Yearly Archives: 2016

Behind the Curtain

By Edward A. Studzinski

“Moon in a barrel: you never know just when the bottom will fall out.”

 Mabutsu (19th Century Japanese haiku poet)

So, August as usual is the period of the “dog days” of summer, usually a great opportunity to catch up on reading. A site I commend to you for all things investment is Hurricane Capital, recommended to me by my friend Michael Mauboussin, of Credit Suisse. Among other things Michael pointed out that the writer of this blog (from Sweden) had posted all of Michael’s strategy and thought pieces going back for years. A recent one, which I would suggest is worth a read is entitled, “Thirty Years – Reflections on the Ten Attributes of Great Investors.” You will discover as you look at the listed attributes, Michael’s bias, is disclosed up front: he believes in economic value which joined with constant learning and teaching, and varied inputs that, when combined with rigorous framework, can lead to insight, consistent with Charlie Munger’s faith in the “mental models” approach to investing.

I was especially struck by the tenth listed attribute – “Read (and keep an open mind)”. Mauboussin relates how yearly, Columbia Business School sends a group of students to Omaha to meet with Todd Combs and Warren Buffett. In a recent visit, Combs apparently suggested to the students that they target reading 500 pages a day. And note that we are not talking about reading in business or finance. Rather, the habit of intellectual curiosity pushes voracious readers to move into ever expanding subject areas, since good ideas may spring from multiple origins. Indeed, to be able to recognize the cusp of change requires reading primarily for education but also for entertainment. The other important thing is to not establish “safe zones” in your reading but rather, seek out things that you don’t either agree with or, that challenge your previous and comfortably held beliefs.

My point here is this – that intellectual curiosity is one of those cultural determinants that sets the tone for a successful investment research methodology. One of the first times I had a discussion at length with Robert Sanborn after I joined Harris Associates was when he was excited after reading the book Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fate of Human Societies by Jared Diamond, which influenced his thinking on investments in a number of ways. Robert was an avid reader, always with a book on his desk that was his current read, and in diverse areas of biography, history, or science, among other things.

booksIn 2004 and 2005, I was involved in the interviewing process for hiring analysts. A believer in the Hyman Rickover School of interviewing, I was always trying to find intellectually curious people who would not be just like everyone else at the firm. I wanted them to be inquiring about life in general, and show it both in their professional and personal interests. One of my favorite questions was what people read for fun, if anything. I will leave it to you to imagine my response when the answer I got one day was, “My reading for fun is all of the quarterly reports written by the people at Longleaf, as well as Buffett’s annual letters, and what you all write.”

There is a somewhat humorous codicil to this story. A few months later, I was having lunch with a friend in charge of an investment analysis effort at a financial research publishing firm based here in Chicago. She told me that one reason for the lunch was they wanted to pick my brain on what criteria I looked for in determining the kind of person who could become a successful investment analyst. I said I am not sure you want to do that as I am not involved in the interviewing process. She insisted that no, they were really interested in the criteria I would use for selecting people. So, over a long lunch, I gave her my thoughts. She left with a long list of notes.

About a year later, I asked how that had worked out. She said they were very pleased, and had used most of my criteria in selecting people for their analyst training program. Part of their underlying premise was that you could teach people accounting and finance, but you could not teach them to read, write, or think. Interestingly, she confirmed what I had long thought, which was that the most successful candidates generally had liberal arts degrees with an emphasis in English literature, and were very gifted and creative writers. The company involved continued to grow, had a successful IPO, and is now a public company with a market capitalization in excess of $3B. There is one piece of information I should include here, so that you don’t go off thinking that this was a rather random event. And that is that for some years before joining Harris, I had been involved in interviewing, selecting, and training individuals to become intelligence analysts. The skill sets and personality characteristics required were not that different from those that one would look for in a good business analyst (which was what I wanted). One looked at all costs to avoid group-think individuals, so as to avoid another Pearl Harbor or Yom Kippur War. Now of course, the Bloomberg terminal has doomed the investment research business in general by making it easy to rationalize never leaving one’s office. It is hard to think out of the box if you never leave the box. Garbage in, garbage out, and if it is not in Bloomberg, it is not worth knowing. What’s next – the anonymity of the blogosphere for research?

Why Is Competition Bad?

In the last few months, there have been discussions in the financial press about non-compete clauses in employment contracts. The primary focus for the discussion has been to examine how growth in the technology area has been impacted in the economy of Massachusetts, which under state law permits non-compete clauses for as long as a three-year period. At the other extreme is California, where they are illegal as contrary to public policy. It is thought, and would appear to be the case, that one result is that the number of technology start-ups in Massachusetts has been throttled by allowing enforcement of non-compete clauses. In a compromise, New York has enforced them, but generally limits the period to no more than a year (described by some as the Goldman Sachs rule).

As should not be a surprise, the clauses are also popular in the financial services industry. Three years of course is a lifetime in the investment management and investment banking industries (what have you done for me today). Being able to walk out the door and start anew of course, has given us Jeff Gundlach as well as Bill Gross in new situations. Illinois until recently allowed non-compete agreements up to a period of three years, but recent court decisions appear to have ended the concept here (sometimes the desire for job growth trumps all). After all, there has been shrinkage in the number of investment management firms and assets under management in general in Chicago. The chicken-egg question is of course whether sub-par performance has led to asset shrinkage, or whether the intellectual capital has become too genetically incestuous and not replenished by input from other parts of the country.

An interesting question, and one to which I do not have an answer, is whether one should look to invest in the products of investment management firms in jurisdictions that do not permit non-compete clauses. Said differently, should one tilt toward California-based firms, because they will always be more vital and self-renewing. After all, as we have seen in the fixed income area in particular, the talent can just go down in the elevator at night and not come back if they don’t think they are being treated fairly, or if they think the wrong things are being emphasized in the culture of the firm. Alternatively, there are firms in both Boston and Chicago which are having serious succession planning issues notwithstanding the ability to “protect” the franchise with non-compete clauses. As we watch for a number of fund shut-downs and personnel exits in coming months, it will be an interesting endeavor to piece through fact from fiction.

What to Do Now?

I am regularly asked, as recently as this week, by various individuals and entities, the question of where I would put funds/new moneys now in terms of investments. At this point, I have to confess that I really have no good ideas. Nothing looks undervalued. Bonds look quite overvalued. In terms of real estate, the idea that class A office properties are changing hands at capitalization rates of 4 times or less (income multiples of 25X or greater) is truly off the charts, driven by a desire for income without an appreciation of the risk attendant. And that is before we think about change as represented by the Millennials. An experienced developer said to me today, an office for a Millennial is a cubicle with a chair and a place to plug in a headset (and not interact with others). Retail real estate is dying a slow, or perhaps not so slow, death. Equities as a class don’t look undervalued. While I feel that now is the time for active value managers to outshine and outperform the passive players, too many of them have compromised the discipline by investing based on metrics. Their analysts have gotten used to a form of pandering rather than looking for truly undervalued or misclassified situations, where the market inefficiencies still exist relative to the business value. My answer for the moment, which few will like, is that cash is the undervalued asset. It also has the lowest opportunity costs attached to it, since one year insured certificates of deposit are increasingly available in the marketplace yielding a 1% APR.

The Diversified Portfolio of Less Correlated Asset Classes

By Charles Boccadoro

“… over the long term the benefits offered by diversifying a portfolio of less correlated asset classes can be significant … investing in a diversified portfolio across equity and fixed income is the best option for most individuals,” wrote Jeremy Simpson in 2015, then director of Morningstar Investment Management in the article The Benefits of Diversification.

In Mebane Faber’s classic The Ivy Portfolio, he cites multiple sources on the benefits of diversification:

Harry Markowitz’s seminal 1952 paper “Portfolio Selection” explained the benefits of portfolio diversification. In addition to earning Markowitz a Nobel Prize in Economics, this Modern Portfolio Theory enabled managers to quantify with mathematics the benefits of not putting all of your eggs in one basket.

The Yale portfolio is constructed based on academic theory-namely namely a framework known as mean-variance analysis. The technique was originally developed by Harry Markowitz in concert with David Swensen’s mentor James Tobin, and eventually earned Markowitz a Nobel Prize in 1990 … You can put together a bunch of risky assets (stocks, real estate, commodities) and as long as they don’t all move together in a correlated fashion, the combined portfolio is less risky than the individual parts.

The most powerful tool an investor has working for him or her is diversification. True diversification allows you to build portfolios with higher returns for the same risk. Most investors, institutional and individual, are far less diversified than they should be.

Recently, in the piece On Financial Planners, I wrote of a family friend whose “certified financial planner” had him in 34 funds across five tax deferred accounts. Adjusting for different share classes, he owned eight unique funds, which turned-out to be not all that unique. Amazon was held in six different funds. Ditto for Phillip Morris, Amgen, UnitedHealth Group, Home Depot, Broadcom, Microsoft, etc.

Below is the correlation matrix for the eight funds. (Click on image to enlarge.) Most are more than 90% correlated, while none are less than 80% correlated. In short, they are all strongly correlated! Why would a financial planner construct this portfolio?

diversification_1

While such a correlation matrix has its limitations, it remains a helpful tool for assessing portfolio concentration and diversification. It comprises correlation coefficients, often denoted “r”, which attempt to measure the tendency of two funds (their monthly total returns) to move together.

Values of r can range from -1.00 to 1.00. The closer to 1.00, the more two funds have behaved similarly. The closer to -1.00, the more two funds have behaved opposite to each other. Values closer to 0.00 mean the funds are uncorrelated and have behaved independent of each other. A more detailed description can be found here and here.

One of the simplest ways to be diversified is through Vanguard Balanced Index Fund (VBINX). Here is the correlation matrix for its basic components, essentially the Total Stock and Bond Index Funds (VTMSX and VBMFX).

diversification_2

One of the shortcomings of correlation is that it is backward looking. Future correlation can change. While certain fund metrics, like volatility and even correlation, tend to be more persistent than say absolute return performance, correlation can change too with evaluation period, especially when markets dislocate. Even so, during the financial crisis bear market, VTMSX and VBMFX remained much more dissimilar than other asset pairs.

diversification_3

Here is the attendant performance comparison over the current market cycle (click on image to enlarge):

diversification_4

Another way to easily get diversification is through some of the so-called Target Date funds. Vanguard, for example, adds global exposure in its Target Retirement Series. Here is the correlation matrix of the underlying funds:

diversification_5

Finally, below find the correlation matrix for several ETFs representing various asset classes, including VTI, VEU, IEF, VNQ, DBC –  the five comprising Faber’s “Ivy Portfolio … it is very simple but still reflects the general allocations of the top endowments without hedge funds and private equity.”

diversification_6

The MultiSearch Correlation Matrix can now be obtained for up to 12 funds across seven evaluation periods on the MFO Premium site. Just click “Correlate” button on the MultiSearch Results page.

Woe! We’re Halfway There

By Leigh Walzer

Over the past eight years the US mutual fund industry has witnessed a massive shift from active to passive management. In the Trapezoid universe, 35% of equity funds are now passively managed compared with 28% a year ago. This figure is AUM weighted, includes exchange-traded and closed-end funds, captures flows through July. The fixed income universe gets less attention but we observe 12% of AUM are now passively managed.

exhibit1How far this trend will extend is up for debate. But the penetration rate actually steepened this year. The new DOL fiduciary rules, which take full effect at the end of 2017, may be a catalyst. If you believe in the classic S curve from Marketing 101, we are (to paraphrase Bon Jovi) only half way there.

Trapezoid believes fewer than 10% of actively managed funds justify their expense ratio.  Readers unfamiliar with Trapezoid and FundAttribution can visit the methodology page on our website. Readers can register for a no-obligation demo on the site. So while a small number of managers give us statistical evidence that they can beat the market and justify

How we arrive at the $70 billion figure: We look at every mutual fund in our universe, considering the AUM, the average expense ratio across classes, and what we think a passive alternative would cost. We ignore funds domiciled outside the US, municipal funds, and separate accounts.

next year’s fees, most of that $70 billion outlay is unjustified. A lot of money is at stake. US mutual and closed-end fund investors are paying over $70 billion per year for active management. Considering all investment vehicles and looking more globally the impact is several times greater.

Who is the beneficiary of all that largesse? Seventy percent of the fees are going to active equity funds, by our reckoning, with fixed income and target date funds accounting for most of the balance.  Capital Group, Fidelity, and T. Rowe represent about 30% of the pot. Franklin Resources, BlackRock, Invesco, Allianz, Natixis, JPMorgan, Sun Life, Mass Mutual, and Principal comprise another 20%. The rest is spread widely. The asset managers share their wealth with a number of service providers, distributors, and subadvisors. Without more transparency, we must make some educated guesses.

If we are really only “halfway there” – in other words passive and rules-based funds will end up with 60+ % of the market, the economics of the industry will come under heavy pressure and will have to manage expenses tightly.

A number of these players are publicly traded. To gauge where the industry is headed, it might be useful to look at the stock prices of the asset managers, particularly those with a high dependence on actively managed funds. Exhibit II shows that the past 24 months have not been kind to this group. Still, some have held up much better than others. Of the larger players, T Rowe Price Group Inc. (TROW) is down 15% while Legg Mason Inc. (LM) is down 30%. Among the hardest hit are Waddell & Reed (WDR), Calamos (CLMS), and Virtus (VRTS)  The basket of stocks in Exhibit II trade at 13.7x 2017 earnings. This compare with 17x for the S&P500. The market is discounting stormy weather, but not an avalanche.

Credit: Yahoo Finance

Credit: Yahoo Finance

Without commenting too much on individual securities, we can make some general observations. The market seems to believe fixed income is relatively immune; fund groups with a high concentration do better.  Some companies benefit from sticky products or distribution. Others have benefitted from acquisitions. Many are now on the passive bandwagon.  The hardest hit stocks are relatively concentrated in active equity mutual funds.

A lot of money is at stake. US mutual and closed-end fund investors are paying over $70 billion per year for active management. . most is unjustified

Sell-side analysts on the whole seem selective, looking for companies with defensive qualities.  They anxiously monitor retail outflows. Although liquid alts have registered disappointing performance (see our July article  “Liquid Alts; The Thrill is Gone” ) and outflows, some still view it as a source of growth.The performance of a firm’s investment products matters greatly. WDR (which markets funds under the Waddell & Reed and Ivy monikers) delivered a stunningly bad sS of -3.4 for the 12 months ending July 2016. (Recall sS is skill from Security Selection. This doesn’t even factor the expenses associated with active fund management) Our skill estimate is based on a bottoms-up analysis of 43 funds with AUM totaling $65 billion; these funds comprise ¾ of the firm’s overall assets.   As a result, the firm’s AUM have dropped by 1/3 and the stock price has fallen by half over the past year. One bright spot for the new CEO is strong performance from small-cap strategies.

Playing Defense

No mutual fund executive wants their company to be the next Waddell & Reed. Mutual fund executives must be tempted to ask their successful fund managers with well-established track records to protect the franchise by tamping down on risk and not straying too far from the benchmarks.

Conversely, investors in actively managed funds must do their homework to ferret out elite managers who continue to justify their higher costs.  Funds with low active share are sometimes called closet indexers. The term refers to a fund which bills itself as an active fund, charges like an active fund, but performs very much like an index fund. Generally, these funds track their benchmarks closely.  Investors who are paying the added freight of an active fund demand a differentiated portfolio. As you would expect, closet index funds score poorly at FundAttribution.com because they deliver no value-added and thus are almost certain to underperform after fees.

Morningstar estimates that 15-20% of funds (by assets) are closet indexers. Professor Thomas Howard of the University of Colorado believes 70% of funds fall into this category. He evidently includes funds whose results match the benchmarks, even if the manager tried to differentiate the holdings.

How to tell if your fund is a closet indexer? One strategy in vogue is to seek funds with high active share. These are funds whose managers make a concerted effort to differ their portfolio from the indices. WSJ subscribers can refer to this list published several years ago.

We combed our universe for “Closet Passives”. In some ways our definition is a little more expansive because we include funds which track a blend of several indices. We allow that blend to vary over time based on a formula (think of a target fund) or at the discretion of the manager (i.e., a fund of closet index funds). In other respects, our definition is narrower. Closet Passives must track their indices over time, and must be fairly consistent over their lifetimes. We exclude funds which market themselves as index funds as well as those with low expense ratios.

exhibit3Here are some representative funds we found. These are not true passives. The portfolio holdings will not resemble their benchmarks. Performance will deviate a bit from year to year due to security selection. But the funds gross returns stay ~98% correlated to the Trapezoid “replication portfolio” at all times.

For a more complete list of Closet Passives, the FundAttribution.com website shows an R-squared for every fund in our universe. (Register for the free demo and navigate to the Fund Analysis/Details page.)  An R-squared close to 100 means we can replicate it almost exactly.

Interestingly, the funds in Exhibit III do show a modicum of sS skill, roughly +0.3 over both the most recent one year and three year periods. (That level of skill is not statistically significant and could be explained by survivorship bias.)

A lot of offerings from insurance companies seem geared to stay fairly close to the benchmarks but are priced like active funds.  And many target date funds look a lot like cocktails blending equity and bond indices; the bartender gets a healthy markup for stirring the drink. 

What if you find you are holding a closet passive with lots of capital gains? I put this question to Sam Lee, fellow contributor and principal of Severian Asset Management. Assuming the fund is in a taxable portfolio, Sam advises you should generally not rush to dump the fund unless the fund is very expensive and/or will distribute lots of capital gains anyway. With some patience, there is usually a future opportunity to get rid of the fund with a smaller tax hit, usually due to some combination of losses in the fund and harvestable losses elsewhere in the portfolio.

Unfortunately, avoiding Closet Passives isn’t good enough. Out of the $70 billion in excess fees cited above, avoiding them will ameliorate only 5% of the problem.  But it is a good place to start.

Slogo 2What’s the Trapezoid story? Leigh Walzer has over 25 years of experience in the investment management industry as a portfolio manager and investment analyst. He’s worked with and for some frighteningly good folks. He holds an A.B. in Statistics from Princeton University and an M.B.A. from Harvard University. Leigh is the CEO and founder of Trapezoid, LLC, as well as the creator of the Orthogonal Attribution Engine. The Orthogonal Attribution Engine isolates the skill delivered by fund managers in excess of what is available through investable passive alternatives and other indices. The system aspires to, and already shows encouraging signs of, a fair degree of predictive validity.

The stuff Leigh shares here reflects the richness of the analytics available on his site and through Trapezoid’s services. If you’re an independent RIA or an individual investor who need serious data to make serious decisions, Leigh offers something no one else comes close to. More complete information can be found at www.fundattribution.com. MFO readers can sign up for a free demo.

Mairs and Power Small Cap Fund (MSCFX), September 2016

By David Snowball

Objective and strategy

The fund seeks “above-average” long-term capital appreciation by investing in 40-45 small cap stocks. For their purposes, “small caps” have a market capitalization under $3.4 billion at the time of purchase. The manager is authorized to invest up to 25% of the portfolio in foreign stocks and to invest, without limit, in convertible securities (but he plans to do neither). Across all their portfolios, Mairs & Power invests in “carefully selected, quality growth stocks” purchased “at reasonable valuation levels.”

Adviser

Mairs & Power, Inc. Mairs and Power, headquartered in Minneapolis and chartered in 1931, manages approximately $8.5 billion in assets. The firm provides investment services to individuals, employee benefit plans, endowments, foundations and over 50,000 accounts in three no-load mutual funds (Growth, Balanced and Small Cap).

Manager

Andrew Adams and Allen Steinkopf. Mr. Adams joined Mairs & Power in 2006 and has managed Small Cap from its inception. From August 2004 to March 2007, he helped manage Nuveen Small Cap Select (EMGRX). Before that he was the co-manager of the large cap growth portfolio at Knelman Asset Management Group in Minneapolis. Mr. Steinkopf joined Mairs & Power in 2013 after co-managing Nuveen Small Cap Select for 10 years. He was appointed as co-manager on this fund in 2015.

Allen D. Steinkopf has passed away at the age of 61. Otherwise it’s a three-person team: Andrew R. Adams, Christopher D. Strom, and Michael C. Marzolf.

Strategy capacity and closure

The fund will close to new investors on September 30, 2016.

Management’s stake in the fund

The fund was launched with $2 million in seed money that Mr. Adams garnered by, as he put it, “passing the hat” at a staff meeting. Insiders continue to have substantial financial commitments to the fund. Mr. Adams has between $500,000 – $1,000,000 invested in the fund. Mr. Steinkopf has between $10,000 – 50,000. Each of the fund’s six trustees has over $100,000 invested in it.

Opening date

August 11, 2011.

Minimum investment

$2500, reduced to $1000 for various tax-sheltered accounts. 

Expense ratio

0.92% on assets of $345.2 million, as of July 17, 2023. 

Comments

We underestimated Mairs & Power Small Cap. Shortly after launch we warned investors, “If you’re looking for excitement, look elsewhere. If you want the next small cap star, go away. It’s not here.” Based on Mairs & Power’s discipline, manifested in two other funds, we suggested “Small Cap will, almost certainly, grow into a solidly above-average performer that lags a bit in frothy markets, leads in soft ones and avoids making silly mistakes.”

It has been all that and more.

There is a rare degree of unanimity surrounding Mairs & Power Small Cap. Morningstar’s analysts recognize it as a Silver medalist and its rating system gives it five stars. Lipper designates it as a Lipper Lead for both total return and consistency of returns. The Observer endorsed it at launch and it has earned the Great Owl designation for its consistent outperformance.

A quick review of its performance from inception through July 2016 substantiates the case:

mairs and powerHere’s how to read that table: since August 2011, Small Cap has generated 6% greater annual returns that its Lipper peers while exposing shareholders to less risk. Its maximum drawdown was significantly smaller, its downside volatility was lower, its performance in bear market months was better and the length and magnitude of its losses (which is what the Ulcer Index measures) was less. It follows then that all of the measures of risk-adjusted returns (the Sharpe, Sortino and Martin ratios) are higher. It’s particularly noteworthy that the measures which are most sensitive to downside risk (Sortino and Martin) show greater advantage than does the standard Sharpe ratio.

Three factors contribute to that strong showing:

  • They like buying good quality, but they’re not willing to overpay.
  • They like buying what they know best. About 90% of the Small Cap portfolio are companies based in the upper Midwest, 50% in the State of Minnesota alone. They are unapologetic about their affinity for Midwestern firms: “we believe there are an unusually large number of attractive companies in this region that we have been following for many years. While the Funds have a national charter, their success is largely due to our focused, regional approach.”
  • And once they’ve bought, they keep it. Turnover over the past five years has averaged 17%, far below the 63% typical of small cap funds. That’s consistent with the record at Growth (10%) and Balanced (16%, with most of their bonds held all the way to maturity).

Messrs. Adams and Steinkopf embody the corporate ethos: they are looking for consistent performers, won’t sacrifice quality to get growth and won’t let “investment decisions [be] based on day-to-day news,” whether Brexit, Yellen or elections.

Bottom Line

There are few investment firms with this combination of quiet focus and discipline. Much was made of the fact that this is Mairs and Power’s first new fund in 50 years.  Less has been said about the fact that this fund had been under consideration for more than five years before they felt comfortable launching it. This is not a firm that rushes into anything. While I wouldn’t normally suggest that investors rush into anything, the fund’s imminent closure means that folks considering the future of their small cap exposure need to move it to the top of their due diligence agenda.

Fans of passive investing might benchmark the fund against iShares Core S&P Small-Cap ETF (IJR), over which Mairs & Power maintains a small but consistent advantage in risk-adjusted performance.

Fund website

Mairs and Power Small Cap

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2016. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

What if…

By Robert Cochran

Investors with any experience at all can recite the long-term results:  the U.S. stock market has averaged about 9-10% total returns over the last 30 years and about 6% the last 15 years.  The bond market has averaged about 5%.  In truth, the average stock market investor has gained only about 3.5%, on average over the last 15 years, and the average bond investor only 3.8%.  The lower investor returns are due to the inability of people to stay in the markets during turbulent time periods, when they cash out near market lows and then miss out on corresponding gains.  All kinds of studies have shown that staying invested pays off, but when risk becomes reality, investors become their own worst enemies, seemingly embracing the “sell low, buy high” concept they are trying to avoid.  Bond investors have realized gains that are almost 25% lower than average, for the very same reasons.

This topic is surely worthy of a long discussion, but there is another, darker aspect of this investor tendency that has even worse long-term implications.  There are a number of very intelligent researchers, analysts, and long-term thinkers, who are suggesting that, going forward, both stock and bond returns will be quite muted.  They suggest investors should expect no more than 4-5% for stocks, and that bonds (in a period of rising rates) will barely break even.  We all know predictions and estimates are just that.  But there are compelling reasons why this could indeed happen.

The 30-year bond bull market, when interest rates on 30-year U.S. Treasuries declined from more than 20% to the current 2.3%, is over.  Short-term bonds have been at or near 0% for several years now.  Whether it is later this year, or next year, or the year after that, it is pretty clear that the Fed will be pushing rates higher over the next few years.  Most bond experts say investors should be happy to net their bond coupons and hope the face values do not decline.  That could mean average real returns (net of inflation) in the 0-2% range.

If stocks follow a reversion to the mean, we might see average total returns in the low-to-mid single digits, meaning 4-5%.  This would be an average, of course, with riskier asset classes perhaps doing better.  And why should we expect overall investor behavior (buy high, sell low) to change?  Add this to the mix, and you can quickly have net negative returns.

If these return expectations turn out to be correct, what does this do to retirement planning scenarios that have plugged in annual returns of 6%, 7% or higher?  The quick answer is that it will blow many retirement cash flow plans out of the water.  Even a half-percent change in long-term planning assumptions can be huge, so you can imagine what would happen to investment portfolios when expected 7% returns are reduced to 4% or even 3%.  We have been using 4-5% for years with our clients, but we are now considering using 3-4% as a “what-if” scenario.

Retirement cash flow spending becomes critical, of course.  But even more importance might be unloading debt prior to retirement – no ongoing credit card debt, no mortgage debt, and no other outstanding loans.  Mortgage payments are likely our biggest monthly expense, with credit card payments a close second.  The average household’s debt-to-income ratio is more than 45%.  Getting debt paid (or at least lowered) before retirement means much less pressure on the investment portfolio, and could be the difference between running out of money and having money left over when you die.

There are other factors, of course, such as life expectancy (individual and family health history), but we urge clients to use a very conservative number for investment returns, assume inflation at 2-3%, and annual increases for Social Security of 1%.  Run the projections with these inputs, and see what you get.  Any reduction in cash flow needs will only improve the picture.  Do your own “what if”.

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income closing

By David Snowball

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX/SIGIX) closing to new investors

On August 31, 2016, Seafarer announced the imminent closure of its flagship Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income fund. The closure is set to become effective on September 30, 2016.

Highlights of the announcement:

      • The fund will soft-close on September 30, so that existing investors will still be able to add to their accounts. There are the usual exceptions to the closure.
      • The strategy capacity is currently estimated to be around $4 billion. As the fund approaches that threshold, Seafarer will pursue strategies to control inflows from existing shareholders. A capacity constraint is, in Mr. Foster’s judgment, “a real and material constraint for an investment strategy, much the way a wall is real and material constraint to a car.” The plan is to slow the metaphorical car down now, through a soft closure, in hopes to avoid running into the wall and being forced to hard-close the fund later.
      • The minimum initial investment for Seafarer’s lower cost institutional shares has been reduced from $100,000 to $25,000. That applies to both this fund and their new Seafarer Overseas Value Fund (SIVLX).
      • As part of their ongoing commitment to pass economies of scale along to their investors, Seafarer is reducing their management fee on assets of about $1.5 billion from 0.75% to 0.70%.

The change in institutional minimum will allow Investor Class shareholders with more than $25,000 but less than $100,000 in their accounts to move into the lower-cost shares. In addition, folks who invest directly with Seafarer can gain access to the low-cost Institutional share class (which Mr. Foster would prefer to designate as the Universal Share Class) by investing at least $1500 and signing up for an automatic investing plan through their Institutional Class Waiver Program.

Seafarer logoFor those unfamiliar with the fund, Seafarer is a four year old diversified emerging markets fund; its manager, Andrew Foster, has a long and distinguished track record as manager and is incessantly committed to helping his shareholders. He’s been evangelical about lowering expenses whenever conditions permit and his shareholder communications are singularly clear and thoughtful. He believes that emerging market economies are characterized by unreliable capital markets; that is, firms cannot count on being able to raise capital quickly and efficiently when they need it. As a result, one of his strong preferences is for firms that generate sufficient free cash flow to cover their capital needs internally.

The fund has had strong returns and muted volatility, relative to its EM peers. Morningstar recognizes it as a Bronze medalist with a five-star rating. The Observer has repeatedly profiled the fund, most recently in 2015. Additional resources about the fund are on Seafarer’s Featured Fund page. The indefatigable Ted, Linkster and senior member of our discussion board, also points folks to Chuck Jaffe’s August 2016 interview with Mr. Foster.

For those asking “if not Seafarer, who?” I used at the multi-search tool at MFO Premium to generate a list of the E.M. funds with the highest Sharpe ratios, a measure of risk-adjusted returns, over the past three years. Seafarer was fifth on that list. We then used our new fund correlation matrix generator to look at the relationship between the different top-ranked funds.

The list below excludes one fund, a China-India index, because it struck us as too narrow and quirky to offer a meaningful comparison. In each case the results are for the fund’s oldest share class, which often means the Institutional share class.

matrix

A couple things stand out:

      • The funds with the highest and lowest correlations to Seafarer are both “Emerging Asia” funds, Fidelity and Matthews, respectively.
      • Seafarer acts rather more like a “balanced” fund than most, that’s reflected in its high correlation with the EM balanced funds from Fidelity and Alliance Bernstein (AB). We’ve argued before that more EM equity investors should look closely at the option of balanced or hedged EM exposure.

With regard to the list in general:

      • The William Blair fund is also closed to new investors
      • The City National Rochdale fund is a bit pricey (1.61%) and a bit tough to access; Scottrade, for example, has it as a transaction-fee only fund.
      • The AllianceBernstein and Rational Risk (formerly Huntington) funds carry sales loads
      • Baron E.M., managed by Michael Kass, has about $2.3 billion in assets and charges about 30 basis points more than does Seafarer. It is, otherwise, a very solid fund with a very experienced manager.

I don’t want to complicate Mr. Foster’s task by encouraging inappropriate inflows, neither “hot money” nor folks who don’t understand what he’s up to and what they’d be investing in. That said, he’s given potential investors the gift of a month’s time to consider their options. I’d use it.

Elevator Talk: Michael Willis, Index Funds S&P 500 Equal Weight (INDEX)

By David Snowball

Since the number of funds we can cover in-depth is smaller than the number of funds worthy of in-depth coverage, we’ve decided to offer one or two managers each month the opportunity to make a 200 word pitch to you. That’s about the number of words a slightly-manic elevator companion could share in a minute and a half. In each case, I’ve promised to offer a quick capsule of the fund and a link back to the fund’s site. Other than that, they’ve got 200 words and precisely as much of your time and attention as you’re willing to share. These aren’t endorsements; they’re opportunities to learn more.

INDEX, the fund, and Index Funds, the company, are the product of 20 years of failing to beat the S&P 500. Michael Willis worked for years as an active manager, most recently as a Senior Vice President at UBS Financial, trying to beat the S&P 500. Despite consistent, concerted effort, he couldn’t consistently achieve that goal.

indexMr. Willis ultimately reached two sets of conclusions.

First, the S&P 500 contains intrinsic strengths that make it nearly impossible to beat. Its constituent firms are generally pretty solid. It buys and holds. It doesn’t get distracted. And it’s cheap.

Second, the S&P 500 contains intrinsic weaknesses that make it possible to beat. The weighting of any stock in the index is dependent on its market capitalization; the greater a stock’s market cap, the larger its position in the index. And a stock’s market cap reflects the madness of crowds. Market cap-weighted indexes are driven by, and are drivers of, the market’s momentum. Investors get excited about the newest iSomething from Apple (AAPL) and rush to snatch up its stock. The price goes up and passive indexes allocate more of their money to the stock, which causes the price to go up. Because the attention of crowds is limited, they tend to bid up a relatively limited set of stocks which means that the index becomes more and more concentrated in those few. The inadvertent result is that the index has biases toward growth, large caps, concentration and momentum. Those are not universally desirable qualities.

Mr. Willis became intrigued by an alternative approach: investing in the same 500 stocks but weighting your investment equally, rather than weighting it based on a stock’s market cap. In such a system, Apple would constitute 0.2% of the fund, the same as Diamond Offshore Drilling (DO). The FANG stocks, whose collective weighting in the S&P 500 doubled from 3% in 2013 to 6% in 2015, would remain a consistent 0.8% in the equal-weight index. That gives an equal-weight version of the index three distinctive characteristics:

      1. The equal-weight S&P 500 is more value-conscious. In its quarterly rebalancing, it automatically sells whatever has been bid up and buys more of whatever has been left behind. Currently, the equal-weigh index is cheaper than its sibling whether measured by lower price/earnings, price/sales, price/book or price/cash flow.
      2. The equal-weight S&P 500 has more exposure to mid-cap stocks. The average market cap of the equal-weight 500 is $20 billion, about one-quarter of the market cap of the cap-weighted version. Neither version offers meaningful exposure to small cap stocks (about 2% in the equal weight version and 0.15% in the other) but the equal-weight version offers vastly greater exposure to mid-cap stocks (47% versus 13%).
      3. The equal-weight S&P 500 is less prone to inadvertent concentration. If a sector or stock becomes popular, its weight in the cap weighted index automatically grows even if its business prospects or fundamental attractiveness do not. Currently, for example, the cap-weighted S&P 500 has a 50% greater weighting in tech (18% versus 12%) than does the equal-weight version.

In the long-term, biases toward value, smallness and diversification pay off handsomely. One attempt to calculate the returns of the equal-weight and cap-weight versions of the S&P 500 back to 1926 estimate that the equal-weight version returns outperforms the cap weighted version by 281 basis points – that is 2.8% – per year. Over the study’s 90 year horizon, that compounded into a ten-fold difference in returns in favor of the equal-weight index. Standard and Poor’s own researchers place the advantage around 180 basis points per year. The performance of the oldest extant equal-weight index fund (Invesco Equally-Weighted S&P 500 Fund VADAX) shows a 190 basis point advantage over 15 years.

Skeptics of the approach, including our colleague Sam Lee, point out that “there’s no such thing as a free lunch.” The higher returns come at the price of higher volatility, higher taxes as a result of more frequent portfolio rebalancing and the prospect of lagging badly during periods where mega-caps soar. All of which is true, though the magnitude of those downsides seem manageable.

Here, in any case, are Michael Willis’s 300 (admittedly somewhat overwrought) words on why his INDEX fund deserves your attention:

Why buy INDEX over the other guys?

We created a Fund and gave it a profoundly simple ticker to give every investor our story in one word, INDEX.

We created INDEX because we see a trillion-dollar tsunami coming.  A wave of RIAs and investors just like us (and Warren Buffett) who realize the S&P 500 Index is an investment best to own rather than to fight.

We created INDEX because we discovered that the best way to beat the S&P500 Index is to own it, equally.

We created INDEX because we believe the equal-weight methodology corrects an intrinsic “buy-high-sell-low” trading flaw imbedded in the market-cap methodology.

We created INDEX because we want to help people get in on the ground floor of the next Wall Street before everyone else does. 

We created INDEX because we see the entire investment process transitioning into a simple, performance-driven, low-cost model.

We created INDEX because we see a global realignment coming and believe a flight to quality is only in its early stages and that the constituents of the S&P 500 Index will be big benefactors.

We created INDEX as a no-load mutual fund instead of an ETF because we believe most investors are not day traders nor do they want their nest eggs more vulnerable to intraday algorithms and short sellers.

We created INDEX because we envision a day when low cost investing and transparency reigns on Wall Street.

We created INDEX because we want to create a Mutual Fund Company that grows organically from the investor up, instead of backed by the institutions of Wall Street.

We are headquartered in Colorado because sometimes the crisp clean air of the Rocky Mountains can give you clarity you cannot get in the city.

If you share our values, then we invite you to join our story and help us change the way Wall Street invests.

The minimum initial investment in INDEX is $1,000 and the expense ratio is 30 basis points. From the outset, Mr. Willis has made it a priority to remain one of the lowest cost options of this equal-weight strategy. The fund’s website is organized around a long scrolling homepage, with links to a half dozen articles on their “In the News” page.

Funds in Registration, September 2016

By David Snowball

It’s been a quiet month for new registrants. There’s the usual collection of trendy ETFs (e.g., Pacer US Cash Cows 100 ETF) and Mr. Greenblatt is launching more Gorham-branded institutional funds (Gotham Neutral 500 at 1.4%, Defensive Long at 2.15%, and Defensive Long 500 at 1.65%). Other than that, we found just four new no-load, retail funds. Folks interested in social impact investing might want to put Gerstein Fisher Municipal CRA Qualified Investment Fund on their radar. Low minimum, relatively low expense, it provides individual investors a tool to support affordable housing and community development. Otherwise, the new options peaked out at “meh.”

American Beacon Numeric Integrated Alpha Fund

American Beacon Numeric Integrated Alpha Fund will pursue long-term capital appreciation.. The plan is to invest, long and short, in a global equity portfolio. In addition to looking at valuations, they seek to exploit “price trends and patterns, such as momentum, valuation and seasonality.” Happily, Numeric’s approach is “highly-detailed and systematic.” The fund will be managed by Paul Pflugfelder and Bingcheng Yan of Numeric Investors. Messrs. Pflugfelder and Yan are Co-Heads of Hedge Fund Strategies at Numeric and formerly ran a market-neutral strategy for Barclays Global Investors. The initial expense ratio is 6.46%, after waivers, on Investor shares. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.

Gerstein Fisher Municipal CRA Qualified Investment Fund

Gerstein Fisher Municipal CRA Qualified Investment will seek to provide “current income consistent with preservation of capital with investments that will be deemed qualified under the Community Reinvestment Act.” The plan is to invest in CRA-qualified securities; at base, bonds and other instruments which help fund supporting affordable housing and community development. The fund will be managed by Gregg S. Fisher, founder of Gerstein Fisher. The initial expense ratio is capped at 0.99%. The minimum initial investment is $250.

HCM Income Plus Fund (HCMGX/HCMDX)

HCM Income Plus Fund (HCMGX/HCMDX) will pursue total return by investing in equity and fixed-income ETFs. The plan is to use a quant model to find the hottest sector(s) and position the fund there. The prospectus implies that the portfolio might shift weekly. The fund will be managed by Vance Howard, the firm’s president, CEO and the fund’s manager since 2014. Uhhh … that’s a curious statement for a fund that doesn’t yet exist. The initial expense ratio is not yet set. The minimum initial investment is $2,500, reduced to $1,000 for IRAs.

Rareview Longevity Income Generation Fund

Rareview Longevity Income Generation Fund will pursue long-term capital appreciation and income. The plan is to invest in closed-end funds whose portfolios mostly reflect single, broad asset classes (“an MLP fund,” for instance). Generally, the plan would be to invest in CEFs selling at a discount to their net asset value and short CEFs selling at a premium. The fund will be managed by Neil Azous, Chief Investment Officer of Rareview Capital LLC. The initial expense ratio is not yet set. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.

Manager changes, August 2016

By Chip

In memoriam

With great sadness, we note the passing of two members of the investing community.

albert nicholasAlbert “Ab” Nicholas, philanthropist and founder of the Nicholas Funds, died August 4, 2016, full of years and honors, at age 85. He earned his bachelor’s degree, in the early 1950s, from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He was deeply grateful for the scholarship that made it possible for a poor kid from Rockford, Illinois, to attend college and he repaid that kindness a thousand times over through his gifts to the university.

Drafted by the NBA, he chose instead to serve in the Army. Drafted again by the NBA after his discharge, he chose instead to attend graduate school where he studied investment and finance.

He died peacefully in his sleep in bucolic Door County, Wisconsin, and is survived by his wife of 64 years and a large and loving family.

bonnie bahaBonnie Baha, director of global credit at the DoubleLine funds, died August 22, 2016, at age 56. Her family was in Charlotteville, Virginia, dropped her son off at the University of Virginia when she, her husband Mustapha and their daughter were struck by a car. Her husband and daughter were both treated for non-life-threatening injuries.

Ms. Baha studied political science at UC-Irvine before earning her MBA at USC, where she met her future husband. She worked for 17 years at TCW before joining Jeffrey Gundlach at DoubleLine. She recalls the early days when things were so tenuous there that Mr. Gundlach had to make a teary-eyed promise that he’d find a way to make sure each of them got paid. She was also capable of asking Mr. Gundlach why he was such a “f*****g a*****e.” Her colleagues describe her as “generous and gracious … incredibly strong and hilarious.” In announcing her death, the folks at her mosque ask “God to abundantly bless her soul, multiply the good deeds she has left in this world, and enter her into the highest levels of paradise. We pray God envelopes Mrs. Baha’s family with mercy and comfort in this difficult period in their lives.”

This month’s list of manager changes was extensive – nearly 60 full or partial shifts – but largely overshadowed by the lives lost, which we memorialize above. There are a handful of solid folks who’ve moved on, but no immediately blockbuster shifts.

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
GASAX Aberdeen Diversified Alternatives Fund Michael Turner is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Minter is joined by Russell Barlow, Kevin Lyons, and Darren Wolf. 8/16
GMAAX Aberdeen Diversified Income Fund Sean Phayre is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Minter and Michael Turner are joined by Russell Barlow, Kevin Lyons, and Darren Wolf. 8/16
GMMAX Aberdeen Dynamic Allocation Fund Sean Phayre is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Robert Minter and Michael Turner are joined by Russell Barlow, Kevin Lyons, and Darren Wolf. 8/16
NRFAX AEW Real Estate Fund Roman Ranocha, co-portfolio manager of the fund, recently passed away unexpectedly. Matthew Troxell, John Garofalo and J. Hall Jones, Jr. will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
CANTX Alpha Risk Hedged Dividend Equity Fund Scott Chaisson and Tim Shanahan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Timothy Dolan, Warren Mulhern and Charles Petrie will manage the fund. 8/16
ATVAX Athena Value Fund Greg Anderson and John Sabre are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Andrew Howard and C. Thomas Howard will now manage the fund 8/16
WISEX Azzad Wise Capital Fund Ruggero de’Rossi no longer serves as portfolio manager. Jamal Elbarmil, John Polinski and Ihab Salib continue to manage the fund 8/16
CDVDX Cavalier Dividend Income Fund Scott Chaisson and Tim Shanahan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Scott Wetherington will manage the fund. 8/16
CDYGX Cavalier Dynamic Growth Fund Scott Chaisson and Tim Shanahan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. William Mann and Mark Scalzo will manage the fund. 8/16
CATEX Cavalier Global Opportunities Scott Chaisson and Tim Shanahan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. David Haviland will manage the fund. 8/16
CMSFX Cavalier Multi Strategist Fund Scott Chaisson and Tim Shanahan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. The new team is Lee Calfo, Gavan Duemke, Joy Gruber, Henry Ma, Brian Shevland, Josheph Styrna, Scott Wetherington, Sean Wright and Alexis Zemaitis. 8/16
CTROX Cavalier Tactical Rotation Fund Scott Chaisson and Tim Shanahan are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. David Haviland will manage the fund. 8/16
CHNAX Clough China Fund No one, but … Brian Chen has joined the portfolio management team of Eric Brock and Francoise Vappereau 8/16
CAFRX Commonwealth Africa Fund Ronald Manning no longer serves as part of the portfolio management team for the fund. Robert Scharar and Wesley Yuhnke will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
CNZLX Commonwealth Australia/New Zealand Fund Ronald Manning no longer serves as part of the portfolio management team for the fund. Robert Scharar and Wesley Yuhnke will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
CNGLX Commonwealth Global Fund Ronald Manning no longer serves as part of the portfolio management team for the fund. Robert Scharar and Wesley Yuhnke will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
CNJFX Commonwealth Japan Fund Ronald Manning no longer serves as part of the portfolio management team for the fund. Robert Scharar and Wesley Yuhnke will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
CNREX Commonwealth Real Estate Securities Fund Ronald Manning no longer serves as part of the portfolio management team for the fund. Robert Scharar and Wesley Yuhnke will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
KDCAX Deutsche Large Cap Value Fund Deepak Khanna is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Walter Holman and Brendan O’Neill are now managing the fund. 8/16
SSETX Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth Fund David Borah is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Todd Wakefield and Robert Zeuthen will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
EAALX Eaton Vance Atlanta Capital Focused Growth Fund Richard England will retire on October 31, 2016. The rest of the team remains 8/16
ETGIX Eaton Vance Greater India Fund LGM Investments Limited has been terminated as a subadvisor and Rishikesh Patel will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Goldman Sachs will be subadvisor for the fund, with Prashant Khemka managing the fund. 8/16
IHIAX Federated Emerging Market Debt Fund Ruggero de’Rossi no longer serves as portfolio manager for the fund. Ihab Salib will continue to manage the fund 8/16
MXGMX Great-West U.S. Government Mortgage Securities Fund Nick Yu is no longer a portfolio manager for the fund. Catherine Tocher, Sam Moyn, Kiva Patten, Nate Simons and Jack Brown will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
HSQAX Henderson International Select Equity Fund Sanjeev Lakhani is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Matthew Beesley will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
GRRAX James Alpha Macro Portfolio Tim Alford and John Brynjolfsson are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. The team of Akos Beleznay, Kevin Greene, Michael Montague and James Vitalie will now manage the fund. 8/16
MSAKX MainStay Absolute Return Multi-Strategy Fund Taylor Wagenseil will no longer serve as portfolio manager, but will “provide non-discretionary advisory support to the Fund’s portfolio management team as a Senior Advisor” until August 2017. The rest of the extensive team remains. 8/16
KLGAX MainStay Cornerstone Growth Fund Thomas Kamp is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Migene Kim and Andrew Ver Planck will now manage the fund. 8/16
MYHAX MainStay High Yield Opportunities Fund Taylor Wagenseil will no longer serve as portfolio manager, but will “provide non-discretionary advisory support to the Fund’s portfolio management team as a Senior Advisor” until August 2017. Dan Roberts, Louis Cohen and Michael Kimble will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
MTRAX MainStay Income Builder Fund Taylor Wagenseil will no longer serve as portfolio manager, but will “provide non-discretionary advisory support to the Fund’s portfolio management team as a Senior Advisor” until August 2017. Michael Kimble, William Priest, Dan Roberts, Eric Sappenfield, Michael Welhoelter, Louis Cohen, John Tobin and Kera Van Valen will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
MASAX MainStay Unconstrained Bond Fund Taylor Wagenseil will no longer serve as portfolio manager, but will “provide non-discretionary advisory support to the Fund’s portfolio management team as a Senior Advisor” until August 2017. Dan Roberts, Louis Cohen and Michael Kimble will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
NSEIX Nicholas Equity Income Fund Mr. Albert O. Nicholas passed away on August 4, 2016. He was described as very hard working, diligent, humble, and generous. David Nicholas and Michael Shelton will manage the fund. 8/16
NCINX Nicholas High Income Fund Mr. Albert O. Nicholas passed away on August 4, 2016. He was described as very hard working, diligent, humble, and generous. Lawrence Pavelec will manage the fund. 8/16
NCTWX Nicholas II Mr. Albert O. Nicholas passed away on August 4, 2016. He was described as very hard working, diligent, humble, and generous. David Nicholas will manage the fund. 8/16
NCLEX Nicholas Limited Edition Mr. Albert O. Nicholas passed away on August 4, 2016. He was described as very hard working, diligent, humble, and generous. David Nicholas will manage the fund. 8/16
NICSX Nicolas Mr. Albert O. Nicholas passed away on August 4, 2016. He was described as very hard working, diligent, humble, and generous. David Nicholas and Michael Shelton will manage the fund. 8/16
NWGAX Nuveen Tradewinds Global All Cap Fund Emily Alejos and Andrew Thelen are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Thomas Ray and James Stephenson will now manage the fund. 8/16
OWSMX Old Westbury Small & Mid Cap Fund No one, but … Samuel Nathans, William Jacques and James Eysenbach join Michael Morrisroe, Henry Gray, Ormala Krishnan, Jed Fogdall, Joseph Chi, Arun Keswani, Scott Brayman and John Hall. 8/16
OWSOX Old Westbury Strategic Opportunities Fund TPH Asset Management LLC will no longer act as a sub-adviser for a portion of the fund’s portfolio. Bessemer Investment Management LLC will assume the day-to-day investment management responsibility for the portion of the fund’s assets managed by TPH. 8/16
QFFOX Pear Tree PanAgora Emerging Markets Fund George Mussalli, Joel Feinberg and Dmitri Kantsyrev are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Nocholas Alonso, Mark Barnes and Edward Qian will manage the fund. 8/16
RHYAX RBC BlueBay Global High Yield Bond Fund Anthony Robertson will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Justin Jewell and Thomas Kreuzer assume the role of co-portfolio managers of the fund. 8/16
SMSNX Schroder Emerging Markets Multi-Sector Bond Fund Denis Parisien will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund, but he will remain with the firm. James Barrineau and Fernando Grisales are joined by Michael O’Brien. 8/16
SMLNX Schroder Emerging Markets Small Cap Fund Allan Conway is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. He lasted for exactly one year. Tom Wilson joins Richard Sennitt, James Gotto, and Matthew Dobbs in managing the fund. 8/16
SMLNX Schroder Emerging Markets Small Cap Fund Allan Conway is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. He lasted for exactly one year. Tom Wilson joins Richard Sennitt, James Gotto, and Matthew Dobbs in managing the fund. 8/16
SGBNX Schroder Global Strategic Bond Fund Gareth Isaac has resigned his portfolio manager position. Robert Jolly and Paul Grainger remain to manage the fund. 8/16
SIDNX Schroder International Multi-Cap Value Fund Ben Corris is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Michael O’Brien joins Justin Abercrombie and Stephen Langford. 8/16
SIDNX Schroder International Multi-Cap Value Fund Ben Corris is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Justin Abercrombie and Stephen Langford will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
SNAEX Schroder North American Equity Fund Ben Corris is no longer listed as a portfolio manager for the fund. Justin Abercrombie and Stephen Langford will continue to manage the fund. 8/16
SEBLX Sentinel Balanced Fund Daniel Manion has announced his intention to retire in 2Q17. Jason Doiron will continue to manage the fund 8/16
SENCX Sentinel Common Stock Fund Daniel Manion has announced his intention to retire in 2Q17. Hilary Roper will continue to manage the fund 8/16
CBON VanEck Vectors ChinaAMC China Bond ETF David Lai will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Charlie Hu joins Eric Isenberg and Francis Rodilosso. 8/16
WALTX Wells Fargo Alternative Strategies Fund James Clark and Lucy DeStafano are no longer listed as portfolio managers for the fund. Brian Zied and Joseph Bishop join the rest of the team. 8/16
WBSNX William Blair Small Cap Growth Fund No one, but … Karl Brewer and Michael Balkin are joined by Ward Sexton in managing the fund. 8/16

 

Briefly Noted . . .

By David Snowball

New questions to ask your potential fund manager: “so, how did your high school lacrosse team do? And how was the cuisine in the cafeteria?” If the answers were anything close to “great” and “scrumptious,” run away! Run away! As it turns out, new research shows that managers who come from relatively modest, perhaps even challenged, backgrounds tend to surpass their J. Crew wearing peers. So if you can find a kid whose forebears were, say, poor Tennessee farmers, he probably deserves your money. (Especially if his fund is closing to new investors, say, at the end of September.) Thanks to Ira Artman, longtime reader and friend of the Observer, for the heads-up!

After 35 years with Legg Mason, Bill Miller bought himself and his funds free of them. Mr. Miller manages two funds, Miller Income Opportunity Trust (LMCJX) and Legg Mason Opportunity (LGOAX), through a firm that was 50% owned by Legg Mason. By the end of 2016, “subject to certain conditions,” Legg will have sold its stake to Mr. Miller. We were pretty skeptical when Legg gave Mr. Miller and his son the reins of a new fund bearing the Miller, rather than Legg Mason, name. We likened it to a retirement present from the firm to an old, beloved employee who was being shown the door. Its performance since them has not materially softened our skepticism:

lmcjx

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Effective September 1, 2016, T. Rowe Price Health Sciences Fund (PRHSX) reopened to new investors. Price concluded that it was in the shareholders’ best interests to reopen the fund. The $2 billion in outflows that coincided with the announcement of a manager change may have entered into the equation.

Wells Fargo Discovery Fund (WFDAX) reopens on September 12, 2016, about two weeks after its long-time manager, Tom Pence, retires. Coincidence?  Brownie points to anyone who remembers that this fund started life as Strong Mid Cap. Strong had the industry’s most spectacular flameout: founder Dick Strong got named for improper trading, had to admit to wrongdoing, was banned for life from the securities industry, had to sell his firm and fork over $140 million in fines. In the decade since it’s been a very consistently strong performer.

The $4.8 billion Sequoia Fund (SEQUX) has reopened. There was a time when that would have been joyful news to potential investors. Now we’re stuck looking at the rubble and wondering what they’ll be able to rebuild.

Oakmark International Small Cap Fund (OAKEX), Oakmark International Fund (OAKIX) and Oakmark Global Fund (OAKGX) have all reopened to new investors. Small Cap and Global each have about $2.5 billion in assets; International is about ten times as large. All have had a rocky run over the past three or four years. All have seen some outflows, though I wouldn’t describe them as “crippling” or any such. Two of the funds have Morningstar’s “Gold” rating while the third, OAKEX, is “Bronze.”

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

Mairs & Power Small Cap Fund (MSCFX) will close on September 30, 2016. It’s a five-star fund with nearly $300 million in assets. Mairs & Power point to the desire for “a more stable asset base and the continued efficient management of the Fund” as their rationale for closing it.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Effective August 15, 2016, the Aberdeen Global Fixed Income Fund (CUGAX) changed its name to the Aberdeen Global Unconstrained Fixed Income Fund. For whatever reason, Morningstar’s system hasn’t yet picked up the change.

Nuveen NWQ Global Equity Fund (NGEAX) has become Nuveen NWQ Global All-Cap Fund. (Shhhh …. As of 8/30/2016, Morningstar doesn’t know.)

Altegris/AACA Real Estate Long Short Fund (RAAAX) has been renamed Altegris/AACA Opportunistic Real Estate Fund with no change of strategy.

SPDR Russell Small Cap Completeness ETF (RSCO), a singularly dumb name which reflected its former index, the Russell Small Cap Completeness Index, has become SPDR S&P® 1000 ETF (SMD).

Effective August 12, 2016, WHV International Equity Fund became Shelton International Select Equity Fund (WHVAX) while WHV/Acuity Tactical Credit Long/Short Fund was renamed Shelton Tactical Credit Fund (WHAAX).

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

TheShadowThanks, as ever, to TheShadow who knows not only what evil lurks in the hearts of men but also what news lurks in the darkness of the SEC daily filings. His vigilance, and willingness to share timely finds on our discussion board, make this portion of our monthly issue easier for me to produce and more complete for our readers.

“Considering the small size of the [fund] and other relevant considerations” [hmmm … the effect of a 23% short position against an insistently rising market?], its Board has decided to liquidate Aberdeen Multi-Manager Alternative Strategies Fund II (ARDWX) on or about October 14, 2016.

Aberdeen Emerging Markets Debt Local Currency Fund disappeared into the Aberdeen Emerging Markets Debt Fund (AKFAX) on August 15, 2016.

Also on August 15, 2016, Aberdeen Asia-Pacific Smaller Companies Fund, Aberdeen Ultra-Short Duration Bond Fund, Aberdeen European Equity Fund and Aberdeen Latin American Equity Fund were liquidated. Columbia Global Unconstrained Bond Fund (CLUAX) became all too constrained at the end of August, 2016 and is no longer with us.

Consilium Emerging Market Small Cap Fund (CEMSX) will be liquidating its assets at the close of business on November 23, 2016.

Croft Focus Fund (CIFVX/CRFVX), contrarily, liquidated at the end of August solely “due to the relatively small size of the Fund.”

Cupps All Cap Growth Fund (CUPAX) and Cupps Mid Cap Growth Fund were both liquidated on August 31, 2016.

Even Keel Multi-Asset Managed Risk Fund (EKMAX) will liquidate on September 16, 2016. It’s a curious decision since even though the fund was a weak performer it still had nearly $120 million in assets. No word in the filings about what drove the decision.

First Trust High Income ETF (FTHI) is absorbing First Trust Dividend and Income Fund (FAV), a closed-end fund. That’s the first CEF to ETF merger I recall.

The $11 million Hartford Duration-Hedged Strategic Income Fund (HABEX) will disappear on or about October 21, 2016. It’s probably for the best, the fund has underperformed just about every benchmark (from short-term bonds to multi-sector bonds) that I checked for it.

Good Harbor Tactical Core Developed Markets Fund GHDAX and Good Harbor Tactical Core Emerging Markets Fund GHEAX both head to that great good harbor in the sky on September 29, 2016.

Neuberger Berman Flexible Select Fund (NFLAX) will liquidate on October 3, 2016. It’s another fund damned by not standing out; it wasn’t great, it wasn’t awful, it wasn’t dirt cheap and it wasn’t ridiculously expensive. In the end, it simply wasn’t compelling.

Oaktree Emerging Markets Equity Fund (OEEDX) will liquidate on September 30, 2016. They should be embarrassed by their decision. The fund is under two years old and there’s no compelling reason why they should be so quickly pulling the rug out from under their investors. The firm manages nearly $100 billion and might reasonably be expected to put some considerable time and energy into resuscitating a new fund in an area outside of their traditional strengths. Instead, without a word of explanation, they’re turning off the lights and walking away.

The Profit Fund (PVALX) has closed to new investors and will liquidate on September 28, 2016. The “Profit” in the name is, of course, Eugene Profit who has managed the fund since the heady days of the late 1990s. Thomas Heath wrote an interesting profile of Mr. Profit, a former cornerback for the Patriots and Redskins. The article reports that Mr. Profit’s firm was managing $1.8 billion in 2012. It looks, from the most recent Form ADV, like that figure is down to $325 million. The Profit Fund, a reasonably strong performer until mid-2015, accounts for just $5 million of that total.

On August 23, 2016, the Board of Trustees of PNC Funds approved plans of liquidation for each of PNC Small Cap Index Fund (PESCX), PNC Mid Cap Index Fund (PMCEX) and PNC Mid Cap Fund (PMCAX). The funds have about $25 million between them. PNC Mid Cap Fund will be the first to go, on or about October 31, 2016, then its siblings follow on December 31, 2016.

NYSE regulators have informed the advisers to QuantShares U.S. Market Neutral Size Fund (SIZ) that they are “not in compliance with NYSE Arca Inc.’s continued listing standards with respect to the number of record or beneficial holders.”

Stone Ridge Reinsurance Risk Premium Fund (SREIX) is being “reorganized” with and into Stone Ridge High Yield Reinsurance Risk Premium Fund (SHRIX).

Victory RS Focused Growth Opportunity Fund and Victory RS Focused Opportunity Fund both liquidated on August 26, 2016.

USA Mutuals Takeover Targets Fund (TOTNX) and USA Mutuals Beating Beta Fund (BEATX) are taken over and beaten by beta, on or about September 29, 2016.

Witherspoon Managed Futures Strategy Fund (CTAAX) will close down on September 23, 2016.

August 1, 2016

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

aAugust, famously “summer’s last messenger of misery,” is upon us. It’s a month mostly celebrated by NFL fans (for the start of training camp and the endless delusion that this might be the year) and wiccans (who apparently have a major to-do in the stinkin’ heat). All of us whose lives and livelihoods are tied to the education system feel sympathy for the poet Elizabeth M. Taylor:

August rushes by like desert rainfall,
A flood of frenzied upheaval,
Expected,
But still catching me unprepared.
Like a match flame
Bursting on the scene,
Heat and haze of crimson sunsets.
Like a dream
Of moon and dark barely recalled,
A moment,
Shadows caught in a blink.
Like a quick kiss;
One wishes for more
But it suddenly turns to leave,
Dragging summer away.

I could, I suppose, grumble again about the obvious (the combination of repeated stock market records with withering corporate fundamentals isn’t good), but Ed bade me keep silent on the topic. So we’ll try to offer up a bunch of lighter pieces, suitable to summer.

tomato-711827_1280

And I’ll return to keeping company with heirloom tomatoes, oddly-stunted potatoes and cold beer. I hope you do likewise.

Now on with the show!

Observer Fund Profiles: Ariel Global and Catalyst MAP Global TRI

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds. Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds. “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.

Ariel Global (AGLOX): over a two decade career, Rupal Bhansali has clung to a simple observation: “if you don’t swim in shark-infested waters, you can’t get bitten by a shark.” That insistence on ruthlessly weeding out the bad idea first has served, and is serving, her investors well.

Catalyst MAP Global Total Return Income (TRXAX/TRXIX): some funds thrive through flash, some through discipline. The managers at MAP have been practicing outstanding discipline and focus for the past 15 years, first in their separate accounts and now in their two funds. TRXAX, a sort of global balanced fund, is proving to be a worthy extension of their long investing tradition.

Launch Alert: AMG SouthernSun Global Opportunities (SSOLX)

On July 11, SouthernSun Asset Management launched their Global Opportunities fund. SouthernSun’s flagship is a long-established small cap fund, and this seems to be a global version of that strategy. The fund seeks long-term capital appreciation. The plan is to invest in 15-40 companies SouthernSun believes are “niche dominant, attractively valued with financial flexibility and uniquely fitted management teams.” It’s nominally all-cap ($100 million and up) but the manager intends to target small- to mid-cap stocks. They have the option of hedging their currency exposure, but don’t currently intend to do so. The fund will be managed by Michael W. Cook, SouthernSun’s CEO and CIO.

Mr. Cook founded SouthernSun in 1989 and the firm manages $4.4 billion, as of May 31, 2016. He and his team manage two other funds: AMG SouthernSun Small Cap (SSSFX) and Equity (SSEFX). Small Cap has dramatically outperformed its small-core peers since inception but pretty much stunk in 2014 and 2015, trailing more than 95% of its peers both years. Those two years now dominate the fund’s statistical profile, both at Morningstar and at MFO. The manager attributes much of that pounding to the fact that “the market has punished several of our holdings for low levels of exposure to commodities, the Emerging Markets and foreign exchange.”

When we profiled SouthernSun Small Cap in 2011, we highlighted two risks.

There are two concerns worth considering as you look at the fund:

It is highly concentrated, especially for a smaller cap fund. Only nine of the 75 SMid-cap core funds place a greater fraction of their assets in their top ten holdings than does SouthernSun (47%).  That said, most of those concentrated funds have posted strong risk-adjusted returns.

It is volatile, though not gut-wrenchingly so.  The fund’s five-year standard deviation (a measure of volatility) is 29. By comparison, FPA Capital is 22, Longleaf is 24, and Vanguard Extended Market Index (WEXMX, which has a similar market cap though far lower concentration) is 27. Morningstar rates is as having above-average risk and Lipper rates it as “low” in capital preservation. Both services agree, though, that the risk has been well-rewarded: Morningstar gives it “high” returns and Lipper makes it a “Lipper Leader” in the category.

History seems to have born our concerns out. The question for investors approaching the new Global fund is whether Mr. Cook simply got ahead of the market, positioning the fund for long term success at the price of another run of short-term disruption. Given the 2016 performance of the recently reopened Small Cap Fund (up 15% through the end of July, in the top 2% of its peer group) and Mr. Cook’s longer-term record, it would be imprudent simply to glance at a two-star rating or a dismal three-year performance and walk away.

The initial expense ratio is capped at 1.70% for Investor shares, including a 1.0% management fee. The minimum initial investment is $2,000, reduced to $1,000 for IRAs. There’s not a lot of content yet on the AMG SouthernSun Global page. You might get more insight by reviewing AMG SouthernSun Small Cap’s, since the strategies are the same. Southern Sun’s own website walks you through their story without much additional substance. 

Updates

centerstone logoThe recently launched Centerstone Investors (CETAX) and Centerstone International (CSIAX) funds are now available through the Schwab and Pershing platforms. Both are managed by Abhay Despande, formerly of First Eagle Funds.

At the same time, they published their Q2 shareholder letter: Setting Up Shop & the Art of Ignoring Headlines (06/30/2016). Mr. Deshpande recognizes the current challenges: “global long-term interest rates at close to zero, stock prices at historically high levels and increased uncertainty across the globe.” He acknowledges that some investors might be tempted to allow a top-down call (“it’s too scary right now”) to shape their portfolios. He rejects that strategy in favor of one that starts with the premise that “we will continue to have major challenges to overcome. In the case of the latter, which is our own approach, our portfolios will tend to be diversified among well capitalized and reasonably priced businesses, along with some reserves. This long-term, global, bottom-up approach has served us well over time and we believe will continue to do so.” The letter offers a thoughtful, gracefully-written intro to Mr. Deshpande’s approach. It’s quick and well worth reading.

Briefly noted

West Shore “elected not to renew its investment advisory agreement” with the West Shore fund and has been replaced with Satuit Capital Management. I never warmed up to West Shore, which started as West Shore Real Return Income Fund (NWSFX) then became West Shore Real Return Fund after 18 months. At that point, they changed their objective from “capital growth and current income” to “preserving purchasing power.” And they pretty much completely rewrote their “principal strategies” text so that it’s hard to know how exactly the portfolio will change, though the addition of a risk statement concerning the use of futures and other derivatives does offer a partial answer. I’ve been genially skeptical of the fund for a long while.

At a reader’s behest, I spoke at length two years ago with one of the managers whose answers seemed mostly circular and who was reluctant to share information about the fund. His basic argument was: “we don’t intend to make information about the fund, our strategies or insights available on the web.” At the end of the call, he announced that he and co-manager James Rickards were mostly the public faces of the fund and that the actual work of managing it fell to the third member of the trio. Mr. Rickards has since left to resume his career as doomsayer.

The question is, what qualifications does a small cap specialist like Satuit have for running a sort of quasi-hedge fund?

Celebrating David Snowball’s heroism

I really liked the first line of the story: “David Snowball was the all-round hero.”

david snowball

I have no earthly idea of what he’s doing, but apparently he’s doing it brilliantly.

Sadly, the rest appeared to be British rather than English:

Scarborough won the toss in the Pavilion Cup final at Flixton and elected to bat first with Snowball getting the innings off to an excellent start retiring on 30. When Snowball retired Tom Pratt hit 24 and Kieran Rutter added 26 as they moved the score onto 101 for 3 after 15 overs.

At this stage Pickering were still in a position where the runs could be chased down, which was mainly due to tight bowling from James Boyes and Tom Dawson, but a quickfire 30 retired (off 13 balls) from Arthur Ashton took the final score to 151-7 which proved to be a total too difficult for Pickering to chase down.

Pickering in reply were soon in trouble being reduced to 2-2 after two overs with Snowball taking both wickets… The man of the match award, adjudicated by the umpires, was awarded to Snowball for his excellent all-round performance.

Congratulations to the young Snowball a/k/a SnowyLadd. And no, I have no idea of how I might be related to the ferocious bowler.

Farewell to Burnham

The erstwhile Burnham funds (Burnham Fund, Financial Services RMBKX, and Financial Services Long/Short) are now RMB or RMB Mendon funds, as in RMB Fund RMBHX, RMB Mendon Financial Services RMBKX and RMB Mendon Financial Services Long/Short RMBFX. Burnham Financial was replaced as adviser to the funds on July 1, Jon Burnham was replaced at Burnham Fund but Anton Schutz remains at the helm of the financial services funds. The original Mr. Burnham (I.W.) managed the growth-and-income Burnham Fund from 1975-1995 while the younger Mr. Burnham (Jon) ran it from 1995-2016.

Greetings to Gabelli

74-year-old billionaire Mario Gabelli, famous for paying himself $60-70 million a year, has decided he needs more to do so he’s launching The Gabelli Go Anywhere Trust, “a non-diversified, closed-end management investment company with no operating history.” This will be the 16th fund in his management portfolio. Going There will cost you 3.12% a year, which pops to 8.45% a year once you factor-in “Distributions on Series A Preferred Shares” (though I’m not sure quite what that means).

Who does this guy think he is, a presidential nominee?

David Blaine Welliver, former manager of the long-defunct Dblaine fund, has pled guilty (again) to securities fraud charges and has the prospect of having the feds provide secure housing for him for the next five years. As Chuck Jaffe noted in 2011, the Dblaine fund itself was an act of criminal mischief but it represented a tiny sliver of Mr. Welliver’s activities according to the Minneapolis Star-Tribune. He pled guilty this month to a single charge of securities fraud arising from his 2010 attempt to bolster his fund empire. At a time when his firm has $200 in cash, he borrowed $4 million to buy two other mutual funds, spent $100,000 on the acquisition and $500,000 on himself. Five years later the feds got around to filing charges.

At the same time, Visium Asset Management, former adviser to the defunct Visium Event-Driven Fund VIDVX, announced that it was firing 33 people and closing its hedge funds. Bloomberg links the closures to revelations of fraudulent activities by three former managers, one of whom subsequently committed suicide.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

The Oakmark Global Fund (OAKGX), Oakmark International Fund (OAKIX) and Oakmark International Small Cap Fund (OAKEX) all reopened to all investors effective July 29, 2016. Special thanks to David Shepard of Callahan Capital for the timely heads-up!

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

The adviser of the Iron Horse Fund (IRHAX/IRHIX) has announced that it does not intend to renew the contractual management fee waiver agreement upon its termination on July 29, 2016. Expenses will then pop from 1.86% to 2.37%. That particular move will net the adviser ridicule and $8,500 a year, and will keep it ranked as the third most expensive fund in its peer group (option writing funds with front loads). That said it has been a consistently strong performer though it’s drawn only $17 million in assets.

Effective July 29, 2016, Matthews Japan Fund (MJFOX) closed to most new investors. It’s a very solid fund and we debated whether to send a mid-month alert to our subscribers about the impending closure. Ultimately we decided against doing so, mostly because they are two stronger, small options available to interested investors: the four-star Hennessy Japan (HJPNX) with $120 million in assets and five-star Hennessy Japan Small Cap (HJPSX) at just $30 million. The SPARX Asset Management, a Japanese firm specializing in Asia-Pacific asset management, subadvises both funds. They’re very much worth your attention if you think the Japan story has legs.

Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund (VDIGX) closed to all new investors in late July, with the fascinating “exception of investors who are added and invest in the Fund only through technology-driven model portfolios.”

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

American Century Veedot Fund (AMVIX) is renamed the Adaptive Equity Fund effective as of September 7, 2016. American Century Legacy Multi Cap Fund (ACMNX) is renamed the Adaptive All Cap Fund effective as of September 7, 2016.

At some point, probably soon but no one is saying, DSM Large Cap Growth Fund (DSMLX) will be reorganized to become the Touchstone Large Company Growth Fund. Despite its dismal ticker symbol, it’s a really solid fund with $200 million in assets. The management team expects to remain in place after the change.

GMO is being removed as sub-advisor to John Hancock U.S. Equity Fund (JHUAX). Once that occurs, it will be renamed U.S. Growth Fund and its investment objective will be tweaked.

Rothschild Larch Lane Alternatives Fund (RLLBX) is being renamed Fiera Capital Diversified Alternatives Fund.

Effective October 1, 2016 TETON Westwood Income Fund (WEIAX) is changing its name to TETON Convertible Securities Fund. Understandably, its “principal strategies” will now include investing at least 80% in convertibles.

cool car

I’m into it!

USA Mutuals Barrier Fund (VICEX), formerly the Vice Fund (VICEX), has been renamed again as … wait for it! the USA Mutual Vice Fund (VICEX). At the same time, the description of the strategy went from focusing on industries with high barriers to entry (which includes “the alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gaming and defense/aerospace industries”) to focusing on vice industries (which is “the alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gaming and defense/aerospace industries”).

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

American Century Legacy Large Cap Fund (ACGOX) and Focused Growth Fund (AFSIX) have both closed and will liquidate on October 21, 2016.

“[B]ased upon the Fund’s current small asset size and small shareholder base,” its board has decided to liquidate Brown Advisory Multi-Strategy Fund (BAFRX). That will occur on August 12, 2016.

Calamos Focus Growth ETF will be liquidated on or about August 8, 2016. At the beginning of October, Calamos Discovery Growth Fund (CDGAX) and Calamos Mid Cap Growth Fund (CMXAX) will both be liquidated. And somewhere in there, Calamos Focus Growth (CBCAX) will be absorbed by Calamos Growth (CVGRX) while Calamos Long/Short (CALSX) vanishes into Calamos Phineus Long/Short (CPLSX). CALSX was Gary Black’s fund, which Calamos adopted when they hired Mr. Black. By some accounts, Mr. Black’s team was being squeezed out and left Calamos a bit before he did. Mr. Calamos then took the reins and transformed a so-so fund into a bad one. CPLSX is a recently converted hedge fund, Phineus Partners LP, with $20 million in assets and a fine record as a hedge fund.

City National Rochdale Multi-Asset Fund (CNIIX/CNIAX) will be liquidated “in an orderly manner” (sounds very British of them) on or about 29 September 2016.

Discretionary Managed Futures Strategy Fund (FUTEX) becomes (PASTX) on or before July 29, 2016.

E Fund China A Enhanced Equity Fund (EFAAX) bows out August 12, 2016.

The Board of Directors of The Lazard Funds has approved the liquidation of Lazard US Mid Cap Equity Portfolio (LZMOX), effective August 30, 2016.

dodoNeuberger Berman All Cap Core Fund (NBEAX), Neuberger Berman Large Cap Disciplined Growth Fund (NLDAX) and Neuberger Berman World Equity Fund (NWTAX) are all scheduled to liquidate on August 4, 2016. Neuberger Berman Inflation Managed Fund (NDRAX) goes the way of the dodo on October 14, 2016.

Madison NorthRoad International Fund (NRIEX) will discontinue operations, liquidate, terminate, vanish and/or be assigned to the LowRoad on September 30, 2016.

On July 7, 2016, its board decided to liquidate Oakhurst Defined Risk Fund (OAKDX). Two weeks later it was gone. It’s another case of an adviser abandoning a fund shortly after launch. In this case, it put in about 18 months and the adviser pulled the plug.

The closing of the merger of Putnam Voyager Fund into Putnam Growth Opportunities Fund was originally scheduled to occur on or about July 15, 2016, subject to “certain closing conditions.” Since those conditions haven’t been met, the merger remains on hold.

Schneider Value Fund (SCMLX) has closed in advance of its liquidation.

USA Mutuals Generation Wave Growth Fund (GWGFX) and USA Mutuals/WaveFront Hedged Emerging Markets Fund (WAVNX) will both liquidate on September 29, 2016. USA Mutuals stuck with the latter fund, a converted limited partnership, for less than one year before giving up.

In Closing . . .

A quick word of thanks and encouragement for folks who support the Observer through our Amazon link. As many of you know, we receive an amount equivalent to about 7.5% of whatever you buy – from used books to Halloween candy or home appliances – through our link. It’s invisible and costs you nothing (it’s part of Amazon’s marketing budget), but provides us a pretty steady $20-25/day.

Despite the craziness of summer, folks have been very faithful about using the link and we’re thankful. If you’ve been meaning to use it but haven’t yet, take a moment, click our Amazon link and set it as a bookmark on your browser’s bookmark bar (the one you see across the top of your screen with your most-used bookmarks.

bookmark

If you’re more inclined to browse for unique, hand-crafted goods, you might want to take a look at Amazon Homemade, where we found this really cool lamp. And if you love cool lamptormenting your children (or yourself) you could certainly use Amazon for some back-to-school shopping. If the dinner table gets rowdy, dropping the line “oh, yeah. I was just at Amazon and found some really nice notebooks for your Trig class this month” will really quiet them down.

Thanks too, to those who continue to support us through direct PayPal donations Adrian, Larry, and stalwart subscribers Deb and Greg. We really appreciate you.

Between now and our next issue, I’ll be working on a course I haven’t taught in ten years (Business and Professional Communication) as well as an old favorite with new relevance (Propaganda).  And, too, we’ve got interviews lined up with three managers, a new Elevator Talk and two new profiles. It’ll be good.

Take care and we’ll see you soon,

David

Morningstar’s “undiscovered” funds

By David Snowball

In case you’re wondering, here is the Observer’s mission:

The Mutual Fund Observer writes for the benefit of intellectually curious, serious investors— managers, advisers, and individuals—who need to go beyond marketing fluff, beyond computer- generated recommendations and beyond Morningstar’s coverage universe … Our special focus is on innovative, independent new and smaller funds. MFO’s mission is to provide readers with calm, intelligent arguments and to provide independent fund companies with an opportunity to receive thoughtful attention even though they might not yet have drawn billions in assets. Its coverage universe has been described as “the thousands of funds off Morningstar’s radar,” a description one fund manager echoes as “a Morningstar for the rest of us.”

Morningstar is in the business of helping investors. Since most investors have most of their money in large funds, that’s where Morningstar spends their time and energy. By way of illustration, Morningstar has published reviews of 530 funds in 2016. Of those, 450, or 85%, have assets under management of more than a billion. The median size for all reviewed funds, including those that haven’t been reviewed in the past five or ten years, is about $1.5 billion. The median size for all funds, not just those reviewed, is about $220 million. To be clear: there are 3400 funds with less than $220 million in assets, of which 24 (0.7%) have received analyst coverage in the past 12 months.

That’s not a criticism, it’s a business model. Morningstar needs to follow the money because that’s where the vast bulk of the paying customers are. The Observer, both noncommercial and nonprofit, has the freedom to go where Morningstar cannot; a complement rather than a competitor, mostly yin to their mostly yang.

At the same time, the folks at Morningstar maintain some level of vigilance toward smaller, newer funds. That’s embodied in the Morningstar Prospects list and in an annual “undiscovered managers” panel at the Morningstar Investor Conference. This year’s undiscovered managers were:

Rupal Bhansali of Ariel Funds. Rupal’s two Ariel funds (Global AGLOX and International AINTX) have five year records and about a quarter billion in AUM but Ms. Bhansali herself has been managing for 21 years and overseas hundreds of millions more in separate accounts.

Jonathan Bloom, representing the team-managed FMI Funds. FMI International (FMIJX), for which he was being recognized, holds $4.4 billion and has a six-year record.

Andrew Foster of Seafarer Funds. Andrew’s Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income Fund (SFGIX) has $1.4 billion in assets and a four year record which builds on his decade of work at Matthews International.

In this case, on average, you can become “undiscovered” after you have $2 billion in assets and a five year record as a fund and a ten or fifteen year record as a manager. They all richly deserve the recognition. We profile Ariel Global below and have written repeatedly about Seafarer. In truth we should have begun coverage of FMI around the time we launched, but I screwed up and the fund is outside of our coverage universe (roughly defined as “funds off Morningstar’s radar”) now.

Morningstar also published two articles this month on the subject of undiscovered funds; the sort of “not ready for prime-time” crew that Morningstar’s keeping an eye on for you. After torching the strawman argument that most new funds aren’t worth much attention (uhhh … (a) we agree and (b) we think that’s true of most old funds, too. The Observer’s argument from the moment we launched is that 80% of all mutual funds could be shuttered with no loss to anyone except the folks drawing fees from them), Morningstar offered some off-the-radar possibilities for you.

In “These Mutual Funds Are New but Still Worthy” (07/27/2016), Christine Benz identifies three from the handful “worthwhile mutual funds” launched recently. They are:

  Launch date  
Mairs & Power Small Cap MSCFX August 2011 Our 2011 profile, drawing on my remarkably low-key conversation with the manager, concludes “There’s simply no reason to be excited about this fund. Which is exactly what Mairs & Power wants. Small Cap will, almost certainly, grow into a solidly above-average performer that lags a bit in frothy markets, leads in soft ones and avoids making silly mistakes. It’s the way Mairs & Power has been winning for 80 years and it’s unlikely to change now.”
Meridian Small Cap Growth MSGGX December 2013 Our 2014 profile looked at Mr. Schaub and Meade’s long record at Janus Triton and argued “While the track record of the fund is short, the record of its managers is long and impressive. Investors looking for intelligent, risk-managed exposure to this important slice of the market owe it to themselves to look closely here.”
Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income SFGIX February 2012 Our original 2012 profile, twice updated, concluded “Mr. Foster is remarkably bright, thoughtful, experienced and concerned about the welfare of his shareholders … He’s a good manager of risk, which has made him a great manager of returns. The fund offers him more flexibility than he’s ever had and he’s using it well. There are few more-attractive emerging markets options available.”

It turns out that if you have a highly accomplished manager who leaves a large fund to launch a small one, you’ve got an awfully good prospect for success. Likewise, if you’ve got a firm that never launches new funds and then they launch a new fund, you’ve got an awfully good prospect for success. It’s never been clear to us why you’d approach such managers as if they were amiable bumpkins recently tumbled from the turnip truck, waiting for years before acknowledging that they were even off-the-radar (but close).

Dan Culloton, associate director of equity manager research, offers a larger list 10 Under-the-Radar and Up-and-Coming Funds (7/26/2016) which strike the Morningstar analysts as “intriguing, little-known or new.”

Goldman Sachs ActiveBeta U.S. Large Cap Equity ETF (GSLC) The funds low vol plus price momentum strategy earned an incredibly tepid endorsement: “The ETF’s 0.09% expense ratio is less likely to erode whatever modest performance advantage it might offer.” Uhhh… if that’s it, why bother?
AQR Long-Short Equity (QLEIX)  Three years old, top 1% since launch plus $1.4 billion in assets. It’s your basic AQR black box. Frankly, if I had fund radar and funds with a billion in assets were under it, I’d invest in new radar.
LoCorr Market Trend (LOTIX)  Two-year-old fund based on a 10-year-old hedge fund, $1.4 billion in assets. It’s a managed futures fund that benefits from the fact that most of its peers are rolling wrecks. NAV peaked in April 2015, down about 7% since.
AC Alternatives Market Neutral Value (ACVKX)  Five years old market-neutral fund with $715 million and a manager who oversees $25 billion. It uses a pair-trading strategy where it would, for example, balance a long position in one carmaker with a short position in another. The goal is 300-400 bps above cash with zero market correlation. With annual returns of 2-4%, they’re right in the range. If you find the strategy attractive, consider acting now. The manager expects to close at below $1 billion.
Columbia Acorn Emerging Markets (CATIX)  This five-year-old fund closed in July 2014 with $575 million in assets and reopened in February 2016 at about one-third of that amount. Over that same period, it lost about 30%. Because Morningstar doesn’t break out small- to mid-cap EM funds (or EM balanced funds) separately, CATIX looks worse than it is. It’s a solid, risk-sensitive fund in a very volatile niche.
Rainier International Discovery (RAIIX) Nice fund, $215 million, three year record but the load-waived shares are a bit scarce. It’s managed by Henrik Strabo who ran American Century International Discovery for about 20 years, then bounced around a bit: Touchstone, GuideMark, Clough, Rogge, but never for more than a year or two. Odd.
Queens Road Small Cap Value (QRSVX) Our profile concludes, “Based on his record over the past 13 years, Mr. Scruggs has earned the designations patient, disciplined, successful. If you aspire to the same, the two Queens Road funds should surely be on your due-diligence list.” Yep.
JPMorgan Global Allocation (GAOSX) $1.4 billion and 5 years old. That seems to be some sort of sweet spot for “under the radar but not too far under.” Morningstar defaults to sharing the institutional class ticker which, in several cases, as here, adds a star or two to the rating. 
T. Rowe Price Global Allocation (RPGAX) We might have misunderestimated RPGAX. When we profiled it in 2013, we concluded “Investors who have traditionally favored a simple 60/40 hybrid approach and long-term investors who are simply baffled by where to move next should look carefully at RPGAX. It doesn’t pretend to be a magic bullet, but it offers incredibly broad asset exposure, a modest degree of opportunism and a fair dose of risk hedging in a single, affordable package. In a fund category marked by high expenses, opaque strategies and untested management teams, it’s apt to stand modestly out.” Oops. I forgot how dismal the average world allocation fund is. RPGAX is substantially stronger than its peers, though it consistently trails other plausible comparisons such as Vanguard STAR (VGSTX) and Leuthold Core (LCORX).
CRA Qualified Investment (CRANX) $2 billion and nine years old. In late 2013 we noted “Virtue has its price: The Community Reinvestment Act requires banks make capital available to the low- and moderate-income communities in which they operate. That’s entirely admirable but the fund’s investors pay a price: it trails 90% of its intermediate-bond peers.” Through the magic of standard reporting periods (1, 3, 5 years) plus a couple okay years of late, the bad years have vanished from the ratings and its 3- and 5-year returns are 20-40 bps above average. Supporting community redevelopment is a very good thing, just do it with your eyes open.

Bottom line: not all investors have the freedom to consider truly new funds. For many investors, policy or principle requires them to wait three to five years, to hold off until a fund crosses an asset threshold (e.g., $250 million minimum) or demonstrates high liquidity or a capacity-unconstrained strategy (i.e., the ability to quickly absorb and return huge amounts of money without disrupting the market or strategy). The Morningstar Prospects list is a valuable tool for helping such investors find relatively small, relatively new opportunities that might otherwise be lost in the noise. If you’re in that camp, you should try to track down a subscription.

Investors who are unconstrained by such arbitrary rules might find useful leads here three years and a billion dollars sooner.

Bill Gross goes commando again

By David Snowball

Janus has announced the departure of Kumar Palghat from Janus Unconstrained Global Bond Fund (JUCAX). Mr. Palghat, a very accomplished investor with a long record of success at PIMCO and elsewhere, will become the manager of Janus Short Duration Income ETF. Mr. Palghat worked with the fund for just over one year. In his absence, Bill Gross returns to complete control.

bill gross

Let’s make two observations about JUCAX. One, before Mr. Palghat’s arrival, JUCAX was a ridiculously volatile fund that underperformed its peers.

jucax

Two, after Mr. Palghat’s arrival, JUCAX became a very stable fund that substantially outperformed its peers.

jucax2

Coincidence? Maybe. Then again:

bill gross

At the same time, the fund’s Board of Trustees broadened Mr. Gross’s toolkit by expanding the fund’s ability to invest in commodity-linked investments. By Bloomberg’s estimation, over half of the money in the $1.5 billion fund comes from Mr. Gross’s own $2 billion fortune.

Mr. Palghat’s new fund will target beating the LIBOR for 200-300 bps. This will put him in direct competition with PIMCO Enhanced Short Maturity Active ETF (MINT), the largest of the actively-managed ETFs. He’ll be joined in the venture by former colleagues at Kapstream Capital, which he founded after leaving PIMCO in 2006 and which Janus bought in 2015.

As the world reaches a 5,000 year low in global interest rates, value in the bond world continues to deteriorate. Today, more than a third of global government bonds trade at negative yields and almost two thirds yield less than 1%. This month, German 10-year government bonds joined Switzerland and Japan in trading at negative yields, guaranteeing investors 10 years of losses!  Kapstream, “I wouldn’t buy a bond with your money,”  May 2016

Third Avenue seeks a buyer

By David Snowball

The disaster of Third Avenue Focused Credit (TFCVX) rolls on. For those not following December’s drama, TFCVX offered the impossible: it would invest in illiquid securities (that is, stuff that couldn’t be sold at the drop of a hat) but provide investors with daily liquidity (that is, act as if portions of the portfolio could be sold at the drop of a hat). That worked fine as long as the market was rising and no one actually wanted their money back, but when the tide began to go out and investors wanted their money, the poop hit the propeller.

Third Avenue couldn’t raise the cash to meet investor withdrawal demands. Instead, they froze withdrawals from the fund (an unprecedented development) and had their irascible president David Barse escorted from the building by security. Since then, they’ve been trying to sell off the portfolio piecemeal, passing along dribs and drabs to shareholders as funds become available. The frozen shareholders have so far received two distributions, $0.59/ share on December 16 and $0.54/share on June 14, 2016. That’s $1.13/share against a last pre-freeze NAV of $6.48.

Third Avenue is now looking to off-load the fund on someone else, either through outright sale or through some sort of co-management agreement (“Third Avenue weights sale of high-yield fund,” Wall Street Journal, 07/28/2016). That report immediately raises two questions:

  1. Who would want it? And,
  2. What would they be buying?

Third Avenue is paying the investment bank Houlihan Lokey Inc.to find an answer to the first question. The Journal’s two speculations are distressed securities investors or firms “who want to get into the mutual-fund business” (though that seems a bit like trying to sell the Titanic to firms “who want to get into the shipping business”).

The nominal answer to the second question is a fund “which had assets of $592 million.” Sadly, that answer is arrant nonsense. A security is worth precisely what a buyer will pay for it and the evidence at hand is that Third Avenue can’t find anyone to pay anything like that amount. If they could, they wouldn’t be trying to sell the fund, they’d simply sell the securities in the fund.

So where does the $592M come from? The explanation comes in Third Avenue’s latest shareholder report. They dutifully report that the fund has “Total Investments #” of $585,734,004. At the bottom of the table, the hashtag gets explained: “#  Total cost.” Translation: the fund is holding pieces of paper for which they paid $585 million.

Morningstar offers up one silver lining. Their estimate of shareholders’ Potential Cap Gains Exposure is -201.68. Translation: for $1 you have invested, you might reap $2 in tax losses.

Have We Been Here Before?

By Edward A. Studzinski

“The past is never dead. It’s not even past.”

William Faulkner

I recently had coffee with one of my former colleagues in the investment management world. He asked me if our readers understood that, in the world of mutual fund managements, it was all about assets under management and profitability to the various stakeholders in the business. Thoughts about the returns for the investor were generally secondary, or put differently, whether the investors actually got any yachts (or vacations in the Caribbean or second homes on Hilton Head Island) did not matter. Having recently reviewed some posts on our Bulletin Board, I told him that no, many of our readers were still operating under the belief that there was, somewhere in that room full of manure, a pony.

Our desire for hope and change (at least in terms of investment returns) often leads us to ignore the evidence of simple mathematics working against us. I have been as guilty of this as anyone. How else to explain a continued investment in the Sequoia Fund which, based on Morningstar’s reported numbers as of 7/29/2016, gave me a 744 basis point annualized return for five years while charging me 100 basis points a year as expenses. So the expense ratio as a percentage of returns was 13.4%.

Had I been as smart as I thought I was, I would have listened to those who suggested putting money into the Vanguard Dividend Growth Fund,. For a similar five-year period charged 33 basis points a year in expenses and had an annualized return of 1332 basis points. This translates to expenses as a percentage of returns per year on the order of 2.5%.

The numbers become more instructive when you look at a category where active management actually should add value, given market inefficiencies. Namely, that is the area of global funds.

Let’s look at six global funds with those five year records through 7/29/2016:

  expenses annualized returns exp/annualized returns
Artisan Global Value 128 bp 1031 bp 12.4%
Dodge & Cox Global 63 bp 814 bp 7.7%
Oakmark Global Select 113 bp 899 bp 12.6%
Polaris Global Value 99 bp 990 bp 10.0%
T Rowe Price Global 89 bp 981 bp 9.1%
Vanguard Global Equity 57 bp 784 bp 7.3%

Some comments are appropriate. By way of disclosure, my wife has had an IRA account with Polaris for more than ten years. That is a function of a portfolio that does not look like other portfolios, with extremely low turnover, and a manager in Bernie Horn who learned his craft while in the same office space as the legendary Hakan Castegren (Harbor International) when Castegren had his office in Boston before relocating to Bermuda. Dodge & Cox is extremely reasonable in terms of fees and returns. It should do better, as it has a strong research department whose analysts do real independent research. If the organization has a flaw, it is that they let their funds get too large before closing them, and end up diluting their investor returns (you either buy more of the same stock at less undervalued prices or you expand the portfolio with ideas that are increasingly not the best ideas). Vanguard’s Global Equity Fund is the sub-par performer with lowest expenses but the least attractive performance. That is a function of Vanguard’s tendency to shoot itself in the foot.

When Vanguard Global was launched, it had one fund management firm – Marathon out of London. The performance was superb, as one might expect, since Marathon is one of the best global and international managers out there (and I say that because I sit on an endowment investment committee that has them managing an international account, so I see their long-term returns) When assets ballooned, Vanguard closed Global Equity. It subsequently reopened it, but with three management firms, diluting both accountability and performance. While Vanguard seems to believe its own pr about multi-manager teams on its active-managed funds, benefits seem to accrue more to growth in assets under management than in investor returns. We will have an opportunity to see how this might have played out. Harbor has retained Marathon to be sole manager of a new international fund, the Harbor Diversified International All-Cap Fund, whose institutional shares have an 85 bp expense ratio (after reimbursements).

I suggest investors think about what is important to them. I agree with David that global funds are not favored by investment consultants and asset allocators (you are cutting into the possible number of recommendations and potential fees). For many investors, all-in, they end up being a better choice than having multiple international and domestic funds. Alternatively, they can prove to be as much if not more expensive than having a domestic fund and an international fund in its place. Global would seem to be one of those areas where the higher fees of active management over indexation can be justified.

But you have to know what you are getting. If 20 or 30 bp a year are being skimmed off the top by a parent for its distribution platform, well …… And if the lead manager is taking 100 days off a year, spending his or her time on a not-for-profit board, or refuses to do any travel but for marketing purposes, then you may be better served elsewhere.

What Goes On In Las Vegas, Stays In Las Vegas

One of the reasons I have showed a bias towards passive management in recent years, aside from the lower fees impact on compounding of investment returns, has been the difficulty of knowing where the value-added came or comes from in active management. Is it the portfolio manager(s)or the investment analysts or both?. Of the many funds his name was on at PIMCO as portfolio manager, what was Bill Gross really doing in each of them on a daily basis that contributed to the returns? When is a portfolio manager named on a fund just as window dressing to make the trustees think there is succession planning and sustainability? I am thinking of another situation where a young, extraordinarily articulate analyst allegedly convinced his colleagues that the Affordable Care Act was going to be a disaster, the extent of which was unknowable, for the broad health care industry. As a result of his arguments, the firm apparently pared its exposures substantially in pharmaceuticals and medical technology, missing one of the great merger and acquisition booms of the last five years.

The point here is that internally and externally, we do not live in a static world. Peter Lynch, for the point in time he was running his fund, achieved extraordinary returns for his investors. If Peter Lynch returned to run a 1940’s Act mutual fund today, should we expect that he would be able to achieve the same kind of performance? Probably that would not be the case. For one, the investable universe that he had then, and the one he would find himself with today are very different animals. Two, the competitors he would have and the resources available to them would also be very different. Three, the time horizons and patience of the retail investor is very different than it was back then. In many respects, his investors were very loyal (helped by a 3% load), so his capital was if not permanent, pretty close to it. Today, Buffett has permanent capital (and a competitive advantage) but most 1940’s Act mutual funds definitively do not.

This question fascinates me – would they come back today? If so, why? If not, why not? Over the next several months, I am going to endeavor to track down some former well-known fund managers, and ask them why or if, when presented with an opportunity, they have elected NOT to return to this side of the business to run a fund again.

Outside the Box

This weekend in Barron’s on page 30, James Grant of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer is interviewed. I have been a reader of Grant’s for more than twenty-five years. And when wherever I have been working did not subscribe, I either talked them into subscribing or purchased my own subscription out of my own pocket. While I do not agree with everything said or the views of everyone interviewed, it is a publication that does not reflect consensus views or thinking. And I should say, given my own pessimistic views of the world, humanity, and motivation, Jim Grant makes me look a raving optimist. I commend the interview to you, not necessarily for what it says but for raising questions which are worthy of discussion. They are questions which you certainly won’t hear being talked about by either party in the current political climate. Particularly chilling is his reference to the Ph.D standard, where former tenured economics faculty members try things out on the real economy because they were good theoretical blackboard ideas. Apropos of which, we have “Helicopter” Ben Bernanke, jetting and boating his consulting practice around the world now that the Federal Reserve is in the hands of Janet Yellin. After reading the interview, one is left wondering, to paraphrase Churchill, whether we are at “the end of the beginning or the beginning of the end.” In any event, read the article and keep in mind the dangers inherent in making leveraged investments that try to create something out of nothing.

Lingering Questions

Last month, I raised the question of how much it costs a fund company to be on a no-transaction fee platform with a discount broker. The old answer is 40 basis points. And if you think it is the fund investment management companies that are solely bearing that cost, I have some beachfront property in the hurricane zone in Florida for you, complete with alligators. The new answer is 10 basis points, but then a lot of other costs and expenses become non-transparent, buried in custodial and transaction fees of varying amounts. If you want a real eye-opener, go sometime to the Prospectus or Statement of Additional Information, where fund ownership of large owners is disclosed. For many funds you will see that it is through Schwab, Fidelity, TD Ameritrade, etc., that 80 to 90 per cent of the ownership of a fund is held. Rarely does direct ownership of a fund through the fund company count for a majority of its ownership positions. Hmmmm. What happens when the economics of distribution change? That is a little bit like the question as to what the value of an ounce of gold becomes if rather than as a passive store of value, it starts being used as a medium of exchange to settle transactions.

By:

Edward Studzinski

Fund Facts

By Charles Boccadoro

At the recent Chicago conference, Morningstar’s Gregg Warren stated that asset management remains an attractive business because of steady fees, high operating margins, low start-up costs, and because “investment inertia is its best friend.”

Through June there were 281 funds with assets over $10B, including 8 that have trailed their peers in absolute return by at least 1.7% per year during the current market cycle since November 2007, or about 14% or more in underperformance. (See table below, click on image to enlarge.) Most are bottom quintile performers, trail nearly 90% of their peers, and four are Three Alarm funds. They include Templeton Growth (TEPLX), Thornburg Investment Income Builder (TIBAX), Davis New York Venture (NYVTX), Fidelity Magellan (FMAGX), and American Funds’ Bond Fund of America (ABNDX) and Intermediate Bond Fund of America (AIBAX). The folks invested in these funds certainly can’t be accused of chasing returns.Facts_1
Speaking of inertia, for the June commentary I wrote of a “Certified Financial Planner” who placed a family friend in 34 American Funds across five tax deferred accounts. My friend has since decided to transfer his accounts to Vanguard. The actual transfer remains excruciatingly long, say to say. Although Vanguard makes it easy enough to start the process on-line, actual transfers between fund houses can take weeks and involve printed forms, snail mail, and even paper checks. (Much longer than my experience when transferring from say Schwab to Fidelity, which was just a day or two.)

In my friend’s case, the transfers can only be done “in-kind,” so unless the 34 funds are liquidated at American Funds (transferred actually to an AF money market fund), Vanguard will charge $35 per fund or $1,200 to sell the 34 funds prior to reinvesting in Vanguard funds. Good grief! On the other hand, liquidating before transfer means being out of the market for some uncertain period of time, which comes with its own attendant risk. In any case, the word “entrenched” comes to mind.

Speaking of AUM, what is the top fund by AUM in each category? We’ve recently added this screen and others to the MultiSearch tool on the Premium site. Below are results month ending June, for large-, mid-, multi-, and small-cap US equity funds (click image to enlarge). Performance metrics are for current market cycle.Facts_2

Below are top 10 funds by AUM of all 9,371 rated funds through June (click image to enlarge). Vanguard holds 5 stops, American Funds holds 3.Facts_3

Meb Faber has now posted 9 podcasts. I’ve enjoyed the first three so far, especially the one with Patrick O’Shaughnessy. Wes Gray is next up. One can learn a lot in short period listening in on these conversations.

In one episode, Meb speaks of the 521 Rule. He explains, “Stocks around the world average 5% a year, bonds around 2% a year. I’m averaging up and T-Bills about 1%.” He’s talking real returns after inflation and notes US equities have done a little better.

The numbers remind me of excess returns, which is the difference between total return and risk-free rate (90-day TBill). In the piece Timing Method Performance Over Ten Decades, we find US equities, US bonds, and US TBill dating back to 1926 have returned 10, 6, and 4% annually, round numbers, respectively. So, annualized percent excess return (APER) equates to 6% for stocks and 2% for bonds.

Zero interest rate monetary policy has resulted in APER and annualized percent return (APR) being nearly identical the past several years. Nonetheless, we’ve added APER to the MultiSearch screening metrics … rates have to start going up, right? (Eric Cinnamond suggests not. In his new blog Absolute Return Investing, he wonders if nomalization is impossible given current level of global debt.)

Below please find a sample output (click image to enlarge) showing several reference indices and stalwart funds, each since inception, which varies from about 30 years to almost 60 years (the extent of our Lipper database). For the past 30-40 years, bonds have delivered excess returns better than the much longer-term norms, while international stocks have remained an enduring disappointment.Facts_4

Finally, to help address Where In The World Is Your Fund Adviser?, we’ve added screens for fund company Management Location (city and state). It turns out there are fund companies in more than 300 cities across 46 states … who would have guessed? They include:

  • First Security Fund Advisers Inc of Little Rock, Arkansas,
  • Viking Fund Management LLC of Minot, North Dakota,
  • Thornburg Investment Management Inc of Santa Fe, New Mexico,
  • Reynolds Capital Management of Las Vegas, Neveda, and
  • WesBanco Bank Inc of Wheeling, West Virgina.

States not represented? Alaska, Idaho, Mississippi, and Wyoming.

When to be Scared of the Stock Market

By Samuel Lee

Sometimes it is sensible to be scared of being in the stock market. Those times are rare. I want to describe them from the perspective of a value investor, who only cares about the future cash flows of his investments; I am not offering a method of short-term market timing.

The key fact to grasp is just how resilient corporate earnings are in a big, developed country with strong institutions. The chart below shows the per-share inflation-adjusted earnings of the S&P 500 as well as its 10-year moving average. Though there are violent swings in the per-share earnings series, the moving average shows that the normalized earnings power of U.S. publicly traded corporations grew right through them, rarely reversing for long. Over this period, the U.S. experienced the Great Depression, two world wars, the Cold War, massive corporate tax hikes, oil crises, stagflation, corrupt and incompetent leaders, the 9/11 attacks, countless scandals in leading corporations, the financial crisis and so on.

sp 500 earnings

To the long-term value investor, there are really only a handful of circumstances that warrant a retreat from the stock market:

Prices are so high that the return on stocks over the long run cannot plausibly be much higher than that of other assets such as bonds. During the dot-com bubble, the cyclically-adjusted earnings yield of the market fell to a little over 2% while 30-year Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities yielded over 4%. For a value-oriented investor to have justified owning the stock market as a whole, he had to assume—dream of, really—fantastically high earnings growth.

The future earnings power of the market is severely impaired or destroyed and this fact is not reflected in prices. This scenario is apocalyptic and has never occurred in the U.S. For a large, developed country’s corporate sector to be permanently maimed, it would either have to be bombed to rubble as Germany and Japan were during World War II or property rights would have to disappear as in Russia during the Russian Revolution. Severe recessions do not noticeably dent the stock market’s future earnings power. A rule of thumb in determining whether a market’s earnings power is at risk of permanent impairment is if significant numbers of citizens are fleeing or want to flee the country for their personal safety.

Discount rates will rise a lot and stay high for a long time. In other words, investors for whatever reason will demand a much lower valuation in stocks, requiring current prices to fall a lot. During the 1970s and early 1980s, rising inflation and nominal interest rates caused investors to demand absurdly low valuations to own stocks. As inflation and interest rates ratcheted up, stock valuations kept ratcheting down. (With the benefit of hindsight, many analysts think that investors were suffering from the money illusion, using the era’s high nominal rates to discount real earnings.) This is a blessing for some. Current dollars invested in the market will take a big, permanent hit, but any future dollars invested in the market will earn a higher rate of return. A secular rise in discount rates is a massive transfer of wealth from the old, who have much of their net worth in financial assets, to the young, who have decades of earnings ahead of them that they can plow into cheap financial assets.

How does this apply to the current market outlook? Valuations are high, but not implausibly high given real yields on bonds. The U.S. stock market’s cyclically-adjusted earnings yield is around 4% while the 30-year TIPS yields less than 1%. Moreover, today’s problems are trivial compared to the existential threats that have loomed in the past. Even if the Eurozone and China blew up at the same time and threw the world into another depression, the long-run underlying earnings power of the rich world’s corporate sector will very likely not be permanently devastated. Valuations would cheapen, for sure, but that would indicate a buying opportunity. (Investors in developing markets, on the other hand, would probably take a permanent hit.)

What concerns me most is that interest rates—real and nominal—are so low everywhere. If the world were to enter an era of rising interest rates as we experienced in the 70s and early 80s, the mighty tailwind that’s boosted valuations over the past 30-plus years would turn into a long-lived headwind. This is a truly frightening scenario that implies years or even decades of puny returns in virtually all financial assets.

Contrast these considerations with media chatter. Everyone talks about and focuses on things that do not truly affect the intrinsic value of the market. The times to be scared are when 1) everyone is euphoric and realistic appraisals of future earnings cannot justify current prices, 2) people are fleeing the country or want to flee the country due to fears over personal safety, or 3) real rates enter a period of secular increases.

Keeping A Watchful Eye on Your Manager

By Leigh Walzer

By Leigh Walzer

It’s summertime. You are reading this from the vacation house. Or perhaps you are at the ballgame like Professor Snowball, rooting for the Quad City River Bandits. There is no event risk on the horizon. You trust your fund managers.  The portfolios can stay on autopilot until Labor Day.

As advisors struggle with the new fiduciary rules, they may wonder how frequently manager selection decisions need to be reviewed. We set out to answer the question: What is the likelihood that a portfolio left on autopilot will go bad over time.

We compared the ratings on 7000 mutual funds to see how much the probability metrics changed over time. Trapezoid’s data and models (which can be trialled at www.fundattribution.com) tell us the probability a given fund class will deliver skill over the next 12 months. For most funds, skill is a function of value-added from security or sector selection.  Skill takes into account a manager’s returns each period adjusted for factor exposures and other attributes.

If you have crossed off anything mathematical from your summer reading list, you can skip the next few paragraphs. Otherwise, bear with me.  Investment professionals might hope that probabilities are fairly stable, because it would imply the manager selection decisions you made years ago are still valid. And you could fulfill your fiduciary duty while working on your tan.

Actually, the probability for a typical equity or liquid alts fund today equals the probability from 9 months ago plus or minus a standard deviation of .14.  (This study is based on return data through April 2016. There are a few things going on with the data and the natural rate may a bit lower.) The median fund on the Trapezoid Honor Roll has a probability of .68. In nine months’ time, roughly 9% of these funds will see the probability deteriorate to below 50%. At that level, we adjudge (taking into account the availability of lower-cost passive alternatives) you are better off dumping the fund.

If you own a fund which just barely qualified for the Honor Roll 9 months ago with a probability rating of .6, the odds we will want to dump it is 23%.  On an annualized basis, you may need to change out 25% of your managers.

Confidence in portfolio managers is hard to earn and easy to lose.

Some professional managers review the managers more frequently for the riskiest asset classes. But the standard deviation is just as high for long only equities as for liquid alts, suggesting you need to be just as vigilant reviewing equity managers.

Funds Upgraded or Downgraded

We present here a subset of notable funds whose outlook, as measured by FundAttribution, has changed materially over the past 9 months. We include here the institutional ticker. Our confidence in the worthiness of a fund can vary greatly by share class: very few funds in our experience are good enough to justify paying a large upfront load.  However, when we re-rate a fund, the metrics for all fund classes tend to rise. The FundAttribution.com site indicates whether a particular class is good enough to make the Trapezoid Honor Roll. 

Upgrades:

Category Fund   AUM ($bn)
All-Cap Growth MFS Growth Fund MFEIX 12.7
Large Blend Columbia Contrarian Core Fund CCCIX 9.8
Large Blend Fidelity All-Sector Equity Fund FSAEX 9.6
Large Value Federated Strategic Value Dividend Fund SVAIX 14.7
Large Value Invesco Diversified Dividend Fund LCEIX 17.7
Large Value JPMorgan Value Advantage Fund JVAIX 10.3
Large Value Nuance Concentrated Value Fund NCVLX 0.5
Mid-Cap Growth Janus Enterprise Fund JMGRX 8.3
Mid-Cap Growth Pioneer Growth Opportunities Fund PSMKX 1.3
Mid-Cap Value American Century Mid-Cap Value Fund AVUAX 8.0
Mid-Cap Value T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value Fund TRMIX 11.8
Foreign All-Cap Value Franklin Mutual Global Discovery Fund FMDRX 21.7
Foreign Large Blend American Beacon International Equity Fund AAIEX 2.7
Foreign Large Blend First Eagle Overseas Fund SGOIX 15.0

The Fidelity All-Sector Equity Fund (FSAEX) and T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Value Fund (TRMIX) funds are closed to new investors and some other funds/strategies have experienced AUM growth.

Some of these funds have been upgraded by Morningstar in recent months. Funds which have risen in our estimation but have not been upgraded by Morningstar include JPMorgan Value Advantage (JVAIX), Pioneer Growth Opportunities Fund (PSMKX), and Franklin Mutual Global Discovery Fund (FMDRX).

Funds whose metrics have been downgraded included:

Category Fund   AUM ($bn)
Large Growth Sequoia Fund SEQUX 4.9
Large Growth Touchstone Sands Capital Select Growth Fund CFSIX 3.4
Foreign Large Blend Dodge & Cox International Stock Fund DODFX 51.6
Foreign Large Blend Templeton World Fund FTWRX 4.4
Foreign SMID Blend GMO Foreign Small Companies Fund GMFSX 1.0
Pacific Region Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund MICSX 3.1
Eq/Bond Global GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation Fund GBMFX 15.6
Eq/Bond Global GMO Global Asset Allocation Fund GMWAX 2.7
Eq/Bond Global Wells Fargo Absolute Return Fund WABIX 7.4
Eq/Bond Global Wells Fargo Asset Allocation Fund EAAIX 4.0
Dynamic Alloc PIMCO All Asset All Authority Fund PAUIX 8.4
Dynamic Alloc PIMCO All Asset Fund PAAIX 19.2

Confidence in portfolio managers is hard to earn and easy to lose.  The woes of Sequoia Fund (SEQUX) have been documented at length by my colleagues over the past few months. Sequoia and Touchstone Sands Capital Select Growth Fund (CFSIX) both had steep falls from grace. Both Dodge & Cox International Stock Fund (DODFX) and Templeton World Fund (FTWRX) fell off the honor roll. The three GMO funds on this list the and two Wells Fargo funds are managed by the same personnel. GMO’s poor performance has shaken management’s faith in its managers so much that it is in the process of replacing the stock pickers with a quantitative approach. Quantitative investing seems to be coming more in vogue, but it was not the salve at two PIMCO funds managed by Rob Arnott

I was a bit surprised to find Matthews Asian Growth and Income Fund (MICSX) on the downgrade list.  Several Matthews funds including Matthews Pacific Tiger Fund (MIPTX) are fixtures on our Honor Roll. Matthews manages several funds with similar names which take rather different investment approaches to the Pacific Region. We observe MICTX missed out on on India in recent years and carried too much exposure to Industrials.

Our conclusion:

Good managers go through bad patches or long stretches with merely average performance.  Even after a careful manager selection process, the data next year won’t always validate the original decision.  Fiduciaries should review all managers annually and be prepared to change up to one quarter of mandates. Generally, you should look for returns which justify expenses, taking into account risk, factor exposures, consistency, and fluctuations in expense ratios. FundAttribution monitors all funds, making it easy to identify whether other active funds in the same space who may have earned their laurels since your last review.

Ariel Global (AGLOX), August 2016

By David Snowball

Objective and strategy

Ariel Global Fund’s fundamental objective is long-term capital appreciation. The manager pursues an all-cap global portfolio. The fund is, in general, currency hedged so that the returns you see are driven by stock selection rather than currency fluctuation. The manager pursues a “bottom up” discipline which starts by weeding out as much trash as humanly possible before proceeding to a meticulous investment in both the fundamentals of the remaining businesses and their intrinsic value. The fund is diversified and will generally hold 50-150 positions. As of July 2016, there are 84.

Adviser

Ariel Investments LLC of Chicago. Founded in 1983, Ariel manages $10 billion in assets spread between nine separate account strategies and six mutual funds. Ariel provides a great model of a socially-responsible management team: the firm helps run a Chicago public charter school, is deeply involved in the community, has an intriguing and diverse Board of Trustees, is employee-owned, and its managers are heavily invested in their own funds. One gets a clear sense that these folks aren’t going to play fast and loose either with your money or with the rules.

Manager

Rupal Bhansali. Ms. Bhansali joined Ariel in 2011 and has served as portfolio manager for the International and Global Funds since their inception in 2011.  She and her team are based in New York City which substantially eases the burden of meeting representatives of the non-U.S. firms in which they might invest. She has more than 20 years of industry experience, most recently spending 10 years at MacKay Shields as Head of International Equities, managing MainStay International (MSEAX). Before that, she was a portfolio manager and co-head of international equities at Oppenheimer Capital.

Strategy capacity and closure

Vast. The combined global and international strategies hold about $3.5 billion now but could accommodate $50 billion.

Management’s stake in the fund

A lot more than is obvious at first glance. Ms. Bhansali’s reported investment in the fund is between $50,000 – $100,000 as of September 30, 2015. She has two layers of additional investment. First, Ariel is owned by its employees and directors so when she joined the firm, she devoted a fair amount of her wealth to investing in it. Second, her portfolios were originally marketed as separately-managed accounts; she made a substantial investment in such an account to visibly align herself with her investors. As a result, the reported investment in the fund is a fraction of her total financial commitment.

I am a bit perplexed that Ariel president John Rogers hasn’t invested in the fund, though he does have a noticeable investment in its sibling, Ariel International (AINTX). Six of Ariel’s seven independent trustees have chosen to invest in the fund, as have four of her six fellow managers.

Opening date

December 30, 2011.

Minimum investment

$1,000 for Investor shares, $1 million for Institutional (AGLYX) ones.

Expense ratio

1.25%, after waivers, for Investor shares on assets of $88 million, as of July 29, 2016. The Institutional shares charge 1.0%.

Comments

I have twice had the opportunity to speak with Ms. Bhansali and have come away impressed from each encounter. She’s had a long career in international and global investing. She’s very smart and articulate; she really gives the impression of thinking about questions rather than rattling off talking points. She’s made a series of principled and thoughtful career moves, and she’s served her investors well. I hope you have the opportunity to engage with her as well.

Three things worth knowing:

  1. She and her team think of themselves as business analysts, not financial analysts. There are a lot of businesses out there which are poorly run, vulnerable to predation or in a dying industry. She wants no part of any of them. “When we look at these fundamental business risks, we eliminate 60% of all firms. Those are stocks that we would not own, ever, regardless of price.” To be clear: they are sensitive to price and valuation, but only if the underlying business is sound. Of the sound businesses, about 50% are fully valued. They focus their 360-degree analysis on the remaining 20%.
  2. She and her team are very risk conscious. “We start with the question, ‘what can go wrong? How bad could it get?’ and if we don’t like the answer, we walk away. No amount of theoretical upside is worth some of these risks.”
  3. She and her team build the portfolio stock-by-stock. They’re not benchmarking themselves against an index or peer group; the culture at Ariel favors independent thinking even when it means being out of step. Similarly, they don’t make thematic bets. They allow ideas to compete for space in the portfolio. The more misunderstood a firm is, the more it’s likely mispriced. An example she cites frequently is the choice between Microsoft (which she does own) and Apple (which she doesn’t). Everyone knows that these are two tech giants and everyone knows that tech companies post flashy growth numbers, everyone knows that Microsoft’s best days are behind it. In consequence, everyone bought Apple. As it turns out, “everyone” was wrong. Over the past five years, an investment in Microsoft – a steady cash machine with predictable, recurrent cash flows – was far more profitable than an investment in Apple. “Everyone is ‘contrarian’ but it’s not enough to be contrarian. You must be contrary and correct. Very few are.” The most mispriced firms earn the largest spots in the portfolio. As of August 2016, Microsoft is the fund’s largest holding.

We should note, finally, that the fund’s performance is better than it looks. Both of her funds lagged their peers during their first two quarters of operation (Q1 and Q2, 2012). They have substantially outperformed since then. Ms. Bhansali identifies four factors behind the lag:

  1. The fund launched one day too late. A fund’s first NAV is published at the end of its first day. The markets rose by 200 bps that day but the fund recorded zero change.
  2. The fund was still deploying cash during a very buoyant quarter. Q1 saw the average fully-invested global fund rise by 12%.
  3. The fund was contrarian on the emerging markets, which everybody “had to” own. The EMs rose 14% in that quarter. (Now that everyone hates the emerging markets, the fund is overweight in them.)
  4. Five stocks in the portfolio had unrelated profit warnings in Q2, each got hammered. After reassessment, they liquidated two of the five positions (both of which continued falling) and added to the other three, all of which have been strong performers since then. Having so many stocks pop up with warnings in such a short period was, she reports, “an aberration.”

Bottom Line

Ariel International and Global follow the same discipline. Purists might prefer to look more closely at the larger, five-star International (AINTX) fund. Both because it’s smaller and it affords its manager greater flexibility, we chose to profile Global. In either case, patient, risk-sensitive investors interested in expanding (or upgrading) their international exposure should add the funds to their due-diligence list.

Fund website

Ariel Global.  

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