Dear friends,

The trees have barely begun to change color here in Iowa. The days are warm, football is in the air (had I mentioned that my son Will had a running touchdown on offense and a nifty interception on defense this week?) and dentists everywhere are gearing up for Halloween. It’s an odd time, then, for investors to be concerned with Santa Claus.

The Quad at Augustana College in early autumn

And yet they are. The broad market indexes are up 2.5% in September (typically a rocky month), 16.2% year-to-date and 30% over the past 12 months. In a normal year, investors would hold their breaths through October and then look with happy anticipation to the arrival of “the Santa Claus rally.” In 80 of the past 100 years, stocks have risen in December, generally by a bit more than 2%.

The question folks are raising this year seems worth pondering: will the intersection of a bull run with a fiscal cliff make for a distinctly Grinchy end of the year? Will even the suspicion of such an outcome make enough folks lighten their stock exposure to trigger a rare year-end market sag?

I don’t know, but the prospect makes me especially grateful for the opportunity to enjoy the company of my students and the fading warmth of the harvest season.

The Last Ten: Fidelity’s New Fund Launches Since 2002

“The Last Ten” will be a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.  We start this month with Fidelity, the Beantown Behemoth.

There was, at one time, few safer bets than a new Fidelity fund.  New Fido funds had two things going from them: (1) Fidelity could afford to buy and support the brightest young managers around and (2) older Fidelity funds might, by happenstance, choose to buy a stock recently purchased by the new fund.  The size of those purchases could cause a stock’s price to spike, much to the profit of its early owners.  The effect was consistent enough that it became the subject of newsletters and academic studies.

Which leads us to the question: when was the last time that Fidelity launched a compelling fund?  You know, one-of-a-kind, innovative, must-have, that sort of thing?

Might it have been New Millenium (FMILX), 20 years ago?  If not, what?

Here’s an easier question: when was the last time that Fidelity launched a fund which now carries a five-star rating from Morningstar?

Answer: five years ago, with the launch of Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX) in November of 2007. It’s a fund so low-profile that it doesn’t appear in any of Fidelity’s advertising and is not covered by any of Morningstar’s analysts.  The only other five star fund launched by Fido in a decade is an institutional bond index fund, Spartan Intermediate Term Bond Index (FIBIX), December 2005.

That’s not to say that Fidelity hasn’t been launching funds.  They have.  Hundreds of them.  They’re just not very good.

It’s hard to generate an exact count of Fidelity’s new fund launches because some apparently new funds are just older funds being sold through new channels, such as the launch of a Fidelity Advisor fund that’s just a version of an older Fidelity one.

That said, here’s a rough 10 year total.  Fidelity has launched 154 new mutual funds in a decade.  Those appear as Fidelity, Fidelity Advisor, Fidelity Series and Strategic Adviser funds.  Taking the various share classes into account, Fido made 730 new packages available in the decade.

That includes:

26 Fidelity funds for retail investors

18 Fidelity Series funds – which are available for purchase only by other Fidelity funds.  The most amazing development there is the imminent launch of new funds for Joel Tillinghast and Will Danoff.  Mr. T has brilliantly managed the $35 billion Low Priced Stock (FLPSX) since 1989.  He recently completed a sabbatical, during which time the fund was run by a team.  The team has been retained as co-managers as part of what Fidelity admits is “succession planning.”  He’ll now also manage Intrinsic Opportunities.  Will Danoff, who manages the $85 billion Contrafund (FCNTX) and $20 billion Advisor News Insights (FNIAX) funds, is being asked to manage Opportunistic Insights.

20 Strategic Advisers funds (e.g. SMid Cap Multi-manager) – which rely on non-Fidelity managers.

9 Spartan index funds, some of which overlap Series index funds.

58 Fidelity Advisor funds – some (Advisor Small Cap Value) of which are near-duplicates of other Fidelity funds. But, it turns out that a fair number are either unique to the Advisor lineup or are distinct from their Fidelity sibling. The 14 “Income Replacement” series, for example, are distinct to the Advisor line. Will Danoff’s Advisor New Insights fund, for example, is not a clone of Contrafund.  Advisor Midcap II A is sort of a free agent. Advisor Value Leaders is bad, but unparalleled.

13 “W” class Freedom Index funds are another distinct adviser-only set, which have the same target dates as the Freedom series but which execute exclusively through index funds.

How good are those funds?  They’re definitely “not awful.”  Of the 730 new fund packages, 593 have earned Morningstar ratings.  Morningstar awards five stars to the top 10% of funds in a group and four stars to the next 22.5%.  By sheer coincidence, you’d expect Fido to have fielded 59 new five-star funds.  They only have 18.  And you’d expect 192 to have four or five star ratings.  They managed 118.  Which is to say, new Fidelity funds are far less likely to be excellent than either their storied past or pure chance would dictate.

The same pattern emerges if you look at Morningstar’s “gold” rating for funds, their highest accolade.  Fidelity has launched nine “Gold” funds in that period – all are either bond funds, or index funds, or bond index funds.  None is retail, and none is an actively-managed stock or hybrid fund.

Why the apparent mediocrity of their funds?  I suspect three factors are at work.  First, Fidelity is in the asset-gathering business now rather than the sheer performance business.  The last thing that institutional investors (or even most financial planners) want are high-risk, hard-to-categorize strategies.  They want predictable packages of services, and Fidelity is obliged to provide them.  Second, Fidelity’s culture has turned cautious.  Young managers are learning from early on that “safe is sane.”  If that’s the case, they’re not likely to be looking for the cutting edge of anything.  The fact that they’re turning to overworked 25-year veterans to handle new in-house funds might be a sign of how inspiring the Fidelity “bench” has become.  Third and finally, Fidelity’s too big to pursue interesting projects.  It’s hard for any reasonably successful Fidelity fund to stay below a billion in assets, which means that niche strategies and those requiring nimble funds are simply history.

Bottom line: the “Fidelity new-fund effect” seems history, as Fidelity turns more and more to index funds, repackaged products and outside managers.  But at least they’re unlikely to be wretched, which brings us to …

The Observer’s Annual “Roll Call of the Wretched”

It’s the time of year when we pause to enjoy two great German traditions: Oktoberfest and Schadenfreude.  While one of my favorites, Leinenkugel’s Oktoberfest, was shut out (Bent River Brewery won first, second and third places at the Quad City’s annual Brew Ha Ha festival), it was a great excuse to celebrate fall on the Mississippi.

And a glass of Bent River’s Mississippi Blonde might be just what you need to enjoy the Observer’s annual review of the industry’s Most Regrettable funds.  Just as last year, we looked at funds that have finished in the bottom one-fourth of their peer groups for the year so far.  And for the preceding 12 months, three years, five years and ten years.  These aren’t merely “below average.”  They’re so far below average they can hardly see “mediocre” from where they are.

When we ran the screen in October 2011, there are 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $70 million.  In 2012 there were . . . 151 consistently awful funds, the median size for which is $77 million.

Since managers love to brag about the consistency of their performance, here are the most consistently awful funds that have over a billion in assets.  Funds repeating from last year are flagged in red.

Of these 13, two (DFA and Wells) deserve a pass because they’re very much unlike their peer group.  The others are just billions of bad.

What about funds that didn’t repeat from last year’s list?  Funds that moved off the list:

1. Liquidated – the case of Vanguard Asset Allocation.
2. Fired or demoted the manager and are seeing at least a short term performance bump – Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid Cap (FMCBX ), Fidelity Magellan (FMAGX), Hartford US Government Securities (HAUSX), and Vantagepoint Growth (VPGRX) are examples.
3. They got lucky.  Legg Mason Opportunity “C”, for example, has less than a billion left in it and is doing great in 2012, while still dragging  a 100th percentile ranking for the past three and five years. Putnam Diversified Income (PINDX) is being buoyed by strong performance in 2009 but most of 2011 and 2012 have been the same old, sad story for the fund.

The most enjoyable aspect of the list is realizing that you don’t own any of these dogs – and that hundreds of thousands of poor saps are in them because of the considered advice of training financial professionals (remember: 11 of the 13 are loaded funds, which means you’re paying a professional to place you in these horrors).

Just When You Thought It Couldn’t Get Any Worse

I then refined the search with the Observer’s “insult to injury” criteria: funds that combined wretched performance with above-average to high risk and above average fees.  The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $192,546 – $100,000 below last year’s level.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 9.2% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

Likewise, with Prasad Growth (PRGRX) whose performance graph looks like this:

The complete Roll Call of Wretched:

I have a world of respect for the good folks at Morningstar.  And yet I sometimes wonder if they aren’t being a bit generous with funds they’ve covered for a really long time.  The list above represents funds which, absent wholesale changes, should receive zero – no – not any – zilch investor dollars.  They couple bad performance, high risk and high expenses.

And yet:

Thornburg Value (a “Bronze” fund): “This fund’s modified management team deserves more time.”  What?  The former lead manager retired in 2009.  The current managers have been on-board since 2006.  The fund has managed to finish in the bottom 1 – 10% of its peers every year since.  Why do they deserve more time?

Litman Gregory Masters Value: “This fund’s potential is stronger than its long-term returns suggest.”  What does that mean?  For every trailing time period, it trails more or less 90% of its peers.  Is the argument, “hey, this could easily become a bottom 85^th percentile fund”?

Two words: run away!  Two happier words: “drink beer!”

Chip, the Observer’s technical director, deserves a special word of thanks for her research and analysis on this piece.  Thanks, Chip!

RPHYX Conference Call

For about an hour on September 13^th, David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC, manager of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Somewhere between 40-50 people signed up for the RiverPark call but only about two-thirds of them signed-in.  For the benefit of folks interested in hearing David’s discussion of the fund, here’s a link to an mp3 version of Thursday night’s conference call. The RiverPark folks guess it will take between 10-30 seconds to load, depending on your connection.  At least on my system it loads in the same window that I’m using for my browser, so you might want to right-click and choose the “open in a new tab” option.

http://78449.choruscall.com/riverpark/riverpark120913.mp3

When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.

The conference call was a success for all involved.  Once I work out the economics, I’d like to offer folks the opportunity for a second moderated conference call in November and perhaps in alternate months thereafter.  Let me know what you think.

Observer Fund Profiles:

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX): RPHYX has performed splendidly since inception, delivering what it promises, a cash management fund capable of generating 300 basis points more than a money market with minimal volatility.  This is an update of our September 2011 profile.

T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX): a Clark-Kentish sort of fund.  One moment quiet, unassuming, competent then – when inflation roars – it steps into a nearby phone booth and emerges as . . .

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves.  Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Each month, though, there are interesting new no-load retail funds and, more recently, actively managed ETFs.  This month’s funds are due to be launched before the end of 2012.  Two, in particular, caught our attention:

Buffalo Dividend Focus Fund will try to generate “current income” as its primary goal, through reliance on dividends.  That’s a rare move and might reflect some pessimism about the prospects of using bonds for that goal.  GMO, for example, projects negative real returns for bonds over the next 5-7 years.  It’s particularly interesting that John Kornitzer will run the fund.  John has done a really solid job with Buffalo Flexible Income (BUFBX) over the years and is Buffalo’s founder.

RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income Fund is the latest collaboration between RiverNorth and another first-tier specialist.  RiverNorth’s unmatched strength is in using an asset allocation strategy that benefits from their ability to add arbitrage gains from pricing inefficiencies in closed-end funds.  They’re partnering with Oaktree Capital Management, which is best known in the mutual fund world for its find work on Vanguard Convertible Securities (VCVSX).   Oaktree’s principals have been working together since the mid-1980s on “high yield bonds, convertible securities, distressed debt and principal investments.”  They’re managing $78 billion of institutional and private money for folks on four continents.  Their founder, Howard Marks, still writes frequent shareholder letters (a la Jeremy Grantham) which are thoughtful and well-argued (despite the annoying watermark splashed across each page).

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 40 fund manager changes, down from last month’s bloodbath in which 70 funds changed management.

WhiteBox, Still in the Box

A number of readers have urged me to look into Whitebox Tactical Opportunities (WBMAX), and I agreed to do a bit of poking around.

There are some funds, and some management teams, that I find immediately compelling.  Others not.

So far, this is a “not.”

Here’s the argument in favor of Whitebox: they have a Multi-Strategy hedge fund which uses some of the same strategies and which, per a vaguely fawning article in Barron’s, returned 15% annually over the past decade while the S&P returned 5%. I’ll note that the hedge fund’s record does not get reported in the mutual funds, which the SEC allows when it believes that the mutual fund replicates the hedge.  And, too, the graphics on their website are way cool.

Here’s the reservation: their writing makes them sound arrogant and obscure.  They advertise “a proprietary, multi-factor quantitative model to identify dislocations within and between equity and credit markets.”  At base, they’re looking for irrational price drops.  They also use broad investment themes (they like US blue chips, large cap financials and natural gas producers), are short both the Russell 2000 (which is up 14.2% through 9/28) and individual small cap stocks, and declare that “the dominant theories about how markets behave and the sources of investment success are untrue.”  They don’t believe in the efficient market hypothesis (join the club).

After nine months, the fund is doing well (up 13% through 9/28) though it’s trailed its peers in about a third of those months.

I’ll try to learn more in the month ahead, but I’ll first need to overcome a vague distaste.

Briefly Noted . . .

RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) continues to rock.  It’s in the top 2% of all large-growth funds for the past 12 months and has attracted $450 million in assets.  Manager David Rolfe recently shared two analyses of the fund’s recent performance.  Based on Lipper data, it’s the fourth-best performing large growth fund over the past year.  Morningstar data placed it in the top 30 for the past three months.  The fund was also featured in a Forbes article, “Investors will starve on growth stocks alone.”  David is on the short-list of managers who we’d like to draw into a conference call with our readers.  A new Observer profile of the fund is scheduled for November.

Small Wins for Investors

As we noted last month, on Sept. 4, Aston Funds reopened ASTON/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) to new investors after reallocating capacity to the mutual fund from the strategy’s separate accounts. The firm still intends to close the entire strategy at roughly $1 billion in assets, which should help preserve manager Eric Cinnamond’s ability to navigate the small-cap market.

In a “look before you leap” development, Sentinel Small Company Fund (SAGWX)  reopened to new investors on September 17, 2012.  Except for the fact that the fund’s entire management team resigned six weeks earlier, that would be solidly good news.

Brown Capital Management Small Company (BCSIX) reopened on Sept. 4, 2012.  Morningstar considers this one of the crème de la crème of small growth funds, with both five stars and a “Gold” rating.  It remained closed for less than one year.

CLOSINGS

Loomis Sayles Small Cap Growth (LCGRX) closed to new investors on Sept. 4, 2012.

AQR Risk Parity (AQRNX) will close to new investors on November 16. If you’ve got somewhere between $1 million and $5 million sitting around, unallocated, in your risk-parity investment pot, you might consider this high-minimum fund.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

American Century Inflation Protection Bond (APOAX) is now American Century Short Duration Inflation Protection Bond, which follows a strategy change that has the fund focusing on, well, short duration bonds.

The former BNY Mellon Mid Cap Stock Fund is now BNY Mellon Mid Cap Multi-Strategy Fund and its portfolio has been divided among several outside managers.

Federated Asset Allocation (FSTBX) will become Federated Global Allocation in December.  It will also be required to invest at least 30% outside the US, about 10% is non-US currently.  The fund’s bigger problem seem more related to a high turnover, high risk strategy than to a lack of exposure to the Eurozone.

Virtus Global Infrastructure (PGUAX) changed its name to Virtus Global Dividend (PGUAX) on September 28, 2012.

That same day, Loomis Sayles Absolute Strategies (LABAX) became Loomis Sayles Strategic Alpha Fund. Loomis had been sued by the advisors to the Absolute Strategies Fund (ASFAX), who thought Loomis might be trading on their good name and reputation.  While admitting nothing, Loomis agreed to a change.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Columbia has merged too many funds to list – 18 in the latest round and 67 since its merger with RiverSource.  Okay, fine, here’s the list:

• Connecticut Tax-Exempt Fund
• Diversified Bond Fund
• Emerging Markets Opportunity Fund
• Frontier Fund
• Government Money Market Fund
• High Yield Opportunity Fund
• Large Cap Value Fund
• LifeGoal Income Portfolio
• Massachusetts Tax-Exempt Fund
• Mid Cap Growth Opportunity Fund
• Multi-Advisor International Value Fund
• Portfolio Builder Moderate Aggressive Fund
• Portfolio Builder Moderate Conservative Fund
• Select Small Cap Fund
• Small Cap Growth Fund II
• Variable Portfolio – High Income Fund
• Variable Portfolio – Mid Cap Growth Fund
• Variable Portfolio – Money Market Fund

Dreyfus/Standish International Fixed Income Fund is slated to merge into Dreyfus/Standish Global Fixed Income Fund (DHGAX).

In an exceedingly rare move, Fidelity is moving to close three funds with an eye to liquidating them. The Dead Funds Walking are Fidelity Fifty (FFTYX), Fidelity Tax Managed Stock (FTXMX) and Fidelity 130/30 Large Cap (FOTTX). The largest is Fifty, with nearly $700 million in assets. Morningstar’s Janet Yang expressed her faith in Fifty’s manager and opined in April that this was a “persuasive option for investors.” Apparently Fidelity was not persuaded. The other two funds, both undistinguished one-star laggards, had about $100 million between them.

Janus Worldwide (JAWWX) is being merged into Janus Global Research (JARFX) at the start of 2013.  That seems like an almost epochal change: JAWWX was once a platform for displaying the sheer brilliance of its lead manager (Helen Young Hayes), then things crumbled.  Returns cratered, Hayes retired, assets dropped by 90% and now it’s being sucked into a fund run by Janus’s analyst team.

According to her LinkedIn page, Ms. Hayes is now an Advisor at Red Rocks Capital, LLC (their site doesn’t mention her),  Director at HEAF (a non-profit) and Advisor at Q Advisors, LLC (but only in the “advisory” sense, she’s not one of the actual Q Advisors).

Although it’s not mentioned on his LinkedIn page, George Maris – who managed JAWWX to a 5% loss during his tenure while his peers booked a 2% gain – will continue to manage Janus Global Select (JORNX), a desultory fund that he took over in August.

Chuck Jaffe used the Janus closing as a jumping-off point for a broader story about the excuses we make to justify keeping wretched funds.  Chuck does a nice job of categorizing and debunking our rationalizations.  It’s worth reading.

A bunch of small Pyxis funds have vanished: Short-Term Government (HSJAX) and  Government Securities (HGPBX) were both absorbed by Pyxis Fixed Income (HFBAX) which, itself, has a long-term losing record.  International Equity (HIQAX) merged into Pyxis Global Equity (HGMAX), and U.S. Equity (HUEAX) into Pyxis Core America Equity (HCOAX).  All of those funds, save Core America, have very weak long-term records.

Triex Tactical Long/Short Fund (TLSNX) closed on September 4, moved to cash and liquidated on September 27.  Not sure what to say.  It has just $2 million in assets, but it’s less than a year old and has substantially above-average performance (as of early September) relative to its “multialternative” peer group.

Turner Concentrated Growth Fund (yep – that stalwart from the “Roll Call of the Wretched,” above) is being merged into Turner Large Growth Fund (TCGFX).

In Closing . . .

For users of our discussion board, we’re pleased to announce the creation of a comprehensive Users Guide.  As with many of our resources, it’s a gift to the community from one of the members of the community.  In this case, Old Joe, who has many years of experience in technical writing, spent the better part of a month crafting the Guide even as chip and Accipiter kept tweaking the software and forcing rewrites.  OJ’s Guide is clear, visually engaging and starts with a sort of Quick Start section for casual users then an advanced section for folks who want to use the wealth of features that aren’t always immediately observable.

For which chip, Accipiter and I all say “thanks, big guy!  You did good.”

Since launch, the Observer has been read by 99,862 people and our monthly readership is pretty steadily around 8500.  Thanks to you all for your trust and for the insights you’ve shared.  Here’s the obligatory reminder: please do consider using (and sharing) the Observer’s link to Amazon.com.  While it’s easy to make a direct contribution to the Observer, only two or three folks have been doing so in recent months (thanks Gary, glad we could help! And thanks Carl, you’re an ace!) which makes the Amazon program really important.

We’ll look for you in November.  Find a nice harvest festival and enjoy some apples for us!

Dear friends,

Welcome to what are, historically, the two most turbulent months in the market.  Eight of the Dow’s 20 biggest one-day gains ever have occurred in September or October but so have 12 of the 20 biggest one-day losses.

And that might be a good thing.  Some exceedingly talented investors, like Eric “I Like Volatility” Cinnamond (see below), visibly perk up at the opportunities that panic presents.  And it will help distract us from the fact that, of all the things the two major political parties are about to launch (and they’re gonna launch a lot), the nicest is mud.

I wonder if this explains why the Germans have Octoberfest, but launch it in September?

Gary Black as savior?  Really?

Calamos Investments announced August 23 that they had appointed Gary Black as their new “global co-CIO.”  That was coincident with the departure of Nick Calamos from the co-CIO role.  Mr. Calamos had a sudden urge “to pursue personal interests.”

Gary Black?

That Gary Black? 

Black is most famous for serving for three years as CEO of Janus Investments.  During his watch, at least 15 equity managers left Janus and one won a $7.5 million lawsuit.  At the time of his dismissal (“amicable,” of course), he was reportedly trying to sell Janus to a larger firm.  The board disapproved, though we don’t know whether they disapproved of selling the firm or of Black’s inability to get an appropriate price for it.

A snapshot of Janus Capital Group’s balance sheet doesn’t exactly represent a ringing endorsement of Black’s tenure.

(source: Morningstar and the 2009 Janus annual report)

Some might summarize it as: “huge expense, huge controversy, rising debt, falling value.”

Do you suppose, in light of all of that, that the deposed Nick Calamos’s endorsement of Black might have had a tinge of “I hope you like what you get?”  He says, “The Calamos investment team is in good hands given Gary’s significant experience in leading investment teams on a global basis.”

Calamos, of course, is not hiring him as CEO.  Nope. That role is held by the firm’s 72-year-old founder.  They’re hiring him on the basis of his ability as chief investment officer.

How does he do as CIO?  Well, a lot of his retooled Janus funds absolutely cratered in the 2008 meltdown.  And his own investment firm doesn’t seem poised to appear on the cover of Barron’s quite yet.  Part of the agreement includes acquisition of Black’s investment firm, Black Capital Management.  Black Capital has a trivial asset base ($70 million) and a bunch of small separate accounts (average value: $370,000).  Black filed in March to launch his own long-short mutual fund, but it never got off the ground.

Aston / River Road Independent Value reopens

Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX) is an exceptionally good young fund from Eric Cinnamond, a manager who has a great 16 year record as a small cap, absolute return investor.  The fund opened in December 2010, we profiled it with some enthusiasm in February 2011.  The fund quickly established its bona fides, drew a lot of assets and, in a move of singular prudence, was closed while still small and maneuverable.

On September 4, it reopens to new investors.  While that’s good news, it also raises a serious question: “you’re bigger than you were when you closed and you’re sitting at 50% cash, so why on earth is this time to reopen?”

Mr. Cinnamond’s answer comes in two parts.  First, the fund reserved $200 million in capacity for anticipated institutional inflows which never materialized.  At the same time, lots of advisors have been disappointed at getting shut off.  Eric writes:

Yes, the Independent Value Fund is opening again.  The rationale was simple.  The $200 million we set aside for possible institutional investors was not allocated.  In other words, institutional consultants (there are a few exceptions), remain committed to the relative world of investing — a world that has never made sense to me.  Meanwhile, we’ve had like-minded advisors who want to purchase the Fund.  So our capacity target of the Portfolio has not changed, but we have changed our expectation of mix between advisor (the fund) vs. institutional assets (separate accounts).  More advisor assets and fewer institutional assets.

Second, the fund’s cash level and capacity are separate issues.  Right now companies are achieving utterly unsustainable profit margins, which makes them look cheap and attractive.  He shares Jeremy Grantham’s belief (or Jeremy shares Eric’s) that this is a bubble and it will inevitably (and painfully) end when profit margins regress to the mean.  In a non-bubbled world, he would have use for several hundred million dollars more than the fund holds. Again, Mr. Cinnamond:

The other obvious question is, “If you have so much cash, why would you want to grow assets?”  The size of the fund doesn’t impact our cash levels. Our opportunity set drives cash. If the fund is $1 million or $1 billion, cash would be the same percentage of the portfolio. We are simply reopening the fund to fill remaining capacity that was not taken by institutions.

In order to get the get the fund fully invested, I’m going to need higher volatility and improved valuations. With what appears to be an experiment in unlimited balance sheet expansion at the Federal Reserve, the timing of the return of free markets and volatility remains unknown. However, as with the mortgage credit boom and the tech bubble before, what is not sustainable will not be sustained. I am confident of that and I am confident the current profit cycle will revert as all others before it (there has never been a linear profit cycle). As peak corporate margins and profits revert, I believe the fund is position well to take advantage of the eventual return of the risk premium and volatility.

To those who suspect that he or River Road or Aston is simply making an asset grab, he notes that they are not going to market the reopened fund and that they even suspect that they may lose assets as skeptics pull their accounts.

We may actually lose assets initially due to the reopening (it may be frowned upon by some), I really don’t know and have never been too concerned about AUM.  One of my favorite investment quotes of all time is “I would rather lose half of my shareholders than half of their money” (I think this was Jean-Marie Eveillard). I strongly believe in this. Also, we do not plan on actively marketing the fund and my focus will remain on small cap research/analysis and portfolio management. As far as portfolio management goes, I remain committed to not violating our investment discipline of only allocating capital when getting adequately compensated relative to risk assumed.

As he waits for those bigger opportunities, he’s reallocating money toward some attractively priced small cap exploration and production and energy service companies.

We’ve updated our profile of the fund for folks interested in learning more.

Writing about real asset investing: stuff in the ground versus stuff on the page

We’re currently working on an essay about “real asset” investing and the quickly growing pool of real asset investment vehicles.  Real assets are things that have physical properties: precious metals, commodities, residential or commercial real estate, farmland, oil and gas fields, power generation plants, pipelines and other distribution systems, forestland and timber.

Advocates of real asset investing tend to justify inclusion of real assets on either (or both) of two grounds: normal and apocalyptic.

The “normal” argument observes that inflation is deadly to long-term returns, silently eroding the value of all gains. If inflation were to accelerate, that erosion might be dramatic. Neither stocks nor (especially) bonds generate real returns in periods of high and rising inflation. Real assets do.

The “apocalyptic” argument observes that we might be entering a period of increasingly unmanageable imbalances between the supply of everything from food and fertilizer to energy and metals, and the demand for them. The market’s way of addressing that imbalance is to raise the price of the items demanded. That should stimulate production and decrease consumption. Some pessimists, GMO’s Jeremy Grantham prime among them, believe that the imbalance might well be irreparable which will make the owners of resources very rich at the expense of others.

Regardless of which justification you use, you end up with inflation. Investors have the option of addressing inflation through a combination of two strategies: investing in real or tangible assets or investing in inflation-linked derivations. In the first case, you’d buy oil or the stocks of oil producing companies. In the second, you might buy TIPs or commodity index futures. The first strategy is called “real asset” investing. The second is “real return” investing.

Gaining the advantages of real asset investing requires devoting a noticeable but modest portion of your portfolio (5% at the low end and 25% at the high end) to such assets, but doing so with the knowledge that they’ll lag other investments as long as inflation stays low.

While there is a huge discussion of this issue in the institutional investment community, there’s very little directed to the rest of us. There’s only one no-load real assets fund, T. Rowe Price Real Assets (PRAFX). The fund was launched for exclusive use in Price’s asset allocation products, such as their Retirement Date funds. It has only recently been made available to the public. There are a half dozen load-bearing funds, two with quite reasonable performance, one diversified real assets ETF and a thousand ETFs representing individual slices of the real asset universe.

I’d planned on profiling both real asset investing and PRAFX this month, but the research is surprisingly complex and occasionally at odds. Rather than rush to print with a second-rate essay, we’ll keep working on it for our October issue.

Note to Paul Ryan, Investor: Focus!

For someone professing great economic knowledge, Paul Ryan’s portfolio reflects the careful discipline of a teenager at the mall. That, at least, is one reading of his 2012 financial disclosure statements on file with the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives. (The statement was amended a week later to add a million or so held by his wife in a trust.)

Highlights of his financials:

• Ryan is a real assets investor. Woo-hoo! Among his largest investments are shares of a mining partnership (Ava O Limited), gravel rights to a quarry in Oklahoma (Blondie & Brownie, LLC – I’m sure Obama’s people are sniffing around that one), IPath Dow Jones UBS Commodity fund, Nuveen Real Estate Securities, and a bunch of assets (time, mineral rights, a cabin?, and land) through the Little Land Company LP.
• In 2011, he was adding to his real asset holdings. He bought shares of a commodity ETF (and sold part four months later), Pioneer Natural Resources Co, a TIPS fund and (on three occasions) a real estate fund.
• Directly or through family trusts, Ryan owns about three dozen mutual funds, mostly solid and unexceptional (think Artisan, Fido, Hartford, T Rowe).
• He’s neither a fan of The Great Man theory of investing nor of passively managed investments. While he owns shares of Berkshire-Hathaway and PIMCO Total Return (PTTRX), the Berkshire holding is trivial ($1-15,000). The PIMCO one, mediated through two trusts, is under $50,000. Bill Gross tweeted approval (“Thanks Paul Ryan @RepPaulRyan @PaulRyanVP for investing in a PIMCO fund. Your reputation as a numbers guy is validated”), conceivably before he noticed that Ryan had been selling his shares in the fund. Other than the ETFs in his partnerships, he has no passive investments and he made 35 portfolio transactions in the year.
• He hasn’t, for reasons political or economic, bought into the notion of emerging markets. While he has several global or international funds (Artisan, Hartford, Oakmark, Scout, Vanguard), he has just one small sliver of an emerging markets ETF inside a partnership.
• He’s got a lot of economically inefficiently little investments. Footnotes to the financials reveal a fair number of holdings just above or just below the $1000 reporting threshold.
• He’s taking care of his three children’s education through two fairly substantial accounts (on in the $50-100,000 range and the other in $100-250,000) in Wisconsin’s 529 plan. That warrants a second woo-hoo.

If you’d like to find out whether your Representative should be trusted with any amount greater than a $20 weekly allowance, all of the member reports are available at the House of Representatives’ financial disclosure page.

Another take on Ryan’s finances comes in a story by Stan Luxenberg at TheStreet.com. There’s a certain irony to the fact that Luxenberg decries Ryan’s jumbled portfolio in a muddled mess of an article. Ryan owns shares of four partnerships (CMR, Little Land Co., Ryan-Hutter Investment and Ryan Limited Partnership) and an IRA. Dramatically simplifying his fund holdings would likely require merging or liquidating those partnerships. Whether the partnerships themselves make sense or are just a tax dodge is a separate question.

Artio implodes?

Artio, formerly Julius Baer, is closing their domestic equity funds. On August 30, 2012, the Artio board voted to shut down Artio US Multicap, US Midcap, US Smallcap and US Microcap funds.

While the closures may have come as a surprise to many, BobC warned members of the Observer discussion board on August 8 of the impending decision. In following up on the lead, he discovered a more ominous problem: that Artio’s famous flagship fund is taking on water fast.

This caused us to probe a bit, and we discovered that Artio’s so-called flagship international funds (BJBIX, JETAX, JETIX, JIEIX) have been bleeding assets like a proverbial stuck pig, if not worse. For the oldest fund BJBIX, which was originally marketed as Julius Baer International Equity Fund in 1993, and where current managers Pell and Younes came aboard in 1995, fund assets peaked in 2007 at just under $11 billion. We started using the fund in the late 1990’s. Today, assets are under $1 billion. A similar disaster has occurred in the other international fund ticker symbols, but they do not have the long, storied history of BJBIX. This fund was once the best-performing international fund, but it never recovered from 2008, following that year’s average numbers by really awful relative performance in 2009-2011. And year to-date it is in the bottom 10%. We exited the fund several years ago when Pell and Younes would no longer take our calls. That’s usually a pretty big red flag that something is amiss.

But based on this, it would appear that Pell and Younes’ purchase of Bank Julius Baer’s U.S. fund management company was the beginning of the end.

Unfortunately, we are now concerned about Artio’s Total Return Bond Fund (JBGIX, BJBGX), which has a tremendous history and great management. If the asset bleed should occur there, for no other reason than perception of the future of Artio as a company, this would be a big problem for investors.

A lively discussion of the company’s future, alternatives and implications followed.  If you haven’t visited the board in a while, you owe it to yourself to drop by.  There’s a remarkable depth of information available there.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.

Aston/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX), update: stubborn short-sightedness on the part of institutional account managers translates to a big win for small investors. When ARIVX closed, they reserved $200 million in capacity for institutional investors who didn’t show up.  That’s give you $200 million in room to add one of the industry’s most profitable and stable small cap value funds to your portfolio.

Northern Global Tactical Asset Allocation (BBALX), update: this formerly mild-mannered balanced fund is maturing into a fascinating competitor to Vanguard’s splendid STAR (VGSTX) fund. The difference may come down to Northern’s greater flexibility and reliance on (gasp!) index funds.

The Best of the Web

Our friend and collaborator, Junior Yearwood, is working to manage a chronic medical condition.  He won’t, for just a bit, we hope, be able to contribute to the Observer.  While he’s gone we’ll keep his “Best of” feature on hiatus. I wish Junior a swift recovery and encourage folks who haven’t done so to find our picks for best retirement income calculator, best financial news site, best small fund website and more at Best of the Web.

Launch Alert: Manning & Napier Strategic Income funds

Manning & Napier launched Strategic Income Conservative (MSCBX) and Strategic Income Moderate (MSMSX) on August 2, 2012.  They both combine shares of four other Manning & Napier funds (Core Bond (EXCRX), Dividend Focus (MNDFX), High Yield Bond (MNHYX) and Real Estate (MNRIX) in pursuit of income, growth, and risk management. Conservative will hold 15-45% in Dividend Focus and Real Estate while Moderate will hold 45-75%. Both have low investment minimums, reasonable fees and Manning’s very steady management team.

Launch Alert: William Blair International Leaders

William Blair & Company launched William Blair International Leaders Fund (WILNX) on August 16. The fund is managed by George Greig, who has an outstanding 25 year record and two very solid funds (International Growth WBIGX and Global Growth WGGNX) and Ken McAtamney, who is being elevated from the analyst ranks. The new fund will invest in “foreign companies with above-average returns on equity, strong balance sheets, and consistent, above-average earnings growth, resulting in a focused portfolio of leading companies.”  That’s an admirably Granthamite goal. $5000 investment minimum, reduced to $1000 for accounts with an automatic investing provision.  The expense ratio will be 1.45% after waivers. Grieg’s record is very strong and his main fund closed to new investors in June, so we’re putting WILNX on the Observer’s watch-list for a profile.

RiverPark Short-Term High Yield conference call

There are few funds to have stirred more conversation, or engendered more misunderstanding, than RiverPark Short-Term High Yield (RPHYX). It’s a remarkably stable, profitable cash management fund whose name throws off lots of folks.

Manager David Sherman of Cohanzick Asset Management and RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, have generously agreed to participate in a conference call with Observer readers. I’ll moderate the call and David will field questions on the fund’s strategies and prospects. The call is September 13 at 7:00 p.m., Eastern.

You can register for the conference by navigating to  http://services.choruscall.com/diamondpass/registration?confirmationNumber=10017662 and following the prompts.  If you’ve got questions, feel free to write me or post a query on the discussion board.

The Observer in the News

I briefly interrupted my August vacation to answer a polite question from the investing editor of U.S. News with a rant.

The question: “what should an investor do when his or her fund manager quits?”

The rant: “in 90% of the cases, nothing.”

Why?  Because, in most instances, your fund manager simply doesn’t much matter.  Some very fine funds are led by management teams (Manning & Napier, Dodge & Cox) and some fund firms have such strong and intentional corporate cultures (T. Rowe Price) that new managers mostly repeat the success of their predecessors.  Most funds, and most larger funds in particular, are managed with an eye to unobjectionable mediocrity.  The firm’s incentive is to gather and keep assets, not to be bold.  As a result, managers are expected to avoid the sorts of strategies that risk landing them outside of the pack.

There are, however, some funds where the manager makes a huge difference.  Those are often smaller, newer, boutique funds where management decisions are driven by ideas more compelling than “keep our institutional clients quiet.”  You can read the whole story in “What to Do When Your Fund Manager Quits,” US News, August 6, 2012.

If you’ve ever read the Observer and (understandably) wondered “who is this loon and what is he up to?” there’s a reasonable article written by a young local reporter about the Observer and me.  It’s a fairly wide-ranging discussion and includes pictures that led my departmental colleagues to begin a picture captioning contest.  Anya and Chip both weigh in. “Augustana professor attracts international attention with investment site,” Rock Island Argus and Moline Dispatch, August 20, 2012.

Briefly Noted . . .

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Effective September 4, 2012, The Brown Capital Management Small Company Fund (BCSIX) will re-open for investment to all investors. Morningstar designates this as one of the Gold small-growth funds. Its returns are in the top 10% of its peer group for the past 5, 10 and 15 years. It strikes me as a bit bulky at $1.4 billion but it continues to perform. Average expenses, $5000 minimum, low turnover. (Special thanks to “The Shadow” for posting to the discussion board word of the Brown and ARIVX re-openings.  S/he is so quick at finding this stuff that it’s scary.)

Jake Mortell of Candlewood Advisory writes to say that “One of the funds I am working with, The Versus Capital Multimanager Real Estate Income Fund (VCMRX) is reducing fees on the first $25 million in assets into the fund as a risk offset to early adopters. The waiver reduces fees from 95 bps to 50 bps on the first $25 million in assets to the fund for a period of 12 months.”  It’s a closed-end fund managed by Callan Associates, famed for the Callan Periodic Table of Investment Returns.

CLOSINGS

Invesco Van Kampen High Yield Municipal (ACTHX) will close on September 4, 2012. The fund is huge ($7 billion), good (pretty consistently in the top 25% of its peer group over longer periods) and has been closed before.

Touchstone Small Cap Core Fund (TSFAX) will close to new investments on September 21, 2012. It’s an entirely decent fund that has drawn almost $500 million in under three years.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

In November, two perfectly respectable AllianceBernstein funds get rechristened. AllianceBernstein Small/Mid Cap Growth (CHCLX) becomes AllianceBernstein Discovery Growth while AllianceBernstein Small/Mid Cap Value (ABASX) will change to AllianceBernstein Discovery Value.  Same managers, same mandate, different marketing.

AllianceBernstein Balanced Shares (CABNX) becomes AllianceBernstein Global Risk Allocation on Oct. 8, 2012. New managers and a new mandate (more global allocating will go on) follow.

Artio is changing Artio Global Equity’s (BJGQX) name to Artio Select Opportunities.

BlackRock Emerging Market Debt (BEDIX) will change its name to BlackRock Emerging Market Local Debt on Sept. 3, 2012. The fund also picked up a new management team (Sergio Trigo Paz, Raphael Marechal, and Laurent Develay), all of whom are new to BlackRock. .

In mid-August, Pax World Global Green Fund became Pax World Global Environmental Markets Fund (PGRNX, “pea green”?  Hmmm…). It also became almost impossible to find at Morningstar. Search “Pax World” and you find nothing. The necessary abbreviation is “Pax Wld Glbl.” While it might be a nice idea, the fund has yet to generate the returns needed to validate its focus.

I failed to mention that PineBridge US Micro Cap Growth Fund became the Jacob Micro Cap Growth Fund (JMCGX). With the same management in place, it seems likely that the fund will continue to pursue the same high expense, high risk strategy that’s handicapped it for the past decade.

WisdomTree International Hedged Equity ETF became WisdomTree Europe Hedged Equity Fund (HEDJ – “hedge,” get it?) at the end of August. The argument is that if you hedge out the effects of the collapsing euro, there are some “export-driven European-based firms that pay dividends” which are great businesses selling at compelling valuations. The valuations are compelling, in part, because so many investors are (rightly) spooked by the euro and euro-zone financial stocks. Hedge one, avoid the other, et voila!

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

John Houseman, Smith Barney spokesperson.

Smith Barney passed away at age 75. Morgan Stanley is dropping the name from its brokerage unit in favor of Morgan Stanley Wealth Management. The Smith (1892) and Barney (1873) brokerages merged in 1938, with the resulting firm operating under a half dozen different monikers over the years. Investors of a certain age associate Smith Barney primarily with John Houseman, the actor who served as their spokesman (“They make money the old-fashioned way. They earn it”) in the late 1970s and 1980s. The change is effective this month.

SmartMoney, the magazine, is no more. Originally (1992) a joint venture between Hearst and Dow-Jones, Dow bought Heart’s take in the magazine in 2010. The final print issue, September 2012, went on newsstands on August 14. In one of those fine bits of bloodless corporate rhetoric, Dow-Jones admitted that “[a]pproximately 25 staff positions for the print edition are being impacted.”  “Impacted.”  Uh… eliminated. Subscribers have the option of picking up The Wall Street Journal or, in my case, Barron’s.

American Independence is liquidating its Nestegg series of target-date funds. The five funds will close at the end of August and cease operations at the end of September 2012. They’re the fourth firm (after Columbia, Goldman Sachs and Oppenheimer) to abandon the niche this summer.

BMO plans to liquidate BMO Large-Cap Focus (MLIFX).

In what surely qualifies as a “small win” for investors, Direxion is liquidating its nine triple-leveraged ETFs (for example, Direxion Daily BRIC Bear 3X Shares BRIS) by mid-September.

Dreyfus plans to merge Dreyfus/Standish Fixed Income (SDFIX) into Dreyfus Intermediate-Term Income (DRITX) in January 2013. Same manager on both.

DWS Clean Technology (WRMAX) is liquidating in September 2012.

FocusShares announced plans to close and liquidate its entire lineup of 15 exchange-traded funds, all of which have minimal asset levels. The Scottrade subsidiary, which launched its ETFs last year, cited current market conditions, the funds’ inability to draw assets and their future viability, as well as prospects for growth in the ETFs’ assets, for the closing.

Guggenheim Long Short Equity (RYJJX) and Guggenheim All Cap Value (SESAX) are both slated for liquidation. Apparently the Long-Short managers screwed up:

Due to unfavorable market conditions, the Long Short Equity Strategy Fund (the “Fund”) has assumed a defensive investment position in an effort to protect the current value of the Fund. While the Fund is invested in this manner, it does not invest in accordance with certain of its investment policies, including its investment policy to invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of its net assets, plus any borrowings for investment purposes, in equity securities, and/or derivatives thereof.

With no assets, terrible returns and a portfolio turnover rate approaching 1000%, one hardly needed additional reasons to close the fund. All Cap Value is going just because it was tiny and bad.

Jones Villalta Opportunity Fund (JVOFX), managed by Messrs Jones and Villalta, is being liquidated on September 21. The fund had a great 2009 and a really good 2010, followed by miserable performance in 2011 and 2012. It never gained any market traction and the management finally gave up.

Marsico Emerging Markets (MERGX) will be liquidated on September 21, 2012. The fund, less than two years old, had a rotten 2011 and a mediocre 2012. One of its two managers, Joshua Rubin, resigned in July. Frankly, the larger factor might be that Marsico is in crisis and they simply couldn’t afford to deal with this dud in the midst of their other struggles. Star managers Doug Rao and Cory Gilchrist have both left in the past 12 months, leaving an awfully thin bench.

Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) will likely merge into Nuveen Dividend Value (FFEIX) in October 2012. Nuveen Large Cap Value’s assets have dwindled to less than $140 million after several years of steady outflows. The move also makes sense as both funds are run by the same management team. Owners of Nuveen Large Cap Value should expect to see fees drop by 5 basis points as a result of the merger.

The Profit Opportunity (PROFX) fund has closed and will be liquidated by the end of September.  It was minuscule (around $300,000), young (under two years) and inexplicably bad. PROFX is a small cap fund run by Eugene Profit, whose other small cap fund (Profit PVALX) is small but entirely first-rate. Odd disconnect.

Russell Investments is shutting down all 25 of its passively managed funds, with a combined total of over $310 million. The one ETF that will remain in operation is the Russell Equity ETF (ONEF) with $4.2 million in AUM. The shutdown will take place over the middle two weeks of October.

About the same time, Russell U.S. Value Fund (RSVIX) is merging in Russell U.S. Defensive Equity Fund (REQAX). They’re both closet index funds (R-squared of about 99) with mediocre records. The key difference is that REQAX is a large and reasonably profitable mediocre, closet-index fund.  RSVIX was not.

Sterling Capital Management has filed to liquidate the Sterling Capital National Tax-Free Money Market, Sterling Capital Prime Money Market Fund, and Sterling Capital U.S. Treasury Money Market Fund. The funds will be liquidated on December 14, 2012.

Touchstone Intermediate Fixed Income (TCFIX) has been liquidated after poor performance led to the departure of a major shareholder.

In Closing . . .

Each month we highlight changes in the fund world that you might not otherwise notice. This month we’ve found a near-record 69 fund manager changes. In addition, there are 10 new funds in registration with the SEC. They are not yet available for sale but knowing about them (say, for example, Wasatch’s new focused Emerging Markets fund) might help your planning. Most will come on the market by Thanksgiving.

In about a week the discussion board is undergoing a major software upgrade.  Chip and Accipiter have built some cool new functions into the latest version of Vanilla.  Chip highlights these:

1. There’s an add-on that will let folks more easily format their posts: a hyperlink function (much requested) and easy images are part of it;
2. A polling add-on that will allow us to quickly survey members;
3. Enhancements to the administration of the discussion board;
4. Pop up alerts, that you can choose to enable or disable, to notify you when certain content is updated or posts are responded to; and most importantly
5. We’ll be able to take advantage of some of cool add-ons that Accipiter’s been working over the past months.

We might be offline for a couple hours, but we’ll post a notice of the exact time well in advance.

I’m often amazed at what goes on over there, by the way. There have been over 2.5 million pageviews and 3300 discussions launched. That’s made possible by a combination of the wit and generosity of the posters and the amazing work that Chip and Accipiter have done in programming and reprogramming the board to make it ever more responsive to folks’ needs (and now to Old Joe’s willingness to turn his considerable talents as a technical writer to the production of a User’s Guide for newcomers). Quiet thanks to you all.

Following from the enthusiasm of the folks on our discussion board, we’re scheduled to profile T. Rowe Price Real Assets PRAFX (waves to Polina! It’s sort of a “meh” fund but is looking like our best no-load option), Artisan Global Equity ARTHX (“hey, Investor.  I’ve been putting this one off because I was starting to feel like a shill for Artisan. They’ve earned the respect, but still …”) and the Whitebox funds (subject of a Barron’s profile and three separate discussion threads. Following our conversation with David Sherman at Cohanzick, we have an update of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) in the works and owe one for the splendid, rapidly growing RiverPark Wedgewood Growth (RPGFX) fund.

The following announcement is brought to you by Investor, a senior member of the Observer’s discussion community:

And speaking of fall, it’s back-to-school shopping time! If you’re planning to do some or all of your b-t-s shopping online, please remember to Use the Observer’s link to Amazon.com. It’s quick, painless and generates the revenue (equal to about 6% of the value of your purchases) that helps keep the Observer going.

My theory is that if I keep busy enough, I won’t notice either the daily insanity of the market or what happens next to the Steelers’ increasingly fragile O-line.

We’ll look for you then,

Dear friends,

Welcome to the Summer Break edition of the Mutual Fund Observer. I’m writing from idyllic Ephraim, Wisconsin, a beautiful little village in Door County on the shores of Green Bay. Here’s a quick visual representation of how things are going:

Thanks to Kathy Glasnap, a very talented artist who has done some beautiful watercolors of Door County, for permission to use part of one of her paintings (“All in a Row”). Whether or not you’ve (yet) visited the area, you should visit her gallery online at http://www.glasnapgallery.com/

Chip, Anya, Junior and I bestirred ourselves just long enough to get up, hit <send>, refill our glasses with sangria and settle back into a stack of beach reading and a long round of “Mutual Fund Truth or Dare.”  (Don’t ask.)

In celebration of the proper activities of summer (see above), we offer an abbreviated Observer.

MFO in Other Media: David on Chuck Jaffe’s MoneyLife Radio Show

I’ll be the first to admit it: I have a face made for radio and a voice made for print.  Nonetheless, I was pleased to make an appearance on Chuck Jaffe’s MoneyLife radio show (which is also available as a podcast).  I spoke about three of the funds that we profiled this month, and then participated in a sort of “stump the chump” round in which I was asked to offer quick-hit opinions in response to listener questions.

Dodge & Cox Global Stock (DODWX) for Rick in York, Pa.  It’s easy to dismiss DODWX if you’ve give a superficial glance at its performance.  The fund cratered immediately after launch in 2008 when the managers bought financial stocks that were selling at a once-in-a-generation price only to see them fall to a once-in-a-half-century price.  But those purchases set up a ferocious run in 2009.  It was hurt in 2011 by an oversized emerging markets stake which paid off handsomely in the first quarter of 2012.  It’s got a great management team and an entirely sensible investment discipline.  It’ll be out-of-step often enough but will, in the long run, be a really good investment.

Fidelity Emerging Markets (FEMKX) for Brad in Cazenovia, NY.  My bottom line was “it’s not as bad as it used to be, but there’s still no compelling reason to own it.”  If you’re investing with Fido, their new Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX) is a more much intriguing option.

Leuthold Core Investment (LCORX) for Scott in Redmond, Ore. This was the original go-anywhere fund, born of Leuthold’s sophisticated market analysis service.  Quant driven, quite capable of owning pallets of lead or palladium.  Brilliant for years but, like many computer-driven funds, largely hamstrung lately by the market’s irrational jerks and twitches.  If you anticipate a return to a more-or-less “normal” market where returns aren’t driven by fears of the Greeks, it’s likely to resume being an awfully attractive, conservative holding.

Matthews Asia Dividend Fund (MAPIX) for Robert in Steubenville, Ohio.  With Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), this fund has the best risk-return profile of any Asian-focused fund.  The manager invests in strong companies with lots of free cash flow and a public commitment to their dividend.  What it lacks in MACSX’s bond and convertibles holdings, it makes up for in good country selection and stock picking.  If you want to invest in Asia, Matthews is the place to start.

T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX) for Dennis in Strongsville, Ohio. PRWCX usually holds about 65% of the portfolio in large, domestic dividend-paying stocks and a third in other income-producing securities.  Traditionally the fund held a lot of convertible securities though David Giroux, manager since 2006, has held a bit more stock and fewer converts.  The fund has lost money once in a quarter century and a former manager chuckled over the recollection that Price’s internal allocation models kept coming to the same conclusion: “invest 100% in PRWCX.”

MFO in Other Media: David on “The Best Fund for the Next Six Months … and Beyond”

Early in July, John Waggoner wrote to ask for recommendations for “the remainder of 2012.”  Answers from three “mutual fund experts” (I shudder) appear in John’s July 5^th column.  Dan Wiener tabbed PrimeCap Odyssey Aggressive Growth (POAGX) and Jim Lowell picked Fidelity Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX).  I highlighted the two most recent additions to my non-retirement portfolio:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX), which I described as “one of the most misunderstood funds I cover. It functions as a cash management fund for me — 3% to 4% returns with (so far) negligible volatility. Its greatest problem is its name, which suggests that it invests in short-term, high-yield bonds (which, in general, it doesn’t) or that it has the risk profile of a high-yield fund (ditto).”

David Sherman, the manager, stresses that RPHYX “is not an ATM machine.”  That said, the fund returned 2.6% in the first seven months of 2012 with negligible volatility (the NAV mostly just drops with the month-end payouts).  That’s led to a Sharpe ratio above 3, which is simply great.  Mr. Sherman says that he thinks of it as a superior alternative to, say, laddered bonds or CDs.  While in a “normal” bond market this will underperform a diversified fund with longer durations, in a volatile market it might well outperform the vast majority.

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX), driven by the fact that Mr. Foster “performed brilliantly at Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX), which was the least volatile (hence most profitable) Asian fund for years. With Seafarer, he’s able to sort of hedge a MACSX-like portfolio with limited exposure to non-Asian emerging markets. The strategy makes sense, and Mr. Foster has proven able to consistently execute it.”

SFGIX has substantially outperformed the average emerging-Asia, Latin America and diversified emerging markets fund in the months since its launch, though it trails MACSX.  The folks on our discussion board mostly maintain a “deserves to be on the watch-list” stance, based mostly on MACSX’s continued excellence.  I’m persuaded by Mr. Foster’s argument on behalf of a portfolio that’s still Asia-centered but not Asia exclusively.

Seafarer Overseas Piques Morningstar’s Interest

One of Morningstar’s most senior analysts, Gregg Wolper, examined the struggles of two funds that should be attracting more investor interest than they are, in “Two Young Funds Struggle to Get Noticed” (July 31, 2012).

One is TCW International Small Cap (TGICX) which launched in March 2011.  It’s an international small-growth fund managed by Rohit Sah.  Sah had “an impressive if volatile record” in seven years at Oppenheimer International Small Company (OSMAX).  The problem is that Sah has a high-volatility strategy even by the standards of a high-volatility niche, which isn’t really in-tune with current investor sentiment.  Its early record is mostly negative which isn’t entirely surprising.  No load, $2000 investment minimum, 1.44% expense ratio.

The other is Seafarer Overseas Growth and Income (SFGIX).  Wolper recognizes Mr. Foster’s “impressive record” at Matthews and his risk-conscious approach to emerging markets investing.  “His fund tries to cushion the risks of emerging-markets investing by owning less-volatile, dividend-paying stocks and through other means, and in fact over the past three months it has suffered a much more moderate loss than the average diversified emerging-markets fund.”  Actually, from inception through July 31 2012, Seafarer was up by 0.4% while the average emerging markets fund had lost 7.4%.

Mr. Wolper concludes that when investors’ appetite for risk returns, these will both be funds to watch:

At some point, though, certain investors will be looking for a bold fund to fill a small slot in their portfolio. Funds with modest asset bases have more flexibility than their more-popular rivals to own smaller, less-liquid stocks in less-traveled markets should they so choose. For that reason, it’s worth keeping these offerings in mind. Their managers are accomplished, and though there are caveats with each, including their cost, they feature strategies that are not easy to find at rival choices.

It’s What Makes Yahoo, Yahoo

Archaic, on the Observer’s discussion board, complained, “When I use Yahoo Finance to look at a particular fund … [its] Annual Total Return History, the history is complete through 2010 but ends there. No 2011. Anyone know why?”

The short answer is: because it’s Yahool.  This is a problem that Yahoo has known about for months, but has been either unable or unmotivated to correct.  Here’s their “Help” page on the problem:

I added a large arrow only because I don’t know how to add either a flashing one or an animated GIF of a guy slapping himself on the forehead.  Yahoo has known about this problem for at least three months without correcting it.

Note to Marissa Mayer, Yahoo’s new CEO: Yahoo describes itself as “a company that helps consumers find what they are looking for and discover wonders they didn’t expect.”  In this case, we’re looking for 2011 data and the thing we wonder about is what it says about Yahoo’s corporate culture and competence.  Perhaps you might check with the folks at Morningstar for an example of how quickly and effectively a first-rate organization identifies, addresses and corrects problems like this.

Too Soon Gone: Eric Bokota and FPA International Value (FPIVX)

I had the pleasure of a long conversation with Eric Bokota at the Morningstar Investment Conference in June.  I was saddened to hear that events in his private life have obliged him to resign from FPA.  The FPA folks seemed both deeply saddened and hopeful that one day he’ll return.  I wish him Godspeed.

Four Funds That Are Really Worth Your Time (even in summer!)

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features three newer funds and an update ING Corporate Leaders, a former “Star in the Shadows” whose ghostly charms have attracted a sudden rush of assets.

FPA International Value (FPIVX): led by Oakmark alumnus Pierre Py, FPA’s first new fund in almost 30 years has the orientation, focus, discipline and values to match FPA’s distinguished brand.

ING Corporate Leaders Trust (LEXCX): the ghost ship of the fund world sails into its 78^th year, skipperless and peerless.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX): RiverPark’s successful hedge, now led by a guy who’s been getting it consistently right for almost two decades, is now available for the rest of us.

The Cook and Bynum Fund (COBYX): you think your fund is focused?  Feh! You don’t know focused until you’ve met Messrs. Cook and Bynum.

The Best Small Fund Websites: Seafarer and Cook & Bynum

The folks at the Observer visit scores of fund company websites each month and it’s hard to avoid the recognition that most of them are pretty mediocre.  The worst of them post as little content as possible, updated as rarely as possible, signaling the manager’s complete disdain for the needs and concerns of his (and very rarely, her) investors.

Small fund companies can’t afford such carelessness; their prime distinction from the industry’s bloated household names is their claim to a different and better relationship with their investors.  If investors are going to win the struggle against the overwhelming urge to buy high and leave in a panic, they need a rich website and need to use it.  If they can build a relationship of trust and understanding with their managers, they’ve got a much better chance of holding through rough stretches and profiting from rich ones.

This month, Junior and I enlisted the aid of two immensely talented web designers to help us analyze three dozen small fund websites in order to find and explain the best of them.  One expert is Anya Zolotusky, designer of the Observer’s site and likely star of a series of “Most Interesting Woman in the World” sangria commercials.  The other is Nina Eisenman, president of Eisenman Associates and founder of FundSites, a firm which helps small to mid-sized fund companies design distinctive and effective websites.

If you’re interested in why Seafarer and Cook & Bynum are the web’s best small company sites, and which twelve earned “honorable mention” or “best of the rest” recognition, the entrance is here!

Launch Alert: RiverNorth and Manning & Napier, P. B. and Chocolate

Two really good fund managers are combining forces.  RiverNorth/Manning & Napier Dividend Income (RNMNX) launched on July 18^th.  The fund is a hybrid of two highly-successful strategies: RiverNorth’s tactical allocation strategy based, in part, on closed-end fund arbitrage, and Manning & Napier’s largely-passive dividend focus strategy.  Both are embedded in freestanding funds, though the RiverNorth fund is closed to new investors.  There’s a lively discussion of the fund and, in particular, whether it offers any distinct value, on our discussion board.  The minimum investment is $5000 and we’re likely to profile the fund in October.

Briefly Noted . . .

As a matter of ongoing disclosure about such things, I want to report several changes in my personal portfolio that touch on funds we’ve profiled or will soon profile.  In my non-retirement portfolio, I sold off part of my holdings of Matthews Asian Growth and Income (MACSX) and invested the proceeds in Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX).  As with all my non-retirement funds, I’ve established an automatic investment plan in Seafarer.  In my retirement accounts, I sold my entire position in Fidelity Diversified International (FDIVX) and Canada (FICDX) and invested the proceeds in a combination of Global Balanced (FGBLX) and Total Emerging Markets (FTEMX).  FDIVX has gotten too big and too index-like to justify inclusion and Canada’s new-ish manager is staggering around, and I’m hopeful that the e.m. exposure in the other two funds will be a significant driver while the fixed-income components offer some cushion.  Finally, also in my retirement accounts, I sold T. Rowe Price New Era (PRENX) and portions of two other funds to buy Real Assets Fund (PRAFX).  What can I say?  Jeremy Grantham is very persuasive.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

A bunch of funds have tried to boost their competitiveness by cutting expenses or at least waiving a portion of them.

Cohen & Steers Dividend Value (DVFAX) will limit fund expenses to 1.00% for A shares through June 2014.

J.P. Morgan announced 9 basis point cuts for JP Morgan US Dynamic Plus (JPSAX) and JP Morgan US Large Cap Core Plus (JLCAX).

Legg Mason capped expenses on Legg Mason BW Diversified Large Cap Value (LBWAX) at between 0.85% – 1.85%, depending on share class.

Madison Investment Advisors cuts fees on Madison Mosaic Investors (MINVX) by 4 bps, Madison Mosaic Mid Cap (GTSGX) by 10, and Madison Mosaic Dividend Income (BHBFX, formerly Balanced) by 30.

Managers is dropping fees for Managers Global Income Opportunity (MGGBX), Managers Real Estate Securities (MRESX), and Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced (MBEAX) by 11 – 16 bps.

Alger Small Cap Growth (ALSAX) and its institutional brother reopened to new investors on Aug. 1, 2012.  It was once a really solid fund but it’s been sagging in recent years so your ability to get into it really does qualify as a “small win.”

CLOSINGS

Columbia Small Cap Value (CSMIX) has closed to new investors. For those interested, The Wall Street Journal publishes a complete closed fund list each month.  It’s available online with the almost-poetic name, Table of Mutual Funds Closed to New Investors.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Just as a reminder, the distinguished no-load Marketfield (MFLDX) will become the load-bearing MainStay Marketfield Fund on Oct. 5, 2012.  The Observer profile of Marketfield appeared in July.

At the end of September, Lord Abbett Capital Structure (LAMAX), a billion dollar hybrid fund, will be relaunched as Lord Abbett Calibrated Dividend Growth, with a focus on dividend-paying stocks and new managers: Walter Prahl and Rick Ruvkun.  No word about why.

Invesco announced it will cease using the Van Kampen name on its funds in September.  By way of example, Invesco Van Kampen American Franchise “A” (VAFAX) will simply be Invesco American Franchise “A”.

Oppenheimer Funds is buying and renaming the five SteelPath funds, all of which invest in master limited partnerships and all of which have sales loads.  There was a back door into the fund, which allowed investors to buy them without a load, but that’s likely to close.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

BlackRock is merging its S&P 500 Index (MDSRX) and Index Equity (PNIEX) funds into BlackRock S&P 500 Stock (WFSPX).  And no, I have no idea of what sense it made to run all three funds in the first place.

DWS Clean Technology (WRMAX) will be liquidated in October 2012.

Several MassMutual funds (Strategic Balanced, Value Equity, Core Opportunities, and Large Cap Growth) were killed-off in June 2012.

Oppenheimer is killing off their entry into the retirement-date fund universe by merging their regrettable Transition Target-Date into their regrettable static allocation hybrid funds.  Oppenheimer Transition 2030 (OTHAX), 2040 (OTIAX), and 2050 (OTKAX) will merge into Active Allocation (OAAAX). The shorter time-frame Transition 2015 (OTFAX), 2020 (OTWAX), and 2025 (OTDAX) will merge into Moderate Investor (OAMIX).  Transition 2010 (OTTAX) will, uhhh … transition into Conservative Investor (OACIX). The same management team oversaw or oversees the whole bunch.

Goldman Sachs took the easier way out and announced the simple liquidation of its entire Retirement Strategy lineup.  The funds have already closed to new investors but Goldman hasn’t yet set a date for the liquidation.   It’s devilishly difficult to compete with Fidelity, Price and Vanguard in this space – they’ve got good, low-cost products backed up by sophisticated allocation modeling.  As a result they control about three-quarters of the retirement/target-date fund universe.  If you start with that hurdle and add mediocre funds to the mix, as Oppenheimer and Goldman did, you’re somewhere between “corpse” and “zombie.”

Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity II (TFEMX), a perfectly respectable performer with few assets, is merging into Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity (TEMAX). Same management team, similar strategies.

In a “scraping their name off the door” move, ASTON has removed M.D. Sass Investors Services as a subadvisor to ASTON/MD Sass Enhanced Equity (AMBEX). Anchor Capital Advisors, which was the other subadvisor all along, now gets its name on the door at ASTON/Anchor Capital Enhanced Equity.

Destra seems already to have killed off Destra Next Dimension (DLGSX), a tiny global stock fund managed by Roger Ibbotson.

YieldQuest Total Return Bond (YQTRX), one of the first funds I profiled as an analyst for FundAlarm, has finally ceased operations.  (P.S., it was regrettable even six years ago.)

In Closing . . .

Some small celebrations and reminders.  This month the Observer passed its millionth pageview on the main site with well over two million additional pageviews on our endlessly engaging discussion board (hi, guys!).  We’re hopeful of seeing our 100,000^th new reader this fall.

Speaking of the discussion board, please remember that registration for participating in the board is entirely separate from registering to receive our monthly email reminder.  Signing up for board membership, a necessary safeguard against increasingly agile spambots, does not automatically get you on the email list and vice versa.

And speaking of fall, it’s back-to-school shopping time!  If you’re planning to do some or all of your b-t-s shopping online, please remember to Use the Observer’s link to Amazon.com.  It’s quick, painless and generates the revenue (equal to about 6% of the value of your purchases) that helps keep the Observer going.  Once you click on the link, you may want to bookmark it so that your future Amazon purchases are automatically and invisibly credited to the Observer. Heck, you can even share the link with your brother-in-law.

A shopping lead for the compulsive-obsessive among you: How to Sharpen Pencils: A Practical & Theoretical Treatise on the Artisanal Craft of Pencil Sharpening for Writers, Artists, Contractors, Flange Turners, Anglesmiths, & Civil Servants (2012).  The book isn’t yet on the Times’ bestseller lists, though I don’t know why.

A shopping lead for folks who thought they’d never read poems about hedge funds: Katy Lederer’s The Heaven-Sent Leaf (2008).  Lederer’s an acclaimed poet who spent time working at, and poetrifying about, a New York hedge fund.

In September, we’ll begin looking at the question “do you really need to buy a dedicated ‘real assets’ fund?”  T. Rowe Price has incorporated one into all of their retirement funds and Jeremy Grantham is increasingly emphatic on the matter.  There’s an increasing area of fund and ETF options, including Price’s own fund which was, for years, only available to the managers of Price funds-of-funds.

We’ll look for you.

photo by rcbodden on Flickr.

Dear friends,

“Summertime and the livin’ is easy”?

“Roll out those lazy, hazy, crazy days of summer,
Those days of soda and pretzels and beer”

“That’s when I had most of my fun back …
Hot fun in the summertime.”

“In summer, the song sings itself.”

What a crock.  I’m struck by the intensity of the summer storms, physical and financial.  As I write, millions are without power along the Eastern seaboard after a ferocious storm that pounded the Midwest, roared east and killed a dozen.  Wildfires continue unchecked in the west and the heat and drought in Iowa have left the soil in my yard fissured and hard.  Conditions in the financial markets are neither better nor more settled.  The ferocious last day rally in June created the illusion of a decent month, when in fact it was marked by a series of sharp, panicky dislocations.

I’m struck, too, by the ways in which our political leaders have responded, which is to say, idiotically.  Republicans continue to deny the overwhelming weight of climate science.  Democrats acknowledge it, then freeze for fear of losing their jobs.  And both sides’ approach to the post-election fiscal cliff is the same: “let’s get through the election first.”

It’s striking, finally, how rarely the thought “let’s justify being elected” seems to get any further than “let’s convince voters that the other side is worse.”

Snippets from MIC

I had the pleasure of attending the Morningstar Investment Conference in late June.  The following stories are derived from my observations there.  I also had an opportunity to interview two international value managers, David Marcus of Evermore and Eric Bokota of FPA, there.  Those interviews will serve as elements of an update of the Evermore Global Value profile and a new FPA International Value profile, both in August.

David Snowball at MIC, courtesy of eventtoons.com

BlackRock and the Graybeards

On Day One of the conference, Morningstar hosted a keynote panel titled “A Quarter-Century Club” in which a trio of quarter-centenarians (Susan Byrne, Will Danof and Brian Rogers) reflected in their years in the business.  All three seemed to offer the same cautionary observation: “the industry has lost its moral compass.”  All three referred to the pressure, especially on publicly traded firms, to “grow assets” as the first priority and “serve shareholders” somewhere thereafter.

Susan Byrne, chairman and founder of Westwood Management Corp., the investment advisor to the Westwood Funds, notes that, as a young manager, it was drilled into her head that “this is not our money.” It was money held in trust, “there are people who trust you (the manager) individually to take care for them.” That’s a tremendously important value to her but, she believes, many younger professionals don’t hear the lesson.

Will Danoff, manager of Fidelity Contrafund (FCNTX), made a thoughtful, light-hearted reference to one of his early co-workers, George.  “George didn’t manage money and he didn’t manage the business.  His job, so far as I can tell, was to walk up to the president every morning, look him in the eye and ask ‘how are you going to make money today for our shareholders?’ You don’t hear that much anymore.”

Brian Rogers, CIO of T Rowe Price made a similar, differently nuanced point: “when we were hired, it was by far smaller firms with a sense of fiduciary obligation, not a publicly-traded company with an obligation to shareholders. Back then we learned this order of priorities: (1) your investors first, (2) your employees and then (3) your shareholders.” In an age of large, publicly-traded firms, “new folks haven’t learned that as deeply.”

As I talk with managers of small funds, I often get a clear sense of personal connection with their shareholders and a deep concern for doing right by them. In a large, revenue-driven firm, that focus might be lost.

The extent of that loss has been highlighted by some very solid reporting by Aaron Pressman and Jessica Toonkel of Reuters.   Pressman and Toonkel document what looks like the unraveling of BlackRock, the world’s largest private investment manager. In short order:

• Robert Capaldi, senior client strategist for Chief Executive Laurence Fink, left.
• Susan Wagner, a founding partner and vice chairman, announced her immediate retirement.  Wagner had overseen much of BlackRock’s growth-through-acquisition strategy which included purchase of Barclay’s Global Investors and Merrill Lynch’s funds, a total of $2.4 trillion in assets.
• Chief equity strategist Boll Doll announced his retirement (at 57) as evidence began to surface that his and BlackRock’s long-time claim of “proprietary” investment models was false.
• Star energy fund manager Daniel Rice resigned in the wake of criticism of his decision to invest substantial amounts of his shareholders’ money into a firm in which he had a personal, if indirect, stake.  He did so without notifying anyone outside of the firm.  BlackRock, reportedly, had no explanation for investors.

Insiders report to Reuters that “further senior-level changes” are imminent.

BlackRock’s plans to double its mutual fund business in the next 18 months by targeting RIAs remain in place.  Why double the business?  Whose interests does it serve?  BlackRock has demonstrated neither any great surplus of investment talent nor of innovative investment ideas, nor can they plausibly appeal (at $4 trillion of AUM) to “economies of scale.”

No, doubling their business is in the best interests of BlackRock executives (bonuses get tied to such things) and, likely, to BlackRock shareholders.  There’s no evidence for why RIAs or fundholders are anything more than tools in BlackRock’s incessant drive from growth.  The American essayist and critic Edward Abbey observed, “Growth for the sake of growth is the ideology of the cancer cell.”  And, apparently, of the publicly traded megacorp.

Advice from a Conservative Domestic Equity Manager: Go Elsewhere

The Quarter Century panel of senior started talking about the equity market going forward. They were uniformly, if cautiously, optimistic. Rogers drew some parallels to the economy and market of 1982. I liked Susan Byrne’s comments rather more: “It feels like 1982 when you believed that any rally was a trap, designed to fool me, humiliate me and keep me poor.” Mr. Danoff argued that global blue chips “have absolutely flat-lined for years,” and represent substantial embedded value. They argued for pursuing stocks with growing dividends, a strategy that will consistently beat fixed income or inflation.

In closing, Don Phillips asked each for one bit of closing advice or insight. Brian Rogers, T. Rowe Price’s CIO and manager of their Equity Income fund (PRFDX) offered these two:

1. it’s time to remember Buffett’s adage, “be fearful when others are greedy, and greedy when others are fearful.”

and

2. “take a look at the emerging markets again.”

That’s striking advice, given Mr. Rogers’ style: he’s famously cautious and consistent, invests in large dividend-paying companies and rarely ventures abroad (5% international, 0.25% emerging markets). He didn’t elaborate but his observation is consistent with the recurring theme, “emerging markets are beginning to look interesting again.”

Note to the Scout Funds: “See Grammarian”

The marketing slogan for the Scout Funds is “See Further.”  Uhhh .. no.  “Farther.”  In this usage, “further” would be “additional,” as in “see further references in the footnotes.”  Farther refers to distance (“dad, how much farther is it?”) which is presumably what would concern a scout.

Scout’s explanation for the odd choice: “One of our executives wanted ‘See Farther’ but discovered that some other fund company already used it and so he went with ‘See Further’ instead.”

I see.

No, I don’t.  First, I can’t find a record for the “see farther” motto (though it is plausible) and, second, that still doesn’t justify an imprecise and ungrammatical slogan.

Kudos to Morningstar: They Get It Right, and Make It Right, Quickly

In June I complained about inconsistencies in Morningstar’s data reports on expense ratios and turnover, and the miserable state of the Securities and Exchange Commission database.

The folks at Morningstar looked into the problems quite quickly. The short version is this: fund filings often contain multiple versions of what’s apparently the same data point. There are, for example, a couple different turnover ratios and up to four expense ratios. Different functions, developed by different folks at different times, might inadvertently choose to pull stats from different places. Mr. Rekenthaler described them as “these funny little quirks where a product somewhere sometime decided to do something different.” Both stats are correct but also inconsistent. If they aren’t flagged so that readers can understand the differences, they can also be misleading.

Morningstar is interested in providing consistent, system-wide data.  Both John Rekenthaler, vice president of research, and Alexa Auerbach in corporate communications were in touch with us within a week. Once they recognized the inconsistency, they moved quickly to reconcile it.  Rekenthaler reports that their data-improvement effort is ongoing: “senior management is on a push for Morningstar-wide consistency in what data we publish and how we label the data, so we should be ferreting out the remaining oddities.”  As of June 19, the data had been reconciled. Thanks to the Wizards on West Wacker for their quick work.

FBR Funds Get Sold, Quickly

On June 26 2012, FBR announced the sale of their mutual fund unit to Hennessy Advisors.   Of the 10 FBR funds, seven will retain their current management teams. The managers of FBR’s Large Cap, Mid Cap and Small Cap funds are getting dumped and their funds are merging into Hennessy funds. One of the mergers (Large Cap) is likely a win for the investors. One of the mergers (Mid Cap) is a loss and the third (Small Cap) has the appearance of a disaster.

FBR Large Cap (FBRPX, 1.25% e.r., 9.2% over three years) merges into Hennessy Cornerstone Large Growth (HFLGX), three year old large value fund, 1.3% e.r., 13.8% over 3 years. Win for the FBR shareholders.

FBR Mid Cap (FBRMX, 1.35% e.r., five year return of 3.0%) merges into Hennessy Focus 30 (HFTFX), midcap fund, 1.36% e.r., five year return of 1.25%. Higher minimum, same e.r., lower returns – loss for FBR shareholders.

FBR Small Cap (FBRYX, 1.45% e.r., five year return of 4.25%) merges into Hennessy Cornerstone Growth (HGCGX), small growth fund, 1.33% e.r., five year return of (8.2). Huh? Slightly lower expenses but a huge loss in performance. The 1250 basis point difference is 5-year performance does not appear to be a fluke. The Hennessy fund is consistently at the bottom of its peer group, going back a decade.   The fact that founder and CIO Neil Hennessy runs Cornerstone Growth might explain the decision to preserve the weaker fund and its strategy. This is a clear “run away!” for the FBR shareholders.

One alternative for FBRYX investors is into FBR’s own Small Cap Financial fund (FBRSX), run by Dave Ellison, FBR’s CIO. Ellison’s funds used to bear the FBR Pegasus brand. The fund only invests in the finance industry, but does it really well. That said, it’s more expensive than FBRYX with weaker returns, reflecting the sector’s disastrous decade.

The fate of FBR’s Gas Utility Index fund (GASFX) is unclear.  The key question is whether Hennessy will increase fees.  An FBR representative at Morningstar expressed doubt that they’d do any such thing.

The Long-Short Summer Series: Trying to Know if You’re Winning

As part of our summer series on long-short funds, we look this month at the performance of the premier long-short funds, of interesting newcomers, and of two benchmarks.

The challenge is to know when you’re winning if your goal is not the easily measurable “maximum total return.”  With long-short funds, you’re shooting for something more amorphous, akin to “pretty solid returns without the volatility that makes me crazy.”  In pursuit of funds that meet those criteria, we looked at the performance of long-short funds on one terrible day (June 1) and one great day (June 29), as well as during one terrible month (May 2012) and one really profitable period (January – June, 2012).

We looked at the return of Vanguard’s Total Stock Market Index fund for each period, and highlighted (in green) those funds which managed to lose half as much as the market in the two down periods (May and June 1) but gain at least two-thirds of the market in the two up periods.  Here are the results, sorted by 2012 returns.

As we noted last month, in comparing the long-term performance of long-short funds to a very conservative bond index, consistent winners are hard to find.  Interesting possibilities from this list:

RiverPark Long Short Opportunity (RLSFX), which converted from an in-house hedge fund in March and which we’ll profile in August.

Marketfield (MFLDX), the mutual fund version of a global macro hedge fund, which we’re profiling this month.

ASTON/River Road Long Short (ARLSX), a disciplined little fund that we profiled last month.

New on our radar is Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Research (BPRRX), sibling to the one indisputable gold-standard fund in the group, Robeco Long Short (BPLEX).  While the two follow the same investment discipline, BPLEX has a singular focus on small and micro stocks while BPRRX has a more traditional mid- to large-cap portfolio.

The chart below tracks BPPRX against its peer group average (orange) and the group’s top funds, including BPLEX (green), Marketfield (burgundy), and Wasatch (gold).  BPPRX itself is the blue line.

Since inception, BPRRX has been (1) well above average and (2) well below BPLEX.  It’s worth further research.

FundReveal perspective on Long-Short funds

Nearly all of the Long-Short funds examined exhibit consistently low risk.  Many of them also beat the S&P 500’s Average Daily Returns.  Of the six funds analyzed by David (see bullets below) those rated as “A-Best” in one year most often beat the S&P in total returns the next year, a finding consistent with the out-of-sample forward testing that we have conducted for the entire market.

One thing that remains surprising is that the Long-Short funds great idea hasn’t really panned out.  It makes such sense to use all positive and negative information about companies and securities available when investing.   Doesn’t only investing long leave “money [information] on the table.”  But, in general, these funds have not delivered on that perceived potential.

BPLSX, Robeco Boston Partners Long/Short Fund has been delivering.  We agree with David that it can be seen as the gold standard.  From FundReveal’s perspective, the fund has persistently delivered “A-Best” performance, beating the S&P on both risk and return measures. Since 2005 the fund has been rated A-Best six times and C twice.  This includes a whopping 82% total return in 2009.  In 2009, 2010, and 2011 positive total returns followed A Best risk return rating in the preceding year.  Don’t get too excited:  the fund is closed.

David has commented or will comment on the following funds in the Mutual Fund Observer.

• ARLSX  – Aston/River Road Long/Short
• FMLSX – Wasatch 1st Source Long/Short
• MFLDX – Marketfield Fund
• AMBEX – Aston/River Long/Short
• JAZZX – James Advantage Long/Short
• GRTHX – GRT Absolute Return Fund

Good:

The two funds with positive investment decision-making attributes based on the FundReveal model are FMLSX and MFLDX.  Both persistently deliver A-Best risk-return performance, and relatively high Persistence Ratings, a measurement of the likelihood of A performance in the future: FMLSX: 40%, and MFLDX: 44%.

Not so Good:

JAZZX has demonstrated high Volatility and low Average Daily Return relative to its peers and the S&P.   It has only been in existence a short time; we have data from 2011 and 2012 YTD, but it is not faring well.   A wait and see position is probably justified.

Some additional candidates for consideration garnered from the FundReveal “Best Funds List” (free the FundReveal site).

VMNFX Vanguard Market Neutral Fund.  A solid low risk fund with 45% Persistence.  It has not hit the ball out of the park, but the team is demonstrating good decision- making as inferred from FundReveal measurements.

ALHIX American Century Equity Market Neutral Fund.  A solid fund with 4% volatility, market beating Average Daily Return in 2011, and Persistence of 44%.

FLSRX Forward Long/Short Credit Analysis Fund.  This fund may not even belong in this discussion since the others are stock funds.  Morningstar classifies this as an alternative bond fund.  Its portfolio is nearly exclusively Muni Bonds.  It is 34% Short and 132% Long in the Muni Bonds that make up 99% of its portfolio.  It has low Volatility, high Average Daily Return, Persistence Rating of 44%, and extraordinary performance in down markets (32% above the S&P).

A complete version of this analysis with tables and graphics is available on the FundReveal blog.

Best of the Web: Our Summer Doldrums Edition

Our contributing editor, Junior Yearwood, in collaboration with financial planner Johanna Fox-Turner have fine-tuned their analysis of retirement income calculators, a discussion they initiated last month.  In addition, Junior added a review of Chuck Jaffe’s new MoneyLife podcast.  Drop by Best of the Web to sample both!

Two Funds and Why They’re Really Worth Your While

Each month, the Observer profiles between two and four mutual funds that you likely have not heard about, but really should have.  Our “Most intriguing new funds: good ideas, great managers” do not yet have a long track record, but have other virtues which warrant your attention.  They might come from a great boutique or be offered by a top-tier manager who has struck out on his own.  The “stars in the shadows” aren’t all worthy of your “gotta buy” list, but all of them are going to be fundamentally intriguing possibilities that warrant some thought. Two intriguing  funds are:

Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX): Andrew Foster, who performed brilliantly as a risk-conscious emerging Asia manager for Matthews, is now leading this Asia-centric diversified emerging markets fund.  It builds on his years of experience and maintains its cautiousness, while adding substantial flexibility.

Marketfield (MFLDX): there are two reasons to read, now and closely, about Marketfield.  One, it’s about the most successful alternative-investment fund available to retail investors.  Two, it’s just been bought by New York Life and will be slapped with a front-end load come October.  Investors wanting to maintain access to no-load shares need to think, now, about their options.

Rest in Peace: Industry Leaders Fund (ILFIX)

I note with sadness the closing of Industry Leaders fund, a small sensible fund run by Gerry Sullivan, a remarkably principled investor.  The fund identified industries in which there was either one or two dominant players, invested equally in them and rebalanced periodically.  The idea (patented) was to systematically exclude sectors where leaders never emerged or were quickly overthrown.  The fund did brilliantly for the first half of its existence and passably in the second half, weighed down by exposure to global financial firms, but never managed any marketing track.

Sullivan continues as the (relatively new) manager of Vice Fund (VICEX), which has a long and oddly-distinguished record.

Briefly noted …

Several months ago we reported on the Zacks fund rating service, noting that it was sloppy, poorly explained, unclear, and possibly illogical.  Doubtless emboldened by our praise, Mitch and Ben Zacks have launched two ETFs: Zacks Sustainable Dividend ETF and Zacks MLP ETF.  There’s no evident need for either, an observation quite irrelevant in the world of ETFs.

Small Wins for Investors

Schwab reduced the expense ratio on Laudus Small-Cap MarketMasters (SWOSX) by 10 basis points and Laudus International MarketMasters (SWOIX) by 19 basis points.

Forward Frontier Strategy (FRNMX) has capped the fund’s expenses at 1.09 – 1.49%, depending on share class.

The three Primecap Odyssey funds (Stock POSKX, Growth POGRX and Aggressive Growth POAGX) have all dropped their 2% redemption fees.  That’s not really much of a win for investors since the redemption fees are designed to discourage rapid trading of fund shares (which is a bad thing), but I take what small gains I can find.

Touchstone Emerging Markets Equity (TEMAX) has reopened to new investors after 16 months.

Former Seligman Manager in Insider-Trading Case

The SEC announced that former Seligman Communications and Information comanager Reema Shah pled guilty to securities fraud and is barred permanently from the securities industry. The SEC says that Shah and a Yahoo (YHOO) executive swapped insider tips and that the Seligman fund she comanaged and others at the firm netted a $389,000 profit from trading based on insider information on Yahoo.

Farewells

Gary Motyl, chief investment officer for the Franklin, Templeton, and Mutual Series fund families, passed away.  Motyl was one of Sir John Templeton’s first hires and he’s been Franklin’s CIO for 12 years.  Pending the appointment of a new CIO later this summer, his duties are being covered by three other members of Franklin’s staff.

Closings

Delaware Select Growth (DVEAX) closed to new month on June 8th.

Franklin Double Tax-Free Income (FPRTX) initiated a soft close on June 15^th and will switch to a hard close on August 1^st.

Prudential Jennison Health Sciences (PHLAX) closed on June 29^th after siphoning up $300 million in 18 months.

For those interested, The Wall Street Journal publishes a complete closed fund list each month.  It’s available online with the almost-poetic name, Table of Mutual Funds Closed to New Investors.

Old Wine, New Bottles

JPMorgan Asia Pacific Focus has changed its name to JPMorgan Asia Pacific (JASPX). The management of the team will be Mark Davids and Geoff Hoare.

Columbia Strategic Investor (CSVAX) will be renamed Columbia Global Dividend Opportunity. Actually it will become an entirely different fund under the guise of being “tweaked.”  I love it when they do that.  The former small cap and convertibles fund gets reborn as an all-cap global stock fund benchmarked against the MSCI All World Country Index. CSVAX’s managers have been fired and replaced by a team of guys who already run six other Columbia funds.

Ivy International Balanced (IVBAX) is being renamed Ivy Global Income Allocation.  It also picked up a second manager.

Off to the Dustbin of History

September will be the last issue of SmartMoney, a magazine once head-and-shoulders sharper and more data-driven than its peers.  According to a phone rep for SmartMoney, Dow is likely to convert SmartMoney.com into a pay site.  Dow will, they promise, “beef up” the online version and add editorial staff.  Plans have not yet been made final, but it sounds like SmartMoney subscribers will get free access to the site and might get downloadable versions of the articles.

It was a busy month for Acadia Principal Conservation Fund (APCVX).  On June one, the board cut its offensively high 12(b)1 fee in half (to an industry-standard 0.25%) and dropped its expense ratio by 10 basis points.  On June 25^th, they closed and liquidated the fund.  On the upside, the fund (mostly) preserved principal in its two years of existence.  On the downside, it made no money for its investors and had a negative real return.  Still, that doesn’t speak to the coherence of their planning.

Effective June 1, Bridgeway Aggressive Investors 2 (which I once dubbed “Bridgeway Not Quite So Aggressive Investors”) and Micro-Cap Limited both ceased to exist, having merged into Aggressive Investors 1 (BRAGX) and Ultra-Small Company (BRUSX).  Both of the remaining funds had long, brilliant runs before getting nailed in recent years by the apparent implosion of Bridgeway’s quant models.

Fido plans to merge Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector All Cap (FARAX) into Fidelity Stock Selector All Cap (FDSSX), which would lead to an expense reduction for the Advisor shareholders.  By year’s end, Fidelity will merge Mid Cap Growth (FSMGX) into Stock Selector Mid Cap Fund (FSSMX). They’ve already closed Mid Cap Growth in preparation for the move.

JPMorgan Asia Equity (JAEAX) is being liquidated on July 20, 2012.  It’s a bad fund that has seen massive outflows.  The managers, nonetheless, will remain with JPMorgan.

Nuveen Large Cap Value (FASKX) merges into Nuveen Dividend Value (FFEIX), also in October.  That’s a win for Large Cap shareholders: they get the same management team and a comparable strategy with lower expenses.

Oppenheimer Fixed Income Active Allocation (OAFAX) will merge into Oppenheimer Global Strategic Income (OPSIX) in early October, 2012.

Victory Value (SVLSX), which spiraled from mediocre to awful in the last two years, will liquidate at the end of August.  Friends and mourners still have access to Victory Special Value (SSVSX, a weak mid-cap growth fund) and Victory Established Value (VETAX, actually very solid mid-cap value fund).

I’m off to Washington for the Fourth of July week with family.  Preparation for that trip and ten days of often-hectic travel in June kept me from properly thanking several contributors (thanks!  A formal acknowledgement is coming!) and from completing profiles of a couple fascinating funds: Cook and Bynum (COBYX) and FPA International (FPIVX), one of which will be part of a major set of new profiles in August.

Until then, take care, keep cool and celebrate family!