

The Best of the Web: Retirement Income Calculators

Our fourth “Best of the Web” feature focuses on retirement income calculators.  These are software programs, some quite primitive and a couple that are really smooth, that help answer two questions that most of us have been afraid to ask:

  1. How much income will a continuation of my current efforts generate?

and

  1. Will it be enough?

The ugly reality is that for most Americans, the answers are “not much” and “no.”  Tom Ashbrook, host of NPR’s On Point, describes most of us as “flying naked” toward retirement.  His May 29 program entitled “Is the 401(k) Working?” featured Teresa Ghilarducci, an economics professor at The New School of Social Research, nationally-recognized expert in retirement security and author of When I’m Sixty-Four: The Plot against Pensions and the Plan to Save Them (Princeton UP, 2008).  Based on her analysis of the most recent data, it “doesn’t look good at all” with “a lot of middle-class working Americans [becoming] ‘poor’ or ‘near-poor’ at retirement.”

Her data looks at the investments of folks from 50-64 and finds that most, 52%, have nothing (as in: zero, zip, zilch, nada, the piggy bank is empty).   In the top quarter of wage earners, folks with incomes above $75,000, one quarter of those in their 50s and 60s have no retirement savings.  Among the bottom quarter, 77% have nothing and the average account value for those who have been saving is $10,000.

The best strategy is neither playing the lottery nor pretending that it won’t happen.  The best strategy is a realistic assessment now, when you still have the opportunity to change your habits or your plans. The challenge is finding a guide that you can rely upon.  Certainly a good fee-only financial planner would be an excellent choice but many folks would prefer to turn to the web answers.  And so this month we trying to ferret out the best free, freely-available retirement income calculators on the web.

MFO at MIC

I’m pleased to report that I’ll be attending The Morningstar Investment Conference on behalf of the Observer.  This will be my first time in attendance.  I’ve got a couple meetings already scheduled and am looking forward to meeting some of the folks who I’ve only known through years of phone conversations and emails.

I’m hopeful of meeting Joan Rivers – I presume she’ll be doing commentary on the arrival of fashionistas Steve Romick, Will Danoff & Brian Rogers – and am very much looking forward to hearing from Jeremy Grantham in Friday’s keynote.  If folks have other suggestions for really good uses of my time, I’d like to hear from you.  Too, if you’d like to talk with me about the Observer and potential story leads, I’d be pleased to spend the time with you.

There’s a cheerful internal debate here about what I should wear.  Junior favors an old-school image for me: gray fedora with a press card in the hatband, flash camera and spiral notebook.   (Imagine a sort of balding Clark Kent.)  Chip, whose PhotoShop skills are so refined that she once made George W. look downright studious, just smiles and assures me that it doesn’t matter what I wear.  (Why does a smile and the phrase “Wear what you like and I’ll take care of everything” make me so apprehensive? Hmmm…)

Perhaps the better course is just to drop me a quick note if you’re going to be around and would like to chat.

Briefly noted . . .

Dreyfus has added Vulcan Value Partners as a sixth subadvisor for Dreyfus Select Managers Small Cap Value (DMVAX).  Good move!  Our profile described Vulcan Value Partners Small Cap fund as “a solid, sensible, profitable vehicle.”  Manager C.T. Fitzpatrick spent 17 years managing with Longleaf Partners before founding the Vulcan Value Partners.

First Eagle has launched First Eagle Global Income Builder (FEBAX) in hopes that it will provide “a meaningful but sustainable income stream across all market environments.”  Like me, they’re hopeful of avoiding “permanent impairment of capital.”  The management team overlaps their four-star High Yield Fund team.  The fund had $11 million on opening day and charges 1.3%, after waivers, for its “A” shares.

Vanguard Gets Busy

In the past four weeks, Vanguard:

Closed Vanguard High-Yield Corporate (VWEHX), closed to new investors.  The fund, subadvised by Wellington, sucked in $1.5 billion in new assets this year.  T. Rowe Price closed its High Yield (PRHYX) fund in April after a similar in-rush.

Eliminated the redemption fee on 33 mutual funds

Cut the expense ratios for 15 fixed-income, diversified-equity, and sector funds and ETFs.

Invented a calorie-free chocolate fudge brownie.

Osterweis, too

Osterweis Strategic Income (OSTIX) has added another fee breakpoint.  The fund will charge 0.65% on assets over $2.5 billion.  Given that the fund is a $2.3 billion, that’s worthwhile.  It’s a distinctly untraditional bond fund and well-managed.  Because its portfolio is so distinctive (lots of short-term, higher-yielding debt), its peer rankings are largely irrelevant.

At Least They’re Not in Jail

Former Seligman Communications and Information comanager Reema Shah pled guilty to securities fraud and is barred from the securities industry for life. She traded inside information with a Yahoo executive, which netted a few hundred thousand for her fund.

Authorities in Hong Kong have declined to pursue prosecution of George Stairs, former Fidelity International Value (FIVLX) manager.  Even Fido agrees that Mr. Stairs “did knowingly trade on non-public sensitive information.” Stairs ran the fund, largely into the ground, from 2006-11.

Farewells

Henry Berghoef, long-time co-manager of Oakmark Select (OAKLX), plans to retire at the end of July.

Andrew Engel, who helped manage Leuthold’s flagship Core Investment(LCORX) and Asset Allocation(LAALX) funds, died on May 9, at the age of 52.  He left behind a wife, four children and many friends.

David Williams, who managed Columbia Value & Restructuring (EVRAX, which started life as Excelsior Value & Restructuring), has retired after 20 years at the helm. The fund was one of the first to look beyond simple “value” and “growth” categories and into other structural elements in constructing its portfolio.

Closings

Delaware Select Growth (DVEAX) will close to new investors at the beginning of June, 2012.

Franklin Double Tax-Free Income (FPRTX) will soft-close in mid-June then hard-close at the beginning of August.

Goldman Sachs Mid Cap Value (GCMAX) will close to new investors at the end of July. Over the past five years the fund has been solidly . .. uh, “okay.”  You could do worse.  It doesn’t suck often. Not clear why, exactly, that justifies $8 billion in assets.

Old Wine, New Bottles

Artisan Growth Opportunities (ARTRX) is being renamed Artisan Global Opportunities.  The fund is also pretty global and the management team is talented and remaining, so it’s mostly a branding issue.

BlackRock Multi-Sector Bond Portfolio (BMSAX) becomes BlackRock Secured Credit Portfolio in June.  It also gets a new mandate (investing in “secured” instruments such as bank loans) and a new management team.  Presumably BlackRock is annoyed that the fund isn’t drawing enough assets (just $55 million after two years).  Its performance has been solid and it’s relatively new, so the problem mostly comes down to avarice.

Likewise BlackRock Mid-Cap Value Equity (BMCAX) will be revamped into BlackRock Flexible Equity at the end of July.  After its rebirth, the fund will become all-cap, able to invest across the valuation spectrum and able to invest large chunks into bonds, commodities and cash.  The current version of the fund has been consistently bad at everything except gathering assets, so it makes sense to change managers.  The eclectic new portfolio may reflect its new manager’s background in the hedge fund world.

Buffalo Science & Technology (BUFTX) will be renamed Buffalo Discovery, effective June 29, 2012.

Goldman Sachs Ultra-Short Duration Government (GSARX) is about to become Goldman Sachs High Quality Floating Rate and its mandate has been rewritten to focus on foreign and domestic floating-rate government debt.

Invesco Small Companies (ATIAX) will be renamed Invesco Select Companies at the beginning of August.

Nuveen is reorganizing Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) into Dividend Value (FFEIX), pending shareholder approval of course, next autumn.  The recently-despatched management team managed to parlay high risk and low returns into a consistently dismal record so shareholders are apt to agree.

Perritt Emerging Opportunities (PREOX) has been renamed Perritt Ultra MicroCap.  The fund’s greatest distinction is that it invests in smaller stocks, on whole, than any other fund and their original name didn’t capture that reality.  The fund is a poster child for “erratic,” finishing either in the top 10% or the bottom 10% of small cap funds almost every year. Its performance roughly parallels that of Bridgeway’s two “ultra-small company” funds.

Nuveen Tradewinds Global All-Cap (NWGAX) and Nuveen Tradewinds Value Opportunities (NVOAX) have reopened to new investors after the fund’s manager and a third of assets left.

Off to the Dustbin of History

AllianceBernstein Greater China ’97 (GCHAX) will be liquidated in early June. It’s the old story: high expenses, low returns, no assets.

Leuthold Hedged Equity will liquidate in June 2012, just short of its third anniversary.  The fund drew $4.7 million between two share clases and the Board of Trustees determined it was in the best interests of shareholders to liquidate.  Given the fund’s consistent losses – it turned $10,000 into $7900 – and high expenses, they’re likely right.  The most interesting feature of the fund is that the Institutional share class investors were asked to pony up $1 million to get in, and were then charged higher fees than were retail class investors.

Lord Abbett Large Cap (LALAX) mergers into Lord Abbett Fundamental Equity (LDFVX) on June 15.

Oppenheimer plans to merge Oppenheimer Champion Income (OPCHX) and Oppenheimer Fixed Income Active Allocation (OAFAX) funds will merge into Oppenheimer Global Strategic Income (OPSIX) later this year.  That’s the final chapter in the saga of two funds that imploded (think: down 80%) in 2008, then saw their management teams canned in 2009. The decision still seems odd: OPCHX has a half-billion in assets and OAFAX is a small, entirely solid fund-of-funds.

In closing . . .

Thanks to all the folks who’ve provided financial support for the Observer this month.  In addition to a handful of friends who provided cash contributions, either via PayPal or by check, readers purchased almost 210 items through the Observer’s Amazon link.  Thanks!  If you have questions about how to use or share the link, or if you’re just not sure that you’re doing it right, drop me a line.

It’s been a tough month, but it could be worse.  You could have made a leveraged bet on the rise of Latin American markets (down 25% in May).  For folks looking for sanity and stability, though, we’ll continue in July our summer-long series of long-short funds, but we’ll also update the profiles of RiverPark Short-Term High Yield (RPHYX), a fund in which both Chip and I invest, and ING Corporate Leaders (LEXCX), the ghost ship of the fund world.  It’s a fund whose motto is “No manager? No problem!”  We’re hoping to have a first profile of Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX) and Conestoga Small Cap (CCASX).

Until then, take care and keep cool!

May 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

April started well, with the super-rich losing more money in a week than I can even conceive of.  Bloomberg reports that the 20 wealthiest people on Earth lost a combined $9.1 billion in the first week of April as renewed concerns that Europe’s debt crisis might worsen drove the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index to its largest decline of 2012.  Bill Gates, a year older than me, lost $558.1 million on the week. (World’s Richest Lose $9 Billion as Global Markets Decline).

I wonder if he even noticed?

Return of the Giants

Mark Jewell, writing for the AP, celebrated the resurgence of the superstar managers (Star Fund Managers Recover Quickly from Tough 2011).  He writes, “A half dozen renowned managers are again beating their peers by big margins, after trailing the vast majority last year. Each is a past winner of Morningstar’s manager of the year award in his fund category, and four have been honored as top manager of the decade.”  Quick snapshots of Berkowitz, Miller and Bill Gross follow, along with passing mention of Brent Lynn of Janus Overseas Fund (JDIAX), Michael Hasenstab of Templeton Global Bond (TPINX) and David Herro of Oakmark International (OAKIX).

A number of funds with very good long-term records were either out-of-step with the market or made bad calls in 2011, ending them in the basement.  There are 54 four- or five-star rated funds that tanked in 2011; that is, that trailed at least 90% of their peers.  Of those, 23 – 43% of the group – rebounded sharply this year and ended up with 10% returns for the year, through 4/30/11.  The rest of the worst-to-first roster:

American Century Zero Coupon 2015 and 2020

Fairholme

Federated International Leader

Jones Villalta Opportunity

SEI Tax-Exempt Tax-Advantaged

Fidelity Advisor Income Replacement 2038, 2040 and 2042

JHancock3 Leveraged Companies

Templeton Global Total Return CRM International Opportunity

Fidelity Capital & Income

REMS Real Estate Value Opportu

Templeton Global Bond and Maxim Templeton Global Bond

Catalyst/SMH Total Return Income

Fidelity Leveraged Company Stock

ING Pioneer High Yield

Templeton International Bond

API Efficient Frontier Income

Hartford Capital Appreciation

PIMCO Total Return III

Before we become too comfortable with the implied “return to normal, we really can trust The Great Men again,” we might also look at the roster of great funds that got hammered in 2011 and are getting hammered again in 2012.  Brian Barash at Cambiar Aggressive Value, Leupp and Ronco (no, not the TV gadgets guy) at Lazard U.S. Realty Income Open, The “A” team at Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Maximum Term and Whitney George & company at Royce Micro-Cap range from the bottom 2 – 25% of their peer groups.

Other former titans – Ariel (ARGFX), Clipper (CFIMX, a rare two-star “Gold” fund), Muhlenkamp Fund (MUHLX), White Oak Growth (WOGSX) – seem merely stuck in the mud.

“A Giant Sucking Sound,” Investor Interest in Mutual Funds . . .

and a lackadaisical response from the mutual fund community.

Apropos my recent (and ongoing) bout with the flu, we’re returning to the odd confluence of the Google Flu tracker and the fate of the fund industry.  In October 2011, we posted our first story using the Google Trends data, the same data that allows Google to track incidence of the flu by looking at the frequency and location of flu-related Google searches.  In that article, we included a graph, much like the one below, of public interest in mutual funds.  Here was our original explanation:

That trend line reflects an industry that has lost the public’s attention.  If you’ve wondered how alienated the public is, you could look at fund flows – much of which is captive money – or you could look at a direct measure of public engagement.   The combination of scandal, cupidity, ineptitude and turmoil – some abetted by the industry – may have punched an irreparable hole in industry’s prospects.

This is a static image of searches in the U.S. for “mutual funds,” from January 2004 to April 2012.

And it isn’t just a retreat from investing and concerns about money.  We can separately track the frequency of “mutual funds” against all finance-related searches, which is shown on this live chart:

In brief, the industry seems to have lost about 75% of its mindshare (sorry, it’s an ugly marketing neologism for “how frequently potential buyers think about you”).

That strikes me as “regrettable” for Fidelity and “potentially fatal” for small firms whose assets haven’t yet reached a sustainable level.

I visit a lot of small fund websites every month, read more shareholder communications than I care to recall and interview a fair number of managers.  Here’s my quick take: a lot of firms materially impair their prospects for survival by making their relationship with their shareholders an afterthought.  These are the folks who take “my returns speak for themselves” as a modern version of “Build a better mousetrap, and the world will beat a path to your door” (looks like Emerson actually did say it, but in a San Francisco speech rather than one of his published works).

In reality, your returns mumble.  You’re one of 20,000 datapoints and if you’re not a household name, folks aren’t listening all that closely.

According to Google, the most popular mutual-fund searches invoke “best, Vanguard (three variants), Fidelity (three variants), top, American.”

On whole, how many equity managers do you suppose would invest in a company that had no articulated marketing strategy or, at best, mumbled about the quality of their mousetraps?

And yet, this month alone, in the course of my normal research, I dealt with four fund companies that don’t even have working email links on their websites and several more whose websites are akin to a bunch of handouts left on a table (one or two pages, links to mandatory documents and a four-year-old press release).  And it’s regrettably common for a fund’s annual report to devote no more than a paragraph or two to the fund itself.

There are small operations which have spectacularly rich and well-designed sites.  I like the Observer’s design, all credit for which goes to Anya Zolotusky of Darn Good Web Design.  (Anya’s more interesting than you or me; you should read her bio highlights on the “about us” page.)  I’ve been especially taken by Seafarer Funds new site.  Three factors stand out:

  • The design itself is clear, intuitive and easily navigated;
  • There’s fresh, thoughtful content including manager Andrew Foster’s responses to investor questions; and,
  • Their portfolio data is incredibly rich, which implies a respect for the active intelligence and interest of their readers.

Increasingly, there are folks who are trying to make life easier for small to mid-sized firms.  In addition to long established media relations firms like Nadler & Mounts or Kanter & Company, there are some small firms that seem to be seeking out small funds.  I’ve had a nice exchange with Nina Eisenman of FundSites about her experience at the Mutual Fund Education Alliance’s eCommerce show.  Apparently some of the big companies are designing intriguing iPad apps and other mobile manifestations of their web presence while representatives of some of the smaller companies expressed frustration at knowing they needed to do better but lacking the resources.

“What we’re trying to do with FundSites is level the playing field so that a small or mid-sized fund company with limited resources can produce a website that provides investors and advisors with the kind of relevant, timely, compliant information the big firms publish. Seems like there is a need for that out there.”

I agree but it really has to start at the top, with managers who are passionate about what they’re doing and about sharing what they’ve discovered.

Barron’s on FundReveal: Meh

Speaking of mousetraps, Barron’s e-investing writer Theresa Carey dismissed FundReveal as “a lesser mousetrap” (04/21/12). She made two arguments: that the site is clunky and that she didn’t locate any commodity funds that she couldn’t locate elsewhere.  Her passage on one of the commodity funds simultaneously revealed both the weakness in her own research and the challenge of using the FundReveal system.  She writes:

The top-ranked fund from Fidelity over the past three years is the Direxion Monthly Commodity Bull 2X (DXCLX). While it gets only two Morningstar stars, FundReveal generally likes it, awarding a “B” risk-return rating, second only to “A.” Scouring its 20,000-fund database, FundReveal finds just 61 funds that performed better than the Fidelity pick. (emphasis mine)

Here’s the problem with Theresa’s research: FundReveal does not rank funds on a descending scale of A, B, C, and D. Each of the four quadrants in their system gets a letter designation: “A” is “higher return, lower risk” and “B” is higher return, higher risk.”  Plotted in the “B” quadrant are many funds, some noticeably riskier than the others.  Treating “B” as if it were a grade on a junior high report card is careless and misleading.

And I’m not even sure what she means by “just 61 funds … performed better” since she’s looking at simple absolute returns over three years or FundReveal’s competing ADR calculation.  In either case, we’d need to know why that’s a criticism.  Okay, they found 61 superior funds.  And so … ?

Her article does simultaneously highlight a challenge in using the FundReveal system.  For whatever its analytic merits, the site is more designed for folks who love spreadsheets than for the average investor and the decision to label the quadrants with A through D does carry the risk of misleading casual users.

The Greatest Fund that’s not quite a Fund Anymore

In researching the impending merger of two Firsthand Technology funds (recounted in our “In Brief” section), I came across something that had to be a typo: a fund that had returned over 170% through early April.  As in, 14 weeks, 170% returns.

No typo, just a familiar name on a new product.  Firsthand Technology Value Fund, despite having 75% of their portfolio in cash (only $15.5 of $68.4 million was invested), peaked at a 175% gain.

What gives?  At base, irrational exuberance.  Firsthand Technology Value was famous in the 1990s for its premise – hire the guys who work in Silicon Valley and who have firsthand knowledge of it to manage your investments – and its performance.  In long-ago portfolio contests, the winner routinely was whoever had the most stashed in Tech Value.

The fund ran into performance problems in the 2000s (duh) and legal problems in recent years (related to the presence of too many illiquid securities in the portfolio).  As a result, it transformed into a closed-end fund investing solely in private securities in early 2011.  It’s now a publicly-traded venture capital fund that invests in technology and cleantech companies that just completed a follow-on stock offering. The fund, at last report, held stakes in just six companies.  But when one of those companies turned out to be Facebook, a bidding frenzy ensued and SVVC’s market price lost all relationship to the fund’s own estimated net asset value.  The fund is only required to disclose its NAV quarterly.  At the end of 2011, it was $23.92.  At the end of the first quarter of 2012, it was $24.56 per share.

Right: NAV up 3%, market price up 175%.

In April, the fund dropped from $46.50 to its May 1 market price, $26.27.  Anyone who held on pocketed a gain of less than 10% on the year, while folks shorting the stock in April report gains of 70% (and folks who sold and ran away, even more).

It’s a fascinating story of mutual fund managers returning to their roots and investors following their instincts; which is to say, to rush off another cliff.

Four Funds and Why They’re Really Worth Your While

Each month, the Observer profiles between two and four mutual funds that you likely have not heard about, but really should have.  Our “Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers” do not yet have a long track record, but have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought. Two intriguing newer funds are:

Amana Developing World Fund (AMDWX): Amana, which everyone knew was going to be cautious, strikes some as near-comatose.  We’ve talked with manager Nick Kaiser about his huge cash stake and his recent decision to begin deploying it.  This is an update on our May 2011 profile.

FMI International (FMIJX): For 30 years, FMI has been getting domestic stock investing right.  With the launch of FMI International, they’ve attempted to “extend their brand” to international stocks.  So far it’s been performing about as expected, which is to say, excellently

The “stars in the shadows” are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Artisan Global Value (ARTGX): can you say, “it’s about time”?  While institutional money has long been attracted to this successful, disciplined value strategy, retail investors began to take notice just in the past year. Happily, the strategy has plenty of capacity remaining.  This is an update on our May 2011 profile.

LKCM Balanced (LKBAX): LKCM Balanced (with Tributary Balanced, Vanguard Balanced Index and Villere Balanced) is one of a small handful of consistently, reliably excellent balanced funds.  The good news for prospective shareholders is that LKCM slashed the minimum investment this year, from $10,000 to $2,000, while continuing its record of great, risk-conscious performance.

The Best of the Web: Curated Financial News Aggregators

Our third “Best of the Web” feature focuses on human-curated financial news aggregators.  News aggregators such as Yahoo! News and Google News are wildly popular.  About a third of news users turn to them and Google reports about 100,000 clicks per minute at the Google News site.

The problem with aggregators such as Google is that they’re purely mechanical; the page content is generated by search algorithms driven by popularity more than the significance of the story or the seriousness of the analysis.

In this month’s “Best of the Web,” Junior and I test drove a dozen financial news aggregators, but identified only two that had consistently excellent, diverse and current content.  They are:

Abnormal Returns: Tadas Viskanta’s six year old venture, with its daily linkfests and frequent blog posts, is for good reason the web’s most widely-celebrated financial news aggregator.

Counterparties: curated by Felix Salman and Ryan McCarthy, this young Reuter’s experiment offers an even more eclectic mix than AR and does so with an exceptionally polished presentation.

As a sort of mental snack, we also identified two cites that couldn’t quite qualify here but that offered distinctive, fascinating resources: Smart Briefs, a sort of curated newsletter aggregator and Fark, an irreverent and occasionally scatological collection of “real news, real funny.”  You can access Junior’s column from “The Best” tab or here.  Columns in the offing include coolest fund-related tools, periodic tables (a surprising number), and blogs run by private investors.

We think we’ve done a good and honest job but Junior, especially, would like to hear back from readers about how the feature works for you and how to make it better, about sites we’re missing and sites we really shouldn’t miss.  Drop us a line. We read and appreciate everything and respond to as much as we can.

A “Best of” Update: MoneyLife with Chuck Jaffe Launches

Chuck Jaffe’s first episode of the new MoneyLife show aired April 30th. The good news: it was a fine debut, including a cheesy theme song and interviews with Bill O’Neil, founder of Investor’s Business Daily and originator of the CAN-SLIM investing system, and Tom McIntyre.  The bad news: “our Twitter account was hijacked within the 48 hours leading up to the show, which is one of many adventures you don’t plan for as you start something like this.”  Assuming that Chuck survives the excitement of his show’s first month, Junior will offer a more-complete update on June 1.  For now, Chuck’s show can be found here.

Briefly noted …

Steward Capital Mid-Cap Fund (SCMFX), in a nod to fee-only financial planners, dropped its sales load on April 2.  Morningstar rates it as a five-star fund (as of 4/30/12) and its returns over the past 1-, 3- and 5-year periods are among the best of any mid-cap core fund.  The investment minimum is $1000 and the expense ratio is 1.5% on $35 million in assets.

Grandeur Peak Global Advisors recently passed $200 million in assets under management.  Roughly $140M is in Global Opportunities (GPGOX/GPGIX) and $60M is in International Opportunities (GPIOX/GPIIX).  That’s a remarkable start for funds that launched just six months ago.

Calamos is changing the name of its high-yield fixed-income fund to Calamos High Income from Calamos High Yield (CHYDX) on May 15, 2012 because, without “income” in the name investors might think the fund focused on high-yielding corn hybrids (popular here in Iowa).

T. Rowe Price High Yield (PRHYX) and its various doppelgangers closed to new investors on April 30, 2012.

Old Mutual Heitman REIT is in the process of becoming the Heitman REIT Fund, but I’m not sure why I’d care.

ING’s board of directors approved merging ING Index Plus SmallCap (AISAX) into ING Index Plus MidCap (AIMAX) on or about July 21, 2012. The combined funds will be renamed ING SMID Cap Equity. In addition, ING Index Plus LargeCap (AELAX) was approved to merge into ING Corporate Leaders 100 (IACLX) on or about June 28, 2012.  Let’s note that ING Corporate Leaders 100 is a different, and distinctly inferior fund, than ING Corporate Leaders Trust “B”.

Huntington New Economy Fund (HNEAX), which spent most of the last decade in the bottom 5-10% of mid cap growth funds, is being merged into Huntington Mid Corp America Fund (HUMIX) in May 2012.  HUMIX is less expensive than HNEAX, though still grievously overpriced (1.57%) for its size ($139 million in assets) and performance (pretty consistently below average).

The Firsthand Funds are moving to merge Firsthand Technology Leaders Fund (TLFQX) into Firsthand Technology Opportunities Fund TEFQX). The investment objective of TLF is identical to that of TOF and the investment risks of TLF are substantially similar to those of TOF.  TLF is currently managed solely by Kevin Landis (TLF was co-managed by Kevin Landis and Nick Schwartzman from April 30, 2010 to December 13, 2011).

The $750 million Delaware Large Cap Value Fund is being merged into the $750 million Delaware Value® Fund, which “does not require shareholder approval, and you are not being asked to vote.”

The reorganization has been carefully reviewed by the Trust’s Board of Trustees. The Trustees, most of whom are not affiliated with Delaware Investments®, are responsible for protecting your interests as a shareholder. The Trustees believe the reorganization is in the best interests of the Funds based upon, among other things, the following factors:

Shareholders of both Funds could benefit from the combination of the Funds through a larger pool of assets, including realizing possible economies of scale . . .

Uhhh . . . notes to the “Board of Trustees [who] are responsible for protecting [my] interests”: (1) it’s “who,” not “whom.”  (2) If Delaware Value’s asset base is doubling and you’re anticipating “possible economies of scale,” why didn’t you negotiate a decrease in the fund’s expense ratio?

Snow Capital All Cap Value Fund (SNVAX) is being closed and liquidated as of the close of business on May 14, 2012.  The fund, plagued by high expenses and weak performance, had attracted only $3.7 million despite the fact that the lead manager (Richard Snow) oversees $2.6 billion.

Likewise,  Dreyfus Dynamic Alternatives Fund and Dreyfus Global Sustainability Fund were both liquidated in mid-April.

Forward seems to be actively repositioning itself away from “vanilla” products and into more-esoteric, higher cost funds.  In March, Forward Banking and Finance Fund and Forward Growth Fund were sold to Emerald Advisers, who had been running the funds for Forward, rebranded as Emerald funds.  Forward’s board added International Equity to the dustbin of history on April 30, 2012 and Mortgage Securities in early 2011.  Balancing off those departures, Forward also launched four new funds in the past 12 months: Global Credit Long/Short, Select Emerging Markets Dividend, Endurance Long/Short, Managed Futures and Commodity Long/Long.

On April 17, 2012, the Board of Trustees of the ALPS ETF Trust authorized an orderly liquidation of the Jefferies|TR/J CRB Wildcatters Exploration & Production Equity Fund (WCAT), which will be completed by mid-May.  The fund drew fewer than $10 million in assets and managed, since inception, to lose a modest amount for its (few) investors.

Effective on June 5, 2012, the equity mix in Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Conservative Term will include a greater emphasis on dividend-paying common stocks and a larger allocation to REITs and REOCs. Their other target date funds are shifting to a modestly more conservative asset allocation.

Nice work if you can get it.  Emily Alejos and Andrew Thelen were promoted to become the managers of Nuveen Tradewinds Global All-Cap Plus Fund of April 13.  The fund,  after the close of business on May 23, 2012, is being liquidated with the proceeds sent to the remaining shareholders.  Nice resume line and nothing they can do to goof up the fund’s performance.

News Flash: on April 27, 2012 Wilmington Multi-Manager International Fund (GVIEX), a fund typified by above average risks and expenses married with below average returns, trimmed its management team from 27 managers down to a lean and mean 26 with the departure of Amanda Cogar.

In closing . . .

Thanks to all the folks who supported the Observer in the months just passed.  While the bulk of our income is generated by our (stunningly convenient!) link to Amazon, two or three people each month have made direct financial contributions to the site.  They are, regardless of the amount, exceedingly generous.  We’re deeply grateful, as much as anything, for the affirmation those gestures represent.  It’s good to know that we’re worth your time.

In June we’ll continuing updating profiles including Osterweis Strategic Investment (OSTVX – gone from “quietly confident” to “thoughtful”) and Fidelity Global Strategies (FDYSX – skeptical then, skeptical now).  We’ll profile a new “star in the shadows,” Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX) and greet the turbulent summer months by beginning a series of profiles on long/short funds that might be worth the money.  June’s profile will be ASTON/River Road Long-Short Fund (ARLSX).

As ever,

April 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Are you feeling better?  2011 saw enormous stock market volatility, ending with a total return of one-quarter of one percent in the total stock market.  Who then would have foreseen Q1 2012: the Dow and S&P500 posted their best quarter since 1998.  The Dow posted six consecutive months of gains, and ended the quarter up 8%.  The S&P finished up 12% and the NASDAQ up 18% (its best since 1991).

Strong performance is typical in the first quarter of any year, and especially of a presidential election year.  Investors, in response, pulled $9.4 billion out of domestic equity funds and – even with inflows into international funds – reduced their equity investments by $3.2 billion dollars.  They fled, by and large, into the safety of the increasingly bubbly bond market.

It’s odd how dumb things always seem so sensible when we’re in the midst of doing them.

Do You Need Something “Permanent” in your Portfolio?

The title derives from the Permanent Portfolio concept championed by the late Harry Browne.  Browne was an advertising executive in the 1960s who became active in the libertarian movement and was twice the Libertarian Party’s nominee for president of the United States.  In 1981, he and Terry Coxon wrote Inflation-Proofing Your Investments, which argued that your portfolio should be positioned to benefit from any of four systemic states: inflation, deflation, recession and prosperity.  As he envisioned it, a Permanent Portfolio invests:

25% in U.S. stocks, to provide a strong return during times of prosperity.

25% in long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, which should do well during deflation.

25% in cash, in order to hedge against periods of recession.

25% in precious metals (gold, specifically), in order to provide protection during periods of inflation.

The Global X Permanent ETF (PERM) is the latest attempt to implement the strategy.  It’s also the latest to try to steal business from Permanent Portfolio Fund (PRPFX) which has drawn $17.8 billion in assets (and, more importantly from a management firm’s perspective, $137 million in fees for an essentially passive strategy).  Those inflows reflect PRPFX’s sustained success: over the past 15 years, it has returned an average of 9.2% per year with only minimal stock market exposure.

PRPFX is surely an attractive target, since its success not attributable to Michael Cuggino’s skill as a manager.  His stock picking, on display at Permanent Portfolio Aggressive Growth (PAGRX) is distinctly mediocre; he’s had one splendid year and three above-average ones in a decade.  It’s a volatile fund whose performance is respectable mostly because of his top 2% finish in 2005.  His fixed income investing is substantially worse.  Permanent Portfolio Versatile Bond (PRVBX) and Permanent Portfolio Short Term Treasury (PRTBX) are flat-out dismal.  Over the past decade they trail 95% of their peer funds.  All of his funds charge above-average expenses.  Others might conclude that PRPFX has thrived despite, rather than because of, its manager.

Snowball’s annual rant: Despite having received $48 million as his investment advisory fee (Mr. Cuggino is the advisor’s “sole member,” president and CEO), he’s traditionally been shy about investing in his funds though that might be changing.  “As of April 30, 2010,” according to his Annual Report, “Mr. Cuggino owned shares in each of the Fund’s Portfolios through his ownership of Pacific Heights.” A year later, that investment is substantially higher but corporate and personal money (if any) remain comingled in the reports.  In any case, he “determines his own compensation.”  That includes some portion of the advisor’s profits and the $65,000 a year he pays himself to serve on his own board of trustees.  On the upside, the advisor has authorized a one basis point fee waiver, as of 12/31/11.  Okay, that’s over.  I promise I’ll keep quiet on the topic until the spring of 2013.

It’s understandable that others would be interested in getting a piece of that highly-profitable action.  It’s surprising that so few have made the attempt.  You might argue that Hussman Strategic Total Return (HSTRX) offers a wave in the same direction and the Midas Perpetual Portfolio (MPERX), which invests in a suspiciously similar mix of precious metals, Swiss francs, growth stocks and bonds, is a direct (though less successful) copy.  Prior to December 29, 2008, MPERX (then known as Midas Dollar Reserves) was a government money market fund.  That day it changed its name to Perpetual Portfolio and entered the Harry Browne business.

A simple portfolio comparison shows that neither PRPFX nor MPERX quite matches Browne’s simple vision, nor do their portfolios look like each other.

  Permanent Portfolio Permanent ETF Perpetual Portfolio targets
Gold and silver 24% 25% 25
Swiss francs 10%  – 10
Stocks 25% 25% 30
          Aggressive growth           16.5           15           15
          Natural resource companies           8           5           15
          REITs           8           5  
Bonds 34% 50% 35
          Treasuries, long term           ~8           25  
          Treasuries, short-term           ~16           25  
          Corporate, short-term           6.5  –  
       
Expense ratio for the fund 0.77% 0.49% 1.35%

Should you invest in one, or any, of these vehicles?  If so, proceed with extreme care.  There are three factors that should give you pause.  First, two of the four underlying asset classes (gold and long-term bonds) are three decades into a bull market.  The projected future returns of gold are unfathomable, because its appeal is driven by psychology rather than economics, but its climb has been relentless for 20 years.  GMO’s most recent seven-year asset class projections show negative real returns for both bonds and cash.  Second, a permanent portfolio has a negative correlation with interest rates.  That is, when interest rates fall – as they have for 30 years – the funds return rises.  When interest rates rise, the returns fall.  Because PRPFX was launched after the Volcker-induced spike in rates, it has never had to function in a rising rate environment.  Third, even with favorable macro-economic conditions, this portfolio can have long, dismal stretches.  The fund posts its annual returns since inception on its website.  In the 14 years between 1988 and 2001, the fund returned an average of 4.1% annually.  During those same years inflation average 3% annually, which means PRPFX offered a real return of 1.1% per year.

And, frankly, you won’t make it to any longer-term goal with 1.1% real returns.

There are two really fine analyses of the Permanent Portfolio strategy.  Geoff Considine penned “What Investors Should Fear in the Permanent Portfolio” for Advisor Perspectives (2011) and Bill Bernstein wrote a short piece “Wild About Harry” for the Efficient Frontier (2010).

RiverPark Funds: Launch Alert and Fund Family Update

RiverPark Funds are making two more hedge funds available to retail investors, folks they describe as “the mass affluent.”  Given the success of their previous two ventures in that direction – RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) and RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX, in which I have an investment) – these new offerings are worth a serious look.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund is a long/short fund that has been managed by Mitch Rubin since its inception as a hedge fund in the fall of 2009.  The RiverPark folks believe, based on their conversation with “people who are pretty well versed on the current mutual funds that employ hedge fund strategies” that the fund has three characteristics that set it apart:

  • it uses a fundamental, bottom-up approach
  • it is truly shorting equities (rather than Index ETFs)
  • it has a growth bias for its longs and tends to short value.

Since inception, the fund generated 94% of the stock market’s return (33.5% versus 35.8% for the S&P500 from 10/09 – 02/12) with only 50% of its downside risk (whether measured by worst month, worst quarter, down market performance or max drawdown).

While the hedge fund has strong performance, it has had trouble attracting assets.  Morty Schaja, RiverPark’s president, attributes that to two factors.  Hedge fund investors have an instinctive bias against firms that run mutual funds.  And RiverPark’s distribution network – it’s most loyal users – are advisors and others who are uninterested in hedge funds.  It’s managed by Mitch Rubin, one of RiverPark’s founders and a well-respected manager during his days with the Baron funds.  The expense ratio is 1.85% on the institutional shares and 2.00% on the retail shares and the minimum investment in the retail shares is $1000.  It will be available through Schwab and Fidelity starting April 2, 2012.

RiverPark/Gargoyle Hedged Value Fund pursued a covered call strategy.  Here’s how Gargoyle describes their investment strategy:

The Fund invests all of its assets in a portfolio of undervalued mid- to large-cap stocks using a quantitative value model, then conservatively hedges part of its stock market risk by selling a blend of overvalued index call options, all in a tax-efficient manner. Proprietary tools are used to maintain the Fund’s net long market exposure within a target range, allowing investors to participate as equities trend higher while offering partial protection as equities trend lower.

Since inception (January 2000), the fund has posted 900% of the S&P500’s returns (150% versus 16.4%, 01/00 – 02/12).  Much of that outperformance is attributable to crushing the S&P from 2000-2002 but the fund has still outperformed the S&P in 10 of 12 calendar years and has done so with noticeably lower volatility.  Because the strategy is neither risk-free nor strongly correlated to the movements of the stock market, it has twice lost a little money (2007 and 2011) in years in which the S&P posted single-digit gains.

Mr. Schaja has worked with this strategy since he “spearheaded a research effort for a similar strategy while at Donaldson Lufkin Jenrette 25 years ago.”  Given ongoing uncertainties about the stock market, he argues “a buy-write strategy, owning equities and writing or selling call options on the underlying portfolio offers a very attractive risk return profile for investors. . . investors are willing to give up some upside, for additional income and some downside protection.  By selling option premium of about 1 1/2% per month, the Gargoyle approach can generate attractive risk adjusted returns in most markets.”

The hedge fund has about $190 million in assets (as of 02/12).  It’s managed by Joshua Parker, President of Gargoyle, and Alan Salzbank, its Managing Partner – Risk Management.  The pair managed the hedge fund since inception (including of its predecessor partnership since its inception in January 1997).  The expense ratio is 1.25% on the institutional shares and 1.5% on the retail shares and the minimum investment in the retail shares is $1000.  The challenge of working out a few last-minute brokerage bugs means that Gargoyle will launch on May 1, 2012.

Other RiverPark notes:

RiverPark Large Growth (RPXFX) is coming along nicely after a slow start. It’s a domestic, mid- to large-cap growth fund with 44 stocks in the portfolio.  Mitch Rubin, who managed Baron Growth, iOpportunity and Fifth Avenue Growth as various points in his career, manages it. Its returns are in the top 3% of large-growth funds for the past year (through March 2012), though its asset base remains small at $4 million.

RiverPark Small Cap Growth (RPSFX) continues to have … uh, “modest success” in terms of both returns and asset growth.  It has outperformed its small growth peers in six of its first 17 months of operation and trails the pack modestly across most trailing time periods. It’s managed by Mr. Rubin and Conrad van Tienhoven.

RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) is a concentrated large growth fund which aims to beat passive funds at their own game.  It’s been consistently at or near the top of the large-growth pack since inception.  David Rolfe, the manager, strikes me as bright, sensible and good-humored and the fund has drawn $200 million in assets in its first 18 months of operation.

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) pursues a distinctive, and distinctly attractive, strategy.  He buys a bunch of securities (called high yield bonds among them) which are low-risk and inefficiently priced because of a lack of buyers.  The key to appreciating the fund is to utterly ignore Morningstar’s peer rankings.  He’s classified as a “high yield bond fund” despite the fact that the fund’s objectives and portfolio are utterly unrelated to such funds.  It’s best to think of it as a sort of cash-management option.  The fund’s worst monthly loss was 0.24% and its worst quarter was 0.07%.   As of 3/28/12, the fund’s NAV ($10.00) is the same as at launch but its annual returns are around 4%.

Finally, a clarification.  I’ve fussed at RiverPark in the past for being too quick to shut down funds, including one mutual fund and several actively-managed ETFs.  Matt Kelly of RiverPark recently wrote to clear up my assumption that the closures were RiverPark’s idea:

Adam Seessel was the sub-adviser of the RiverPark/Gravity Long-Biased Fund. . . Adam became friendly with Frank Martin who is the founder of Martin Capital Management . . . a year ago, Frank offered Adam his CIO position and a piece of the company. Adam accepted and shortly thereafter, Frank decided that he did not want to sub-advise anyone else’s mutual fund so we were forced to close that fund.

Back in 2009, [RiverPark president Morty Schaja] teamed up with Grail Advisers to launch active ETFs. Ameriprise bought Grail last summer and immediately dismissed all of the sub-advisers of the grail ETFs in favor of their own managers.

Thanks to Matt for the insight.

FundReveal, Part 2: An Explanation and a Collaboration

For our “Best of the Web” feature, my colleague Junior Yearwood sorts through dozens of websites, tools and features to identify the handful that are most worth your while.  On March 1, he identified the low-profile FundReveal service as one of the three best mutual fund rating sites (along with Morningstar and Lipper).  The award was made based on the quality of evidence available to corroborate a ratings system and the site’s usability.

Within days, a vigorous and thoughtful debate broke out on the Observer’s discussion board about FundReveal’s assumptions.  Among the half dozen questions raised, two in particular seemed to resonate: (1) isn’t it unwise to benchmark everything – including gold and short-term bond funds – against the risk and return profile of the S&P 500?  And (2) you assume that past performance is not predictive, but isn’t your system dependent on exactly that?

I put both of those questions to the guys behind FundReveal, two former Fidelity executives who had an important role to play in changing the way trading decisions were made and employees rewarded.  Here’s the short version of their answers.  Fuller versions are available on their blog.

(1) Why does FundReveal benchmark all funds against the S&P? Does the analysis hold true if other benchmarks are used?

FundReveal uses the S&P 500 as a single, consistent reference for comparing performance between funds, for 4 of its 8 measures. The S&P also provides a “no-brainer” alternative to any other investments, including mutual funds. If an investor wishes to participate in the market, without selecting specific sectors or securities, an S&P 500 index fund or ETF provides that alternative.

Four of FundReveal’s eight measurements position funds relative to the index. Four others are independent of the S&P 500 index comparison.

An investor can compare a fund’s risk-return performance against any index fund by simply inserting the symbol of an index fund that mimics the index. Then the four absolute measures for a fund (average daily returns, volatility of daily returns, worst case return and number of better funds) can be compared against the chosen index fund.

ADR and Volatility are the most direct and closest indicators of a mutual fund’s daily investment and trading decisions. They show how well a fund is being managed. High ADR combined with low Volatility are indicators of good management. Low ADR with high Volatility indicates poor management.

(2) Why is it that FundReveal says that past total returns are not useful in deciding which funds to invest in for the future? Why do your measures, which are also calculated from past data, provide insight into future fund performance?

Past total returns cannot indicate future performance. All industry performance ratings contain warnings to this effect, but investors continue using them, leading to “return chasing investor behavior.”

[A conventional calculations of total return]  includes the beginning and ending NAV of a fund, irrespective of the NAVs of the fund during the intervening time period. For example, if a fund performed poorly during most of the days of a year, but its NAV shot up during the last week of the year, its total return would be high. The low day-to-day returns would be obscured. Total Return figures cannot indicate the effectiveness of investment decisions made by funds every day.

Mutual funds make daily portfolio and investment decisions of what and how much to hold, sell or buy. These decisions made by portfolio managers, supported by their analysts and implemented by their traders, produce daily returns: positive some days, and negative others. Measuring their average daily values and their variability (Volatility) gives direct quantitative information about the effectiveness of the daily investment decisions. Well managed funds have high ADR and low Volatility. Poorly managed funds behave in the opposite manner.

I removed a bunch of detail from the answers.  The complete versions of the S&P500 benchmark and past performance as predictor are available on their blog.

My take is two-fold: first, folks are right in criticizing the use of the S&P500 as a sole benchmark.  An investor looking for a conservative portfolio would likely find himself or herself discouraged by the lack of “A” funds.  Second, the system itself remains intriguing given the ability to make more-appropriate comparisons.  As they point out in the third paragraph, there are “make your own comparison” and “look only at comparable funds” options built into their system.

In order to test the ability of FundReveal to generate useful insights in fund selection, the Observer and FundReveal have entered into a collaborative arrangement.  They’ve agreed to run analyses of the funds we profile over the next several months.  We’ll share their reasoning and bottom line assessment of each fund, which might or might not perfectly reflect our own.  FundReveal will then post, free, their complete assessment of each fund on their blog.  After a trial of some months, we’re hoping to learn something from each other – and we’re hoping that all of our readers benefit from having a second set of eyes looking at each of these funds.

Both the Tributary and Litman Gregory profiles include their commentary, and the link to their blog appears at the end of each profile.  Please do let me know if you find the information helpful.

Lipper: Your Best Small Fund Company is . . .

GuideStone Funds.

GuideStone Funds?

Uhh … Lipper’s criterion for a “small” company is under $40 billion under management which is, by most standards, not small.  Back to GuideStone.

From their website: “GuideStone Funds, a controlled affiliate of GuideStone Financial Resources, provides a diversified family of Christian-based, socially screened mutual funds.”

Okay.  In truth, I had no prior awareness of the family.  What I’ve noticed since the Lipper awards is that the funds have durn odd names (they end in GS2 or GS4 designations), that the firm’s three-year record (on which Lipper made their selection) is dramatically better than either the firm’s one-year or five-year record.  That said, over the past five years, only one GuideStone fund has below-average returns.

Fidelity: Thinking Static

As of March 31, 2012, Fidelity’s Thinking Big viral marketing effort has two defining characteristics.  (1) it has remained unchanged from the day of its launch and (2) no one cares.  A Google search of the phrase Fidelity  +”Thinking Big” yields a total of six blog mentions in 30 days.

Morningstar: Thinking “Belt Tightening”

Crain’s Chicago Business reports that Morningstar lost a $12 million contact with its biggest investment management client.  TransAmerica Asset Management had relied on Morningstar to provide advisory services on its variable annuity and fund-of-funds products.  The newspaper reports that TransAmerica simplified things by hiring Tim Galbraith, Morningstar’s director of alternative investments, to handle the work in-house.  TransAmerica provided about 2% of Morningstar’s revenue last year.

Given the diversity of Morningstar’s global revenue streams, most reports suggest this is “unfortunate” rather than “terrible” news, and won’t result in job losses.  (source: “Morningstar loses TransAmerica work,” March 27 2012)

James Wang is not “the greatest investor you’ve never heard of”

Investment News gave that title to the reclusive manager of the Oceanstone Fund (OSFDX) who was the only manager to refuse to show up to receive a Lipper mutual fund award.  He’s also refused all media attempts to arrange an interview and even the chairman of his board of trustees sounds modestly intimidated by him.  Fortune has itself worked up into a tizzy about the guy.

Nonetheless, the combination of “reclusive” and an outstanding five-year record still don’t add up to “the greatest investor you’ve never heard of.”  Since you read the Observer, you’ve surely heard of him, repeatedly.  As I’ve noted in a February 2012 story:

  1. the manager’s explanation of his investment strategy is nonsense.  He keeps repeating the magic formula: IV = IV divided by E, times E.  No more than a high school grasp of algebra tells you that this formula tells you nothing.  I shared it with two professors of mathematics, who both gave it the technical term “vacuous.”  It works for any two numbers (4 = 4 divided by 2, times 2) but it doesn’t allow you to derive one value from the other.
  2. the shareholder reports say nothing. The entire text of the fund’s 2010 Annual Report, for example, is three paragraph.  One reports the NAV change over the year, the second repeats the formula (above) and the third is vacuous boilerplate about how the market’s unpredictable.
  3. the fund’s portfolio turns over at triple the average rate, is exceedingly concentrated (20 names) and is sitting on a 30% cash stake.  Those are all unusual, and unexplained.

That’s not evidence of investing genius though it might bear on the old adage, “sometimes things other than cream rise to the top.”

Two Funds and Why They’re Really Worth Your While

Each month, the Observer profiles between two and four mutual funds that you likely have not heard about, but really should have.

Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies (MASNX): Litman Gregory has assembled four really talented teams (order three really talented teams and “The Jeffrey”) to manage their new Alternative Strategies fund.  It has the prospect of being a bright spot in valuable arena filled with also-ran offerings.

Tributary Balanced, Institutional (FOBAX): Tributary, once identified with First of Omaha bank and once traditionally “institutional,” has posted consistently superb returns for years.  With a thoughtfully flexible strategy and low minimum, it deserves noticeably more attention than it receives.

The Best of the Web: A Week of Podcasts

Our second “Best of the Web” feature focuses on podcasts, portable radio for a continually-connected age.  While some podcasts are banal, irritating noise (Junior went through a month’s worth of Advil to screen for a week’s worth of podcasts), others offer a rare and wonderful commodity: thoughtful, useful analysis.

In “A Week of Podcasts,” Junior and I identified four podcasts to help power you through the week, three to help you unwind and (in an exclusive of sorts) news of Chuck Jaffe’s new daily radio show, MoneyLife with Chuck Jaffe.

We think we’ve done a good and honest job but Junior, especially, would like to hear back from readers about how the feature works for you and how to make it better, about sites we’ve missing and sites we really shouldn’t miss.  Drop us a line, we read and appreciate everything and respond to as much as we can.

Briefly noted . . .

Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX), managed by Andrew Foster, is up about 3% since its mid-February launch.  The average diversified emerging markets fund is flat over the same period.  The fund is now available no-load/NTF at Schwab and Scottrade.  For reasons unclear, the Schwab website (as of 3/31/12) keeps saying that it’s not available.  It is available and the Seafarer folks have been told that the problem lies in Schwab’s website, portions of which only update once a month. As a result, Seafarer’s availability may not be evident until April 11..

On the theme of a very good fund getting dramatically better, Villere Balanced Fund (VILLX) has reduced its capped expense ratio from 1.50% to 0.99%.  While the fund invests about 60% of the portfolio in stocks, its tendency to include a lot of mid- and small-cap names makes it a lot more volatile than its peers.  But it’s also a lot more rewarding: it has top 1% returns among moderate allocation funds for the past three-, five- and ten-year periods (as of 3/30/2012).  Lipper recently recognized it as the top “Mixed-Asset Target Allocation Growth Fund” of the past three and five years.

Arbitrage Fund (ARBFX) reopened to investors on March 15, 2012. The fund closed in mid-2010 was $2.3 billion in assets and reopened with nearly $3 billion.  The management team has also signed-on to subadvise Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies (MASNX), a review of which appears this month.

Effective April 30, 2012, T. Rowe Price High Yield (PRHYX, and its advisor class) will close to new investors.  Morningstar rates it as a Four Star / Silver fund (as of 3/30/2012).

Neuberger Berman Regency (NBRAX) has been renamed Neuberger Berman Mid Cap Intrinsic Value and Neuberger Berman Partners (NPNAX) have been renamed Neuberger Berman Large Cap Value.  And, since there already was a Neuberger Berman Large Cap Value fund (NVAAX), the old Large Cap Value has now been renamed Neuberger Berman Value.  This started in December when Neuberger Berman fired Basu Mullick, who managed Regency and Partners.  He was, on whole, better than generating high volatility than high returns.  Partners, in particular, is being retooled to focus on mid-cap value stocks, where Mullick tended to roam.

American Beacon announced it will liquidate American Beacon Large Cap Growth (ALCGX) on May 18, 2012 in anticipation of “large redemptions”. American Beacon runs the pension plan for American Airlines.  Morningstar speculates that the termination of American’s pension plan might be the cause.

Aberdeen Emerging Markets (GEGAX) is merging into Aberdeen Emerging Markets Institutional (ABEMX). Same managers, same strategies.  The expense ratio will drop substantially for existing GEGAX shareholders (from 1.78% to 1.28% or so) but the investment minimum will tick up from $1000 to $1,000,000.

Schwab Premier Equity (SWPSX) closed at the end of March as part of the process of merging it into Schwab Core Equity (SWANX).

Forward is liquidating Forward International Equity Fund, effective at the end of April.  The combination of “small, expensive and mediocre” likely explains the decision.

Invesco has announced plans to merge Invesco Capital Development (ACDAX) into Invesco Van Kampen Mid Cap Growth (VGRAX) and Invesco Commodities Strategy (COAAX) Balanced-Risk Commodity Strategy (BRCAX).  In both mergers, the same management team runs both funds.

Allianz is merging Allianz AGIC Target (PTAAX) into Allianz RCM Mid-Cap (RMDAX), a move which will bury Target’s large asset base and modestly below-average returns into Mid-Cap’s record of modestly above-average returns.

ING Equity Dividend (IEDIX) will be rebranded as ING Large Cap Value.

Lord Abbett Mid-Cap Value (LAVLX) has changed its name to Lord Abbett Mid-Cap Stock Fund at the end of March.

Year One, An Anniversary Celebration

With this month’s issue, we celebrate the first anniversary of the Observer’s launch.  I am delighted by our first year and delighted to still be here.  The Internet Archive places the lifespan of a website at 44-70 days.  It’s rather like “dog years.”  In “website lifespan years,” we are actually celebrating something between our fifth and eighth anniversary.  In truth, there’s no one we’d rather celebrate it with that you folks.

Highlights of a good year:

  • We’ve seen 65,491 “Unique Visitors” from 103 countries. (Fond regards to Senegal!).
  • Outside North America, Spain is far and away the source of our largest number of visits.  (Gracias!)
  • Junior’s steady dedication to the site and to his “Best of the Web” project has single-handedly driven Trinidad and Tobago past Sweden to 24th place on our visitor list.  His next target: China, currently in 23rd.
  • 84 folks have made financial contributions (some more than once) to the site and hundreds of others have used our Amazon link.   We have, in consequence, ended our first year debt-free, bills paid and spirits high.  (Thanks!)
  • Four friends – Chip, Anya, Accipiter, and Junior – put in an enormous number of hours behind the scenes and under the hood, and mostly are compensated by a sense of having done something good. (Thank you, guys!)
  • We are, for many funds, one of the top results in a Google search.  Check PIMCO All-Asset All-Authority (#2 behind PIMCO’s website), Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (#4), RiverPark Short Term High Yield (#5), Matthews Asia Strategic Income (#6), Bretton Fund (#7) and so on.

That reflects the fact that we – you, me and all the folks here – are doing something unusual.  We’re examining funds and opportunities that are being ignored almost everywhere else.  The civility and sensibility of the conversation on our discussion board (where a couple hundred conversations begin each month) and the huge amount of insight that investors, fund managers, journalists and financial services professionals share with me each month (you folks write almost a hundred letters a month, almost none involving sales of “v1agre”) makes publishing the Observer joyful.

We have great plans for the months ahead and look forward to sharing them with you.

See you in a month!

 

March 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

In the midst of the stock market’s recent generosity – 250 mutual funds booked returns of 20% or more in the first two months of 2012 – it’s easy to forget how bad 2011 was for the smart money crowd.  The average equity hedge fund, represented by the HFRX Equity Hedge Index, lost 19% for the year.  The value guys lost more than the growth guys. The Economist took some glee in reproducing a hypothetical letter from a hedge fund manager.  It reads, in part,

It is also time to move on from the concept of delivering “alpha”, the skill you’ve paid us such fat fees for. Upon reflection, we have decided that we’re actually much better at giving you “smart beta”. This term is already being touted at industry conferences and we hope shortly to be able to explain what it means. Like our peers we have also started talking a lot about how we are “multi-strategy” and “capital-structure agnostic”, and boasting about the benefits of our “unconstrained” investment approach. This is better than saying we don’t really understand what’s going on.

As an unofficial representative of the dumb money crowd, I’ll peel my eyes away from the spectacle of the Republican Party deciding which vital organ to stab next, just long enough to offer a cheery “nyah-nyah-nyah.”

The Observer in The Journal

As many of you know, The Wall Street Journal profiled the Observer in a February 6 article entitled “Professor’s Advice: It’s Best to Be Bored.” I talked a bit about the danger of “exciting” opportunities, offered leads on a dozen cool funds, and speculated about two emerging bubbles.  Neither should be a great surprise, but both carry potentially enormous consequences.

The bubbles in question are U.S. bonds and gold.  And those bubbles are scary because those assets have proven to be the last refuge for tens of millions of older investors (who, by the way, vote in huge numbers) whose portfolios were slammed by the stock market’s ferocious, pointless decade.  Tim Krochuk of GRT Capital Partners volunteers the same observation in a conversation this week.  “If rates return to normal – 4 or 5% – holders of long bonds are going to lose 40 – 50%.  If you thought that a 40% stock market fall led to blood in the streets, wait until you see what happens after a hit that big in retirees’ ‘safe’ portfolios.”  Folks from Roger Ibbotson to Teresa Kong have, this week, shared similar concerns.

For visual learners, here are the two graphs that seem best to reflect the grounds for my concern.

The first graph is the yield on benchmark 10-year Treasuries.  When the line is going up, Treasuries are in a bear market.  When the line is going down, they’re in a bull market.  Three things stand out, even to someone like me who’s not a financial professional:

  • A bear market in bonds can last decades.
  • The current bull market in bonds has proceeded, almost without interruption for 30 years.
  • With current yields at 2% and inflation at 3% (i.e., there’s a negative real yield already), there’s nowhere much for the bull to go from here.

The second graph is the price of gold.  Since investing in gold is a matter of theology rather than economics, there’s not much to say beyond “gee, do you suppose it’ll rise forever?”

It might.  Thomas Sowell’s Basic Economics calculates that $1 investing in U.S. stocks in 1800 and held for about 200 years would be worth $500,000.   $1 in gold would be worth $0.78.  But this time’s different.  It always is.

In celebration of boring investments

In investing terms, “income” was once dismissed as the province of the elderly whose other eccentricities included reflection on the state of their bowel movements and strong convictions about Franklin Roosevelt.  Market strategies abjured dividend-paying firms, reasoning that dividends only arose when management was too timid or stupid to find useful things to do with their earnings.  And equity managers who were trapped by the word “income” in their fund name tried various dodges to avoid it.  In the mid-90s, for example, Fidelity Dividend Growth fund (FDGFX) invested in fast growing small caps, under the theory that  those firms had “the potential to increase (or begin paying) dividends in the future.”  Even today, it’s possible to find funds (Gabelli, Columbia, Huber, FAM) named “Equity Income” with yields below 0.6%.

The problem was compounded by organizational structures that isolated the equity and fixed-income teams from each other.  Even most stock/bond hybrid funds maintained the division: 60% of the portfolio was controlled by the equity manager, 40% by the fixed income manager.  Period.   Only a handful of managers – chief among them, David Winters at Wintergreen (WGRNX) and his forebears at the Mutual Series, Marty Whitman at Third Avenue Value (TAVFX), Steve Romick at FPA Crescent (FPACX) and Andrew Foster and Paul Matthews at Matthews Asian Growth and Income (MACSX) – had the freedom, the confidence and the competence to roam widely over a firm’s capital structure.

Today, some of the best analysis and most innovative product design is being done on income-sensitive funds.  That might reflect the simple fact that funds without income (alternately, gold exposure) have had a disastrous decade.  Jeremy Grantham observes in his latest quarterly letter

The U.S. market was terrible for the last 10 years, gaining a pathetic 0.5% per year overall, after inflation adjustments and even including dividends. Without dividends, the [S&P 500] index itself has not gone up a penny in real terms from mid-1997 to end-2011, or 14½ years. This is getting to be a long time!

Now dividend-stocks are (unwisely) declared as an alternative to bonds (“stock dividends, as an alternative or supplement to bonds, are shaping up to have better yields and less risk” notes a 2012 article in Investment News) and investors poured money into them in 2011.

The search for income is increasingly global.  Morningstar reports that “There now are 24 equity income funds that invest at least 25% of their assets outside of the U.S. and 30 funds that invest at least 75%, with the majority of those funds being launched in the last few years, according to Lipper.”

Among the cool options now available:

Calamos Evolving World Growth (CNWGX), which invests broadly in emerging market stocks, the stocks of developed market firms which derive at least 20% of sales in emerging markets, then adds convertibles or bonds to manage volatility. 4.75% front load, 1.68% e.r.

Global X Permanent ETF (PERM) which will pursue a Permanent Portfolio-like mix of 25% stocks, 25% gold and silver, 25% short-term bonds, and 25% long-term government bonds.  Leaving aside the fact that with Global X nothing is permanent, this strategy for inflation-proofing your portfolio has some merits.  We’ll look at PERM and its competitors in detail in our April issue.

Innovator Matrix Income Fund (IMIFX), which intends to rotate through a number of high-yielding surrogates for traditional asset classes.  Those include master limited partnerships, royalty trusts, REITs, closed end funds and business development companies.  In, for example, a low-inflation, low-growth environment, the manager would pursue debt REITs and closed-end bond funds to generate yield but might move to royalty trusts and equity REITs if both inflation and growth accelerated.  Hmmm.

iShares Morningstar Multi-Asset High Income Index Fund, still in registration, which will invest 20% in stocks, 60% in bonds (including high-yield corporates, emerging markets and international) and 20% in “alternative assets” (which means REITs and preferred shares).  Expenses not yet announced.

WisdomTree Emerging Markets Equity Income (DEM), which launched in 2007.  It holds the highest-paying 30% of stocks (about 300) in the WisdomTree Emerging Markets Dividend Index.  The fund has returned 28% annually over the past three years (through 1/31/12), beating the emerging markets average by 5% annually.  By Morningstar’s calculation, the fund outperforms its peers in both rising and falling markets. Expenses of 0.63%.

In September of 2010, I lamented “the best fund that doesn’t exist,” an emerging markets balanced fund.  Sophisticated readers searched and did find one closed-end fund that fit the bill, First Trust Aberdeen Emerging Opportunities (FEO), which I subsequently profiled as a “star in the shadows.”  A pack of emerging markets balanced funds have since comes to market:

AllianceBernstein Emerging Markets Multi Asset (ABAEX) will hold 0-65% bonds (currently 40%), with the rest in stocks and cash.  4.25% front load, 1.65% e.r.

Dreyfus Total Emerging Markets (DTMAX), which has an unconstrained allocation between stocks and bonds.  5.75% load, 1.65% e.r.

Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX), launched in November and already approaching $100 million in assets, the fund has a pretty static 60/40 allocation.  No-load, 1.40% e.r.

First Trust/Aberdeen Emerging Opportunities (FEO), a closed-end fund and an Observer “Star in the Shadows” fund.  About 60% bonds, 40% stocks.  Exchange traded, 1.76% e.r.

Lazard Emerging Markets Multi-Strategy (EMMOX), which has a floating allocation between stocks, bonds (including convertibles) and currency contracts. No-load, 1.60% e.r.

PIMCO Emerging Multi-Asset (PEAAX), the most broadly constructed of the funds, is benchmarked against an index which invests 50/50 between stocks and bonds.  The fund itself can combine stocks, bonds, currencies and commodities. 5.5% load for the “A” shares, 1.74% expenses.

Templeton Emerging Markets Balanced (TAEMX), which must have at least 25% each in stocks and bonds but which is currently 65/30 in favor of stocks.  5.75% front load, 1.54% expenses.

While the options for no-load, low-cost investors remain modest, they’re growing – and growing in a useful direction.

Launch Alert (and an interview): Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income

In my February 2012 Commentary, I highlighted the impending launch of Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX and SIGIX).  I noted

The fund will be managed by Andrew Foster, formerly manager of Matthews Asia Growth & Income (MACSX) and Matthews’ research director and acting chief investment officer.

The great debate surrounding MACSX was whether it was the best Asia-centered fund in existence or merely one of the two or three best funds in existence.  Here’s the broader truth within their disagreement: Mr. Foster’s fund was, consistently and indisputably one of the best Asian funds in existence.

The launch provoked three long, thoughtful discussion threads about the prospects of the new fund, the Seafarer prospectus was our most downloaded document in the month of February and Chip, our sharp-eyed technical director, immediately began plotting to buy shares of the fund for her personal portfolio.

Mr. Foster and I agreed that the best way to agree potential investors’ questions was, well, to address potential investors’ questions.  He read through many of the comments on our discussion broad and we identified these seven as central, and often repeated.

Kenster1_GlobalValue:  Could he tell us more about his investment team? He will be lead manager but will there be a co-manager? If not, then an Assistant Manager? How about the Analysts – tell us more about them? Does he plan to add another analyst or two this year to beef up his team?

He’s currently got a team of four.  In addition to himself, he works with:

Michelle Foster, his wife, CFO, Chief Administrator and partner.  She has a remarkable investing resume.  She started as an analyst with JP Morgan, was a Principal at Barclay’s Global Investors (BGI) where she developed ETFs (including one that competed directly with Andrew’s India fund), and then joined investment advisory team at Litman/Gregory Asset Management.

William Maeck, his Associate Portfolio Manager and Head Trader.  William was actually Foster’s first boss at A. T. Kearney in Singapore where Andrew worked before joining Matthews.  Before joining Seafarer, he worked with Credit Suisse Securities as an investment advisor for high net worth individuals and family offices.  For now, William mostly monitors trading issues for the fund and has limited authority to execute trades at Foster’s direction.  With time, he should move toward more traditional co-manager responsibilities.

Kate Jaquet, Senior Research Analyst and Chief Compliance Officer.  Kate brings a lot of experience in fixed-income and high-yield investing and in Latin America.  She began her career in emerging markets in 1995 as an economic policy researcher for the international division of The Adam Smith Institute in London.  In 1997, she joined Credit Suisse First Boston as an investment banking and fixed-income analyst within their Latin America group. In 2000, she joined Seneca Capital Management in San Francisco as a senior research analyst in their high yield group.  She worked on high yield and distressed issuers, the metals & mining, oil & gas, and utilities industries, emerging market sovereigns and select emerging market corporate issuers.

AndyJ : I’m still mildly curious about the context of his leaving Matthews. Simply “pursuing other opportunities” might be the whole story, or it might not – even if perfectly true, there’s likely a context that would be interesting to know about.

Good and fair question.  Mr. Foster has a deep and abiding respect for Matthews and a palpable concern for his former shareholders.  When he joined Matthews in 1998, the firm managed $180 million.  It had grown a hundredfold by the time he left.  As a long-time member of the team, sometime chief investment officer, chief research officer and portfolio manager, he’d made a huge and rewarding commitment to the company.  About his leaving Mr. Foster made two points:

  1. A fund like this has been on his mind for a decade.  It wasn’t clear, ten years ago, whether Matthews would remain purely Asia-focused or would broaden its geographic horizons.  As part of those deliberations, Paul Matthews asked Andrew to design a global version of MACSX.  He was very excited about the potential of such a fund.  After a long debate, Matthews concluded that it would remain an Asia specialist.  He respects their decision (indeed, as manager, helped make it pay off) but never gave up the dream of the broader fund and knew it would never fit at Matthews.
  2. He did not leave until he was sure that his MACSX shareholders were in good hands.  He worked hard to build “an extremely capable team,” even celebrating the fact that he only hired “people smarter than me.”  He became convinced that the fund was in the hands of folks who’d put the shareholders first.  In order to keep it that way, he “made sure I didn’t do anything to advance [Seafarer] at the expense of Matthews.”  As a result, his current team is drawn from outside Matthews and he has not sought to aggressively recruit former shareholders out of the prior fund so as to drive growth in the new one.

Kenster1_GlobalValue: What does he see as potentially the top 3 countries in the fund if he were investing & managing the Seafarer fund right now? As an example – Indonesia looks great but what are his thoughts on this country? How would he rate it? Would he be lightly invested in Indonesia because he feels it might be too growthy at this time?

While he didn’t address Indonesia in particular, Mr. Foster did highlight six markets that were “particularly interesting.”  They are:

  1. Vietnam
  2. Brazil
  3. Mexico
  4. Turkey
  5. Poland
  6. South Africa

He argues that there are substantial political and cultural challenges in many of these countries, and that that turmoil obscures the fundamental strength of the underlying economy.  While it’s possible to conclude that you’d have to be nuts to sink your money in broken countries, Andrew notes that “broken can be good . . . the key is determining whether you’re experiencing chaos or progress, both raise a lot of dust.”  His general conclusion, having lived through generations of Asian crisis, “I’ve seen this story before.”

Maurice: I’d be interested in what Mr. Foster brings new to the table. Why would I not if invest new dollars with Matthews?

He thinks that two characteristics will distinguish Seafarer:

  1. The Fund can provide exposure to multiple asset classes, as its strategy allows for investment in equities, convertible bonds, and fixed income.
  2. The Fund has a broad geographical mandate. It’s not just broader than Asia, it’s also broader than “emerging markets.”   SFGIX / SIGIX  is pursuing exposure to emerging and frontier markets around the world, but Mr. Foster notes that in some instances the most effective way to gain such exposure is through the securities in neighboring countries.  For example, some of the best access to China is through securities listed in Singapore and Hong Kong; Australia plays a similar role for some Asian markets.

MikeM :  It seems to me that if you are looking for Asian exposure, this may not be your fund. This fund is not supposed to be an Asian concentrated fund like his previous fund at Matthews, MACSX.

Yes and no.  Mr. Foster can invest anywhere and is finding a lot of markets today that have the characteristics that Asia had ten years ago.  They’re fundamentally strong and under-recognized by investors used to looking elsewhere.  That said, he considers Asia to be “incredibly important” (a phrase he used four times during our conversation) and that “a large portion of the portfolio, particularly at the outset” will be invested in the Asian markets with which he’s intimately acquainted.

AndyJ: It’s danged expensive. There’s a closed-end fund, FEO, from the long-successful people at Aberdeen, which has a proven track record using a “balanced” EM strategy and costs the same as the investor shares of the Foster fund will. So, I’m not totally sure that Seafarer as a brand new entity is worthier of new $ at this point than FEO.

His response: “I hear you.”  His money, and his family’s, is in the fund and he wants it to be affordable. The fund’s opening expense ratio is comparable to what Matthews charged when they reached a billion in assets. He writes, “I view it as one of the firm’s central duties to ensure that expenses become more affordable with scale, and over time.” Currently, he can’t pass along the economies of scale, but he’s committed to do so as soon as it’s economically possible. His suspicion is that many funds get complacent with their expense structure, and don’t work to aggressively pursue savings.

fundalarmit’s almost exclusively about pay. If you’re a star, and your name is enough to attract assets, why would you want to share the management fee with others when you can have your own shop. Really. Very. Simple.  Answer.

While Mr. Foster didn’t exactly chuckle when I raised this possibility, he did make two relevant observations.  First, if he were just interested in his own financial gain, he’d have stayed with Matthews. Second, his goal is to pursue asset growth only to the degree that it makes economic sense for his shareholders.  By his estimation, the fund is economically sustainable at $100-125 million in assets.  As it grows beyond that level, it begins accumulating economies of scale which will benefit shareholders.  At the point where additional assets begin impairing shareholder value, he’ll act to restrict them.

Seafarer represents a thoughtfully designed fund, with principled administration and one of the field’s most accomplished managers.  It’s distinctive, makes sense and has been under development for a decade.  It’s worthy of serious consideration and will be the subject of a fund profile after it has a few months of operation.

Launch Alert: Wasatch Frontier Emerging Small Countries Fund (WAFMX)

Just as one door closes, another opens. Wasatch closed their wildly successful Emerging Markets Small Cap Fund (WAEMX) to new investors on February 24, 2012.  The fund gathered $1.2 billion in assets and has returned 51% per year over the three years ending 2/29/2012. They immediately opened another fund in the same universe, run by the same manager.

Wasatch Frontier Emerging Small Countries Fund (WAFMX) became available to retail investors on March 1, 2012.  It has been open only to Wasatch employees for the preceding weeks.  It will be a non-diversified, all-cap fund with a bias toward small cap stocks.  The managers report:

In general, frontier markets and small emerging market countries, with the exception of the oil-producing Persian Gulf States, tend to have relatively low gross national product per capita compared to the larger traditionally-recognized emerging markets and the world’s major developed economies. Frontier and small emerging market countries include the least developed markets even by emerging market standards. We believe frontier markets and small emerging market countries offer investment opportunities that arise from long-term trends in demographics, deregulation, offshore outsourcing and improving corporate governance.

The Fund may invest in the equity securities of companies of any size, although we expect a significant portion of the Fund’s assets to be invested in the equity securities of companies under US$3 billion at the time of purchase.

We travel extensively outside the U.S. to visit companies and expect to meet with senior management. We use a process of quantitative screening followed by “bottom up” fundamental analysis with the objective of owning the highest quality growth companies tied economically to frontier markets and small emerging market countries.

The manager is Laura Geritz.  She has been a portfolio manager for the Wasatch Emerging Markets Small Cap Fund since 2009 and for the Wasatch International Opportunities Fund since 2011. The minimum investment is $2000, reduced to $1000 for accounts with an automatic investing plan.  The expense ratio will be 2.25%, after waivers.    We will, a bit after launch, try to speak with Ms. Geritz and will provide a full profile of the fund.

Fidelity is Thinking Big

(May God have mercy on our souls.)

Despite the ironic timing – they simultaneously announce a bunch of long overdue but still pretty vanilla bond funds at the same time they trumpet their big ideas – Fido has launched its first major ad campaign which doesn’t involve TV.  Fidelity is thinking big.

In one of those “did they have the gang at Mad Magazine write this?” press releases, Fido will be “showcasing thought-provoking insights” which “builds on Fidelity’s comprehensive thought leadership” “through an innovative new thought leadership initiative.”

Do you think so?

So what does “thinking big” look like?  At their “thinking big” microsite, it’s a ridiculous video that runs for under three minutes, links that direct you to publishers websites so that you can buy three to five year old books, and links to articles that are a year or two old.  The depth and quality of analysis in the video are on par with a one-page Time magazine essay.  It mixes fun facts (it takes 635 gallons of water to make one pound of hamburger), vacuous observations (water shortages “could further exacerbate regional water issues”) and empty exhortations (“think about it.  We do.”).

According to the Boston Business Journal, the campaign “was created by Fidelity’s internal ad agency, Fidelity Communications and Advertising. Arnold Worldwide, the mutual fund firm’s ad agency of record, did not work on the campaign.”  It shows.  While the VP for communications described this as “the first campaign where we’ve actually attempted to create a viral program without a large supporting TV effort,” he also adds that Fidelity isn’t taking a position on these issues, they’re just “stating the facts.”

Yep.  That’s the formula for going viral: corporate marketing footage, one talking head and a “just the facts” ethos.

A quick suggestion from the guy with a PhD in communication: perhaps if you stopped producing empty, boilerplate shareholder communications (have you read one of your annual reports?) and stopped focusing on marketing, you might actually educate investors.  A number of fund companies provide spectacularly good, current, insightful shareholder communications (T. Rowe Price and Matthews Asia come immediately to mind).  Perhaps you could, too?

The Best of the Web: A new Observer experiment

This month marks the debut of the Observer’s “best of the web” reviews.  The premise is simple: having a million choices leaves you with no choices at all.  When you’ve got 900 cable channels, you’ll almost always conclude “there’s nothing on” and default to watching the same two stations. It’s called “the paradox of choice.”  Too many options cause our brains to freeze and make us miserable.

The same thing is true on the web.  There are a million sites offering financial insight; faced with that daunting complexity, we end up sticking with the same one or two.  That’s comforting, but may deny you access to helpful perspectives.

One solution is to scan the Observer’s discussion board, where folks post and discuss a dozen or more interesting topics and articles each day.  Another might be our best of the web feature.  Each month, based on reader recommendations and his own evaluations, contributing editor Junior Yearwood will post reviews for three to five related sites.  Each is a page long and each highlights what you need know: what’s the site about, what does it do well, what’s our judgment?

The debut issue features fund rating sites.  Everyone knows Morningstar, but how many folks have considered the insights available from, and strengths or weaknesses of, its dozen smaller competitors?  Take the case of a single splendid fund, Artisan International Value (ARTKX).  Depending on who you ask, it’s seen as somewhere between incredibly excellent (for our money, it is) and utterly undistinguished.  Here’s the range of assessments from a variety of sites:

    • BarCharts.com: 96% buy
    • Morningstar: Five stars, Gold
    • FundMojo: 89/100, a Master
    • Lipper: 24 of 25 possible points, a Leader
    • U.S. News: 8.1/100
    • FundReveal: less risky, lower return
    • MaxFunds 79/100, good
    • TheStreet.com: C-, hold
    • Zacks: 3/5, hold.

After a month of reading, Junior and I identified three sites that warranted your time, and named eight more that you probably won’t be bookmarking any time soon.

If you’re wondering “what do those mean?”  Or “does Zacks know something that Morningstar doesn’t?” – or even if you’re not – we’re hoping you’ll check out the best of the web.”

Numbers that you really shouldn’t trust

Claymore/Mac Global Solar Energy Index ETF (XTANX) is up 1120% YTD!

(Source: BarCharts.com, YTD Leaders, as of 2/29/2012)

Or not.  First, it’s a Guggenheim ETF now.  Second, there was a 10:1 reverse split on February 15.  BarCharts has a “strong buy” rating on the shares.

GMO Domestic Bond III (GMBDX) is up 767%!

(Same source)

Uhh.  No.  9:1 reverse split on January 17.

There are 77 T. Rowe Price funds that waive the investment minimum for investors with an automatic investing plan!

(Source: Morningstar premium fund screener, 2/29/2012)

Uhh. No.  T. Rowe discontinued those waivers on August 1, 2011.

The “real” expense of running Manning & Napier Dividend Focus (MNDFX) is 5.6%.

(Source: Manning and Napier website, 2/29/2012)

Likewise: no.  An M&N representative said that the figures represented the fund’s start-up state (high expenses, no shareholders) but that they weren’t allowed to change them yet.  (???)  The actual e.r. without an expense waiver is 1.05%, but they have no intention of discontinuing the waiver.

NorthRoad International is a five-star fund that offers tiny beta and huge alpha

(Source: Morningstar profile, 2/29/2011)

Uhh.  No.  Not even a little.  Why not?  Because until June 30, 2011, this was the Madison Mosaic Small/Mid-Cap Fund.  Because US smaller stocks were bouncing back from the bloody meltdown from October 2007 – March 2009, this fund returns that were great by international large cap standards and those returns have been folded seamlessly into Morningstar’s assessment.

In NorthRoad’s defense: the fund’s own publicity material makes the change very clear and refuses to include any comparisons that precede the fund’s new mandate.  And, since the change, it has been a distinctly above-average international fund with reasonable fees.  It’s just not the fund that Morningstar describes.

Any three-year performance number.  The market reached its bottom in the first week of March, 2009 and began a ferocious rally.  We are now entering the point where the last remnants of a fund’s performance during the market downturn are being cycled-out of the three-year averages.  As of 3/01/2012, there are 18 funds which have returned more than 50% per year, on average for the past three years.  Half of all funds have three-year returns above 21% per year.  Forester Value (FVALX), the great hero of 2008 and the recipient of a ton of money in 2009, now has three-year returns that trail 99% of its peers.

Two funds and why they’re worth your time . . .

Really, really worth your time.

Each month we provide in-depth profiles of two funds that you should know more about, one new and one well-established.

Matthews Asia Strategic Income (MAINX): most US investors have little or no exposure to Asian fixed-income markets, which are robust, secure and growing. Matthews, which already boasts the industry’s deepest corps of Asia specialists, has added a first-rate manager and made her responsible for the first Asian income fund available to U.S. retail investors.

GRT Value (GRTVX): what do you get when you combine one of the best and most experienced small cap investors, a corps of highly professional and supportive partners, a time-tested, risk-conscious strategy and reasonable expenses? GRTVX investors are finding out.

Briefly noted:

T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX) opened to retail investors in December, 2011.  The fund invests in companies that own “stuff in the ground.”  The fund was launched in May 2011 but was only available for use in other T. Rowe Price funds.  A 5% allocation to real assets became standard in their target-date funds, and might represent a reasonable hedge in most long-term portfolios.  The fund’s opening to retail investors was largely unexplained and unnoticed.

Wasatch Microcap Value (WAMVX) has reopened to new investors through Schwab, Fidelity, TD Ameritrade, and other intermediaries.

Talented managers with good marketers attract cash!  What a great system.  The folks at Grandeur Peaks passed $100 million in assets after four months of operation.  The exceedingly fine River Park /Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) just passed $200 million.   When I first profiled the fund, July 2011, it had $200,000 in assets.  Dave Rolfe, the manager, estimates that the fund’s strategy can accommodate $5 billion.

Vanguard finally put Vanguard Asset Allocation out of its misery by merging it into Vanguard Balanced Index fund (VBINX) on 2/10/2012.  Last fall the Observer identified Vanguard Asset Allocation as one of the fund universe’s 12 worst funds based on its size and its wretched consistency.  We described funds on the list this way:

These funds that have finished in the bottom one-fourth of their peer groups for the year so far.  And for the preceding 12 months, three years, five years and ten years.  These aren’t merely “below average.”  They’re so far below average they can hardly see “mediocre” from where they are.

RiverNorth DoubleLine Strategic Income (RNSIX) will close to new investors on March 30, 2012. The fund, comanaged by The Great Gundlach, gathered $800 million in its first 14 months.

Wells Fargo will liquidate Wells Fargo Advantage Social Sustainability (WSSAX) and Wells Fargo Advantage Global Health Care (EHABX) by the end of March, 2012.  It’s also merging Wells Fargo Advantage Strategic Large Cap Growth (ESGAX) into Wells Fargo Advantage Large Cap Growth (STAFX), likely in June.

Bridgeway is merging Bridgeway Aggressive Investors 2 (BRAIX) into Bridgeway Aggressive Investors 1 (BRAGX) and Bridgeway Micro-Cap Limited (BRMCX) into Bridgeway Ultra-Small Company (BRUSX).   Bridgeway had earlier announced a change in BRUSX’s investment mandate to allow for slightly larger (though still tiny) stocks in its portfolio.  In hindsight, that appears to have been the signal of the impending merger.  BRUSX, which closed when it reached just $22.5 million in assets, is a legendary sort of fund.  $10,000 invested at its 1994 launch would now be worth almost $120,000 against its peers $50,000.

Invesco Small Companies (ATIIX) will close to new investors on March 5, 2012.  That’s in response to an entirely-regrettable flood of hot money triggered by the fund’s great performance in 2011.  Meanwhile, Invesco also said it will reopen Invesco Real Estate (IARAX) to new investors on March 16.

Delaware Large Cap Value (DELDX) is merging into Delaware Value (DDVAX), itself an entirely-respectable large cap value fund with noticeably lower expenses.

Likewise Lord Abbett is merged Lord Abbett Large-Cap Value (LALAX) into Lord Abbett Fundamental Equity (LDFVX).

Proving the adage that nothing in life is certain but death and taxes, State Street Global Advisors will kill its Life Solutions funds on May 15.  Among the soon-to-be decedents are Balanced, Growth and Income & Growth.  Also going are SSgA Disciplined Equity (SSMTX) and Directional Core Equity (SDCQX).

Speaking of death, the year’s second mass execution of ETFs occurred on February 17 when Global X took out eight ETFs at once: Farming, Fishing, Mexico Small Caps, Oil, Russell Emerging Markets Growth, Russell Emerging Markets Value, and Waste Management.  The 17 HOLDRS Trusts, which promised to “revolutionize stock investing” were closed in December and liquidated on January 9, 2012.

Our chief programmer, Accipiter, was looking for a bit of non-investing reading this month and asked folks on the board for book recommendations. That resulting outpouring was so diverse and thoughtful that we wanted to make it available for other readers. As a result, our Amazon store (it’s under Books, on the main menu bar) now has a “great non-investing reads” department. You’ll be delighted by some of what you find there.

Oh, and Accipiter: there will be a quiz over the readings.

Amazon’s time limit

If you’re one of the many people who support the Observer, thank you!  Thank you, thank you, thank you!  A dozen readers contributed to the Observer this month (thank you!) by mail or via PayPal.  That’s allowed us to more than offset the rising costs caused by our rising popularity.  You not only make it all worthwhile, you make it all possible.

If you’re one of the many people who support the Observer by using our link to Amazon.com, thank you – but here’s a warning: the link you create expires or can be wiped out as you navigate.

If you enter Amazon using the Observer’s link (consider bookmarking it), or any other Associate’s link, and put an item in your Shopping Cart, the item carries a special code which serves to identify the referring site (roughly: “us”).  It appears the link expires about 24 hours after you set it, so if something’s been in your shopping cart for six weeks (as sometimes happens with me), you might want to re-add it.

Which I mention because Amazon just restated their policy.

A WORD OF WARNING BEFORE YOU GO:

We are going try to cull dead accounts from our email list in the next month, since the monthly charge for sending our notice climbs precipitously after we pass 2500 names.  Anyone who has subscribed to receive an email notice but who has never actually opened one of them (it looks like more than a hundred folks) will be dropped.  We’d feel bad if we inadvertently lost you, so please do be sure to open the email notice (don’t just look at it in a preview pane) at least once so we know you’re still there.

Take great care and I’ll write again, soon.

February 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to the Year of the Dragon.  The Chinese zodiac has been the source of both enthusiasm (“Year of the Dragon and the scaly beast’s unmatched potency as a symbol for prosperity and success – as part of China’s own zodiac – promises an extra special 12 months”) and merriment (check the CLSA Asia-Pacific Market’s Feng Shui Report)  in the investing community.  The Dragon itself is characterized as “magnanimous, stately, vigorous, strong, self-assured, proud, noble, direct, dignified, eccentric, intellectual, fiery, passionate, decisive, pioneering, artistic, generous, and loyal. Can be tactless, arrogant, imperious, tyrannical, demanding, intolerant, dogmatic, violent, impetuous, and brash.”

Sort of the Gingrich of Lizards.

The Wall Street Journal reports (1/30/12) that Chinese investors have developed a passion for packing portfolios with “fungus harvested from dead caterpillars . . . homegrown liquors, mahogany furniture and jade, among other decidedly non-Western asset classes.”

Given that the last Year of the Dragon (2000) was a disappointment and a prelude to a disaster, I think I’ll keep my day job and look for really good sales on cases of peanut butter (nothing soothes the savaged investor quite like a PB&J . . . and maybe a sprinkle of caterpillar fungus).

Morningstar’s Fund Manager of the Year Awards

I’m not sure if the fund industry would be better off if John Rekenthaler had stayed closer to his bully pulpit, but I know the rest of us would have been.  Mr. Rekenthaler (JR to the cognoscenti) is Morningstar’s vice president of research but, in the 1990s and early part of the past decade, played the role of bold and witty curmudgeon and research-rich gadfly.   I’d long imagined a meeting of JR and FundAlarm’s publisher Roy Weitz as going something like this: 

The ugly reality is that age and gentility might have reduced it to something closer to: 

For now, I think I’ll maintain my youthful illusions.

Each year Morningstar awards “Fund Manager of the Year” honors in three categories: domestic equity, international equity and fixed-income.  While the recognition is nice for the manager and his or her marketers, the question is: does it do us as investors any good.  Is last year’s Manager of the Year, next year’s Dud of the Day?

One of the things I most respect about Morningstar is their willingness to provide sophisticated research on (and criticisms of) their own systems.  In that spirit, Rekenthaler reviewed the performance of Managers of the Year in the years following their awards.

His conclusions:

Domestic Fund Manager of the Year: “meh.”  On whole, awardees were just slightly above average with only three disasters, Bill Miller (1998), Jim Callinan (1999 – if you’re asking “Jim Who?” you’ve got a clue about how disastrous), and Mason Hawkins (2006).  Bruce Berkowitz will appear in due course, I fear.   JR’s conclusion: “beware of funds posting high returns because of financials and/or technology stocks.”

Fixed-Income Manager of the Year: “good” and “improving.”  On whole, these funds lead their peers by 50-80 basis points/year which, in the fixed income world, is a major advantage.  The only disaster has been a repeated disaster: Bob Rodriquez of FPA New Income earned the award three times and has been mediocre to poor in the years following each of those awards.  Rekenthaler resists the impulse to conclude that Morningstar should “quit picking Bob Rodriguez!” (he’s more disciplined than I’d be).  JR notes that Rodriquez is streaky (“two or three truly outstanding years” followed by mediocrity and disappointment before taking off again) and that “it’s a tough fund to own.”

International Fund Manager of the Year:  Ding! Ding! Ding!  Got it right in a major way.  As Rekenthaler puts it, “the Morningstar team selecting the International-Stock winners should open a hotline on NFL games.”  Twelve of the 13 international honorees posted strong returns in the years after selection, while the final honoree Dodge & Cox International (DODFX) has beaten its peer group but just by a bit.

Rekenthaler’s study, Do the Morningstar Fund Manager of the Year Awards Have Staying Power? is available at Morningstar.com, but seems to require a free log-in to access it.

Fun with Numbers: The Difference One Month Makes

Investors often look at three-year returns to assess a fund’s performance.  They reason, correctly, that they shouldn’t be swayed by very short term performance.  It turns out that short term performance has a huge effect on a fund’s long-term record.

The case in point is Matthews Asian Growth and Income (MACSX), a FundAlarm “Star in the Shadows” fund, awarded five stars and a “Silver” rating by Morningstar.  It’s in my portfolio and is splendid.  Unless you look at the numbers.  As of January 27 2011, it ranked dead last – the 100th percentile – in its Morningstar peer group for the preceding three years.  Less than one month earlier, it was placed in the 67th percentile, a huge drop in 20 trading days.

Or not, since its trailing three-year record as of January 27 showed it returning 18.08% annually.  At the beginning of the month, its three-year return was 14.64%.

How much difference does that really make?  $10,000 invested on January 1 2009 would have grown to $15,065 in three years.  The same amount invested on January 27 2009 and left for three years would have grown to $16,482.  Right: the delay of less than a month turned a $5100 gain into a $6500 one.

What happened?   The January 27 calculation excludes most of January 2009, when MACSX lost 3.3% while its peers dropped 7.8% and it includes most of January 2012, when MACSX gained 4.8% but its peers rallied 10.2%.  That pattern is absolutely typically for MACSX: it performs brilliantly in falling markets and solidly in rising ones.  If you look at a period with sharp rises – even in a single month – this remarkably solid performer seems purely dreadful.

Here’s the lesson: you’ve got to look past the numbers.  The story of any fund can’t be grasped by looking at any one number or any one period.  Unless you understand why the fund has done what it has and what it supposed to be doing for your portfolio, you’re doomed to an endless cycle of hope, panic and missteps.  (From which we’re trying to save you, by the way.)

Looking Past the Numbers, Part Two: The Oceanstone Fund

Sometimes a look past the numbers will answer questions about a fund that looking dowdy. That’s certainly the case with MACSX. In order instances, it should raise them about a fund that’s looking spectacular. The Oceanstone Fund (OSFDX) is a case in point. Oceanstone invests in a diversified portfolio of undervalued stocks from micro- to mega-cap. Though it does not reflect the fund’s current or recent portfolio, Morningstar classifies it as a “small value” fund.  And I’ve rarely seen a fund with a more-impressive set of performance numbers:

Percentile rank,
Small Value Peers
2007 Top 1%
2008 Top 1%
2009 Top 1%
2010 Top 13%
2011 Top 8%
2012, through 1/31 Top 2%
Trailing 12 months Top 5%
Trailing 36 months Top 1%
Trailing 60 months Top 1%

In the approximately five years from launch through 1/30/2011, Oceanstone’s manager turned $10,000 into $59,000.  In 2009, powered by gains in Avis Budget Group and Dollar Thrifty Automotive (1,775 percent and 2,250 percent respectively), the fund made 264%.  And still, the fund has only $17 million in assets.

Time to jump in?  Send the big check, and wait to receive the big money?

I don’t know.  But you do owe it to yourself to look beyond the numbers first.  When you do that, you might notice:

1. that the manager’s explanation of his investment strategy is nonsense.  Here’s the prospectus description of what he’s doing:

In deciding which common stocks to purchase, the Fund seeks the undervalued stocks as compared to their intrinsic values. To determine a stock’s intrinsic value (IV), the Fund uses the equation: IV = IV/E x E. In this equation, E is the stock’s earnings per share for its trailing 4 quarters, and a reasonable range of its IV/E ratio is determined by a rational and objective evaluation of the current available information of its future earnings prospects.

Read that formula: IV = IV divided by E, times E.  No more than a high school grasp of algebra tells you that this formula tells you nothing.  I shared it with two professors of mathematics, who both gave it the technical term “vacuous.”  It works for any two numbers (4 = 4 divided by 2, times 2) but it doesn’t allow you to derive one value from the other.  If you know “the stock’s earnings” and are trying to determine it’s “investment value,” this formula can’t do it.

2. that the shareholder reports say nothing.  Here is the entire text of the fund’s 2010 Annual Report:

Oceanstone Fund (the Fund) started its 2011 fiscal year on 7/1/2010 at net asset value (NAV) of $28.76 per share. On 12/27/2010, the Fund distributed a short-term capital gain dividend of $2.7887 per share and a long-term capital gain dividend of $1.7636. On 6/30/2011, the Fund ended this fiscal year at NAV of $35.85 per share. Therefore, the Fund’s total return for this fiscal year ended 6/30/2011 is 42.15%. During the same period, the total return of S&P 500 index is 30.69%.

For portfolio investment, the Fund seeks undervalued stocks. To determine a stock’s intrinsic value (IV), the Fund uses the equation IV = IV/E x E, as stated in the Fund’s prospectus. To use this equation, the key is to determine a company’s future earnings prospects with reasonable accuracy and subsequently a reasonable range for its IV/E ratio. As a company’s future earnings prospects change, this range for its IV/E ratio is adjusted accordingly.

Short-term, stock market can be volatile and unpredictable. Long-term, the deciding factor of stock price, as always, is value. Going forward, the Fund strives to find at least some of the undervalued stocks when they become available in U.S. stock market, in an effort to achieve a good long-term return for the shareholders.

One paragraph reports NAV change, the second reproduces the vacuous formula in the prospectus and the third is equally-vacuous boilerplate about markets.  What, exactly, is the manager telling you?  And what does it say that he doesn’t think you deserve to know more?

3. that Oceanstone’s Board is chaired by Rajendra Prasad, manager of Prasad Growth (PRGRX).  Prasad Growth, with its frantic trading (1300% annual turnover), collapsing asset base and dismal record (bottom 1% of funds for the past 3-, 5- and 10-year period) is a solid candidate for our “Roll Call of the Wretched.”  How, then, does his presence benefit Oceanstone’s shareholders?

4. the fund’s portfolio turns over at triple the average rate, is exceedingly concentrated (20 names) and is sitting on a 30% cash stake.  Those are all unusual, and unexplained.

You need to look beyond the numbers.  In general, a first step is to read the managers’ own commentary.  In this case, there is none.  Second, look for coverage in reliable sources.  Except for this note and passing references to 2009’s blistering performance, none again.  Your final option is to contact the fund advisor.   The fund’s website has no email inquiry link or other means to facilitate contact, so I’ve left a request for an interview with the fund’s phone reps.  They seemed dubious.  I’ll report back, in March, on my success or failure.

And Those Who Can’t Teach, Teach Gym.

Those of us who write about the investment industry occasionally succumb to the delusion that that makes us good investment managers.  A bunch of funds have managers who at least wave in the direction of having been journalists:

  • Sierra Strategic Income Fund: Frank Barbera, CMT, was a columnist for Financial Sense from 2007 until 2009.
  • Roge Partners:  Ronald W. Rogé has been a guest personal finance columnist for ABCNews.com.
  • Auer Growth:  Robert C. Auer, founder of SBAuer Funds, LLC, was from 1996 to 2004, the lead stock market columnist for the Indianapolis Business Journal “Bulls & Bears” weekly column, authoring over 400 columns, which discussed a wide range of investment topics.
  • Astor Long/Short ETF Fund: Scott Martin, co-manager, is a contributor to FOX Business Network and a former columnist with TheStreet.com
  • Jones Villalta Opportunity Fund: Stephen M. Jones was financial columnist for Austin Magazine.
  • Free Enterprise Action Fund: The Fund’s investment team is headed by Steven J. Milloy, “lawyer, consultant, columnist, adjunct scholar.”

Only a handful of big-time financial journalists have succumbed to the fantasy of financial acumen.  Those include:

  • Ron Insana, who left CNBC in March 2006 to start a hedge fund, lost money for his investors, closed the fund in August 2008, joined SAC Capital for a few months then left.  Now he runs a website (RonInsanaShow.com) hawking his books and providing one minute market summaries, and gets on CNBC once a month.
  • Lou Dobbs bolted from hosting CNN’s highly-rated Moneyline show in 1999 in order to become CEO of Space.com.  By 2000 he was out of Space and, by 2001, back at CNN.
  • Jonathan Clements left a high visibility post at The Wall Street Journal to become Director of Financial Education, Citi Personal Wealth Management.  Sounds fancy.  Frankly, it looks like he’s been relegated to “blogger.”  As I poke around the site, he seems to write a couple distinctly mundane, 400-word essays a week.
  • Jim Cramer somehow got rich in the hedge fund world.  Since then he’s become a clown whose stock picks are, by pretty much every reckoning, high beta and zero alpha.   And value of his company, TheStreet.com’s, stock is down 94.3% since launch.
  • Jim Jubak, who writes the “Jubak’s Picks” column for MSN Money, launched Jubak Global Equity (JUBAX), which managed to turn $10,000 at inception into $9100 by the end of 2011 while his peers made $11,400.

You might notice a pattern here.

The latest victim of hubris and comeuppance is John Dorfman, former Bloomberg and Wall Street Journal columnist.  You get a sense of Dorfman’s marketing savvy when you look at his investment vehicles.

Dorfman founded Thunderstorm Capital in 1999, and then launched The Lobster Fund (a long-short hedge fund) in 2000.  He planned launch of The Oyster Fund (a long-only hedge fund) and The Crab Fund (short-only) shortly thereafter, but that never quite happened.  Phase One: name your investments after stuff that’s found at low tide, snatched up, boiled and eaten with butter.

He launched Dorfman Value Fund in 2008. Effective June 30, 2009, the fund’s Board approved changing the name from Dorfman Value Fund to Thunderstorm Value Fund.  The reason for the name change is that the parent firm of Thunderstorm Mutual Funds LLC “has decided the best way to promote a more coherent marketing message is to rebrand all of its products to begin with the word ‘Thunderstorm’.”

Marketers to mutual fund: “Well, duh!”

Earth to Dorfman: did you really think that naming your fund after a character in Animal House (Kent Dorfman, an overweight, clumsy legacy pledge), especially one whose nickname was “Flounder,” was sharp to begin with? Name recognition is all well and good . . . . as long as your name doesn’t cause sniggering. I can pretty much guarantee that when I launch my mutual fund, it isn’t going to be Snowball Special (DAVYX).

Then, to offset having a half-way cool name, they choose the ticker symbol THUNX.  THUNX?  As in “thunks.”  Yes, indeed, because nothing says “trust me” like a vehicle that goes “thunk.”

Having concluded that low returns, high expenses, a one-star rating, and poor marketing aren’t the road to riches, the advisor recommended that the Board close (on January 17, 2012) and liquidate (on February 29, 2012) the fund.

Does Anyone Look at this Stuff Before Running It?

They’re at it again.  I’ve noted, in earlier essays, the bizarre data that some websites report.  In November, I argued, “There’s no clearer example of egregious error without a single human question than in the portfolio reports for Manning & Napier Dividend Focus (MNDFX).”  The various standard services reported that the fund, which is fully invested in stocks, held between 60 – 101% of its portfolio in cash.

And now, there’s another nominee for the “what happens when humans no longer look at what they publish” award.  In the course of studying Bretton Fund (BRTNX), I looked at the portfolios of the other hyper-concentrated stock funds – portfolios with just 10-15 stocks.

One such fund is Biondo Focus (BFONX), an otherwise undistinguished fund that holds 15 stocks (and charges way too much).   One striking feature of the fund: Morningstar reports that the fund invested 30% of the portfolio in a bank in Jordan.  That big gray circle on the left represents BFONX’s stake in Union Bank.

There are, as it turns out, four problems with this report.

  1. There is no Union Bank in Jordan.  It was acquired by, and absorbed in, Bank Al Etihad of Amman.
  2. The link labeled Union Bank (Jordan) actually leads to a report for United Bankshares, Inc. (UBSI).  UBSI, according to Morningstar’s report, mostly does business in West Virginia and D.C.
  3. Biondo Focus does not own any shares of Union or United, and never has.
  4. Given the nature of data contracts, the mistaken report is now widespread.

Joe Biondo, one of the portfolio managers, notes that the fund has never had an investment in Union Bank of Jordan or in United Bankshares in the US.  They do, however, use Union Bank of California as a custodian for the fund’s assets.  The 30% share attributed to Union Bank is actually a loan run through Union Bank, not even a loan from Union Bank.

The managers used the money to achieve 130% equity exposure in January 2012.  That exposure powered the portfolio to a 21.4% gain in the first four weeks of January 2012, but didn’t offset the fund’s 24% loss in 2011.  From January 2011 – 2012, it finished in the bottom 1% of its peer group.

Google, drawing on Morningstar, repeats the error, as does MSN and USA Today while MarketWatch and Bloomberg get it right. Yahoo takes error in a whole new direction when provides this list of BFONX’s top ten holdings:

Uhhh, guys?  Even in daycare the kids managed to count past two on their way to ten.  For the record, these are holdings five and six.

Update from Morningstar, February 2

The folks at Biondo claimed that they were going to reach out to Morningstar about the error. On February 2, Alexa Auerbach of Morningstar’s Corporate Communications division sent us the following note:

We read your post about our display of inaccurate holdings for the Biondo Focus fund. We’ve looked into the matter and determined that the fund administrator sent us incomplete holdings information, which led us to categorize the Union Bank holding as a short-equity position instead of cash. We have corrected our database and the change should be reflected on Morningstar.com soon.

Morningstar processes about 50,000 fund portfolios worldwide per month, and we take great pride in providing some of the highest quality data in the industry.

Point well-taken. Morningstar faces an enormous task and, for the most part, pulls it off beautifully. That said, if they get it right 99% of the time, they’ll generate errors in 6,000 portfolios a year. 99.9% accuracy – which is unattested to, but surely the sort of high standard Morningstar aims for – is still 600 incorrect reports/year. Despite the importance of Morningstar to the industry and to investors, fund companies often don’t know that the errors exist and don’t seek to correct them. None of the half-dozen managers I spoke with in 2011 and early 2012 whose portfolios or other details were misstated, knew of the error until our conversation.

That puts a special burden on investors and their advisers to look carefully at any fund reports (certainly including the Observer’s). If you find that your fully-invested stock fund has between 58-103% in cash (as MNDFX did), a 30% stake in a Jordanian bank (BFONX) or no reported bonds in your international bond fund (PSAFX, as of 2/5/2012), you need to take the extra time to say “how odd” and look further.

Doesn’t Anyone at the SEC Look at their Stuff Before Posting It?

The Securities and Exchange Commission makes fund documents freely available through their EDGAR search engine.  In the relentless, occasionally mind-numbing pursuit of new funds, I review each day’s new filings.  The SEC posts all of that day’s filings together which means that all the filings should be from that day.  To find them, check “Daily Filings” then “Search Current Events: Most Recent Filings.”

Shouldn’t be difficult.  But it is.  The current filings for January 5, 2012 are actually dated:

      • January 5, 2012
      • October 14, 2011
      • September 2, 2011
      • August 15, 2011
      • August 8, 2011
      • July 27, 2011
      • July 15, 2011
      • July 1, 2011
      • June 15, 2011
      • June 6, 2011
      • May 26, 2011
      • May 23, 2011
      • January 10, 2011

For January 3rd, only 20 of 98 listings are correct.  Note to the SEC: This Isn’t That Hard!  Hire A Programmer!

Fund Update: HNP Growth and Preservation

We profiled HNP Growth and Preservation (HNPKX) in January 2012.  The fund’s portfolio is set by a strict, quantitative discipline: 70% is invested based on long-term price trends for each of seven asset classes and 30% is invested based on short-term price trends.  The basic logic is simple: try to avoid being invested in an asset that’s in the midst of a long, grinding bear market.  Don’t guess about whether it’s time to get in or out, just react to trend.  This is the same strategy employed by managed futures funds, which tend to suffer in directionless markets but prosper when markets show consistent long-term patterns.

Since we published our profile, the fund has done okay.  It returned 3.06% in January 2012, through 1/27.  That’s a healthy return, though it lagged its average peer by 90 bps.  It’s down about 5.5% since launch, and modestly trails its peer group.  I asked manager Chris Hobaica about how investors should respond to that weak initial performance.  His reply arrived too late to be incorporated in the original profile, but I wanted to share the highlights.

Coming into August the fund was fully invested on the long term trend side (fairly rare…) and overweight gold, Treasuries and real estate on the short term momentum side. . .  Even though the gold and Treasuries held up [during the autumn sell-off], they weren’t enough to offset the remaining assets that were being led down by the international and emerging assets.  Also, as is usually the case, assets class correlations moved pretty close to 1.

Generally though, this model isn’t designed to avoid short-term volatility, but rather a protracted bear market.  By the end of September, we had moved to gold, treasuries and cash.  So, the idea was that if that volatility continued into a bear market, the portfolio was highly defensive.

While we are never happy with negative returns, we explain to shareholders that the model was doing what it was supposed to do.  It became defensive when the trends reversed.  I am not worried by the short term drop (I don’t like it though), as there have been many other times over the backtest that the portfolio would have been down in the 8-10% range.

Three Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  One category is the most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month we’ll highlight three funds with outstanding heritages and fascinating prospects:

Bretton Fund (BRTNX): Bretton is an ultra-concentrated value fund managed by the former president of Parnassus Investments.  It has shown remarkable – and remarkably profitable – independence from style boxes, peers and indexes in its brief life.

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities (GPGOX): here’s a happy thought.  Two brilliantly-successful managers who made their reputation running a fund just like this one have struck out on their own, worrying about a much smaller and more-nimble fund, charging less and having a great time doing it.

Matthews Asia Strategic Income (MAINX): Matthews, which already boasts the industry’s deepest corps of Asia specialists, has added a first-rate manager and made her responsible for the first Asian income fund available to U.S. retail investors.

Launch Alert: Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income

Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX) is set to launch in mid-February, 2012.  The fund’s final prospectus is available at SeafarerFunds.com. The fund will be managed by Andrew Foster, formerly manager of Matthews Asia Growth & Income (MACSX) and Matthews’ research director or acting chief investment officer.

The great debate surrounding MACSX was whether it was the best Asia-centered fund in existence or merely one of the two or three best funds in existence.  Here’s the broader truth within their disagreement: Mr. Foster’s fund was, consistently and indisputably one of the best Asian funds in existence.  That distinction was driven by two factors: the fund’s focus on high-quality, dividend-paying stocks plus its willingness to hold a variety of securities other than common stocks.  A signal of the importance of those other securities is embedded in the fund’s ticker symbol; MACSX reflects the original name, Matthews Asian Convertible Securities Fund.

Those two factors helped make MACSX one of the two least volatile and most profitable Asian funds.  Whether measured by beta, standard deviation or Morningstar’s “downside capture ratio,” it typically incurs around half of the risk of its peers. Over the past 15 years, the fund’s returns (almost 11% per year) are in the top 1% of its peer group.  The more important stat is the fund’s “investor returns.”  This is a Morningstar calculation that tries to take into account the average investor’s fickleness and inept market timing.  Folks tend to arrive after a fund has done spectacularly and then flee in the midst of it crashing.  While it’s an imperfect proxy, “investor returns” tries to estimate how much the average investor in a fund actually made.  With highly volatile funds, the average investor might have earned nothing in a fund that made 10%.

In the case of MACSX, the average investor has actually made more than the fund itself.  That occurs when investors are present for the long-haul and when they’re in the habit of buying more when the fund’s value is falling.  This is an exceedingly rare pattern and a sign that the fund “works” for its investors; it doesn’t scare them away, so they’re able to actually profit from their investment.

Seafarer will take the MACSX formula global.  The Seafarer prospectus explains the strategy:

The Fund attempts to offer investors a relatively stable means of participating in a portion of developing countries’ growth prospects, while providing some downside protection, in comparison to a portfolio that invests purely in the common stocks of developing countries. The strategy of owning convertible bonds and dividend-paying equities is intended to help the Fund meet its investment objective while reducing the volatility of the portfolio’s returns.

Mr. Foster writes: “I hope to marry Asia Pacific with other ‘emerging markets,’ a few carefully-selected ‘frontier’ markets, alongside a handful of ‘developed’ countries.  I am excited about the possibilities.”

The fund’s minimum investment is $2500 for regular accounts and $1000 for IRAs.  The initial expense ratio is 1.60%, an amount that Mr. Foster set after considerable deliberation.  He didn’t want to charge an unreasonable amount but he didn’t want to risk bankrupting himself by underwriting too much of the fund’s expenses (as is, he expects to absorb 0.77% in expenses to reach the 1.6% level).  While the fund could have launched on February 1, Mr. Foster wanted a couple extra weeks for finish arrangements with some of the fund supermarkets and other distributors.

Mr. Foster has kindly agreed to an extended conversation in February and we’ll have a full profile of the fund shortly thereafter.  In the meantime, feel free to visit Seafarer Funds and read some of Andrew’s thoughtful essays on investing.

Briefly Noted

Fidelity Low-Priced Stock (FLPSX) manager Joel Tillinghast has returned from his four-month sabbatical.  It looks suspiciously like a rehearsal for Mr. Tillinghast’s eventual departure.  The five acolytes who filled-in during his leave have remained with the fund, which he’d managed solo since 1989.  If you’d had the foresight to invest $10,000 in the fund at inception, you’d have $180,000 in the bank today.

Elizabeth Bramwell is retiring in March, 2012.  Bramwell is an iconic figure who started her investment career in the late 1960s.  Her Bramwell Growth Fund became Sentinel Capital Growth (SICGX) in 2006, when she also picked up responsibility for managing Sentinel Growth Leaders (SIGLX), and Sentinel Sustainable Growth Opportunities (CEGIX). Kelli Hill, her successor, seems to have lots of experience but relatively little with mutual funds per se.  She’s sometimes described as the person who “ran Old Mutual Large Cap Growth (OILLX),” but in reality she was just one of 11 co-managers.

Fidelity has agreed to pay $7.5 million to shareholders of Fidelity Ultra-Short Bond fund (FUSBX) (and their attorneys) in settlement of a class action suit.  The plaintiffs claimed that Fidelity did not exercise reasonable oversight of the fund’s risks.  Despite being marketed as a low volatility, conservative option, the fund invested heavily in mortgage-backed securities and lost 17% in value from June 2007 – May 2008.  Fidelity, as is traditional in such cases, “believes that all of the claims are entirely without merit.”  Why pay them then?  To avoid “the cost and distraction” of trial, they say.  (Court Approves a $7.5 Million Settlement, MFWire, 1/27/12).

Fidelity is changing the name of Fidelity Equity-Income II (FEQTX) to Fidelity Equity Dividend Income fund. Its new manager Scott Offen, who took over the fund in November 2011, has sought to increase the fund’s dividend yield relative to his predecessor Stephen Peterson.

Bridgeway Ultra-Small Company (BRUSX) is becoming just a little less “ultra.”  The fund has, since launch, invested in the tiniest U.S. stocks, those in the 10th decile by market cap.  As some of those firms thrived, their market caps have grown into the next-higher (those still smaller than microcap) decile.  Bridgeway has modified its prospectus to allow the fund to buy shares in these slightly-larger firms

Invesco has announced the merger of three more Van Kampen funds, which follows dozens of mergers made after they acquired Morgan Stanley’s funds in 2010.  The latest moves: Invesco High Income Muni (AHMAX) will merge into Invesco Van Kampen High Yield Municipal (ACTFX).  Invesco US Mid Cap Value (MMCAX) and Invesco Van Kampen American Value (MSAJX), run by the same team, are about to become the same fund.  And Invesco Commodities Strategy (COAIX) disappears into the more-active Invesco Balanced Risk Commodity Strategy (BRCNX). The funds share management teams and similar fees, but Invesco Commodities Strategy has closely tracked its Dow-Jones-UBS Commodity Total Return Index benchmark, while Invesco Van Kampen Balanced Risk Commodity Strategy is more actively managed.

DWS Dreman Small Cap Value (KDSAX), which is already too big, reopened to all investors on February 1, 2012.

Managers Emerging Markets Equity (MEMEX) will liquidate on March 9, 2012. The fund added a bunch of co-managers three years ago, but it’s lagged its peer group in each of the past five years.  It’s attracted $45 million in assets, apparently not enough to making it worth the advisor’s while.

On March 23, 2012, the $34 million ING International Capital Appreciation (IACAX) will also liquidate, done in by performance that was going steadily from bad to worse.

I’d missed the fact that back in mid-October, RiverPark Funds liquidated their RiverPark/Gravity Long-Biased Fund.  RiverPark has been pretty ruthless about getting rid of losing strategies (funds and active ETFs) after about a year of weakness.

The Observer: Milestones and Upgrades

The folks who bring you the Observer are delighted to announce two milestones and three new features, all for the same reasonable rate as before.  Which is to say, free.

On January 27, 2012, folks launched the 2000th discussion thread on the Observer’s lively community forum.  The thread in question focused on which of two Matthews Asia funds, Growth and Income (MACSX) or Asia Dividend (MAPIX), was the more compelling choice.  Sentiment seemed to lean slightly toward MAPIX, with the caveat that the performance comparison should be tempered by an understanding that MACSX was not a pure-equity play.  One thoughtful poster analogized it to T. Rowe Price’s stellar Capital Appreciation (PRWCX) fund, in that both used preferred and convertible shares to temper volatility without greatly sacrificing returns.  In my non-retirement account, I own shares of MACSX and have been durn happy with it.

Also on January 27, the Observer attracted its 50,000th reader.  Google’s Analytics program labels you as “unique visitors.”  We heartily agree.  While the vast majority of our readers are American, folks from 104 nations have dropped by.  I’m struck that we’re had several hundred visits from each of Saudi Arabia, Israel, France, India and Taiwan.  On whole, the BRICs have dispatched 458 visitors while the PIIGS account for 1,017.

In March the Observer will debut a new section devoted to providing short, thoughtful summaries and analyses of the web’s best investment and finance websites.  We’ve grown increasingly concerned that the din of a million cyber voices is making it increasingly hard for folks to find reliable information and good insights as they struggle to make important life choices.  We will, with your cooperation, try to help.

The project team responsible for the effort is led by Junior Yearwood.  Those of you who’ve read our primer on Miscommunication in the Workplace know of Junior as one of the folks who helped edit that volume.   Junior and I met some years ago through the good offices of a mutual friend, and he’s always proven to be a sharp, clear-eyed person and good writer.  Junior brings what we wanted: the perspectives of a writer and reader who was financially literate but not obsessed with the market’s twitches or Fidelity’s travails.  I’ll let him introduce himself and his project:

It’s rare that a 19-year-old YouTube sensation manages to sum up the feelings of millions of Americans and people the world over.  But Tay Zonday, whose richly-baritone opening line is “are you confused about the economy?” did.  “Mama, Economy;  Make me understand all the numbers” explains it all.

The fact is we all could use a little help figuring it all out.  “We” might be a grandmother who knows she needs better than a zero percent savings account, a financial adviser looking to build moats around her clients’ wealth, or even me, the former plant manager and current freelance journalist. We all have something in common; we don’t know everything and we’re a bit freaked out by the economy and by the clamor.

My project is to help us sort through it.  The idea originated with the estimable Chuck Jaffe MarketWatch.   I am not a savvy investor nor am I a financial expert. I am a guy with a sharp eye for detail and the ability to work well with others.   My job is to combine your suggestions and considered analysis with my own research, into a monthly collection of websites that we believe are worth your time.  David will oversee the technical aspects of the project.   I’ll be reaching out, in the months ahead, to both our professional readership (investment advisers, fund managers, financial planners, and others) and regular people like myself.

Each month we will highlight and profile around five websites in a particular category. The new section will be launching in March with a review of mutual fund rating sites.  In the following months we’ll look at macro-level blogs run by investment professionals, Asian investing and many of the categories that you folks feel most interested in.   I’d be pleased to hear your ideas and I can be reached at [email protected]

A special word of thanks goes out to Chuck. We hope we can do justice to your vision.

Finally, I remain stunned (and generally humbled) by the talent and commitment of the folks who daily help the Observer out.  I’m grateful, in particular, to Accipiter, our chief programmer who has been both creative and tireless in his efforts to improve the function of the Observer’s discussion board software.  The software has several virtues (among them, it was free) but isn’t easy to scan.  The discussion threads look like this:

MACSX yield 3.03 and MAPIX yield 2.93. Why go with either as opposed to the other?

14 comments MaxBialystock January 27| Recent Kenster1_GlobalValue3:54PM Fund Discussions

Can’t really see, at a glance, what’s up with the 14 comments.  Accipiter wrote a new discussion summary program that neatly gets around the problem.  Here’s that same discussion, viewed through the Summary program:

MACSX yield 3.03 and MAPIX yield 2.93. Why go with either as opposed to the other? By – MaxBialystock viewed (468)

    • 2012-01-28 – scott : I was going to say MACSX is ex-Japan, but I guess it isn’t – didn’t it used to …
    • 2012-01-28 – MaxBialys : Reply to @scott: Yes, it’s SUPPOSED to be…….
    • 2012-01-28 – scott : Reply to @MaxBialystock: Ah. I own a little bit left of it, but I haven’t looke…
    • 2012-01-28 – MikeM : If you go to their web, site, they have a compare option where you can put the…
    • 2012-01-28 – InformalE : Pacific Tigers, MAPTX, is ex-Japan. I don’t think MACSX was ever ex-Japan.In re…
    • 2012-01-28 – msf : You can’t put too much stock in the category or benchmark with these funds. M…
    • 2012-01-28 – MaxBialys : Lots of work, thought and information. And CLEARLY expressed. MACSX is still ab…
    • 2012-01-28 – catch22 : Hi Max, Per your post, it appears you are also attempting to compare the dividen…
    • 2012-01-28 – Investor : I recently sold all of MACSX and reinvested most in MAPIX. I just did not feel …
    • 2012-01-28 – fundalarm : Reply to @Investor: as mentioned before, i have done the same at the end of Dec…
    • . 07:27:27 . – msf : Reply to @fundalarm: Though figures show long term performance of MAPIX to be b…
    • 2012-01-28 – MaxBialys : Ya, well, I kinda hogtied myself. I got 11 X more in MAPIX than MACSX, and MACS…

The Summary is easy to use.  Simply go to the Discussions page and look at the gray bar across the top.  The menu options are Discussions – Activity – Summary – Sign In.  Signing up and signing in are easy, free and give you access to a bunch of special features, but they aren’t necessary for using the Summary.  Simply click “Summary”  and, in the upper right, the “comments on/off” button.  With “comments on,” you immediately see the first line of every reply to every post.  It’s a fantastic tool for scanning the discussions and targeting the most provocative comments.

In addition to the Summary view, Chip, our diligent and crafty technical director, constructed a quick index to all of the fund profiles posted at the Observer.  Simply click on the “Funds” button on the top of each page to go to the Fund’s homepage.  There you’ll see an alphabetized list of the fifty profiles (some inherited from FundAlarm) that are available on-site.  Profiles dated “April 2011” or later are new content while many of the others are lightly-updated versions of older profiles.

I’m deeply grateful to both Accipiter and Chip for the passion and superb technical expertise that they bring.  The Observer would be a far poorer place without.  Thanks to you both.

In closing . . .

Thanks to all the folks who supported the Observer in the months just passed.  While the bulk of our income is generated by our (stunningly convenient!) link to Amazon, two or three people each month have made direct financial contributions to the site.  They are, regardless of the amount, exceedingly generous.  We’re deeply grateful, as much as anything, for the affirmation those gestures represent.  It’s good to know that we’re worth your time.

In March, there’ll be a refreshed and expanded profile of Matthews Asia Strategic Income (MAINX), profiles of Andrew Foster’s new fund, Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX) and ASTON/River Road Long-Short Fund (ARLSX) and a new look at an old favorite, GRT Value (GRTVX).

 

As ever,

 

 

January 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to a new year.  Take a moment, peer back at 2011 and allow yourself a stunned “what the hell was that about?”  After one of the four most volatile years the stock market’s seen in decades, after defaults, denunciations, downgrades, histrionics and the wild seesaw of commodity prices, stocks are back where they began.  After all that, Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index (VTSMX) had, as of 12/29/11, risen by one-quarter of one percent for the year.

I have no idea what the year ahead brings (except taxes).  I’m dubious that the world will follow the Mayans into extinction on December 21st.    My plan for the new year, and my recommendation for it: continue to live sensibly, invest cautiously and regularly, enjoy good wine and better cheese, celebrate what I have and rejoice at the fact that we don’t need to allow the stock market to run our lives.

All of which introduces a slightly-heretic thought.

Consider Taking a Chill Pill: Implications of a Stock-Light Portfolio

T. Rowe Price is one of my favorite fund companies, in part because they treat their investors with unusual respect.  Price’s publications depart from the normal marketing fluff and generally provide useful, occasionally fascinating, information.  I found two Price studies, in 2004 and again in 2010, particularly provocative.  Price constructed a series of portfolios representing different levels of stock exposure and looked at how the various portfolios would have played out over the past 50-60 years.

The original study looked at portfolios with 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100% stocks.  The update dropped the 20% portfolio and looked at 0, 40, 60, 80, and 100%.

As you think about your portfolio’s shape for the year ahead, you might find the Price data useful.  Below I’ve reproduced partial results for three portfolios.  The original 2004 and 2010 studies are available at the T. Rowe Price website.

20% stocks

60% stocks

100% stocks

Conservative mix, 50% bonds, 30% cash

The typical “hybrid”

S&P 500 index

Years studied

1955-03

1949-2009

1949-2009

Average annual return (before inflation)

7.4

9.2

11.0

Number of down years

3

12

14

Average loss in a down year

-0.5

-6.4

-12.5

Standard deviation

5.2

10.6

17.0

Loss in 2008

-0.2*

-22.2

-37.0

* based on 20% S&P500, 30% one-year CDs, 50% total bond index

 

What does that mean for you?  Statisticians would run a Monte Carlo Analysis to guide the answer.  They’d simulate 10,000 various decades, with different patterns and sizes of losses and gains (you could lose money in 6 of 10 years which, though very unlikely, has to be accounted for), to estimate the probabilities of various outcomes.

Lacking that sophistication, we can still do a quick calculation to give a rough idea of how things might play out.  Here’s how the simple math plays out.

Assuming no losing years, $10,000 invested conservatively for 10 years might grow to $20,900.  You might or might not have experienced a loss (historically, the portfolio lost money one year in 16). If your loss occurred in Year 10, your $10,000 would still have grown to $20,000.

Assuming no losing years, $10,000 invested moderately for 10 years might grow to $25,000.  You’ll likely have lost money twice, about 6.5% each year.  If you suffered an average loss in Year Five and again at Year Ten, your $10,000 would still have grown to $17,600.

Assuming no losing years, $10,000 invested aggressively for 10 years might grow to $29,900.  You’ll likely have lost money twice, about 12.5% each year.  If you suffered an average loss in Year Five and again at Year Ten, your $10,000 would still have grown to $18,385.

Measured against a conservative portfolio, a pure stock portfolio increases the probability of losing money by 400% (from a 6% chance to 23%), increases the size of your average loss by 2500% (from 0.5% to 12.5%) and triples your volatility.  With extraordinary luck, it doubles the conservative portfolio’s gain.  With average luck, it trails it. This is not a prediction of how stocks will do, in the short term, or the long term, but  is simply a reminder of the consequence of investing in them.

We can’t blithely assume that future returns will be comparable to past ones.  As Bob Cochran and others point out, bonds enjoyed a 30 year bull market which has now ended.  GMO foresees negative “real” returns for bonds and cash over the next seven years and substandard ones for US stocks as a whole.   That said, the Price studies show how even fairly modest shifts in asset allocation can have major shifts in your risk/reward balance.  As with Tabasco sauce, dribbles and not dollops offer the greatest gain.  Adding only very modest amounts of stock exposure to otherwise very conservative portfolios might provide all the heat you need (and all the heat you can stand).

Launch Alert: TIAA-CREF Lifestyle Income

On December 9, 2011, TIAA-CREF launched a new series of Lifestyle funds-of-funds.  In light of the T. Rowe Price research, Lifestyle Income (TSILX) might be worth your attention.  TSILX invests 20% of its assets in stocks, 40% in Short-Term Bond Fund (TCTRX) and 40% in their Bond (TIORX) and Bond Plus (TCBPX) funds.  The bond funds are all low cost offerings with index-like returns.  The equities sleeve is needlessly complicated with 11 funds, the smallest allocation being 0.2% to Mid-Cap Value.  That said, TSILX has a bearable expense ratio for a new fund (0.85%).  It’s run by the same team that has achieved consistent mediocrity with TIAA-CREF Managed Allocation (TIMIX), another fund of too many TIAA-CREF funds.   In this case, “mediocrity” isn’t bad and “consistent” is good.   The minimum initial investment is $2500.

TSILX might, then, approximate T. Rowe Price’s conservative portfolio allocation.  They are, of course, not the only option.  Several of the “retirement income” funds offered by the major no-load families have the same general nature.  Here’s a rundown of them:

  • Vanguard LifeStrategy Income (VASIX) has about the same stock and short-term bond exposure, with a higher minimum and lower expenses
  • Fidelity Freedom Income (FFFAX) with the same minimum as TSILX and lower expenses.  It’s been a weaker performer than the Vanguard fund.  Both lost around 11% in 2008, more than the Price model likely because they held less cash and riskier stocks.
  • T. Rowe Price’s income funds are attractive in their own right, but don’t come particularly close to the conservative allocation we’ve been discussing.  Retirement Income and Personal Strategy Income both hold far more stock exposure while Spectrum Income (RPSIX) holds fewer stocks but some riskier bonds.

The Great Unanswered Question: “What Are Our Recommendations Worth?”

This is the time of year when every financial publication and most finance websites (not including the Observer), trumpet their “can’t miss” picks for the year ahead.  A search of the phrase “Where to Invest in 2012” produced 99,200 hits in Google (12/26/2011), which likely exceeds the number of sensible suggestions by about 99,100.

Before browsing, even briefly, such advice, you should ask “what are those recommendations worth?”  A partial answer lies in looking at how top publications did with their 2011 picks.  Here are The Big Four.

Morningstar, Where to Invest in 2011 was a report of about 30 pages, covering both general guidance and funds representing a variety of interests.  It no longer seems available on the various Morningstar websites, but copies have been posted on a variety of other sites.

Fund

Category

Results

Sequoia( SEQUX) Long-time favorites Up 14%, top 1%
Oakmark (OAKMX) Long-time favorites Up 2%, top quarter
Oakmark Select (OAKLX) Long-time favorites Up 3%, top quarter
Fairholme (FAIRX) Long-time favorites Down 29%, dead last
T Rowe Price Equity Income( PRFDX) Long-time favorites 0%, middle of the pack
Dodge & Cox International (DODFX) Long-time favorites Down 16%, bottom quarter
Scout International (UMBWX) Long-time favorites Down 12%, bottom half
Harbor International (HAINX) Long-time favorites Down 11%, top quarter
PIMCO Total Return (PTTRX) Long-time favorites Up 3%, bottom 10th
Harbor Bond (HABDX) Long-time favorites Up 3%, bottom 10th
Dodge & Cox Income (DODIX) Long-time favorites Up 4%, bottom quarter
MetWest Total Return (MWTRX) Long-time favorites Up 5%, bottom quarter
Vanguard Tax-Managed  Capital Appreciation (VMCAX) Tax-managed portfolio Up 2%, top third
Vanguard Tax-Managed International (VTMGX) Tax-managed portfolio Down 14%, top third
Amana Trust Income (AMANX) Steady-Eddie stock funds Up 2%, top quarter, its ninth above average return in 10 years
Aston/Montag & Caldwell Growth (MCGFX) Steady-Eddie stock funds Up 3%, top decile
T. Rowe Price Dividend Growth (PRDGX) Steady-Eddie stock funds Up 4.2%, top decile
T. Rowe Price Short-Term Bond (PRWBX) Short-term income investing, as a complement to “true cash” Up 1%, top half of its peer group
American Century Value (TWVLX) Top-notch bargaining hunting funds Up 1%, top half of its peer group
Oakmark International (OAKIX) Top-notch bargaining hunting funds Down 14%, bottom third
Tweedy Browne Global Value (TBGVX) Top-notch bargaining hunting funds Down 5%, still in the top 5% of its peers

 

Kiplinger, Where to Invest in 2011 began with the guess that “Despite tepid economic growth, U.S. stocks should produce respectable gains in the coming year.”  As long as you can respect 1.6% (Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index through Christmas), they’re right. In a sidebar story, Steven Goldberg assured that “This Bull Market Has Room to Run.”  Again, if “into walls” and “off cliffs” count, they’re right.

The story focused on 11 stocks and, as a sort of afterthought, three funds.  In a particularly cruel move, the article quotes a half dozen fund managers in defense of its stock picks – then recommends none of their funds.

Fund

Category

Results

Fidelity Contrafund (FCNTX) Large US companies with a global reach A 1% gain through Christmas, good enough to land in the top third of its peer group, one of Fidelity’s last great funds
Vanguard Dividend Growth (VDIGX) Large US companies with a global reach 7.5% gain and top 1% of its peer group
PIMCO Commodity RealReturn (PCRDX) Diversification, some protection from a falling dollar and from inflation Down 5% as of Christmas, in the middle of its peer group, its worst showing in years

 

SmartMoney, Where to Invest in 2011, cheated a bit by not offering its recommendations until February.  Even then, it focused solely on a dozen individual stocks.  The worst of their picks, Oracle ORCL, was down 16% between the start of the year and the Christmas break.  The best, TJX Companies TJX, was up 49%. Six stocks lost money, six gained.  The portfolio gained 4.8%.  A rough conversion into fund terms would have you subtract 1.4% for operating expenses, leaving a return of 3.4%.  That would have it ranked in the top 14% of large cap core funds, through Christmas.  If you missed both the best and worst stock, your expense-adjusted returns would drop to 1.4%.

Money, Make Money in 2011: Your Investments discussed investing as a small part of their 2011 recommendations issue.  The offered a series of recommendations, generally a paragraph or two, followed by a fund or two from their Money 70 list.

Money’s strategic recommendations were: Favor stocks over bonds, favor large caps over small cap, good overseas carefully and don’t rush into emerging markets,  shorten up bond durations to hedge interest rate risks and add a few riskier bonds to boost yields

Funds

Strategy

Results

Jensen (JENSX) For domestic blue chip exposure Slightly underwater for 2011, middle of the pack finish
Oakmark International (OAKIX) Cautious, value-oriented international Down 15%, bottom half of international funds
T. Rowe Price Blue Chip Growth (TRBCX) International via the global earnings of US multinational corporations Up about 2%, top quarter of its peer group
FPA New Income (FPNIX) They recommend “a small weighting” here because of its short-duration bonds Up about 2%, top quarter of its peer group
Vanguard High-Yield Corporate (VWEHX) A bond diversifier Up 7%, one of the top high-yield funds
T. Rowe Price International Bond (RPIBX) A bond diversifier Up 2%, bottom quarter of its peer group

 

The Bottom Line: give or take the Fairholme implosion, Morningstar was mostly right on equities and mostly wrong on bonds and commodities, at least as measured by a single year’s return.  SmartMoney’s stock picks weren’t disastrous, but missing just one stock in the mix dramatically alters your results. Kiplinger’s got most of the forecasts wrong but chose funds with predictable, long term records.

Amateur Hour in Ratings Land, Part 1: TheStreet.com

How would you react to an article entitled “The Greatest Baseball Players You’ve Never Heard Of,” then lists guys named DiMaggio, Clemente and Kaline?  Unknown novelists: Herman Melville, Stephen King . . . ?

TheStreet.com, founded by frenetic Jim Cramer, is offering up mutual fund analysis.  In December, mutual fund analyst Frank Byrt offered up “10 Best Mutual Funds of 2011 You’ve Never Heard Of.”  The list made me wonder what funds the folks at TheStreet.com have heard of.  They start by limiting themselves to funds over $1 billion in assets, a threshold that suggests somebody has heard of them.  They then list, based on no clear criteria (they’ve been “leaders in their category”), some of  the industry’s better known funds:

Franklin Utilities (FKUTX) – $3.6 billion in assets under management

Fidelity Select Biotechnology (FBIOX) – $1.2 billion

Sequoia Fund (SEQUX) – $4.7 billion, the most storied, famously and consistently successful fund of the past four decades.

Federated Strategic Value Dividend Fund (SVAAX) – $4.9 billion

Delaware Smid Cap Growth (DFDIX) – $1 billion

GMO Quality (GQETX) – technically it’s GMO Quality III, and that number is important.  Investors wanting Quality III need only shell out $10 million to start while Quality IV requires $125 million, Quality V requires $250 million and Quality VI is $300 million.   In any case, $18 billion in assets has trickled in to this unknown fund.

Wells Fargo Advantage Growth (SGRNX) – the fund, blessed by a doubling of assets in 2011 and impending bloat, is closing to new investors. Mr. Byrt complains that “Ognar has wandered from the fund’s mandate,” which is proven solely by the fact that he owns more small and midcaps than his peers.  The prospectus notes, “We select equity securities of companies of all market capitalizations.”  As of 10/30/2011, he had 45% in large caps, 40% in mid caps and 15% in small names which sounds a lot like what they said they were going to do.  Mr Byrt’s ticker symbol, by the way, points investors to the $5 million minimum institutional share class of the $7.2 billion fund.  Po’ folks will need to pay a sales load.

Vanguard Health Care Admiral Fund (VGHAX) – a $20 billion “unknown,” with a modest $50,000 minimum and a splendid record.

SunAmerica Focused Dividend (FDSAX) – $1 billion

Cullen High Dividend Equity (CHDVX) – $1.3 billion.

Of the 10 funds on Mr. Byrt’s list, three have investment minimums of $50,000 or more, four carry sales loads, and none are even arguably “undiscovered.”  Even if we blame the mistake on an anonymous headline writer, we’re left with an unfocused collection of funds selected on unexplained criteria.

Suggestion from the peanut gallery: earn your opinion first (say, with serious study), express your opinion later.

Amateur Hour in Ratings Land, Part 2: Zacks Weighs In

Zacks Investment Research rates stocks.  It’s not clear to me how good they are at it.  Zacks’ self-description mixes an almost mystical air with the promise of hard numbers:

The guiding principle behind our work is that there must be a good reason for brokerage firms to spend billions of dollars a year on stock research. Obviously, these investment experts know something special that may be indicative of the future direction of stock prices. From day one, we were determined to unlock that secret knowledge and make it available to our clients to help them improve their investment results.

So they track earnings revisions.

Zacks Rank is completely mathematical. It”s cold. It”s objective.

(It’s poorly proofread.)

The Zacks Rank does not care what the hype on the street says. Or how many times the CEO appeared on TV. Or how this company could some day, maybe, if everything works perfectly, and the stars are aligned become the next Microsoft. The Zack Rank only cares about the math and whether the math predicts that the price will rise.

Momentum investing.  That’s nice.  The CXO Advisory service, in an old posting, is distinctly unimpressed with their performance.  Mark Hulbert discussed Zacks in a 2006 article devoted to “performance claims that bear little or no relationship with the truth.”

In a (poorly proofread) attempt to diversify their income stream, Zacks added a mutual fund rating service which draws upon the stock rating expertise to rank “nearly 19,000 mutual funds.”

There are three immediately evident problems with the Zacks approach.

There are only 8000 US stock funds, which is surely a problem for the 10,000 funds investing elsewhere.  Zacks expertise, remember, is focused on US equities.

The ratings for those other 10,000 funds are based “a number of key factors that will help find funds that will outperform.”  They offer no hint as to what those “key factors” might be.

The ratings are based on out-of-date information.  The SEC requires funds to disclose their holdings quarterly, but they don’t have to make that disclosure for 60 days after the end of the quarter.  If Zacks produces, in January, a forecast of the six-month performance of a fund based on a portfolio released in November of the fund’s holdings in September, you’ve got a problem.

Finally, the system doesn’t attend to trivial matters such as strategy, turnover, expenses, volatility . . .

All of which would be less important if there were reliable evidence that their system works.  But there isn’t.

Which brings us to Zack’s latest: a 12/20/11 projection of which aggressive growth funds will thrive in the first half of 2012 (“Top 5 Aggressive Growth Mutual Funds”).  Zacks has discovered that aggressive growth funds invest in “a larger number of” “undervalued stocks” to provide “a less risky route to investing in these instruments.”

Investors aiming to harness maximum gains from a surging market often select aggressive growth funds. This category of funds invests heavily in undervalued stocks, IPOs and relatively volatile securities in order to profit from them in a congenial economic climate. Securities are selected on the basis of their issuing company’s potential for growth and profitability. By holding a larger number of securities and adjusting portfolios keeping in mind market conditions, aggressive growth funds offer a less risky route to investing in these instruments.

Larger than what?  Less risky than what?  Have they ever met Ken Heebner?

Their five highest rated “strong buy” funds are:

Legg Mason ClearBridge Aggressive Growth A (SHRAX): ClearBridge is Legg Mason’s largest equity-focused fundamental investing unit.  SHRAX traditionally sports high expenses, below average returns (better lately), above average risk (ditto), a 5.75% sales load and a penchant for losing a lot in down markets.

Delaware Select Growth A (DVEAX): give or take high expenses and a 5.75% sales load, they’ve done well since the March 2009 market bottom (though were distinctly average before them).

Needham Aggressive Growth (NEAGX) which, they sharply note, is “a fund focused on capital appreciation.”  Note to ZIR: all aggressive growth funds focus on capital appreciation.  In any case, it’s a solid, very small no-load fund with egregious expenses (2.05%) and egregious YTD losses (down almost 15% through Christmas, in the bottom 2% of its peer group)

Sentinel Sustainable Growth Opportunities A (WAEGX): 5% sales load, above average expenses, consistently below average returns

American Century Ultra (TWCUX): a perfectly fine large-growth fund.  Though American Century has moved away from offering no-load funds, the no-load shares remain available through many brokerages.

So, if you like expensive, volatile and inconsistent . . . .  (Thanks to MFWire.com for reproducing, without so much as a raised eyebrow, Zacks list.  “Are These Funds Worth a Second Look?” 12/21/2011)

Two Funds, and Why They’re Worth your Time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s new fund:

HNP Growth and Preservation (HNPKX): one of the strengths and joys of small funds is that they offer the opportunity to try new approaches, rather than offering the next bloated version of an old one.  The HNP managers, learning from the experience of managed futures funds, offer a rigorous, quantitative approach to investing actively and cautiously across several asset classes.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Tocqueville Select (TSELX): Delafield Fund is good.  Top 5% of the past three years.  And five years.  And ten and fifteen years, for that matter.  Could Tocqueville Select be better?  It offers the same talented team that runs Delafield, but allows them to construct a concentrated portfolio that needs to invest only one-twentieth of Delafield’s assets.

Launch Alert:

Matthews Asia Strategic Income Fund (MAINX) launched on November 30, 2011.  The fund will invest in a wide variety of bonds and other debt securities of Asian corporate and sovereign issuers in both local and hard currencies. The fund will draw on both Matthews’ expertise in Asian fixed-income investing, which dates to the firm’s founding, and on the expertise of its new lead manager, Teresa Kong. Ms. Kong was Head of Emerging Market Investments at Barclays Global Investors / BlackRock, where she founded and led the Fixed Income Emerging Markets team. She was a Senior Portfolio Manager for them, a Senior Securities Analyst at Oppenheimer Funds, and an analyst for JP Morgan Securities.  Matthews argues that the Asian fixed income market is large, diverse, transparent and weakly-correlated to Western markets. Because Asian firms and governments have less debt than their Western counterparts, they are only a small portion of global bond indexes which makes them attractive for active managers. The Matthews fund will have the ability to invest across the capital structure, which means going beyond bonds into convertibles and other types of securities. The minimum initial investment is $2500 for regular accounts, $500 for IRAs.  Expenses are capped at 1.40%.

Prelaunch Alert: RiverNorth Tactical Opportunities

RiverNorth Core Opportunities (RNCOX) exemplifies what “active management” should be.  The central argument in favor of RNCOX is that it has a reason to exist, a claim that lamentably few mutual funds can seriously make.  RNCOX offers investors access to a strategy which makes sense and which is not available through – so far as I can tell – any other publicly accessible investment vehicle. The manager, Patrick Galley, starts with a strategic asset allocation model (in the neighborhood of 60/40), modifies it with a tactical asset allocation which tilts the fund in the direction of exceptional opportunities, and then implements the strategy either by investing in low-cost ETFs or higher-cost closed-end funds.  He chooses the latter path only when the CEFs are selling at irrational discounts to their net asset value.  He has, at times, purchased a dollar’s worth of assets for sixty cents.

Closed-end funds are investment vehicles very much like mutual funds.  One important difference is that they can make greater use of leverage to boost returns.  The other is that, like stocks and exchanged-traded funds, they trade throughout the day in secondary markets.  When you buy shares, it’s from another investor in the fund rather than from the fund company itself.  That insulates CEFs from many of the cash-flow issues that plague the managers of open-ended funds.

RNCOX, since inception, has outperformed its average peer by about two-to-one, though the manager consistently warns that his strategy will be volatile.  After reaching about a half billion in assets, the fund closed in the summer of 2011.

In the fall of 2011, RiverNorth filed to launch a closed-end fund of its own, RiverNorth Tactical Opportunities.  The fund will invest in other closed-end funds, just as its open-ended sibling does.  The closed-end fund will have the ability to use leverage, which will magnify its movements.  The theory says that they’ll deploy leverage to magnify the upside but it would be hard to avoid catching downdrafts as well.

Morningstar’s Mike Taggart agrees that the strategy is “compelling.”  Mr. Galley, legally constrained from discussing a fund in registration, says only that the timing of launch is still unknown but that he’d be happy to talk with us as soon as he’s able.  Folks anxious for a sneak peek can read the fund’s IPO filing at the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Pre- Pre-Launch Alert:

Andrew Foster announced on Seafarer’s website that he’s “exploring” a strategy named Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income.  At this point there is no vehicle for the strategy, that is, nothing in registration with the SEC, but tracking Mr. Foster’s thinking is likely to be a very wise move.

Mr. Foster managed Matthews Asian Growth and Income (MACSX), a FundAlarm “star in the shadows” fund, from 2005-2011.   As its manager, he first worked with and then succeeded Paul Matthews, the firm’s founder.  Saying that he did an excellent job substantially understates his success.  MACSX was one of the most consistent, least volatile and most rewarding Asia-focused funds during his tenure. Andrew also served as Matthews’ director of research and chief investment officer.

Andrew left to found his own firm in 2011, with the announced intention of one day launching a thoroughly modern mutual fund that drew on his experience.  While this is not yet that fund, it does illustrate the direction of his planning.   Andrew writes:

This strategy attempts to offer a stable means of participating in a portion of developing countries’ growth prospects, while providing some downside protection relative to a strategy that invests only in the common stocks of emerging markets. The strategy’s objective is to provide long-term capital appreciation along with some current income. In order to pursue that objective, the strategy incorporates dividend-paying equities, convertible bonds and fixed income securities. It may also invest in companies of any size or capitalization, including smaller companies.

We’ll do our best to monitor the strategy’s development.

Mining for Hidden Gems among Funds

Journalist Javier Espinoza’s pursuit of “hidden gems” – great funds with under $100 million in assets – led him to the Observer.  His article Mining for Hidden Gems Among Funds ran in the Wall Street Journal’s “Investing in Funds” report (12/05/2011).  The Journal highlighted five funds:

Pinnacle Value (recommended David Snowball and profiled as a “star in the shadows”)

Marathon Value (another “star in the shadows,” recommended by Johanna Turner of Milestones Financial Planning and a supporter of both FundAlarm and the Observer)

Artio US Smallcap (recommended by Bob Cochran of PDS Planning, one of the most thoughtful and articulate members of the community here and at FundAlarm)

Bogle Small Cap Growth (recommended by Russel Kinnel, Morningstar’s venerable director of fund research)

Government Street Equity (recommended by Todd Rosenblut, mutual fund analysis for S&P Capital IQ)

Fund Update

RiverPark Wedgewood (RWGFX), which the Observer profiled in September as one of the most intriguing new funds, has an experienced manager and a focused portfolio of exceptionally high-quality firms.  Manager Dave Rolfe aims to beat index funds at their own game, by providing a low turnover, tightly-focused portfolio that could never survive in a big fund firm.

The fund is approached the end of 2011 with returns in the top 2% of its large growth peer group.  Manager Dave Rolfe has earned two distinctions from Morningstar.  His fund has been recognized with the new Bronze designation, which means that Morningstar’s analysts weigh it as an above-average prospect going forward.  In addition, he was featured in a special Morningstar Advisor report, Wedgewood’s Lessons Pay Off.  After lamenting the pile of cookie-cutter sales pitches for firms promising to invest in high-quality, reasonably-priced firms, Dan Culloton happily observes, “self-awareness, humility and patience set Wedgewood apart.”  I agree.

Briefly Noted . . .

Matthews International Capita Management reopened Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund (MACSX) and the Matthews Asia Small Companies Fund (MSMLX) on January 4, 2012. The funds have been closed for about a year, but both saw substantial asset outflows as Asian markets got pummeled in 2011.  MACSX was identified as an Observer “Star in the Shadows” fund.  As usual, it’s one of the best Asian funds during market turbulence (top 15% in 2011) though it seems to be a little less splendid than under former manager Andrew Foster.  The young Small Companies fund posted blistering returns in 2009 and 2010.  Its 2011 returns have modestly trailed its Asian peers.  That’s a really reassuring performance, given the fund’s unique focus on smaller companies.

The Wall Street Journal reports on a fascinating initiative by the SEC.  They’ve been using quantitative screens to identify hedge funds with “aberrational performance,” which might include spectacularly high returns or inexplicably low volatility. They then target such funds for closer inspection.  The system is been so productive that they’re now adding mutual funds to the scan (“SEC Ups its Game to Identify Rogue Firms,” 12/29/11).

Artisan Partners has withdrawn their planned IPO, citing unfavorable market conditions.  The cash raised in the IPO would have allowed the firm to restructure a bit so that it would be easier for young managers to hold a significant equity stake in the firm.

Ed Studzinski, long-time comanager of Oakmark Equity & Income (OAKBX) retired on January 1, 2012, at age 62.  Clyde McGregor will now manage the fund alone.

ETrade daily publishes the list of “most searched” mutual funds, as an aid to folks wondering where investors’ attention is wandering.  If you can find any pattern in the post-Christmas list, I’d be delighted to hear of it:

  • Rydex Russell 2000 2x Strategy (RYRSX)
  • Managers PIMCO Bond (MBDFX)
  • T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Stock (PRMSX)
  • Vanguard Energy (VGENX)
  • T. Rowe Price New Horizons (PRNHX)

Highland Funds Asset Management will spin-off from Highland Capital Management next month and switch its name to Pyxis Capital.  Highland’s 19 mutual funds will be rebranded with the Pyxis name effective January 9.  Pyxis is a constellation in the southern sky and Latin for a mariner’s compass.  Pixies?  Pick Six?  Pick sis?  What do you suppose was going on at the meeting where someone first suggested, “hey, let’s change our name to something that no one has ever heard of, which is hard to say and whose sole virtue is an obscure reference that will be grasped by three Latin astronomers?”

Anya Z. and the Observer’s New Look

In December we unveiled the Observer’s new visual design, which is easier to navigate, easier to maintain and infinitely more polished.  I’d like to take a moment to recognize, and thank, the designer.  Anya Zolotusky is a Seattle area web designer who specializes in elegant and highly useable websites for small businesses.  Anya’s resume has entries so cool that they make me laugh.  Uhhh . . . she pioneered “cybercasts from uncomfortable places.”   One presumably uncomfortable place was a Mt Everest Basecamp, 18,000’ up from which she handled all communications, including live audio and video interviews with CNN and their ilk).

We talked a while about what I imagined the Observer should look like and Anya took it from there.  She describes her goal:

Primarily I wanted a more polished look that would better suit the spirit of the MFO and make using the site a more pleasant experience for visitors. I liked incorporating the energy of the exchange floor, but faded way back, because the MFO is a source of calm and reason in the midst of investment world chaos. The colors, the clean layout and clear navigation are all intended to create a calm backdrop for a topic that is anything but. And the iconic Wall Street bull is just a natural totem for the MFO. I’m happy to have contributed a little to what I hope is a long, bullish future for the MFO and all the Snowball Groupies (especially my mom)!

Anya’s mom is a Soviet émigré and long-time fan of FundAlarm.  Her encouragement, in a note entitled “Come on, Snowball.  Do it for mom!” helped convince me to launch the Observer in the first place.

And so, thanks to Anya and all the remarkably talented folks whose skill and dedication allows me to focus on listening and writing.  Anyone interested in seeing the rest of Anya’s work should check out her Darn Good Web Design.

Two New Observer Resources

The Observer continues to add new features which reflect the talents and passions of the folks who make up our corps of volunteer professionals.  I’m deeply grateful for their support, and pleased to announce two site additions.

The Navigator


Accipiter, our chief programmer and creator of the Falcon’s Eye, has been hard at work again. This time he’s turned his programming expertise to The Navigator, a valuable new tool for looking up fund and ETF information. Similar to the Falcon’s Eye, you can enter a ticker and receive links to major sources of information, 27 at last count. In added functionality, you can also enter a partial ticker symbol and see a dropdown list of all funds that begin with those characters. Additionally, you can search for funds by entering only part of a fund name and again seeing a dropdown list of all funds containing the string you entered. Choosing a fund from the dropdown then returns links to all 27 information sources. This all strikes me as borderline magical.  Please join me in thanking Accipiter for all he does.

Miscommunication in the Workplace

This ten-page guide, which I wrote as a Thanksgiving gift for the Observer’s readers, has been downloaded hundreds of times.  It has now found a permanent home in the Observer’s Resources section.  If you’ve got questions or comments about the guide, feel free to pass them along.  If we can make the guide more useful, we’ll incorporate your ideas and release a revised edition.

In Closing . . .

Augustana bell tower panorama

Augustana College bell tower panorama, photo by Drew Barnes, class of 2014.

Winter will eventually settle in to the Midwest.  The days are short and there are lots of reasons to stay inside, making it a perfect time to catch up on some reading and research.  I’ve begun a conversation with Steve Dodson, former president of Parnassus Investments and now manager of Bretton Fund (BRTNX) and I’m trying to track down James Wang, manager of the curious Oceanstone Fund (OSFDX).  Five years, five finishes at the top of the fund world, cash heavy, few assets and virtually no website.  Hmmm. Our plan is to review two interesting new funds, one primarily domestic and one primarily international, in each of the next several months. We’ll profile the new Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities (GPGOX) and Matthews Asia Strategic Income (MAINX) funds in February and March, respectively.

Observer readers have asked for consideration of a half dozen funds, including Conestoga Small Cap (CCASX) and Aston/Cornerstone Large Cap Value (RVALX).  I don’t know what I’ll find, but I’m delighted by the opportunity to learn a bit and to help assuage folk’s curiosity.

In addition, Junior Yearwood, who helped in editing the Miscommunication in the Workplace guide, has agreed to take on the task of bringing a long-stalled project to life.  Chuck Jaffe long ago suggested that it would be useful to have a launch pad from which to reach the highest-quality information sources on the web; a sort of one-stop shop for fund and investing insights.  While the Observer’s readers had a wealth of suggestions (and I’ll be soliciting more), I’ve never had the time to do them justice.  With luck, Junior’s assistance will make it happen.

We’re healthy, in good spirits, the discussion board is populated by a bunch of good and wise people, and I’m teaching two of my favorite classes, Propaganda and Advertising and Social Influence.  Life doesn’t get much better.

I’ll see you soon,

David

December 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to the Observer 2.0.  We worked hard over the past month to create a new look for the Observer: more professional, easier to read, easier to navigate and easier to maintain.  We hope you like it.

It’s hard to believe that, all the screaming aside, the stock market finished November at virtually the same point that it began.  Despite wild volatility and a ferocious month-end rally, Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index Fund (VTSMX) ended the month with just a tiny loss.

Finding Funds that Lose at Just the Right Time

The best investors are folks who are able to think differently than do their peers: to find opportunities where others find only despair.  In our ongoing attempt to get you to think differently about how you find a good investment, we decided to ask: do you ever want funds that aren’t top performers?

The answer, for long term investors, is “yes.”  In general, you do not want to own the high-beta funds that have the best performance in “junk rallies.”  Junk rallies are periods where the least attractive investment options outperform everything else.  Those rallies push the riskiest, least prudent funds (temporarily) to the top.

One way to identify junk rallies is to look for markets where the performance of solid, high-quality companies dramatically lags the performance of far more speculative ones.  We did that by comparing the returns of index funds tracking the boring Dow Jones Industrial Average (blue chips) with the performance of funds tracking the endlessly exciting NASDAQ.  It turns out that there are three years where the Nazz outperformed the Dow by more than 1000 basis points (i.e., by 10 percentage points).  Those years are 2003 (Dow trails by 2100 bps), 2007 (1040 bps) and 2009 (3200 bps).

This month’s screen looks at funds that, over the past 10 years, are above average performers except during junk rallies.  In junk rally years, we looked for absolute returns of 10% or more.

10 year return, thru 11/30/11

10-year
% Rank

Comments

Amana Trust Growth Large Growth

7.4

1

A FundAlarm “star in the shadows,” one of a series of funds brilliantly managed by Nick
American Century Strategic Allocation: Aggressive Aggressive Allocation

5.2

15

Team-managed, broadly diversified with “sleeves” of the portfolio (e.g., “international bonds”) farmed out to other AC managers.
American Century Strategic  Allocation: Moderate Moderate Allocation

5.2

14

Ditto.
Columbia Greater China A China Region

13.1

36

5.75% load, specializes in high quality Chinese firms.
DF Dent Premier Growth Mid-Cap Growth

5.9

35

Daniel F. Dent, that is.
DFA Emerging Markets II Diversified Emerging Mkts

15.7

24

Quant, the DFA funds are about impossible to get into.
Eaton Vance Parametric Tax-Managed Emerging Markets Diversified Emerging Mkts

17.7

7

A sort of “enhanced index” fund that rebalances rarely and has more small market exposure than its peers.  Sadly, an institutional fund.
Fidelity Contrafund Large Growth

7.3

1

One of Fidelity’s longest-tenured managers and most consistently excellent funds
Franklin Templeton Growth Allocation Aggressive Allocation

5.8

9

Same manager for more than a decade, but a 5.75% load.
ING Corporate Leaders Trust Large Value

7.5

1

One of the Observer’s “stars in the shadows,” this fund has no manager and has been on auto-pilot since the Great Depression
Invesco European Growth A Europe Stock

9.6

22

An all-cap fund that’s looking for high-quality firms, same lead manager for 14 years
MFS Research International A Foreign Large Blend

6.1

16

Neat strategy: the portfolio is constructed by the fund’s research analysts, with a growth at a reasonable price discipline.
Munder Mid-Cap Core Growth Mid-Cap Growth

8.1

5

Price-sensitive, low-turnover institutional midcap fund.
Permanent Portfolio Conservative Allocation

11.3

1

Despite all the nasty things I’ve written about it, there’s been no fund with a more attractive risk-return profile over the last decade than this one.  The portfolio is an odd collection of precious metals, currency, bonds and aggressive stocks.
T. Rowe Price Global Technology Technology

7.4

3

The manager’s only been around for three years, but the strategy has been winning for more than 10.
T. Rowe Price Media & Telecomm Communications

12.0

1

Top 1% performer through three sets of manager changes
Wells Fargo Advantage Growth I Large Growth

7.3

1

Ognar!  Ognar!  Formerly Strong Growth Fund, it’s been run by Tom Ognar for a nearly a decade.  Tom was mentored by his dad, Ron, the previous manager.

As one reads the Morningstar coverage of these funds, the words that keep recurring are “disciplined,” “patient” and “concentrated.”  These are folks with a carefully articulated strategy who focus on executing it year after year, with little regard to what’s in vogue.

While this is not a “buy” list, it does point out the value of funds like Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), in which I’ve been invested for a good while.  MACSX puts up terribly relative performance numbers (bottom 10-15%) every time the Asian market goes wild and brilliant ones (top 5%) when the markets are in a funk.  If you’re willing to accept bad relative performance every now and then, you end up with excellent absolute and relative returns in the long-run.

Updating “The Observer’s Honor Roll, Unlike Any Other”

In November 2011, we generated an Honor Roll of funds.  Our criterion was simple: we looked for funds that were never abysmal.   We ignored questions of the upside entirely and focused exclusively on never finishing in a peer group’s bottom third.  That led us to two dozen no-load funds, including the Price and Permanent Portfolio funds highlighted above.

One sharp member of the discussion board community, claimu, noticed the lack of index funds in the list.  S/he’s right: I filtered them out, mostly because I got multiple hits for the same index. Eleven index funds would have made the list:

  • four S&P 500 funds (California Investment, Dreyfus, Price, Vanguard)
  • four more-or-less total market funds (Price, Schwab, Schwab 1000, Vanguard)
  • one international (Price), one growth (Vanguard) and one small growth (Vanguard).

The story here might be the 67 S&P500 index funds that have a ten-year record but didn’t make the list. That is, 95% of S&P500 funds were screened-out because of some combination of high expenses and tracking error.

Those differences in expenses and trading efficiency add up.  An investment a decade ago in the Vanguard 500 Index Admiral Class (VFIAX) would have returned 2.45% annually over the decade while the PNC S&P 500 “C” shares (PPICX) earned only 1.14% – less than half as much.  $10,000 invested in Vanguard a decade ago would now (11/30/11) be worth $13,300 while a PNC investor would have $11,700 – for having taken on precisely the same risks at precisely the same time.

Press Release Journalism: CNBC and the End of the Western World

Does anyone else find it disturbing that CNBC, our premier financial news and analysis network, has decided to simply air press releases as news?   Case in point: the end of the world as we know it.  On 11/30/11, CNBC decided to share David Murrin’s fervent announcement that there’s nowhere worth investing except the emerging economies:

The Western world has run out of ideas and is “finished financially” while emerging economies across the world will continue to grow, David Murrin, CIO at Emergent Asset Management told CNBC on the tenth anniversary of coining of the so-called BRIC nations of Brazil, Russia, India and China, by Goldman Sachs’ Jim O’Neill.

“I still subscribe and I’ve spoken about it regularly on this show that this is the moment when the Western world realizes it is finished financially and the implications are huge, whereas the emerging BRIC countries are at the beginning of their continuation cycle,” Murrin told CNBC. (The Western World Is ‘Finished Financially’)

One outraged reader phrased it this way: “So why do reasonably respectable news outlets take as news the ravings of someone who has so obvious a financial stake in what is being said … News flash, “The CEO of Walmart declares the death of main street businesses . . . ” Good God!”

While Mr. Murrin is clearly doing his job by “talking his book,” that is, by promoting interest in the investment products he sells, is CNBC doing theirs?  If their job is either (a) providing marketing support for hedge funds or (b) providing inflammatory fodder, the answer is “yes.”  If, on the other hand, their job is . . .oh, to act like professional journalists, the answer is “no.”

What might they have done?  Perhaps examine Mr. Murrin’s credibility.  Ask even a few questions about his glib argument (here’s one: “the Chinese markets are at the mercy of the world’s largest and least accountable bureaucracy, one which forces the private markets to act as proxies for a political party.  To what extent should investors stake their financial futures on their faith in the continued alignment of that bureaucracy’s interests and theirs?”).  Perhaps interview someone who suspects that the expertise of companies domiciled in the Western world will allow them to out-compete firms domiciled elsewhere?  (Many thanks to Nick Burnett of CSU-Sacramento, both for pointing out the story and for supplying appropriate outrage.)

A Gift Freely Given

We’re deeply grateful for the support, financial, intellectual and moral, that you folks have offered during this first year of the Observer’s life.  It seemed fitting, in this season of thanksgiving and holidays, to say thanks to you all.  As a token of our gratitude, we wanted to share a small gift with each of you.  Chocolate was my first choice, but it works poorly as an email attachment.  After much deliberation, I decided to provide some practical, profitable advice from a field in which I have both academic credentials and lots of experience: communication.

Many of you know that I am, by profession and calling, a Professor of Communication Studies at Augustana College.  Over the years, the college has allowed me to explore a wide variety of topics in my work, from classical rhetoric and persuasion theory, to propaganda, persuasion and business communication practices.  Spurred by a young friend’s difficulties at work and informed by a huge body of research, I wrote a short, practical guide that I’d like to share with each of you.

Miscommunication in the Workplace: Sources, Prevention, Response is a 12-page guide written for bright adults who don’t study communication for a living.  It starts by talking about the two factors that make miscommunication so widespread.   It then outlines four practical strategies which will reduce the chance of being misunderstood and two ways of responding if it occurs anyway.  There’s a slightly-classy color version, but also a version optimized for print.  Both are .pdf files.

In the theme of thanksgiving, I should recognize the three people who most helped bring focus and clarity to my argument.  They are

Junior Yearwood, a friend and resident of Trinidad, brought a plant manager’s perspective, an editor’s sensibility and a sharp eye to several drafts of the guide.  Junior helped both clarify the document’s structure and articulate its conclusion.

Nicholas Burnett, an Associate Dean at Cal State – Sacramento, brought a quarter century’s experience in teaching and analyzing business and professional communication.  Nick pointed me to several lines of research that I’d missed and helped me soften claims that probably went beyond what the research supports.

Cheryl Welsch, a/k/a Chip, the Observer’s Technical Director and Director of Information Technology at SUNY-Sullivan, brought years of experience as a copy editor (as Hagrid would have it, she’s “a thumpin’ good one”).  She also helped me understand the sorts of topics that might be most pressing in helping folks like her staff.

The Harvard Business Review published Communicating Effectively (2011), which is a lot more expensive (well, this is free so pretty much everything is), longer (at 250 pages) and windier but covers much of the same ground.

If you have reactions, questions or suggested revisions, please drop a note to share them with me.  I’m more than willing to update the document.  If you really need guidance to the underlying research, it’s available.

Two other holiday leads for you.  QuoteArts.com offers a bunch of the most attractive, best written greeting cards (and refrigerator magnets) that I’ve seen.  The Duluth Trading Company offers some of the best made, best fitting men’s work clothing I’ve bought in years.  The Observer has no financial link to either of these firms and I know they have nothing to do with funds, but I’m really pleased with them and wanted to give you a quick heads-up about them.

Two Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s new fund:

Lockwell Small Cap Value (LOCSX): a product of The Great Morgan Stanley Diaspora, Lockwell is a new incarnation of a very solid institutional fund.  The manager, who has successfully run billions of dollars using this same discipline, is starting over with just a million or two.  While technically a high-minimum institutional fund, there might be room to talk.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Artisan Small Cap (ARTSX): they’re baaaaaack!   ARTSX is the fund that launched Artisan had a blazing start in 1996: a chart-topping 35% gain, $300 million in assets, and a principled close within 11 months.  What followed were nearly 15 years of uninspiring performance.  In 2009, the management team that has brilliantly guided Artisan Mid Cap took over here and the results have been first rate.  Time for another look!

Fund Update: RiverPark Short-Term High Yield and RiverPark/Wedgewood

Two of the RiverPark funds that we’ve profiled are having banner years.

RiverPark/Wedgewood (RWGFX) offers a concentrated portfolio of exceedingly high-quality stocks.  They’ve got a great track record with this strategy, though mostly through separately-managed accounts.  I have some questions about whether the SMA success would translate to similar performance in their fund.  The answer appears to be “yes,” at least so far.  For 2011 (through 11/29), they’re in the top 2% of large growth funds. Their 2.2% gain places them about 750 basis points ahead of their average peer.  The fund has gathered $70 million in assets.

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) continues to be a model of stability.  Its unique portfolio of called high yield bonds and other orphan investments is yielding 4.2% and has returned 3.25% YTD (through 11/29/11).  Judged as a high-yield bond fund, that’s great: top 4% YTD with minimal share price volatility.  Viewed as a cash management tool, it’s even better.  Latest word is that assets are up to $35 million as more advisors come onboard.

In mid-November, Barron’s ran a nice profile, “Enjoying Their Freedom,” of RiverPark and of these two funds.

Closure alert: Aston/River Road Independent Value

In a November 18 filing with the SEC, Aston announced that ARVIX will close to new investors “if the net assets of the Fund reach a certain level in combination with other assets managed in the same investment strategy by … River Road Asset Management.  Currently, the Fund expects its Soft Close Level to be between $500 million and $600 million in net assets.”  Eric Cinnamond, the manager suggests that “given our sales pipeline,” the fund will likely close before December is over.  Existing investors will be permitted to add to their accounts but (with a few exceptions) no new investors will be allowed in.

In general, folks interested in a low volatility strategy crafted for high volatility markets really should look, and look quickly, to see whether ARVIX makes sense for their portfolios.  The Observer’s April 2011 profile of ARVIX makes clear that this is a strategy with a long, consistently and hugely successful trade record.  So far in 2011, it’s in the top 1% of small value funds.  Mr. Cinnamond is both modest and thoughtful, and tries to balance a celebration of the fund’s success with realism about the years ahead:

This year has set up nicely for the portfolio — ideal market for a flexible and opportunistic strategy.  Every year won’t be like this (the product has high tracking error) and if small caps go lot higher from here, the strategy will most likely lag as I continue to be positioned defensively with below average risk in the equity portfolio and above average cash levels.  That said, as you know, this can change quickly — hopefully recent volatility in the small cap market continues into 2012.

Right, “hopefully recent volatility … continues.”  Volatile markets create outsized opportunities that Mr. Cinnamond has, over the course of years, profitably exploited.  Two other takes on the fund are the fund’s most recent profile of itself and a new Morningstar essay which looks at the two best small-value funds in 2011: The Top Performing Funds in 2011’s Toughest Category.

Launch alert:

Forward Management introduced a new investor share class for the $1.2 billion, Forward Select Income Fund (FFSLX) at the end of November, 2011. The fund focuses on the preferred securities of REITs, rather than their common stock.  The fund’s yielding over 9% currently, and has pretty consistently finished near the top of the real estate fund stack by combining above average returns with low volatility.

This is the fifth Forward real estate fund to be offered directly (i.e., without a load) to retail investors.  The others are Forward International Real Estate (FFIRX), the Forward Real Estate Long/Short (FFSRX), Forward Real Estate and the Forward Global Infrastructure (FGLRX).  In each case, there’s a $4000 minimum which is reduced to $500 if you set up an account with an automatic investing plan.

Fidelity launched Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX) on November 1st.   FTEMX represents a really good idea: an emerging markets balanced fund.  The fund will invest about 60% of its assets in stocks and 40% in bonds, which should over time provide stock-like returns with greatly reduced volatility.  That might translate to higher shareholder returns, as folks encounter fewer dramatic declines and are less likely to be tempted to sell low.  The fund is managed by a team led by John Carlson.  Mr. Carlson has been doing really good work for years on Fidelity’s emerging markets bond fund, Fidelity New Market Income (FNMIX).  There’s a $2500 minimum investment and an expense ratio of 1.40%.

One landmine to avoid: don’t pay attention to the fund’s performance against its Morningstar peer group.  Morningstar doesn’t have an E.M. balanced group, and so assigned this fund to E.M. stock.

I’ve also profiled the closed-end First Trust/Aberdeen Emerging Opportunities (FEO) fund.  FEO has a higher expense ratio (1.80%) but can often be bought at a discounted price.

Alpine: A slight change in elevation

The good folks at the Alpine Funds have taken inspiration for their namesake mountain range.  Effective January 12, they’re increasing their minimum initial investment for stock funds by a thousand fold:  “For new shareholders after January 3, 2012, the minimum initial investment of the Institutional Class has increased from $1,000 to $1,000,000.” The minimum for bond rises will rise only a hundredfold: “For new shareholders after January 3, 2012, the minimum initial investment of the Institutional Class (formerly the Investor Class) has increased from $2,500 to $250,000.”

At the same time they’re renaming a bunch of funds and imposing a 5.5% front load.

Alpine Dynamic Balance Fund Alpine Foundation Fund
Alpine Dynamic Financial Services Fund Alpine Financial Services Fund
Alpine Dynamic Innovators Alpine Innovators Fund
Alpine Dynamic Transformations Fund Alpine Transformations Fund

Of the funds involved, Dynamic Transformations (ADTRX) is most worth a look before the no-load door closes.  It’s a relatively low turnover, relatively tax efficient mid-cap growth fund that invests in companies undergoing, well, dynamic transformations.  (After January, I guess the transformations can be rather less dynamic.)  That discipline parallels the discipline successfully applied at Artisan’s Mid Cap (ARTMX) fund.  As with Alpine’s other funds, risk management is not a particular strength and so it tends to be a high volatility / high return strategy; that is, it captures more of both the upside and the downside in any market movement.

(Thanks to the members of the Observer’s discussion board community, who read SEC filings even more closely – and with more enthusiasm, if you can imagine that – than I do.  Special thanks to TheShadow for triggering the discussion.)

Briefly Noted . . .

Normally “leaving” is followed by “coming back.”  Not so, at Fidelity.  Andy Sassine, manager of Fidelity Small Cap Stock (FSCLX) is taking a six-month year, but the firm made clear that it’s a one-way trip.  He might work at Fidelity again, but won’t work as a manager.  His fund is being taken over by Lionel Harris of Fidelity Small Cap Growth (FCPGX). Small Cap Growth will be taken over by Pat Venanzi, who manages two small slices of Fidelity Stock Selector Small Cap (FDSCX) and Fidelity Series Small Cap Opportunities (FSOPX).

In the 2012 first quarter, American Beacon will merge the Bridgeway Large Cap Value (BRLVX) fund into the newly created American Beacon Bridgeway Large Cap Value and retain Bridgeway as subadviser.   Bridgeway Social Responsibility, a previous Bridgeway offering, was acquired by Calvert Large Cap Growth. This past May, that fund merged into Calvert Equity (CSIEX), which is not subadvised by Bridgeway.

Allianz RCM Disciplined International Equity (ARDAX) will liquidate on Dec. 20, 2011.

American Beacon Evercore Small Cap Equity  (ASEAX) is closing ahead of its liquidation on or about Dec. 15, 2011.

Dreyfus has closed and plans to liquidate the Dreyfus Select Managers Large Cap Growth (DSLAX) as of Dec. 13, 2011.

In one of those “laws of unintended consequences moves,” Schwab gave in to advisors’ demands and changed the benchmark for the Schwab International Index Fund (SWISX).  Investors claimed that it was too hard to compare SWISX’s performance because it was the only fund using Schwab’s internally-generated benchmark.  In an entirely Pyrrhic victory, Schwab moved to the standard benchmark (MSCI EAFE) and thereby lost any reason for existence.  The move will require the fund to divest itself of a substantial, and entirely sensible, stake in Canadian stocks and make substantial investments in mid-cap stocks.

American Century International Value Fund (ACVUX) is being rebuilt: new management team, new discipline (quant rather than fundamental), new benchmark (MSCI EAFE Value)

In closing . . .

Many thanks to all of the folks who have used the Observer’s Amazon link.  It’s remarkable easy to use (click on it, set it as your default Amazon bookmark and you’re done) and helps a lot.

I’ve been working through three books that might be worth your year-end attention.

Robert Frank, wealth reporter for the WSJ, The High-Beta Rich: How the Manic Wealthy Will Take Us to the Next Boom, Bubble, and Bust. In some ways it’s a logical follow-up to his book Richistan: A Journey Through the American Wealth Boom and the Lives of the New Rich (2008).  The 8.5 million Richistanis, Frank discovered, own things like “shadow yachts,” which are the yachts which follow the rich guys’ yacht and carry their helicopters.  In The High-Beta Rich, Frank looks at the ugly implications of financial instability among the very wealthy.  Generally speaking, their worth is highly volatile and market dependent.  A falling market decreases the wealth of the very rich about three times more than it does for the rest of us.  Frank writes:

Suddenly, in 1982, the year I call the magic year for wealth, the 1 percent, which used to be like the teetotalers of our economy, became the binge drinkers.

And when times were good, they did two or three times better than everyone else. When times were bad, they did two or three times worse. So if you look at the last three recessions, the top 1 percent lost two to three times in income what the rest of America lost. And, you know, part of it has to do with more and more of today’s wealth is tied to the stock market, whether it’s executives who are paid in stock or somebody who’s starting a company and takes it public with an IPO.

And the stock market is more than 20 times as volatile as the real economy.

And, as it turns out, slamming the rich around has real implications for the financial welfare of the rest of us.  Frank appeared on NPR’s Talk of the Nation program on November 16.  There’s a copy of the program and excerpts from the book available on Talk of the Nation’s website.

Folks who find their faith useful in guiding their consumption and investments might enjoy a new book by a singularly bright, articulate younger colleague of mine, Laura Hartman.  Laura is an assistant professor of religion and author of The Christian Consumer: Living Faithfully in a Fragile World.  The fact that it’s published by Oxford University Press tells you something about the quality of its argument.  She argues:

At base, consumerism arises from a distorted view of human nature.  This ethos teaches that our wants are insatiable (and the provocations of advertising help make this so), that buying the new article of clothing or fancy gadget will answer our deepest longings.  That we are what we own.  Humans, then, are seen as greedy and lacking and shallow.  (192)

While this isn’t a “how-to” guide, Laura does offer new (or freshened) ways of thinking about how to consume what you need with celebration, and how to leave what others need untouched.

The most influential book I’ve read in years is Alan Jacobs’ Pleasures of Reading in an Age of Distraction.  Jacobs is a professor of English at Wheaton College in Illinois.  Despite that, he writes and thinks very well.  Jacobs takes on all of the wretched scolds who tell us we need to be reading “better” stuff and argues, instead, that we need to rediscover the joy of reading for the joy of reading.

One of Jacobs’ most compelling sections discussed the widespread feeling, even among hard-reading academics, that we’ve lost the ability to read anything for more than about five minutes.  It made me feel good to know that I wasn’t alone in that observation.  He has convinced me to try a Kindle which, he argues, has renewed in him the habit of reading which such passion that you sink into the book and time fades away.  The Kindle’s design makes it possible, he believes, to feel like we’re connected while at the same time disconnecting.

Regardless of what you buy or who you share our link with, thanks and thanks again!

In January, we’ll look at two interesting funds, the new HNP Growth & Preservation (HNPKX) which brings a “managed futures” ethos to other asset classes and Value Line Asset Allocation (VLAAX) which has one of the most intriguing performance patterns I’ve seen.  In addition, we’ll ring in the New Year by looking at the implication of following the “Where to Invest 2011” articles that were circulating a year ago.

Wishing you great joy in the upcoming holiday season,

 

David

 

 

November 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to David’s Market Timing Newsletter!  You’ll remember that, at the beginning of October, I pointed out that (1) you hated stocks and (2) you should be buying them.  One month and one large rally – small caps are up 17% for the month through 10/27 while large caps added 12% – later, I celebrate the fact that I’ve now tied Abby Joseph Cohen for great market timing calls (one each).  Unlike AJC, I promise never to do it again.

October brought more than a sizzling rally.  It brought record breaking heat to the U.K. and record-breaking snowfalls to New York and New England.  To my students and colleagues at Augustana College, it brought a blaze of color, cool mornings, warm afternoons, the end of fall trimester and a chance to slow down and savor the dance of the leaves.

Between the oppression of summer and the ferocity of winter, it’s good to have a few days in which to remember to breathe and celebrate life.  One of the pleasures of working at a small college is the opportunity to engage in that celebration with really bright, inquisitive kids.

The Observer’s Honor Roll, Unlike Any Other

Last month, in the spirit of FundAlarm’s “three-alarm” fund list, we presented the Observer’s first Roll Call of the Wretched.  Those were funds that managed to trail their peers for the past one-, three-, five- and ten-year periods, with special commendation for the funds that added high expenses and high volatility to the mix.

This month, I’d like to share the Observer’s Honor Roll of consistently bearable funds.  Most such lists start with a faulty assumption: that high returns are intrinsically good.

Wrong!

While high returns can be a good thing, the practical question is how those returns are obtained.  If they’re the product of alternately sizzling and stone cold performances, the high returns are worse than meaningless: they’re a deadly lure to hapless investors and advisors.  Investors hate losing money much more than they love making it.  One of Morningstar’s most intriguing statistics are its “investor return” numbers, which attempt to see how the average investor in a fund did (rather than how the hypothetical buy-and-hold-for-ten-years investor did).  The numbers are daunting: Fidelity Leverage Company (FLVCX) made nearly 13% a year for the past decade while its average investor lost money over that same period.

In light of that, the Observer asked a simple question: which mutual funds are never terrible?  In constructing the Honor Roll, we did not look at whether a fund ever made a lot of money.  We looked only at whether a fund could consistently avoid being rotten.  Our logic is this: investors are willing to forgive the occasional sub-par year, but they’ll flee in terror in the face of a horrible one.  That “sell low” – occasionally “sell low and stuff the proceeds in a zero-return money fund for five years” – is our most disastrous response.

We looked for no-load, retail funds which, over the past ten years, have never finished in the bottom third of their peer groups.   And while we weren’t screening for strong returns, we ended up with a list of funds that consistently provided them anyway.

U.S. stock funds

Name Style Assets (Millions)
Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Maximum Term Large Blend 750
Manning & Napier Tax Managed Large Blend 50
New Century Capital Large Blend 100
New Covenant Growth Large Blend 700
Schwab MarketTrack All Equity Large Blend 500
T. Rowe Price Capital Opportunities Large Blend 300
Tocqueville Large Blend 500
Vanguard Morgan Growth Large Growth 7,600
Satuit Capital U.S. Emerging Companies Small Growth 150

International stock funds

HighMark International Opportunities Large Blend 200
New Century International Large Blend 50
Laudus International MarketMasters Large Growth 1,600
Thomas White International Large Value 500
Vanguard International Value I Large Value 6,000

 

Blended asset funds

Fidelity Puritan Moderate Hybrid 17,600
FPA Crescent Moderate Hybrid 6,500
T. Rowe Price Balanced Moderate Hybrid 2,850
T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Balanced Moderate Hybrid 1,500
Vanguard STAR Moderate Hybrid 12,950
Fidelity Freedom 2020 Target Date 16,100
Permanent Portfolio Conservative Hybrid 15,900
T. Rowe Price Personal Strat Income Conservative Hybrid 900

 

Specialty funds

T. Rowe Price Media & Telecomm Communications 1,750
T. Rowe Price Global Technology Technology 450

 

All of these funds were rated as three stars, or better, by Morningstar (10/31/11).  Almost all took on average levels of risk, and almost all were above average performers in bear markets.  All of them had positive Sharpe ratios; that is, all of them more than rewarded investors for the risks they bore.  While we don’t offer this as a “buy” list, much less a “must have” list, investors looking for solid, long-term performance without huge risks might start their due diligence here.

Trust, But Verify

My first-year students have a child-like faith in The Internet.  They’re quite sure that the existence of the ‘net means that they can access all human knowledge and achieve unparalleled wisdom. One percipient freshman wrote that,

“As technology becomes more sophisticated, developing the capacity to help us make moral and ethical choices as well as more pragmatic decisions, what we call human wisdom will reach new levels” (quoting Marc Prensky, Digital Wisdom, 2009 – I’ll note that the term “claptrap” comes to mind whenever I read the Prensky essay) . . . our mind limits our wisdom, meaning that our daily distractions are holding us back from how intelligent we can really be. Technology however, fills those gaps with its vast memory. Technology is helping us advance our memory, helping us advance our creativity and imagination, and it is fixing our flaws . . . our digital wisdom is doing nothing but getting vaster.  Prensky makes a lot of good arguments as to why we are not in fact the stupidest generation to have walked this Earth, and I couldn’t agree more.

 

“Digital wisdom” remains a bit elusive, if only because of flaws in the digits that originally enter the . . . well, digits, into the databases.

There’s no clearer example of egregious error without a single human question than in the portfolio reports for Manning & Napier Dividend Focus (MNDFX).  Focus remains almost fully-invested in common stocks, with 2-4% in a money market.  I used the Observer’s incredibly helpful Falcon’s Eye fund search to track down all the major reports of MNDFX’s portfolio.  I discovered that, as of July 31 2011:

$65 million was held in a money market, and $47 million was in stocks.  That would be a 58% cash stake.  Source: Manning & Napier month-end holdings, July 31 2011.

That 61% of the fund’s assets were shorting cash and that 94% was long cash, for a net cash stake of 33%.  Source: Morningstar.

That 100.28% of the fund’s assets were invested in two Dreyfus Money Market funds.  The top ten holdings combined contributed 127% of the fund’s assets.  Good news: the money market funds had returned 10.5% each in the first seven months of 2011.  Source: Yahoo Finance.

That the fund’s top holding was one Dreyfus money market (94% of assets), the fund’s cash Hybrid must be 33%. Source: USA Today.  U.S. News and MSN both agree.

SmartMoney’s undated portfolio report shows 3.9% cash.  The Wall Street Journal’s 8/31/11 portfolio lists the Dreyfus fund at 3.02% of the portfolio.

The most striking thing is the invisibility of the error.  No editor caught it, no data specialist questioned it, no writer looked further.  It seems inevitable that given the sheer volume of information out there, you owe it to yourselves to check – and check again – on the reliability of the information you’ve received before putting your money down.

Two Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s new fund:

Manning & Napier Dividend Focus (MNDFX): Manning & Napier is likely the best management team you’ve never heard of.  Focusing on dividends is likely the best strategy to follow.  And this fund gives you the lowest cost way to combine the two.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Pinnacle Value (PVFIX): John Deysher does micro-caps right.  Sensible, skeptical, and cash-heavy, Pinnacle Value offers a remarkably smooth version of the micro-cap ride.

Small Funds Doing Well, and Doing Good

Saturna Capital has been recognized by the Mutual Fund Education Alliance for its philanthropic efforts.  On October 27th, they (and American Century Investments) received MFEA’s Community Investment Award for 2011.  Saturna, which advises the Sextant and Amana funds, pledged over $2.5 million toward construction of the St. Paul’s Academy Upper School.  Saturna’s leadership galvanized other constituencies in the Bellingham, Washington, community to support the project.  Their efforts played a key role in securing $6 million in bank financing and over $1 million in private donations.

The past two winners were Aberdeen Asset Management (2010) and Calvert Investments (2009).

Matthews Asia shared the award for best retail communications with Saturna.  Both Saturna’s Market Navigator newsletter and Matthews’ collection of Asia-focused newsletters, including the flagship Asia Insight, were recognized for their excellent design and content.   This is Saturna’s 15th communication award since 2008.

Northern Funds made a series of often dramatic reductions in the fees it charges to retail investors.  They accomplished that by raising the expense waivers on three dozen funds, effective January 1, 2012. The most striking reductions include lopping 45 basis points of the expenses charged by their Emerging Markets Equity Index fund – a drop of more than half, making it less expensive than Vanguard’s offering – and 35 basis points on the Global Sustainability Index.  None of the Northern indexes will charge more than 0.30% after the changes.  Expenses on Northern’s money market funds will be cut by 10 basis points, from 0.45% to 0.35%.

Morningstar’s Halloween Tricks and Treats

Russel Kinnel, Morningstar’s director of stuff, offered up a set of “portfolio-eating zombie funds” as part of his annual Halloween review (“Yikes … These Funds Have Been Bludgeoned….” 10/31/11). He focused simply on the greatest year-to-date losses, excluding leveraged index funds.  The most ghoulish of the creatures:

  1. YieldQuest Core Equity (YQCEX), down 56%.  YieldQuest, with whose adviser I had a cranky exchange when I first profiled these funds, earns a Special Dishonorable Mention for fielding three funds, in three different asset classes, each of which has lost 40% or more this year.  The other funds place 4th and 5th on the list of losers: 4. YieldQuest Total Return Bond (YQTRX) and 5. YieldQuest Tax Exempt Bond (YQTEX).
  2. Birmiwal Oasis (BIRMX), down 55%.  Feeling a bit playful, Mr. Kinnel offers “Lesson one: Don’t invest in a fund that sounds like a tiki bar.”
  3. The USX China (HPCCX), down 54% in 2011 and 14% annually for the past five years.

At #6 on Kinnel’s list is Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX), down 35%, “aided” in part by a 7% expense ratio.  Apex also qualified for the Observer’s Rollcall of the Wretched (October 2011) for finishing in the bottom 25% of its peer group for the past 1, 3, 5 and 10 years plus having above average risk and high expenses.  Our happiest note about Apex:

The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $293,225.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 8% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

Tenth on the list is Legg Mason Capital Management Opportunity (LMOPX), down 29%.  Another Roll Call of the Wretched honoree, I noted of LMOPX, “You know you’ve got problems when trailing 91% of your peers represents one of your better recent performances.”  Alarmed at the accusation, the fund promptly settled down and now trails all of its peers (through 10/27/2011).

At the end of September, though, he offered up a basket of autumn treats: his nominees for the best funds launched in the past three years.  Kinnel highlighted 19 funds, the five which are “most ready to buy” are:

Dodge & Cox Global Stock (DODWX), “a fine bet right now.”  Low expenses, great family.

PIMCO EqS Pathfinder (PTHDX), headed by Mutual Series veterans Anne Gudefin and Chuck Lahr.

DoubleLine Total Return Bond (DBLTX).  His court trial is over and he won, but might still need to pay millions.  The one thing that the trial does make clear is that the very talented Mr. Gundlach is not a good person.  The evidence at trial paints him as an egomaniac (“I am the “A” team”), anxious to be sure no one else detracted from his glory (he had TCW meticulously remove all references to his co-manager from press mentions of his Morningstar Manager of the Year award).  Evidence not permitted at trial dealt with sexual liaisons with co-workers, drugs and porn.  I’m sure he’s as talented as he thinks he is (as for that matter is Mr. Berkowitz), but it’s hard to imagine a world in which I’d trust him with my money.

American Funds International Growth and Income (IGAAX) is “a similar story to Dodge & Cox Global.”

Hotchkis and Wiley High Yield (HWHAX) offers two former PIMCO managers running a small, good fund.

Among the funds that made both Mr. Kinnel’s list and were profiled at the Observer or at FundAlarm: Akre Focus (AKREX), Tweedy Browne Global Value II Currency Unhedged (TBCUX) and Evermore Global Value (EVGBX).

Launch alert:

Motley Fool Epic Voyage Fund launched on November 1, 2011.  It’s an international small-cap value offering, managed by the same folks who run Motley Fool Independence (FOOLX) and Great America (TMFGX) funds.  FOOLX is a global equities fund, Great America is smaller-cap domestic.  Both are above-average performers and both tend to invest broadly between market caps and styles.  $3000 investment minimum and 1.35% expenses, after waivers.

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities (GPGOX) and Grandeur Peak International Opportunities (GPIOX) both launched October 17, 2011.  The funds are currently available directly from Grandeur Peak (http://www.grandeurpeakglobal.com or 1.855.377.PEAK), or through Schwab or Scottrade. President Eric Huefner reports that, “We expect to be available at Fidelity, Pershing, E*Trade, and various other platforms within the next few weeks.”  They’re also working with TD Ameritrade, but apparently that’s going really slow.

Former Wasatch managers Robert Gardiner and Blake Walker are attempting to build on their past success at Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX) and Wasatch International Opportunities (WAIOX).  My August story, Grandeur Peaks and the road less traveled, details the magnitude (hint: considerable) of those successes.

Both funds launched with $2.00 per share prices, while the industry standard is $10.00.  Folks on the Observer’s discussion board noted the anomaly and speculated that it might be a strategy for masking volatility.  At $2.00, another change under 0.5% gets reported as “zero.”  Mr. Huefner offered a more benign explanation: “that’s what we always did at Wasatch and since we’re all from Wasatch, we decided to do it again.”

Wasatch’s rationale was symbolic: since their original offerings were all micro- to small-cap funds which would need to close with still-small asset bases, they thought the $2.00 NAV nicely reinforced the message “we’re different, we’re the small fund guys.”

Briefly Noted . . .

RiverPark Short-Term High-Yield (RPHYX) was the subject of a very positive Forbes article, entitled “For fixed-income investors, another way to beat Treasurys” (October 21 2011).  Forbes was struck by the same risk minimization that we were: “the principal, and interest payments, are virtually guaranteed.  It might not always work. But investors who can sleep at night knowing they’re holding junk bonds might be better off than investors who are barely beating inflation in the Treasury and money markets.”  The fund’s assets under management are around $25 million, up from $20 million in summer.  Almost three-quarters of that money comes from institutional investors.

T. Rowe Price Emerging Europe and Mediterranean is trying to become T. Rowe Price Emerging Europe.  Two factors are driving the change.  First, Israel was been reclassified as a “developed” market which meant that the fund eliminated its investments there.  Second, it had only limited exposure to Turkey and Egypt, which made the “and Mediterranean” designation somewhat misleading.  If shareholders (the sheep) approve, the change will become effective in March, 2012.  The fund’s manager and wretched recent record (up 15.5% annually over the past 10 years, but down 4% annually over the past five) both remain.

Meet “the New Charlie.”  Having dispatched “my Charlie” Fernandez, Bruce Berkowitz found a Fred, instead.  Fred Fraenkel joins the firm as Chief Research Officer for whom Job Number One is . . . research?  Not so much.  “As our Chief Research Officer, Fred’s first task is to find ways to better communicate with clients as to which Fairholme’s best is yet to come,” says Berkowitz.

Effective on October 18, nine Old Mutual funds disappeared into a bunch of Touchstone funds.  These include Old Mutual Analytic U.S. Long/Short Fund which melted into Touchstone U.S. Long/Short and Old Mutual Barrow Hanley Value disappeared into Touchstone Value.

Eaton Vance Global Macro Absolute Return (EAGMX) reopened to new investors on Oct. 19, 2011.  The Morningstar analyst, perhaps bewilderingly, says: “Eaton Vance Global Macro Absolute Return is like the duck on smooth water whose hidden legs are pedaling furiously under the surface.”  The data says: steadily deteriorating performance and in the basement, overall.

Eaton Vance Equity Asset Hybrid (EEAAX) will liquidate at the end of December, 2011.

Harbor Funds’ Board of Trustees announced on Halloween Day that Harbor Small Company Value Fund (HISMX) will be liquidated (and dissolved!  What a Halloween-ish image) by year’s end.  HISMX was a perfectly solid little fund (top 10% of its peer group over the past three years) that never managed to become economically sustainable.  Harbor’s ongoing need to underwrite the expenses of a $10 million fund made its death inevitable.  The Board’s assertion that this was in the best interests of the fund’s shareholders, who were holding a good investment for which Harbor offers no obvious alternative, is polite drivel.  (Thanks to TheShadow for quickly noticing, and posting, the announcement.)

In closing . . .

A million thanks to the folks who have been supporting the Observer, whether through direct contributions or by using our Amazon link.  Special thanks for the ongoing support of our Informal Economist and John S, and to the new contributors this month.  I’ve been a putz about getting out thank-you notes, but they’re coming!

As you begin planning holiday shopping, please do use – and share – the link.  It costs nothing and takes no effort, but does make a real difference.

We’re hoping that by December you’ll actually see that difference.  The Observer actually has a secret identity.  Buried beneath our quiet exterior is a really attractive, highly-functional WordPress site waiting to get out.  We haven’t had the resources before to exploit those capabilities.  But now, with the combined efforts of Anya Z., a friend of the Observer who has redesigned the site, and Chip and her dedicated staff, we’re close to rolling out a new look.  Clean, functional, and easier to use: all made possible by your moral, intellectual and financial support.

And so, as we approach the season of Thanksgiving, here’s a sincere thanks and “see ya!” to one and all.

David

October 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to fall.  I know you’re not happy.  The question is: are you buying?  You said you were going to.  “Blood in the streets.  Panic in the markets.”  As wretched as conditions are, there’s reason to pause:

By Morningstar’s calculation, every sector of the market is now selling at a discount to fair value.  Most are discounted by 20% and only two defensive sectors (utilities and consumer defensives) are even close to fair value.

Also by their calculation, the bluest chip stocks (those with “wide moats”) are priced at an 18% discount, nearly identical to the discount on junk stocks (20%).

GMO’s most recent seven-year asset class return forecasts (as of 08/31/11), have US High Quality, International Large Caps and Emerging Markets Stocks set for real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) returns of 5.8 – 7.2% per year – very close to the “normal” long-term returns on the stock market.

It’s hard and it may turn out to be insane, but you have to ask: is this the time to be running away from, or toward, the sound of gunfire?

Why Google Flu Should Be Worrying the Fund Industry Sick

The flu is A Bad Thing, for flu sufferers and society alike.  Unpleasant, expensive and potentially fatal.  If you want to find out how bad the flu is in any particular part of the country, you’ve got two choices:

contact the Centers for Disease Control and receive information that tells you about the severity of the problem a week or two ago, or

check Google Flu Trends – which reports real-time on where people are searching flu-related terms – to get an accurate read, instantly.

It turns out that when people are interested in a topic, they Google it (who knew?).  As their interest grows, the number of searches rises.  As it ebbs, search activity dries up.  Google can document trends in particular topics either worldwide, by country, region or city.  Research on the method’s usefulness as an early warning indicator, conducted jointly by researchers from Google and the Centers for Disease Control, was published in Nature.

The funny thing is that interest in flu isn’t the only thing Google can track.  For any phenomenon which is important to huge numbers of people, Google can generate a seven-year chart of the changing level of people’s interest in topic.

Which brings us to mutual funds or, more narrowly, the apparent collapse of public interest in the topic.  Here’s the continually updated Google trend chart for mutual funds:

If you want to play, you can locate the search here. There’s a second Google trend analysis here, which generated a very similar graph but different secondary search options.  (It’s geeky cool.  You’re welcome.)

That trend line reflects an industry that has lost the public’s attention.  If you’ve wondered how alienated the public is, you could look at fund flows –much of which is captive money – or you could look at a direct measure of public engagement.   The combination of scandal, cupidity, ineptitude and turmoil – some abetted by the industry – may have punched an irreparable hole in industry’s prospects.

And no, the public interest hasn’t switched to ETFs.  Add that as a second search term and you’ll see how tiny their draw is.

The problem of Alarming Funds and the professionals who sustain them isn’t merely a problem for their shareholders.  It’s a problem for an entire industry and for the essential discipline which that industry must support.  Americans must save and invest, but the sort of idiocy detailed in our next story erodes the chance that will ever happen.

Now That’s Alarming!

FundAlarm maintained a huge database of wretched funds.  Some were merely bad (or Alarming), some were astoundingly bad (Three-Alarm) and some were astoundingly bad pretty much forever (the Most Alarming, Three-Alarm funds).

While we don’t have the resources to maintain a Database of Dismal, we do occasionally scan the underside of the fund universe to identify the most regrettable funds.  This month’s scan (run 09/02/2011) looked at funds that have finished in the bottom one-fourth of their peer groups for the year so far.  And for the preceding 12 months, three years, five years and ten years.  These aren’t merely “below average.”  They’re so far below average they can hardly see “mediocre” from where they are.

There are 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $70 million.  Since managers love to brag about the consistency of their performance, here are the most consistently awful funds that have over a billion in assets:

Morningstar
Category
Total
Assets
($ mil)
Fidelity Magellan Large Growth

17,441

Vanguard Asset Allocation Moderate Allocation

8,568

Lord Abbett Affiliated “A” Large Value

7,078

Putnam Diversified Income “A” Multisector Bond

5,101

DFA Two-Year Global Fixed-Income World Bond

4,848

Eaton Vance National Municipal Muni National Long

4,576

Bernstein Tax-Managed Internat’l Foreign Large Blend

4,084

Legg Mason Value “C” Large Blend

2,986

Federated Municipal Ultrashort Muni Short

2,921

BBH Broad Market Intermediate-Term Bond

2,197

Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid-Cap Growth

2,082

Legg Mason ClearBridge Fundamental “A” Large Blend

1,879

Vantagepoint Growth Large Growth

1,754

AllianceBernstein International Foreign Large Blend

1,709

Hartford US Government Secs HL Intermediate Government

1,205

Legg Mason Opportunity “C” Mid-Cap Value

1,055

69,484

September saw dramatic moves involving the two largest mutts.

Fidelity Magellan

Fidelity removed Harry Lange as manager of Fidelity Magellan (FMAGX).  Once the largest, and long the most famous, fund in the world, Magellan seems cursed.  It’s lost over $100 billion in assets under management and has chewed up and spit out several of Fidelity’s best and brightest managers.  Those include:

Jeffrey Vinik (1992-96): Vinik was a gun-slinging manager who guided Magellan to 17% annualized returns.  In late ’95 and ’96, he made a market-timing move – selling tech, buying bonds – that infuriated the Magellan faithful.  He inherited a $20 billion fund, left a $50 billion fund (in a huff), launched a hedge fund with made 50% per year, then closed the fund in 2000.  Presumably bored, he launched another hedge fund which has half its money in ETFs and bought two professional sports franchises.

Robert Stansky (1996-2005): Stansky, a former Fidelity Growth Company (FDGRX) star, inherited a $50 billion fund and – after a decade – left a $52 billion fund behind.  Those end points mask Magellan’s huge growth to $110 billion in the late 90s and subsequent collapse.  Stansky transformed Magellan from a mid-cap to a mega-cap fund, which made sense since his prior fund, a large-growth creature, so substantially crushed the competition (13% annually at Gro Co to 10% for the peer group).  A hopeful start ended with a series of weak years and Stansky opted for retirement.  He surfaced briefly as part of an abandoned plan to launch a series of Fidelity multi-manager funds.

Harry Lange (2005-11): Lange ran Fidelity Capital Appreciation (FDCAX) for a decade before taking on Magellan, and ran Fidelity Advisor Small Cap (FSCTX) for about seven years.   Described by Morningstar as “one of Fidelity’s very best managers,” FDCAX outpaced its peers by almost 50% over his tenure.  Lange inherited a $52 billion fund and left a $17 billion one.  Early in his tenure, he dumped Stansky’s blue chip names for smaller, riskier names.  That strategy worked brilliantly for three years, and then flopped badly enough that Lange left with the fund trailing 96% of its peers over his last five years.

And now it’s Jeff Feingold’s turn.  Like all the rest, Feingold is a star.  Ran a smaller fund.  Ran it well.  And now has a chance to run Magellan into . . . well, that is the cursed question, isn’t it?  Frankly, I can’t imagine any reason to put my money at risk here.

Vanguard Asset Allocation

Morningstar said: “This fund has merit for investors who are seeking an asset-allocation vehicle for the long haul…” (Analyst Report, “This mutual fund takes full advantage of its flexibility,” 2/22/11).

Vanguard, talking plainly, said “no, it doesn’t.”  On September 30, Vanguard fired the fund’s long-time managers and announced a plan to turn the firm’s most active fund into its most passive one.  Since launch, VPAAX moved its assets between three asset classes and had the ability to park 100% of the assets into any one of the classes.  Effective October 1, the fund will move toward a static, passively-managed 60/40 stock/bond split.  By year’s end, the firm will seek approval to merge it into Vanguard Balanced Index Fund (VBINX).

Just when you thought it couldn’t get any worse

I then refined the search with the Observer’s “insult to injury” criteria: funds that combined wretched performance with above-average to high risk and above average fees.  The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $293,225.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 8% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

The bad news: lots of people trust Bill Miller with their money.   With over $4 billion still tied up in his Legg Mason Value (LMVTX) and Legg Mason Opportunity (LMOPX), Miller has done a lot of damage.  Value spent four of the past five years at the bottom of the large-core heap (that is, it has trailed at least 93% of its peers in each of those years) and clocks in with an annualized loss of 2.3% for the past decade.   In a bizarre vote of confidence, the Board of Legg Mason closed its American Leading Companies fund and rolled all of the assets into Value.   The fund responded by losing 16.75% of that money over the next four months (rather worse than the market or its pees).   Morningstar’s bold judgment:  “We like the management but can’t recommend this bold offering as a core holding.” (emphasis mine)

The complete Roll Call of Wretched:

Alger Mid Cap Growth “B” (AMCGX) The fund is managed by president Dan Chung.  Morningstar has rarely been clearer about a fund.   They turned negative in 2003, warning about erratic performance, scandal, a lack of focus, and excessive risk.  Seven analysts have each, in turn, affirmed that judgment.   They’re right.
Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) As noted above, this is Mr. Bhirud’s retirement account
Eaton Vance AR Municipal IncomeEaton Vance GA Municipal IncomeEaton Vance PA Municipal IncomeEaton Vance TN Municipal IncomeEaton Vance VA Municipal Income Adam A. Weigold has run all of these single-state funds for the past four years.Of the “independent” trustees, only one has made any investment in either of the two national muni funds, though they do receive $230,000/year from Eaton Vance and several are old enough that a muni fund makes good sense.
Eaton Vance Nat’l Ltd Maturity Municipal Income William H. Ahern, in his 14th year, is old enough to invest in this fund.  And smart enough not to.  Neither the manager nor any of the trustees has a penny here.
Eaton Vance National Municipal Income Thomas M. Metzold is celebrating 20 years of futility here.  In all that time he’s managed to invest over $1,000,000 in other Eaton Vance funds but not a nickel here.
JHancock High Yield “B” (TSHYX) Here’s the formula: go from “erratic” and “mediocre” to “finish in the top 3% or the bottom 3% of your peer group every year for the past six”.
Legg Mason Capital Management Value (LMVTX) After trailing 99% of its peers in 2006, 2007 and 2008, the fund has rallied and trails only 90% over the past three years.  To his credit, Mr. Miller is heavily invested in both these dogs.
Legg Mason Capital Management Opportunity (LMOPX) You know you’ve got problems when trailing 91% of your peers represents one of your better recent performances.
ProFunds Biotechnology UltraSector (BIPIX) The number of top decile finishes (2003, 04, 05 08) doesn’t offset the bottom decile ones (2001, 02, 06, 07, 09, 11).  Oddity is 2010 – just a bit below average.  Confused investors who lost 3.1 while the fund made 6.3%
ProFunds UltraJapan (UJPIX) “Ultra” is always a bad sign for investors intending to hold for more than, oh, a day.
ProFunds UltraSector Mobile Telecom (WCPIX) Yep.  See above.
Stonebridge Small Cap Growth (SBAGX) They charge 4.4% annually, lose 4.1% annually and trail their peers by 4.4% annually.  Do you suppose expenses are weighing on performance?
Tanaka Growth (TGRFX) Eeeeeeeee!  Tanaka bought the remaining assets of the Embarcadero funds in November, 2010.  You might recall that Embarcadero was the renamed incarnation of the Van Wagoner funds, each of which managed a long series of bottom 1% performances before their deaths.

Trust Us: We’re Professionals, Part One

The poor schmoos invested in these wretched funds didn’t get there alone.  They had professional assistance.   52% of all the funds in Morningstar’s database carry a sales load or other arrangement designed to compensate the financial professional who advised you to buy that fund.  By contrast 88% of all large awful funds and 70% of roll call of the wretched funds are designed to be sold by financial professionals.  (I’m confident that none of the investors or advisors in these wretches are Observer readers.)

Trust Us: We’re Professionals, Part Two

Every mutual fund is overseen by a Board of Trustees, who is responsible for making sure that the fund operates in the best interests of its shareholders.  By law, a majority of those trustees must be independent of the management company.  And, by law, the trustees must explain – publicly, in print, annually – their decision about whether to keep or fire the manager.  Those discussions appear in the fund’s annual or semi-annual report.

So how do these independent trustees justify keeping the same losers atop these truly bad funds every blessed year?  To find out, I read the Boards’ justifications for each of these funds for the past couple years.  The typical strategy: “yes, but…”  As in, “yes, the fund is bad but…”  Boards typically

  1. Go to great lengths to show how careful they’ve been
  2. Don’t mention how bad the fund has
  3. And find one bright spot – any bright spot – as grounds for ratifying the contract and retaining their profitable spots on the board.

Here’s the Legg Mason Opportunity board at work:

The Board received and reviewed performance information for the Fund and for a group of funds selected by Lipper, an independent provider of investment company data. The Board was provided with a description of the methodology Lipper used to determine the similarity of the Fund with the funds included in the Performance Universe. The Lipper data also included a comparison of the Fund’s performance to a benchmark index selected by Lipper. The Board also received from the independent contract consultant analysis of the risk adjusted performance of the Fund compared with its corresponding Lipper benchmark index. The Board also reviewed performance information for the Fund showing rolling returns based upon trailing performance. In addition, the Directors noted that they also had received and discussed at periodic intervals information comparing the Fund’s performance to that of its benchmark index.

So, they’ve gotten a huge amount of data and have intimate knowledge of how the data was compiled.

The Board noted the Fund’s underperformance during the 3, 5 and 10 years ended June 30, 2010 and noted more recent favorable performance . . .

You’ll notice that they don’t say “The Board noted that the fund has trailed 99-100% of its peers for every trailing standard period from one to ten years.”  But it has.  Back to the board:

which resulted in first quintile performance for the one-year ended June 30, 2010.

There’s the ray of light.  The Board might have – but didn’t – note that this was a rebound from the fund’s horrendous performance in the preceding twelve months.

The Board further considered the Adviser’s commitment to, and past history of, continual improvement and enhancement of its investment process, including steps recently taken by the Adviser to improve performance and risk awareness. As a result, the Board concluded that it was in the best interest of the Fund to approve renewal of the Management and Advisory Agreements.

Each Trustee receives $132,500 annually from Legg Mason for the part-time job of “somber ratifier.”

The Alger Board of Wobblies Trustees simply hid Alger Mid Cap Growth in the crowd:

. . . the performance for the near term (periods of 1 year or less through 6/30/10) of some of the Funds (Small Cap, Growth Opportunities, Convertible) generally surpassed (sometimes by a wide margin) or matched their peer group and benchmark, while others (Mid Cap, SMid Cap, Health Sciences) generally fell short (again, sometimes by a wide margin) of those measures, and the performance of still others (Large Cap, Capital Appreciation, Balanced) was mixed . . . (emphasis added)

The Board does not, anywhere, acknowledge the fund’s above average risks.  Of the high expenses they say:

All of the Funds’ expense ratios, except those of Health Sciences Fund, exceeded their peer median. The Trustees determined that such information should be taken into account . . . [for the funds as a group] the profit margin in each case was not unacceptable.

And still, without confronting the fact that Mid-Cap Growth trails 90% of its peers (technically, 87-95% depending on which share class you’re looking at) over the past one, three, five and ten years, “The Board determined that the Funds’ overall performance was acceptable.”

Alger’s Board members receive between $74,000 – 88,000 for their work.  None, by the way, has any investment in this fund.

The most bizarre judgment, though, was rendered by the Board of the Tanaka Growth Fund:

The Board next considered the investment performance of the Fund and the Advisor’s performance.  The Board generally approved of the Fund’s performance.  The Board noted with approval the Advisor’s ongoing efforts to maintain such consistent investment discipline.

Tanaka trails 95%, 97%, 99%, 97% and 96% of its peers (in order) for 2011 YTD and the past 1, 3, 5 and 10 year periods.  Consistent, indeed.

Mutual Fund Math: Fun Facts to Figure

Folks on the Observer discussion board occasionally wonder, “how many funds are there?” The best answer to which is, “uh-huh.”

There are 21,705 funds listed in Morningstar’s database, as of 09/30/11.  But that’s not the answer since many of the funds are simply different share classes of the same product.  The Alger Mid Cap Growth Fund, lamented above, comes in 10 different packages.  Many of the American Funds (for example, American Funds AMCAP) come with 18 different share classes.

Ask the database to report only “distinct portfolios,” and the total drops to 6628.  That includes neither closed-end nor exchange-traded funds.

The average no-load fund now has 2.7 share classes (often Retail, Institutional, Advisor).  The average load-bearing fund has 4.1 classes.

Investing as monkey business

Mental Floss, a bi-monthly magazine which promises to “help you feel smart again,” declared September/October 2011 to be their money issue.  It’s a wonderful light read (did you know that the symbol for the British pound was derived from the Latin for “pound,” since one pound of silver was used to strike 240 pound coins?) that featured one fascinating article on monkeys as investors.  Researchers, interested in the question of whether our collective financial incompetence is rooted in genetics, actually taught a colony of monkeys to use money in order to buy food.

Among the findings: monkeys showed precisely the same level of loss aversion that humans do.  In rough terms, both species find losses about three times more painful than they find gains pleasurable.  As a result, the monkey pursued risk-averse strategies in allocating their funds.

Despite the pain, we, in general, do not.  Instead, we pursue risk-averse strategies after allocating our funds: we tend to buy painfully risky investments (often at their peak) and then run off howling (generally at their nadir).

Would you like some pasta with your plans?

The Wall Street Journal recently profiled investment advisors who publish weekly, monthly or quarterly newsletters as a way to keep their clients informed, focused and reassured (“Keys to Making the Write Investments,” 09/19/11).  Among the firms highlighted is Milestones Financial Planning of Mayfield, Kentucky whose owner (Johanna Turner) is a long-time reader of, and supporter of, both FundAlarm and the Observer.  In addition to her monthly “mutual fund find” feature, Johanna shares recipes (mostly recently for vegetarian spaghetti – which would be all the better with a side of meatballs).  Her most recent newsletter, and recipe, is here.

Two Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s new fund:

Mairs & Power Small Cap (MSCFX): Mairs & Power rolls out a new fund about, oh, every half century or so.  Their last launch before this was 1961.  The firm specializes in long-term, low-turnover, low-flash investing.  Their newest fund, a pure extension of the Mairs & Power Growth Fund discipline, is sure to appeal to fans of The Newhart Show, fly-tying, the Duluth Trading Company and other sensible, sensibly-paced pursuits.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

SouthernSun Small Cap Fund (SSSFX): measured as a small-cap value fund, SSSFX has been one of the two top in the field lately.  But it’s actually more of a smid-cap core fund.  And, surprisingly, it’s also one of the top two funds there, too.  With an incredibly compact, high-quality portfolio and low-turnover style, it’s surprising so few have heard of it.

Launch alert:

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities and Grandeur Peak International Opportunitiesboth launch October 17, 2011.

Former Wasatch managers Robert Gardiner and Blake Walker are attempting to build on their past success with  Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX) and Wasatch International Opportunities (WAIOX).  My August story, Grandeur Peaks and the road less traveled, details the magnitude (hint: considerable) of those successes.

Briefly Noted . . .

SEC time travel continues.  The SEC’s current filings page for September 6 contained 62 prospectus filings – of which precisely two are for September 6.  The other 60 had originally been filed as early as October 14, 2010.  Still no explanation for why “today’s filings” include 14 month old filings.

Effective November 4, Nakoma Absolute Return (NARFX) will become Schooner Global Absolute Return Fund.   Very few details are available, but since the change did not require shareholder approval, it seems likely that the Nakoma team and objectives will – for better and worse – remain in place.

In another sign of the direction in which the marketing winds are blowing, Jensen Fund (JENSX) is changing its name to Jensen Quality Growth Fund.

Federated Balanced Allocation (BAFAX) will merge into Federated Asset Allocation (FSTBX) on Sept. 30, 2012.

Value Line Convertible (VALCX) will merge into Value Line Income & Growth (VALIX) on Dec. 16, 2011.

GMO will liquidate GMO Tobacco-Free Core Fund (GMTCX) at the end of December, 2011 and GMO Tax-Managed U.S. Equities Fund (GTMUX) at the end of October, 2011.

Munder Asset Allocation Balanced (MUBAX) will liquidate on Oct. 14.

Invesco Van Kampen Global Tactical Asset Allocation (VGTAX) will liquidate on Oct. 28.  Despite an exceptionally solid record and an exceptionally trendy name, the fund drew only $21 million in assets in just under three years and so it’s a deadster.

Four small Highmark Funds (did you even know there were Highmark funds?) will be merged out of existence in October, 2011.  The dead funds walking are HighMark Fundamental Equity (HMFAX), HighMark Small Cap Value (HMSCX), HighMark Diversified Equity Allocation (HEAAX) and HighMark Income Plus Allocation (HMPAX).

Allianz RCM Global Resources (ARMAX) is now Allianz RCM Global Commodity Equity.  Alec Patterson joined as co-manager.

In closing . . .

Dwindling consumer confidence is reflected in the Observer’s Amazon revenue, which drifted down by a third from August to September.  If you’ve looking to a particularly compelling purchase, consider picking up a copy of Baumeister and Tierney’s Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest Human Strength (Penguin, 2011).  Roy Baumeister is an Eminent Scholar (really, that’s part of his official title) doing research in social psychology at Florida State.  John Tierney is a very skilled science journalist with The New York Times.  I first heard about Baumeister’s research in a story on National Public Radio, picked up the book and have found it pretty compelling.  Here’s a précis of their argument:

  • Willpower is central to success in life,
  • You have a limited supply of it, so that exercising will in one area (quitting smoking) leaves you powerless to cope with another (controlling your diet) but
  • Your stock of willpower can be quickly and substantially increased through exercise.

The implications of this research, from how we invest to how we teach our children, are enormous.  This is a particularly readable way into that literature.

That said, a number of people contributed to the Observer through our PayPal link in September and I’d especially like to thank Old_Joe and CathyG for their continuing support, both financial and intellectual.  Thanks, guys!

Speaking of support, we’ve added short biographies of the two people who do the most to actually make the site function: Accipiter and Chip.  If you’d like to learn just a bit more about them and their work here, it’s in the About Us section.

Keep those cards and letters coming!  We appreciate them all and do as much as we can to accommodate your insights and concerns.

Be brave – October is traditionally one of the two scariest months for the stock market – and celebrate the golden hues of autumn.  I’ll see you again just after Halloween!

With respect,

David

 

September 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Almost all of the poems about the end of summer and beginning of fall are sad, wistful things.  They’re full of regrets about the end of the season of growth and crammed with metaphors for decline, decay, death and despair.

It’s clear that poets don’t have investment portfolios.

The fact that benchmarks such as the Dow Jones Industrial average and Vanguard Total Bond Market are both showing gains for the year masks the trauma that has led investors to pull money out of long-term funds for six consecutive weeks.  Whether having the greatest outflows since the market bottom in March 2009 is a good thing remains to be seen.

Roller coasters are funny things.  They’re designed to scare the daylights out of you, and then deposit you back exactly where you started.  It might be a sign of age (or, less likely, wisdom) that I’d really prefer a winding garden path or moving walkway to the thrills now on offer.

The Latest Endangered Species: Funds for Small Investors

Beginning in the mid-1990s, I maintained “The List of Funds for Small Investors” at the old Brill/Mutual Funds Interactive website.  I screened for no-load funds with minimums of $500 or less and for no-load funds that waived their investment minimums for investors who were willing to start small but invest regularly.  That commitment was made through an Automatic Investing Plan, or AIP.

At the time, the greatest challenge was dealing with the sheer mass of such funds (600 in all) and trying to identify the couple dozen that were best suited to new investors trying to build a solid foundation.

Over the years, almost all of those funds ceased to be “funds for small investors.”  Some closed and a fair number added sales loads but the great majority simply raised their investment minimums.  In the end, only one major firm, T. Rowe Price, persevered in maintaining that option.

And now they’re done with it.

Effective on August 1, Price eliminated several policies which were particularly friendly to small investors.  The waiver of the minimum investment for accounts with an Automatic Asset Builder (their name for the AIP) has been eliminated. Rather than requiring a $50 minimum and $50/month thereafter, AAB accounts now require $2500 minimum and $100/thereafter.

The minimum subsequent investment on retail accounts was raised from $50 to $100.

The small account fee has been raised to $20 per account under $10,000. The fee will be assessed in September. You can dodge the fee by signing up for electronic document delivery.

Price changed the policies in response to poor behavior on the part of investors. Too many investors started with $50, built the account to $300 and then turned off the asset builder. Price then had custody of a bunch of orphaned accounts which were generating $3/year to cover management and administrative expenses.  It’s not clear how many such accounts exist. Bill Benintende, one of Price’s public relations specialists, explains “that’s considered proprietary information so it isn’t something we’d discuss publicly.”  This is the same problem that long-ago forced a bunch of firms to raise their investment minimums from $250- 500 to $2500.

Two groups escaped the requirement for larger subsequent investments.  Mr. Benintende says that 529 college savings plans remain at $50 and individuals who already have operating AAB accounts with $50 investments are grandfathered-in unless they make a change (for example, switching funds or even the day of the month on which an investment occurs).

That’s a real loss, even if a self-inflicted one, for small investors.  Nonetheless, there remain about 130 funds accessible to folks with modest budgets and the willingness to make a serious commitment to improving their finances.  By my best reading, there are thirteen smaller fund families and a half dozen individual funds still taking the risk of getting stiffed by undisciplined investors.  The families willing to waive their normal investment minimums are:

Family AIP minimum Notes
Ariel $50 Four value-oriented, low turnover funds with the prospect of a fifth (international) fund in the future.
Artisan $50 Eleven uniformly great, risk-conscious equity funds.  Artisan tends to close their funds early and a number are currently shuttered.
Aston  funds $50 A relatively new family, Aston has 26 funds covering both portfolio cores and a bunch of interesting niches.  They adopted some venerable older funds and hired institutional managers to sub-advise the others.
Azzad $50 Two socially-responsible funds, one midcap and one (newer) small cap
Berwyn $0 Three funds, most famously Berwyn Income (BERIX), all above average, run by the small team.
Gabelli/GAMCO $0 On AAA shares, anyway.  Gabelli’s famous, he knows it and he overcharges.  That said, these are really solid funds.
Heartland $0 Four value-oriented small to mid-cap funds, from a scandal-touched firm.  Solid to really good.
Homestead $0 Seven funds (stock, bond, international), solid to really good performance, very fair expenses.
Icon $100 17 funds whose “I” or “S” class shares are no-load.  These are sector or sector-rotation funds.
James $50 Four very solid funds, the most notable of which is James Balanced: Golden Rainbow (GLRBX), a quant-driven fund that keeps a smallish slice in stocks
Manning & Napier $25 The best fund company that you’ve never heard of.  Fourteen diverse funds, all managed by the same team.
Parnassus $50 Six socially-responsible funds, all but the flagship Parnassus Fund (PARNX) currently earn four or five stars from Morningstar. I’m particularly intrigued by Parnassus Workplace (PARWX) which likes to invest in firms that treat their staff decently.
USAA $50 USAA primarily provides financial services for members of the U.S. military and their families.  Their funds are available to anyone but you need to join USAA (it’s free) in order to learn anything about them.  That said, 26 funds, so quite good.

There are, in addition, a number of individual funds with minimums reduced or waived for folks willing to commit to an automatic investment.  Those include Barrett  Opportunity (SAOPX), Cullen High Dividend Equity (CHDEX), Giordano (GIORX), Primary Trend (PTFDX), Sector Rotation (NAVFX), and Stonebridge Small Cap Growth (SBAGX).

On a related note: Fidelity would like a little extra next year

Fidelity will begin charging an “annual index fund fee” of $10.00 per fund position to offset shareholder service costs if your fund balance falls below $10,000, effective December 2011.  They’re using the same logic: small accounts don’t generate enough revenue to cover their maintenance costs.

The Quiet Comeback of Artisan Small Cap (ARTSX)

The second fund in which I ever invested (AIM Constellation was the first) was Artisan Small Cap (ARTSX). Carlene Murphy Ziegler had been a star manager at Stein, Roe and at Strong.  With the support of her husband, Andrew, she left to start her own fund company and to launch her own fund.  Artisan Small Cap was a solid, mild-manned growth-at-a-reasonable price creature that drew a lot of media attention, attracted a lot of money, helped launch a stellar investment boutique, and quickly closed to new investors.

But, somewhere in there, the fund got out of step with the market.  Rather than being stellar, it slipped to okay and then “not too bad.”  It had some good years and was never terrible, but it also never managed to have two really good years back-to-back.  The firm added co-managers including Marina Carlson, who had worked so successful with Ziegler at the Strong Funds.  Ziegler stepped aside in 2008 and Carlson in 2009.

At that point, manager responsibilities were given to Andrew Stephens and the team that runs Artisan Mid Cap Fund (ARTMX).  ARTMX has posted remarkably strong, consistent results for over a decade.  It’s been in the top 10-15% of midcap growth funds for the past 1, 3, 5 and 10 year periods.  It has earned four or five star ratings from Morningstar for the past 3, 5, and 10 year periods.

Since taking over in October 2009, ARTSX has outperformed its peers.  $10,000 invested on the day the new team arrived would have gain to $13,900, compared to $13,100 at its peers.   Both year to date and for the three, turbulent summer months, it’s in the top 2% of small growth funds.  It has a top 5% record over the past year and top 15% over the past three.

Artisan has a very good record of allowing successful teams to expand their horizons. Scott Satterwhite’s team from Artisan Small Cap Value (ARTVX) inherited Artisan Mid Cap Value (ARTQX) and the large cap Artisan Value (ARTLX) funds, and has reproduced their success in each.  The same occurred with the Artisan International Value team running Artisan Global Value and Artisan International running Artisan International Small Cap.

Given that track record and the fund’s resurgence under the Stephen’s team, it might be time to put Artisan Small Cap back on the radar.

Fund Update: RiverPark Short-Term High Yield

We profiled RPHYX in July as one of the year’s most intriguing new funds. It’s core strategy – buying, for example, called high yield bonds – struck me “as a fascinating fund.  It is, in the mutual fund world, utterly unique . . .  And it makes sense.  That’s a rare and wonderful combination.”

The manager, David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, has been in remarkably good spirits, if not quite giddy, because market volatility plays into the fund’s strengths.  There are two developments of note.

The manager purchased a huge number of additional shares of RPHYX after the market rout on Monday, August 8.  (An earlier version of this note, on the Observer’s discussion board, specified an amount and he seemed a bit embarrassed by the public disclosure so I’ve shifted to the demure but accurate ‘huge number’ construction.)

The fund’s down about 0.4% since making its monthly distribution (which accounts for most of its NAV changes). For those keeping score, since August 1, Fidelity Floating Rate High Income (FFHRX, a floating-rate loan fund that some funds here guessed would parallel RiverPark) is down 4%, their new Global High-Income fund (FGHNX) is down 5% and Fidelity High Income (SPHIX) is down 4.5%.

Fortunately, the fund generates huge amounts of cash internally. Because durations are so short, he’s always got cash from the bonds which are being redeemed. When we spoke on August 10th, he calculated that if he did nothing at all with the portfolio, he’d get a 6% cash infusion on August 16, a 10% infusion on August 26th, and cash overall would reach 41% of the portfolio in the next 30 days. While he’s holding more cash than usual as a matter of prudent caution, he’s also got a lot to buy with.

And the market has been offering a number of exceptional bargains. He pointed to called HCA bonds which he first bought on July 27 at a 3.75% annualized yield. This week he was able to buy more at a 17% yield. Since the bonds would be redeemed at the end of August by a solidly-profitable company, he saw very little risk in the position. Several other positions (Las Vegas Sands public preferred and Chart Industries convertibles) have gone from yielding 3-3.5% to 5-6% available yields in the last two weeks.

He was also shortening up the portfolio to take advantage of emerging opportunities. He’s selling some longer-dated bonds which likely won’t be called in order to have more cash to act on irrational bargains as they present themselves. Despite an ultra-short duration, the fund is now yielding over 5%. The Fed, meanwhile, promises “near zero” interest rates for the next two years.

Mr. Sherman was at pains to stress that he’s not shilling for the fund. He doesn’t want to over-promise (this is not the equivalent of a savings account paying 5%) and he doesn’t want to encourage investors to join based on unrealistic hopes of a “magic” fund, but he does seem quite comfortable with the fund and the opportunity set available to him.

Note to the Securities and Exchange Commission: Hire a programmer!

Every day, the SEC posts all of its just-received filings online and every day I read them.  (Yep.  Really gotta get a life.) Here is a list of all of today’s prospectus filings.  In theory, if you visit on September 1st and click on “most recent,” you’ll get a screen full of filings dated September 1st.

Except when you don’t.  Here, for example, is a screen cap of the SEC new filings for August 22, 2011:

Notice how very far down this list you have to go before finding even one filing from August 22nd (it’s the ING Mutual Funds listing).  On July 25th, 43 of 89 entries were wrong (including one originally filed in 2004).

Two-thirds of all Wall Street trades emanate from high-frequency traders, whose computers execute trades in 250 microseconds (“Not So Fast,” The Economist, 08/06/11).  Those trades increase market volatility and asset correlations, to the detriment of most investors.  The SEC’s difficulty in merely getting the date right on their form postings doesn’t give me much confidence in their ability to take on the problems posed by technology.

Four Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new funds:

RiverPark/Wedgewood (RWGFX): David Rolfe makes it seem so simple.  Identify great companies, buy only the best of them, buy only when they’ve on sale, and hold on.  For almost 19 years he’s been doing to same, simple thing – and doing it with unparalleled consistency and success.  His strategy is now available to retail investors.

Walthausen Select Value (WSVRX): the case for this focused small- to mid-cap fund is simple.  Manager John Walthausen has performed brilliantly with the last three funds he’s run and his latest fund seeks to build on one of those earlier models.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Northern Global Tactical Asset Allocation (BBALX): up until August 1st, you could access to the best ideas of Northern Investment Policy Committee only if you had $5 million to meet this fund’s minimum or $500 million in assets at Northern.  And then it became a retail fund ($2500) with an institutional pedigree and expenses (0.68%).  Folks looking for a conservative core fund just stumbled onto a really solid option.

Walthausen Small Cap Value (WSCVX): we profiled this fund shortly after launch as one of the year’s best new funds.  Three years on, it’s running rings around its competition and starting to ask about when it will be necessary to close to new investors.  A somewhat volatile choice, it has produced remarkable results.

Briefly noted . . .

 

Berwyn Income (BERIX) will reopen to new investors on Sept. 19. The $1.3 billion fund closed in November 2010, but says the board, “recent volatility in the market has led to new investment opportunities for the Fund.”  BERIX makes a lot of sense in turbulent markets: modest stake in dividend-paying stocks and REITs, plus corporate bonds, preferred shares, convertibles and a slug of cash.  Lots of income with some prospect for capital growth.  The fund more than doubled in size between 2008 and 2009, then doubled in size again between 2009 and 2010.  At the end of 2008, it was under $240 million.  Today it carries a billion more in heft.  Relative performance has drifted down a bit as the fund has grown, but it remains really solid.

Fidelity is bringing out two emerging market funds in mid-October. The less interesting, Emerging Markets Discovery, will be their small- to mid-cap fund. Total Emerging Markets will be a 60/40 balanced fund. The most promising aspect of the balanced fund is the presence of John Carlson, who runs New Markets Income (FNMIX) at the head of the management team.  FNMIX has a splendid long-term record (Carlson’s been there for 16 years) but it’s currently lagging because it focuses on dollar-denominated debt rather than the raging local currency variety.  Carlson argues that local currencies aren’t quite the safe haven that newbies believe and that, in any case, they’re getting way overvalued.  He’ll have a team of co-managers who, I believe, run some of Fidelity’s non-U.S. funds.  Fido’s emerging markets equity products have not been consistently great, so investors here might hope for index-like returns and a much more tolerable ride than a pure equity exposure would offer. The opening expense ratio will be 1.4% and the minimum investment will be $2500.

Northern Funds are reducing the operating expenses on all of their index funds, effective January 1, 2012.  The seven funds involved are:

Reduction and resulting expense ratio
Emerging Market Equity Reduced by 42 basis points, to 0.30%
Global Real Estate 15 basis points, to 0.50%
Global Sustainability 35 basis points, to 0.30%
International Equity 20 basis points, to 0.25%
Mid Cap 15 basis points, to 0.15%
Small Cap 20 basis points, to 0.15%
Stock 15 basis points, to 0.10%

Nicely done!

Forward Management introduced a new no-load “investor” share class for Forward International Real Estate Fund (FFIRX), the Forward Real Estate Long/Short Fund (FFSRX), and the Forward Global Infrastructure Fund (FGLRX). Forward Real Estate (FFREX) already had a no-load share class.  The funds are, on whole, respectable but not demonstrably great. The minimum investment is $4,000.

DWS Strategic Income (KSTAX) becomes DWS Unconstrained Income on Sept. 22, 2011. At that point, Philip Condon will join the management team of the fund.  “Unconstrained” is the current vogue term for income funds, with PIMCO leading the pack by offering unconstrained Bond (also packaged as Harbor Unconstrained Bond), Tax-Managed Bond and Fixed Income funds.  All of them have been underperformers in their short lives, suggesting that the ability to go anywhere doesn’t immediately translate into the wisdom to go somewhere sensible.

Litman Gregory Asset Management has renamed its entire line of Masters’ Select funds as Litman Gregory Masters Funds name.

PIMCO Developing Local Markets (PLMIX) has changed its name to PIMCO Emerging Markets Local Currency, presumably to gain from the “local currency debt” craze.

Dreyfus S&P Stars Opportunities (BSOBX) will change its name to Dreyfus MidCap Core on Nov. 1, 2011.

DWS RREEF Real Estate Securities (RRRRX) will close Sept. 30, 2011.

JPMorgan U.S. Large Cap Core Plus (JLCAX) closed to new investors on Sept. 2, 2011.

Scout TrendStar Small Cap (TRESX) is merging into Scout Small Cap (UMBHX).

MFS Core Growth (MFCAX) merged into MFS Growth (MFEGX) in August.

Effective Sept. 15, 2011, GMO Global Balanced Asset Allocation Fund (GMWAX) will be renamed GMO Global Asset Allocation Fund and it will no longer be bound to keep at least 25% each in stocks and bonds.

Forward Funds is changing Forward Large Cap Equity (FFLAX), a mild-mannered fund with a slight value bias, into Forward Large Cap Dividend Fund.  After November 1, at least 80% of the portfolio will be in . . . well, large cap, dividend-paying stocks.   Not to rain on anybody’s parade, but all of its top 25 holdings are already dividend-paying stocks which implies marketing rather than management drove the change.

Likewise, Satuit Capital Micro Cap has been changed to the Satuit Capital U.S. Emerging Companies Fund (SATMX).   The Board hastened to assure shareholders that the change was purely cosmetic: “there are no other changes to the Fund being contemplated as a result of this name change.”  Regardless, it’s been a splendid performer (top 1% over the past decade) with an elevated price tag (1.75%)

DWS Climate Change (WRMAX) becomes DWS Clean Technology on October 1, 2011.

A few closing notes . . .

We’re very pleased to announce the launch of The Falcon’s Eye.  Originally written by a FundAlarm board member, Falcon, the Eye provides a quick and convenient link to each of the major profiles for any particular fund.  Simply click on “The Falcon’s Eye” link on the main menu bar atop this page and enter one or more ticker symbols.  A new windows pops up, giving the fund name and direct links to ten major source of information:

Yahoo Morningstar Google
Smart Money U.S. News Barron’s
Bloomberg USA Today MSN

And, of course, the Observer itself.

Mark whichever sources interest you, click, and the Eye will generate direct links to that site’s profile of or reporting on your fund.  Thanks to Accipiter for his tireless work on the project, and to Chip, Investor, Catch22 and others for their support and beta testing of it.  It is, we think, a really useful tool for folks who are serious about understanding their investments.

Thanks to all of you for using or sharing the Observer’s link to Amazon.com, which is providing a modest but very steady revenue stream.  Special thanks for the folks who’ve chosen to contribute to the Observer this month and, especially, to the good folks at Milestones Financial Planning in Kentucky for their ongoing support.  We’re hoping for a major upgrade in the site’s appearance, in addition to the functionality upgrades that Chip and Accipiter have worked so faithfully on.

Looking for the archive? There is an archive of all Observer and later FundAlarm commentaries, links to which usually appear at the top of this page. This month we encountered a software glitch that was scrambling the list, so we’ve temporarily hidden it. Once out tech folks have a chance to play with the code, it’ll be back where it belongs. Thanks for your patience!

Keep those cards and letters, electronic or otherwise, coming.  I love reading your thoughts.

See you in October!

David

August 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

The folks in Washington are, for the most part, acting like six-year-olds who missed their nap times.  The New York Fed is quietly warning money market managers to reduce their exposure to European debt.  A downgrade of the federal government’s bond rating seems nearly inevitable. The stock market managed only one three-day set of gains in a month.

In short, it’s summer again.

Grandeur Peak and the road less traveled

GP Advisors logo

A team of managers, led by Robert Gardiner, and executives left Wasatch Advisors at the end of June 2011 to strike out on their own.  In mid July they announced the formation of Grandeur Peak Global Advisors and they filed to launch two mutual funds.  The new company is immediately credible because of the success that Mr. Gardiner and colleague Blake Walker had as Wasatch managers.

Robert Gardiner managed or co-managed Wasatch Microcap (WMICX), Small Cap Value (WMCVX) and Microcap Value (WAMVX, in which I own shares).  In 2007, he took a sort of sabbatical from active management but continued as Director of Research.  During that sabbatical, he reached a couple conclusions: (1) global microcap investing was the world’s most interesting sector and (2) he’d like to manage his own firm.  He returned to active management with the launch of Wasatch Global Opportunities (WAGOX), a global micro-to small-cap fund.  From inception in late 2008 to July 2011, WAGOX turned a $10,000 investment into $23,500 while an investment in its average peer would have led to a $17,000 portfolio.  Put another way, WAGOX earned $13,500 or 92% more than its average peer managed.

Blake Walker co-managed Wasatch International Opportunities (WAIOX) from 2005-2011.  The fund was distinguished by outsized returns (top 10% of its peer group over the past five years, top 1% over the past three), and outsized stakes in emerging markets (nearly 50% of assets) and micro- to small-cap stocks (66% of assets, roughly twice what peer funds have).  In March 2011, Lipper designated WAIOX as the top International Small/Mid-Cap Growth Fund based on consistent (risk-adjusted) return for the five years through 2010. In March 2009, it had received Lipper’s award for best three-year performance.

Wasatch published an interesting paper on the ongoing case for global small and micro-cap investing, “Think International, Think Small” (January 2011).

Gardiner had talked with Wasatch about starting his own firm for a number of years. At age 46, he decided that it was time to pursue that dream. Grandeur Peak’s president, Eric Huefner described the eventual departure of Gardiner & co. as “very friendly,” and he stressed the ongoing ties between the firms.  The fact that Grandeur Peak is one of the most visible mountains in the Wasatch Range, one does get a sense of amity.

According to SEC filings and pending SEC approval, Grandeur Peaks will launch two funds at the beginning of October: Global Opportunities and International Opportunities.  Both will be managed jointed by Messrs. Gardiner and Walker. The short version:

Grandeur Peak Global Opportunities will seek long-term growth by investing, primarily, in a small- and micro-cap global portfolio.  The target universe is stocks valued under $5 billion, though up to one-third of the portfolio might be invested in worthy, larger firms.  Emerging markets exposure will range from 5-50%.   The minimum investment will be $2000, reduced to $1000 for funds with an automatic investment plan.  Expenses will be capped at 1.75% with a 2% redemption fee on shares held for 60 days or less.

Grandeur Peak International Opportunities will seek long-term growth by investing, primarily, in a small- and micro-cap international portfolio.  The target universe is stocks valued under $2.5 billion.  Emerging markets exposure will range from 10-60%.   As with Global, the minimum investment will $2000, reduced to $1000 for funds with an automatic investment plan, and expenses will be capped at 1.75% with a 2% redemption fee on shares held for 60 days or less.

Global’s investment strategies closely parallel Wasatch Global’s.  International differs from its Wasatch counterpart in a couple ways: its target universe has a higher cap ($1 billion for Wasatch, $2.5 billion for Grandeur) and it has a bit more wiggle room on emerging markets exposure (20-50% for Wasatch, 10 – 60% for Grandeur).

A key difference is that Grandeur intends to charge substantially less for their funds.  Both of the new funds will have expenses capped at 1.75%, while the Wasatch funds charge 1.88 and 2.26% for International and Global, respectively. That expense cap represents a substantial and, I’m sure, well considered risk for Grandeur.  Small global funds cost a lot to run.  A fund’s actual expenses are listed in its annual report to shareholders.  There are a couple dozen no-load, retail global funds with small asset bases.  Here are the asset bases and actual expenses for a representative sample of them:

Advisory Research Global Value (ADVWX), $13 million in assets, 5.29% in expenses

Artisan Global Equity (ARTHX), $15 million, 1.5%

Alpine Global Infrastructure (AIFRX ), $12 million , 3.03%

Chou Equity Opportunity (CHOEX), $24 million, 28.6%

Commonwealth Global (CNGLX), $15 million, 3.02%

Encompass (ENCPX), $25 million, 1.45%

Jubak Global Equity (JUBAX), $35 million, 5.43%

Roge Partners (ROGEX), $13.5 million, 2.46%

Unlike many start-ups, Grandeur has chosen to focus initially on the mutual fund market, rather than managing separate accounts or partnerships for high net worth individuals and institutions.

Mr. Gardiner is surely familiar with Robert Frost’s The Road Not Taken, from which we get the endlessly quoted couplet, “Two roads diverged in a wood, and I— I took the one less traveled by.”  From microcap growth investing to international microcaps to launching his own firm, he’s traveled many “paths less traveled by.” And he’s done it with consistent success.  I wish him well with the launch of Grandeur Peaks and hope to speak with one or another of the managers after their funds launch in October.

And yet I’m struck by Frost’s warning that his poem was “tricky, very tricky that one.”  Americans uniformly read the poem to say “I took the road less traveled and won as a result.”  In truth, the poem says no such thing and recounts a tale told, many years later, “with a sigh.”

Fund Update: RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX)

Like Grandeur Peak, RiverPark Advisors grew from the decision of high-profile executives and managers to leave a well-respected mid-sized fund company.  Morty Schaja, president of Baron Asset Management, left with an investment team in 2009 to found RiverPark.  The firm runs two small funds (RiverPark Small Cap Growth RPSFX and Large Cap Growth RPXFX) and advises three other, sub-advised funds.

I profiled (and invested in) RiverPark Short Term High Yield, one of the sub-advised funds, in July.  The short version of the profile is this: RPHYX has the unique and fascinating strategy (investing in called high yield bonds, among other things) that allows it to function as a cash management fund with a yield 400-times greater than the typical money market.  That profile engendered considerable discussion and a number of reader questions.  The key question is whether Cohanzick, the adviser, had the strategy in place during the 2008 meltdown and, if so, how it did.

Mr. Schaja was kind enough to explain that while there wasn’t a stand-alone strategy in 2008, these investments did quite well as part of Cohanzick’s broader portfolios during the turmoil.  He writes?

Unfortunately, the pure separate accounts using this strategy only began in 2009, so we have to look at investments in this strategy that were part of larger accounts (investing the excess cash).   While we can’t predict how the fund may perform in the hypothetical next crisis, we take comfort that in 2008 the securities performed exceedingly well.  As best as we can tell there were some short term negative marks as liquidity dried up, but no defaults.  Therefore, for those investors that were not forced to sell, within weeks and months the securities matured at par.   Therefore, under this hypothetical scenario, even if the Fund’s NAV fell substantially over a few days because markets became illiquid and pricing difficult, we would expect the Fund’s NAV would rebound quickly (over a few months) as securities matured.  If we were lucky enough to receive positive flows into the Fund in such an environment, the Fund could take advantage of short term volatility to realize unusually and unsustainable significantly higher returns.

One reader wondered with RPHYX would act rather like a floating-rate fund, which Mr. Schaja rather doubted:

In an environment where default risk is of primary concern, we would expect the Fund to compare favorably to a floating rate high income fund.   While floating rate funds protect investors from increasing interest rates they are typically invested in securities with longer maturities and therefore inherently greater default risk.   Additionally, the Fund is focused not only on securities with limited duration but where Cohanzick believes there is limited risk of default in the short period until the time in which it believes the securities will either mature or be redeemed.

It is striking to me that during the debt-related turmoil of the last weeks of August, RPHYX’s net asset value never moved: it sold for $9.98 – 10.01 with most of the change accounted for by the fund’s monthly income distribution.  It remains, in my mind, a fascinating option for folks distraught by money market funds taking unseen risks and returning nothing.

Fund Update: Aston/River Road Independent Value

One of my last FundAlarm profiles celebrated the launch of Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) was “the third incarnation of a splendid, 15-year-old fund.”  Eric Cinnamond, the manager here and formerly of Intrepid Small Cap (ICMAX), has an outstanding record for investing in small and midcap stocks while pursuing an “absolute return” strategy.  He hates losing money and does it rarely.  The bottom line was, and is, this:

Aston / River Road Independent Value is the classic case of getting something for nothing. Investors impressed with Mr. Cinnamond’s 15 year record – high returns with low risk investing in smaller companies – have the opportunity to access his skills with no higher expenses and no higher minimum than they’d pay at Intrepid Small Cap. The far smaller asset base and lack of legacy positions makes ARIVX the more attractive of the two options. And attractive, period.

Mr. Cinnamond wrote at the end of July with a series of updates on his fund.

Performance is outstanding.  The fund is up 8% YTD, through the end of July 2011.  In the same period, his average peer is up 1.3% and ICMAX (his former fund) is up 0.73%. Eric notes that, “The key to performance YTD has been our equity performance and limiting mistakes. Although this is too short of a period to judge a Fund, it’s ideally our ultimate goal in this absolute return strategy — limit mistakes and require an adequate return given the risk of each small cap equity investment.”

The portfolio is half cash, 48% at the end of the second quarter.  Assuming that the return on cash is near-zero, that means that his stocks have returned around 16% so far this year.

Money is steadily flowing in.  He notes, “We are now at $265 million after seven months with good flows and a healthy institutional pipeline.”  He plans to partially close the fund at around $800 million in assets.

The fund is more attractive to advisors than to institutions, though it should be quite attractive to bright individual investors as well.  The problem with institutions, he believes, is that they’re more style-box bound than are individual advisors.  “The absolute return strategy requires flexibility so it doesn’t fit perfectly in the traditional institutional consultant style box.  For most consultants, the Independent Value strategy would not be used as their core small cap allocation as it has above average tracking error.  For the most part, advisors seem to be less concerned about the risk of looking different than a benchmark and are more concerned about protecting their private clients’ capital…so it’s a nice fit.”

On the bigger picture issues, Eric is “hopeful volatility increases in the near future — ultimately creating opportunity.”  He notes that the government’s “printing party” has inflated the earnings of a lot of firms, many of them quite marginal.  He’s concerned with valuation distortions, but comfortable that patience and discipline will, now as ever, see him through.

Cash Isn’t Trash (but it’s also not enough)

ARIVX is not alone in holding huge cash reserves this year, but it is alone in profiting from it. There are 75 retail, no-load funds which were holding at least 40% in cash this year.  ARIVX has the best YTD returns (7.92%) followed by Merk Hard Currency (MERKX) at 7.46% with several dozen cash-heavy funds under water so far this year.  The great bulk of those funds have returned between 1-3% while the (volatile) Total U.S. Market index is up 4% (as of July 29, 2011). Notable cash-heavy funds include

Hussman Strategic Total Return (HSTRX), an always-defensive mix of bonds, foreign currencies, cash and precious-metals exposure.   Five stars, up 2.3% YTD.

Intrepid Small Cap (ICMAX), Mr. Cinnamond’s previous fund, now run by the very competent team that almost handles Intrepid Capital (ICMBX). Five stars, up 0.73%.

Pinnacle Value (PVFIX), John Deysher’s perennially cash-heavy microcap value fund.  Five stars, down 1.7%.

Forester Discovery (INTLX), international sibling to the only equity fund to have made money in 2008.   Four stars, up 2.3%.

Congressional Effect Fund (CEFFX), a three-star freak that goes entirely to cash whenever Congress is in session.  800% portfolio turnover, 2.3% returns.

Harbor Bond (HABDX), a clone of the titanic PIMCO Total Return (PTTRX) fund.  Bill Gross is nervous, having raised cash and cut risk.  Five stars, up 4%.

Morningstar’s Hot on My Heels!

Morningstar ran a couple essays this month that reflect issues that the Observer took up earlier.

Russel Kinnel, Morningstar’s director of mutual fund research, felt the urge to “get really contrarian” and look at four of the smallest funds in the Morningstar 500 (“Four Tiny but Potent Mutual Funds,” 08/01/2011).  They’re described as “being ignored by fund investors, but they’ve really got a lot to like.”  Three of the four have been profiled here, while (WHG Balanced) the fourth has a $100,000 minimum investment.   That’s a bit rich for my budget.

The funds, with links to the Observer’s profiles, are:

Queens Road Small Cap Value (QRSVX):  “Manager Steve Scruggs has done a great job of deep value investing . . . Its return on $10,000 since that time is $25,500 versus $20,100 for the average small-value fund.”

Ariel Focus (ARFFX): “Can Ariel’s emphasis on stable, low-valuation companies work in a focused large-cap fund? I think so. The emphasis on stability has kept volatility roughly in line with other large-blend funds despite the concentration.”

Masters Select Focused Opportunities (MSFOX): “Now, this fund really counts as contrarian. It has a Morningstar rating of 1 star, and its 20-stock portfolio has added up to high risk . . . [They have several excellent sub-advisers who have had a long stretch of poor performance.] That’s not likely to continue, and this fund could well have a bright future.”  My concern when MSFOX launched was that taking six ideas from each of three teams might not get you the same results that you’d get if any of the sub-advisers had the option to construct the whole portfolio.  That still seems about right.

WHG Balanced (WHGBX): “. . . a virtual clone, GAMCO Westwood Balanced (WEBAX), dates back to 1991, and Mark Freeman and Susan Byrne have a strong record over that period. Moreover, it’s conservatively positioned with high-quality stocks and high-quality bonds.”

In Investors Behaving Badly, analyst Shannon Zimmerman fretted about the inability of investors to profit from the “wildly volatile yet in some ways utterly predictable performance” performance of Fidelity Leveraged Company Stock fund (FLVCX). Manager Tom Soviero buys the stock of the kinds of companies which have been forced to issue junk bonds.  Zimmerman notes that the fund has some of the industry’s strongest returns over the decade, but that it’s so wildly volatile that very few investors have held on long enough to benefit: “in all trailing periods of three or more years, [the fund’s investor returns] rank among the peer group’s worst.”  In closing, Zimmerman struck a cautious, balanced note:

As an analyst, I try to square the vicious circle outlined above by giving Soviero credit where it’s due but encouraging prospective buyers, not to beware, but to be aware of the fund’s mandate and its penchant for wild performance swings.

The Observer highlighted the same fund in May 2011, in “Successor to ‘The Worst Best Fund Ever’.”  We were growling about a bunch of fawning articles about “The Decade’s Best Stock Picker,” almost none of which confronted the truth of the matter: wildly volatile funds are a disaster.  Period.  Their excellent returns don’t matter because (1) 90% of their investors flee at the worst possible moment and (2) the remainder eat the resulting tax bill and performance distortions.  We concluded:

People like the idea of high-risk, high-return funds a lot more than they like the reality of them. Almost all behavioral finance research finds the same dang thing about us: we are drawn to shiny, high-return funds just about as powerfully as a mosquito is drawn to a bug-zapper.

And we end up doing just about as well as the mosquito does.

Two Funds and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new funds:

T. Rowe Price Global Infrastructure (TRGFX): governments around the world are likely to spend several trillion dollars a year on building or repairing transportation, power and water systems.  Over the past decade, owning either the real assets (that is, owning a pipeline) or stock in the asset’s owners has been consistently profitable.  Price has joined the dozen or so firms which have launched funds to capitalize on those large, predictable investments.  It’s not clear that rushing in, here or in its peers, is called for.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

Marathon Value (MVPFX): Marathon is the very archetype of a “star in the shadows.”  It’s an unmarketed, friends-and-family fund that exists to give smaller stakeholders access to the adviser’s stock picking.  The fund has a nearly unparalleled record for excellent risk-managed returns over the decade and it’s certainly worth the attention of folks who know they need stock exposure but who get a bit queasy at the thought. Thanks to the wise and wily Ira Artman for recommending a profile of the fund.

And ten other funds that our readers think are really worth your time

One intriguing thread on the Observer’s discussion board asked, “what fund do you to love more and more over the years“?  While several folks made the obvious point (“don’t love an investment, it can’t love you back”), a number of readers contributed thoughtful and well-argued choices.  The most popular, all-weather funds:

Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX), endorsed by ron, MikeM, rono.  “I’m not sure there has been a better “low risk – great return” fund then PRPFX.”

FPA Crescent (FPACX), Scott, MikeM, “one fund with a terrific long-term track record.”

Oakmark Equity & Income (OAKBX), from ron, cee (The fund just does great year after year and even in the 2008 bear market it only lost 16%. This will be a long-term relationship :)

Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), DavidS, Scott, PatShuff, “our oldest fund for lower volatility Asian exposure.”  Andrew Foster just left this fund in order to found Seafarer Capital

I’m not sure that it’s just a sign of the times that the common characteristic of these longest-term holdings is the flexibility they accord their managers, their low risk and long-tenured management.

Other interesting nominees included two Fidelity funds (the hybrids Capital & Income FAGIX and Global Balanced FGBLX), Franklin Income (FKINX), Metropolitan West Total Return Bond (MWTRX), Matthews Asia Dividend (MAPIX) and T. Rowe Price Spectrum Income (RPSIX), my own favorite fund-of-Price funds.

Briefly Noted . . .

Joseph Rohm is no longer manager of the T. Rowe Price Africa & Middle East (TRAMX) after leaving T. Rowe on June 30 to relocate to his hometown, Cape Town, South Africa.  It’s hard to know what to make of the move or the fund.  Two reasons:

The management team has shifted several times already.  Rohm was the founding manager, but his stint lasted only ten weeks.  Alderson then stepped in for 18 months, followed by 27 months of Rohm again, and now Alderson.  That’s awfully unusual, especially for Price which values management stability and smooth transitions.

The fund lacks a meaningful peer group or public benchmark.  Measured against diversified emerging markets funds, TRAMX stinks with deep losses in 2011 (through July 29) and a bottom of the heap peer ranking since inception.  The problem is that it’s not a diversified emerging markets fund.   While it would be tempting to measure it against one of the existing Africa ETFs – SPDR S&P Emerging Middle East and Africa (GAF), for instance – those funds invest almost exclusively in a single country, South Africa.  GAF has 90% of its assets in South Africa and virtually 100% in just three countries (South Africa, Egypt and Morocco).

Ed Giltanen, a Price representative, expects a new management team to be in-place within a few months.  Morningstar recommends that folks avoid the fund.  While the long-term case for investing in Africa is undamaged, it’s hard to justify much short term movement in the direction of TRAMX.

On June 30, Guinness Atkinson launched its Renminbi Yuan & Bond Fund.  It invests in Renminbi Yuan-denominated bonds issued by corporations and by the Chinese government.  It may also hold cash, bank deposits, CDs and short-term commercial paper denominated in Renminbi or Yuan. Edmund Harriss will manage the fund.  He also manages three other GA funds: China & Hong Kong Fund, the Asia Focus Fund, and the Asia Pacific Dividend Fund. The China & Hong Kong fund has been around a long time and it’s been a solid but not outstanding performer.  The two newer funds have been modestly unfortunate.  The expense ratio will be 0.90% and there’s a $10,000 minimum investment for regular accounts.  That is reduced to $5000 if you’re already a GA shareholder, or are buying for a retirement or gift account.

I’ve long argued that an emerging-markets balanced fund makes a huge amount of investment sense, but the only option so far has been the closed-end First Trust/Aberdeen Emerging Opportunities (FEO).  I’m pleased to report that Franklin Templeton will launch Templeton Emerging Markets Balanced, likely by October 1.  The fund will been managed by famous guys including Michael Hasenstab and Mark Mobius. “A” shares of the fund will cost 1.53%.

The rush to launch emerging markets bond funds continues with MFS’s planned launch of MFS Emerging Markets Debt Local Currency in September 2011.  The industry has launched, or filed to launch, more than a dozen such funds this year.

Aston closed and liquidated the Aston/New Century Absolute Return ETF (ANENX) in late July.  The three-year-old was a fund of ETFs while its parent, New Century Alternative Strategies (NCHPX) is a very solid, high expense fund of hedge-like mutual funds.

Aston also canned Fortis Investment Management as the subadvisor to Aston/Fortis Real Estate (AARIX). Harrison Street Securities replaced them on the renamed Aston/Harrison Street Real Estate fund.

TCW is in the process of killing off two losing funds.  TCW Large Cap Growth (TGLFX) will merge into TCW Select Equities (TGCNX) and TCW Relative Value Small Cap (TGOIX) merges into TCW Value Opportunities (TGVOX).  In an additional swipe, the Large Cap Growth managers will be dismissed from the team managing TCW Growth (TGGIX).  Owie.

Wells Fargo Advantage Strategic Large Cap Growth (ESGAX) has a new manager: Tom Ognar and his team.  The change is worth noting just because I’ve always liked the manager’s name: it has that “Norse warrior” ring to it.  “I am Ognar the Fierce and I am here to optimize your portfolio.”

 

New names and new missions

Janus Dynamic Allocation (JAMPX), a consistently mediocre three-year-old, will become more global in fall.  Its name changes to Janus World Allocation and it will switch from a domestic benchmark to the MSCI All Country World index.

Janus Long/Short (JALSX) will become Janus Global Market Neutral on September 30, and will change its benchmark from the S&P500 to a 3-month T-Bill index.

ING Janus Contrarian (IJCAX) fired Janus Capital Management as subadvisor and changed its name to ING Core Growth and Income Portfolio. The fund is currently managed by ING Investment Management, and will merge into ING Growth and Income in early 2012.

Effective Sept. 1, 2011, Invesco Select Real Estate Income (ASRAX) will change its name to Invesco Global Real Estate Income.  The name change is accompanying by prospectus changes allowing a more-global portfolio and a global benchmark.

MFS Sector Rotational (SRFAX) changed its name to MFS Equity Opportunities on August 1, 2011.

DWS Strategic Income (KSTAX) will change its name to DWS Unconstrained Income at the end of September.  “Strategic” is so 2010 . . . this season, everyone is wearing “unconstrained.”

Dreyfus S&P Stars Opportunities (BSOBX) becomes Dreyfus MidCap Core on November 1st.

The FaithShares folks will close and liquidate their entire line of ETFs (the Baptist, Catholic, Christian, Lutheran and Methodist Values ETFs).  The ETFs in question were fine investment vehicles except for two small flaws: (1) poor returns and (2) utterly no investor interest.  FaithShares will then change their name to Exchange Traded Concepts, LLC.  And what will ETC, LLC do?   Invoking the “those who can’t do, consult” dictum, they propose to sell their expertise as ETF providers to other aspiring investment managers.   Their motto: “Launch your own ETF without lifting a finger.”  Yep, that’s the level of commitment I’d like to see in an adviser.

In closing . . .

Special thanks to “Accipter,” a long-time contributor to the FundAlarm and Observer discussion boards and Chip, the Observer’s Technical Director, for putting dozens of hours into programming and testing The Falcon’s Eye.  Currently, when you enter a fund’s ticker symbol into a discussion board comment, our software automatically generates a link to a new window, in which you find the fund’s name and links to a half dozen fund reports.  Falcon’s Eye will provide direct access through a search box; it’ll cover ETFs as well and will include links to the Observer’s own fund profiles.  This has been a monumental project and I’m deeply grateful for their work.  Expect the Eye to debut in the next two weeks.

Thanks, too, to the folks who have used the Observer’s Amazon link.  If you haven’t done so yet, visit the “Support Us” page where you’ll see the Amazon link.  From there, you can bookmark it, set it as your homepage, right-click and play it on your desktop or copy it and share it with your deranged brother-in-law.  In addition, we’ve created the Observer’s Amazon store to replace our book recommendations page.  Click on “Books” to visit it.  The Amazon store brings together our readers’ best ideas for places to learn more about investing and personal finance in general.  We’ll add steadily to the collection, as you find and recommend new “must read” works.

With respect,

David

July 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

The craziness of summer always amazes me.  People, who should be out watching their kids play Little League, or lounging in the shade with a cold drink, instead fret like mad about the end of the (investing) world as we know it.  Who would have guessed, despite all of the screaming, that it’s been a pretty decent year in the market so far?  Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index fund (VTSMX) returned 6.3% in the first six months of 2011.  The market turbulence in May and June still constituted a drop of less than 3% from the market’s late April highs.

In short, more heat than light, so far.

Justice Thomas to investors: “Sue the Easter Bunny!”

On June 13th, the Supreme Court issued another ruling (Janus Capital Group vs. First Derivative Traders)  that seemed to embrace political ideology rather more than the facts of the case. The facts are simple: Janus’s prospectuses said they did not tolerate market-timing of the funds.  In fact, they actively colluded in it.  When the news came out, Janus stock dropped 25%.  Shareholders sued, claiming that the prospectus statements were material and misleading.  The Court’s conservative bloc, led by Skippy Thomas, said that stockholders could sue the business trust in which the funds are organized, but not Janus.  Since the trust has neither employees nor assets, it seems to offer an impregnable legal defense against any lies embedded in a prospectus.
The decision strikes me as asinine and Thomas’s writing as worse.  The only people cheerleading for the decision are Janus’s lawyers (who were active in the post-decision press release business) and the editorial page writers for The Wall Street Journal:

In Janus Capital Group Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, investors claimed to have been misled into buying shares of stock at a premium by prospectuses that misrepresented Janus Investment Fund’s use of so-called market timing. . .

The Court’s ruling continues a string of recent cases that put limits on trial-bar marauding, but the dissent by the four liberal Justices all but invites further attempts. As in so many legal areas, this Supreme Court is only a single vote away from implementing through the courts a political agenda that Congress has consistently refused to pass.

The editorial can sustain its conclusion only by dodging the fact (the business trust is a shell) and quoting Thomas’s thoughtless speechwriter/speechmaker analogy (which fails to consider the implication of having the writer and maker being the same person).   The Journal‘s news coverage recognized the problem with the ruling:

William Birdthistle, a professor at the Chicago-Kent College of Law, said the ruling disregarded the practical reality that mutual funds are dominated by their investment advisers, who manage the business and appoint the funds’ boards of directors.

“Everyone knows the fund is an empty marionette. It doesn’t do anything,” said Prof. Birdthistle, who filed a brief supporting the Janus investors. “You’re left with a circumstance where no one is responsible for this.”

The New York Times gets closer:

With Justice Clarence Thomas writing for a 5-to-4 majority, the Supreme Court has made it much harder for private lawsuits to succeed against mutual fund malefactors, even when they have admitted to lying and cheating.

The court ruled that the only entity that can be held liable in a private lawsuit for “any untrue statement of a material fact” is the one whose name the statement is presented under. That’s so even if the entity presenting the statement is a business trust — basically a dummy corporation — with no assets, while its owner has the cash.

Justice Thomas’s opinion is short and, from the mutual fund industry’s perspective, very sweet: Janus Capital Group and Janus Capital Management were heavily involved in preparing the prospectuses, but they didn’t “make” the statements so they can’t be held liable. . . Which means that there is no one to sue for the misleading prospectuses.

The ICI was publicly silent (too busy preparing their latest “fund expenses have too plummeted” and “America, apple pie and 12(b)1 fee” press releases,) though you have to imagine silent high-fives in the hallway.  I’m not sure of what to make of Morningstar’s reaction.  They certainly expressed no concern about, displeasure with or, alternately, support for the decision.  Mostly they conclude that there’s no threat in the future:

The ruling should not have a material impact on Janus mutual fund shareholders, according to Morningstar’s lead Janus fund analyst, Kathryn Young. Janus has had procedures in place since 2003 to prevent market-timing . . .

Uhhh . . .  Uhhh . . .  if those procedures are expressed as a sort of contract – communicated to investors – in the prospectus . . .  uhhh . . . hello?

The more pressing question is whether the decision also guts the SEC’s enforcement power, since the decision seems to insulate a firm’s decision-makers from the legal consequences of their acts.  It’s unclear why that insulation wouldn’t protect them from regulators quite as thoroughly as from litigators.

In short, you’ll have about as much prospect of winning a suit against the Easter Bunny as you will of winning against a fund’s fictitious structure.

The Odd Couple: Manager Gerry Sullivan and the Vice Fund (VICEX)

One of the fund industry’s nicest guys, Gerry Sullivan, has been appointed to run an awfully unlikely fund: VICEX.  Gerry has managed the Industry Leaders fund (ILFIX) since its launch.  The fund uses a quantitative approach to identify industries in which there are clear leaders and then looks to invest in the one or two leading firms.  The fund has a fine long-term record, though it’s been stuck in the mud for the past couple years.  The problem is the fund’s structural commitment to financial stocks, which have been the downfall of many good managers (think: Bruce Berkowitz, 90% financials, bottom 1% of large cap funds through the first half of 2011).  Since financial services match the criteria for inclusion, Sullivan has stuck with them – and has been stuck with them.  The rest of the portfolio is performing well, and he’s waiting for the inevitable rebound in U.S. financials.

In the interim, he’s been appointed manager of two very distinctive, sector-limited funds:

Generation Wave Growth Fund (GWGF), a sort of “megatrends” fund targeting the health care, financial services and technology sectors, and

Vice Fund (VICEX), which invests in “sin stocks.”  It defines those as stocks involved with aerospace/defense, gaming, tobacco and alcoholic beverages.

I’m sure there are managers with less personal engagement in sin industries than Gerry (maybe John Montgomery, he of the church flute choir, at Bridgeway), but not many.

Almost all of the research on sin stocks reaches the same conclusion: investing here is vastly more profitable than investing in the market as a whole.  Sin stocks tend to have high barriers to entry (can you imagine anyone starting a new tobacco company?  or a new supersonic fighter manufacturer?) and are often mispriced because of investor uneasiness with them.  Over the medium- to long-term, they consistently outperform both the market and socially-responsible indexes.  One recent study found a global portfolio of sin stocks outperforming the broad market indexes in 35 of 37 years, with “an annual excess return between 11.15% and 13.70%”  (Fabozzi, et al, “Sin Stock Returns,” Journal of Portfolio Management, Fall 2008).

About two-thirds of the portfolio will be selected using quantitative models and one-third with greater qualitative input.  He’s begun reshaping the portfolio, and I expect to profile the fund once he’s had a couple quarters managing it.

Who You Callin’ a “Perma-bear”?

Kiplinger’s columnist Andrew Feinberg wrote an interesting column on the odd thought patterns of most perma-bears (“Permanent Pessimists,” May 2011).  My only objection is his assignment of Jeremy Grantham to the perma-bear den.  Grantham is one of the founders of the institutional money manager GMO (for Grantham, Mayo, and van Otterloo).  He writes singularly careful, thoughtful analyses – often poking fun at himself and his own errors (“I have a long and ignoble history of being early on market calls and, on two occasions, damaged the financial well-being of two separate companies – Batterymarch and GMO”) – which are accessible through the GMO website.

Feinberg notes that Grantham has been bearish on the US stock market for 20 years.  That’s a half-truth.  Grantham has been frequently bearish about whatever asset class has been most in vogue recently.  The bigger questions are, is he wrong and is he dangerous?  In general, the answers are “sometimes” and “not so much.”

One way of testing Grantham’s insights is to look at the performance of GMO funds that have the flexibility to actually act on his recommendations.  Those funds have consistently validated Grantham’s insights.  GMO Global Balanced, Global Equity Allocation and U.S. Equity Allocation are all value-conscious funds whose great long-term records seem to validate the conclusion that Grantham, skeptical and grumpy or not, is right quite often enough.

Who You Callin’ “Mr. Charge Higher Prices”?

This is painful, but an anonymous friend in the financial services industry sent along really disturbing ad for a webinar (a really ugly new word).  The title of the June 8th webinar was “How to Influence Clients to Select Premium-Priced Financial Products and Services! (While Reinforcing Your Valuable Advice).”    The seminar leader “is known as Mr. Charge Higher Prices because he specializes in teaching how to get to the top of your customer’s price . . . and stay there!”


Sound sleazy?  Not at all, since the ad quotes a PhD, Professor of Ethics saying that the seminar leader shows you how to sell high-priced products which are also “higher-value products that more closely align with their goals and objectives.  [He] teaches them how to do so with integrity and professionalism.”  Of course, a quick internet search of the professor’s name and credentials turns up the fact that his doctorate is from an online diploma mill and not a university near London. It’s striking that seven years after public disclosure of his bought-and-paid-for PhD, both the ethicist and Mr. Higher Prices continue to rely on the faux credential in their advertising.

And so, one simple ad offers two answers to the question, “why don’t investors trust me more?”

Two Funds, and why they’re worth your time

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new funds:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX): put your preconceptions aside and pick up your copy of Graham and Dodd’s Security Analysis (1940).  Benjamin Graham was the genius who trained the geniuses and one of his favorite investments was “cigar butt stocks.”  Graham said of cigar butts found on the street, they might only have two or three good puffs left in them but since they were so cheap, you should still pick them up and enjoy them.  Cigar butt stocks, likewise: troubled companies in dying industries that could be bought for cheap and that might still have a few quarters of good returns.

You could think of RiverPark as a specialist in “cigar butt bonds.” They specialize in buying high-yield securities that have been, or soon will be, called.  Effectively, they’re buying bonds that yield 4% or more, but which mature in the next month or two.  The result is a unique, extremely low volatility cash management fund that’s earning several hundred times more than a money market.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit. There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight gf them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.

The selection of this month’s star was inspired by a spate of new fund launches.  As a result of some combination of anxiety about a “new normal” investing world dominated by low returns and high volatility, fund companies have become almost obsessive about launching complex, expensive funds, whose managers have an unprecedented range of investment options.  Eight of the nine no-load funds on July’s funds in registration page represent that sort of complex strategy:

  • Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies
  • PIMCO Credit Absolute Return Fund
  • PIMCO Inflation Response Multi-Asset
  • PIMCO Real Income 2019 and 2029
  • PIMCO Tax Managed Real Return Fund
  • Schooner Global Absolute Return Fund
  • Toews Hedged Commodities Fund

The same thing’s true of the May and June lists: 75% “alternative strategy” funds.

We don’t list load-bearing funds, in general, but recent registrations and launches there show the same pattern:

  • Franklin Templeton Global Allocation
  • BlackRock Credit Opportunities
  • BlackRock Emerging Market Long/Short Equity
  • Parametric Structured Commodity Strategy Fund
  • Neuberger Berman Global Allocation

The question is: if managers asked to execute a simple strategy (say, buying domestic stocks) couldn’t beat a simple index (the S&P 500), what’s the prospect that they’re going to soar when charged with executing hugely complex strategies?

This month’s star tests the hypothesis, “simpler really is better”:

ING Corporate Leaders Trust Series B (LEXCX): at $500 million in assets, you might think LEXCX a bit large to qualify as “in the shadows.”  This 76 year old fund is almost never in the news.  There’s never been an interview with its manager, because it has no manager.  There’s never been a shift in portfolio strategy, because it has no portfolio strategy.  Born in the depths of the Great Depression, LEXCX has the industry’s simplest, more stable portfolio.  It bought an equal number of shares of America’s 30 leading companies in 1935, and held them.  Period.  No change.  No turnover.  No manager.

The amazing thing?  This quiet antique has crushed not only its domestic stock peers for decades now, it’s also outperforming the high-concept funds in the very sort of market that should give them their greatest advantage.  Read on, Macduff!

Nassim Taleb is launching a Black Swan ETF!

Or not. Actually just “not.”

Nassim Taleb, a polymath academic, is the author of Fooled by Randomness (2001) and The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (2007).  The latter book, described by the Times of London as one of the “Books that helped to change the world,” argues that improbable events happen rather frequently, are effectively unpredictable, and have enormous consequences.  He seems to have predicted the 2007-09 meltdown, and his advice lends itself to specific portfolio actions.

Word that “Taleb is launching a black swan ETF” is rippling through various blogs, discussion boards (both here and Morningstar) and websites.  There are three small problems with the story:

  1. Taleb isn’t launching anything.  The original story, “Protect Your Tail,” from Forbes magazine, points to Taleb’s former investment partner and hedge fund manager, Mark Spitznagel.  The article notes, “After Taleb became seriously ill the duo shut the fund. Taleb has since given up money management . . .”
  2. It’s not clear that Spitznagel is launching anything.  Forbes says, “In July Universa intends to tap the financial adviser market by offering its own black swan ETF. The fund will mimic some of the strategies employed by its institutional-only hedge fund and will have an expense ratio of 1.5%.”  Unfortunately, as of late June, there’s no such fund in registration with the SEC.
  3. And you wouldn’t need it if there was such a fund.  Spitznagel himself calls for allocating “about 1% of an investment portfolio to fund such a ‘black swan protection protocol.'”  (Hmmm… in my portfolio that’d be about $12.50.)  If you wanted to have some such protection without a fund with a trendy name, you could adopt Taleb’s recommendation for a “barbell strategy,” in which you place 80% into stable investments, like government bonds and cash, and 20% into risky ones, such stocks and commodities.

Oddly enough, that comes close to describing the sort of strategy already pursued by funds like Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) and Fidelity Strategic Income (FSICX) and those funds charge half of the reported “black swan” expenses.

Briefly noted:

Long-time SmartMoney columnist, James B. Stewart has moved to The New York Times.  Stewart helped found the publication and has been writing the “Common Sense” column for it for 19 years, yet the letter from the editor in that issue made no mention of him and his own final column offered his departure as an afterthought. On June 24th, his first column, also entitled “Common Sense,” appeared in the Times.  Stewart’s first story detailed the bribery of Mexican veterinarians by Tyson Foods.  He’ll be a Saturday columnist for the Business Day section of the paper, but they’re no word on what focus – if any – the feature might have.

For those interested in hiking their risk profiles, Matthews Asia launched its new Matthews China Small Companies Fund (MCSMX) on May 31, 2011.  As with most Matthews funds, there’s a lead manager (Richard Gao, who also manages Matthews China MCHFX) and a guy who’s there in case the manager gets hit by a bus (Henry Zhang, also the back-up guy on Matthews China).

Possible investors will want to read Andrew Foster’s new commentary for Seafarer Capital.  Andrew managed Matthews Asia Growth & Income (2005-2011) before leaving to found Seafarer.  While he has not yet filed to launch a mutual fund, Andrew has been posting a series of thoughtful essays on Asian investing, including several that focus on odd numbers and Chinese finance.  He promises in the next essay to look at BRICS in general but will also “touch upon China’s elevated (some would say breakneck) pace of investment, and what it means for the future of that country.”

Investors will also want to look at the prevalence of financial fraud in Chinese companies.  A recent Barron’s article provides a list of 20 Chinese firms that had a stop trading on the NASDAQ recently, a sign that their American accountants wouldn’t sign-off on the books.  While Matthews has a fine record and Gao promises extensive face-to-face meetings and fundamental research, these seem to be investments treacherous even for major firms.

Vanguard’s new actively managed emerging-markets fund, Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock (VMMSX) launched at the end of June.  It will complement their existing emerging markets index fund (VEIEX), the largest e.m. fund in existence.  Vanguard has four high-quality sub-advisors (M&G Investment Management, Oaktree Capital Management, Pzena Investment Management, and Wellington Management) none of whom have yet run an emerging markets funds.  Minimum investment is $3000 and the expense ratio is 0.95%, far below the category average.Rejoice!  AllianceBernstein is liquidating AllianceBernstein Global Growth (ABZBX). It’s no surprise, given the fund’s terrible performance of late.

Schwab plans to liquidate Schwab YieldPlus (SWYSX), a fund which once had $12 billion in assets.  Marketed as a higher-yield alternative to money markets, it blew apart in 2008 – down 47% – and Schwab has spent hundreds of millions on federal and state claims related to the fund, and faced charges filed by the SEC. Schwab will liquidate Schwab Tax-Free YieldPlus (SWYTX) and Schwab California Tax-Free YieldPlus (SWYCX) at the same time.

Vanguard Structured Large-Cap Growth liquidated on May 31, 2011.

John Hancock Classic Value Mega Cap (JMEAX) will liquidate on Aug. 19, 2011.

Calvert Large Cap Growth (CLGAX) will merge into Calvert Equity (CSIEX), assuming that shareholders (baaaa!) approve.  They’ve got the same management team and Calvert will lower CSIEX’s expenses a bit.

Morgan Stanley Special Growth (SMPAX) will soon merge into Morgan Stanley Institutional Small Company Growth (MSSGX).

ING Value Choice (PAVAX) and ING Global Value Choice (NAWGX) will close to most new investors on July 29, 2011.

Nuveen Tradewinds Value Opportunities (NVOAX) and Nuveen Tradewinds Global All-Cap (NWGAX) will close to most new investors on August 1, 2011.

Fidelity Advisor Mid Cap (FMCDX) will change its name to Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid Cap on August 1, 2011.

JPMorgan Dynamic Small Cap Growth (VSCOX) and JPMorgan Small Cap Growth (PGSGX) will close to most new investors on August 12, 2011.

The MFO Mailbag . . .

I receive a couple dozen letters a month.  By far, the most common is a notice that someone goofed up their email address when signing up our e-mail notification service or registering for the site.  Regrets to Wolfgang and fjujv1.  The system generated a flood of mail reporting on its daily failure to reach you.  For other folks, please double-check the email you register with and, if you have a spam blocker, put the Mutual Fund Observer on your “white list” or our mail won’t get through.

Is there a Commentary archive (Les S)?  Yes, Les, there is.  You just can’t see it yet.  Chip is adjusting the site navigation and, within a week, the April through June commentaries will be available through links on the main commentary page.

Will the Observer post lists of Alarming, Three-Alarm and Most Alarming Three-Alarm funds (Joe B, Judy S, Ed S)?  Sorry, but no.  Those were Roy’s brainchild and I lack the time, expertise and passion needed to maintain them.  Morningstar’s free fund screener will allow you to generate lists of one-star funds, but I’m not familiar with other free screening tools aimed at finding the stinkers.

Is it still possible to access stuff you’d written at FundAlarm (Charles C)?  Not directly now that FundAlarm has gone dark.  I’d be happy to share copies of anything that I’ve retained (drop an email note), though that’s a small fraction of FundAlarm’s material.  There’s an interesting back door.  Google allows you to search for cached material by site.  That is, for example, you can ask The Google if it could provide a list of all references to Fidelity Canada that appeared at FundAlarm.com.  To do that, simple add the word site, a colon, and a web address to your search.

Fidelity Canada site:fundalarm.com

If the word “cached” appears next to a result, it means that Google has saved a copy of that page for you.

Shouldn’t Marathon Value be considered a Star in the Shadows (Ira A)?  Yes, quite possibly. Ira has recommended several other find small funds in the past and Marathon Value (MVPFX) seems to be another with a lot going for it.  I’ll check it out.  Thanks, Ira.  If you’ve got a fund you think we should look at more closely, drop a line to [email protected], and I’ll do a bit of reading.

In closing . . .

Thanks to all the folks who’ve provided financial support for the Observer this month.  In addition to a half dozen friends who provided cash contributions, either via PayPal or by check, readers purchased almost 250 items through the Observer’s Amazon link.  We have, as a result, paid off almost all of our start-up expenses.  Thanks!

For July, we’ll role out three new features: our Amazon store (which will make it easier to find highly-recommended books on investing, personal finance and more), our readers’ guide to the best commentary on the web, and The Falcon’s Eye.  (Cool, eh?)  Currently, if you enter a fund’s ticker symbol in a discussion board post, it generates a pop-up window linking you to the best web-based resources for researching and assessing that fund.  In July we’ll roll that out as a free-standing tool: a little box leading you to a wealth of information, including the Observer’s own fund profiles.

Speaking of which, there are a number of fund profiles in the works for August and September.  Those include Goodhaven Fund, T. Rowe Price Global Infrastructure and Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond funds, RiverPark Wedgewood Fund and, yes, even Marathon Value.

Until then, take care and keep cool!

David

 

June 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

After a lovely month in England, I returned to discover that things are getting back to “normal” again in the financial markets.

Top executives of publicly traded money management firms got raises averaged 33% “as improved financial results and increases in assets under management put them further away from the market turmoil of years past” (Randy Diamond, “Good times rollin’ once again for money manager execs,” Pensions and Investments Online, May 16 2011). While paltry by bankers’ standards, some of the money firm chiefs should be able to cover their mortgages: Larry Fink of BlackRock took home $24 million, while Janus CEO Richard Weil and Affiliated Managers Group CEO Sean Healey each got $20 million.

Pension plans are moving back into hedge fund investing.  According to the consulting firm Prequin, pension plans have 6.8% of their money in hedge funds now compared to 3.6% in 2007.  One motive for the change: hedge funds have returned 6.8% on average over the decade compared to 5.7% for the plans’ stock investments.  By increasing exposure to hedge funds, the plans can mask the magnitude of their uncovered commitments.  That is, they can project higher future returns and so argue that they’ll surely be able to cover their apparently huge deficits.  (“Pensions leap back to hedge funds,” WSJ, May 27 2011)

Rich folks are losing interest in managing their own investments, and are back to handing money over to their “wealth managers” to shepherd.  In 2009, 69% of high net worth investors wanted to take “an active role” in managing their investments.  It’s down to 47% in 2011, which Clifford Favrot of Delta Financial Advisers describes as “returning to normal” (“Rich relax a bit but stay on guard,” WSJ, May 27 2011).

In general, any time folks decide that it’s time to stop worrying, it’s time to start worrying.  Worrier par excellence Jeremy Grantham of GMO argues that the strong performance of risk assets – both stocks and bonds – is detached from the underlying economy.  His advice: “the environment has simply become too risky to justify prudent investors hanging around, hoping to get luck.  So now is not the time to float along with the Fed, but to fight it.”  While Grantham ruefully admits “to a long and ignoble history of being early on market calls” (well, sometimes two years early), he’s renewed his calls to concentrate on high quality US blues and emerging market equities (“Time to be serious – and probably too early – once again,” GMO Quarterly Letter, May 2011).

Part of Wall Street’s Normal: Gaming the System

Folks who suspect that the game is rigged against them have gotten a lot of fodder in the last two months.  A widely discussed article in Rolling Stone Magazine (“The Real Housewives of Wall Street,” April 2011) looks at how federal bailout money was allocated.  In general: (1) poorly and (2) to the rich.  While Stone is not generally a voice of conservatism, its story might have a comfortable home even in the National Review:

. . . the government attempted to unfreeze the credit markets by handing out trillions to banks and hedge funds. And thanks to a whole galaxy of obscure, acronym-laden bailout programs, it eventually rivaled the “official” budget in size — a huge roaring river of cash flowing out of the Federal Reserve to destinations neither chosen by the president nor reviewed by Congress, but instead handed out by fiat by unelected Fed officials using a seemingly nonsensical and apparently unknowable methodology.

Stone argues that “the big picture” of a multi-trillion dollar bailout is simply too big for human comprehension, but that you can learn a lot by looking through the lens of the assistance given a single firm: Waterfall TALF Opportunity.  While Waterfall received a pittance – a mere quarter billion compared to Goldman Sachs $800 billion – Waterfall was distinguished by the credentials of its two chief investors: Christy Mack and Susan Karches.

Christy is the wife of John Mack, the chairman of Morgan Stanley. Susan is the widow of Peter Karches, a close friend of the Macks who served as president of Morgan Stanley’s investment-banking division. Neither woman appears to have any serious history in business, apart from a few philanthropic experiences. Yet the Federal Reserve handed them both low-interest loans of nearly a quarter of a billion dollars through a complicated bailout program that virtually guaranteed them millions in risk-free income.

Stone details the story of the women’s risk-free profits, courtesy of a category of bailout program they describe as “giving already stinking rich people gobs of money for no ****ing reason at all.”  Waterfall investors put up $15 million, then received $220 million in federal funds with the promise that they could receive 100% of any investment gains but be responsible for only 10% of any investment losses they incurred.  It’s a fascinating, frustrating story.

Happily, the women wouldn’t need to worry about investment losses as long as they accepted guidance from the world’s best investors: members of the U.S. House of Representatives.  A study in Business and Politics examined the financial disclosure records of all the members of Congress.  They concluded that somehow members of Congress outperformed the stock market by “6.8% per annum after compounding – better than hedge-fund superstars.”  U.S. Senators performed even better.  While it’s possible that House members are simply smarter than hedge fund managers, the authors darkly conclude “We find strong evidence that Members of the House have some type of non-public information which they use for personal gain” (“Fire Your Hedge Fund, Hire Your Congressman,” Barron’s, 05/26/2011).

It’s the world’s scariest ad!

Remember Larry, Darryl and Darryl from the old Newhart TV show?  The three deranged brothers launched their first business – “Anything for a Buck”. They’ll do anything for a buck. If it’s something cool like digging up an old witch’s body from the cellar, they might even pay you the buck!

 

Larry, Darryl and Darryl
 

Apparently they’re now the masterminds behind iShares, whose slogan seems to be “anything can be an ETF!”

 

iShares-ad
 

Fairholme Fund wobbles

Fairholme Fund (FAIRX), a huge, idiosyncratic beast run by Morningstar’s equity manager of the decade, Bruce Berkowitz, has had a bad year.  The fund trails its average peer by 15 percentage points of the past year and ranks in the bottom 1% of large cap value funds for the past quarter, two quarters and four quarters (as of June 2011).  The fund sucked in $4 billion of anxious money in 2010 after a long, remarkable run.  Predictable as the rains in spring, $1 billion of assets rushed back out the door in April alone (per Morningstar fund flow estimates).  That’s three times worse than any other month in its history.

Bruce Berkowitz didn’t dodge the fund’s problems in a May 11 conference call with investors:

Here are my thoughts on the Fairholme Funds recent performance: horrible, [and] that’s the summary in hindsight and it may be to be expected over the short term.

We’ve always stated in our reports that short-term performance should not be over emphasized. It’s the long term that counts. This is not the first time we’ve underperformed; it won’t be the last time and I don’t think it’s reality to outperform every month, quarter or year.

So it’s been lousy for months, we’ve been losing, we’re way underperforming, and it may stay lousy for more time.

He argues that the short-term problem is his decision to buy financial stocks (now 90% of the portfolio), which is expects to continue buying.  “We need to buy low and buy lower and buy lower. Even when the crowd yells you’re wrong. This is how we’ve achieved our performance over the past decade and this is how we will achieve our performance in the next couple of decades.”

One of his highest-visibility holdings, St. Joe Corporation (JOE) a Florida land company.  They started as a paper mill, got rich, got stupid, bought a bunch of stuff they shouldn’t have (brokerage firms, for example), had no debt but made no money.  After a long battle, Fairholme took control of St. Joe in March, forcing out the CEO and much of the board.

Why care?

There’s an interesting argument that St. Joe was less important for its huge land holdings than for its ability to make investments that Fairholme itself cannot make.  A fascinating article in Institutional Investor notes:

St. Joe may not seem like a major prize in the big scheme of things, with a market value of just $2.4 billion, but Berkowitz and Charles Fernandez, his No. 2 at Fairholme for the past three and a half years, saw a huge opportunity. Not only did they think that the company’s real estate operations could be worth a lot more in the future, they saw St. Joe as a way to buy assets that a regulated mutual fund would be prohibited from owning directly. In essence, if successful, they could transform their flagship Fairholme Fund into something akin to a hedge fund or an investment vehicle like Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway.

“We’re trying to go in a direction we think most mutual funds will be going — where we have the flexibility to do private transactions and public transactions, and the ability to do what makes sense for our shareholders,” Berkowitz says. (“Fairholme’s Bruce Berkowitz Is Beating Hedge Fund Managers at Their Own Game,” Institutional Investor, 05/19/2011).

Indeed, in his conference call, Berkowitz says, “JOE is, at its heart, an asset manager.”

The possibilities are intriguing.  In his interview with the Observer, Mr. Berkowitz argued that Fairholme’s size ($20 billion in assets) was critical to its future.  While many observers felt the fund was too unwieldy, Berkowitz argues that only its size allows it to become party to a set of expensive, unconventional opportunities.

Beyond the simple matter of corporate restructurings, bankruptcies and other conventional “special situations,” managers are looking increasingly far afield for opportunities.  Hedge fund manager David Einhorn, who lost big to Berkowitz in the St. Joe fight, recently announced a $200 million investment in the New York Mets.   And bond maestro Jeff Gundlach pushed the investment potential of gemstones at a recent investment conference:

[Gundlach] likes gold for its “Biblical street cred, if such a thing is possible.” But he advocates gem stones over gold. “Gold has shown itself to be money and pretty. Gems have also shown themselves to be money and prettier,” he says.  (Mark Gongloff, gundlach-leads-off-with-prostitutes, WSJ Marketbeat blog, 05/25/2011

Hmmm . . . perhaps Newt Gingrich’s reported $500,000 bill with Tiffany’s isn’t just egregious excess: it’s creative portfolio management.

This never turns out well: the emerging markets debt obsession grows

A lot of emerging market debt funds are now coming to market, many of them specializing in debt priced in some local currency.  By Morningstar’s estimate, of the 20 emerging-markets local-currency funds, 14 have been opened in the last year.  These funds are a vote against the future of the US dollar and in favor of currencies supported – largely – by commodity-producing economies and growing populations.  Among the recent notable entrants:

Harbor Emerging Markets Debt (HAEDX) launched on May 2, 2011, and invests in securities that are economically tied to emerging markets, or priced in emerging-markets currencies. It’s being sub-advised, as all Harbor funds are.  The subadvisor is Stone Harbor Investment Partners whose Stone Harbor Emerging Markets Debt (SHMDX) has returned 10.5% annualized since inception. Harbor Emerging Markets Debt has an expense ratio of 1.05% and a $1000 minimum.

Aberdeen Asset Management launched Aberdeen Emerging Markets Debt Local Currency (ADLAX) on May 2, 2011. Brett Diment will lead the team responsible for managing the fund.

Forward Management launched Forward Emerging Markets Corporate Debt (FFXIX) on May 3, 2011. The fund will invest mainly in emerging-markets corporate debt, and will be subadvised by SW Asset Management. David Hinman and Raymond Zucaro will manage the fund.

T. Rowe Price launched T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Local Currency Bond on May 26. The fund will invest in bonds denominated in emerging-markets currencies or derivatives that provide emerging-markets bond exposure.  Andrew Keirle and Christopher Rothery who manage the fund also have been managing a similar strategy for institutional investors in the T. Rowe Price Funds SICAV–Emerging Local Markets Bond Fund since 2007. That said, the institutional fund has consistently trailed T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Bond (PREMX) since inception.

HSBC filed to launch HSBC Emerging Markets Debt, which will invest primarily in U.S.-dollar-denominated while Emerging Markets Local Debt will invest in local-currency debt. Both should come on-line on June 30, 2011.

PIMCO Developing Local Markets (PLMDX) will be renamed PIMCO Emerging Markets Currency on August 16, to reflect a slight strategy shift. The fund holds positions in short maturity local bonds and currency derivatives.  The change will give the managers a bit more freedom to choose which countries to pursue.

Emerging market bond funds have returned an average of 12-13% annually over the past 10-15 years. On face, easier and more diverse access to these assets should be a good thing.  Remember two things:  First, the asset class has done so well that future returns are likely modest.  Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo (GMO) projects real returns on emerging market debt of just1.7% annually over the next 5-7 years (Asset Class Return Forecast, 04/30/2011).   That’s well below their projection for E.M. stocks (4.5% real) or U.S. blue chip companies (4.0%).   Second, much of those gains took place when relatively few investment companies were interested.  In 2003 for example, investors placed only $14 billion to work in emerging market debt.  Fidelity New Market Income (FNMIX) earned 31% that year. In 2010, it was $72 billion and the Fido fund returned 11%.  As more funds pile in, profits are going to become fewer and opportunities thinner.  While E.M. debt is a valid asset class, joining the herd rushing toward it might bear a moment’s reflect.

Funds worth your attention

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers. These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new fund:

Fidelity Global Strategies (FDYSX): this relatively young fund has one of Fidelity’s broadest, most ambitious mandates.  In June 2011, it was rechristened to highlight a global approach.  It’s not clear that the changes are anything more than pouring old wine in a new bottle.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit.  There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.  This month’s star:

RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX): going, going, gone as of June 30.  This former “most intriguing new fund” is larger than most “stars,” but it deserves recognition for two reasons.  First, it’s truly a one-of-a-kind offering.  Second, its imminent closing makes this the idea time for potential investors to do their research and make a decision before regrets set in.

Research on the cutting edge of “duh”

Investment managers and strategies plow through an enormous amount of behavioral research these days, trying to use the predictable patterns of human (i.e., investor) behavior to better position their portfolios.  That said, a remarkable amount of published research in the area seems to cry out “duh!”

On unusually warm days, people are more likely to believe in global warming than they are on cold days, according to a survey of 1200 Americans and Australians by the Center for Decision Sciences at the Columbia Business School.

In a related study, people sitting in a steadily warming room are more likely to believe in global warming than those who are not.

On sunny days, investors are more like to choose stocks over bonds but when it’s ridiculously hot, investors become cranky and markets become volatile.

By the way, if you hand folks a warm drink, they’re more likely to rate you as a “warm” person than it you hand them a cold drink.

Extreme market volatility is bad for investors’ hearts: among Chinese investors anyway.  A 1% market jump correlates with a 2% jump in heart attacks among Chinese investors (and you thought you had problems with emerging markets’ volatility).

If you build more highways, that is, if you make driving easier and more convenient, people drive more, according to a study soon to be published in the American Economic Review.

Work is stressful, which can be scientifically measured by checking levels of the stress hormone cortisol.  A new study in the Journal of Family Psychology suggests that women’s stress levels drop when their husbands are helping with chores, but it’s the opposite for men: Their stress levels fall when their wives are busy while they’re relaxing. Oddly, the scientists didn’t report results for families in which dad did the housework, and mom relaxed.

Briefly noted:

Janus did something right and cool: kudus to Janus for publicizing the investments made by each manager in each fund, as well as in Janus funds as a whole.  While this information is purely available (it’s in the Statement of Additional Information), I know of no other fund company that brings it all together in one place.  For those interested, check here to see how serious their Janus manager is about his or her fund.

Janus Venture (JAVTX) reopened to new investors on May 6 and launched a series of new share classes (A, C, S and I).  As usual, it’s not clear why Janus re-opened the fund: it has a larger portfolio ($1.3 billion) for a small cap fund, the largest in its history, and small caps are already coming off an extended run.  The best reason to take the fund seriously, at least if you can access it without a load, is the strength of its new management team.  Janus Triton (JATTX) managers Chad Meade and Brian Schaub have run Venture for less than a year, but have made a real difference in that time.  They’ve decreased the fund’s concentration and eliminated some of its micro-cap exposure, and have generated very solid returns.  Triton, also a small cap fund, has been an exceedingly solid performer for Janus and noticeably less volatile than the typical Janus fund.  The advantage of a fee cap (holding total expenses to 1.05% for the next year) makes it more attractive still.

Journalists are funny. You can almost hear the breathlessness in Neal Anderson’s prose: “The MFWire has learned that the Boston-based mutual fund giant is re-branding the large cap blend fund as the Fidelity Global Strategies Fund. . . “(“Fido Shifts a Fund’s Name and Strategies,” 05/04/2011).  True enough, but it’s not exactly as if you needed a secret contact to find this out: Fidelity duly submitted the paperwork and it was made publicly available a week before in the SECs EDGAR database.

RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX) will close to new investors on June 30, 2011.  You really might want to read the new fund profile this month.

The Quant Funds have a new name.  They’re now the Pear Tree Funds because the former name “no longer reflects the true nature of the mutual fund family.”  At base, the funds have three sub-advisors (Polaris, PanAgora and Columbia Partners), not all of who are quant investors and the advisor felt “the former name no longer reflects the true nature” of their funds.  Apparently “pear trees” (dense, brittle and short-lived) comes closer.

During the FundAlarm hiatus, Fidelity launched Fidelity Conservative Income Bond (FCONX).  It’s an ultra-short term bond fund run by Kim Miller.  While he’s been with Fidelity for 20 years, his management experience is limited most to money market funds, though he was on the team for several of the Asset Manager and municipal bond funds.  The fund’s expense ratio is 0.40% and it has accumulated $100 million in assets in three months.  (A slow start for a Fido fund!)

Similarly, the BearlyBullish fund registered in March and launched in early May.  At base, it’s a mid- to large-cap stock fund, mostly invested in the US and Canada.  When the managers’ market indicators turn negative, the fund simply moves more of its assets to cash.  That strategy worked in 2008, when the separately managed accounts that use this system dropped 24% while the broad market dropped by 37%.  It’s run by a team from Alpha Capital Management.  The investment minimum is $1000 and the expense ratio is 1.49%.

Nuveen Quantitative Large Cap Core (FQCAX) changed its name to Nuveen Quantitative Enhanced Core.

Old Mutual Strategic Small Companies (OSSAX) changed its name to Old Mutual Copper Rock International Small Cap. The fund also changed its strategy from a domestic small-cap strategy to an international small-cap strategy.

Pending shareholder approval on June 27, Madison Mosaic Small/Mid-Cap Fund will become NorthRoad International Fund (MADMX) and the Fund’s investment objective will be changed from “long-term growth” to “long-term capital appreciation by investing in non-U.S. companies.” Under the proposal, total fund operating expenses will decrease from 1.25% to 1.15% (annualized). Madison owns a majority stake in New York-based NorthRoad already.  Northroad handles institutional accounts now and their three managers have good credentials, both in previous employment (Lazard Asset Management in a couple cases) and colleges (Williams, Columbia, Yale).  The Small/Mid-Cap fund drew negligible assets and was only a so-so performer in its short life, so this is likely a substantial gain for the firm and its shareholders.

Dreyfus Core Value will merge into Dreyfus Strategic Value (DAGVX) on Nov. 16.

MFS Core Growth (MFCAX) will merge into MFS Growth (MFEGX).

Munder Large-Cap Growth has merged into Munder Growth Opportunities (MNNAX).

RidgeWorth Large Cap Quantitative Equity (SQEAX) will merge into RidgeWorth Large Cap Core Growth Stock (CFVIX) on July 15.

Loomis Sayles Disciplined Equity liquidated on May 13.

William Blair Emerging Markets Growth (BIEMX) will close to new investors on June 30.  Heartland Value Plus (HRVIX) closed to new investors in mid-May.  Heartland noted some skepticism about the state of the small cap market in justifying their close.

In closing . . .

Google Analytics offers fascinating snapshots of the Observer community.  7000 people have visited the site and about a thousand drop by more than once a day.  Greetings to visitors from Canada, Spain, Israel, Mexico and the U.K. – our most popular countries outside the U.S.  A cheery smile to the women who (secretly) use the Observer: research just released by the market-research firm Mintel Group discovered that women, more than men, were likely to make their investments through mutual funds (“Girls just want to have funds,” Barron’s, 05/21/2011).  Over half of all the folks who wrote me before the launch of the Observer were women who relied on FundAlarm’s research and discussions, though most admitted to never feeling quite brave enough to post.

Men, contrarily, were more likely to use ETFs, stocks, options and futures – and to trade actively.  (Note to the guys: stop that!)

In addition, a special wave to our one visitor from Kenya, who seems faithfully to have read every page on the site!

Thanks to all the folks who’ve provided financial support to the Observer of the past month.  Thanks especially to the six friends of the Observer who made direct contributions through PayPal.  In response to a couple notes, I’ve also posted my snail mail address for the sake of people who want to either write or send a check (which dodges PayPal’s fees).   In addition, our Amazon link led to 244 purchases in May, which contributes a lot.  Thanks to you all!

A special thanks to Roy Weitz, who stepped in as moderator during my three weeks in England.

We read, and respond to, everything we can.  Chip continues to monitor the Board’s technical questions and I try to handle any of the emailed notes.  If you have a question, comment, compliment or concern, just write me!

If you write, please remember to include your name and contact information.  I’m always interested in learning about funds or investment trends that intrigue you, but I’m exceedingly wary of anonymous tips.

Take care and I’ll see you again on July 1!

 

David

May 1, 2011

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to May and welcome to the Observer’s first monthly commentary.  Each month I’ll try to highlight some interesting (often maddening, generally overlooked) developments in the world of funds and financial journalism.  I’ll also profile for you to some intriguing and/or outstanding funds that you might otherwise not hear about.

Successor to “The Worst Best Fund Ever”

They’re at it again.  They’ve found another golden manager.   This time Tom Soveiro of Fidelity Leveraged Company Stock and its Advisor Class sibling.  Top mutual fund for the past decade so:

Guru Investor, “#1 Fund Manager Profits from Debt”
Investment News, “The ‘Secret’ of the Top Performing Fund Manager”
Street Authority, “2 Stock Picks from the Best Mutual Fund on the Planet”
Motley Fool, “The Decade’s Best Stock Picker”
Mutual Fund Observer, “Dear God.  Not again.”

The first sign that something might be terribly amiss is the line: “Thomas Soviero has replaced Ken Heebner at the top” (A New Winner on the Mutual Fund Charts, Bloomberg BusinessWeek, 21 April 2011).  Ken Heebner manages the CGM Focus (CGMFX) fund, which I pilloried last year as “the worst best fund ever.”  In celebration of Heebner’s 18.8% annual returns over the decade, it was not surprising that Forbes made CGMFX “the Best Mutual Fund of the Decade.”  The Boston Globe declared Kenneth “The Mad Bomber” Heebner “The Decade’s Best” for a record that “still stands atop all competitors.” And SmartMoney anointed him “the real Hero of the Zeroes.”

All of which I ridiculed on the simple grounds that Heebner’s funds were so wildly volatile that no mere moral would ever stay invested in the dang things.  The simplest measure of that is Morningstar’s “investor returns” calculation.  At base, Morningstar weights a fund’s returns by its assets: a great year in which only a handful of people were invested weighs less than a subsequent rotten year when billions have flooded the fund.  In Heebner’s case, the numbers were damning: the average investor in CGMFX lost 11% a year in the same period that the fund made 19% a year. Why?  Folks rushed in after the money had already been made, were there for the subsequent inferno, and fled before his trademark rebounds.

Lesson for us all: we’re not as brave or as smart as we think.  If you’re going to make a “mad investment” with someone like “The Mad Bomber,” keep it to a small sliver of your portfolio – planners talk about 5% of so – and plan on holding through the inevitable disaster.

Perhaps, then, you should approach Heebner’s successor with considerable caution.

The new top at the top is Fidelity Advisor Leveraged Company Stock (FLSAX).  Fidelity has developed a great niche investing in high-yield or “junk” bonds.  They’ve leveraged an unusually large analyst staff to support:

  • Fidelity Capital and Income (FAGIX), a five-star high yield bond fund that can invest up to 20% in stocks
  • Fidelity Floating Rate High Income (FFRHX), which buys floating rate bank loans
  • Fidelity High Income (SPHIX), a four-star junk bond fund
  • Fidelity Focused High Income (FHIFX), a junk bond fund that can also own convertibles and equities
  • Fidelity Global High Income (no ticker), likely launch in June 2011
  • Fidelity Strategic Income (FSICX), which has a “barbell shaped” portfolio, which one end being high quality government debt and the other being junk. Nothing in-between.

And the Fidelity Leveraged Company Stock (FLVCX), which invests in the stock of those companies which resort to issuing junk bonds or which are, otherwise, highly-leveraged (a.k.a., deeply in debt).  As with most of the Fidelity funds, there’s also an “advisor” version with five different share classes.

Simple, yes?  Great fund, stable management, interesting niche, buy it!

Simple no.

Most of the worshipful articles fail to mention two things:

1. the fund thrives when interest rates are falling and credit is easy.  Remember, you’re investing in companies whose credit sucks.  That’s why they were forced to issue junk bonds in the first place.  If the market force junk bonds constricts, these guys have nowhere to turn (except, perhaps, to guys with names like “Two Fingers”).  The potential for the fund to suffer was demonstrated during the credit freeze in 2008 when the fund lost between 53.8% (Advisor “A” shares) and 54.5% (no-load) of value.  Both returns place it in the bottom 2 or 3% of its peer group.

The fund’s performance during the market crash (October 07 – March 09) explains why it has a one-star rating from Morningstar for the past three years. Across all time periods, it has “high” risk, married recently to “low” returns.  Which helps explain why . . .

2. the fund is not shareholder-friendly.People like the idea of high-risk, high-return funds a lot more than they like the reality of them. Almost all behavioral finance research finds the same dang thing about us: we are drawn to shiny, high-return funds just about as powerfully as a mosquito is drawn to a bug-zapper.

And we end up doing just about as well as the mosquito does.  Morningstar captures some sense of our impulses in their “investor return” calculations.  Rather than treating a fund’s first year return of 500% – when it had only three investors, say – equal to its fifth year loss of 50% – which it has 20,000 investors – Morningstar weights returns by the size of the fund in the period when those returns were earned.

In general, a big gap between the two numbers suggests either (1) investors rushed in after the big gains were already made or (2) investors continue to rush in and out in a sort of bipolar frenzy of greed and fear.

Things don’t look great on that front:

Fidelity Leveraged Company returned 14.5% over the past decade.  Its shareholders made 3.6%.

Fidelity Advisor Leveraged Company, “A” shares, returned 14.9% over the past decade.  Its shareholders, on average, lost money: down 0.1% for the same period.

Two other observations here:  the wrong version won.  For reasons unexplained, the lower-cost no-load version of the fund trailed the Advisor “A” shares over the past decade, 14.5% to 14.9%.  And that little difference made a difference.  $10,000 invested in the no-load shares grew to $38,700 after 10 years while Advisor shares grew to $40,100.  little differences add up, but I don’t know how.  Finally, the advisors apparently advised poorly.  Here’s a nice win for the do-it-yourself folks buying the no-load shares.  The advisor-sold version had far lower investor returns than did the DIY version.  Whether because they showed up late or had a greater incentive to “churn” their clients’ portfolios, the advisor-led group managed to turn a great decade into an absolute zero (on average) for their clients.

“Eight Simple Steps to Starting Your Own Mutual Fund Family”

Sean Hanna, editor-in-chief at MFWire.com has decided to published a useful little guide “to help budding mutual fund entrepreneurs on their way” (“Eight Simple Steps,” April 21 2011).  While many people spent one year and a million dollars, he reports, to start a fund, it can be a lot simpler and quicker.  So here are MFWire’s quick and easy steps to getting started:

Step 1: Develop a Strategy
Step 2: Hire Expert Counsel
Step 3: Your Board of Directors
Step 4: The Transfer Agent
Step 5: Custodian
Step 6: Distribution
Step 7: Fund Accountant
Step 8: Getting Noticed

The folks here at the Observer applaud Mr. Hanna for his useful guide, but we’d suggest two additional steps need to be penciled-in.  We’ll label them Step 0 and Step 9.

Step 0: Have your head examined.  Really.  There are nearly 500 funds out there with under $10 million in assets.  Make sure you have a reason to be #501.  Forty or so have well-above average five year records and have earned either four- or five-star Morningstar ratings.  And they’re still not drawing investors.

Step 9: Plan on losing money.  Even if your fund is splendid, you’re almost certain to lose money on it.  Mr. Hanna’s essay begins by complaining about “the old boy network” that dominates the industry.  Point well taken.  If you’re not one of “the old boys,” you’re likely to toil in frustrated obscurity, slowly draining your reserves.  Indeed, much of the reason for the Observer’s existence is that no one else is covering these orphan funds.

My suggestion: if you can line up three major investors who are willing to stay with you for the first few years, you’ll have a better chance of making it to Year Three, your Morningstar and Lipper ratings, and the prospect of making it through many advisors’ fund screening programs.  If you don’t have a contingency for losing money for three to five years, think again.

Hey!  Where’d my manager go?

Investors are often left in the dark when star managers leave their funds.  Fund companies have an incentive to pretend that the manager never existed and certainly wasn’t the reason to anyone invested in the fund (regardless of what their marketing materials had been saying for years).  In general, you’ll hear that a manager “left to pursue other opportunities” and often not even that much.  Finding where your manager got to is even harder.  Among the notable movers:

Chuck Akre left FBR Focus (FBRVX) and launched Akre Focus (AKREX).  Mr. Akre made a smooth marketing move and ran an ad for his new fund on the Morningstar profile page for his old fund.   Perhaps in consequence, he’s brought in $300 million to his new fund.

Eric Cinnamond left Intrepid Small Cap (ICMAX) to become lead manager of Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX).   Mr. Cinnamond’s splendid record, and Aston’s marketing, have drawn $60 million to ARIVX.

Andrew Foster left Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX) after a superb stint in which he created one of the least volatile and most profitable Asia-focused portfolios.  He has launched Seafarer Capital Partners, with plans (which I’ll watch closely) to launch a new international fund. In the interim, he’s posting thoughtful weekly essays on economics and investing.

If you’re a manager (or know the whereabouts of a vanished manager) and want, like the Who’s Down in Whoville to cry out “We are here!  We are here!  We are here!” then drop me a line and I’ll pass word of your new venue along.

The last Embarcadero story ever

It all started with Garrett Van Wagoner, whose Van Wagoner Emerging Growth Fund which returned 291% in 1999.  Heck, all of Van Wagoner’s funds returned more than 200% that year before plunging into a 10-year abyss.  The funds tried to hide their shame but reorganizing into the Embarcadero Funds in 2008, but to no avail.

In one of those “did you even blush when you wrote that?” passages, Van Wagoner Capital Management, investment adviser of the Embarcadero Funds, opines that “there are important benefits from investing through skilled money managers whose strategies, when combined, seek to provide enhanced risk-adjusted returns, lower volatility and lower sensitivity to traditional financial market indices.”

Uhh . . . that is, by the way, plagiarized.  It’s the same text used by the Absolute Strategies Fund (ASFAX) in describing their investment discipline.  Not sure who stole it from whom.

This is the same firm that literally abandoned two of their funds for nearly a decade – no manager, no management contract, no investments – while three others spent nearly six years “in liquidation”.   Rallying, the firm reorganized those five funds into two (Market Neutral and Absolute Return).  Sadly, they couldn’t then find anyone to manage the funds.  On the downside, that meant they were saddled with high expenses and an all-cash portfolio during 2010.  Happily, that was their best year in a decade.  And, sadly, no one was there to enjoy the experience.  Embarcadero’s final shareholder report notes:

While 2010 was difficult for the Funds, shareholders now have the benefit of new management utilizing an active investment program with expenses that are lower than previously applicable to the Funds.  No shareholders remain in the Funds, and their existence will be terminated in the near future.

Uhh . . . if there are no shareholders, who is benefiting from new management?  The “new management” in question is Graham Tanaka, whose Tanaka Growth Fund (TGFRX ) absorbed the remnants of the Embarcadero funds.  TGFRX is burdened with high expenses (2.45%), high volatility (a 10-year beta of 140) and low returns (a whopping 0.96% annually over the decade).  The sad thing is that’s infinitely better than they’re used to: Embarcadero Market Neutral lost 16.4% annually while Embarcadero Absolute Disast Return lost 23.8%.

Sigh: the Steadman funds (aka “Deadman funds” which refused, for decades, to admit they were dead), gone.  American Heritage (a fund entirely dependent on penile implants), gone.  Frontier Microcap (sometimes called “the worst mutual fund ever”), gone.  And now, this.  The world suddenly seems so empty.

Funds for fifty: the few, the proud, the affordable!

It’s increasingly difficult for small investors to get started in investing.  Many no-load funds formerly offered low minimums (sometimes just $100) to entice new investors.  That ended when they discovered that thousands of investors opened a $100 fund, adding a bit at first, then promptly forget about it.  There’s no way that a $400 account does anybody any good: the fund company loses money by holding it (it would only generate $6 to cover expenses for the year) and investors end up with tiny puddles of money.

A far brighter idea was to waive the minimum initial investment requirement on the condition that an investor commit to an automatic monthly investment until the fund reached the normal minimum.  That system helps enormously, since investors are likely to leave automatic plans in place long enough to get some good from them.

For those looking to start investing, or start their children in investing, look at one of the handful of no-load fund firms that still waives the minimum investment for disciplined investors:

  • Amana – run in accordance with Islamic investment principles (in practice, socially responsible and debt-avoidant), the three Amana funds ask only $250 to start and waive even that for automatic investors.
  • Artisan – one of the most distinguished boutique firms, whose five autonomous teams manage 11 domestic and international equity funds
  • Aston – which specializes in strong, innovative sub-advised funds.
  • Manning & Napier – the quiet company, M&N has a remarkable collection of excellent funds that almost no one has heard of.
  • Parnassus – runs a handful of solid-to-great socially responsible funds, including the Small Cap fund which I’ve profiled.
  • Pax World – a mixed bag in terms of performance, but surely the most diverse collection of socially-responsible funds (Global Women’s Equity, anyone) around.
  • T. Rowe Price – the real T. Rowe Price is said to be the father of growth investing, but he gave rise to a family of sensible, well-run, risk-conscious funds, almost all of which are worth your attention.

Another race to the bottom

Two more financial supermarkets, Firstrade and Scottrade, have joined the ranks of firms offering commission free ETFs.  They join Schwab, which started the movement by making 13 of its Schwab-branded ETFs commission-free, TD Ameritrade (with 100 free ETFs, Vanguard (64) and Fidelity (31).  The commissions, typically $8 per trade, were a major impediment for folks committed to small, regular purchases.

That said, none of the firms above did it to be nice.  They did it to get money, specifically your money.  It’s their business, after all.  In some cases, the “free” ETFs have higher expenses ratios than their commission-bearing cousins.  In some cases, additional fees apply.  AmeriTrade, for example, charges $20 if you sell within a month of buying.  And in some cases, the collection of free ETFs is unbalanced, so you’re decision to buy a few ETFs for free locks you into buying others that do bear fees.

In any case, here’s the new line-up.

Firstrade (no broad international ETF)
Vanguard Long-Term Bond (BLV)
Vanguard Intermediate Bond (BIV)
Vanguard Short-Term Bond (BSV)
Vanguard Small Cap Growth (VBK)
iShares S&P MidCap 400 (IJH)
Vanguard Emerging Markets (VWO)
Vanguard Dividend Appreciation (VIG)
iShares S&P 500 (IVV)
PowerShares DB Commodity Index (DBC)
iShares FTSE/Xinhua China 25 (FXI)

Scottrade (no international and no bonds)
Morningstar US Market Index ETF (FMU)
Morningstar Large Cap Index ETF (FLG)
Morningstar Mid Cap Index ETF (FMM)
Morningstar Small Cap Index ETF (FOS)
Morningstar Basic Materials Index ETF (FBM)
Morningstar Communication Services Index ETF (FCQ)
Morningstar Consumer Cyclical Index ETF (FCL)
Morningstar Consumer Defensive Index ETF (FCD)
Morningstar Energy Index ETF (FEG)
Morningstar Financial Services Index ETF (FFL)
Morningstar Health Care Index ETF (FHC)
Morningstar Industrials Index ETF (FIL)
Morningstar Real Estate Index ETF (FRL)
Morningstar Technology Index ETF (FTQ)
Morningstar Utilities Index ETF (FUI)

Four funds worth your attention

Really worth it.  Every month the Observer profiles two to four funds that we think you really need to know more about.  They fall into two categories:

Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers.  These are funds that do not yet have a long track record, but which have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “most intriguing new funds” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought.  This month’s two new funds are:

Amana Developing World (AMDWX) is the latest offering from the most consistently excellent fund company around (Saturna Capital, if you didn’t already know).  Investing on Muslim principles with a pedigree anyone would love, AMDWX offers an intriguing, lower-risk option for investors interested in emerging markets exposure without the excitement.

Osterweis Strategic Investment (OSTVX) is a flexible allocation fund that draws on the skills and experience of a very successful management team.  Building on the success of Osterweis (OSTFX) and Osterweis Strategic Income (OSTIX), this intriguing new fund offers the prospect of moving smoothly between stocks and bonds and sensibly within them.

Stars in the shadows: Small funds of exceptional merit.  There are thousands of tiny funds (2200 funds under $100 million in assets and many only one-tenth that size) that operate under the radar.  Some intentionally avoid notice because they’re offered by institutional managers as a favor to their customers (Prospector Capital Appreciation and all the FMC funds are examples).  Many simply can’t get their story told: they’re headquartered outside of the financial centers, they’re offered as part of a boutique or as a single stand-alone fund, they don’t have marketing budgets or they’re simply not flashy enough to draw journalists’ attention.  There are, by Morningstar’s count, 75 five-star funds with under $100 million in assets; Morningstar’s analysts cover only eight of them.

The stars are all time-tested funds, many of which have everything except shareholders.  This month’s two stars are:

Artisan Global Value (ARTGX): Artisan is the first fund to move from “intriguing new fund” to “star in the shadows.”  This outstanding little fund, run the same team that runs the closed, five-star Artisan International Value (ARTKX) fund has been producing better returns with far less risk than its peers, just as ARTKX has been doing for years.  So why no takers?

LKCM Balanced (LKBAX): this staid balanced fund has the distinction of offering the best risk/return profile of any balanced fund in existence, and it’s been doing it for over a decade.  A real “star in the shadows.” Thanks for Ira Artman for chiming in with a recommendation on the fund, and links to cool resources on it!

Briefly Noted:

Morningstar just announced a separation agreement with their former chief operating officer, Tao Huang.  Mr. Huang received $3.15 million in severance and a consulting contract with the company.  (I wonder if Morningstar founder Joe Mansueto, who had to sign the agreement, ever thinks back to the days when he was a tiny, one-man operation just trying to break even?)  It’s not clear why Mr. Huang left, though it is clear that no one suggests anyone did anything wrong (no one “violated any law, interfered with any right, breached any obligation or otherwise engaged in any improper or illegal conduct”), he’s promised not to “disparage” Morningstar.

On April 26, Wasatch Emerging India Fund (WAINX) launched.  The fund focuses on Indian small cap companies and has two experienced managers, Ajay Krishnan and Roger Edgley.   Mr. Krishnan is a native of India and co-manages Wasatch Ultra Growth.  Mr. Edgley, a native of England for what that matters, manages Wasatch Emerging Markets Small Cap, International Opportunities and International Growth. Wasatch argues that the Indian economy is roaring ahead and that small caps are undervalued.  Since they cover several hundred Indian firms for their other funds, they’re feeling pretty confident about being the first Indian small cap fund.

I somehow missed the launch of Leuthold Global Industries, back in June 2010.

The Baron funds have decided to ease up on frequent traders.  “Frequent trading” used to be “six months or less.”    As of April 20, 2011, it’s 90 days or less.

You might call it DWS not-too-International (SUIAX).  A supplement to the prospectus, dated 4/11/11, pledges the fund to invest at least 65% of its assets internationally, the same threshold DWS uses for their Global Thematic fund.  Management is equally bold in promising to think about whether they’ll buy good investments:  “Portfolio management may buy a security when its research resources indicate the potential for future upside price appreciation or their investment process identifies an attractive investment opportunity.”  DWS hired their fourth lead manager (Nikolaus Poehlmann) in five years in October 2009, fired him and his team in April 2011, and brought on a fifth set of managers. That might explain why they trail 96% of their peers over the past 1-, 3-, and 5-year periods but it doesn’t really help in explaining how they’ve managed to accumulate $1 billion in assets.

Henderson has changed the name of two of its funds: Henderson Global Opportunities is now Henderson Global Leaders Fund (HFPIX) and Henderson Japan-Asia Focus Fund is now Henderson Japan Focus (HFJIX).   Both funds are small and expensive.  Japan posts a relatively fine annualized loss of 6% over the past five years while Global Leaders has clocked in with a purely mediocre 1.3% annual loss over its first three years of existence.

ING plans to sell their Clarion fund to CB Richard Ellis Group by July 1, 2011. ING Clarion Real Estate (IVRIX) will keep the same strategy and management team, though presumably a new moniker.

Loomis Sayles Global Markets changed its name to Loomis Sayles Global Equity and Income (LGMAX).

The portfolio-management team responsible for Aston/Optimum Mid Cap (ABMIX) left Optimum Investment Advisers and joined Fairpointe Capital.  Aston canned Optimum, hired Fairpointe and has renamed the fund Aston/Fairpointe Mid Cap. There will be no changes to the management team or strategy.

Thanks!

Mutual Fund Observer has had a good first month of operation.  That wouldn’t have been possible without the support, financial, technical and otherwise, of a lot of kind people.  And so thanks:

  • To Roy Weitz and FundAlarm, who led the way, provided a home, guided my writing and made this all possible.
  • To the nine friends who have, between them, contributed $500 through our PayPal to help support us.
  • To the many people who used the Observer’s link to Amazon, from which we received nearly a hundred dollars more.  If you’re interested in helping out, click on the “support us” link to learn more.
  • To the 300 or so folks who’ve joined the discussion board so far.  I’m especially grateful for the 400-odd notices that let us identify problems and tweak settings to make the board a bit friendlier.
  • To the 27,000 visitors who’ve come by in the first month since our unofficial opening.
  • To two remarkably talented and dedicated IT professionals: Brad Isbell, Augustana College’s senior web programmer and proprietor of the web consulting firm musatcha.com and to Cheryl Welsch, better known here as Chip, SUNY-Sullivan’s Director of Information Technology.  They’ve both worked long and hard under the hood of the site, and in conjunction with the folks here, to make it all work.

I am deeply indebted to you all, and I’m looking forward to the challenge of maintaining a site worthy of your attention.

But not right now!  On May 3rd I leave for a long-planned research trip to Oxford University.  There I’ll work on the private papers of long-dead diplomats, trying to unravel the story behind a famous piece of World War One atrocity propaganda.  It was the work of a committee headed by one of the era’s most distinguished diplomats, and it was almost certainly falsified.  So I’ll spend a week at the school on which they modeled Hogwarts, trying to learn what Lord Bryce knew and when he knew it.  Then off to enjoy London and the English countryside with family.

You’ll be in good hands while I’m gone.  Roy Weitz, feared gunslinger and beloved curmudgeon, will oversee the discussion board while I’m gone.  Chip and Brad, dressed much like wizards themselves, will monitor developments, mutter darkly and make it all work.

Until June 1 then!

 

David