Yearly Archives: 2018

Manager changes, February 2018

By Chip

Sixty-two funds saw partial turnover in their management teams but no high profile manager stalked off or was shown the door, and no rising star was awarded a new charge. Actually there were rather more than 62, since we don’t track boring bond funds (the value added by the third manager on a Massachusetts muni fund is modest enough that we don’t track those teams; sorry, guys) and, this month only, we’re boycotting changes in the Dreyfus funds. Frankly, Dreyfus got annoying. Their announcements show up in the SEC filings under a bunch of labels (including dozens of Dreyfus series, CitizensSelect, Advantage Funds and Strategic Funds) and were poorly written. We ended up with a headache and the decision to share the following announcement: “about a dozen Dreyfus funds shifted teams this month; if you invest with them, you might want to double-check.”

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
CLSHX AdvisorOne CLS Shelter Fund Paula Wieck is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Case Eichenberger, Jackson Lee and Rusty Vanneman will join Gene Frerichs on the management team. 2/18
TWGTX American Century All Cap Growth Fund Marcus Scott and Michael Orndorff are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Joseph Reiland and Gregory Woodhams will now manage the fund. 2/18
TWHIX American Century Heritage Fund  Michael Orndorff, Marcus A. Scott and Greg Walsh are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Robert Brookby will join Nalin Yogasundram on the management team. 2/18
TWEGX American Century International Discovery Fund No one, but . . . Federico Laffan, oddly, has just been added to the prospectus, though he’s been on the team that manages the fund since 2014. Trevor Gurwich and Pratik Patel are the other 2/3 of the team. 2/18
AMJVX American Century Multi-Asset Income Fund No one, but . . . John Donner joins Vidya Rajappa, Scott Wilson, Richard Weiss, and Radu Gabudean on the management team. 2/18
ACFIX Arbitrage Credit Opportunities Fund No one, but . . . John Orrico joins Gregory Loprete and Robert Ryon on the management team.. 2/18
ARSQX Aristotle Value Equity Fund No one, but . . . Gregory Padilla joins Howard Gleicher on the management team. 2/18
MDEGX BlackRock Long-Horizon Equity Fund No one, but . . . Jane Holl joins Stuart Reeve and Andrew Wheatley-Hubbard on the management team. 2/18
EGEAX Carillon Eagle Smaller Company Fund Matthew McGeary, Betsy Pecor and Charles Schwartz are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. James McBride and Timothy Miller will now manage the fund. 2/18
CLSAX CLS Global Diversified Equity Fund Paula Wieck is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Grant Engelbart and Rusty Vanneman will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
CLERX CLS Growth and Income Fund Paula Wieck is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Joshua Jenkins and Rusty Vanneman will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
CLHAX CLS International Equity Fund No one, but . . . Jackson Lee joins Konstantin Etus and Joe Smith on the management team. 2/18
CLSHX CLS Shelter Fund Paula Wieck is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Gene Frerichs will be joined by Case Eichenberger, Jackson Lee, and Rusty Venneman on the management team. 2/18
CBSAX Columbia Mid Cap Growth Fund William Chamberlain is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. John Emerson, Matthew Litfin, and Erika Maschmeyer will now manage the fund. 2/18
SLMCX Columbia Seligman Communications and Information Fund Rahul Narang will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Vimal Patel joins Paul Wick, Shekhar Pramanick, Sanjay Devgan, Jeetil Patel, and Christopher Boova on the management team. 2/18
SHGTX Columbia Seligman Global Technology Fund Rahul Narang will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Vimal Patel joins Paul Wick, Shekhar Pramanick, Sanjay Devgan, Jeetil Patel, and Christopher Boova on the management team. 2/18
FGMNX Fidelity GNMA Fund William Irving no longer serves as lead portfolio manager of the fund. Sean Corcoran joins Franco Castagliuolo in managing the fund. 2/18
FINPX Fidelity Inflation-Protected Bond Fund William Irving no longer serves as lead portfolio manager of the fund. Sean Corcoran joins Franco Castagliuolo in managing the fund. 2/18
FSNGX Fidelity Select Natural Gas Ted Davis will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Ben Shuleva will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
FNARX Fidelity Select Natural Resources John Dowd will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Nathan Strik will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
FSRRX Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund William Irving is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Sean Corcoran joined Franco Castagliuolo, Samuel Wald, Mark Snyderman, Adam Kramer, and Ford O’Neil on the management team. 2/18
HISIX Homestead International Equity No one, but . . . Scott Crawshaw joins Patrick Todd, Andrew West, Bryan Lloyd, Alexander Walsh, and Ferrill Roll in managing the fund.
“Ferrill Roll” is a fascinating name, something worthy of Game of Thrones.
2/18
WASAX Ivy Asset Strategy Fund Cynthia Prince-Fox is retiring, effective April 30th, and will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. W. Jeffrey Surles joins F. Chace Brundige on the management team. 2/18
IGJAX Ivy Government Securities Fund No one, but . . . Susan Regan joins Rick Perry in managing the fund. 2/18
IWGAX Ivy Wilshire Global Allocation Fund Cynthia Prince-Fox is retiring, effective April 30th, and will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. W. Jeffrey Surles joins F. Chace Brundige on the management team. 2/18
Various John Hancock Funds II Multi-Index Lifestyle Portfolios Effective immediately, Marcelle Daher no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the funds. Robert Sykes joins Robert Boyda and Nathan Thooft on the management team. 2/18
Various John Hancock Funds II Multi-Index Lifetime Portfolios Effective immediately, Marcelle Daher no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the funds. Robert Sykes joins Robert Boyda and Nathan Thooft on the management team. 2/18
Various John Hancock Funds II Multi-Index Preservation Portfolios Effective immediately, Marcelle Daher no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the funds. Robert Sykes joins Robert Boyda and Nathan Thooft on the management team. 2/18
Various John Hancock Funds II Multimanager Lifestyle Portfolios Effective immediately, Marcelle Daher no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the funds. Robert Sykes joins Robert Boyda and Nathan Thooft on the management team. 2/18
Various John Hancock Funds II Multimanager Lifetime Portfolios Effective immediately, Marcelle Daher no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the funds. Robert Sykes joins Robert Boyda and Nathan Thooft on the management team. 2/18
MVPFX Marathon Value Portfolio Marc Heilweil, who’d guided the fund since inception in 2000, will no longer serve as a portfolio manager. Todd Jones now runs the fund. 2/18
MITTX Massachusetts Investors Trust No one, but . . . Alison O’Neill Mackey joins Kevin Beatty and Ted Maloney on the management team. 2/18
DIFAX MFS Diversified Income Fund As of September 1, 2018, William Adams will no longer be a portfolio manager of the fund. As of December 31, 2018, Jim Swanson will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Almeida and Michael Skatrud join Ward Brown,  David Cole, Rick Gable, Matt Ryan, Jonathan Sage, and Geoffrey Schechter on the management team. 2/18
MWOFX MFS Global Growth Fund No one, but . . . Joseph Skorski joins David Antonelli and Jeffrey Constantino on the management team. 2/18
MHOAX MFS Global High Yield Fund As of September 1, 2018, William Adams will no longer be a portfolio manager of the fund. Michael Skatrud will join David Cole, Matt Ryan and William Adams in managing the fund, in anticipation of Mssr. Adams departure. 2/18
MFEGX MFS Growth Fund Matthew Sabel is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Eric Fischman and Paul Gordon will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
MHITX MFS High Income Fund As of September 1, 2018, William Adams will no longer be a portfolio manager of the fund. Michael Skatrud will join David Cole and William Adams in managing the fund, in anticipation of Mssr. Adams departure. 2/18
OTCAX MFS Mid Cap Growth Fund Matthew Sabel is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Eric Fischman and Paul Gordon will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
FPPAX MFS Prudent Investor Fund No one, but . . . Edward Dearing joins David Cole and Barnaby Weiner in managing the fund. 2/18
MFIOX MFS Strategic Income Fund As of September 1, 2018, William Adams will no longer be a portfolio manager of the fund. Michael Skatrud joins Joshua Marston, Ward Brown, Philipp Burgener, David Cole, Alexander Mackey, Robert Persons, and Matt Ryan in managing the fund, in anticipation of Mssr. Adams departure. 2/18
MFGIX Monteagle Quality Growth Fund No one, but . . . Steven MacNamara joined Tom Sauer, Craig Cairns, Stefan Kip Astheimer, and Brett Winnefeld on the management team. 2/18
QVGIX Oppenheimer Global Allocation Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Alessio de Longis and Benjamin Rockmuller will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
ODAAX Oppenheimer Global Multi-Alternatives Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Alessio de Longis and Benjamin Rockmuller will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
QMGAX Oppenheimer Global Multi-Asset Growth Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Alessio de Longis and Benjamin Rockmuller will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
QMAAX Oppenheimer Global Multi-Asset Income Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Alessio de Longis and Benjamin Rockmuller will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
OYCIX Oppenheimer Portfolio Series Conservative Investor Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Jeffrey Bennett will now run the fund. 2/18
OYAIX Oppenheimer Portfolio Series Equity Investor Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Jeffrey Bennett will now run the fund. 2/18
OYMIX Oppenheimer Portfolio Series Moderate Investor Fund Mark Hamilton and Dokyoung Lee will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Jeffrey Bennett will now run the fund. 2/18
PNOPX Putnam Multi-Cap Growth Fund Richard Bodzy and Robert Brookby are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Katherine Collins and R. Sheperd Perkins will now manage the fund. 2/18
RDMIX Rational Dynamic Momentum Fund Michael Ivie and R. Jerry Parker will no longer serve as portfolio managers for the fund. Adam Butler, Rodrigo Gordillo, and Michael Philbrick will now manage the fund. 2/18
SIEPX Saratoga International Equity Fund Marc Miller is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. John Brim, Stephanie Jones, and Stephen Smith are now managing the fund. 2/18
SITIX STAAR International Fund J. Andre Weisbrod is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Brett Boshco now manages the fund. 2/18
SITAX STAAR Investment Trust – Alternative Categories Fund J. Andre Weisbrod is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Brett Boshco now manages the fund. 2/18
SITLX STAAR Larger Company Stock Fund J. Andre Weisbrod is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Brett Boshco now manages the fund. 2/18
SITSX STAAR Smaller Company Stock Fund J. Andre Weisbrod is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Brett Boshco now manages the fund. 2/18
FPCIX Strategic Advisers Core Income Fund Stewart Wong is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Jonathan Dugan joins Gregory Pappas, Jeffrey Moore, Michael Plage, Franco Castagliuolo, Sean Corcoran, and James Herbst on the management team. 2/18
HMVAX The Hartford Midcap Value Fund James Mordy has announced his plan to retire from the fund, effective December 31, 2018. Gregory Garabedian will continue to manage the fund. 2/18
USMIX USAA Extended Market Index Fund Jennifer Hsui, Rachel Aguirre, Creighton Jue, Alan Mason, and Greg Savage will no longer serve as portfolio managers for the fund. Richard Brown, Thomas Durante, and Karen Wong will now run the fund. 2/18
WEEMX Wells Fargo Factor Enhanced Emerging Markets Fund No one, but . . . Monisha Jayakumar is added as a portfolio manager, joining Dennis Bein, Harindra de Silva, and David Krider on the team. 2/18
WINTX Wells Fargo Factor Enhanced International Fund No one, but . . . Monisha Jayakumar is added as a portfolio manager, joining Dennis Bein, Harindra de Silva, and David Krider on the team. 2/18
WLECX Wells Fargo Factor Enhanced Large Cap Fund No one, but . . . Monisha Jayakumar is added as a portfolio manager, joining Dennis Bein, Ryan Brown, and Harindra de Silva on the team. 2/18
WFESX Wells Fargo Factor Enhanced Small Cap Fund No one, but . . . Monisha Jayakumar is added as a portfolio manager, joining Dennis Bein, Ryan Brown, and Harindra de Silva on the team. 2/18

Briefly Noted

By David Snowball

Updates

The 2018 Thomas Reuters Lipper Fund Awards have been announced. By their calculation, the top fund families overall are Thrivent Mutual Funds and TIAA Investments. Thrivent represents the universe of small fund companies while TIAA represents large firms. The top small fund families were PRIMECAP (equities), Ashmore (fixed income) and Allianz Global Investors (mixed assets).

Individual funds worth noting include Artisan High Income (top high income fund over three years), DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced CAPE (top LCV over three years), and Towle Deep Value Fund (top SCV over three).

Longboard Alternative Growth Fund (LONAX) underwent a -1-for-4 reverse share split on February 23, 2018. In general, such moves are (1) rare and (2) window-dressing. Not to be outdone, Direxion Daily Technology Bear 3X Shares, Direxion Daily Energy Bear 3X Shares, Direxion Daily MSCI Emerging Markets Bear 3X Shares, Direxion Daily S&P Biotech Bear 3X Shares and the Direxion Daily FTSE China Bear 3X Shares all announced on February 28, 2018, reverse splits of 5:1 or 10:1.

Mirae Asset Global Investments is buying the Global X Funds for an undisclosed sum. At $10 billion, Global X is a tiny player in the ETF industry. At $120 billion, Mirae is still no more than a mid-sized one. The Global X ETFs, which will continue being sold under the Global X name, mostly occupy weird little niches: the Founder-Run Companies ETF (BOSS), the Guru Index ETF (GURU), the Lithium& Battery Tech ETF (LIT), the Scientific Beta ETF (SCIU) and so on.

Thomas Kirchner launched the Pennsylvania Avenue Event-Driven Fund (PAEDX) in 2003. We were impressed by him and the fund, and long-ago profiled them. Frustrated by his inability to raise assets, in June 2010 it became the Quaker Event Arbitrage Fund (QEAAX). Despite being remarkably good (top 10% over the past decade, for example), the fund still hasn’t drawn assets. In another reboot, Mr. Kirchner and his co-manager have filed to reorganize the fund as the Camelot Event Driven Fund. While we regret the fund’s ongoing sales fee (a 5.5% front load) and high expenses (1.99% e.r.), we have faith in his ability and best wishes for his success.

Briefly Noted . . .

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

I’ve seen nothing, except the endless trickle of four or five basis point reductions in management fees. While they qualify as better than nothing, they really do strike me as terrified, grudging and impotent gestures. On a $1,000 investment, for example, a three basis point reduction saves the investor $0.30 per year. If you’re doing this in response to the fact that your industry is being ground into irrelevance, you’re apt to be sorely disappointed about how much loyalty thirty cents will buy you. And if you blind yourself to the need for a more fundamental rethinking (“Hey, we cut our fees to the bone! What more could they ask of us?”), you’re likely to end up in a minor niche business.

Had I mentioned that you could still buy hand copied book manuscripts in England in the 19th century. Right, 400 years after Gutenberg people were still making a living by hand copying entire books for rich eccentrics.

Okay, here’s a last minute find of The Shadow’s: the investment minimums for the Zevenbergen Funds’ Institutional Classes will decrease from $250,000 to $50,000. The funds in question are Zevenbergen Growth Fund (ZVNIX) and Zevenbergen Genea Fund (ZVGIX).

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

Davis Funds has closed Class T shares for Davis New York Venture Fund (DNVTX), effective immediately.

Effective April 13, 2018, Eaton Vance Atlanta Capital SMID-Cap Fund (EAASX) will discontinue all sales of its shares to new qualified retirement plans.

Effective February 2, 2018, Fidelity Small Cap Growth Fund (FCPGX) closed to new investors. Only time will tell whether closing a small cap fund at $4.3 billion was too late. 

Goodwood SMID Long/Short Fund (GAMAX) has closed its Advisor Class shares and will liquidate them on April 23, 2018.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

On April 20, 2018 Columbia U.S. Government Mortgage Fund becomes Columbia Quality Income Fund.

Cognios Market Neutral Large Cap Fund (COGIX) is being reorganized as a newly created series of M3Sixty Funds Trust.

Effective on or about February 26, 2018, the name of Pax Ellevate Global Women’s Index Fund (PXWEX) will change to Pax Ellevate Global Women’s Leadership Fund. At that same time, the advisor will waive another 10 bps of their management fee.

Effective April 27, 2018, PIMCO is changing the name of its Class P shares to Class I-2 shares. “P” designates the more expensive of PIMCO’s two institutional share classes: a $1 million minimum like “Institutional,” but about 10 bps higher expenses.

Putnam has decided to terminate one of its more interesting experiments. In 2009, Putnam tried to turn about their failing fortunes – roughly speaking, their funds sucked and investors had noticed – with the launch of their Absolute Return series, which was accompanied by a full media onslaught. The basic story was this: each fund would target a return of cash plus a certain number of basis points, so Absolute Return 100 hoped for returns 100 bps (or 1% annually) above what you could get with T-bills.

Putnam recently announced a plan to change the funds’ names, goals, and investment strategies … and, by the way, to eliminate the use of performance fees. Here’s the short version:

Putnam Absolute Return 100 (PARTX) becomes Putnam Short Duration Bond and dreams of “as high a rate of current income as Putnam Management believes is consistent with preservation of capital.”

Putnam Absolute Return 300 Fund (PTRNX) becomes Putnam Fixed Income Absolute Return Fund, “seeking positive total return” (unlike the rest of us).

Putnam Absolute Return 500 Fund (PJMDX) will merge into Putnam Absolute Return 700 Fund (PDMAX), which then becomes Putnam Multi-Asset Absolute Return Fund. While AR 700 was “seeking to earn a positive total return that exceeds the return on U.S. Treasury bills by 700 basis points (or 7.00%) on an annualized basis over a reasonable period of time (generally at least three years or more) regardless of market conditions,” the new version just hopes for “positive total return.”

They’re a hard bunch to judge. Morningstar gives them between two and four stars but that’s a judgment against a peer group (nontraditional bond or multialternative) and not against their self-declared mission. Except for a few share classes of AR 100, the funds were not able to hang out the “mission accomplished” banner.

Here’s the data. The “target return” is Putnam’s calculation of what cash plus 100/300/500/700 would have come to from the funds’ inception through February 2018. Each fund has nine share classes, so the “actual return” is the range of the worst- to best-performing share classes.

Fund Target return Actual return
AR 100 1.24% 0.7 – 1.7%
AR 300 3.24% 1.8 – 2.8%
AR 500 5.24% 3.0 – 4.3%
AR 700 7.24% 3.2 – 4.8%

The changes occur on April 30, 2018 but Putnam believes that the portfolio transition, in June 2018, will involve portfolio makeovers with the prospect of attendant transaction costs and short-term taxable distributions.

John Rekenthaler offered a thoughtful eulogy for Putnam, the funds and the “absolute return” category (“Why Putnam has struggled with its absolute return funds,” 2/2/18). He graciously allows, “I would not go so far as to call absolute return funds ‘absolute nonsense’ (a phrase that I also once used for the group, but I have become more moderate with age). However, I remain unconvinced.”

Putnam Multi-Cap Value Fund is becoming Putnam Sustainable Future Fund on March 19, 2018. The goal remains long-term capital appreciation but will invest in “growth stocks of mid-size companies whose products and services we believe provide solutions that directly contribute to sustainable social, environmental and economic development.”

Effective on or about April 25, 2018, the name of the REX VolMAXXTM Long VIX Weekly Futures Strategy ETF (VMAX) will change to REX VolMAXXTM Long VIX Futures Strategy ETF.

On May 1, 2018, the T. Rowe Price Media & Telecommunications Fund (PRMTX) will change its name to the T. Rowe Price Communications & Technology Fund.  Price notes that the “investment universe available to the fund has evolved since the fund adopted its current name in 1997, and Internet-related securities now represent a much more significant portion of the fund’s holdings,” so the new name reflects an attempt to accurately reflect the current portfolio and strategy.

Effective on or about April 17, 2018, Touchstone Global Growth Fund (TGGAX, formerly DSM Global Growth Fund) will be renamed the Touchstone International Growth Opportunities Fund. At base, they’re eliminating their stake in U.S. stocks (over half of the portfolio) and reducing expenses by 10 bps. “There will be no other changes to the Fund,” they aver.

Value Line Income and Growth Fund has become Value Line Capital Appreciation Fund (VALIX). At base, they plan to lose the need for their “income” to be “as high and dependable as is consistent with reasonable risk and capital growth to increase total return” and downshift it to “income consistent with its asset allocation.”

To better coincide with its new investment objective and corresponding benchmark index, Vanguard REIT Index Fund (VGSIX) has changed its name to Vanguard Real Estate Index Fund

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Thanks, as always, to The Shadow whose indefatigable sleuthing in the dark hallways of the SEC’s EDGAR database drags dozens of fund changes – most especially liquidations – to light each month. Even when I’ve already caught the changes, it’s incredibly reassuring to have him there … in the shadows … watching.

Both AB Asia ex-Japan Equity Portfolio (AXJAX) and AB Credit Long/Short Portfolio (ALASX) have closed and will liquidate on April 20, 2018. As you read on, you might notice that April 20, 2018 is the most popular date for liquidating one’s fund. (It probably has something to do with social media.)

Altegris Multi-Strategy Alternative Fund (MULNX) will liquidate on March 31, 2018.

Avenue Credit Strategies Fund (ACSAX) will be liquidated on March 14, 2018. If you know of ACSAX at all, it’s because of its tie to the spectacularly ill-fated Third Avenue Focused Credit Fund (TFCVX). Focused Credit trapped itself with such a spectacularly illiquid portfolio that it had to suspend all redemptions in December 2015 in order to relieve pressure as it is tried to liquidate itself. Two years later, TFCVX has been paying out dribs and drabs so that the current NAV is $0.51/share. They anticipate final liquidation this year, at which point Third Avenue shareholders will have received about 85% of their December 2015 account value back.

In any case, Avenue Credit Strategies was launched in 2012 by Jeffrey Gary, the founder manager of Focused Credit. Two things stand out about the first. First, he refuses to report the fund’s daily assets under management which is legal but very rare. One speculation is that he’s trying to confuse hedge fund traders who might otherwise be able to front-run his trades. Second, his trades don’t appear to have worked well enough that folks would want to copy them.

ACSAX is in blue while his boring long-short credit peers are in orange and the bond market aggregate is green.

BMO TCH Emerging Markets Bond Fund closed on February 8, 2018 and was, on short notice, liquidated. Similarly, the Class R3 share class of BMO Mid-Cap Value Fund and BMO Small-Cap Value Fund have been closed and will be liquidated.

The $2 million Bridgeway Small-Cap Momentum Fund (BRSMX) will liquidate on May 14, 2018.

CM Advisors Fund (CMAFX) merged into CM Advisors Small Cap Value Fund (CMOVX) on February 23, 2018. In an unnecessarily macabre note, the SEC filing designated CMOVX as “the Survivor Fund,” which rather brings a zombie apocalypse to mind. Others use the phrase “acquiring fund.”

Dreyfus Global Infrastructure Fund (DGANX) will liquidate on March 27, 2018. 

Dreyfus Core Equity Fund (DLTSX), a clone of the no-load Dreyfus Appreciation Fund (DGAGX) is slated to merge into Dreyfus Worldwide Growth Fund (PGROX) on or about June 29, 2018. Why not merge into Appreciation? Because both Core and Worldwide carry sales loads.

Cohen & Steers Active Commodities Strategy Fund (CDFAX) will liquidate on April 13, 2018, if not sooner. (It’s rare that a Board allows that it might hurry up the execution, but here they did.)

The Trustees of Context Capital Funds have voted to liquidate and terminate Context Macro Opportunities Fund (CMOFX) effective on or about March 30, 2018. 

On or about March 19, 2018, Equinox Crabel Strategy Fund (EQCRX) will “discontinue operations, close, liquidate and terminate.”  It will pass its fifth anniversary on March 5, 2018, with a record of having lost money since inception and still having earned a three-star rating from Morningstar which tells you something about the managed futures peer group.

Equinox Systematica Macro Fund (EBCIX) is closing down. It’s another tiny managed futures fund with a losing record since inception. Final liquidation of the Fund is currently anticipated to occur on March 19, 2018.

“The Board of Trustees of Renaissance Capital Greenwich Funds has concluded that it is in the best interests of the Global IPO Fund (IPOSX) and its shareholders that the Fund be liquidated on or about March 28, 2018.” Yuh … the fund has been around since the late 1990s and has managed to return 1.9% per year which is identical to the return on the three-month T-bill over the same period. (The fund’s expense ratio – 2.5% – substantially exceeds its 20 year annual return.) The biggest difference: no money market fund has subjected itself to the 85% drawdown experienced by IPOSX investors.

Goldman Sachs Strategic Macro Fund (GAAMX, formerly Goldman Sachs Fixed Income Macro Strategies Fund) was scheduled for liquidation on February 20, 2018 but the execution has now been delayed until about March 26, 2018. “The Liquidation Date may be further changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.” Having checked the performance chart, I don’t think the delay is attributable to second thoughts on the Board’s part.

Around July 16, 2018, The Hartford Municipal Real Return Fund (HTNAX) merges into The Hartford Municipal Opportunities Fund (HHMAX).

Hartford Schroders Emerging Markets Debt and Currency Fund (SARVX) is expected to merge into Hartford Schroders Emerging Markets Multi-Sector Bond Fund (SMSVX). No date is set, but shareholders (baaaaa!) will be asked for their approval during a May 2018 proxy vote. The funds are pretty weakly correlated (0.74 from the inception of SARVX) but is should still be a pretty clear win for SARVX shareholders. They are moving into a less expensive fund whose three-year annual returns are 220% of their current fund’s while its volatility is only 130%.

Hartford Global Equity Income Fund (HLEAX) will be merging into Hartford International Equity Fund (HDVAX), assuming shareholder (baaaaa!) approval. The merger will occur on June 25, 2018.

HSBC Total Return Fund liquidated on February 28, 2018.

MassMutual Premier Value Fund (MCEAX) will be dissolved on or about March 23, 2018 (the “Termination Date”). “Will be dissolved” always strikes me as the fate of the intrepid spacefarers captured by the Xoraxian Empire.

Hurry to pay your last respects: Janus Henderson Real Return Fund (JURAX) liquidates on Friday, March 2, 2018.

LJM Preservation and Growth Fund (LJMAX) closed to new investments on February 7, 2018 and will liquidate on March 29, 2018. Here’s a hint as to why:

Yuh, that would be rather more than an 80% repricing event there. Morningstar was “Neutral” on the fund until February 9, 2018, at which point they were officially “Negative.”

Manning & Napier Fund Quality Equity Series (MNQSX) will liquidate on March 9, 2018. No one will notice.

Neiman Tactical Income Fund (NTAFX) will undergo “orderly dissolution” on March 16, 2018.

Parnassus Asia Fund (PAFSX/PFPSX) will be liquidated on March 29, 2018.

Pear Tree Panagora Risk Parity Emerging Markets Fund (RPEMX/EMRPX) is merging into Pear Tree PanAgora Emerging Markets Fund (QFFOX), which “have identical investment objectives and substantially similar investment strategies” but “there will be an increase in fees for Risk Parity Fund shareholders.” Both funds badly trail their peers with the Risk-Parity fund offering one-third of its peers’ returns in exchange for a small reduction in short-term volatility. The reorganization will close on or about March 28, 2018.

In an announcement almost too dull to make, PNC has announced the liquidation of PNC Maryland Tax Exempt Bond Fund and PNC Ohio Intermediate Tax Exempt Bond Fund, both of which will close May 8 and liquidate June 8.

Folks at Poplar Forest Capital has announced the intention of merging Poplar Forest Outliers Fund (IPFOX) into Yorktown Mid Cap Fund (YWBIX) on April 20, 2018. The two funds’ “investment objectives, strategies, policies and a portfolio management team … are substantially similar,” which is to note that Poplar founder J. Dale Harvey runs both.  The manager for Yorktown Mid Cap is Dale Harvey. He’s been the subadvisor for a year and the fund is two years old. It’s got $23 million and a 1.25% e.r. for “I” shares.  The retail “A” shares for the Outliers fund was eliminated in November 2016. The remaining “I” class has $5 million and 1.1% expenses. Neither fund is covered in glory.

Green represents their Morningstar peer group, orange is Poplar and blue is Yorktown. The funds have a correlation of 0.88 and nearly identical short term Sharpe ratios.

The Schwab Money Market Fund (SWMXX) will liquidate on May 25, 2018. No idea of why.

SSGA High Yield Bond Fund (SSHGX) will liquidate on April 20, 2018.

Effective February 7, 2018, the Virtus Seix Limited Duration Fund was liquidated. The SEC filing explains that that means “the Fund has ceased to exist and is no longer available for sale. Accordingly, the Fund’s Prospectuses and SAI are no longer valid.”

WisdomTree has announced the liquidation of nine ETFs on or about March 16, 2018. The walking dead are:

  • WisdomTree Strong Dollar Emerging Markets Equity Fund EMSD
  • WisdomTree U.S. Domestic Economy Fund WUSA
  • WisdomTree U.S. Export and Multinational Fund WEXP
  • WisdomTree United Kingdom Hedged Equity Fund DXPS
  • WisdomTree Global ex-U.S. Hedged Dividend Fund DXUS
  • WisdomTree Japan Hedged Real Estate Fund DXJR
  • WisdomTree Japan Hedged Capital Goods Fund DXJC
  • WisdomTree Japan Hedged Health Care Fund DXJH
  • WisdomTree Global ex-U.S. Hedged Real Estate Fund HDRW

February 1, 2018

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

It’s a Tale of Two Parties, one rather healthier than the other. My students, slowed by a surprisingly cold month and end-of-term stress (Augustana is finishing a Winter trimester that began a bit after Halloween and ends near Valentine’s Day), have taken to launching spontaneous little parties in hopes of gathering that last burst of energy needed to make it through a last set of research presentations and reflective essays. Lionel Ritchie (whose name they barely recognize) captures the late winter moment: “Party, Karamu, Fiesta, Forever. Come on and sing along.” On whole, that strikes me as joyful, appropriate and, ultimately, productive.

The other party rather less so.

“Going so soon? I wouldn’t hear of it. Why my little party’s just beginning.”

                 Wicked Witch of the West, in L. Frank Baum, The Wonderful Wizard of Oz (1900)

I have never been much of a fan of any parties, but two draw my gravest reservations: (1) those in my honor and (2) those hosted by Wall Street. I’m safe from the former, at least until the end of May, but may be getting dragged into the latter. Two forces have been kept in balance in recent years: the stock market is increasingly overvalued but no one is very enthused about it, so it stumbles ahead without dramatic rises or falls. The first remains true, the second is in jeopardy.

The stock market is overvalued. Unless you believe that stocks are worth precisely whatever someone last paid for them (that is, that they’re never overpriced because someone just saw value in them), the stock market is overvalued. Way. Way, way, and for a long time. The folks at the Leuthold Group track about 30 different valuation measures, several of which focus on the valuations on the median stock in an index. Why median? Because the valuation of the “average” stock mostly reflects the valuations of an index’s largest stocks. By way of example, just five stocks (Apple, Microsoft, Facebook, Amazon and Alphabet) comprise 13% of the S&P 500. Looking at the median stock (the 250th cheapest or 250th most expensive, depending on the direction you’re looking from) avoids that bias.

So, where are we? Quoth Leuthold: “the broad U.S. stock market is more overvalued than at any time in history”(Perception for the Professional, January 2018).

That has, of course, been true for quite a while now. Low interest rates have suppressed interest in fixed-income investing and the move to “passive” investing has kept many portfolios fully exposed to the stock market, where once their managers might have begun reacting (or, admittedly, reacting foolishly) to the market’s moves.

Investors are (finally) starting to get excited. That’s never a good thing. Lisa Beilfuss, writing for the Wall Street Journal, notes, “after sitting out most of the nearly nine-year bull market, individual investors are finally pouring in” (“Retail investors jump into the market,” 1/27-28/2018). Discount brokerages saw surging activity at the end of 2017 and on into January 2018. One analyst warns that FOMO is setting in: Fear Of Missing Out. At Ameritrade, which saw a 72% rise in new accounts established by younger investors, cash flows are being driven by interest in cryptocurrencies and cannabis. E*Trade affirmed, “Crypto and cannabis … volumes have been up big.” Those investments are being financed, at least in part, by peoples’ decision to stop saving money: the US personal savings rate fell in December to its lowest level since the days of the housing bubble. All savings activities combined (college, retirement, savings accounts and so on) consume just 2.4% of disposable income. That’s down by 65% since the modest peak in the aftermath of the financial crisis. That’s helped pay for 14 record highs recorded in the S&P 500 just during January, the most in a single month since 1955. NASDAQ records, 13 of them, match what we saw in December 1999, at the climax of the tech and telecom bubble. When records fall in quick succession, we’re experiencing price acceleration which is, according to three Harvard economists, “the strongest indicator” of an impending peak (Greenwood, et al, “Bubbles for Fama,” 2017).

So where do we go from here? Quite possibly to a party. Stock markets tend to have climactic “melt-ups” in which crazed investors buy anything they can and whatever price it takes. It’s sort of akin to the feeding frenzy of tuna: toss a bit of chum in the water and the fish become so frenzied that they’ll even attack unbaited hooks. By how much might the market rise? In their January report for professional investors (Perception), Leuthold made a simple calculation: if the median stock matched the highest recorded valuation ever, on every measure, then the market would rise 5.1% further.

Oops. The broad U.S. market rose 5.4% in January, pushing through Leuthold’s “crazy but credible” ceiling. Jeremy Grantham, founder of the institutional investment firm GMO, is more optimistic in his pessimism; “we are currently showing signs of entering the blow-off or melt-up phase of this very long bull market” with an eventual S&P 500 top around 3400 – 3700. That is, if historical patterns repeat, the S&P 500 might reasonably (?) be expected to rise 20-25% further.

Woo hoo!

Followed, he fears, by a 50% decline. Leuthold suggests that just returning to our modern “normal” valuations – the median valuations seen since 1990 – would require a 24% decline from here. If the S&P 500 does indeed inflate to the 3400 -3700 range, the decline would be a bit over 40%. Of course, if we again saw the kinds of lows we’ve twice experienced since 1990, the decline would be 64% from here and … well, 73% from Grantham’s hypothetical peak.

Happily, the fact that other people are being stupid is not a reason for us to join them. A soaring market does not justify throwing Bitcoins at marijuana entrepreneurs, nor does the prospect of a falling market justify a panicked flight to cash and stocks of survival biscuits. MFO’s position is always the same: don’t put more money at risk than you can afford to lose, create an asset allocation plan that’s appropriate to your needs and risk tolerance, invest in vehicles that have earned investors’ faith over time … then move on to more important topics, like enjoying life and making a difference in the lives of others.

We’ll try to help. Our March issue will include my annual portfolio disclosure, recommendations for getting a little balance in your portfolio, cash-heavy funds (think of them as light hedge funds, since cash is the ultimate uncorrelated, defensive asset) that managed double-digit returns last year (we call them the “15/15 funds”) and profiles of two funds that consistently get it right. We hope you’ll stick around for the adventure.

Thanks go to . . .

Your generosity continues, and we appreciate it. Many, many thanks go to those who made contributions in January. Some of you subscribed to MFO Premium, some sent us a check, and many made contributions through our PayPal link. We’re grateful for every one. In particular, we’d like to thank Cecil, the Kaspar family, Raal, Gary, Sharon, Mark, Pete, Malcolm, Greg, Michael, Andrew, Dan, OJ (a mighty wave to you, from Chip!), Ted a.k.a. The Linkster, David, Harold, Haim, Tom, Bob C, Marva, Deb, Brian, William, Nate, and the folks at Gardey Financial. We recognize the names of many folks who have, out of a sense of right, supported us year after year; we sometimes sit around, talking about you and wondering how you’re doing. Really. We hope we’re able to make a difference.

Thanks, as ever,

 

What You See …

By Edward A. Studzinski

“If you can’t annoy somebody, there’s little point in writing.”

       Kingsley Amis

These days, given the continuing march of new highs in the market indices, coupled with the ongoing extremes of most valuation metrics on individual securities, there is not a lot for a conservative investor to say that hasn’t been said before. What is different this time is the continuing flight from higher fee investment vehicles by both retail and institutional investors. And that money is flowing either into exchange-traded funds or passive index products (the popularity of which provides additional juice to the rising markets). I have said before that we know how this movie ends. It will not have a happy ending. I don’t know when, and I don’t know by how much. I just know it will not end well. And yes, I am fully prepared to admit that I have been too conservative over the last five years. But that ultimately is the difference between investment and speculation. And in the fund world, it is the difference between asset gatherers and investment managers.

What I would like to cover briefly are some of Byron Wien’s Ten Surprises for 2018. This past year in December, shortly before the list was released, I had the pleasure of sitting next to Byron Wien at a small dinner party in New York. He would not and did not discuss his list with me. But, he was willing to discuss the methodology that went into researching and constructing it every year. Wien for many years was the Chief Investment Strategist at Morgan Stanley. Wien left Morgan Stanley in 2009 and joined Blackstone as a senior advisor in its Private Wealth Solutions Group. Interestingly, Wien’s successor at Morgan Stanley had no interest in continuing the Ten Surprises franchise, so Wien was able to secure the use of the name for effectively nothing (another example of children wanting to kill their parents).

What is a surprise? Wien believes a surprise happens when the average investor ascribes a one in three chance of an event taking place. Wien however believes the surprises have more than a 50% chance of happening. There are also the small group of Also-rans, which have either a lower probability in Wien’s mind of occurring or, are less germane to the investor. In total, we have the Ten Surprises and Six Also-rans. I am not going to discuss all sixteen items, but only those I find most intriguing.

The first one that strikes me as important is Wien’s Also-ran #15. The FANG stocks continue to make new highs, while many other companies stand still. There is a lot of discussion about creative destruction, especially with hundreds of companies spending billions of dollars on r & d. Remember, creative destruction used to be the two guys in the garage in Silicon Valley. Now it is corporate America. What I find of major interest (and concern) as an investor, is that the rapid growth of Amazon and Google to name a few, could come to a screeching halt if only the regulators decided to enforce the antirust and anti-competitive laws on the books. We see a lot of enforcement coming out of the European Union. We would see more if BREXIT were not a front and center issue there. And here, a change in the administration or control of Congress could also result in more targeted enforcement.

Wien’s Surprise #6 is the prospect of rising inflation. We have seen it for some time now, particularly in the shopping basket. The combination of shrinking packaging and shrinking contents has been obvious to anyone whose grocery budget has been static for the last couple of years. Rising inflation means higher interest rates. And higher interest rates mean that bonds and certificates of deposit become decent competition for the dividend yield available on the S&P 500. That produces disintermediation from stocks, slowing and then reversing the rise of the markets.

Wien’s Surprise #5 is that oil hits $80 a barrel, and stays there. At this point, we are increasingly capable of supplying our own needs with domestic production. Could that come to an end, especially with increased demand from developing economies (read “China”), as well as disruptions in the supply chain. Conflict in the Middle East or terrorist acts in various energy producing areas around the world could throw a monkey wrench into the prospects of global economic growth. Those who blocked the completion of pipelines running down from Canada for environmental concerns may find themselves in an unpopular and untenable position.

Wien’s Surprise #4 is a real barn burner. The markets, given increased speculation, suffer a 10% correction, with the S&P 500 falling to 2300 but rebounding strongly by year-end. This is one I like myself. Since the beginning of the year, we have been seeing a melt-up in securities prices, extending the extremes in valuation. And yet, there are now increasing signs that not all is right. Many companies are selling out to foreign bidders. Managements continue to cash out as huge sellers of stock – the fleeing of the insiders.

What I am going to leave you with is this. In New York, excepting hotel room rates which seem to have come down thirty per cent from the end of last year, everything else is up. A year ago my restaurant tab for dinner would have been about 60% of what it was this December. And yet, the restaurants I was in were not full. I also saw lots of shuttered locations, because the rentals for those locations had reached a point where the fundamentals of the businesses could no longer support them. If our markets are this rubber band which is stretching out further and further, at what point does the rubber band snap, as in the dot.com craze?

AlphaCentric Income Opportunities Fund (IOFIX), February 2018

By Charles Boccadoro

“Timing, perseverance, and ten years of trying

will eventually make you look like an overnight success.”

        Biz Stone

Objective and Strategy

The AlphaCentric Income Opportunities Fund seeks to provide current income. Presently, it invests in often overlooked (some call “pejorative”) segments of non‐agency (private label) residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), specifically in seasoned (2007 or earlier) subprime mortgages with floating rate coupons.

The irony is that 10 years after the housing collapse these bonds, once highly discounted if not feared worthless, represent one of the more sought after asset classes, as described nicely in Claire Boston’s Bloomberg article “Goldman and Pimco Are Loading Up on Mortgage Bonds.” Basically, this asset class has become desirable because of healthy yield in a low interest rate environment, uncorrelated behavior to traditional fixed income, and stable to improving credit worthiness, including lower home loan to values.

Consider the following:

    • Housing prices since 1948 have increased 4% per year, mirroring the consumer price index and avoiding recession, except for the tragedy of 2008 … they have been increasing sharply since 2011
    • Mortgage delinquencies, which went from under 3% in 2005 to nearly 12% in 2009, have been decreasing steadily since 2011, now nearly back to historical levels and decreasing faster than other household debt
    • Loan-to-values (LTVs) have gone from 110% as recently as 2011 to under 70% through September 2017 and with it the attendant increase in homeowner equity and decrease in mortgage debt to household assets
    • Voluntary prepayments (refinancings) have gone from just 3% in 2010 to 8% today
    • Lower priced homes have outperformed more expensive ones due to inventory shortage in nearly all of the largest metropolitan areas and inventories remain historically low
    • Mortgage rates also remain historically low, even at 4-4.5%, helping keep home ownership affordable.
    All this translates into a very opportunistic environment for this strategy to excel, or as its most senior principal adviser Tom Miner describes: “It’s been lightning in a bottle.”

While the fund’s prospectus allows for a broader mandate of asset-backed securities, IOFIX currently maintains a clearly defined RMBS niche, summarized here and depicted below: smaller, seasoned, subprime, mezzanine securities with improving underlying collateral, uncorrelated to broader market with less interest rate risk, producing a high income strategy yielding 5-8% annually. Its total return, however, since inception has been much higher.

Adviser

The adviser is AlphaCentric Advisors LLC. The sub-adviser is Garrison Point Capital, LLC (“Garrison Point or GPC”), an investment advisory firm founded in 2012 and located in Walnut Creek, California, about a half hour BART ride from San Francisco’s financial district. Fortunately, AlphaCentric leaves GPC independent to manage the fund’s day-to-day operations, including its thoughtful briefings and quarterly conference calls summarizing fund strategy and performance. (Here’s link to latest Quarterly Report.)

I visited its office twice and spoke directly to the principals at GPC without the need for AlphaCentric oversight or investment relations/media representative. In addition to acting as sub-adviser on IOFIX, GPC provides investment advice to individuals, high net worth individuals, trusts, businesses and charitable organizations.

It runs a very successful strategy similar to IOFIX called Garrison Point Enhanced Yield for separately managed accounts  (see historical performance on Pages 58-59 in the Prospectus), a smaller hedge fund called Garrison Point Opportunities I focused on a different asset class, and manages assets for an insurance company. The firm manages $1.8B all up, but most is in its Income Opportunities mutual fund.

GPC moved from 100 Pine Street to Walnut Creek in December 2016, a bit more that a year ago. A cheaper space and much easier commute for the two most senior partners whose homes are in nearby Danville. Their current office space is open and utilitarian and just a few minutes’ walk from the BART station.

Managers

Tom Miner, Garrett Smith, Brian Loo are jointly and primarily responsible for the day-to-day management of IOFIX’s portfolio. Jonathan Tran is chief analyst. Tom, Garrett, and Jonathan launched GPC in 2012. Tom and Garrett worked together briefly at Lehman Brothers in 2007 and again at Barclay’s from 2009 to 2012.

Tom, who enjoys this infectious enthusiasm for what he does (the kind my colleagues David and Ed describe when they champion fund managers), retired from Lehman after 20 years in structured fixed income products the year before its collapse. Garrett, who had just joined Lehman, was not so lucky. But it was Garrett who talked Tom out of retirement to join Barclays’ where together, along with Jonathan, they built one of the firm’s larger high net worth businesses and supervised nearly $2B in fixed income assets, employing much the same strategy they ultimately used to launch GPC.

Brian came to GPC from TCW after it had acquired MetWest, a fixed income firm he helped launch. Brian seems to be the first person folks talk to when they call the firm, like I did, asking about its strategy. He works from a remote office in LA.

Tom holds an MBA from the University of Utah where he is also an Adjunct Professor of Finance teaching Fixed Income Analysis and Venture Capital. Garrett is a United States Naval Academy graduate with MBA from Northwestern University. As a flight officer in the U.S. Navy, he logged over 400 carrier landings … over 200 at night! Brian holds a BS in Math/Applied Science from UCLA, an MS from the Carnegie Mellon’s Tepper School of Business, and is a CFA charterholder. Jonathan received a B.S. in Finance from The University of Virginia’s McIntire School of Business.

The four are partners in the firm, and together they represent more than 70 years’ experience in securitized products, with Tom’s experience making up nearly half. The team impresses me with their clarity, openness, and passion for what they do.

Strategy Capacity and Closure

The fund has achieved something few funds do … crossing the $1B threshold of assets under management (AUM) in less than two years. It attracted more capital in last quarter of 2017 than in the first six quarters of its existence. It ended the year with $1.6B, five times the level it started the year.

The GPC team seems intent on letting market opportunities decide the capacity and not an assets-gathered goal. Given the enormity of inflows, “closure is month-to-month at this point,” Tom explains. While the overall subprime market segment is nearly $400B, it is becoming harder to find bonds at a price GPC is willing to pay. But not yet impossible.

They remain in near continuous contact with 30-40 dealers and do substantial business with about half of them. Their current portfolio comprises nearly 300K mortgages with an average loan balance of $155K across more than 400 securities purchased at an average price of just $60.72 (par being $100). Fortunately, about $1B in non-agency RMBS are exchanged each day with 550 market trades made monthly. So, the typical trade of perhaps $2M is under the radar for institutional buyers with say $100B portfolios.

During their most recent conference call, they shared that the market’s fragmentation actually aids them in sourcing securities, as does patience. So far they are still able to buy securities that meet their price target and risk, the latter based on scenario assessment modelling. But if that changes, they will close.

Tom insists they will not be tempted to accept fast money only to disappoint investors. “We’d rather keep fewer investors longer term.” He also believes AlphaCentric will support GPC’s closure recommendation if and when it happens. My suspicion is that the fund will be capacity tested soon. Come May, IOFIX will reach the three-year mark, prompting rating coverage from Morningstar. Given its current performance level, it will debut with five stars, creating even greater demand.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Per the latest SAI, as of March 2017, Tom Miner owned over $1M, Garrett Smith over $50K, and Brian Loo over $10K. Tom and Garrett stated that the team’s stake will be much higher, “like 10 times,” when the SAI is updated this year. Mr. Jerry Szilagyi, AlphaCentric’s controlling member and an interested trustee of the Income Opportunities Fund, which is one of several under the Mutual Fund Series Trust, holds over $100K.

Opening Date

May 28, 2015. All three share classes: IOFIX, IOFAX, and IOFCX. Lipper categorizes the fund as “Multi-Sector Income: Funds that seek current income by allocating assets among several different fixed income securities (with no more than 65% in any one sector except for defensive purposes), including U.S. government and foreign governments, with a significant portion of assets in securities rated below investment-grade.” Morningstar has it in same category.

That said: As of 31 December 2017, the fund maintains 94% of its portfolio in the subprime mortgage sector … and Garrison is bullish on it. Certainly more than the 65% referenced in Lipper’s category definition.

Lipper tracks 104 MultiSector Income funds. The elephant in the category is PIMCO’s Income Fund (PIMIX) with $108B in AUM. IOFIX ranks 25th in the category by AUM. Ten multisector funds have launched since IOFIX, including two GPC lists or have listed as competitors: Deer Park Total Return Credit (DPFNX) and Wilshire Income Opportunities (WIOPX). Others are Angel Oak Multi-Strategy Income (ANGLX), Performance Trust Strategic Bond (PTIAX) and Voya Securitized Credit (VCFIX). The last two are MFO five- and three-year Great Owls, respectfully, in the General Bond and US Mortgage categories.

Minimum Investment

The fund imposes only a $2500 minimum investment on all share classes, including the institutional IOFIX shares, which is good news. There is also a very low $100 minimum for automatic investments. I verified these minimums at Fidelity. At Schwab, however, it offers the normally 4.75% front-loaded share class IOFAX via No-Load/No Transaction Fee, but imposes a $100K minimum on the IOFIX institutional shares. So, caveat ēmptor.

Expense Ratio

IOFIX is 1.5% with AUM of $461.6M, as of June 2023. IOFAX is 1.75% reflecting a 12b-1 distribution fee. A 4.75% front-load on this class is waived above $50K. IOFCX sports an egregious 2.5% expense ratio. That this latter class even exists reflects poorly on the advisor and the industry generally. All are net prospectus expenses after waivers. Fortunately, the preponderance of AUM is in IOFIX.

Given that the average expense ratio in the category is 0.85% (oldest share class only), these levels are undeniably high. But its performance has been so strong by any measure, nobody cares.

Focusing on IOFIX, the adviser pays 0.33% “other” (mostly administrative and servicing). The remaining 1.16% “management fee” (after a 0.01% acquired fund fee) is then split between AlphaCentric and Garrison Point, or 0.58% each. Since another Jerry Szilagyi company “MFund Services LLC,” also gets paid to manage the overall trust, Szilagyi’s firms appear to receive more fee from the fund than GPC does.

There are five AlphaCentric Funds, all less than four years old. “The Future of Investing … We seek to offer financial advisors and their clients access to best-in-class, style-forward managers in open-end mutual fund format, the types of products that were once only available to institutions and large endowments.” This last sentence is typically code for we charge high fees. Arguing that it’s still less than what hedge funds traditionally charge at 2% yearly plus a 20% performance fee. Only IOFIX has yet to attract significant assets, 96% in fact of the fund family. Average AlphaCentric fees: 1.84%, oldest share class only, or 2.10%, all share classes.

Interestingly, AlphaCentric is listed along with Eventide, Pinnacle and Advisory Research as a strategic partner in a firm called Multi-Funds, which describes itself as “A Premier Marketing, Consulting and Distribution Firm.” While this channel may indeed have helped bring attention to IOFIX, allowing the sub-adviser to focus on its strategy and portfolio management … what it loves to do, Multi-Funds hasn’t helped other funds in the AlphaCentric family achieve anywhere near the assets attracted by IOFIX.

Jerry Szilagyi also runs Catalyst Funds, a collection of “Intelligent Alternatives … We understood that the market did not need another traditional family of mutual funds … we endeavor to offer unique investment products to meet the needs of discerning financial advisers and their clients … specialized strategies seeking to produce income and equity-oriented returns while attempting to limit risk and volatility.” There are 28 Catalyst Funds comprising $6.2B in AUM. Average age just under 5 years. Most come in three classes, including those imposing 4.75% front-loads and 12b-1 fees. Average fees: 1.76% (oldest share class, 2.01% all share classes).

Here are the lifetime scorecard metrics from the MFO Premium site (click image to enlarge):

Are the high fees justified by overall fund family performance at AlphaCentric and Catalyst? Absolutely not.

Both AlphaCentric and Catalyst receive a “Lower” MFO Fund Family Score, which means most of their funds since inception underperform their categories on an absolute return basis. Risk adjusted performance is not any better. More than a third of their funds are bottom quintile performers based on Martin and 60% are in the bottom two quintiles. The four oldest surviving funds at Catalyst, which date back to 2006, sport absolutely abysmal performance.

Do they offer some winners? Yes, and one is IOFIX hands-down.

Comments

It’s been a perfectly behaved fund. It goes up or stays flat. It rarely goes down. It’s delivered what most alternative funds promise but rarely deliver: equity-like returns with bond-like volatility. It provides nearly 5% annualized dividend paid monthly. Last year its total return was 14%, after fees, to investors, beating its peers by 8.1% … about what the long outstanding PIMIX delivered in total. It delivered top quintile absolute return and risk adjusted returns based on Sortino and Martin ratios.

Here are last year’s risk and return metrics for the top 10 performers in Multi-Sector Income category, using our MultiSearch screener (click image to enlarge):

Since inception, the fund’s outperformance is even more impressive. It’s beaten AGG (iShares Core US Aggregate Bond ETF), HYG (iShares iBoxx $ High Yield Corporate Bond ETF), and PIMCO’s Income Fund (PIMIX) … all by substantial margins. It’s even beaten the S&P500, which few equity funds have done recently let alone fixed income funds.

“But more than its overall return, what we’re most proud of,” said Garrett during the latest conference call, “is the consistency of return.” The up-only behavior is similar to PIMIX’s only more so. Why? Because the underlining assets in the IOFIX portfolio are behaving that way; specifically, return on subprime mortgages generally has been 20.4% the past two years,  out-performing so-called “Alt-A” mortgages at 18.8% and prime mortgages at “only” 12.1%.

My colleague Sam Lee suggests another reason may contribute to the attractive behavior of funds like IOFIX and PIMIX. Matrix pricing of less liquid, harder to value assets may provide a steadier appearance than those in more highly traded markets. Similar to private equity or the value of your home, which is not marked-to-market daily, like holdings in your Schwab account.

IOFIX is priced daily by an independent but publicly traded company, called Intercontinental Exchange (ICE). Brian explains that the 3rd party pricing prevents any temptation to “meddle.”

Here’s summary of risk and return metrics in tabular form, from IOFIX launch through December 2017 (click image to enlarge):

The fund has demonstrated resilience during sell-offs in high yield and core bonds. The following correlation table for these same funds, plus SPY (S&P500 ETF), helps explain why. IOFIX is indeed negatively correlated with core bonds and uncorrelated with most others (click image to enlarge).

More fundamentally, IOFIX will be more resilient to factors affecting traditional core and high yield bonds, because of its variable coupon structure and its reliance on housing market versus corporate profits or balance sheets. That’s both the fund’s strength and potential weakness, but since launch it’s definitely been its strength.

Brian doesn’t expect conditions to change much in 2018. “Perhaps not as quite as much rate compression or improving credit [which enhanced the fund’s returns last year], but then we seem to say that every year.”

Tom emphasizes: “Even if housing prices stop increasing, amortization pays down the debt reducing loan to value every month!” Recent tax reform will benefit subprimes more because those loans are well below the deduction threshold, enabling its owners to have more money after taxes to further pay their mortgage. He also believes that since these mortgages are seasoned, originating 10-12 years ago, the owners are probably no longer “subprime” borrowers.

Greatest risk to the fund? Capacity. It is a shrinking market, at a rate of 15% per year, since “they don’t issue subprime mortgages anymore.” Because of daily trading volume and high demand, liquidity has not been an issue. But as a precaution, the firm secured a $200M line of credit recently to help mitigate any unexpected redemption pressure.

Other risks? If credit spreads rise because riskier assets like equities or high yield bonds are considered overpriced, or if home prices collapse perhaps because of a downturn in jobs. But given the appreciation in home prices, limited inventory, and decreases in LTVs, the asset class seems well positioned not lose money during another downturn.

If rates rise too much because of an overheated economy, the swath of underlining variable rate mortgages in these securities could make it harder for owners to make payments or even trigger caps, but then that’s balanced by the increase in home prices … the inflation of real assets.

Brian summarizes: “It’s really a mitigated credit story … the seasoned nature of these bonds provides a powerful stabilizing mechanism.”

Bottom Line

“The secret to riches, lab rats, is the same as the secret to comedy: timing,” Max Skinner tells his bond trading desk in the 2006 movie “A Good Year.”

The folks at Garrison Point have produced the perfect strategy at the perfect time. Their background, team work, risk/return models, and passion appear perfectly suited to exploit this current fixed income market niche.

So far, they have picked the right sectors and subsectors (tranches) and the right securities within those subsectors. Securities that have been called at par resulting in higher yield. Securities protected by subordination (tranches with lower rating absorbing any losses first) and benefiting from excess interest unique to this asset class. Securities enhanced by favorable legal settlements.

While IOFIX is fairly young, the team has prosecuted similar strategies very successfully at Barlcay’s for high net worth individuals and in their separately managed accounts since launching the firm. And, they continue to examine other “overlooked” asset-backed classes for opportunities to deliver “asymmetric yield.”

Were it not wrapped in an AlphaCentric logo, which means investors are paying perhaps 50 pps more than they should, it would be the perfect fund. But as long as IOFIX is producing at these levels, as long as it continues to handsomely outperform say PIMIX, the performance is worth the higher fees.

If you are looking to diversify your fixed income portfolio with uncorrelated assets, or looking to diversify your overall portfolio with real assets, consider IOFIX while you still can.

Fund Website

The website is a convenient place to get latest fund documents, including fact sheet, prospectus, etc. The best info though is the quarterly briefing. And, the opportunity to sign-up for the quarterly conference calls under the events tab. Beyond that, the Garrison Point team is very approachable and happy to field questions directly. Just give them a call at 415-887-1410.

Disclosure

I’ve been heavy IOFIX since early July 2017 in my retirement account.

Launch Alert: CrossingBridge Low Duration High Yield (CBLDX)

By David Snowball

CrossingBridge Low Duration High Yield launched on February 1, 2018. The fund seeks “high current income and capital appreciation consistent with the preservation of capital.” The plan is to invest in junk bonds and loans, mostly CCC or better. Their investable universe includes corporate bonds, zero-coupon bonds, commercial paper, ETNs, distressed debt securities, bank loan assignments and/or participations, private placements, mortgage- and asset-backed securities, U.S. Government obligations and bank loans to corporate borrowers. While most of the portfolio will be domestic, up to 25% might be foreign fixed-income securities. They’ll generally have a duration of three years or less. There’s also some (limited) ability to hedge the portfolio.

The adviser tends to invest around the notion of default risk: they invest in firms where the default risk appears minimal or where the issuer has already defaulted so they’re able to buy securities at huge discounts. They believe “that the combination of this fundamental analysis and the short duration characteristics of the securities result in a low volatility, absolute return risk profile.”

Why might you care?

CrossingBridge is an affiliate Cohanzick Management, sub-adviser to two exceptionally excellent and distinctive fixed-income funds. They are RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX/RPHIX) and RiverPark Strategic Income (RSIVX/RSIIX). RPHYX, in particular, has posted an exceptional risk-return profile: it has the highest Sharpe ratio of any mutual fund (as in: #1 out of 7000+) over the past five years and 14th over the past three. The Strategic Income fund is a couple steps out on the risk-return spectrum, offering the prospect of high single digit returns with an aversion to losing money.

  Return Best year Median year Worst year Sharpe Maximum drawdown Duration (years) Beta*
RPHIX 2.4% 4.4% 3.45% 1.2% 3.08 -0.6 0.2 -3 0.04
                 
RSIIX 3.6% 10.2 4.5% (3.8%) 1.08 -7.3 2-4 0.14

* relative to the BarCap Aggregate

CrossingBridge seems to be positioned in between the two older funds, offering the potential for more substantial returns than RPHIX with less downside than RSIIX.

Like the RiverPark funds, CrossingBridge is managed by David Sherman, Cohanzick’s founder, president and lead manager. In the case of CrossingBridge, Michael DeKler, a senior analyst at Cohanzick, serves as assistant portfolio manager.

For now, only the institutional share class is available to the public. It charges 0.99% with a $250,000 minimum. They are authorized to sell Investor shares with expenses of 1.27% and a $2500 minimum. No word yet on when that might occur. I’d share their website, but they don’t appear to have one.

We have profiled both Short Term High Yield and Strategic Income. By way of disclosure, I have personal investments in both though MFO has no financial ties to either RiverPark or Cohanzick.

Elevator Talk: Parker Binion, KCM Macro Trends Fund

By David Snowball

Since the number of funds we can cover in-depth is smaller than the number of funds worthy of in-depth coverage, we’ve decided to offer one or two managers each month the opportunity to make a 200 word pitch to you. That’s about the number of words a slightly-manic elevator companion could share in a minute and a half. In each case, I’ve promised to offer a quick capsule of the fund and a link back to the fund’s site. Other than that, they’ve got 200 words and precisely as much of your time and attention as you’re willing to share. These aren’t endorsements; they’re opportunities to learn more about interesting funds.

KCM Macro Trends Fund (KCMTX/KCMIX) launched in 2008. It’s managed by two guys trained as attorneys: Marty Kerns, who has been managing the fund since inception, and Parker Binion, who joined in early 2016. 

The fund’s strategy is thoughtful and appealing. They want to give you exposure to stocks when markets are rising, and exposure to other assets when markets are falling. That implies two decisions:

  1. Macro: is this a Risk-On or Risk-Off environment?
  2. Micro: what are the best investments giving the environment?

In a Risk-On environment, the fund relies on quantitative screens to construct an equity portfolio. In a Risk-Off environment, the fund can reduce net equity exposure to zero so that it’s effectively market neutral. In such markets we will hedge using three approaches: (1) buying ETFs that act inverse to the stock market to create a market neutral or net short posture, (2) option trades that accomplish the same thing, and (3) investing in non-correlated asset classes such as bonds, precious metals or currencies through the use of ETFs.”

As we ran our statistical screens, the pattern was pretty striking:

KCM Macro Trends has returns in the top 1% of its Morningstar Multi alternative peer group over the past five years.

As of January 31, 2018, the fund has the highest five-year returns of any multi alternative fund in Morningstar’s database; they’ve earned 11.3% annually while the next highest fund (AlphaCore Absolute, GDAMX) booked 7.4%.

The fund’s returns are in the top two for the one- and three-year periods.

KCM Macro Trends has the highest returns of any alternative global macro fund in our database, which is built on Lipper data and categories; they’ve earned 11.8% annually while the next-highest fund (RiverNorth Core RNCOX) booked 8.8%.

KCM Macro Trends has the highest Sharpe ratio, the most widely used measure of the risk-return balance, of any alternative global macro fund: 1.15, with RNCOX an honorable second at 1.06.

The fund’s returns are in the top 5 for the 1- and 3-year periods as well.

While the fund was around only for the last eight months of the 2007-09 crisis (August 2008 – March 2009), it dramatically outperformed its peers and the broad market during that last spasm: KCMTX fell 14.5%, the average multi alternative fund fell 22% while the S&P 500 declined 41%. (In eight months! Yikes.)

All of which is reflected in the fund’s consistent five-star rating (over the past 3 and 5 year periods, and overall) by Morningstar.

We asked Mr. Binion to talk through the factors that might explain the fund’s distinctive risk-return profile. Here is his 292 word précis:

Marty Kerns and I have developed five core beliefs about investing. Here’s what we stand for:

  1. ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Consensus positions get benchmark results. We seek to beat our benchmark, thus we must be contrarian. We must have “active share.” So we rigorously test new ideas, trying always to identify what “works.” When we outperform, research is a big part of our edge.

  1. QUANTITATIVE INVESTING

We convert our research into quantitative models by developing buy/sell rules and ranking systems. These models produce buy/sell signals that we follow in a disciplined manner. We do this to remove as much emotion and behavioral bias as possible from the investment process. This is a big edge over most discretionary managers.

  1. LONG EQUITY BIAS

We favor equities over other asset classes under most circumstances due to their risk premium. We are biased long because good shorting opportunities are harder to find, and because shorts have limited upside potential with unlimited downside risk. However, we do use short positions in our fund as hedges seeking to reduce volatility and for profit.

  1. RISK CONTROL

For example, on a stock selection level, we cap sector exposure and individual name exposure. On a portfolio construction level, we make sure the models we use are relatively uncorrelated (i.e. diversified), and weighted in parity to the risk they pose.

  1. FLEXIBILITY

Finally, we believe in being flexible to adapt to changing market conditions. We have rules in place that guide us when markets get too risky, or extremely favorable, and will adjust our portfolios accordingly. Over the long term, we believe our flexibility is a big edge over funds trapped in an equity style box come rain or shine.

We run our fund with these core principles in mind.

KCMTX is a no-load fund (and no transaction fee on major retail platforms) with a $5,000 investment minimum and expenses of 1.65%. The Institutional class, KCMIX, has a $250,000 minimum and expenses of 1.40%. The fund’s website isn’t incredibly rich, but does provide a clean snapshot of the fund and a nice (and soon to be updated) investor presentation.

Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

The SEC requires advisers to give them 75 days to review and comment upon any proposed new fund offering. During those 75 days, the advisers aren’t permitted to say anything about the funds except “please refer to our public filing with the SEC.” At peak times of the year, there might be a couple dozen no-load retail funds and active ETFs in registration. Midwinter, not so much. Fidelity’s ESG bond index might be a useful option for investors looking to express their concerns about shaping a more humane world. Beyond that, mostly nice people who don’t yet have a public track record or striking competitive advantage. They might do very well, but we’ll have to watch for a bit.

Balter Merger Opportunity Fund (BMRGX/BMERX)

Balter Merger Opportunity will pursue capital appreciation. The plan is to establish a global merger arbitrage portfolio, with the prospect of shorting one of the partners in an announced merger. The strategy works, though there are already several dominant (if not excellent) players in the field. The fund will be managed by David J. Simon, Michael D. Horgan and Brett Patelsky of Twin Securities. The initial expense ratio has not been disclosed, and the minimum initial investment will be $5,000 for the Investor share class.

Belmont Theta Income Fund

Belmont Theta Income Fund will pursue positive returns independent of market cycles, consistent with income generation. The plan is to let loose The Iron Condor. An Iron Condor, of course, is “a directionally neutral, defined risk option strategy … to sell volatility in the S&P 500 index.” The fund will be managed by Stephen Solaka and Daniel Beckwith. The initial expense ratio will be 1.99% (yikes), and the minimum initial investment will be $5,000.

Fidelity U.S. Sustainability Bond Index Fund

Fidelity U.S. Sustainability Bond Index Fund will track the Bloomberg Barclays MSCI U.S. Aggregate ESG Choice Index. The plan is a bit unclear: it’s an investment grade US bond fund with ESG screens but I can’t tell if those are positive screens (they’re tilted toward “good” companies), negative ones (they simply screen out bad actors and track the “neutral to good” crowd) or something else. The fund will be managed by Brandon Bettencourt and Jay Small. The initial expense ratio will be 0.20% for Investor shares, and the minimum initial investment will be $2,500.

Rational Trend Aggregation Dividend and Income Fund

Rational Trend Aggregation Dividend and Income Fund will pursue current income while maintaining a secondary emphasis on long-term capital appreciation and low volatility. The plan is to trade bunches of income-producing securities based on trend following, mean reversion and intermarket analysis models. The fund will be managed by Matthew B. Tuttle, founder of the adviser. If I’m reading Linked In correctly, Mr. Tuttle is a private wealth adviser with Ameriprise. The initial expense ratio will be 1.62% for the no-load Institutional shares, and the minimum initial investment will be $1,000 for all share classes.

Rational Trend Aggregation Growth Fund

Rational Trend Aggregation Growth Fund will pursue long-term capital appreciation while maintaining a secondary emphasis on capital preservation. The plan is to trade U.S. equities using a momentum-based strategy. The prospectus, for reasons unclear, has the following phrase in a larger, bolded font: “tactical models implemented by the Advisor are,” followed by the same list (trend, mean reversion, intermarket analysis) evident in their other fund’s prospectus. The fund will be managed by Matthew B. Tuttle, founder of the adviser. The initial expense ratio will be 1.67% for the no-load Institutional shares, and the minimum initial investment will be $1,000 for all share classes.

REX BKCM ETF

REX BKCM ETF is an actively-managed ETF which will pursue total return. The plan is to invest in the cryptocurrency world: firms that accept payments, support miners, develop opps, use blockchain and/or are “Cryptocurrency Service Providers.” The fund will be managed by Brian Kelly, Founder and CEO of BKCM LLC, and Denise M. Krisko. Ms. Krisko has the distinction of having managed the fund “since its inception in 2016.” Ummmm … no? The initial expense ratio is not yet public and there is, of course, no minimum initial investment.

RVX Emerging Markets Equity Fund

RVX Emerging Markets Equity Fund will pursue long-term capital appreciation. The plan is to use “quantitative screening followed by ‘bottom-up’ fundamental analysis with the goal of owning the highest quality, undervalued companies” whose fates are tied to the emerging markets. Geographically, those firms might be headquartered in developed, emerging or frontier markets. The fund will be managed by Cindy New and Robin Kollannur of RVX Asset Management. RVX is an institutional EM specialist with, as best I can tell, $133 million in AUM. The initial expense ratio will be 1.35% after waivers for both the Institutional and Investor class shares, and the minimum initial investment has not been announced.

Six Thirteen Core Equity Fund (TZDKX)

Six Thirteen Core Equity Fund will pursue long-term growth of capital. The plan is to invest in the stock of high quality and attractively valued companies consistent with the Jewish values of tikkun olam (repairing the world) and of promoting the development of Israel. The fund will be managed by Evan F. Shorten and Justin L. Ross of JVIF, LLC (the Jewish Values Investment Funds). The initial expense ratio will be 1.36% after waivers, and the minimum initial investment will be $3,600. There’s a rich embedded set of cultural signals here. Nina Kallen, a friend and remarkably sharp attorney in Boston, helps with a bit of decoding: “There are,” she reports, “613 commandments in the Torah. Tsedakah is a Jewish concept that combines the English concepts of charity and justice. The Jewish word Chai means life. All Hebrew words have a numeric value taken from their letters. The numeric value of Chai is 18. So multiples of 18 are considered lucky –36, 360,3600, etc. Monetary gifts at bat mitzvahs often are in those amounts.”

I love being around people who are sharper than me, and especially those who are differently sharp. One of the joys of working with MFO is being surrounded by a cadre of folks – Chip, Charles, Ed and our readers – who are just those sort of people.

Manager changes, January 2018

By Chip

Ahh … it’s a quiet month on the manager change front. Forty-eight funds saw partial turnover in their management teams but no high profile manager stalked off or was shown the door, and no rising star was awarded a new charge. Despite the pressure for cost containment, 11 of the funds were simply adding to the size of the management team. The month’s sole highlight occurred when Chip encountered Harding Loevner manager Ferrill Roll, declared it “feral” and began wondering about whether he might be a candidate for managing a fund in Westeros. (Note in passing: don’t succumb to the temptation, the penalties for underperforming your benchmark there involve dragon fire.)

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
Various AB Multi-Manager Select Retirement Allocation target date funds Vadim Zlotnikov is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Daniel Loewy and Christopher Nikolich will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
GOPAX Aberdeen China Opportunities Fund Kathy Xu will no longer serve on the fund. Hugh Young, Nicholas Yeo, Flavia Cheong, and Nicholas Chui will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
Various American Century One Choice Funds target date funds No one, but . . . Vidya Rajappa joins G. David MacEwen, Radu Gabudean, Richard Weiss, and Scott Wilson 1/18
AVEFX Ave Maria Bond Fund No one, but . . . Adam Gaglio is joining Brandon Scheitler and Richard Platte on the management team. 1/18
AVEMX Ave Maria Value Fund George Schwartz is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Chadd Garcia is joining Timothy Schwartz and Joseph Skornicka on the management team. 1/18
BXMIX Blackstone Alternative Multi-Strategy Fund GS Investment Strategies, LLC will no longer subadvise the fund. The other subadvisers remain. 1/18
BBCPX Bridge Builder Core Plus Bond Fund No one, but . . . Stephen Bartolini joins the rest of the management team. 1/18
ACXAX Catalyst Multi-Strategy Fund Kevin Jamali will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Darren Kottle will now manage the fund. 1/18
TAPRX Columbia Contrarian Asia Pacific Fund George Gosden and Vanessa Donegan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Soo Nam Ng and Christine Seng will now manage the fund. 1/18
CRIHX CRM Long/Short Opportunities Fund No one, but . . . Mimi Morris and Jason Yellin join Jay Abramson in managing the fund. 1/18
FDESX Fidelity Advisor Diversified Stock Fund James Morrow no longer serves as lead portfolio manager of the fund. Ramona Persaud continues to manage the fund. 1/18
FLMLX Fidelity Advisor Series Equity-Income Fund James Morrow no longer serves as lead portfolio manager of the fund. Sean Gavin will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
FDGFX Fidelity Dividend Growth Fund Ramona Persaud no longer serves as lead portfolio manager of the fund. Gordon Scott will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
FJACX Fidelity Series Small Cap Discovery Fund Charles Myers no longer serves as co-manager of the fund. Derek Janssen will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
RFAP First Trust Riverfront Dynamic Asia Pacific ETF Effective January 2, 2018, Doug Sandler and Michael Jones are no longer portfolio managers for the fund. Adam Grossman, Chris Konstantinos, and Scott Hays will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 1/18
RFDI First Trust Riverfront Dynamic Developed International ETF Effective January 2, 2018, Doug Sandler and Michael Jones are no longer portfolio managers for the fund. Adam Grossman, Chris Konstantinos, and Scott Hays will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 1/18
RFEM First Trust Riverfront Dynamic Emerging Markets ETF Effective January 2, 2018, Doug Sandler and Michael Jones are no longer portfolio managers for the fund. Adam Grossman, Chris Konstantinos, and Scott Hays will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 1/18
RFEU First Trust Riverfront Dynamic Europe ETF Effective January 2, 2018, Doug Sandler and Michael Jones are no longer portfolio managers for the fund. Adam Grossman, Chris Konstantinos, and Scott Hays will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 1/18
GFRAX Goldman Sachs High Yield Floating Rate Fund Jean Joseph is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Michael Goldstein is joined by Rachel Golder and Ken Yan on the management team. 1/18
HISOX Harbor Small Cap Growth Opportunities Fund Lance Marx will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Cam Philpott, David Hand, Hiren Patel, and Sean McGinnis continue to serve as co-portfolio managers for the fund. 1/18
HLMVX Harding Loevner Global Equity Portfolio No one, but . . . Scott Crawshaw joins Richard Schmidt, Christopher Mack, Peter Baughan and Ferrill Roll on the management team. 1/18
HLMOX Harding, Loevner Frontier Emerging Markets Richard Schmidt is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Pradipta Chakrabortty and Babatunde Ojo continue to serve as the portfolio managers of the fund. 1/18
HLMIX Harding, Loevner International Equity No one, but . . . Scott Crawshaw joins Ferrill Roll, Alexander Walsh, Bryan Lloyd, Patrick Todd and Andrew West on the management team. 1/18
SCUIX Hartford Schroders US Small Cap Opportunities Fund No one, but . . . Robert Kaynor joins Jenny Jones in managing the fund. 1/18
SMDIX Hartford Schroders US Small/Mid-Cap Opportunities Fund No one, but . . . Robert Kaynor joins Jenny Jones in managing the fund. 1/18
HSPX Horizons S&P 500 Covered Call ETF Wade Guenther will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Garrett Paolella, Troy Cates, and Jonathan Molchan continue to run the fund. 1/18
ICHCX ICON Healthcare Fund Scott Snyder is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Callahan will now manage the fund. 1/18
MSAVX Invesco American Value Fund Effective on or about April 2, 2018, Thomas Copper will no longer serve as a portfolio manager to fund. Jeffry Vancavage and Sergio Marcheli will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
KPIEX KP International Equity Fund No one, but . . . William Blair joins in as the sixth subadvisor to the fund. 1/18
KPSCX KP Small Cap Equity Fund DeForest Hinman will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. The rest of the extensive team remains. 1/18
OAEIX Oppenheimer Equity Income Fund Michael Levine is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Laton Spahr will now manage the fund. 1/18
PWREX Pioneer Real Estate Fund Gina Szymanski is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Raymond Haddad now manages the fund. 1/18
PBAAX PNC Balanced Allocation Fund Mark McGlone will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Aneet Deshpande, Martin Schulz, Jason Weber, and Michael Coleman will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
POGAX Putnam Growth Opportunities Fund Robert Brookby is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Samuel Cox joins Richard Bodzy in managing the fund. 1/18
PNOPX Putnam Multi-Cap Growth Fund Richard Bodzy and Robert Brookby are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Katherine Collins and Shep Perkins will now manage the fund. 1/18
QEAAX Quaker Event Arbitrage Fund No one, but . . . Paul Hoffmeister will join Thomas Kirchner in managing the fund. 1/18
QTRAX Quaker Global Tactical Allocation Fund Thomas Kirchner is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Todd Cohen, Elliot Gilfarb, Andrew Cowen, and Thomas Lott will now manage the fund. 1/18
QMCVX Quaker Mid-Cap Value Fund Frank Latuda and Gary Kauppila are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Todd Cohen, Elliot Gilfarb, Andrew Cowen, and Thomas Lott will now manage the fund. 1/18
QUSVX Quaker Small-Cap Value Fund Gregory Rogers and Christopher Whitehead are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Todd Cohen, Elliot Gilfarb, Andrew Cowen, and Thomas Lott will now manage the fund. 1/18
QUAGX Quaker Strategic Growth Fund Christopher Perras, Thomas Stevens, Daniel Allen, and Kristin Ceglar are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Todd Cohen, Elliot Gilfarb, Andrew Cowen, and Thomas Lott will now manage the fund. 1/18
RFCI Riverfront Dynamic Core Income ETF Michael Jones is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Tim Anderson and Rob Glownia will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
RFUN Riverfront Dynamic Unconstrained Income ETF Michael Jones is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Tim Anderson and Rob Glownia will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
USAAX USAA Growth Fund Paul Radomski no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the fund. Andy Eng will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
WALTX Wells Fargo Alternative Strategies Fund John Burbank is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. The other eleven managers remain. 1/18
WWIAX Westwood Income Opportunity Fund No one, but . . . Daniel Barnes joins Mark Freeman and Todd Williams on the management team. 1/18
WWLAX Westwood LargeCap Value Fund Lisa Dong no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the fund. Mark Freeman, Scott Lawson, Matthew Lockridge, and Varun Singh will continue to manage the fund. 1/18
WHGSX Westwood Smallcap Fund Lisa Dong no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the fund. William Costello, Matthew Lockridge, and Frederic Rowsey continue to manage the fund. 1/18

 

Briefly Noted

By David Snowball

Updates (and notes from careful readers)

Several MLP funds – including Center Coast MLP Focus Fund (CCCAX) and Global X MLP ETF (MLPA) – have announced that the recent tax law changes affects them. They’re treated as “a regular corporation” for the purpose of tax law, which means that the statutory tax rate that affects them has dropped from 35% to 21%. It is not yet clear that the rate change will have any appreciable effect on shareholders or the funds’ returns because of the complexity of calculating corporate taxes, then or now.

FPA U.S. Value Fund (FPPFX) has affirmed the proposition that “it is non-diversified” but simultaneously eliminated the provision that “[t]he portfolio may be moderately concentrated, typically 20-50 positions.”

One of our readers, Shawn McFarlane, was struck by evidence of a backlash against Vanguard within the financial services industry. “I thought I would share some interesting information. At least three large financial services firms are adding servicing fees to (or dropping) Vanguard funds” from their platforms. The story Shawn is referring to ran in the Wall Street Journal (which has a paywall) and was lightly excerpted at a site called Dealbreaker (which, understandably but regrettably, has a bunch of intrusive ads). The short version is that Fidelity, TDAmeritrade and Morgan Stanley are making access to Vanguard products either more difficult or more expensive. Vanguard took in $180 billion in new money in 2017, more than four times more than second place finisher Fidelity. The impositions aren’t going to stop the flows to Vanguard, but at least allow the others to make a bit of money off them.

Kirk Taylor shared a recent SEC filing in which the advisers to the four-star, $1.2 billion Semper MBS Total Return Fund (SEMPX) proposed “an increase in the Fund’s contractual advisory fee,” initially of 15 bps from 0.45% to 0.60%. (Remember, the advisory fee is just the adviser’s take, it’s not the complete set of expenses.) To compensate investors, they also propose adding “breakpoints” in which the fee declines as assets grow. Sadly, the lowest-possible level of the new fees is still higher than the current fee. The current fee is 45 basis points. The new fee starts at 60 basis points, drops to 55 bps for assets over the $1.5 billion threshold and 50 bps for assets over a $2.5 billion threshold. They’re also raising the cap for the overall expense limitation. By Semper’s estimate, retail shareholders will see their expenses rise from 1.00% now to 1.08%. The adviser is silent, at least in the filings, on what benefit investors receive in exchange for their higher expenses. Kirk’s note, “what a load of crap,” suggests that the benefits of the fee increase are not universally appreciated by shareholders.

Victory Capital Holdings has filed for an IPO. They’re a relatively acquisitive bunch, having purchased Munder, CEMP and RS Investments in the past few years. As of September 30, 2017, the firm “had $517.7 million aggregate principal amount of outstanding term loans under our existing senior credit agreement.” I think the translation is “had $517 million in debt.” Part of that debt, surely came from buying other fund firms but they also “incurred $125.0 million of this debt in February 2017 to pay a special dividend to our stockholders.” (That has the feeling of borrowing money to buy gifts for other people.) The purpose of the IPO is to allow them to repay a portion of that debt. Sadly, researchers suggest that Victory’s shareholders are not likely to see a benefit from the move. Michael Berkowitz’s 2003 study, “Ownership, risk and performance of mutual fund management companies,” concludes:

… publicly-traded management companies invest in riskier assets and charge higher management fees relative to the funds managed by private management companies. At the same time, however, the risk-adjusted returns of the mutual funds managed by publicly-traded management companies do not appear to outperform those of the mutual funds managed by private management companies.

Briefly Noted . . .

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

The minimum initial investment for the Alambic funds – Alambic Mid Cap Growth Plus (ALMGX), Alambic Mid Cap Value Plus (ALMVX), Alambic Small Cap Growth Plus (ALGSX), Alambic Small Cap Value Plus (ALAMX) – has been reduced from $50,000 to $5,000. Should you care? Maybe. While the funds have just $7 million between them, Alambic manages nearly a billion overall. Their average account is around $100 million, which means this isn’t a small potatoes operation. All of the funds have beaten their peers since inception, while none of them have high volatility. The Mid Cap Growth Fund, in particular, has posted substantially higher-than-average returns with substantially lower-than-average volatility since inception. They hold a large number of positions, seeking small gains from “behavioral biases and informational asymmetries create small, predictable deviations in individual stock prices from fair value.” The founders are Citigroup / Salomon Brothers alumni and the organization, overall, is a collection of geeks. The 10 core staff includes:

A PhD in Chemical Engineering from MIT who also has an MBA and a CFA
Another PhD in Chemical Engineering from MIT who has a CAIA
An R&D engineer with a BS in Chemical Engineering from Iowa State (go Cyclones!)
An M.S. in Chemical Engineering from Illinois who also has an MBA and a CFA
An M.S. in Ocean Engineering from MIT (really, what else would you expect of their head marketer?)
And MS in Mechanical Science & Engineering from Illinois
An MS in Mechanical Engineering for Purdue plus
A J.D., an undefined B.A. from Johns Hopkins and a classical pianist

If you understand “thinking differently” to be a virtue, this has the prospect of being a saintly team. More to the point, founder Albert Richards was head of European equities for Citigroup for 12 years.

Sadly, none of that saves them from inept web maintenance. When you try to reach their homepage, you’re greeted with the warning:

Jacob Small Cap Growth Fund (JSIGX) and Jacob Micro Cap Growth Fund (JMIGX) have reduced their minimum subsequent investment from $1,000 to $100. Given that these are institutional funds with $1 million minimums, one wonders how many of their investors were strapped for the extra $900 to add to the fund?

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

Convergence Core Plus (MARVX) and Convergence Opportunities (CIPVX) have both chosen to “permanently close” the Investment Class shares of their fund, effectively immediately. The funds are perfectly respectable, if a bit expensive, and their Institutional share class carries a relatively modest $15,000 minimum.

Oakmark International (OAKIX) has closed to new investors “and most third-party intermediaries” effective January 26, 2018.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Collins Long/Short Credit Fund (CLCAX) has been adopted by CrossingBridge Advisors, LLC and rebranded as CrossingBridge Long/Short Credit Fund. The fund will operate, for the next 150 days, under an interim advisory agreement (largely impenetrable, though available for lawyers and other masochists). CrossingBridge is a $300 million affiliate of David Sherman’s $1.6 billion Cohanzick Management firm.

FPA U.S. Value Fund (FPPFX) has affirmed the proposition that “it is non-diversified” but simultaneously eliminated the provision that “[t]he portfolio may be moderately concentrated, typically 20-50 positions.”

In late January, the name “Columbia European Equity Fund” was replaced with “Columbia Contrarian Europe Fund.”

In October 2017, we ridiculed the decision to rebrand Lebenthal Lisanti Small Cap Growth Fund as Dinosaur Lisanti Small Cap Growth Fund (ASCGX). Morningstar’s Jeff Ptak wrote to let us know that Dinosaur Financial Group Holdings had taken a stake in Lebenthal Lisanti. The name still comes across as (a) stupid and (b) unexplained. That probably requires us to now celebrate the second name change in four months. The Dinosaur is extinct and the fund is now Lisanti Small Cap Growth Fund (ASCGX).The fund’s manager, Mary Lisanti, is a well-known and well-regarded figure renowned for her long-ago work at the Strong Funds. Sadly, her fund remains tiny, expensive and undistinguished.

As of February 1, 2018 Navian Waycross Long/Short Equity Fund became Waycross Long/Short Equity Fund (WAYEX). The Navian name was short-lived. The fund’s February 2017 annual report mentions “The Fund name was changed during the period to reflect Waycross Partners’ recent partnership with Navian Capital, LLC. Navian Capital is a broker/dealer based in Cincinnati, Ohio. The Navian partnership provides our firm with marketing, operational, and compliance support.”

The Board of Directors of the Prudential Funds approved replacing “Prudential” with “PGIM” in each Fund’s name with the exception of the Prudential Day One funds.  Beyond that Prudential Jennison Emerging Markets Equity Fund will change its name to PGIM Jennison Emerging Markets Equity Opportunities Fund and Prudential QMA Strategic Value Fund will become PGIM QMA Large-Cap Value Fund.

Putnam Multi-Cap Value Fund (PMVAX) is becoming Putnam Sustainable Future Fund with the addition of “sustainability criteria” to its investment strategies. The fund picked up a new manager at the very end of December and its portfolio already receives an above-average sustainability grade from Morningstar, so this isn’t a major change.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Berwyn Fund (BERWX) is being merged into Chartwell Small Cap Value Fund (CWSVX) in the second quarter of 2018. Over the past five years, Chartwell has modestly outperformed its peer group and has substantially outperformed Berwyn with lower volatility than either. It also offers lower expenses, by a bit, than Berwyn.

Capital Management Mid-Cap Fund (CMCIX) is seeking shareholder approval to merge into Wellington Shields All-Cap Fund (WSCMX), effective March 30, 2018. If the change occurs, the goal will switch from “long-term capital appreciation” to just “capital appreciation” and the strategies will include investing in stocks of all caps. Not to be critical of the move, but WSCMX is a one-star, $10 million fund that’s been around less than four years. It’s combined market-like volatility and far below market returns. CMCIX is twice the size, has a 23 year record and is a stronger performer. CMCIX is midcap, WSCMX is large growth. Hmmm … our recommendation to CMCIX investors would be to move to PowerShares S&P MidCap Low Volatility ETF (WMLV) or Hartford Schroeders Small/Mid Cap Opportunities (SMDIX), either of which is cheaper, better and offers the mid-cap focus folks were originally seeking.

The entire Castlemaine fund family (you did know there was a Castlemaine fund family, right?) – Castlemaine Emerging Markets Opportunities (CNEMX), Castlemaine Event Driven (CNEVX), Castlemaine Long/Short (CNLSX), Castlemaine Market Neutral (CNMNX) and Castlemaine Multi-Strategy (CNMSX) – has closed and liquidated on January 31, 2018 after very short notice. The funds launched in January 2016 and had barely $7 million between them. The market neutral fund was exceptional, the others … meh.

Castlemaine, by the way, is a town in Victoria, Australia, near the university where the funds’ manager earned a master’s degree in astronomy.

CM Advisors Fund (CMAFX) is slated to merge into CM Advisors Small Cap Value Fund (CMOVX ), pending shareholder approval. By Morningstar’s calculation, they’re both small cap value funds which have trailed 98-100% of their peers over the past 5-10 years.

FMC Strategic Value Fund (FMSVX) will liquidate on February 16, 2018.

Thank to Ted, our discussion board’s indefatigable Linkster, for the note that IndexIQ, a subsidiary of New York Life Investment Management, has announced it will be closing three of its 24 ETFs in March. They are IQ Canada Small Cap ETF (CNDA), IQ Global Oil Small Cap ETF (IOIL) and IQ Australia Small Cap ETF (KROO).

How Linkster-ish is Ted? As of 1/31/2018, he had initiated 19,497 discussion threads at MFO alone and surely tens of thousands more at our predecessor, FundAlarm.

Innovator McKinley Income Fund (IMIFX) will liquidate at the close of business on February 22, 2018. IMIFX is a sort of equity-income fund whose high expenses (2.7%) ate just about half of the income it generated (5.4%) leaving precious little for growth. The fund returned about 2.5% annually since inception.

iShares iBonds March 2018 Term Corporate ETF (IBDB) liquidates on April 2, 2018, which is not an entirely surprising development given the fund’s name and objective.

John Hancock continues to struggle to get enough shareholders today to merge John Hancock Small Company Fund (JCSAX) into John Hancock Small Cap Core Fund (JCCAX). They adjourned the January 26 meeting without resolution, will try again on February 16 and hope to merge the funds by March 9, 2018. The merger would be a win for JCSAX investors.

(Just a moment while I suppress the urge to roll my eyes.) (Okay, I’m better now.) In a surprising development, the LocalShares Board of Directors has voted to liquidate the Nashville Area ETF (NASH). Apparently the opportunity to invest in Cracker Barrel Old Country Store and private prison operator CoreCivic was not sufficient draw to compensate for earning 4.6% while your peers were making 9.8%.

The entire Pacific Financial family of funds – Pacific Financial Core Equity Fund (PFLQX), Tactical (PFTLX), Explorer (PFLPX), Faith & Values Based Moderate (FVMLX), International (PFLIX), Dynamic Allocation (PFLDX), Strategic Conservative (PFLSX), and Flexible Growth & Income (PFLFX) – liquidated on January 30, 2018. I feel badly for them, but the reality is that every one of their funds trailed their Lipper peer groups in every trailing period (1, 3, and 5 years and since inception) I checked.

Major kudos to The Shadow for this one: buried deep in an SEC filing for the Quaker Funds is a provocative note about Quaker Event Arbitrage Fund (QEAAX, QEACX, QEAIX).

Subject to further approvals, it is anticipated that shareholders of the Quaker Event Arbitrage Fund will be asked to approve the reorganization of the Fund into another fund family at a separate special meeting expected to be held in the second quarter of 2018. If the Reorganization is approved, Camelot and the named portfolio managers will continue to manage the Fund. The Fund’s investment objectives, principal investment strategies and investment policies remain unchanged…

I’m intrigued because Quaker Event Arbitrage started life as the no-load Pennsylvania Avenue EventDriven Fund (then PAEDX, a ticker subsequently seized by another fund), managed by Thomas Kirchner who remains co-manager on the Quaker fund. PAEDX was a solid, distinctive fund run by Mr. Kirchner out of his home (I think he was in the kitchen the long-ago afternoon I called him). Solid performance coupled with the utter inability to draw investor attention led to his partnership with Quaker. The fund still has only $22 million in assets, which might explain the implied plan to depart.

SMI Bond Fund (SMIUX) will liquidate on February 7, 2018. The “SMI” is “Sound Mind Investing.”

Effective January 19, 2018, Virtus Contrarian Value merged into Virtus Ceredex Mid-Cap Value Equity Fund (SAMVX). Morningstar’s system continues to think of the surviving fund as “Ridgeworth Ceredex Mid-Cap Value Equity,” which means trying to search “Virtus Ceredex” leads to

That’s right. Bad request! Bad, bad request!

January 1, 2018

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

Welcome to the New Year!

And to an odd question: why is it a New Year? That is, why January 1? Most calendrical events correspond to something: cycles of the moon and stars, movement of the seasons, conclusions of wars or deaths of Great Men.

But why January 1? It corresponds with nothing.

The short version of the answer is that the ancient Roman calendar was a holy mess. Literally: the new year started on the day that the high priest, the pontifex, said it started. Understandably, the pontifex was open to … uhh, reason when it came to choosing the date on which the year began. He might shorten the rule of one leader by moving up the date of New Year’s or delaying the inauguration of another ruler by lengthening the preceding year.

In 45 B.C., Julius Caesar had had enough and, with the help of the astronomer Sosigenes, moved Rome from a 10 month calendar with a floating start day and lots of days that didn’t fall in any month to a version of the calendar we use today.

Except that it had a bit of trouble accommodating the fact that the solar year, which isn’t precisely 365 days long. We got far enough out of sync that they had to add seven days to the year 1000 and 10 more days in the mid 15th century. In 1582, Pope Gregory had had enough and, with the help of Vatican astronomers, created today’s calendar.

Which, by the way, still didn’t have a New Year’s Day and required eliminating 10 entire days from the calendar that year. New Year’s was the solstice in some spots, December 25th in others and March 25th, the spring equinox, in others. The pope finally put his foot down and we got January 1st.

So, why exactly does it make sense for you to gloat, or worry, about how your portfolio did in 2017? The end date of the year is arbitrary. It corresponds neither to the market’s annual flux nor to the longer seven(ish) year cycles in which the market normally rises and falls, much less your own financial needs and resources.

In short, it’s time to look forward with hope and renewed resolve, rather than back with glee or regret.

And so, on to 2018!

It’s deceptively easy to believe that our world is going to hell in a handbasket because the only thing we hear each day is that day’s horrors. Someone got shot. Somewhere got poisoned. Something blew up. Someone betrayed us.

Why all the bad news? Two reasons:

  1. News media report on what’s new; that is, they tell us what happened today that was different from what happened yesterday. They’re looking at individual occurrences, especially if they come with striking visual images. We’re not asked to think about the big picture, because the big picture didn’t happen today. And so we fixate on all the little things that did transpire.
  2. Bad news sells; more particular, bad news delivered in a howling tone generates outrage and clicks. For political parties, it also generates revenue and delivers votes.

But that’s not the actual story of our lives, is it?

Things are getting better.

At the most superficial level, everything made money in 2017. The only fund categories in the red were bear market funds and energy funds. Once you got into the world of straightforward, diversified investing, everything worked. Every category of US diversified equity fund made money, and every category of international diversified equity fund made more money. The top performing domestic category was large growth, up 27% and paced by funds from Quantified STF, Kinetics and Zevenbergen, all of which topped 50% gains. And even that category gain trailed nine international fund categories. The handful of India funds, for example, averaged 48% gains last year. Emerging markets bonds posted double digit returns, while all other bonds make gains in the single digits. On whole, it wasn’t rational but it was profitable.

Not everything is getting better. Not every day and not every year. But the important things are, year after year, decade after decade, century after century, getting better. They’re getting better because it’s in our nature to seek better, rather than to surrender to worse. For every idiot in the news, ten thousand of us work – quietly and without expectation of attention – to make things better. That’s a great ratio. And greater still if you make it 10,001.

Next steps, part one

Our challenges are very real (and terrifying). But they’ve been very real (and terrifying) for centuries. The question is not “will things get better?” so much as “what’s your plan to make it better in 2018?” With off-year elections impending, will you finally decide it’s worth your while to be heard? Will you plant a rain garden or volunteer in your schools? Will you walk more, be consciously grateful, notice others more? Will you spend less time with your portfolio and more with your neighbors? Will you fuss less about this quarter’s returns and more about the pattern of intentional consumption (see “Life After,” below) and serious savings (as a nation, we hit a decade-low in our savings rate last year) that will support your most important goals?

Will you put down your phone, leave tweeting to the birds and step away from an Amazon-induced impulse to buy? Jonathan Clement shared the link to a really thoughtful piece entitled “Life After Amazon,” chronicling nine discoveries one gentleman made after he shut down his Amazon account and returned to buying real things from real people in the real world. It’s worth reading.

I have faith in you.

Next steps, part two

Charles, our endlessly energetic colleague and major domo of MFO Premium, is offering two online seminars, both on January 4th, to help acquaint users – new and old – with its offerings and use. There are details in New Year, New Tools in this issue.

Coming in February: new profiles, a discussion of two strategies for hedging your portfolio for the inevitable change of direction in the market, an Elevator Talk with a cool multi-alts manager, my annual portfolio disclosure, word of Chip’s first equity fund (at least in her non-retirement account) and more!

See you then!

 

New Year, New Tools

By David Snowball

Charles wanted to both thank you and help you discover some of the stuff that our Premium screener can do for you.

It has two features that most screeners lack, and both of them are Charles! Charles has been thinking about what’s really important for investors to know in order to make the best decisions for themselves and their families. As a result, (1) he’s built in tools – from uncommon risk measures to correlation matrices and rolling return screens – that give you information that’s meaningful. And (2) he revises the site almost monthly to accommodate your needs and interests. Literally: if you write with a concern, you get a prompt answer that actually comes from one or both of us. Quite frequently, you also get new or clarified options added to MFO Premium as a result.

All of which works best if you understand which buttons to push. Charles would like to walk you through that process via a live webinar using Zoom. It’s free and easy.

Here are the details:

Date: January 4, 2018
Time: 11:00 a.m. Eastern and again at 5:00 p.m. Eastern

What you have to do:

  1. Select the time that works best for you
  2. Click on the corresponding registration link below
  3. Join in, listen, talk and enjoy!

Morning Session: 11 a.m. Eastern, Jan. 4

Welcome! You are invited to join a meeting: MFO Premium Update

Overview of site background and demo highlighting newest features.

https://zoom.us/meeting/register/a7cdfa6bdb1561d8dc2040ba88984b7b

After registering, you will receive a confirmation email about joining the meeting.

Afternoon Session: 5:00 p.m. Eastern, Jan 4.

Welcome! You are invited to join a meeting: MFO Premium Update

Overview of site background and demo highlighting newest features.

https://zoom.us/meeting/register/306b3afbd7927709c5b9141539e44ee6

After registering, you will receive a confirmation email about joining the meeting.

Even if you’ve used MFO Premium in the past, you need to consider attending. We’ve done a lot of work in the past couple months to make the interface cleaner and easier, while still adding features. Unless you’re a fan of discovery by clicking randomly around, you’ll find the conversation useful.

If you have questions or concerns ahead of the webinar, drop Charles a line.

Rolling toward the one fund you can trust

By David Snowball

The knock on mutual fund performance numbers is that they’re static and arbitrary snapshots that give the illusion of being meaningful. What do you learn from looking at a fund’s five-year performance number? Mostly, you learn that the fund, through skill or luck, did well in the market conditions that obtained between December 2012 and December 2017. Sadly, we don’t have any reason to think those two dates are particularly important (why December 2012? ‘cause it was five years ago, duh!) and we don’t have any reason to believe they’ll tell us about performance in December 2018.

One way of creating a richer portrait of a fund’s risks and returns is by using rolling averages. A fund’s rolling five-year average reflects how it did in every 60 month period as far back as we’ve got data. A six year old fund has one five-year average but 12 rolling five year periods to assess; a ten year old fund has five five-year periods (2012-17, 2011-16) but 60 rolling five year periods.

Karen Wallace at Morningstar recently celebrated “Rolling Returns: A Powerful Analytical Tool That Anyone Can Use”(11/29/17). She notes that “they’re an extremely valuable tool for analyzing fund performance.”

Rolling period returns can provide a more in-depth view into a fund’s performance history than you can get by looking at a single-period trailing return. In a way it’s like comparing a panoramic photo of a forest to a snapshot of a small group of trees.

Rolling returns offer a wider-angle lens into a fund’s full return history. In addition to looking at a fund’s most recent five-year return you could also look at how it performed over many overlapping 60-month periods as far back as your performance data goes, or as far back as the current manager has been in charge, which can help you gain a fuller understanding of its historical performance trends throughout five-year holding periods in a variety of market environments. 

The little complication is that for users wanting to screen the funds or do a side-by-side comparison, the “anyone” in the title translates to “anyone with a Morningstar Direct subscription.” Wikinvest reports the pricing for that service:

Morningstar Direct: Pricing for Morningstar Direct is based on the number of licenses purchased. We charge $16,000 for the first user, $10,500 for the second user, and $8,000 for each additional user.

Speaking on behalf of small investors everywhere: yikes!

Fortunately, those of us who are what Pittsburgh National Bank called “thousandaires” have two affordable and complementary ways to get some of that data.

Morningstar offers a picture of a fund’s rolling averages in their fund profiles. From a fund’s profile page, click on “chart” and, on the upper left corner of the chart click the “growth” pulldown menu and select “rolling returns.” You’ll see a chart with a bunch of bars on it. Now under “rolling period” select 36 months. Using Fidelity Low-Priced Stock as our test subject, here’s what you’ll see:

What does that chart tell you? Over the past 10 years, the fund’s worst-ever 36 month stretch saw an annualized loss of 14.5%, March of 2006 to February 2009. That’s the depths of the 2007-09 financial crisis. That’s better than its peers, represented by the orange line. Conclusion: great in bad times, competitive in good times, pretty steady overall.

MFO offers the data in a single, easy to read table. Here’s our version of the Fidelity Low-Priced Stock story.

What does that say? If you’re willing to hold FLPSX for three years (and there are 205 rolling three-year periods in the data), your worst-ever experience was an annualized loss of 14.6% and your best-ever experience would have been a gain of 30.1% annually. Over the long term, investors have received about 11.8% annually in the average three-year period. Solid! You can also see how much it pays to hold on through bad times: the worst-ever single year was a loss of 42.3% and the worst-ever five year stretch was a loss of 3.7% but the fund’s worst-ever decade still paid its investors 6.8% annually. If you compare the average returns, you see a striking stability: 11.8% annually if you’re willing to hold for three years, 11.6% if you’re willing to hold for five years, and 9.8% if you hold a decade. Why does the longest holding period have the lowest return? Because bear markets tend to show up every seven years or so, as a result many five year periods dodge any bear exposure while some 10 year periods contain at least bits of two bear cycles.

Those single-fund charts show you different angles of the same data. MFO Premium adds one additional tool that retail investors can’t access through Morningstar: our fund screener allows you to screen for funds based on their lowest 1, 3, 5, 10 and 20 year rolling averages.

Want a fund that’s never had a losing 12 month period in the past decade? No problem, there are 306 of them. Small problem, they’re all short-term, ultra-short term bond or money market funds.

Here’s a more interesting challenge: can we find a stock-oriented mutual fund that we can trust? We know stocks are volatile, so it’s not reasonable to hope for a fund that has never had a losing three-year run so let’s set reasonable criteria in hopes of finding a fund that has never disappointed. On our screener, I first set four rolling average requirements:

  • 3 year rolling average: never worse than -2% / year
  • 5 year rolling average: never worse than 0% / year
  • 10 year rolling average: never worse than 6% / year
  • 20 year rolling average: never worse than 8% / year

What does that mean? I ignored one-year averages because they’re so volatile and you should be ashamed of yourself if you invest with a one-year time horizon. I start with no more than minimal losses over 3 years, no worse than breaking even over five, with solid gains for long-term investors. And, just to placate folks who do freak out about the risk of short, severe downturns, I added a maximum drawdown screen of category 1 or 2; that is, below average to much below average maximum losses. Then I hit “go.”

Out of an 8000 fund universe, only one fund passed our screen. That fund is Oakmark Equity and Income (OAKBX), which our colleague Ed Studzinski co-managed with Clyde McGregor from 2000-early 2012. Here’s Morningstar’s picture of the fund rolling along:

See all those periods where the green line (their peers) was below zero while their blue bars were way above zero? That’s where they’re being smart and risk-conscious, over and over again, while their peers foundered.

MFO’s screener output gives you a more precise slice of the data: over 229 three-year rolling periods, the worst stretch was -2.0/year, the best was 20.1%/year with an average of 9.8% annually for someone holding for 3 years. And 9.7% for 5-year periods, 9.1% for 10 year periods and 9.8% for 20 year ones. Do you get some sense of stunning consistency here? We do.

It has been a superb performer, though its future requires some tempering of expectations. With Ed gone, some of the sparkle is off the prose in their letters to investors. Honestly, I used to look forward to every one of Ed & Clyde’s letters for their insight and sharp writing. That experience makes me grateful that Ed agreed to join MFO’s merry band. And Clyde McGregor expects to retire by age 70; he’s 65 now, so investors need to anticipate some transition beginning in the next three years or so. Mr. McGregor has two co-managers, Colin Hudson and Edward J. Wojciechowski, both of whom joined Harris Associates in 2005 and were named to the fund’s management in 2013. I have no doubt that they’re both bright and industrious souls, but I also have no proof that they’ll meet the ridiculously high standard set by Messrs. McGregor and Studzinski.

But, for now and for the past 30 years, Oakmark Equity and Income has qualified as “the one fund you can trust.”

Conflicts and Contradictions

By Edward A. Studzinski

“Success is never final. Failure is never fatal. It is courage that counts.”

        Winston S. Churchill

Some time ago, I was surprised by a conversation with my colleague Charles, finding him quite incensed about a visit he had made to a money manager, one of a series of such encounters that began at the Morningstar conference this year. It appears to have been a disconcerting discovery to Charles that the firm in question, rather than lowering their fees, which fell somewhat on the high side, preferred to keep the fees high so as to support the high life. Charles would define the high life as expensive office space in the high-rent district, along with a propensity for displays of conspicuous hospitality that would have caught Jay Gatsby’s attention. As David notes, separately, Ron Baron plays that game better than most. Lowering the fees would most likely have, as Charles argued, garnered enough in the way of assets to make up for the decreased expense ratio.

In that vein, I am reminded of the quote attributed to the Roman Emperor Caligula, “Money has no smell.” There is in the money management business, especially among active managers a sense of entitlement without par. And as the money rolls in, sometimes things change that impact the investors (the other people’s money that builds franchises) but receive little or no press. I am reminded of the situation of my former colleagues from Harris Associates, David Samra and Dan O’Keefe, both of whom departed Harris due to a disagreement about the timing of their becoming partners. Samra and O’Keefe went on to an enviable record of success launching the Artisan International Value Fund and the Artisan Global Value Fund. Both funds enjoyed periods of stellar investment performance, achieving five star ratings from Morningstar. They also managed to regularly outperform Herro’s funds with less risk.

We then had the March 7, 2013 initial public offering of the stock of Artisan Partners Asset Management, Inc. As a result of that IPO, Messrs. Samra and O’Keefe had valuations on their stock in Artisan worth in excess of $100M apiece. Subsequently, Mr. O’Keefe moved from San Francisco back to Illinois where his family and friends are, and now operates out of a satellite office there. Mr. Samra remains in San Francisco, in the financial district. Performance on both funds, while still good, has declined from being top decile. Why? That is probably a question worthy of a Harvard Business School case study. And my suspicion is that at the end of it, you will still not know the answer.

I recently had a dinner companion who is the individual responsible for selecting the Chief Investment Officer for one of the largest endowments in the world. As we discussed the investment world, and the performance of other endowment funds, it suddenly dawned on me that this person was frustrated that there was not some replicable formula or process that would ensure the success, first of the investment personnel selections, and then, of their respective investment performance. Probably the hardest thing for many to deal with in investment manager selections is that often the person or persons are one-offs. This stems from the fact that in many instances, especially as pertains to value investors, besides discipline, we see something that, as practiced, is as much an art as science. And in many instances, the human computers that we are seeing are indeed one-offs. Indeed, there is sometimes something about a time and place that produces a particular intellectual chemistry.

This is a little bit the problem one sees with what a friend of mine labels the “Buffett clones” who are the people who model themselves and their investment process on the way Warren Buffett invests. And yet, they rarely if ever even come close to, let alone replicate, Warren Buffett’s investments or performance. My friend would say that that is because the way that people think Buffett invests is not really the way he does invest, and I will defer to her in that regard.

But I do think that we underestimate, to our great loss, the extent to which the Buffetts, the Druckenmillers, the Millers, the Mungers, are all outliers more than two standard deviations removed, who have going on in their heads processes which are not easily replicated by a group of analysts and an investment committee sitting around a table. The latter, often more concerned with job security and the gathering of assets under management, are increasingly doomed to failure under the twin pressures of increased transparency and fee pressure.

Predictions

2018 will be a very interesting year for investors. We are in a period of great innovation. We are also in a period when normalized investment returns have been distorted by ongoing central bank interventions, which have resulted in unintended consequences. An individual involved in the private equity world recently asked me how I was positioning my investments. My answer was that I was looking for uncorrelated investments whose market capitalizations were generally too small (and illiquid) for institutional investors to invest in (the ability to handle illiquidity being a competitive advantage for individuals). That is not an approach for everyone, especially since illiquidity can be a problem for those not prepared to deal with it. But it should be understood that illiquidity can be an opportunity. I also have a preference for businesses without a lot of debt that provide goods or services for which there is a regular and consistent demand, in meeting basic and ongoing needs. And for the very good business, be prepared to pay a fair price.

Reviews

For those who are movie goers at this time of year, I highly recommend “Darkest Hour” and “Molly’s Game.” And for those with the patience to make your way through a long but worthwhile book, I highly recommend Ron Chernow’s new biography, Grant.

Alfred E. Baron: What, me worry?

By David Snowball

I wonder, sometimes, if I’m more irked by high fund fees because they degrade my returns or because they reflect an annoying sense of entitlement on the part of managers who think we owe them a lifestyle far more opulent than our own. At base, is my objection practical or moral?

Landon Thomas’s long article in the New York Times looks at Ron Baron’s comp and pushes me hard in the direction of the latter: Mr. Baron seems to have an almost superhuman sense of his own worth (“Why Are Mutual Fund Fees So High? This Billionaire Knows,” 12/30/17). For those who don’t subscribe to the Times, CNBC published a good excerpt of the piece.

Here’s a precis of the article:

  1. The Baron funds charge a lot, even after their assets hit the multi-billion dollar range. Mr. Thomas reports that Baron’s fees are about 50% above the industry average.
  2. Founder Ron Baron is perfectly happy with that arrangement, “We have made $23.6 billion for our clients,” he says. We’ll note two flaws in this argument: (1) the vast bulk of those returns are simple growth in the stock market, not Mr. Baron’s brilliance and (2) the bulk of the outperformance is ancient history. Mr. Baron cites the record since inception (a 30 year span) for his two oldest funds, while neglecting to mention the fact that Baron Asset has trailed both its peer group and low-cost competitors such as Vanguard Mid Cap Growth (VMGRX) over the past 20 years.
  3. Baron is living high, and loves it. He’s worth $2 billion, his family has $670 million invested in the funds, he owns a $150 million home and his annual shareholder meetings are platforms on which to display, and through which to validate, his vast wealth.
  4. The system is rigged to keep it that way. Many members of his board of trustees, nominally his investors’ representatives, have been in that role for 30 years, a well compensated (the firm’s 2017 Statement of Additional Information reports compensation of $115,000 – 143,750 for the independent trustees) for a distinctly part-time job and have absolutely no incentive to rock the boat. The board has agreed to a contract that compensates Mr. Baron and other key players based on the firm’s assets under management, which creates an incentive to vacuum up money whenever the opportunity permits. That helps explain the 0.25% 12(b)1 marketing fee he imposes.

Investors have noticed. Assets at Baron Growth (BGRFX) have fallen from $6.9 billion in 2007 to $2.7 billion today and his flagship Baron Asset (BARAX) fund has dropped from $4.3 billion to $2.0 billion.

Mr. Baron, unworried, smiles and maintains both funds’ high fees. With a management fee of 1.0%, those two funds alone generate $47 million a year in revenue for his management company.

The sense of entitlement is regrettably common. Our colleague, Charles Boccadoro, has been visiting fund advisers over the past few months, and he’s coming away repeatedly frustrated by the simple fact that managers charge as much as they can get away with. Investopedia reports the industry-wide averages:

A survey conducted by Russell Reynolds Associates revealed that fund managers at banks make an average of $140,000, while mutual fund managers at insurance companies make $175,000. Fund managers at brokerage firms make $222,000, and mutual fund companies’ mutual fund managers make an average of $436,500. Managers working for larger funds make significantly more …

We’ll note that the $436,500 isn’t the average for excellent managers, entrepreneurial managers or large-fund managers. No, no, it’s what the average schmoo pockets. And there’s a 95% chance that the schmoo in question offers less value than keeping the money yourself and buying an index fund.

There are managers who earn their fees and more. Indeed, some managers simultaneously over-earn their fees and reduce them to offer greater benefit to their investors; Andrew Foster and the folks at Seafarer are a case in point. Many managers of small funds make nothing, regardless of what the prospectus says. By way of example, on behalf of an MFO reader (hi, Judith!) who had questions about prospectus provisions concerning a performance bonus for the manager and other expenses, we reached out to Rondure Global. They confirmed what we told our reader: the manager is underwriting the firm’s existence, rather than vice versa. As a brand new operation, Rondure depends on a line of credit from its partner Grandeur Peak

…and from Laura Gertiz herself to keep the firm afloat for quite some time. Laura may take a very small amount of compensation this year (only enough to allow her to participate in our 401k program), however most of the expenses are coming out of her own pocket at this juncture so it doesn’t make sense for her to be paid any significant amount. That will obviously change in the future, however, you should be aware that if Laura does earn a bonus after profitability is reached, 100% of it will be plowed back into the funds on a long-term vesting schedule in order to align her incentives with those of our investors.

For investors, there are two dangerous questions: (1) how much am I paying? And (2) am I beating the market? They’re dangerous because they encourage you to judge your manager on irrelevant criteria. In place of the first question, we’d suggest asking “am I getting full value for what I’m paying?” Managers can add significant value by moderating risk, offering access to intriguing and otherwise inaccessible asset classes or by giving you the confidence to hold on through tough times. Your worst enemy is you, and your best friend can be a manager who makes you a better investor.

In place of the second question, we’d suggest asking, “is this manager helping me achieve my life goals?” Unless you are a terribly sad and lonely person, you’re really not going to want “he outperformed the Dow by 0.25% annually over his long life” to be the first line in your eulogy. Market-beating means nothing! Losing 19% when the market loses 20% is nothing to cheer. Suffering vertigo and anxiety as your manager charges into, and beats, a foam-filled market is nothing to cheer. Beating the market steadily, whether by 1 basis point or 1000, tells us nothing about whether you’ve been able to lead the life you’ve aspired to. Focus, instead, on what’s meaningful: are you making steady gains of the sort that will allow you to enjoy life, to make a difference in the world, and be rich with friends and family? If so, you’re winning. Celebrate.

BUT if you’re one of the millions of investors whose investments serve mainly to underwrite the lifestyle of an unimaginative member of the herd, act now! MFO Premium offers one very fine suite of tools for assessing whether you’re being treated reasonably (check your manager’s five- and ten-year rolling averages to see whether you might reasonably expect the sorts of returns you need to meet your goals) while ActiveShare.Info offers another.

ActiveShare, underwritten by the folks at Touchstone Investments and guided by the research of Martijn Cremers of Notre Dame, offers another. For domestic equity funds, Active Shares measures the proportion of a fund’s portfolio that simply mimics an index’s; the “different from the index” proportion is called the active share and it’s where the manager can add value. Funds with high active share – 70% or more, depending on the asset class – have the greatest potential to justify their “active” expenses. The site even allows you to calculate what you’re actually paying for the manager’s skill by factoring the size of the active share into an expense ratio calculation: a 1% fee on a fund with 100% active share means all of your money pays for independence from the index, so your active share costs you 1%. Contrarily, a 1% fee on a fund with 10% active shares means the expense ratio on the active part of the account is nearly 10%! Avoid such funds.

Bottom line: for investors in the Baron funds, the same questions apply. Are you so heartened by Mr. Baron’s showmanship and reassuring visage that you’re willing to pay a 50% upcharge for his funds? If so, you’re being charged fairly. If not, check out Nicholas II Fund (NNTWX) which has been around longer, charges less, returns more and has a smaller asset base.

Shukran jazīlan! Trugarez! Xièxie! Go raibh maith agaibh! E molte grazie!

By David Snowball

Likewise merci, danke and, more than all, thanks!

On December 17th, I wrote a note to the 7,000 or so folks on our mailing list. The sad part of the note was reminding folks of the end of our associate’s relationship with Amazon which had so long provided our ability to cover our “hard” bills such as webhosting and email. The glad part was announcing a challenge gift of $2000, offered by three MFO readers who wanted to do the best they could to support us. Their offer was straightforward: we’ll put in a dollar of our own money for every dollar contributed by others, up to a total match of $2000.

That seemed hopeful, as well as very generous. We wrote, hoping that perhaps 20 of you might make $100 contributions, an amount which would trigger your access to MFO Premium (Charles has been streamlining the site and adding features again), allow us to access the full challenge amount and cover more than a third of our Amazon loss.

Ummm … you were magnificent overachievers. Rather than 20 contributions, we received about 200. They ranged from $7.11 to $500, in addition to the original challenge gifts. Tadas Viskanta, master of Abnormal Returns, helped by tweeting out to appeal for his followers to consider chipping in $10 each. Several long-time friends in the industry helped out, as did a huge number of new folks. About 40 people contributed $100 or more and gained MFO Premium (some folks sent letters without sharing email addresses, please write Charles if you’re among them so he can get you set up). Our correspondents ranged from Alaska to Florida (both of which are currently warmer than the Quad Cities).

And not a few tacked on 2.5% to offset PayPal’s cut. Thanks for the extra, it was a very sweet gesture.

It is, by the way, intensely satisfying to have members who feel so strongly about the value this site offers. We’re deeply grateful, both for our own sakes and for the sake of the 24,000 other readers you’ve just helped out.

And so, thanks to …

John R. John M.
Walter C. Benjamin P.
David F. Altaf K.
Richard G. Jonathan P.
R M. Brett A., Happy Holidays to you and yours.
Kapil K. Donald P.
Richard B. Rick C.
Scott O. Ian H.
Philip A. Rand H.
Joe C. Brian R.
Poody M., we target ‘thought provoking’. James L.
John M., good fortune to you. Jeroen B., indeed every bit does help – thank you!
Harlen C. William S.
Victoria O., with waves and a hope to see you at Morningstar! Michelle P.
Craig W. Edward B.
Matthew S. Elie T.
Stephan S. Larry C.
Vera & Alfred H. Thomas A.
Lee S. Bret S.
Allen H. Sunil A.
Ben L., we appreciate you, too. Joel K.
Adam E., you folks are very close to becoming Chip’s first equity fund! William D.
Dan S. – thank you James H.
George H. Jeffrey B., thank you – we’re feeling good.
Bary M. William N.
Kevin P. Leah W. – it’s always good to hear from you.
Duc L. Curtis R.
Nancy J. Jonathan L., dude – we cover them, and we’re gonna cover more.
Nick & Debbie, as soon as you promise to stop having statewide conflagrations, we’re there! Kevin S.
Brett B. Elizabeth S.
William W. Kirk L.
Steven L. Paul E.
Jim McM, all 10,000 pennies make a difference. Eric G., thanks for the extra!
Jack G. Tom S.
Poetry P. Ann S.
Nancy P., the extra makes a big difference! Wilson D.
Jerald R. Thomas K., we’re so glad you find value with us.
Sigrid M. William M.
Francis G. Lloyd T.
Don & Toni. James P..
Mary C. Joe B.
Richard & Linda G. Ryan T.
Neil D. John D. – the curmudgeonly Ed nods and waves.
Silina T. – we’re always happy to help. Edward M.
Michael K. Joan K.
Tim K., thank you – made me think of the $64,000 question! Hjalmar T., thanks as ever, sir!
RJ D. Rae S.
JW M. Lawrence R.
Everett W. Jimmy V.
Mark D. Charles L.
Sara M. Radey J.
Joseph M. from IL, thanks for the support. Raymond K.
Stuart B. Joseph A.
Lisa G. Sunil H.
Robert H. Roberto P.
Robert D. Barry P.
Parker B., it’s good to be appreciated. Gary K.
Jeffrey M. Van S.
Joseph S. Paul B.
John G. Jean S.
Anne G. Stanley C.
Glenn H. Vicki D.
Kenneth W. Paul & Deanna N.
Gary H. Dolph C.
James O., we try. Larry H.
Roger B. William R.
Deborah W. Patrick F.
Hedda N., a very happy new year, to you, as well, dear ma’am!. Brad K.
Gerald D. Susan F.
Michael C. Kirk T., thanks to you – and everyone else – we surpassed our goal!
Kamaldeep C. Mark P.
CL K. Gregory E.
Thomas M. Kathleen W.
Arthur S. Ed G., your support helped us reach the goal.
Ruth B. Eric R.
Paula G. Richard W.
Paul V. Jonathan K.
Ryan L. Fred O., we appreciate it.
Gary B. Richard F.
Tim K. Ganesh R., your access has been updated – thank you!
Andre P. Jonathan F.
Peter & Pamela F. Bill S.
Mark M. Louis D.
Robert G. Dennis B.
Richard K. Charles P.
Marshall J. Paul R.
Ronald L. Ed G.
John K. Philip S.
Dmitriy K. Charles R.
James S. Brian Y.
Mark Z. John L.
Nicholas B. Timothy K., Go Vikings!
Christopher R. John O.
Pat K.. David R.
Gary C., thank you! Raymond G.
George K. Don F., we’re glad you enjoy the site.
Michael S. Robert J.
Mark, we’re happy to keep on keepin’ on. Mitchell G.
Lanny B., that’s our goal. Thomas L.
   Stewart F., your donation means a lot.

Please forgive us if we’ve missed your name – I’m sitting amidst a pile of paper, feeling just a little befuddled.

And thanks to our anonymous challenge donors, to Deb W. for helping us think more clearly and to our regular subscribers, Greg and Brian, for their continued support.

Funds in registration

By David Snowball

Fund advisers are required to file prospectuses for proposed funds with the SEC; the SEC has 75 days to review the filing. If the SEC doesn’t object, then the adviser is free to launch – or to not launch, which is more common than you think – the proposed fund. Funds placed in registration in December will “go live” in February or March 2018. This month’s filings include three actively-managed ETFs, two conversions of existing funds and one mystery: how Thrivent can offer a no-load / no minimum fund for 7 basis points in expenses.

Amplify YieldShares High Yield ETF

Amplify YieldShares High Yield ETF, an actively managed ETF, will seek high current income with a secondary goal of capital appreciation. The plan is to assemble a portfolio primarily comprised of high-yield debt, with some room for high-dividend equities. The adviser claims a “deep value contrarian approach to the credit markets, focusing on absolute value.” The fund will be managed by Peritus Asset Management, LLC. This fund is a reorganization of an unnamed “predecessor fund,” presumably Peritus High Yield ETF (HYLD) with a spectacularly bad track record. The initial expense ratio is 1.25% and there is no minimum initial investment requirement.

BTS Managed Income Fund

BTS Managed Income Fund will seek total return. The plan is to pursue two strategies: an unconstrained fixed-income strategy and a risk management strategy that actively trades in order to hedge the first strategy. In general, the fixed income strategy will occupy 60-70% of the portfolio. The fund will be managed by Vilis Pasts, Matthew Pasts, and Isaac Braley. The initial expense ratio has not been disclosed and the minimum initial investment will be.

Davis Select International ETF (DINT)

Davis Select International ETF (DINT), an actively managed ETF, will seek long-term capital growth . The plan is to create an all-cap global equity portfolio. Notwithstanding the word “international” in the name, the fund is required to hold only 30% non-U.S., including U.S. firms with substantial international exposure. The fund will be managed by Danton Goei of Davis Selected Advisers. The initial expense ratio  is 0.75% and there is, of course, no minimum initial investment requirement. The launch is set for March 2018.

LHA Market State Tactical U.S. Equity ETF

LHA Market State Tactical U.S. Equity ETF, an actively-managed ETF, will seek to beat the US stock market on a risk-adjusted basis. The plan is to use ETFs and futures contracts to achieve a market exposure of between 0-160% of the portfolio. The fund will be managed by Jeffrey C. Landle of Little Harbor Advisors. The initial expense ratio has not been disclosed and there is no minimum initial investment requirement.

Miller/Howard Infrastructure Fund

Miller/Howard Infrastructure Fund will seek current income and long-term capital appreciation. The plan is to invest in a portfolio of exchange listed infrastructure companies including water, gas, and electric utilities, waste, communication and telecom, internet, energy infrastructure, transportation and logistics, and renewable energy. No word about size or geographic location. There is, however, an ESG screen. The fund will be managed by a team led by Lowell G. Miller, Miller-Howard’s CIO. The initial expense ratio will be 1.20% and the minimum initial investment will be $2,500.

Northpointe Small Cap Opportunities Fund

Northpointe Small Cap Opportunities Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation. The plan is to invest in domestic small cap value stocks. The fund will be managed by Jeffrey C. Petherick, CFA, and Mary C. Champagne. This is a conversion of an unnamed predecessor fund and an unspecified record; the previous record in the prospectus is [xx%]. I’m guessing it’s their tiny, under-performing NorthPointe Small Cap Value (NPSVX) fund. The initial expense ratio will be 1.10% and the minimum initial investment will be.

Old Westbury All Cap ESG Fund

Old Westbury All Cap ESG Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation. The plan is pretty vague: “the Adviser’s investment process combines ESG scores, as provided by a third party vendor, with a proprietary quantitative process that measures equity securities’ attractiveness.” The fund will be managed by Dr. Qiang Jiang, Y. Gregory Sivin, and Anna E. White. The initial expense ratio has not been disclosed and the minimum initial investment will be $1,000.

Thrivent Core Low Volatility Equity Fund

Thrivent Core Low Volatility Equity Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation with lower volatility relative to the domestic equity market. The plan is to use quant models to buy low volatility stocks. The fund will be managed by Noah J. Monsen, CFA and Brian W. Bomgren, CQF.. Okay, here are the two elements of the filing that I simply don’t understand. The initial expense ratio is 0.07% and there is no minimum initial investment. I’ve got to call these folks. I’ll update you next month if they’re willing to talk.

Manager changes, December 2017

By Chip

Sixty funds saw complete or partial manager changes, which is right in line with our long-term average. Most months see between 50-70 changes. Just as was the case in September, the most consequential changes are coming from the Third Avenue funds. Michael Winer, manager of Third Avenue Real Estate Value and the firm’s sole remaining star, is retiring after 20 years. His co-managers will need to step up. Just a bit later, the merger of Third Avenue International Value will narrow things further.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
NUBAX Neuberger Berman Unconstrained Bond Fund Andrew Johnson has announced his intent to retire on December 31, 2018. Brad Tank and Ashok Bhatia will join Thanos Bardas, David Brown, Jon Jonsson, Nathan Kush, Ugo Lancioni, and Thomas Marthaler on the management team. 12/17
PSEPX 1789 Growth and Income Fund Stephen Fauer is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Paul Tryon will now manage the fund. 12/17
RGSAX AllianzGI Global Small-Cap Fund Frank Hansen will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Nine other managers remain to keep the lights on. 12/17
AOPAX AllianzGI International Small-Cap Fund Frank Hansen will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Nine other managers remain to keep the lights on. 12/17
GVRPX American Beacon Grosvenor Long/Short Fund River Canyon Fund Management is no longer a subadvisor to the fund. The rest of the team remains 12/17
BERWX Berwyn Fund Lee Grout left Chartwell Investment Partners, LLC  on December 29, 2017, at which point he no longer served as portfolio manager David Dalrymple will replace Mr. Grout as portfolio manager of the fund. 12/17
MASPX BlackRock Advantage U.S. Total Market Fund Murali Balaraman and John Coyle are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Travis Cooke, Raffaele Savi and Richard Mathieson will manage the fund. 12/17
BUFMX Buffalo Mid Cap Fund Scott Moore and Dave Carlsen will no longer serve as portfolio managers for the fund. Chris Carter and Josh West will now manage the fund. 12/17
DHLAX Diamond Hill Large Cap Fund No one, but . . . A promo! References to Austin Hawley as Assistant Portfolio Manager of the Large Cap Fund are removed and replaced with Austin Hawley as Portfolio Manager of the Large Cap Fund. 12/17
EAFVX Eaton Vance Focused Value Opportunities Fund John Crowley is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Aaron Dunn joins Edward Perkins in managing the fund. 12/17
EHSTX Eaton Vance Large-Cap Value Fund John Crowley is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Aaron Dunn joins Edward Perkins in managing the fund. 12/17
EATVX Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Value Fund John Crowley is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Aaron Dunn joins Edward Perkins in managing the fund. 12/17
FSLVX Fidelity Stock Selector Large Cap Value Fund No one immediately but, Katherine Buck is expected to retire effective March 31, 2018. Chip Perrone joined the other eight managers on the team. He is expected to take over Ms. Buck’s co-manager responsibilities at that time. 12/17
FSICX Fidelity Strategic Income Fund William Irving no longer serves as co-manager of the fund. Ford O’Neil, Adam Kramer, Mark Notkin, Jonathan Kelly, David Simner, and Franco Castagliuolo are joined by  Sean Corcoran on the management team. 12/17
FSRRX Fidelity Strategic Real Return Fund William Irving no longer serves as co-manager of the fund. Sean Corcoran joins Ford O’Neil, Adam Kramer, Mark Snyderman, Samuel Wald, and Franco Castagliuolo in managing the fund. 12/17
FCARX Fiera Capital Diversified Alternatives Fund Ellington Management Group will no longer subadvise the fund, and Rasheed Sabar will no longer serve on the management team. Fiera Capital will directly manage that portion of the funds assets. The rest of the management team will remain. 12/17
HHBUX    Hancock Horizon Burkenroad Small Cap Fund  John Portwook will retire on or around January 12, 2018. David Lundgren will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
HHIAX    Hancock Horizon Diversified Income Fund  John Portwook will retire on or around January 12, 2018. Greg Hodlewsky will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
HHQAX     Hancock Horizon Quantitative Long/Short Fund John Portwook will retire on or around January 12, 2018. Paula Chastain and Jacob Hartl will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
HSFAX HSBC Frontier Markets Fund Christopher Turner no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the fund. Ramzi Sidani will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
JORNX Janus Henderson Global Select Fund No one, but . . . George Maris has been joined by Julian McManus and Garth Yettick on the management team. 12/17
JAOSX Janus Henderson Overseas Fund No one, but . . . George Maris has been joined by Julian McManus and Garth Yettick on the management team. 12/17
SGQI Janus Henderson SG Global Quality Income ETF   Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
JSML Janus Henderson Small Cap Growth Alpha ETF Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
JSMD Janus Henderson Small/Mid Cap Growth Alpha ETF Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
TRSK Janus Velocity Tail Risk Hedged Large Cap ETF   Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
SPXH Janus Velocity Volatility Hedged Large Cap ETF   Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
MASNX Litman Gregory Masters Alternative Strategies Fund Passport Capital, LLC has been removed as a subadvisor and John Burbank will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. The rest of the team remains. 12/17
BHBFX Madison Dividend Income Fund Jay Sekelsky has retired. John Brown and Drew Justman will continue to co-manage the fund. 12/17
MNVAX Madison Investors Fund Jay Sekelsky has retired. Matt Hayner and Adam Sweet will continue to co-manage the fund. 12/17
MOSAX MassMutual Select Overseas Fund J.P. Morgan Investment Management was removed as a subadvisor to the fund. Georgina Maxwell, Jeroen Huysinga, and Demetris Georghiou will no longer serve as portfolio managers for the fund. David Herro, Daniel Ling, Felipe Benzinho, and Michael Manelli continue to manage the fund. 12/17
NCRAX Neuberger Berman Core Bond Fund Andrew Johnson has announced his intent to retire on December 31, 2018. Nathan Kush will join Thanos Bardas, David Brown, Thomas Marthaler, and Brad Tank on the management team. 12/17
NCPAX Neuberger Berman Core Plus Fund Andrew Johnson has announced his intent to retire on December 31, 2018. Thanos Bardas, Ashok Bhatia, David Brown, Nathan Kush, Thomas Marthaler, and Brad Tank will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
NSTAX Neuberger Berman Strategic Income Fund Andrew Johnson has announced his intent to retire on December 31, 2018. Ashok Bhatia will join Thanos Bardas, David Brown, Thomas Marthaler, and Brad Tank on the management team. 12/17
NGEAX Nuveen NWQ Global All-Cap Fund Effective immediately, Gregg Tenser is no longer a portfolio manager for the fund. James Stephenson will continue to serve as portfolio manager for the fund until its liquidation after the close of business on January 22, 2018. 12/17
PJMDX Putnam Absolute Return 500 Fund   Robert Kea is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Schoen, James Fetch and Jason Vaillancourt will now manage the fund. 12/17
PDMAX Putnam Absolute Return 700 Fund   Robert Kea is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Schoen, James Fetch and Jason Vaillancourt will now manage the fund. 12/17
PVSAX Putnam Capital Spectrum Fund No one, but . . . Jacquelyne Cavanaugh joins David Glancy as an assistant portfolio manager 12/17
PCONX Putnam Convertible Securities Fund Eric Harthun is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Savin and Anthony Daigle will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
PABAX Putnam Dynamic Asset Allocation Balanced Fund   Robert Kea is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Schoen, James Fetch and Jason Vaillancourt will now manage the fund. 12/17
PACAX Putnam Dynamic Asset Allocation Conservative Fund Robert Kea is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Schoen, James Fetch and Jason Vaillancourt will now manage the fund. 12/17
PAEAX Putnam Dynamic Asset Allocation Growth Fund Robert Kea is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Schoen, James Fetch and Jason Vaillancourt will now manage the fund. 12/17
PDREX Putnam Dynamic Risk Allocation Fund Robert Kea is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Schoen, James Fetch and Jason Vaillancourt will now manage the fund. 12/17
PYSAX Putnam Equity Spectrum Fund No one, but . . . Jacquelyne Cavanaugh joins David Glancy as an assistant portfolio manager 12/17
PMVAX Putnam Multi-Cap Value Fund James Polk is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Katherine Collins will now manage the fund. 12/17
PSLAX Putnam Small Cap Value Fund Eric Harthun is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. David Diamond will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
QEAAX Quaker Event Arbitrage Fund Paul Hoffmeister will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Thomas Kirchner will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
QTRAX Quaker Global Tactical Allocation Fund Paul Hoffmeister will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Thomas Kirchner will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
WMMAX TETON Westwood Mighty Mites Fund Paul Sonkin is no longer a portfolio manager of the fund. Mario Gabelli, Laura Linehan, and Sarah Donnelly will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
OLD The Long-Term Care ETF Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
SLIM The Obesity ETF (if the ticker for the Long-Term Care ETF is OLD, why isn’t this ticker FAT?) Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
ORG The Organics ETF Edward Tom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Weiner and Benjamin Wang will continue to serve as portfolio managers for the fund. 12/17
TAREX Third Avenue Real Estate Value Michael Winer intends to retire in early 2018. Mssr. Winer has been at the helm since 1998. Co-lead managers Jason Wolf and Ryan Dobratz will take over. Wolf and Dobratz joined in 2010 and 2013, respectively. The fund currently holds about $2 billion, down a billion from its peak. 12/17
VCVSX Vanguard Convertible Securities Fund No one, but . . . Andrew Watts joins Stuart Spangler, Abe Ofer, Jean-Pierre Latrille, and Petar Raketic on the management team. 12/17
WALTX Wells Fargo Alternative Strategies Fund As of February 15, 2018, Passport Capital, LLC will no longer serve as a subadvisor to the fund. John Burbank will no longer serve as a portfolio manager The rest of the team remains. 12/17
WMLPX Westwood MLP and Strategic Energy Fund Hollis Ghobrial no longer serves as a portfolio manager of the fund. Matthew Na and Todd Williams will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
APIGX Yorktown Capital Income Fund Michael Dixon is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. David D. Basten, David M. Basten, and Brentz East will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
AFGGX Yorktown Growth Fund Michael Dixon is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. David D. Basten, David M. Basten, and Brentz East will continue to manage the fund. 12/17
APIMX Yorktown Short Term Bond Fund Brentz East will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. David D. Basten, David M. Basten, and Michael Dixon will continue to manage the fund. 12/17

 

Briefly Noted

By David Snowball

Updates

In December’s story, “There’s no idea so dumb that it won’t attract a dozen ETFs,” I derided the notion of blockchain ETFs. That’s because they have so few meaningful investments; there just aren’t many publicly traded blockchain-focused firms to build a portfolio around. I described their investment universe as “a small, motley collection of firms that recently changed their names to blockchainify them (360 Capital Financial suddenly became 360 Blockchain), over-the-counter stocks, foreign small caps and recent IPOs.”

Shortly thereafter, Long Island Iced Tea Corporation – literally, guys who make bottled iced tea – changed their name to Long Island Blockchain. They’re still making iced tea and have no demonstrable competence in blockchain. Notwithstanding that, their stock tripled in value in a single day.

Business Insider chronicled the silliness around the IPO for a firm named “Longfin.”

There’s Longfin [LFIN]. The company went public in the US on December 13, 2017. In its SEC filing, it said it had revenues of $298,786 in the year 2017 and was sitting on $75 in cash. What sent the stock soaring 2,700%, from $5 to $142.82 in a few days, and gave it briefly a market capitalization of over $7 billion, was the December 15 announcement – an elegant and apparently very effective mix of gobbledygook, hype, and silliness that started out like this:

Longfin Corp., a leading global FinTech company, announces the acquisition of Ziddu.com, a Blockchain-empowered solutions provider that offers Microfinance Lending against Collateralized Warehouse Receipts in the form of Ziddu Coins.

Ummm … “sitting on $75 in cash”? I just checked my wallet: that’s rather more than I’m currently sitting on but I do have an extra $30 squirreled away in my desk which would put me over the top.

In any case, my loathing for the ETF industry grew with the registration filings of four bitcoin funds from First Trust, four from ProShares, two from REX and one from Direxion. (And no, I’m not giving you the links to such silliness. If you want them, you’ll need to find them on your own.) These funds, once launched, do represent a pathway through which the insanity of the bitcoin and cryptocurrency markets can infect major financial markets. A long shot, you say? Well, the cryptocurrency market just passed $500 billion value and (2) the 1998 Long Term Capital Management crisis was generated, in large part, by a misplaced bet on the Russian ruble. Wider systemic damage was avoided only through a swift and then-unprecedented bailout.

Briefly Noted . . .

I hardly know where to put the note that Tierra XP Latin America Real Estate ETF (LARE) became the ETFMG Alternative Harvest ETF. The “alternative harvest” at issue is marijuana.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Effective December 18, 2017, 361 Capital, LLC agreed to reduce the limit on the total annual fund operating expenses by 0.15% to 1.79%, 1.54% and 1.39% for the 361 Global Long/Short Equity Fund’s Investor Class, Class I and Class Y shares, respectively.

Effective February 28, 2018, Calamos is going to eliminate the no-load “R” share class for all of its funds. Current “R” shareholders will be transitioned into “A” shares, with the proviso that they will not have to pay the normal “A” share sales load. Given that Calamos “A” shares are typically costly but the “R” shares are noticeably more costly than “A”, it’s a small win.

The Disciplined Growth Investors Fund (DGIFX) is a small, five-star fund that’s normally around 70% domestic equities and 30% bonds or cash. They’ve got low expenses and good risk management; it has pretty much clobbered its Lipper “moderate allocation” peer group since inception. DGIFX has returned 12.4% annually against 7.7% for its peers.  Likewise with its Morningstar “aggressive allocation” peer group.  The fund normally imposes a $10,000 minimum. That’s now been modified to reduce the minimum to “$100 if an automatic monthly investment is established with monthly contributions of at least $100 until the account balance reaches $10,000, and the shareholder agrees to e-delivery of account statements and transaction confirmations.”

Effective immediately after 4:00 pm Eastern Time on January 2, 2018, the Driehaus International Small Cap Growth Fund (DRIOX) will reopen to new investors. The Fund has been closed to most new investors since December 29, 2010. It’s had a very solid run (13.3% annually over the past five years, about 1.8% ahead of its peers) but, like all Driehaus funds, tends to be volatile and costly.

The FX Strategy Fund (FXFAX and FXFIX) has converted their “A” shares into low minimum, no-load “I” shares. That spares shareholders the 5.75% sales charge but, in an unusual arrangement, the “I” shares carry a 0.25% marketing fee while the “A” shares did not. Up until now, the adviser has chosen not to impose the 12(b)1 fee. It looks like that will change and “Class I shares [will] charge a 0.25% Rule 12b-1 Distribution and Shareholder Services fee.”

“Effective December 6, 2017, Vanguard Emerging Markets Bond Fund (VEMBX) will be available for investment.” I admit that I have no idea what that sentence means. The fund has been around since 2016 and returned 13.35% in 2017. But it has only $32 million in investments and, for most of 2017, has been tagged as “not available for purchase.” Which has now changed, it seems.

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

Effective as of the close of business on December 29, 2017, Infinity Q Diversified Alpha Fund (IQDAX) imposes the hardest close on record: it “is closed to all new investment, including through dividend reinvestment, and the Infinity Q Fund’s transfer agent will not accept orders for purchases of shares of the Infinity Q Fund from either current Infinity Q Fund shareholders or new investors.” It’s a multi-alternative hedged fund, under $200 million in assets, five-star rating with a Great Owl designation. The GO signals consistently top-tier risk-adjusted performance against its Lipper Multi-Alternative Strategy peers.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

The focus of “Old Wine, New Bottles” is funds that change their names, generally without changing their nature. That is, there’s no corresponding change in mandate. As it turns out, name changes that don’t reflect fundamental management changes – called “superficial name changes” – should be a red flag for investors. Three scholars recently published a study of 6000 such changes. They conclude:

We study how investors respond to ‘superficial’ mutual-fund name changes that occur for no fundamental reasons. We find that such name changes remain widespread [and] are more widespread than previously studied ‘misleading’ changes. Superficial changes appear to be driven by managerial incentives. Investors react to superficial changes with increased fund flows but appear to gain no benefit through improved performance or lower fees. On the contrary, name-change funds underperform as a group. (Susanne Espenlaub, Imtiaz ul Haq and Arif Khurshed, “It’s all in the name: Mutual fund name changes after SEC Rule 35d-1,” Journal of Banking and Finance, July 2017)

By their estimation, 60% of all name changes are marketing gimmicks: sinking funds making desperate attempts to appear trendy, hot, cool, cutting edge or relevant. 20% of name changes occur in funds that have repeatedly renamed themselves. Many changes, City National Rochdale Emerging Markets (RIMIX) fund’s renaming pursuant to new ownership, are pretty valid. Others, for example those stapling “opportunity,” “contrarian” or “dynamic” to their names, are often admissions of failure.

Resist temptation! If there’s no good reason for a name change, then there’s almost certainly a bad reason for it.

As of April 1, 2018, Advisory Research Global Value Fund (ADVWX) becomes Advisory Research Global Dividend Fund.

City National Rochdale Emerging Markets Fund (RIMIX) is becoming Fiera Capital Emerging Markets Fund, with the same management team and mandate. The sale of the fund closed on December 1, 2017 with the team accepting contracts from Fiera. It’s a singularly worthwhile fund. MFO ranks it as a “Great Owl” fund for posting peer-beating risk-adjusted returns in each trailing period we measure. Since inception in 2012, the fund has outperformed its peers by 8.2% annually: 14.2% versus 6.0% with lower downsides by every measure we follow.

Effective on or about February 28, 2018 Columbia Diversified Equity Income Fund (INDZX) becomes Columbia Large Cap Value Fund, Columbia European Equity Fund (AXEAX) becomes Columbia Contrarian Europe Fund and Columbia Asia Pacific ex-Japan (CAJAX) becomes Columbia Contrarian Asia Pacific Fund. “Contrarian” certainly qualifies for the “chic name” label.

Effective February 28, 2018, the Congress All Cap Opportunity Fund (CACOX) will change its name to Congress SMid Core Opportunity Fund.

First Trust Low Beta Income ETF (FTLB) name is changed to First Trust Hedged BuyWrite Income ETF. First Trust High Income ETF (FTHI) name is changed to First Trust BuyWrite Income ETF.

Effective February 28, 2018, MacKay gets the credit. Nineteen of the MainStay funds add “MacKay” to their names. MacKay Shields is a fixed-income specialist affiliated with New York Life Investments, the firm behind Mainstay. No hint about why MacKay is getting hold of the eight equity-oriented funds in this list.

Current Name New Name
MainStay California Tax Free Opportunities MainStay MacKay California Tax Free Opportunities
MainStay Common Stock MainStay MacKay Common Stock
MainStay Convertible MainStay MacKay Convertible
MainStay Cornerstone Growth MainStay MacKay Growth
MainStay Emerging Markets Debt MainStay MacKay Emerging Markets Debt
MainStay Emerging Markets Equity MainStay MacKay Emerging Markets Equity
MainStay Government MainStay MacKay Government
MainStay High Yield Corporate Bond MainStay MacKay High Yield Corporate Bond
MainStay High Yield Municipal Bond MainStay MacKay High Yield Municipal Bond
MainStay International Equity MainStay MacKay International Equity
MainStay International Opportunities MainStay MacKay International Opportunities
MainStay New York Tax Free Opportunities MainStay MacKay New York Tax Free Opportunities
MainStay S&P 500 Index MainStay MacKay S&P 500 Index
MainStay Short Duration High Yield MainStay MacKay Short Duration High Yield
MainStay Tax Advantaged Short Term Bond MainStay MacKay Tax Advantaged Short Term Bond
MainStay Tax Free Bond MainStay MacKay Tax Free Bond
MainStay Total Return Bond MainStay MacKay Total Return Bond
MainStay U.S. Equity Opportunities MainStay MacKay U.S. Equity Opportunities
MainStay Unconstrained Bond MainStay MacKay Unconstrained Bond

Effective December 20, 2017, UBS Emerging Markets Equity Fund became UBS Emerging Markets Equity Opportunity Fund. That, UBS avers, better aligns with the fund’s strategy. You’ll have to imagine me rolling my eyes at that argument since I can’t imagine any strategy which couldn’t claim “opportunity” as an element.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

On December 21, 2017, Alpine Woods Capital Investors, LLC agreed to sell four of their funds to Aberdeen Asset Managers, Ltd. The sale requires formal, if pro forma, approval by the boards of trustees and shareholders. Assuming that, the transfer will occur in the second quarter of 2018. The funds involved are Alpine Realty Income & Growth Fund (AIAGX), Alpine Global Infrastructure Fund (AIAFX), Alpine International Real Estate Equity Fund (EGALX) and Alpine Dynamic Dividend Fund (ADAVX). I am modestly confused about the fact that they list four open-end funds (and discuss Aberdeen’s record with OEFs) but then make the proviso that the agreement requires “the approval of a change in the advisory arrangements of the Alpine-advised closed-end funds.”

A harsher fate awaits Alpine Financial Services (ADAFX) and Alpine Small Cap Fund (ADIAX), both of which will be liquidated on February 14, 2018.

Ashmore Emerging Markets Equity Opportunities Fund (AEOAX), a one year old fund of Ashmore funds, will liquidate on or about January 4, 2018. In general, I think you should avoid firms that close funds within a year or two of launch; it seems to speak to fundamental problems with their business judgment and commitment to their investors.

The Baird LargeCap Fund (BHGSX), a tiny multi-cap fund with decent performance, was liquidated on December 28, 2017.

Carillon, which recently bought the Scout funds, is beginning a housecleaning. Carillon Eagle Smaller Company Fund is being reorganized into Carillon Scout Small Cap Fund (UMBHX); and Carillon Eagle Mid Cap Stock Fund is merging with Carillon Eagle Mid Cap Growth Fund (HAGIX), effective on or about July 13, 2018. Scout is taking over management of the Smaller Company Fund. In addition, Carillon is liquidating Carillon Eagle Investment Grade Bond Fund (EGBAX) and the Carillon Reams Low Duration Bond Fund (SCLDX) on or about February 28, 2018.

In May 2018, Eaton Vance Global Small-Cap Fund (EAVSX) will merge into Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Global Small-Cap Fund (ESVAX), except that by then it won’t be called Tax-Managed Global Small-Cap Fund, it will be called Global Small-Cap Equity Fund andwill no longer be required to employ tax-management techniques or seek after-tax returns.”

Estabrook Investment Grade Fixed Income Fund (EEFAX) will liquidate on January 31, 2018. The fund ends its life with one star and under $500,000 in assets … not one penny of which came from any of its five managers or five trustees.

The $485 million Fidelity Global Balanced Fund (FGBLX) is slated to merge with Fidelity Asset Manager 60% (FSANX) on April 20, 2018. Hmmm … FGBLX shareholders can think of themselves as moving into Fidelity Slightly Less Global Balanced Fund since FSANX devoted 20% of its portfolio to international equities where FGBLX has 30%. FSANX has lower expenses and a modestly better long-term record, boosted by the strong US market of the past three years.

Footprints Discover Value Fund (DAVAX) liquidated on December 29, 2017. Yuh. Footprints is in blue on the chart below.

Frost Conservative Allocation, Moderate Allocation and Aggressive Allocation funds all liquidated on December 22, 2017.

The two year old, $12 million HSBC Global Equity Volatility Focused Fund (HGEAX) will be liquidated on or before January 31, 2018.

 iShares Edge MSCI Min Vol Global Currency Hedged ETF (HACV) continues to hang in the balance. In mid-November they received a regulatory notice threatening them with delisting by their exchange because they had fewer than 50 shareholders. A 12/29/2017 follow-up filing claims that they are in compliance and eligible for continued listing but just in case …

Janus’s Board of Trustees approved a plan to liquidate and terminate Janus Henderson Real Return Fund (JURAX) with such liquidation (and termination!) effective on or about March 2, 2018.

As of January 20, 2017, Kellner Event Fund (KEFAX) had completed its liquidation and returned capital to its investors.

Lyrical U.S. Hedged Value Fund (LYRDX) will discontinue its operations effective January 29, 2018.

On or about the close of business on April 27, 2018, the three star Russell U.S. Large Cap Equity Fund (RLCZX) will merge into the five-star Russell Multifactor U.S. Equity Fund (RTDSX) which, by happy coincidence, is a U.S. large cap equity fund. The acquiring fund also sports a substantially lower expense ratio, so this looks like a pretty clean win for investors.

TCW High Dividend Equities Fund (TGDEX) will be liquidated on or about January 25, 2018.

Templeton Institutional Emerging Markets (TEEMX) will cease to be an institution, emerging or otherwise, on March 16, 2018.

Third Avenue International Value Fund (TAVIX) is slated to merge into Third Avenue Value Fund (TAVFX). Among the enumerated reasons for the change are (1) they’re both global funds with similar styles, (2) a single fund with a larger asset base will allow them to spread expenses over a larger number of accounts; in sum “the combined fund would have improved commercial prospects and asset growth potential.” Absent from that assessment is the fact that both funds have trailed 88% of their Morningstar peers over the past three years; the five year numbers are no better and the firm is in turmoil.

The TIAA-CREF Global Natural Resources Fund (TNRLX) will be liquidated after the close of business on April 13, 2018.

Templeton Foreign Smaller Companies Fund (FINEX) will merge into Templeton Global Smaller Companies Fund on or about June 1, 2018.

The Board of Trustees of Victory Portfolios has approved a Plan of Liquidation for the Victory Expedition Emerging Markets Small Cap Fund (VAEMX). It is anticipated that the Fund will liquidate on or about February 27, 2018. 

On November 15, 2017, the Board of Trustees of Waddell & Reed Advisors (WRA, in the table below) authorizes reorganization of their funds into corresponding Ivy funds. All of the WRA funds have closed to new investors in anticipation of the move. The reorganization is expected to close on or about February 26, 2018, and does not require shareholder approval.

Equity Funds  
WRA Accumulative Ivy Accumulative
WRA New Concepts Ivy Mid Cap Growth
WRA Small Cap Ivy Small Cap Growth
WRA Vanguard Ivy Large Cap Growth
WRA Global Growth Ivy Global Growth
WRA Continental Income Ivy Balanced
WRA Science and Technology Ivy Science and Technology
WRA Wilshire Global Allocation Ivy Wilshire Global Allocation
Fixed Income Funds  
WRA High Income Ivy High Income
WRA Municipal High Income Ivy Municipal High Income
Money Market  
WRA Cash Management Ivy Cash Management

The adviser to the WBI funds has (correctly) concluded that based on their current asset level, the funds are no longer sustainable. WBI Tactical BP Fund (WBPNX), WBI Tactical DG Fund (WBIDX) and WBI Tactical BA Fund (WBADX) will be euthanized on January 26, 2018. The obscure letter designations appear to be Wealth Builders Inc., Dividend Growth and Balanced. No clue on the meaning of BP.

Xtrackers MSCI Emerging Markets High Dividend Yield Hedged Equity ETF (HDEE) and Xtrackers MSCI Eurozone High Dividend Yield Hedged Equity ETF (HDEZ) closed on December 18 and liquidated on December 29.