Yearly Archives: 2012

Bridgeway Managed Volatility (BRBPX), January 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

To provide high current return with less short-term risk than the stock market, the Fund buys and sells a combination of stocks, options, futures, and fixed-income securities. Up to 75% of the portfolio may be in stocks and options.  They may short up to 35% via index futures.  At least 25% must be in stocks and no more than 15% in foreign stocks.  At least 25% will be in bonds, but those are short-term Treasuries with an average duration of five months (the manager refers to them as “the anchor rather than the sail” of the fund).  They will, on average, hold 150-200 securities.

Adviser

Bridgeway Capital Management.  The first Bridgeway fund – Ultra Small Company – opened in August of 1994.  The firm has 11 funds and 60 or so separate accounts, with about $2 billion under management.  Bridgeway’s corporate culture is famously healthy and its management ranks are very stable.

Managers

Richard Cancelmo is the lead portfolio manager and leads the trading team for Bridgeway. He joined Bridgeway in 2000 and has over 25 years of investment industry experience, including five years with Cancelmo Capital Management and The West University Fund. He has been the fund’s manager since inception.

Management’s stake

Mr. Cancelmo has been $100,000 and $500,000 invested in the fund.  John Montgomery, Bridgeway’s president, has an investment in that same range.  Every member of Bridgeway’s board of trustees also has a substantial investment in the fund.

Opening date

June 29, 2001.

Minimum investment

$2000 for both regular and tax-sheltered accounts.

Expense ratio

0.95% on assets of $29.8 million, as of June 2023. 

Comments

They were one of the finest debate teams I encountered in 20 years.  Two young men from Northwestern University.  Quiet, in an activity that was boisterous.  Clean-cut, in an era that was ragged.  They pursued very few argumentative strategies, but those few were solid, and executed perfectly. Very smart, very disciplined, but frequently discounted by their opponents.  Because they were unassuming and their arguments were relatively uncomplicated, folks made the (fatal) assumption that they’d be easy to beat.   Toward the end of one debate, one of the Northwesterners announced with a smile: “Our strategy has worked perfectly.  We have lulled them into mistakes.  In dullness there is strength!”

Bridgeway Balanced is likewise.  This fund has very few strategies but they are solid and executed perfectly.  The portfolio is 25 – 75% mid- to large-cap domestic stocks, the remainder of the portfolio is (mostly Treasury) bonds.  Within the stock portfolio, about 60% is indexed to the S&P 500 and 40% is actively managed using Bridgeway’s computer models.  Within the actively managed part, half of the picks lean toward value and half toward growth.  (Yawn.)  But also – here’s the exciting dull part – particularly within the active portion of the portfolio, Mr. Cancelmo has the ability to substitute covered calls and secured puts for direct ownership of the stocks!  (If you’re tingling now, it’s probably because your legs have fallen asleep.)

These are financial derivatives, called options.  I’ve tried six different ways of writing a layperson’s explanation for options and they were all miserably unclear.  Suffice it to say that the options are a tool to generate modest cash flows for the fund while seriously limiting the downside risk and somewhat limiting the upside potential.  At base, the fund sacrifices some Alpha in order to seriously limit Beta.  The strategy requires excellent execution or you’ll end up losing more on the upside than you gain on the downside.

But Bridgeway seems to be executing exceedingly well.  From inception through late December, 2012, BRBPX turned $10,000 into $15,000.  That handily beats its long/short funds peer group ($12,500) and the 700-pound gorilla of option strategy funds, Gateway (GATEX, $14,200).  Those returns are also better than those for the moderate allocation group, which exposes you to 60% of the stock market’s volatility against Bridgeway’s 40%. They’ve accomplished those gains with little volatility: for the past decade, their standard deviation is 7 (the S&P 500 is 15) and their beta is 0.41. 

This occurs within the context of Bridgeway’s highly principled corporate structure: small operation, very high ethical standards, unwavering commitment to honest communication with their shareholders (if you need to talk to founder John Montgomery or Mr. Cancelmo, just call and ask – the phone reps are in the same office suite with them and are authorized to ring straight through),  modest salaries (they actually report them – Mr. Cancelmo earned $423,839 in 2004 and the company made a $12,250 contribution to his IRA), a commitment to contribute 50% of their profits to charity, and a rule requiring folks to keep their investable wealth in the Bridgeway funds.

Very few people have chosen to invest in the fund – net assets are around $24 million, down from a peak of $130 million. Not just down, but steadily and consistently down even as performance has been consistently solid.  I’ve speculated elsewhere about the cause of the decline: a mismatch with the rest of the Bridgeway line-up, a complex strategy that’s hard for outsiders to grasp and to have confidence in, and poor marketing among them.  Given Bridgeway’s commitment to capping fees, the decline is sad and puzzling but has limited significance for the fund’s shareholders.

Bottom line

“In dullness, there is strength!”  For folks who want some equity exposure but can’t afford the risk of massive losses, or for any investor looking to dampen the volatility of an aggressive portfolio, Bridgeway Managed Volatility – like Bridgeway, in general – deserves serious consideration.

Company website

Bridgeway Managed Volatility

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2013. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

January 2013, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

AdvisorShares Recon Capital Alternative Income ETF

AdvisorShares Recon Capital Alternative Income ETF (PUTS) will seek consistent, low volatility returns across all market cycles. The managers will do that by selling put options on equities in each of the ten sectors of the S&P 500 Index, using a proprietary selection process.  Kevin Kelly and Garrett Paolella of Recon Capital Partners have managed the fund “since 2011” (an intriguing claim for a fund launched in 2013).  Expenses not yet set.

Avatar Capital Preservation Fund

Avatar Capital Preservation Fund seeks to preserve capital while providing current income and limited capital appreciation.  The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Avatar Tactical Multi-Asset Income Fund

Avatar Tactical Multi-Asset Income Fund seeks current income. The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Avatar Absolute Return Fund

Avatar Absolute Return Fund seeks a positive total return in all market environments.  The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions. The percentage of the Fund’s portfolio invested in each asset class will change over time and may range from 0%-100%, and the Fund may experience moderate volatility.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Avatar Global Opportunities Fund

Avatar Global Opportunities Fund will seek maximum capital appreciation through exposure to global markets. The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Investors Variable NAV Money Market Fund

Investors Variable NAV Money Market Fund will seek to maximize current income to the extent consistent with the preservation of capital and maintenance of liquidity by investing exclusively in high-quality money market instruments.  The fund is managed by Northern Trust Investments, though no individuals are named. The expense ratio is 0.35% and minimum initial investment is $2500, $500 for an IRA and $250 for accounts established with an automatic investment plan. They are simultaneously launching three other variable-NAV money market funds: Investors Variable NAV AMT-Free Municipal Money Market, Variable NAV U.S. Government Money Market and Variable NAV Treasury Money Market Fund.

LSV Small Cap Value Fund

LSV Small Cap Value Fund will seek long-term growth by investing in stocks with a market cap under $2.5 billion (or the highest market cap in the Russell 2000 Value Index, whichever is greater).  Their goal is to find stocks which are out-of-favor but show signs of recent improvement.  They use a quant investment model to match fundamentals with indicators of short-term appreciation potential.   The fund will be managed by Josef Lakonishok, Menno Vermeulen, and Puneet Mansharamani.   Lakonishok is a reasonably famous academic who did some of the groundbreaking work on behavioral finance, then translated that research into actual investment strategies.  His LSV Value Equity Fund (LSVEX) turned $10,000 in $22,000 since launch in 1999; its average peer would have earned $16,200 and the S&P, $14,200. The minimum initial investment is a bracing $100,000. The expense ratio is 0.85%.

SMI Dynamic Allocation Fund

SMI Dynamic Allocation Fund seeks total return through a “dynamic asset allocation investment strategy” in which it invests in the most attractive three of six major asset classes:  U.S. equities, international equities, fixed income securities, real estate, precious metals, and cash.  They’ll look at momentum, asset flows and historical volatility, among other things. The asset allocation and equity sleeve is managed by a team from Sound Mind Investing (Mark Biller, Eric Collier and Anthony Ayers).  The two Sound Mind funds tend to below average returns but low volatility. The fixed income sleeve is managed by Scout Investment’s Reams Asset Management Division.  The Reams team (Mark M. Egan, Thomas M. Fink, Todd Thompson, and  Steven T. Vincent) are really first-rate and were nominated by Morningstar as a 2012 Fixed Income Manager of the Year. The minimum initial investment is $2500. Expenses not yet set.

SPDR SSgA Large Cap Risk Aware ETF

SPDR SSgA Large Cap Risk Aware ETF seeks to provide competitive returns compared to the large cap U.S. equity market and capital appreciation.  I’ll let the managers speak for themselves: “invests in a diversified selection of equity securities included in the Russell 1000 Index that [they] believes are aligned with predicted investor risk preferences. . .  During periods of anticipated high risk, the Adviser will adjust the Portfolio’s composition to be defensive and may increase exposure to value companies.” (The assumption that “value” and “low-risk” are interchangeable seems, to me, to be debatable.)   In low risk periods, they’ll emphasize riskier assets and in periods of moderate risk they’ll look more like the Russell 1000.  The fund is non-diversified.  The fund will be managed by Gary Lowe, Simon Roe and John O’Connell, all of SSgA. Expenses not yet set.

SPDR SSgA Risk Aware ETF

SPDR SSgA Risk Aware ETF seeks to provide competitive returns compared to the broad U.S. equity market and capital appreciation.  I’ll let the managers speak for themselves: “invests in a diversified selection of equity securities included in the Russell 3000 Index that [they] believes are aligned with predicted investor risk preferences. . .  During periods of anticipated high risk, the Adviser will adjust the Portfolio’s composition to be defensive and may increase exposure to large cap and/or value companies.”  In low risk periods, they’ll emphasize riskier assets and in periods of moderate risk they’ll look more like the Russell 3000.  The fund is non-diversified.  The fund will be managed by Gary Lowe, Simon Roe and John O’Connell, all of SSgA. Expenses not yet set.

SPDR SSgA Small Cap Risk Aware ETF

SPDR SSgA Small Cap Risk Aware ETF seeks to provide competitive returns compared to the small cap U.S. equity market and capital appreciation.  I’ll let the managers speak for themselves: “invests in a diversified selection of equity securities included in the Russell 2000 Index that [they] believes are aligned with predicted investor risk preferences. . .  During periods of anticipated high risk, the Adviser will adjust the Portfolio’s composition to be defensive and may increase exposure to value companies.”  In low risk periods, they’ll emphasize riskier assets and in periods of moderate risk they’ll look more like the Russell 2000.  The fund is non-diversified.  The fund will be managed by Gary Lowe, Simon Roe and John O’Connell, all of SSgA. Expenses not yet set.

Stone Toro Relative Value Fund

Stone Toro Relative Value Fund will seek capital appreciation with a secondary focus on current income by investing, primarily, in US stocks.  Up to 40% of the portfolio may be invested in ADRs.  The managers warn us that “The Fund’s investment strategy involves active and frequent trading.”  They don’t say much about what they’re up to and they use a lot of unnecessary quotation marks when they try: “The Adviser employs a unique proprietary process, the Relative Value Process (the ‘Process’), to identify ‘special investment value’.”  The Process is managed by Michael Jarzyna, Founding Partner and CIO of Stone Toro.  He spent a year or so (2008-09) as Associate Portfolio Manager of Blackrock Value Opportunity Fund. From 1998-2006, he managed the technology portions of Merrill Lynch’s small and mid-cap value funds. The minimum initial investment is $1,000.  The expense ratio is 1.57%.

Manager changes, December 2012

By Chip

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
VERDX Aston/Veredus Small Cap Growth Subadvisor, Todd-Veredus Asset Management, has been fired. Lee Munder will be the new subadvisor and the fund will eventually be merged with the Munder-advised Aston SCG Fund.  In the interim, it’s ASTON Small Cap Fund. 12/12
CSXAX Calvert Social Index Fund David Jones and Eric Lessnau, along with subadvisor, World Asset Management Natalie Trunow 12/12
AAOPX Cavanal Hill Opportunistic S. Bob Rezaee Matt Stephani 12/12
DHOAX Delaware High-Yield Opportunities Kevin Loome Thomas H. Chow, Paul A. Matlack, Craig C. Dembek, and John P. McCarthy 12/12
DPHYX Delaware Pooled High-Yield Bond Kevin Loome and Chuck Devereux Thomas H. Chow, Paul A. Matlack, Craig C. Dembek, and John P. McCarthy 12/12
AAAAX DWS Alternative Asset Allocation Inna Okounkova, who’d been on leave through the end of the year, is no longer listed as a portfolio manager. The rest of the team remains. 12/12
FMAAX Federated Prudent Absolute Return Doug Noland, manager of Prudent Bear, will leave this fund Dana Meissner will remain but the word “Prudent” won’t. 12/12
FGLAX Fidelity Advisor Global Balanced Leon Tucker left the team. Maria Nikishkova joined. 12/12
FGBLX Fidelity Global Balanced Leon Tucker left the team. Maria Nikishkova joined. 12/12
FIGVX First Investors Government No one, but . . . Rodwell Chadehumbe joined as comanager 12/12
ITHAX Hartford Capital Appreciation No one, but . . . In March, Kent Stahl and Gregg Thomas will join as comanagers, as part of the fund’s succession planning 12/12
HFOAX Henderson International Opportunities Michael Wood-Martin is no longer a comanager Vincent Musumeci and Nicholas Cowley have joined the team. 12/12
HMAAX HighMark Tactical Capital Growth Allocation Fund David Goerz Derek Izuel, E. Jack Montgomery, and David Wines are in 12/12
HMRAX HighMark Tactical Growth & Income David Goerz Derek Izuel, E. Jack Montgomery, and David Wines are in 12/12
HDEAX Huntington Disciplined Equity Donald Keller Peter A. Sorrentino 12/12
HIEAX Huntington International Equity Madelynn Matlock Paul Attwood 12/12
IFCAX ING Emerging Equity Dividend, formerly ING Greater China Fund As part of its reorganization ING is bringing fund management in-house while Guy Uding and Oscar Kin Fai Leung have been dispatched to the … uhh, outhouse. Robert Davis, Nicolas Simar, and Manu Vandenbulck are the new co-managers. 12/12
IMOIX ING Growth and Income Core Por In conjunction with the change to the Portfolio’s sub-adviser, Thornburg Investment Management, Edward Maran and Connor Browne will be replaced as co-portfolio managers Christopher F. Corapi and Michael Pytosh of ING Investment Management Co. will begin managing the portfolio. 12/12
IVCAX ING International Value Choice Tradewinds Global Investors, LLC was terminated as sub-adviser, another in a long series of losses for them. Martin Jansen, David Rabinowitz, and Joseph Vultaggio will be the new co-managers 12/12
NAWGX ING International Value Equity Tradewinds Global Investors, LLC was terminated as sub-adviser Martin Jansen, David Rabinowitz, and Joseph Vultaggio will be the new co-managers 12/12
PAVAX ING Value Choice A Tradewinds Global Investors, LLC was terminated as sub-adviser Christopher Corapi and Robert Kloss of ING Investment Management Co. will begin managing the portfolio. 12/12
LGILX Laudus Growth Investors US Large Cap Lawrence Kemp Paul A. Graham, Saverio (Sam) Console and Peter Bye are co-managers of the fund. 12/12
SBEYX Legg Mason Esemplia Emerging Markets Long-Short Aquico Wen Stavros Triantafilidis, Michael Bourke and Eric Curiel got the nod.  Their task might be to stop this from acting like a simple e.m. index fund (its 2012 r-squared is 97). 12/12
MSSFX Litman Gregory Masters Smaller Companies Copper Rock Capital Partners and portfolio manager Tucker Walsh have been fired.  No shame: the fund discharged formerly Masterful investors in 2006, 07, 09, 10, 11 and 12. Frank Sustersic and Turner Investment Partners have been hired to join the rest of the team. 12/12
FGIAX Nuveen Global Infrastructure No one, but . . . Tryg Sarsland joins Jay Rosenberg and John Wenker 12/12
BPFAX PTA Comprehensive Alternatives Fund We didn’t even know the PTA ran a mutual fund.  In any case, no one lost their job though given average annual losses of 5.6% over the past five years perhaps someone should have. Subadvisor Horizon Asset Management, with Murray Stahl, Steven Bregman, and Peter Doyle are added. 12/12
RCAPX RS Capital Appreciation Fund As part of reorganization into RS Growth Fund, Christy Phillips, Larry Coats, and David Carr, of subadvisor Oak Value, are all out. Stephen Bishop, Melissa Chadwick-Dunn, and D. Scott Tracy, are in. 12/12
FSCFX Strategic Advisers Small-Mid Cap No one, but . . . Donald Cobin and Christian McDonald were added as portfolio managers. 12/12
FNAPX Strategic Advisers Small-Mid Cap Multi-Manager No one, but . . . Donald Cobin and Christian McDonald were added as portfolio managers. 12/12
PAMGX Prudential Target Moderate Allocation, renamed Prudential Defensive Equity As part of a change in objective, all existing subadvisors will be out. New subadvisor, Quantitative Management Associates, will be in. 12/12
VEINX Wilmington Large Cap Value NWQ Investment Management Company, with portfolio managers Kevin Hunter and Jon Bosse, is out Andrew Hopkins, Rafael Tamargo, Thomas Neale, and Edward Forrester are in 12/12

 

January 1, 2013

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

We’ve been listening to REM’s “It’s the End of the World (as we know it)” and thinking about copyrighting some useful terms for the year ahead.  You know that Bondpocalypse and Bondmageddon are both getting programmed into the pundits’ vocabulary.  Chip suggests Bondtastrophe and Bondaster.  

Bad asset classes (say, TIPs and long bonds) might be merged in the Frankenfund.  Members of the Observer’s discussion board offered bond doggle (thanks, Bee!), the Bondfire of the Vanities (Shostakovich’s entry and probably our most popular), the New Fed (which Hank thinks we’ll be hearing by year’s end) which might continue the racetodebase (Rono) and bondacious (presumably blondes, Accipiter’s best).  Given that snowstorms now get their own names (on the way to Pittsburgh, my son and I drove through the aftermath of Euclid), perhaps market panics, too?  We’d start of course with Market Crisis Alan, in honor of The Maestro, but we haven’t decided whether that would rightly be followed by Market Crisis Ben, Barack or Boehner.  Hopeful that they couldn’t do it again, we could honor them all with Crash B3 which might defame the good work done by vitamin B3 in regulating sex and stress.

Feel free to join in on the 2013 Word of the Year thread, if only if figure out how Daisy Duke got there.

The Big Bond Bubble Boomnanza?

I’m most nervous when lots of other folks seem to agree with me.  It’s usually a sign that I’ve overlooked something.

I’ve been suggesting for quite a while now that the bond market, as a whole, might be in a particularly parlous position.   Within the living memory of almost the entire investing community, investing in bonds has been a surefire way to boost your portfolio.  Since 1981, the bond market has enjoyed a 31-year bull market.  What too many investors forget is that 1981 was preceded by a 35-year year bear market for bonds.  The question is: are we at or near another turning point?

The number of people reaching that conclusion is growing rapidly.  Floyd Norris of The New York Times wrote on December 28th: “A new bear market almost certainly has begun” (Reading Pessimism in the Market for Bonds).  The Wall Street Journal headlined the warning, “Danger Lurks Inside the Bond Boom amid Corporate-Borrowing Bonanza, Some Money Managers Warn of Little Room Left for Gains” (12/06/2012).  Separately, the Journal warned of “a rude awakening” for complacent bond investors (12/24/2012).  Barron’s warns of a “Fed-inflated bond bubble” (12/17/2012). Hedge fund manager Ray Dalio claims that “The biggest opportunity [in 2013] will be – and it isn’t imminent – shorting bond markets around the world” (our friends at LearnBonds.com have a really good page of links to commentaries on the bond market, on which this is found).

I weighed in on the topic in a column I wrote for Amazon’s Money and Markets page.  The column, entitled “Trees Do Not Grow to the Sky,” begins:

You thought the fallout from 2000-01 was bad?  You thought the 2008 market seizure provoked anguish?  That’s nothing, compared to what will happen when every grandparent in America cries out, as one, “we’ve been ruined.”

In the past five years, investors have purchased one trillion dollars’ worth of bond mutual fund shares ($1.069 trillion, as of 11/20/12, if you want to be picky) while selling a half trillion in stock funds ($503 billion).

Money has flowed into bond mutual funds in 53 of the past 60 weeks (and out of stock funds in 46 of 60 weeks).

Investors have relentlessly bid up the price of bonds for 30 years so they’ve reached the point where they’re priced to return less than nothing for the next decade.

Morningstar adds that about three-quarters of that money went to actively-managed bond funds, a singularly poor bet in most instances.

I included a spiffy graph and then reported on the actions of lots of the country’s best bond investors.  You might want to take a quick scan of their activities.  It’s fairly sobering.

Among my conclusions:  

Act now, not later. “Act” is not investment advice, it’s communication advice.  Start talking with your spouse, financial adviser, fund manager, and other investors online, about how they’ve thought about the sorts of information I’ve shared and how they’ve reacted to it.  Learn, reflect, then act.

We’re not qualified to offer investment advice and we’re not saying that you should be abandoning the bond market. As we said to Charles, one of our regular readers,

I’m very sensitive to the need for income in a portfolio, for risk management and for diversification so leaving fixed-income altogether strikes me as silly and unmanageable.  The key might be to identify the risks your exposing yourself to and the available rewards.  In general, I think folks are most skeptical of long-term sovereign debt issued by governments that are … well, broke.  Such bonds have the greatest interest rate sensitivity and then to be badly overpriced because they’ve been “the safe haven” in so many panics.  

So I’d at the very least look to diversify my income sources and to work with managers who are not locked into very narrow niches. 

MFWire: Stock Fund Flows Are Turning Around

MF Wire recently announced “Stock Funds Turn Around” (December 28, 2012), which might also be titled “Investors continue retreat from U.S. stock funds.” In the last full week of 2012, investors pulled $750 million from US stock funds and added $1.25 billion into international ones.

Forbes: Buy Bonds, Sleep Well

Our take might be, Observer: buy bonds, sleep with the fishes.  On December 19th, Forbes published 5 Mutual Funds for Those Who Want to Sleep Well in 2013.  Writer Abram Brown went looking for funds that performed well in recent years (always the hallmark of good fund selection: past performance) and that avoided weird strategies.  His list of winners:

PIMCO Diversified Income (PDVDX) – a fine multi-asset fund.

MFS Research Bond R3 (MRBHX) – R3 shares are only available through select retirement plans.  The publicly available “A” shares carry a sales load, which has trimmed about a percent a year off its returns.

Russell Strategic Bond (RFCEX) – this is another unavailable share class; the publicly available “A” shares have higher expenses, a load, and a lower Morningstar rating.

TCW Emerging Markets Income (TGEIX) – a fine fund whose assets have exploded in three years, from $150 million to $6.2 billion.

Loomis Sayles Bond (LBFAX) – the article points you to the fund’s Administrative shares, rather than the lower-cost Retail shares (LSBRX) but I don’t know why.

Loomis might illustrate some of the downsides to investing in the past.  Its famous lead manager, Dan Fuss, is now 79 years old and likely in the later stages of his career.  His heir apparent, Kathleen Gaffney, recently left the firm.  That leaves the fund in the hands of two lesser-known managers.

I’m not sure of how well most folks will sleep when their manager’s toting 40-100% emerging markets exposure or 60% junk bonds when the next wave crashes over the market, but it’s an interesting list.

Forbes is, by the way, surely a candidate for the most badly junked up page in existence, and one of the least useful.  Only about a third of the screen is the story, the rest are ads and misleading links.  See also “10 best mutual funds” does not lead to a Forbes story on the subject – it leads to an Ask search results page with paid results at top.

Vanguard: The Past 10 Years

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.

Here are our findings so far:

Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches, has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price continues to deliver on its promises.  Of the 22 funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).  Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play.

PIMCO has utterly crushed the competition, both in the thoughtfulness of their portfolios and in their performance.  PIMCO has, for example, about three times as many five-star funds – both overall and among funds launched in the last decade – than you’d predict.

The retirement of Gus Sauter, Vanguard’s long-time chief investment officer, makes this is fitting moment to look back on the decade just past.

Measured in terms of the number of funds launched or the innovativeness of their products, the decade has been unremarkable.  Vanguard:

  • Has 112 funds (which are sold in over 278 packages or share classes)
  • 29 of their funds were launched in the past decade
  • 106 of them are old enough to have earned Morningstar ratings
  • 8 of them has a five star rating (as of 12/27/12)
  • 57 more earned four-star ratings.

Morningstar awards five-stars to the top 10% of funds in a class and four-stars to the next 22.5%.  The table below summarizes what you’d expect from a firm of Vanguard’s size and then what they’ve achieved.

 

Expected Value

Observed value

Vanguard, Five Star Funds, overall

10

8

Vanguard, Four and Five Star Funds, overall

34

65

Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

2

1

Four and Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

7

18

What does the chart suggest?  Vanguard is less likely to be “spectacular” than the numbers would suggest but more than twice as likely to be “really good.”  That makes a great deal of sense given the nature of Vanguard’s advantage: the “at cost” ethos and tight budget controls means that they enter each year with a small advantage over the market.  With time that advantage compounds but remains modest.

The funds launched in the past decade are mostly undistinguished, in the sense that they incorporate neither unusual combinations of assets (no “emerging markets balanced” or “global infrastructure” here) nor innovative responses to changing market conditions (as with “real return” or “inflation-tuned” ones).   The vast bulk are target-date funds, other retirement income products, or new indexed funds for conventional market segments.

They’ve launched about five new actively-managed retail funds which, as a group, peak out at “okay.”

Ticker

Fund Name

Morningstar Rating

Morningstar Category

Total Assets ($mil)

VDEQX

 Diversified Equity Income

★★★

Large Growth

1180

VMMSX

 Emerging  Markets Select Stock

Diversified Emerging Mkts

120

VEVFX

 Explorer Value

 

Small Blend

126

VEDTX

 Extended Duration Treasury Index

★★

Long Government

693

VFSVX

 FTSE All-World ex-US Small Cap Index

★★

Foreign Small/Mid Blend

1344

VGXRX

 Global ex-US Real Estate

Global Real Estate

644

VLCIX

 Long-Term Corporate Bond

★★★★

Long-Term Bond

1384

VLGIX

 Long-Term Gov’t Bond I

Long Government

196

VPDFX

 Managed Payout Distribution Focused

★★★★

Retirement Income

592

VPGDX

Managed Payout Growth & Distribution Focused

★★★★

Retirement Income

365

VPGFX

Managed Payout Growth Focused

★★★

Retirement Income

72

VPCCX

 PRIMECAP Core

★★★★

Large Growth

4684

VSTBX

 Short-Term Corp Bond Index

★★★★

Short-Term Bond

4922

VSTCX

 Strategic Small-Cap Equity

★★★★

Small Blend

257

VSLIX

 Structured Large-Cap Equity

★★★★

Large Blend

 

507

VSBMX

 Structured Broad Market Index

★★★★

Large Blend

384

VTENX

 Target Retirement 2010

★★★★

Target Date 2000-2010

6327

VTXVX

 Target Retirement 2015

★★★★

Target Date 2011-2015

17258

VTWNX

 Target Retirement 2020

★★★★

Target Date 2016-2020

16742

VTTVX

 Target Retirement 2025

★★★★

Target Date 2021-2025

20670

VTHRX

 Target Retirement 2030

★★★★

Target Date 2026-2030

13272

VTTHX

 Target Retirement 2035

★★★★

Target Date 2031-2035

14766

VFORX

 Target Retirement 2040

★★★★

Target Date 2036-2040

8448

VTIVX

 Target Retirement 2045

★★★★

Target Date 2041-2045

8472

VFIFX

 Target Retirement 2050

★★★★

Target Date 2046-2050

3666

VFFVX

 Target Retirement 2055

Target-Date 2051+

441

VTTSX

 Target Retirement 2060

Target-Date 2051+

50

VTINX

 Target Retirement Income

★★★★★

Retirement Income

9629

VTBIX

 Total Bond Market II

★★

Intermediate-Term Bond

62396

This is not to suggest that Vanguard has been inattentive of their shareholders best interests.  Rather they seem to have taken an old adage to heart: “be like a duck, stay calm on the surface but paddle like hell underwater.”  I’m indebted to Taylor Larimore, co-founder of the Bogleheads, for sharing the link to a valedictory interview with Gus Sauter, who points out that Vanguard’s decided to shift the indexes on which their funds are based.  That shift will, over time, save Vanguard’s investors hundreds of millions of dollars.  It also exemplifies the enduring nature of Vanguard’s competitive advantage: the ruthless pursuit of many small, almost invisible gains for their investors, the sum of which is consistently superior results.

Celebrating Small Cap Season

The Observer has, of late, spent a lot of time talking about the challenge of managing volatility.  That’s led us to discussions of long/short, covered call, and strategic income funds.  The two best months for small cap funds are January and February.  Average returns of U.S. small caps in January from 1927 to 2011 were 2.3%, more than triple those in February, which 0.72%.  And so we teamed up again with the folks at FundReveal to review the small cap funds we’ve profiled and to offer a recommendation or two.

The Fund

The Scoop

2012,

thru 12/29

Three year

Aegis Value (AVALX):

$153 million in assets, 75% microcaps, top 1% of small value funds over the past five years, driven by a 91% return in 2009.

23.0

14.7

Artisan Small Cap (ARTSX)

$700 million in assets, a new management team – those folks who manage Artisan Mid Cap (ARTMX) – in 2009 have revived Artisan’s flagship fund, risk conscious strategy but a growthier profile, top tier returns under the new team.

15.5

13.7

ASTON/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX)

$720 million in assets.  The fund closed in anticipation of institutional inflows, then reopened when those did not appear.  Let me be clear about two things: (1) it’s going to close again soon and (2) you’re going to kick yourself for not taking it more seriously.  The manager has an obsessive absolute-return focus and will not invest just for the sake of investing; he’s sitting on about 50% cash.  He’s really good at the “wait for the right opportunity” game and he’s succeeded over his tenure with three different funds, all using the same discipline.  I know his trailing 12-month ranking is abysmal (98th percentile in small value).  It doesn’t matter.

7.1

n/a

Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX)

$55 million in assets, pretty much the top small-value fund over the past one, three and five years, expenses are high but the manager is experienced and folks have been getting more than their money’s worth

27.0

19.0

Lockwell Small Cap Value Institutional (LOCSX)

Tiny, new fund, top 16% among small blend funds over the past year, the manager had years with Morgan Stanley before getting downsized.  Scottrade reports a $100 minimum investment in the fund.

17.1

n/a

Mairs and Power Small Cap Fund (MSCFX) –

$40 million in assets, top 1% of small blend funds over the past year, very low turnover, very low key, very Mairs and Power.

27.1

n/a

Pinnacle Value (PVFIX)

$52 million in assets, microcap value stocks plus 40% cash, it’s almost the world’s first microcap balanced fund.  It tends to look relatively awful in strongly rising markets, but still posts double-digit gains.  Conversely tends to shine when the market’s tanking.

18.9

8.4

RiverPark Small Cap Growth (RPSFX)

$4 million in assets and relatively high expenses.  I was skeptical of this fund when we profiled it and its weak performance so far hasn’t given me cause to change my mind.

5.5

n/a

SouthernSun Small Cap Fund (SSSFX)

$400 million, top 1% returns among small blend funds for the past three and five years, reasonable expenses but a tendency to volatility

18.0

21.9

Vulcan Value Partners Small Cap Fund (VVPSX)

$200 million, top 4% among small blend funds over the past year, has substantially outperformed them since inception; it will earn its first Morningstar rating (four stars or five?) at the beginning of February.  Mr. Fitzpatrick was Longleaf manager for 17 years before launching Vulcan and was consistently placed in the top 5% of small cap managers.

24.3

n/a

Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund (WSCVX)

$550 million in assets, newly closed, with a young sibling fund.  This has been consistently in the top 1% of small blend funds, though its volatility is high.

30.6

19.8

You can reach the individual profiles by clicking in the “Funds” tab on our main navigation bar.  We’re in the process of updating them all during January.  Because our judgments embody a strong qualitative element, we asked our resolutely quantitative friends at FundReveal to look at our small caps and to offer their own data-driven reading of some of them. Their full analysis can be found on their blog.

FundReveal’s strategy is to track daily return and volatility data, rather than the more common monthly or quarterly measures.  They believe that allows them to look at many more examples of the managers’ judgment at work (they generate 250 data points a year rather than four or twelve) and to arrive at better predictions about a fund’s prospects.  One of FundReveal’s key measures is Persistence, the likelihood that a particular pattern of risk and return repeats itself, day after day.  In general, you can count on funds with higher persistence. Here are their highlights:

The MFO funds display, in general, higher volatility than the S&P 500 for both 2012 YTD and the past 5 years.  The one fund that had lower volatility in both time horizons is Pinnacle Value (PVFIX).   PVFIX demonstrates consistent performance with low volatility, factors to be combined with subjective analysis available from other sources.

Two other funds have delivered high ADR (Average Daily Return), but also present higher risk than the S&P.  In this case Southern Sun Small Cap (SSSFX) and Walthausen Small Cap (WSCVX) have high relative volatility, but they have delivered high ADR over both time horizons.  From the FundReveal perspective, SSSFX has the edge in terms of decision-making capability because it has delivered higher ADR than the S&P in 10 Quarters and lower ADR in 6 Quarters, while WSCVX had delivered higher ADR than the S&P in 7 Quarters and lower ADR in 7 Quarters.  

So, bottom line, from the FundReveal perspective PVFIX and SSSFX are the more attractive funds in this lineup. 

Some Small Cap funds worthy of consideration:

Small Blend 

  • Schwartz Value fund (RCMFX): Greater than S&P ADR, Lower Volatility (what we call “A” performance) for 2012 YTD and 2007-2012 YTD.  It has a high Persistence Rating (40%) that indicates a historic tendency to deliver A performance on a quarterly basis. 
  • Third Avenue Small-Cap Fund (TVSVX): Greater than S&P ADR, Lower Volatility with a medium Persistence Rating (33%).

Small Growth

  • Wasatch Micro Cap Value fund (WAMVX): Greater than  S&P ADR, Lower Volatility 2007-2012 YTF, with a medium Persistence Rating (30%).  No FundReveal covered Small Growth funds delivered “A” performance in 2012 YTD. (WAMVX is half of Snowball’s Roth IRA.)

Small Value

  • Pinnacle Value Fund (PVFIX): An MFO focus fund, discussed above.  It has a high Persistence Rating (50%).
  • Intrepid Small Cap Fund (ICMAX ): Greater than  S&P ADR, Lower Volatility for 2007-2012 YTF, with a high Persistence Rating (55%). Eric Cinnamond, who now manages Aston River Road Independent Value, managed ICMAX from 2005-10.
  • ING American Century Small-Mid Cap Value (ISMSX): Greater than  S&P ADR, Lower Volatility for 2007-2012 YTF, with a medium Persistence Rating (25%).

If you’re intrigued by the potential for fine-grained quantitative analysis, you should visit FundReveal.  While theirs is a pay service, free trials are available so that you can figure out whether their tools will help you make your own decisions.

Ameristock’s Curious Struggle

Nick Gerber’s Ameristock (AMSTX) fund was long an icon of prudent, focused investing but, like many owner-operated funds, is being absorbed into a larger firm.  In this case, it’s moving into the Drexel Hamilton family of funds.

Or not.  While these transactions are generally routine, a recent SEC filing speaks to some undiscussed turmoil in the move.  Here’s the filing:

As described in the Supplement Dated October 9, 2012 to the Prospectus of Ameristock Mutual Fund, Inc. dated September 28, 2012, a Special Meeting of Shareholders of the Ameristock Fund  was scheduled for December 12, 2012 at 11:00 a.m., Pacific Time, for shareholders to vote on a proposed Agreement and Plan of Reorganization and Termination pursuant to which the Ameristock Fund would be reorganized into the Drexel Hamilton Centre American Equity Fund, a series of Drexel Hamilton Mutual Funds, resulting in the complete liquidation and termination of the Ameristock Fund. The Special Meeting convened as scheduled on December 12, 2012, but was adjourned until … December 27, 2012.   … The Reconvened Special Meeting was reconvened as scheduled on December 27, 2012, but has again been adjourned and will reconvene on Thursday, January 10, 2012 …

Uh-huh. 

Should Old Acquaintance Be Forgot and Never Brought to Mind?

Goodness, no.

How long can a fund be incredibly, eternally awful and still survive?  The record is doubtless held by the former Steadman funds, which were ridiculed as the Deadman funds and eventually hid out as the Ameritor funds. They managed generations of horrible ineptitude. How horrible?  In the last decade of their existence (through 2007), they lost 98.98%.  That’s the transformation of $10,000 into $102. Sufficiently horrible that they became a case study at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business.

In celebrating the season of Auld Lang Syne, I set out to see whether there were any worthy successors on the horizon.  I scanned Morningstar’s database for funds which trailed at least 99% of the peers this year.  And over the past five years.  And 10 and 15 years.

Five funds actually cropped up as being that bad that consistently.  The good news for investors is that the story isn’t quite as bleak as it first appears.

The  Big Loser’s Name

Any explanation?

Delaware Tax-Free Minnesota Intermediate Term, B (DVSBX) and C (DVSCX) shares

Expenses matter.  The fund’s “A” shares are priced at 0.84% and earn a three-star rating.  “C” shares cost 1.69% – that’s close to a third of the bonds’ total return.

DFA Two-Year Global Fixed Income (DFGFX)

DFA is among the fund world’s more exclusive clubs.  Individuals can’t buy the funds nor can most advisors; advisors need to pass a sort of entrance exam just to be permitted to sell them.  Bad DFA funds are rare.  In the case of DFGFX, it’s a category error: it’s an ultra-short bond fund in an intermediate-term bond category. It returns 1-5% per year, never loses money and mostly looks wretched against higher return/higher risk peers in Morningstar’s world bond category.

Fidelity Select Environment and Alternative Energy (FSLEX)

This is a singularly odd result.  Morningstar places it in the “miscellaneous sector” category then, despite a series of 99th percentile returns, gives it a four-star rating.  Morningstar’s description: “this new category is a catchall.”  Given that the fate of “green” funds seems driven almost entirely by politicians’ agendas, it’s a dangerous field.

GAMCO Mathers AAA (MATRX)

Mathers is glum, even by the standards of bear market funds.  The good news can be summarized thus: high management stability (Mr. Van der Eb has been managing the fund since 1974) and it didn’t lose money in 2008.  The bad news is more extensive: it does lose money about 70% of the time, portfolio turnover is 1700%, expenses are higher, Mr. Eb is young enough to continue doing this for years and an inexplicably large number of shareholders ($20 million worth) are holding on.  Mr. Eb and about half of the trustees are invested in the fund.  Mr. Gabelli, the “G” of GAMCO, is not.

Nysa (NYSAX)

This is an entirely conventional little all-cap fund.  Mr. Samoraj is paid about $16,000/year to manage it.  It’s lost 6.8% a year under his watch.  You figure out whether he’s overpaid.  He’s also not invested a penny of his own money in the fund.  Smart man.  Do ye likewise. (The fund’s website doesn’t exist, so you’re probably safe.)

Jaffe’s Year-End Explosion

I’m not sure that Chuck Jaffe is the hardest-working man in the fund biz, but he does have periods of prodigious output.  December is one of those periods.   Chuck ran four features this month worth special note.

  • Farewell to Stupid Investments.  After nearly a decade, Chuck has ended down his “Stupid Investment of the Week” column.  Chuck’s closing columns echoes Cassius, in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”  Or perhaps Pogo, “we have met the enemy and he is us.”
  • 17th Annual Lump of Coal Awards, December 10 and December 17.  This is the litany of stupidity surrounding the fund industry, from slack-wit regulators to venal managers.  One interesting piece discusses Morningstar’s analyst ratings.  Morningstar’s ratings roughly break the universe down into good ideas (gold, silver, bronze), okay ideas (neutral) and bad ideas (negative).  Of the 1000+ funds rated so far, only 5%qualify for negative ratings.  Morningstar’s rejoinder is that there are 5000 unrated funds, the vast bulk of which don’t warrant any attention.  So while the 5% might be the tip of a proverbial iceberg, they represent the funds with the greatest risk of attracting serious investor attention.

    My recommendation, which didn’t make Chuck’s final list, was to present a particularly grimy bit o’ bituminous to the fund industry for its response to the bond mania.  Through all of 2012, the industry closed a total of four funds to new investment while at the same time launching 39 new bond funds.  That’s looks a lot like the same impulse that led to the launch of B2B Internet Services funds (no, I’m not making that up) just before the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000; a “hey, people want to buy this stuff so we’ve got an obligation to market it to them” approach.

  • Tales from the Mutual Fund Crypt, December 26: stories of recently-departed funds.  A favorite: the Auto-Pilot fund’s website drones on, six months after the fund’s liquidation.  It continues to describe the fund as “new,” six years after launch.

    My nominee was generic: more funds are being shut down after 12 – 18 months of operation which smacks of hypocrisy (have you ever heard of a manager who didn’t preach the “long-term investor” mantra yet the firms themselves have a short-term strategy) and incompetence (in fund design and marketing both).

Chuck’s still podcasting, MoneyLife with Chuck Jaffe.  One cool recent interview was with Doug Ramsey, chief investment officer for the Leuthold Funds.

ASTON/River Road Long-Short Conference Call

On December 17, about fifty readers joined us for an hour-long conversation with Matt Moran and Daniel Johnson, managers of ASTON/River Road Long-Short (ARLSX).  For folks interested but unable to join us, here’s the complete audio of the hour-long conversation.  It starts with Morty Schaja, River Road’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and River Road’s broader discipline and track record: 

The ARLSX conference call

When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded. If the file downloads, instead, you may have to double-click to play it.

If you’d like a preview before deciding whether you listen in, you might want to read our profile of ARLSX (there’s a printable .pdf of the profile on Aston’s website and an audio profile, which we discuss below).  Here are some of the highlights of the conversation:

Quick highlights:

  1. they believe they can outperform the stock market by 200 bps/year over a full market cycle. Measuring peak to peak or trough to trough, both profit and stock market cycles average 5.3 years, so they think that’s a reasonable time-frame for judging them.
  2. they believe they can keep beta at 0.3 to 0.5. They have a discipline for reducing market exposure when their long portfolio exceeds 80% of fair value. The alarms rang in September, they reduce expose and so their beta is now at 0.34, near their low.
  3. risk management is more important than return management, so all three of their disciplines are risk-tuned. The long portfolio, 15-30 industry leaders selling at a discount of at least 20% to fair value, tend to be low-beta stocks. Even so their longs have outperformed the market by 9%.
  4. River Road is committed to keeping the fund open for at least 8 years. It’s got $8 million in asset, the e.r. is capped at 1.7% but it costs around 8% to run. The president of River Road said that they anticipated slow asset growth and budgeted for it in their planning with Aston.
  5. The fund might be considered an equity substitute. Their research suggests that a 30/30/40 allocation (long, long/short, bonds) has much higher alpha than a 60/40 portfolio.

An interesting contrast with RiverPark, where Mitch Rubin wants to “play offense” with both parts of the portfolio. Here the strategy seems to hinge on capital preservation: money that you don’t lose in a downturn is available to compound for you during the up-cycle.

Conference Calls Upcoming: Matthews, Seafarer, Cook & Bynum on-deck

As promised, we’re continuing our moderated conference calls through the winter.  You should consider joining in.  Here’s the story:

  • Each call lasts about an hour
  • About one third of the call is devoted to the manager’s explanation of their fund’s genesis and strategy, about one third is a Q&A that I lead, and about one third is Q&A between our callers and the manager.
  • The call is, for you, free.  Your line is muted during the first two parts of the call (so you can feel free to shout at the danged cat or whatever) and you get to join the question queue during the last third by pressing the star key.

Our next conference call features Teresa Kong, manager of Matthews Asia Strategic Income (MAINX).  It’s Tuesday, January 22, 7:00 – 8:00 p.m., EST.

Matthews is the fund world’s best, deepest, and most experienced team of Asia investors.  They offer a variety of funds, all of which have strong – and occasionally spectacular – long-term records investing in one of the world’s fastest-evolving regions.  While income has been an element of many of the Matthews portfolios, it became a central focus with the December 2011 launch of MAINX.  Ms. Kong, who has a lot of experience with first-rate advisors including BlackRock, Oppenheimer and JPMorgan, joined Matthews in 2010 ahead of the launch of this fund. 

Why might you want to join the call? 

Bonds across the developed world seem poised to return virtually nothing for years and possibly decades. For many income investors, Asia is a logical destination. Three factors support that conclusion:

  1. Asian governments and corporations are well-positioned to service their debts. Their economies are growing and their credit ratings are being raised.
  2. Most Asian debt supports infrastructure, rather than consumption.
  3. Most investors are under-exposed to Asian debt markets. Bond indexes, the basis for passive funds and the benchmark for active ones, tend to be debt-weighted; that is, the more heavily indebted a nation is, the greater weight it has in the index. Asian governments and corporations have relatively low debt levels and have made relatively light use of the bond market. An investor with a global diversified bond portfolio (70% Barclays US Aggregate bond index, 20% Barclays Global Aggregate, 10% emerging markets) would have only 7% exposure to Asia. However you measure Asia’s economic significance (31% of global GDP, rising to 38% in the near future or, by IMF calculations, the source of 50% of global growth), even fairly sophisticated bond investors are likely underexposed.

The question isn’t “should you have more exposure to Asian fixed-income markets,” but rather “should you seek exposure through Matthews?” The answer, in all likelihood, is “yes.” Matthews has the largest array of Asia investment products in the U.S. market, the deepest analytic core and the broadest array of experience. They also have a long history of fixed-income investing in the service of funds such as Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX). Their culture and policies are shareholder-friendly and their success has been consistent. Ms. Kong has outstanding credentials and has had an excellent first year.

How can you join in? 

Click on the “register” button and you’ll be taken to Chorus Call’s site, where you’ll get a toll free number and a PIN number to join us.  On the day of the call, I’ll send a reminder to everyone who has registered.

Would an additional heads up help? 

About a hundred readers have signed up for a conference call mailing list.  About a week ahead of each call, I write to everyone on the list to remind them of what might make the call special and how to register.  If you’d like to be added to the conference call list, just drop me a line.

Podcasts and Profiles

If you look at our top navigation bar, you’ll see a new tab and a new feature for the Observer. We’re calling it our Podcast page, but it’s much more.  It began as a suggestion from Ira Artman, a talented financial services guy and a longtime member of the FundAlarm and Observer community.  Ira suggested that we archive together the audio recordings of our conference calls and audio versions of the corresponding fund profiles. 

Good idea, Ira!  We went a bit further and create a resource page for each fund.  The page includes:

  • The fund’s name, ticker symbols and its manager’s name
  • Written highlights from the conference call
  • A playable/downloadable .mp3 of the call
  • A link to the fund profile
  • A playable/downloadable .mp3 of the fund profile.  The audio profiles start with the print profile, which we update and edit for aural clarity.  Each profile is recorded by Emma Presley, a bright and mellifluous English friend of ours.
  • A link to the fund’s most recent fact sheet on the fund’s website.

We have resource pages for RiverPark Short Term High-Yield, RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity and Aston/River Road Long Short.  The pages for Matthews Asia Strategic Income, Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income, and Cook and Bynum are in the works.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve. This month’s lineup features a single Star in the Shadows:

Bridgeway Managed Volatility (BRBPX): Dick Cancelmo appreciates RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write’s strategy and wishes them great success, but also points out that others have been successful using a similar strategy for well over a decade.  Indeed, over the last 10 years, BRBPX has quietly produced 70% of the stock market’s gains with just 40% of its volatility.

BRBPX and the Mystery of the Incredible Shrinking Fund

While it’s not relevant to the merit of BRBPX and doesn’t particularly belong in its profile, the collapse of the fund’s asset base is truly striking.  In 2005, assets stood around $130 million.  Net assets have declined in each of the past five years from $75 million to $24 million.  The fund has made money over that period and is consistently in the top third of long/short funds.

Why the shrinkage?  I don’t know.  The strategy works, which should at least mean that existing shareholders hang on but they don’t.  My traditional explanation has been, because this fund is dull. Dull, dull, dull.  Dull stocks and dull bonds with one dull (or, at least, technically dense) strategy to set them apart.  Part of the problem is Bridgeway.  This is the only Bridgeway fund that targets conservative, risk-conscious investors which means the average conservative investor would find little to draw them to Bridgeway and the average Bridgeway investor has limited interest in conservative funds.  Bridgeway’s other funds have had a performance implosion.  When I first profiled BRBPX, five of the six funds rated by Morningstar had five-star designations.  Today none of them do.  Instead, five of eight rated funds carry one or two stars.  While BRBPX continues to have a four-star rating, there might be a contagion effect. 

Mr. Cancelmo attributes the decline to Bridgeway’s historic aversion to marketing.  “We had,” he reports, “the ‘if you build a better mousetrap’ mindset.  We’ve now hired a business development team to help with marketing.”  That might explain why they weren’t drawing new assets, but hardly explains have 80% of assets walking out the door.

If you’ve got a guess or an insight, I’d love to hear of it.  (Dick might, too.)  Drop me a note.

As a side note, Bridgeway probably offers the single best Annual Report in the industry.  You get a startling degree of honesty, thoughtfulness and clarity about both the funds and their take on broader issues which impact them and their investors.  I was particularly struck by a discussion of the rising tide of correlations of stocks within the major indices.  Here’s the graphic they shared:

 

What does it mean?  Roughly, a generation ago you could explain 20% of the movement of the average stock’s price by broader movements in the market.   As a greater and greater fraction of the stock market’s trades are made in baskets of stocks (index funds, ETFs, and so on) rather than individual names, more and more of the fate of each stock is controlled by sentiments surrounding its industry, sector, peers or market cap.  That’s the steady rise of the line overall.  And during a crisis, almost 80% of a stock’s movement is controlled by the market rather than by a firm’s individual merits.  Bridgeway talks through the significance of that for their funds and encourages investors to factor it into their investment decisions.

The report offers several interesting, insightful discussions, making it the exact opposite of – for example – Fidelity’s dismal, plodding, cookie cutter reports.

Here’s our recommendation: if you run a fund, write such like Bridgeway’s 2012 Annual Report.  If you’re trying to become a better investor, read it!

Launch Alert: RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income (RNHIX, RNOTX)

RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income Fund launched on December 28.  This is a collaboration between RiverNorth, whose specialty has been tactical asset allocation and investing in closed-end funds (CEFs), and Oaktree.  Oaktree is a major institutional bond investor with about $80 billion under management.  Oaktree’s clientele includes “75 of the 100 largest U.S. pension plans, 300 endowments and foundations, 10 sovereign wealth funds and 40 of the 50 primary state retirement plans in the United States.”  Their specialties include high yield and distressed debt and convertible securities.  Until now, the only way for retail investors to access them was through Vanguard Convertible Securities (VCVSX), a four-star Gold rated fund.

Patrick Galley, RiverNorth’s CIO, stresses that this is “a core credit fund (managed by Oaktree) with a high income opportunistic CEF strategy managed by RiverNorth.”  The fund has three investment strategies, two managed by Oaktree.  While, in theory, Oaktree’s share of the portfolio could range from 0 – 100%, as a normal matter they’ll manage the considerable bulk of the portfolio.  Oaktree will have the freedom to allocate between their high-yield and senior loan strategies.  RiverNorth will focus on income-producing CEFs.

For those already invested in RiverNorth funds, Mr. Galley explained the relationship of RNHIX to its siblings:

We are staying true to the name and focusing on income producing closed-end funds, but unlike RNSIX (which focuses on income producing fixed income) and RNDIX (which focuses on income producing equities) and RNCOX (which doesn’t have an income mandate and only distributes once a year), RNHIX will invest across the CEF spectrum (i.e. all asset classes) but with a focus on income without sacrificing/risking total return.

The argument for considering this fund is similar to the argument for considering RiverNorth/DoubleLine Strategic Income.  You’re hiring world-class experts who work in inefficient segments of the fixed-income universe. 

RiverNorth had the risk and return characteristics for a bunch of asset classes charted.

You might read the chart as saying something like: this is a strategy that could offer equity-like returns with more nearly bond-like volatility.  In a world where mainstream, investment-grade bonds are priced to return roughly nothing, that’s an option a reasonable person would want to explore.

The retail expense ratio is capped at 1.60% and the minimum initial investment is $5000.

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves. Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Funds in registration this month won’t be available for sale until, typically, the beginning of March 2013. We found 15 funds in the pipeline, notably:

Investors Variable NAV Money Market Fund, one of a series of four money markets managed by Northern Trust, all of which will feature variable NAVs.  This may be a first step in addressing a serious problem: the prohibition against “breaking the buck” is forcing a lot of firms to choose between underwriting the cost of running their money funds or (increasingly) shutting them down.

LSV Small Cap Value Fund is especially notable for its management team, led by Josef Lakonishok is a reasonably famous academic who did some of the groundbreaking work on behavioral finance, then translated that research into actual investment strategies through private accounts, hedge funds, and his LSV Value Equity Fund (LSVEX) fund.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 31 fund manager changes, including a fair number of folks booted from ING funds.

Briefly Noted

According to a recent SEC filing, Washington Mutual Investors Fund and its Tax-Exempt Fund of Maryland and Tax-Exempt Fund of Virginia “make available a Spanish translation of the above prospectus supplement in connection with the public offering and sale of its shares. The English language prospectus supplement above is a fair and accurate representation of the Spanish equivalent.”  I’m sure there are other Spanish-language prospectuses out there, but I’ve never before seen a notice about one.  It’s especially interesting given that tax-exempt bond funds target high income investors. 

Effective January 1, DWS is imposing a $20/year small account service fee for shareholders in all 49 of their funds.  The fee comes on top of their sales loads.  The fee applies to any account with under $10,000 which is regrettable for a firm with a $1,000 minimum initial investment.  (Thanks to chip for having spotted this filing in the SEC’s database.  Regrets for having gotten friends into the habit of scanning the SEC database.)

Closings

Eaton Vance Atlanta Capital SMID-Cap (EAASX) is closing to new investors on Jan. 15.  More has been pouring in (on the order of $1.5 billion in a year); at least in part driven by a top-notch five-year rating.

Walthausen Small Cap Value (WSCVX) closed to new investors at the end of the year.  At the same time, the minimum initial investment for the $1.7 million Walthausen Select Value Investor Class (WSVIX) went from $10,000 to $100,000.  WSCVX closed on January 1 at $560 million which might explain was they’re making the other fund’s institutional share class harder to access.

William Blair International Growth (WBIGX) closed to new investors, effective Dec. 31.

Old Wine in New Bottles

American Century Inflation Protection Bond (APOIX) has been renamed American Century Short Duration Inflation Protection Bond. The fund has operated as a short-duration offering since August 2011, when its benchmark changed to the Barclays U.S. 1-5 Year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Index.

Federated Prudent Absolute Return (FMAAX) is about to become less Prudent.  They’re changing their name to Federated Absolute Return and removed the manager of the Prudent Bear fund from the management team.

Prudential Target Moderate Allocation (PAMGX) is about to get a new name (Prudential Defensive Equity), mandate (growth rather than growth and income) and management structure (one manager team rather than multiple).  It is, otherwise, virtually unchanged. 

Prudential Target Growth Allocation (PHGAX) is merging into Prudential Jenison Equity Income (SPQAX).

U.S. Global Investors Global MegaTrends (MEGAX) is now U.S. Global Investors MegaTrends and no longer needs to invest outside the U.S. 

William Blair Global Growth (WGGNX) will change its name to William Blair Global, and William Blair Emerging Leaders Growth (WELNX) will change its name to William Blair Emerging Markets Leaders.

Small wins for investors

Cook & Bynum Fund (COBYX), a wildly successful, super-concentrated value fund, has decided to substantially reduce their expense ratio.  President David Hobbs reports:

… given our earlier dialogue about fees, I wanted to let you know that as of 1/1/13 the all-in expense ratio for the fund will be capped at 1.49% (down from 1.88%).  This is a decision that we have been wrestling with for some time internally, and we finally decided that we should make the move to broaden the potential appeal of the fund. . . .  With the fund’s performance (and on-going 5-star ratings with Morningstar and S&P Capital IQ), we decided to take a calculated risk that this new fee level will help us grow the fund.

Our 2012 profile of the fund concluded, “Cook and Bynum might well be among the best.  They’re young.  The fund is small and nimble.  Their discipline makes great sense.  It’s not magic, but it has been very, very good and offers an intriguing alternative for investors concerned by lockstep correlations and watered-down portfolios.”  That makes the decreased cost especially welcome.  (They also have a particularly good website.)

Effective January 2, 2013, Calamos Growth and Income and Global Growth and Income Funds re-opened to new investors. (Thanks to The Shadow for catching this SEC filing.)

ING Small Company (AESAX) has reopened.  It’s reasonably large and not very good, really.

JPMorgan (JPM) launched Total Emerging Markets (TMGGX), an emerging-markets allocation fund.

Fund firms have been cutting expenses of late as they pressure to gather and hold assets builds. 

Fidelity has reduced the minimum investment on its Advantage share class from $100,000 to $10,000.  The Advantage class has lower expense ratios (which is good) and investors who own more than $10,000 in a fund’s retail Investor class will be moved automatically to the less-expensive Advantage class.

Fido also dropped the minimums on nearly two dozen index and enhanced index products from $10,000 to $2,500, which gives a lot more folks access to low-cost passive (or nearly-passive) shares. 

Fido also cut fees on eight Spartan index funds, between one to eight basis points.  The Spartan funds had very low expenses to begin with (10 basis points in some cases), so those cuts are substantial.

GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation (GBMFX) has decreased its expense ratio from 87 basis points down to 81 bps by increasing its fee waiver.  The fund is interesting and important not because I intend to invest in in soon (the minimum is $10 million) but because it represents where GMO thinks that an investor who didn’t give a hoot about other people’s opinions (that’s the “benchmark-free” part) should invest.

Effective January 1, Tocqueville Asset Management L.P. capped expenses for Tocqueville International Value at 1.25% of the fund’s average daily net assets.  Until now investors have been paying 1.56%. 

Also effective January 1, TCW Investment Management Company reduced the management fees for the TCW High Yield Bond Fund from 0.75% to 0.45%.

Vanguard has cut fees on 47 products, which include both ETFs and funds. Some of the cuts went into effect on Dec. 21, while others went into effect on Dec. 27th.  The reductions on eleven ETFs — four stock and seven bond — on December 21. Those cuts range from one to two basis points. That translates to reductions of 3 – 15%.

Off to the Dustbin of History

The board of trustees of Altrius Small Cap Value (ALTSX) has closed the fund and will likely have liquidated it by the time you read this.  On the one hand, the fund only drew $180,000 in assets.  On the other, the members of the board of trustees receive $86,000/year for their services, claim to be overseeing between 97 – 100 funds and apparently have been doing so poorly, since they received a Wells Notice from the SEC in May 2012.  They were bright even not to place a penny of their own money in the fund.  One of the two managers was not so fortunate: he ate a fair portion of his own cooking and likely ended up with a stomach cramp.

American Century will liquidate American Century Equity Index (ACIVX) in March 2013. The fund has lost 75% of its assets in recent years, a victim of investor disillusionment with stocks and high expenses.  ACIVX charged 0.49%, which seems tiny until you recall that identical funds can be had for as little as 0.05% (Vanguard, naturally).

Aston Asset Management has fired the Veredus of Aston/Veredus Small Cap Growth (VERDX) and will merge the fund in Aston Small Cap Growth (ACWDX).  Until the merger, it will go by the name Aston Small Cap.

The much-smaller Aston/Veredus Select Growth (AVSGX) will simply be liquidated.  But were struggling.

Federated Capital Appreciation, a bottom 10% kind of fund, is merging Federated Equity-Income (LEIFX).  LEIFX has been quite solid, so that’s a win.

GMO is liquidating GMO Inflation Indexed Plus Bond (GMIPX).  Uhh, good move.  Floyd Norris, in The New York Times, points out that recently-auctioned inflation-protected bonds have been priced to lock in a loss of about 1.4% per year over their lifetimes.   If inflation spikes, you might at best hope to break even.

HSBC will liquidate two money-market funds, Tax-Tree and New York Tax-Free in mid-January.

ING Index Plus International Equity (IFIAX) has closed and is liquidating around Feb. 22, 2013.  No, I don’t know what the “Plus” was.

Invesco is killing off, in April, some long-storied names in its most recent round of mergers.  Invesco Constellation (CSTGX) and Invesco Leisure (ILSAX) are merging into American Franchise (VAFAX).  Invesco Dynamics (IDYAX) goes into Mid Cap Growth (VGRAX), Invesco High-Yield Securities (HYLAX) into High Yield (AMHYX), Invesco Leaders (VLFAX) into Growth Allocation (AADAX), and Invesco Municipal Bond (AMBDX) will merge into Municipal Income (VKMMX).   Any investors in the 1990s who owned AIM Constellation (I did), Invesco Dynamics and Invesco Leisure would have been incredibly well-off.

Leuthold Global Clean Technology (LGCTX) liquidated on Christmas Eve Day. Steve Leuthold described this fund, at its 2009 launch, as “the investment opportunity of a generation.”  Their final letter to shareholders lamented the fund’s tiny, unsustainable asset base despite “strong performance relative to its comparable benchmark index” and noted that “the Fund operates in a market sector that has had challenging.”  Losses of 20% per year are common for green/clean/alternative funds, so one can understand the limited allure of “strong relative performance.”

Lord Abbett plan to merge Lord Abbett Stock Appreciation (LALCX) into Lord Abbett Growth Leaders (LGLAX) in late spring, 2013.

Munder International Equity (MUIAX) is merging into Munder International Core Equity (MAICX).

Natixis Absolute Asia Dynamic Equity (DEFAX) liquidated in December.  (No one noticed.)

TCW Global Flexible Allocation Fund (TGPLX) and TCW Global Moderate Allocation Fund (TGPOX) will be liquidated on or about February 15, 2013.  Effective the close of business on February 8, 2013, the Funds will no longer sell shares to new investors or existing shareholders.  These consistent laggards, managed by the same team, had only $10 million between them.  Durn few of those $10 million came from the managers.  Only one member of the management team had as much as a dollar at risk in any of TCW’s global allocation funds.  That was Tad Rivelle who had a minimal investment in Flexible.

In Closing …

Thank you all for your support in 2012. There are a bunch of numerical measures we could use. The Observer hosted 78,645 visitors and we averaged about 11,000 readers a month.  Sixty folks made direct contributions to the Observer and many others picked up $88,315.15 worth of cool loot (3502 items) at Amazon.  And a thousand folks viewed something like 1.6 million discussion topics. 

But, in many ways, the note that reads “coming here feels like sitting down with an old friend and talking about something important” is as valuable as anything we could point to. 

So thanks for it all.

If you get a chance and have a suggestion about how to make the Observer better in the year ahead, drop me a note and let me know.  For now, we’ll continue offering (and archiving) our monthly conference calls.  During January we’ll be updating our small cap profiles and February will see new profiles for Whitebox Long Short Equity (WBLSX) and PIMCO Short Asset Investment (PAIUX).

Until then, take care.

With hopes for a blessed New Year,

 

ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX)

By Editor

The fund:

ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX)

Manager:

Matt Moran and Dan Johnson

The call:

Highlights of the call:

In December 2012, we spoke with Matt and Dan about the River Road Long Short Strategy, which is also used in this fund. With regard to the strategy, they noted:

  • they believe they can outperform the stock market by 200 bps/year over a full market cycle. 
  • they believe they can keep beta at 0.3 to 0.5. They have a discipline for reducing market exposure when their long portfolio exceeds 80% of fair value. 
  • risk management is more important than return management, so all three of their disciplines are risk-tuned. 
  • River Road is committed to keeping the strategy open for at least 8 years.
  • The fund might be considered an equity substitute. Their research suggests that a 30/30/40 allocation (long, long/short, bonds) has much higher alpha than a 60/40 portfolio.

podcastThe conference call (When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.)

The profile:

Long/short investing makes great sense in theory but, far too often, it’s dreadful in practice.  After a year, ARLSX seems to be getting it right and its managers have a pretty cogent explanation for why that will continue to be the case.

The Mutual Fund Observer profile of ARLSX, dated June 2012.

podcastThe ARLSX audio profile

Web:

For information about the Aston mutual fund, subadvised by River Road, please see the following:

Aston Asset Management

2013 Q3 Report

Fact Sheet

ARLSX Profile Sheet

Fund Focus: Resources from other trusted sources

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX)

By Editor

The fund:

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX)RiverPark Logo

Manager:

Mitch Rubin, a Managing Partner at RiverPark and their CIO.

The call:

For about an hour on November 29th, Mitch Rubin, manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity(RLSFX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Nearly 60 people signed up for the call.

The call starts with Morty Schaja, RiverPark’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and Mr. Rubin talking about its strategy.  After that, I posed five questions of Rubin and callers chimed in with another half dozen. I’d like to especially thank Bill Fuller, Jeff Mayer and Richard Falk for the half dozen really sharp, thoughtful questions that they posed during the closing segment.

Highlights of the conversation:

  • Rubin believes that many long/short mutual fund managers (as opposed to the hedge fund guys) are too timid about using leverage.
  • He believes long/short managers as a group are too skittish.  They obsess about short-term macro-events (the fiscal cliff) and dilute their insights by trying to bet for or against industry groups (by shorting ETFs, for example) rather than focusing on identifying the best firms in the best industries.
  • RiverPark benefits from having followed many of their holdings for nearly two decades, following their trajectory from promising growth stocks (in which they invested), stodgy mature firms (which they’d sold) and now old firms in challenged industries (which they short).

podcastThe conference call (When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.)

The profile:

All long-short funds have about the same goal: to provide a relatively large fraction of the stock market’s long-term gains with a relatively small fraction of its short-term volatility.  They all invest long in what they believe to be the most attractively valued stocks and invest short, that is bet against, the least attractively valued ones.  Many managers imagine their long portfolios as “offense” and their short portfolio as “defense.”

That’s the first place where RiverPark stands apart.  Mr. Rubin intends to “always play offense.”  He believes that RiverPark’s discipline will allow him to make money, “on average and over time,” on both his long and short portfolios.

The Mutual Fund Observer profile of RLSFX, dated August, 2012

podcastThe audio profile

Web:

RiverPark Funds Website

2013 Q3 Report

RLSFX Fact Sheet

Fund Focus: Resources from other trusted sources

Mutual Funds That Beat The Market

By Charles Boccadoro

From the Mutual Fund Observer discussion board, December 2012, compiled from original five parts

Wise advice by MJG in the recent post “Will you revise your fund holdings going into 2013, regardless of “fiscal cliff”, etc.?” got me thinking…

He said, “The accumulated data finds that only a small percentage of wizards beat their proper benchmarks annually, and that percentage drops precipitously as the time horizon is expanded. Superior performance persistence is almost nonexistent.”

So I dug into it a bit. Here are the results, divided into five sections: Summary, Equity, Asset Allocation, Fixed Income, and Money Market.

Summary

The table below summarizes how many funds have beaten the market since their inception (or since Jan 1962, as far back as my Steele Mutual Fund Expert database goes). I used only whole months in the calculations so that I could be consistent with two market benchmarks, the SP500 total return (since 1970, price only before) and the 30-day Treasury Bill.

1_2013-01-03_1424

Nearly 9000 mutual funds and ETFs were evaluated. I used load adjusted returns and only the oldest share class. I apologize to the bench mark police for using only SP500 and T-Bill. Nonetheless, I find the results interesting.

First, MJG is right. Less than half of all equity funds have beaten the SP500 over their life times; in fact, one in four have not even beaten the T-Bill, which means their Sharpe Ratios are less than zero!

Second, nearly all fixed income funds have beaten T-Bill performance, which is re-assuring, but fuels the perception that you can’t lose money with bonds. The money market comparison is a bit skewed, because many of these funds are tax exempt. Still, expense ratios must be having their negative effect as only one in five such funds beat the T-Bill.

Digging a bit further, I looked at how the funds did by inception date. Here is a result I can’t yet explain and would ask for the good help on MFO to better understand. It seems like the period from 1998 to 2002, which book-end the tech bubble, is a golden age, if you will, for funds, as more than 60% of the funds initiated during this period have beaten the SP500 over their life times. That’s extraordinary, no? I thought maybe that it was because they were heavily international, small cap, or other, but I have not yet found the common thread for the superior performance.

2_2013-01-03_1425

On the other hand, the period from 1973 to 1982 was abysmal for funds, since only one in ten equity funds created during these years have beaten the SP500 over their life times. And it is not much better between 1983 and 1992.

I next broke-out this same performance by type: equity, asset allocation, fixed income, and money market:

3_2013-01-03_1427

4_2013-01-03_1428

5_2013-01-03_1429

6_2013-01-03_1429

Note that fixed income funds helped contribute to the “golden period” as more than a quarter of those incepted between 1998 and 2000 beat the SP500.

Some other interesting points:

  • Relatively few money market funds have been created since the cash bull run of the ’80s.
  • But otherwise, fund creation is alive and well, with nearly 2000 funds established in the past three years, which accounts for one fifth of all funds in existence.
  • Fixed income fund performance has dropped a bit this year with 15 out of 100 losing money.

I next looked at the best and worst performers in their respective time frames.

Best being top three funds, typically, producing highest APR relative to SP500 for equity and asset allocation types and relative to T-Bill for fixed income and money market types, color coded purple. Best also includes funds with highest Sharpe Ratios, color coded blue, when different from top APR funds. Again, I tried to pick three if there were enough funds for the inception period evaluated. Worst being relative APR, color coded yellow.

I included other notables based on David’s fund profiles (there are nearly 70 in the index), suggestions by other MFO folks, a few runner-ups, and some funds of my own interest.

First up, equity funds…

Equity Funds

1_2012-12-29_2117 2_2012-12-29_2118 3_2012-12-29_2119 4_2012-12-29_2120 5_2012-12-29_2121 6_2012-12-29_2122 7_2012-12-29_2123 8_2012-12-29_2123 9_2012-12-29_2124 10_2012-12-29_2125 11_2012-12-29_2126 12_2012-12-29_2127 13_2012-12-29_2132

Some items that jump out:

  • ETFs take top and bottom APR slots in recent years, but their volatility is frighteningly high.
  • If you invested $10,000 in Fidelity Magellan Fund FMAGX in June of 1963 (fourteen years prior to Peter Lynch’s rein), you are looking at more than $15 million today. Can you believe? Of course, to MJG’s point, the fund’s best years were in the ’60’s when it had two 10er years, then again during Lynch’s reign from 1977 to 1990, when it averaged more than 29% APR. Unfortunately, you have less money today than you did in 2000.
  • Oceanstone Fund OSFDX made all its gains in 2009 with an extraordinary 264% return. That said, it avoided the 2008 financial collapse with only a -10% loss versus -37% for the SP500, and it retains the highest Sharpe Ratio of ALL funds five years or older, except PIMCO Equity Series Long/Short Institutional PMHIX. And, the mysterious OSFDX is up about 21% YTD or 7% higher than the SP500.
  • Four notable funds score top life time Sharpe Ratio for their periods, but did not beat the SP500: Calamos Market Neutral Income A CVSIX and Merger MERFX, both 20+ year funds, Gabelli ABC AAA GABCX, a 15+ year fund, and AQR Diversified Arbitrage I ADAIX, a 3+ year fund. I would think all would be considered as alternatives to bond funds. (Note: MERFX and GABCX are both no load and open to new investors.)
  • Similarly, Pinnacle Value PVFIX from the 7+ year class, MainStay Marketfield I MFLDX from the 5+ year class, and The Cook & Bynum Fund COBYX from the 3+ year class all have superior life time Sharpe performance with STDEVs less than SP500.
  • On the other hand, Evermore Global Value A EVGBX is not yet living up to expectations. It was first reviewed on MFO in April 2011. Guinness Atkinson Alternative Energy GAAEX is doing downright terribly. It was first reviewed in FundAlarm in September 2007.

Next up, a review of asset allocation…

Asset Allocation Funds

Asset allocation or so-called balanced funds, of which there are more than 1200 (oldest share class only). This type of fund can hold a mixed portfolio of equities, bonds, cash and/or property.

I followed consistent methodology used for the equity funds.

Again, I realize that balanced funds do not use either SP500 or T-Bill as a benchmark, but nonetheless I find the comparison helpful. More than one in four such funds actually have beaten the SP500 over their life times. It’s a bit re-assuring to me, since these funds typically have lower volatility. And, nearly nine in ten have done better than cash.

In the tabulation below, purple means the fund was a top performer relative to SP500 over its life time, blue represents highest Sharpe (if not already a top APR), and yellow represents worst performing APR. I included other notables based on David’s commentaries, past puts by catch22, scott, and other folks on MFO, and some funds of my own interest.

Here’s the break-out, by inception date:

1_2012-12-30_0535 2_2012-12-30_0537 3_2012-12-30_0537 4_2012-12-30_0538 5_2012-12-30_0539 6_2012-12-30_0540 7_2012-12-30_0542 8_2012-12-30_0543 9_2012-12-30_0544 10_2012-12-30_0544 11_2012-12-30_0545 12_2012-12-30_0546 13_2012-12-30_0546

Some observations:

  • If you invested $10K in Mairs & Power Balanced MAPOX in Jan 1962, you would have more than $1M today and nearly four times more than if you had invested in American Funds American Balanced ABALX. But ABALX has $56B AUM, while the five star MAPOX has attracted less than $300M.
  • Value Line Income & Growth VALIX does not even warrant coverage by M*.
  • 2008 was a really bad year.
  • Some attractive ETFs have started to emerge in this generally moderate fund type, including iShares Morningstar Multi-Asset Income IYLD.
  • Putnam Capital Spectrum A PVSAX, managed by David Glancy, has outperformed just about everybody in this category since its inception mid 2009.
  • RiverNorth Core Opportunity RNCOX, first reviewed on MFO in June 2011, has had a great run since its inception in 2007. Unfortunately, its availability is now limited.

Next up, fixed income funds.

Fixed Income Funds

A review of fixed income funds, which for this post includes funds that invest in government or corporate bonds, loan stock and non-convertible preferred stock. This type of fund has been getting considerable attention lately on MFO with a growing concern that investors could be lulled into false sense of security.

To recap a little, there are about 1880 funds of this type, of which 30% have actually delivered higher life-time returns than the SP500, and more importantly and relevant, 98% have beaten cash.

In the tabulation below, purple means the fund was a top performer relative to T-Bill over its life time, blue represents highest Sharpe (if not already a top APR), and yellow represents worst performing APR. I included other notables based on David’s profiles, numerous suggestions in the various threads by MFO readers (bee, catch22, claimui, fundalarm, hank, Hiyield007, Investor, johnN, MaxBialystock, MikeM, Mona, msf, Old_Joe, scott, Shostakovich, Skeeter, Ted and others), and some of my own interest.

A reminder that I only used oldest share class, so for popular funds like PONDX, you will find PONAX, similarly MAINX is MINCX, etc.

Here’s the break-out, by fund inception date:

1_2012-12-29_1126 2_2012-12-29_1127 3_2012-12-29_1127 4_2012-12-29_1128 5_2012-12-29_1129 6_2012-12-29_1130 7_2012-12-29_1130 8_2012-12-29_1131 9_2012-12-30_0916 10_2012-12-29_1138 11_2012-12-29_1138 12_2012-12-29_1139 13_2012-12-29_1140

Some observations:

  • Every fund listed (5 years or older) with current yields of 6% or more, lost more than 20% of its value in 2008, except three: PIMCO Income A PONAX, which lost only 6.0%; TCW Total Return Bond I TGLMX, which lost only 6.2% (in 1994); and First Eagle High Yield I FEHIX, which lost 15.8%.
  • In fact, of all fixed income funds more than five years or older that have current yields of 6% or more, nearly 3 out of 4 had a down-year of 20% or more. Those yielding 5% or more did not do much better. For what it’s worth, the break point appears to be between 4 and 5%. Funds with less than 4% current yield did much, much better. Here is summary…

14_2012-12-30_0924

  • Just glance over the list…you will see that PIMCO has produced many top performing fixed income funds.
  • Fortunately, again, nearly every fixed income fund existing today has beaten cash over its life time, some 98%. The 44 funds with negative Sharpe actually fall into two distinct categories: First, those with negative Sharpe, but positive life-time APR. These are generally funds with short duration and/or tax exempt funds. Second, those with negative Sharpe and negative life-time APR. There are 25 such funds, but it’s reassuring to find only 3 older than three years old, which presumably means fixed income funds that actually lose money don’t stay around very long. The three enduring poor performers, tabulated below, are: AMF Ultra Short AULTX, SEI Instl Mgd Enhanced Income A SEEAX, and WisdomTree Euro Debt EU.

15_2012-12-31_0911

Both AULTX and EU have less than $10M AUM, but SEEAX is fairly substantial AUM at $170M, which is simply hard to believe…

16_2012-12-31_0916

 

Money Market Funds

The last part – money market funds, which tend to offer lowest risk, but with attendant lowest return over the long run. There have been times, however, when money market or “cash” has ruled, like from 1966 – 1984 when cash provided a strong 7.8% APR. Here’s a reminder from Bond Fund Performance During Periods of Rising Interest Rates:

1_2012-12-08_1027

Some observations up-front:

  • There are only 500 or so money market funds.
  • The earliest inception date is 1972. It belongs to American Century Capital Presv Investor CPFXX. (But it is not one of better offerings.)
  • Few new money market funds have been created in recent years.
  • Few MFO readers discuss them and none have been profiled. M* does not appear to rate them or provide analyst reports of money market funds.
  • No money market funds have loads, but many impose 12b-1 fees. The average EP is 0.5%.
  • Fortunately, none have a negative absolute return over their life times.
  • There are two main categories of money market funds: taxable and tax-free. The latter have existed since 1981 and represent about a third of offerings today. This plot summarizes average performance for the two types compared to the T-Bill:

2_2013-01-01_1218

  • Since 1981, the annualized return for T-Bill is 5.0%. For money market funds, the average APR is 4.6% for the taxable (about the difference in average EP), and 2.9% for tax-free.
  • Only 1 in 3 taxable money market funds have beaten the T-Bill over their life times. And virtually no tax-free funds have beaten, as you would expect.

Because of the strong tax dependency with these funds, I broke out this distinction in the tabulation below. Purple means the fund was a top performer relative to T-Bill over its life time, and yellow represents worst performing APR. (For the money market funds, I did not break-out top Sharpe in blue, since APR ranking relative T-Bill is fairly close to Sharpe ranking.)

Here’s the break-out, by fund inception date:

3_2013-01-01_1211 4_2013-01-01_1142 5_2013-01-01_1143 6_2013-01-01_1143 7_2013-01-01_1148 8_2013-01-01_1148 9_2013-01-01_1149 10_2013-01-01_1150 11_2013-01-01_1150 12_2013-01-01_1151 13_2013-01-01_1152 14_2013-01-01_1152

For those interested, I’ve posted results of this thread in an Excel file Funds That Beat The Market – Nov 12.

Here is link to original thread.

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX)

By Editor

The fund:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX)RiverPark Logo

Manager:

David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC

The call:

For about an hour on September 13th, David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC, manager of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile. Somewhere between 40-50 people signed up for the RiverPark call.

Highlights include:

  1. they expect to be able to return 300 – 400 basis points more than a money market fund
  2. they manage to minimize risk, not maximize return
  3. they do not anticipate significant competition for these assets
  4. expenses are unlikely to move much
  5. NAV volatility is more apparent than real – by any measure other than a money market, it’s a very steady NAV. 

podcastThe conference call (When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.)

The profile:

People are starting to catch on to RPHYX’s discrete and substantial charms.  Both the fund’s name and Morningstar’s assignment of it to the “high yield” peer group threw off some potential investors.  To be clear: this is not a high yield bond fund in any sense that you’d recognize.

The Mutual Fund Observer profile of RPHYX, updated October, 2012

podcastThe audio profile

Web:

RiverPark Funds Website

2013 Q3 Report

RPHYX Fact Sheet

Fund Focus: Resources from other trusted sources

Bond Fund Performance During Periods of Rising Interest Rates

By Charles Boccadoro

From the Mutual Fund Observer discussion board, December 2012

Current trend on MFO is discussion of negative impact to bond-heavy income and retirement portfolios, if and when rates rise.

In David’s inaugural column on Amazon money and markets “Trees Do Not Grow To The Sky”, he calls attention to: “If interest rates and inflation move quickly up, the market value of the bonds that you (or your bond fund manager) hold can drop like a rock.” And there have been several recent related posts about an impending “Bond Bubble.”

Here’s look back at average intermediate term bond fund performance during the past 50 years:

Intermediate Term Bond Fund Performance

Background uses same 10-year Treasury yield data that David highlights in his guest column. Also plotted is the downside return relative to cash or money-market, since while these funds have held up fairly well on absolute terms, on relative terms the potential for under-performance is quite clear.

More dramatic downside performance can be seen the higher yield (generally quality less than BB) bond funds, where relative and even absolute losses can be 25%:

High Yield Bond Fund Performance

Taking a closer look, the chart below compares performance of intermediate, high-yield, and equities when interest rates rise (note year, 10-year Treasury yield, and rate increase from previous year):

Investment Performance When Rates Rise

I included for comparison 2008 performance. Here declines were not driven by increasing rates, but by the financial crisis, of course. Presumably, such strong relative performance for intermediate bonds in 2008 is what has driven the recent flight to bonds. That said, several previous periods of increasing rates happened during bear markets, like 1974, making alternatives to bonds tough to find.

Over the (very) long run, equities out-perform bonds and cash, as is evident below, but may not be practical alternative to bonds for many investors, because of investment horizon, risk-tolerance, dependence on yield, or all the above.

Long Term Investment Performance

What’s so interesting about this look-back are the distinct periods of “ideal” investments, by which I mean an investment vehicle that both outperformed alternatives and did not incur a sharp decline, as summarized in table below:

 Return Table

In the three years from 1963-65, stocks were the choice. But in the 19 years from 1966-84, cash was king. Followed by the extraordinary 15-year bull run for stocks. Ending with the current period, if you will, where bonds have been king: first, intermediate term bonds from 2000-08, but most recently, alluring high yield bonds since 2009.

Despite its flat-line performance since 2009, cash is often mentioned as a viable alternative (eg, Scout Unconstrained Bond Fund SUBFX and Crescent Fund FPACX are now cash heavy). But until I saw its strong and long-lived performance from 1966-84, I had not seriously considered. Certainly, it has offered healthy growth, if not yield, during periods of rising interest rates.

Here is link to original thread.

December 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

And now, we wait.  After the frenzy of recent months, that seems odd and unnatural.

Will and his minions wait for the holidays, anxious for the last few weeks of school to pass but secure in the knowledge that their folks are dutifully keeping the retail economy afloat.

Campus Beauty

Photo by Drew Barnes ’14, Augustana Photo Bureau

My colleagues at Augustana are waiting for winter and then for spring.  The seemingly endless string of warm, dry weeks has left much of our fall foliage intact as we enter December. As beautiful as it is, we’re sort of rooting for winter, or at least the hope of seasonal weather, to reassert itself. And we’re waiting for spring, when the $13 million renovation of Old Main will be complete and we escape our warren of temporary offices and ersatz classrooms. I’ve toured the half-complete renovation. It’s going to be so cool.

And investors wait. Most of us are waiting for a resolution of “the fiscal cliff” (alternately: fiscal slope, obstacle course, whatchamacallit or, my favorite, Fiscal Clifford the Big Red Dog), half fearful that they won’t find a compromise and half fearful that they will.

Then there are The Two Who Wouldn’t Wait. And they worry me. A lot. We’ve written for a year or so about our concerns that the bond market is increasingly unstable. That concern has driven our search for tools, other than Treasuries or a bond aggregate, that investors might use to manage volatility. In the past month, the urgency of that search has been highlighted by The Two. One of The Two is Jeffrey Gundlach, founder of the DoubleLine funds and widely acknowledged as one of the best fixed-income managers anyway. Gundlach believes that “[d]eeply indebted countries and companies, which Gundlach doesn’t name, will default sometime after 2013” (Bond Investor Gundlach Buys Stocks, Sees ‘Kaboom’ Ahead, 11/30/2012). Gundlach says, “I don’t believe you’re going to get some sort of an early warning. You should be moving now.”  Gundlach, apparently, is moving into fine art.

GMO, the other of The Two, has moved. GMO (Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo) has an outstanding record for anticipating asset class crashes. They moved decisively in 2000 and again in 2007, knowing that they were likely early and knowing that leaving the party early would cost them billions (one quarter of the firm’s assets) as angry investors left. But when the evidence says “run,” they ran. In a late-November interview with the Financial Times, GMO’s head of asset allocation revealed that, firm-wide, GMO had sold off all of their bond holdings (GMO abandons bond market, 11/26/2012). “We’ve largely given up on traditional fixed income,” Inker says, including government and corporate debt in the same condemnation. They don’t have any great alternatives (high quality US stocks are about the best option), but would prefer to keep billions in cash to the alternatives.

I don’t know whether you should wait. But I do believe that you should acquaint yourself with those who didn’t.

The Last Ten: PIMCO in the Past Decade

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.

Here are our findings so far:

Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches, has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price continues to deliver on its promises.  Of the 22 funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).  Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play.

And just as you’re about to conclude that large fund companies will necessarily produce cautious funds that can aspire just to “pretty good,” along comes PIMCO.  PIMCO was once known as an almost purely fixed-income investor.  Its flagship PIMCO Total Return Fund has gathered over a quarter trillion dollars in assets and tends to finish in the top 10% of its peer group over most trailing time periods.

But PIMCO has become more.  This former separate accounts managers for Pacific Life Insurance Company now declares, “We continue to evolve. Throughout our four decades we have been pioneers and continue to evolve as a provider of investment solutions across all asset classes.”

Indeed they have.  PIMCO has spent more time thinking about, and talking about, the global economic future than any firm other, perhaps, than GMO.  More than talk about the changing sources of alpha and the changing shape of risk, PIMCO has launched a bunch of unique funds targeting emerging challenges and opportunities that other firms would prefer simply to ignore (or to eventually react to).

Perhaps as a result, PIMCO has created more five-star funds in the last decade than any other firm and, among larger firms, has a greater fraction of their funds earning four- or five-stars than anyone else.  Here’s the snapshot:

    • PIMCO has 84 funds (which are sold in over 536 packages or share classes)
    • 56 of their funds were launched in the past decade
    • 61 of them are old enough to have earned Morningstar ratings
    • 20 of them have five-star ratings (as of 11/14/12)
    • 15 more earned four-star ratings.

How likely this that?  In each Morningstar category, the top 10 percent of funds receive five stars, the next 22.5 percent receive four stars, and the next 35 percent receive three.  In the table below, those are the “expected values.”  If PIMCO had just ordinary skill or luck, you’d expect to see the numbers in the expected values column.  But you don’t.

 

Expected Value

Observed value

PIMCO, Five Star Funds, overall

8

20

PIMCO, Four and Five Star Funds, overall

20

35

Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

3

9

Four and Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

11

14

Only their RealRetirement funds move between bad and mediocre, and even those funds made yet be redeemed.  The RealRetirement funds, like PIMCO’s other “Real” funds, are designed to be especially sensitive to inflation.  That’s the factor that poses the greatest long-term risk to most of our portfolios, especially as they become more conservative.  Until we see a sustained uptick in inflation, we can’t be sure of how well the RealRetirement funds will meet their mandates.  But, frankly, PIMCO’s record counsels patience.

Here are all of the funds that PIMCO has launched in the last 10 years, which their Morningstar rating (as of mid-November, 2012), category and approximate assets under management.

All Asset All Authority ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World Allocation

25,380

CA Short Duration Muni Income

Muni Bond

260

Diversified Income  ★ ★ ★ ★

Multisector Bond

6,450

Emerging Markets Fundamental IndexPLUS TR Strategy ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Emerging Markets Stock

5,620

Emerging Local Bond ★ ★

Emerging Markets Bond

13,950

Emerging Markets Corporate Bond ★ ★

Emerging Markets Bond

1,180

Emerging Markets Currency

Currency

7060

Extended Duration ★ ★ ★ ★

Long Government

340

Floating Income ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

4,030

Foreign Bond (Unhedged) ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World Bond

5,430

Fundamental Advantage Total Return ★ ★ ★

Intermediate-Term Bond

2,730

Fundamental IndexPLUS TR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Large Blend

1,150

Global Advantage Strategy ★ ★ ★

World Bond

5,220

Global Multi-Asset ★ ★

World Allocation

5,280

High Yield Municipal Bond ★ ★

Muni Bond

530

Income ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Multisector Bond

16,660

International StocksPLUS ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Foreign Large Blend

210

International StocksPLUS TR Strategy (Unhedged) ★ ★ ★ ★

Foreign Large Blend

1,010

Long Duration Total Return ★ ★ ★ ★

Long-Term Bond

6,030

Long-Term Credit ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Long-Term Bond

2,890

Real Estate Real Return ★ ★ ★

Real Estate

2,030

Real Income 2019

Retirement Income

30

Real Income 2029 ★ ★ ★ ★

Retirement Income

20

RealRetirement 2020

Target Date

70

RealRetirement 2030

Target Date

70

RealRetirement 2040 ★ ★

Target Date

60

RealRetirement 2050 ★ ★

Target Date

40

RealRetirement Income & Distribution ★ ★

Retirement Income

40

Small Cap StocksPLUS TR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Small Blend

470

StocksPLUS Long Duration ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Large Blend

790

Tax Managed Real Return

Muni Bond

70

Unconstrained Bond ★ ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

17,200

Unconstrained Tax Managed Bond ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

350

In January, we’ll continue the series of a look at Vanguard.  We know that Vanguard inspires more passion among its core investors than pretty much any other firm.  Since we’re genial outsiders to the Vanguard culture, if you’ve got insights, concerns, tips, kudos or rants you’d like to share, dear Bogleheads, drop me a note.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Conference Call

Volatility is tremendously exciting for many investment managers.  You’d be amazed by the number who get up every morning, hoping for a market panic.  For the rest of us, it’s simply terrifying.

For the past thirty years, the simple, all-purpose answer to unacceptable volatility has been “add Treasuries.”  The question we began debating last spring is, “where might investors look if Treasuries stop functioning as the universal answer?”  We started by looking at long/short equity funds as one possible answer.  Our research quickly led to one conclusion, and slowly to a second.

The quick conclusion: long/short funds, as a group, are a flop. They’re ridiculously expensive, with several dozen charging 2.75% or more plus another 1.5-2% in short interest charges.  They offered some protection in 2008, though several did manage to lose more that year than did the stock market.  But their longer term returns have been solidly dismal.  The group returned 0.15% over the past five years, which means they trailed far behind the stock market, a simple 60/40 hybrid, moderate allocation funds, very conservative short-term bond funds . . . about the only way to make this bunch look good is to compare them to “market neutral” funds (whose motto seems to be, “we can lose money in up markets and down!”).

The slower conclusion: some long-short funds have consistently, in a variety of markets, managed to treat their investors well and a couple more show the real promise of doing so. The indisputable gold standard among such funds, Robeco Long Short (BPLEX) returned 16% annually over the past five years.  The second-best performer, Marketfield (MFLDX) made 9% while funds #3 (Guggenheim Alpha) and #4 (Wasatch Long/Short) made 4%. Sadly, BPLEX is closed to new investors, Guggenheim has always had a sales load and Marketfield just acquired one. Wasatch Long-Short (FMLSX), which we first profiled three years ago, remains a strong, steady performer with reasonable expenses.

Ultimately we identified (and profiled) just three, newer long-short funds worthy of serious attention: Marketfield, RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RPLSX) and ASTON/River Road Long Short (ARLSX).

For about an hour on November 29th, Mitch Rubin, manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity(RLSFX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Nearly 60 people signed up for the call.

For folks interested but unable to join us, here’s the complete audio of the hour-long conversation.  It starts with Morty Schaja, RiverPark’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and Mr. Rubin talking about its strategy.  After that, I posed five questions of Rubin and callers chimed in with another half dozen.

http://78449.choruscall.com/dataconf/productusers/riverpark/media/riverpark121129.mp3
When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded. If the file downloads, instead, you may have to double-click to play it.

If you’d like a preview before deciding whether you listen in, you might want to read our profile of RLSFX (there’s a printable .pdf of the profile on RiverPark’s website).  Here are some of the highlights of the conversation:

Rubin believes that many long/short mutual fund managers (as opposed to the hedge fund guys) are too timid about using the leverage allowed them.  As a result, they’re not able to harvest the full returns potential of their funds.  Schaja describes RLSFX’s leverage as “moderate,” which generally means having investments equal to 150-200% of assets.

The second problem with long/short managers as a group, he believes, is that they’re too skittish.  They obsess about short-term macro-events (the fiscal cliff) and dilute their insights by trying to bet for or against industry groups (by shorting ETFs, for example) rather than focusing on identifying the best firms in the best industries.

One source of RLSFX’s competitive advantage is the team’s long history of long investing.  They started following many of the firms in their portfolio nearly two decades ago, following their trajectory from promising growth stocks (in which they invested), stodgy mature firms (which they’d sold) and now old firms in challenged industries (which are appearing in the short portfolio).

A second source of advantage is the team’s longer time horizon.  Their aim is to find companies which might double their money over the next five years and then to buy them when their price is temporarily low.

I’d like to especially thank Bill Fuller, Jeff Mayer and Richard Falk for the half dozen really sharp, thoughtful questions that they posed during the closing segment.  If you catch no other part of the call, you might zoom in on those last 15 minutes to hear Mitch and the guys in conversation.

Mr. Rubin is an articulate advocate for the fund, as well as being a manager with a decades-long record of success.  In addition to listening to his conversation, there are two documents on the Long/Short fund’s homepage that interested parties should consult.  First, the fund profile has a lot of information about the fund’s performance back when it was a hedge fund which should give you a much better sense of its composition and performance over time.  Second, the manager’s commentary offers an intriguing list of industries which they believe to be ascendant or failing.  It’s sort of thought-provoking.

Conference Calls Upcoming: Great managers on-deck

As promised, we’re continuing our moderated conference calls through the winter.  You should consider joining in.  Here’s the story:

    • Each call lasts about an hour
    • About one third of the call is devoted to the manager’s explanation of their fund’s genesis and strategy, about one third is a Q&A that I lead, and about one third is Q&A between our callers and the manager.
    • The call is, for you, free.  Your line is muted during the first two parts of the call (so you can feel free to shout at the danged cat or whatever) and you get to join the question queue during the last third by pressing the star key.

Our next conference call features Matt Moran and Dan Johnson, co-managers of ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX).   I’ve had several conversations with the team and they strike me as singularly bright, articulate and disciplined.  When we profiled the fund in June, we noted:

The strategy’s risk-management measures are striking.  Through the end of Q1 2012, River Road’s Sharpe ratio (a measure of risk-adjusted returns) was 1.89 while its peers were at 0.49.  Its maximum drawdown (the drop from a previous high) was substantially smaller than its peers, it captured less of the market’s downside and more of its upside, in consequence of which its annualized return was nearly four times as great.

Among the crop of newer offerings, few are more sensibly-constructed or carefully managed that ARLSX seems to be.  It deserves attention.

If you’d like to share your attention with them, our call with ASTON / River Road Long  Short is Monday, December 17, from 7:00 – 8:00 Eastern.  To register for the call, just click on this link and follow the instructions.  I’ll send a reminder email on the day of the call to all of the registered parties.

We’re hoping to start 2013 with a conversation with Andrew Foster of Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX), one of the best of a new generation of emerging markets funds.  We’re also in conversation with the managers of several seriously concentrated equity funds, including David Rolfe of RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) and Steve Dodson of Bretton Fund (BRTNX).

As a service to our readers, we’ve constructed a mailing list that we’ll use to notify folks of upcoming conference call opportunities.  If you’d like to join but haven’t yet, feel free to drop me a note.

Fidelity’s Advice to Emerging Markets Investors: Avoid Us

Fidelity runs several distinct sets of funds, including Fidelity, Fidelity Advisor, Fidelity Select, and Fidelity Series.  In many ways, the most interesting are their Strategic Adviser funds which don’t even bear the Fidelity name.  The Strategic Adviser funds are “exclusive to clients of Portfolio Advisory Services. . . They allow Strategic Advisers to hire (and fire) sub-advisers as well as to buy, sell, and hold mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within the fund.”  In short, these are sort of “best ideas”  funds, two of which are funds of funds.

Which led to the question: would the smartest folks Fidelity could find, who could choose any funds around which to build a portfolio, choose Fidelity?

In the case of emerging markets, the answer is “uhh … no.”  Here’s the portfolio for Strategic Advisers Emerging Markets Fund of Funds (FLILX).

Total portfolio weights as of

10/2012

03/2012

Aberdeen Emerging Markets

14.7%

11.4%

GMO Emerging Markets V

14.5

13.6

Lazard Emerging Markets Equity

14.2

15.7

Acadian Emerging Markets

13.9

8.2

T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Stock

10.7

12.9

Fidelity Emerging Markets

10.2

13.4

SSgA Emerging Markets Select

6.9

7.2

Oppenheimer Developing Markets

5.2

4.9

Eaton Vance Parametric Structured Em Mkts

5.0

5.1

Thornburg Developing World

4.14

n/a

Vanguard MSCI Emerging Markets ETF

0.70

n/a

What should you notice?

  1. The fund’s managers seem to find many funds more compelling than Fidelity Emerging Markets, and so it ends up sixth on the list.  Fidelity’s corporate folks seem to agree and they replaced the long-time manager of this one-star fund in mid October, 2012.
  2. Measured against the March 2012 portfolio, Fidelity E.M. has seen the greatest decrease in its weighing (about 3.2%) of any fund in the portfolio.
  3. Missing entirely from the list: Fidelity’s entire regional lineup including China Region, Emerging Asia, Emerging Middle East and Latin America.
  4. For that matter, missing entirely from the list are anything but diversified large cap emerging markets stock funds.

Fidelity does noticeably better in the only other Strategic Advisers fund of funds, the Strategic Advisers® Income Opportunities Fund of Funds (FSADX).

 

% of fund’s
net assets

T. Rowe Price High Yield Fund

24.2

Fidelity Capital & Income Fund

20.5

Fidelity High Income Fund

14.7

PIMCO High Yield Fund

9.6

Janus High-Yield Fund

9.0

BlackRock High Yield Bond Portfolio

8.2

MainStay High Yield Corporate Bond

4.5

Eaton Vance Income Fund of Boston

3.3

Fidelity Advisor High Income Advantage Fund

3.2

Fidelity Advisor High Income Fund

2.8

Why, exactly, the managers have invested in three different classes of the same Fidelity fund is a bit unclear but at least they are willing to invest with Fido.  It may also speak to the continuing decline of the Fidelity equity-investing side of the house while fixed-income becomes increasingly

A Site Worth Following: Learn Bonds

Junior Yearwood, our friend and contributing editor who has been responsible for our Best of the Web reviews, has been in conversation with Marc Prosser, a Forbes contributor and proprietor of the Learn Bonds website.  While the greatest part of Marc’s work focuses broadly on bond investing, he also offers ratings for a select group of bond mutual funds.  He has a sort of barbell approach, focusing on the largest bond fund companies and on the smallest.  His fund ratings, like Morningstar’s analyst ratings, are primarily qualitative and process-focused.

Marc doesn’t yet have data by which to assess the validity of his ratings (and, indeed, is articulately skeptical of that whole venture), so we can’t describe him as a Best of the Web site.  That said, Junior concluded that his site was clean, interesting, and worth investigating.  It was, he concluded, a new and notable site.

Launch Alert: Whitebox Long Short Equity (WBLSX,WBLRX,WBLFX)

On November 1, Whitebox Advisors converted their Whitebox Long Short Equity Partners hedge fund into the Whitebox Long Short Equity Fund which has three share classes.  As a hedge fund, Whitebox pretty much kicked butt.  From 2004 – 2012, it returned 15.8% annually while the S&P500 earned 5.2%.  At last report, the fund was just slightly net-long with a major short against the Russell 2000.

There’s great enthusiasm among the Observer’s discussion board members about Whitebox’s first mutual fund, Whitebox Tactical Opportunities (WBMAX) , which strongly suggests this one warrants some attention, if only from advisors who can buy it without a sales load. The Investor shares carry at 4.5% front load, 2.48% expense ratio and a $5000 minimum initial investment.  You might check the fund’s homepage for additional details.

Observer Fund Profiles

Had I mentioned that we visited RiverNorth?

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

Artisan Global Equity Fund (ARTHX):  you know a firm is in a good place when the most compelling alternatives to one of their funds are their other funds.  Global, run by Mark Yockey and his team, extends on the long-term success of Artisan International and International Small Cap.

RiverNorth Dynamic Buy Write (RNBWX): one of the most consistently successful (and rarely employed) strategies for managing portfolios in volatile markets is the use of covered calls.  After spending several hours with the RiverNorth team and several weeks reading the research, we may have an answer to a version of the old Ghostbusters question, “who you gonna (covered) call?”

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves. Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Funds in registration this month won’t be available for sale until, typically, the beginning of February 2013. Since firms really like launching by December 31st if they can, the number of funds in the pipeline is modest: seven this month, as compared to 29 last month.  That said, two of the largest fixed-income teams are among those preparing to launch:

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund, the tenth fund advised or sub-advised by DoubleLine, will seek a high level of current income by investing in floating rate loans and “other floating rate investments.”  The fund will be managed by Bonnie Baha and Robert Cohen.  Ms. Baha was part of Mr. Gundlach’s original TCW team and co-manages Multi-Asset Growth, Low-Duration Bond and ASTON/DoubleLine Core Plus Fixed Income.

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund will invest in “a broad range of emerging market fixed income asset classes, such as external debt obligations of sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and corporate entities; currencies, and local currency-denominated obligations of sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and corporate issuers.”  The manager has not yet been named but, as we noted in our lead story, the odds are that this is going to be a top-of-class performer.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 40 fund manager changes, down from last month’s bloodbath in which 70 funds changed management.

The Observer in the News

Last month, we ran our annual Honor Roll of Consistently Bearable Funds, which asks the simple question:  “which mutual funds are never terrible?”  Our basic premise is that funds that earn high returns but crash periodically are, by and large, impossible for investors to hold.  And so we offered up a list of funds that have avoided crashing in any of the past ten years.  As it turns out, by managing beta, those funds ended up with substantial alpha.  In English: they made good money by avoiding losing money.

Chuck Jaffe has been looking at a related strategy for years, which led him to talk about and elaborate on our article.  His story, “A fund-picking strategy for nervous investors,” ran on November 19th, ended up briefly (very briefly: no one can afford fifteen minutes of fame any more) on the front page of Google News and caused a couple thousand new folks to poke their heads in at the Observer.

Briefly Noted . . .

Artisan Partners has again filed for an initial public offering.  They withdrew a 2011 filing in the face of adverse market conditions.  Should you care?  Investors can afford to ignore it since it doesn’t appear that the IPO will materially change operations or management; it mostly generates cash to buy back a portion of the firm from outsiders and to compensate some of the portfolio guys.  Competitors, frankly, should care.  Artisan is about the most successful, best run small firm fund that I know of: they’ve attracted nearly $70 billion in assets, have a suite of uniformly strong funds, stable management teams and a palpable commitment to serving their shareholders.  If I were in the business, I’d want to learn a lot – and think a lot – about how they’ve managed that feat.  Sudden access to a bunch more information would help.

One of The Wall Street Journal columnists surveyed “financial advisers, mutual-fund experts and academics” in search of the five best books for beginning investors.  Other than for the fact that they missed Andrew Tobias’s The Only Investment Guide You’ll Ever Need, it’s a pretty solid list with good works from the efficient market and behavioral finance folks.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Clipper (CFIMX), Davis New York Venture (NYVTX), and Selected American Shares (SLASX) have waived their 30-day trading restriction for the rest of 2012, in case investors want to do some repositioning in anticipation of higher capital gains tax rates in 2013.

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth (SSETX) reopened to new investors on Nov. 1.

Victoria 1522 (VMDIX/VMDAX), an emerging markets stock fund, is cutting its expense ratio by 40 basis points. That’s much better news than you think. Glance at Morningstar’s profile of the lower-minimum Advisor shares and you’ll see a two-star fund and move on.  That reading is, for two reasons, short-sighted.  First, the lower expense ratio would make a major difference; the institutional shares, at 25 bps below the Advisor shares, gain a star (as of 11/30/12) and this reduction gives you 40 bps.  Second, the three-year record masks an exceedingly strong four-plus year record.  From inception (10/08) through the end of 11/12, Victoria 1522 would have turned a $10,000 investment into $19,850.  Its peer over the same period would have returned $13,500. That’s partly attributable to good luck: the fund launched in October 2008 and made about 3% in the quarter while its peers dropped nearly 21%.  Even excluding that great performance (that is, looking at 1/09 – 11/12), the fund has modestly outperformed its peer group despite the drag of its soon-to-be-lowered expenses.  ManagerJosephine Jiménez has a long, distinguished record, including long stints running Montgomery Asset Management’s emerging markets division.  (Thanks to Jake Mortell of Candlewood Advisory for the heads up!)

Wells Fargo has reopened the Class A shares of its Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target funds: Target Today, 2010, 2020, 2030 and 2040.

CLOSINGS

AllianceBernstein Small Cap Growth (QUASX) will close to new investors on January 31, 2013. That’s all I noticed this month.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Calvert Enhanced Equity (CMIFX) will be renamed Calvert Large Cap Core in January 2013.

Actually, this one is a little bit more like “old vinegar in new bottles.”  Dominion Insight Growth Fund was reorganized into the Shepherd Large Cap Growth Fund in 2002.  Shepherd LCG changed its name to the Shepherd Fund in 2008. Then Shepherd Fund became Foxhall Global Trends Fund in 2009, and now Foxhall Global Trends has become Fairfax Global Trends Fund (DOIGX). In all of the name changes, some things have remained constant: low assets, high expenses, wretched performance (they’ve finished in the 98th -99th percentile for the trailing one, three, five and ten year periods).

Forward Aggressive Growth Allocation Fund became Forward Multi-Strategy Fund on December 3, 2012, which is just a bit vanilla. The 50 other multi-strategy funds in Morningstar’s database include Dynamic, Ethical, Global, Hedged and Progressive flavors of the marketing flavor du jour.

In non-news, Marathon Value Portfolio (MVPFX) is moving from the Unified Series Trust to  Northern Lights Fund Trust III. That’s their third move and I mention it only because the change causes the SEC to flag MVPFX as a “new” fund.  It isn’t new, though it is a five-star, “Star in the Shadows” fund and worth knowing about.

Wells Fargo Advantage Total Return Bond (MBFAX) will be renamed Wells Fargo Advantage Core Bond sometime in December.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Geez, the dustbin of history is filling up fast . . .

BNY Mellon Intermediate U.S. Government (MOVIX) is merging into BNY Mellon Intermediate Bond (MIIDX) in February, though the manager is the same for both funds.

Buffalo plans to merge Buffalo China (BUFCX) into Buffalo International (BUFIX) in January, 2013. The fund was originally sub-advised by Jayhawk Capital and I long ago wrote a hopeful profile of the then-new fund. Jayhawk ran it for three years, making huge amounts twice (2007 and 2009), lost a huge amount once (2008), lived in the basement of a highly volatile category and were replaced in 2009 by an in-house management team. The fund has been better but never rose to “good” and never drew assets.

Dreman is killing off five of the six funds: Contrarian International Value (DRIVX), Contrarian Mid Cap Value (DRMVX), Contrarian Value Equity (DRVAX), High Opportunity (DRLVX), and Market Over-Reaction (DRQLX).  Mr. Dreman has a great reputation and had a great business sub-advising load-bearing funds.  Around 2003, Dreman launched a series of in-house, no-load funds.  That experiment, by and large, failed.  The funds were rebranded and repriced, but never earned their way.  The fate of their remaining fund, Dreman Contrarian Small Cap Value (DRSVX), is unknown.

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Tax-Sensitive Equity (SDCEX) will liquidate on January 8, 2013 and Dreyfus Small Cap (DSVAX) disappears a week later. Dreyfus is also liquidating a bunch of money market and state bond funds.

Fidelity is pulling a rare 5:1 reverse split by merging Tax Managed Stock (FTXMX), Advisor Strategic Growth (FTQAX), Advisor 130/30 Large Cap (FOATX), and Large Cap Growth (FSLGX) into Fidelity Stock Selector All Cap (FSSKX).

Guggenheim Flexible Strategies (RYBSX) (formerly Guggenheim Long Short Interest Rate Strategies) is slated to merge into Guggenheim Macro Opportunities (GIOAX).

Henderson Global is liquidating their International All Cap Equity (HFNAX) and the Japan Focus (HFJAX) funds in December.

Legg Mason has decided to liquidate Legg Mason Capital Management Disciplined Equity Research (LGMIX), likely on the combination of weak performance and negligible assets.

Munder International Equity (MUIAX) will merge into Munder International Core Equity (MAICX) on Dec. 7.

The board of Northern Funds approved the liquidation of Northern Global Fixed Income (NOIFX) for January 2013.

Pear Tree Columbia Micro Cap (MICRX) just liquidated.  They gave the fund all of one year before declaring it to be a failed experiment.

RidgeWorth plans to merge RidgeWorth Large Cap Core Growth Stock (CRVAX) will be absorbed by RidgeWorth Large Cap Growth Stock (STCIX).

Turner is merging Turner Concentrated Growth (TTOPX) into Turner Large Growth (TCGFX) in early 2013.

Westwood has decided to liquidate Westwood Balanced (WHGBX) less than a year after the departure of longtime lead manager Susan Byrne.

In February, Wells Fargo Advantage Diversified Small Cap (NVDSX) disappears into Wells Fargo Advantage Small Company Growth (NVSCX), Advantage Equity Value (WLVAX) into Advantage Intrinsic Value (EIVAX) and Advantage Small/Mid Cap Core (ECOAX) into Advantage Common Stock (SCSAX).

Well Fargo is also liquidating its Wells Fargo Advantage Core builder Series (WFBGX) in early 2013.

Coming Attractions!

The Observer is trying to help two distinct but complementary groups of folks.  One group are investors who are trying to get past all the noise and hype.  (CNBC’s ratings are dropping like a rock, which should help.)  We’re hoping, in particular, to help folks examine evidence or possibilities that they wouldn’t normally see.  The other group are the managers and other folks associated with small funds and fund boutiques.  We believe in you.  We believe that, as the industry evolves, too much emphasis falls on asset-gathering and on funds launched just for the sake of dangling something new and shiny (uhh … the All Cap Insider Sentiment ETF).  We believe that small, independent funds run by smart, passionate investors deserve a lot more consideration than they receive.  And so we profile them, write about them and talk with other folks in the media about them.

As the Observer has become a bit more financially sustainable, we’re now looking at the prospect of launching two sister sites.  One of those sites will, we hope, be populated with the best commentaries gathered from the best small fund managers and teams that we can find.  Many of you folks write well and some write with grace that far exceeds mine.  The problem, managers tell me, is that fewer people than you’d like find their way to your sites and to your insights.

Our technical team, which Chip leads, thinks that they can create an attractive, fairly vibrant site that could engage readers and help them become more aware of some of the smaller fund families and their strategies.  We respect intellectual property, and so we’d only use content that was really good and whose sharing was supported by the adviser.

That’s still in development.  If you manage a fund or work in support of one and would like to participate in thinking about what would be most helpful, drop Chip a note and we’ll find a way to think through this together.  (Thanks!)

Small cap funds tend to have their best performance in the first six weeks of each year and so we’re planned a smallcapfest for our January issue, with new or revised profiles of the most sensible small cap funds as well as a couple outside perspectives on where you might look.

In Closing . . .

I wanted to share leads on three opportunities that you might want to look in on.  The Observer has no financial stake in any of this stuff but I like sharing word of things that strike me as really first-rate.

QuoteArts.com is a small shop that consistently offers a bunch of the most attractive, best written greeting cards (and refrigerator magnets) that I’ve seen.  Steve Metivier, who runs the site, gave us permission to reproduce one of their images (normally the online version is watermarked):

The text reads “A time to quiet our hearts… (inside) to soften our edges, clear our minds, enjoy our world, and to share best wishes for the season. May these days and all the new year be joyful and peaceful.”  It strikes me as an entirely-worthy aspiration.

Robert CialdiniThe best book there is on the subject of practical persuasion is Robert Cialdini’s Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (revised edition, 2006).  Even if you’re not impressed that I’ve used the book in teaching persuasion over the past 20 years, you might be impressed by Charlie Munger’s strong endorsement of it.  In a talk entitled “The Psychology of Human Misjudgment,” Munger reports being so impressed with Cialdini’s work that he read the book, gave copies of it to all his children and sent Cialdini (“chawl-dee-nee,” if you care) a share of Berkshire Hathaway in thanks.   Cialdini has since left academe, founded the consulting group Influence at Work and now offers Principles of Persuasion workshops for professionals and the public. While I have not researched the workshops in any depth, I suspect that if I were a small business owner, marketer or financial planner who needed to both attract clients and change their behavior for the better. I’d take a serious look.

Finally, at Amazon’s invitation, I contributed an essay that will be posted at their new “Money and Markets” store from December 5th until about the 12th.  Its original title was, “It’s time to go,” but Amazon’s project director and I ended up settling on the less alarming “Trees don’t grow to the sky.”  If you’ve shopped at, say, Macy’s, you’re familiar with the store-within-a-store notion: free-standing, branded specialty shops (Levenger’s, LUSH, FAO Schwarz) operating within a larger enterprise.  It looks like Amazon is trying an experiment in the same direction and, in November, we mentioned their “Money and Markets” store.  Apparently the Amazonians noticed the fact that some of you folks went to look around, they followed your footprints back here and did some reading of their own.  One feature of the Money and Markets store is a weekly guest column and the writers have included Jack Bogle and Tadas Viskanta, the founder of Abnormal Returns which is one of the web’s two best financial news aggregators.  In any case, they asked if I’d chip in a piece during the second week of December.   We’re not allowed to repost the content for a week or so, but I’ll include it in the January cover essay.  Feel free to drop by if you’re in the area.

In the meanwhile, I wanted to extend sincere thanks from all of the folks here (chip, Anya, Junior, Accipiter and me) for the year you’ve shared with us.  You really do make it all worthwhile and so blessings of the season on you and yours.

As ever,

Artisan Global Equity Fund (ARTHX) – December 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks to maximize long-term capital growth.  They invest in a global, all-cap equity portfolio which may include common and preferred stocks, convertible securities and, to a limited extent, derivatives.  They’re looking for high-quality growth companies with sustainable growth characteristics.  Their preference is to invest in firms that benefit from long-term growth trends and in stocks which are selling at a reasonable price.  Typically they hold 60-100 stocks. No more than 30% of the portfolio may be invested in emerging markets.  In general they do not hedge their currency exposure but could choose to do so if they owned a security denominated in an overvalued currency.

Adviser

Artisan Partners of Milwaukee, Wisconsin with Artisan Partners UK LLP as a subadvisor.   Artisan has five autonomous investment teams that oversee twelve distinct U.S., non-U.S. and global investment strategies. Artisan has been around since 1994.  As of 9/30/2012, Artisan Partners had approximately $70 billion in assets under management.  That’s up from $10 billion in 2000. They advise the 12 Artisan funds, but only 5% of their assets come from retail investors.

Manager

Barry P. Dargan is lead portfolio manager and Mark L. Yockey is portfolio manager.  Dargan and Yockey are jointly responsible for management of the fund, they work together to develop investment strategies but Mr. Dargan generally exercises final decision-making authority.  Previously, Mr. Dargan worked for MFS, as an investment analyst from 1996 to 2001 and as a manager of MFS International Growth (MGRAX) from 2001 to 2010.  Mr. Yockey joined Artisan in 1995 and is the lead manager for Artisan International (ARTIX) and Artisan International Small Cap (ARTJX).  The fact that Mr. Dargan’s main charge handily outperformed ARTIX over nearly a decade might have helped convince Artisan to bring him on-board.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Dargan has over $1 million invested with the fund, and Mr. Yockey has between $500,000 and $1 million invested.  As of December 31, 2011, the officers and directors of Artisan Funds owned 16.94% of Artisan Global Equity Fund.

Opening date

March 29, 2010

Minimum investment

$1,000, which Artisan will waive if you establish an account with an automatic investment plan.

Expense ratio

1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $16.7 million. There is a 2% redemption fee for shares held less than 90 days.

Comments

Q:   What do you get when you combine the talents of two supremely successful international stock managers, a healthy corporate culture and a small, flexible fund?

A:   Artisan Global Equity.

The argument for considering ARTHX is really straightforward.  First, both managers have records that are both sustained and excellent.  Mr. Dargan managed, or co-managed, six funds, including two global funds, while at MFS.  Those included funds targeting both U.S. and non-U.S. investors.  While I don’t have a precise calculation, it’s clear he was managing more than $3 billion.  Mr. Yockey has famously managed two Artisan international funds since their inception, was once recognized as Morningstar’s International Fund Manager of the Year (1998).  For most trailing time periods, his funds have top 10% returns.  International Small Cap received Morningstar’s highest accolade when it was designated as the only “Gold” fund in its peer group while International was recognized as a “Silver” fund.  Based on head-to-head comparisons from 2001-2010, Mr. Yockey is really first rate and Mr. Dargan might be better.  (Being British, it’s almost certain that he has a cooler accent.)

Second, Artisan is a good steward.  The firm’s managers are divided into five teams, each with a distinctive philosophy and portfolio strategy.  The Global Equity team has four members (including Associate Portfolio Managers Charles Hamker and Andrew Euretig who also co-manage International Small Cap) and their discipline grows from the strategies first employed in ARTIX then extended to ARTJX.  Artisan has a very good record for lowering expenses, being risk conscious, opening funds only when they believe they have the capacity to be category-leaders (and almost all are) and closing funds before they’re bloated.

Third, ARTHX is nimble.  Its mandate is flexible: all sizes, all countries, any industry.  The fund’s direct investment in emerging markets is limited to 30% of the portfolio, but their pursuit of the world’s best companies leads them to firms whose income streams are more diverse than would be suggested by the names of the countries where they’re headquartered.  The managers note:

Though we have outsized exposure to Europe and undersized exposure to the U.S., we believe our relative country weights are of less significance since the companies we own in these developed economies continually expand their revenue bases across the globe.

Our portfolio remains centered around global industry leading companies with attractive valuations. This has led to a significant overweight position in the consumer sectors where many of our holdings benefit from significant exposure to the faster growth in emerging economies.

Since much of the world’s secular (enduring, long-term) growth is in the emerging markets, the portfolio is positioned to give them substantial exposure to it through their Europe and US-domiciled firms.  While the managers are experienced in handling billions, here they’re dealing with only $17 million.

The results are not surprising.  Morningstar believes that their analysts can identify those funds likely to serve their shareholders best; they do this by looking at a series of qualitative factors on top of pure performance.  When they find a fund that they believe has the potential to be consistently strong in the future, they can name it as a “Gold” fund.   Here are ARTHX’s returns since inception (the blue line) against all of Morningstar’s global Gold funds:

Artisan Global Equity versus gold funds

Not to say that the gap between Artisan and the other top funds is large and growing, but it is.

Bottom Line

Artisan Global Equity is an outstanding small fund for investors looking for exposure to many of the best firms from around the global.  The expenses are reasonable, the investment minimum is low and the manager is first-rate.  Which should be no surprise since two of the few funds keeping pace with Artisan Global Equity have names beginning with the same two words: Artisan Global Opportunities (ARTRX) and Artisan Global Value (ARTGX).

Fund website

Artisan Global Equity

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2012. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

New and Noteworthy Site

By Editor

LearnBonds Mutual Fund & ETF Ratings

History and Focus

LearnBonds (LB) Mutual Fund & ETF Ratings was launched in December 2011 by its co-founders Marc Prosser and David Waring. Marc Prosser is currently a Forbes contributor; previously he was the Chief Marketing Officer at Forex Capital Markets (FXCM). David Waring was formerly the Managing Director, business development and strategy, at Market Simplified Inc.

Unlike industry heavyweights such as Morningstar and Lipper, LB Ratings focuses on a relatively small number of bond funds in a limited number of categories. They divide funds into categories based on purpose. The categories currently listed are core bond funds, municipal bond funds, short term/low-duration bond funds, high credit risk bond funds and long duration funds. Their belief is that no individual or family should have more than 5 purpose driven funds in their portfolio. This is how David Waring describes their approach:

We have tremendous respect for Morningstar and Lipper’s mutual fund and ETF ratings. LB Ratings will not replace these great tools. However, we recognize many investors find these tools overwhelming and complicated to apply to making investment choices. We are addressing the need for a simplified product which expresses strong views as to which funds an investor should own.

Methodology

LB Ratings does not use a mathematical formula to identify or rate individual funds. Every fund listed on LB ratings was personally chosen and rated by the co-founders.  Instead of mechanical, number-based, quantitative analysis, they use a specific set of criteria to personally select and rate individual funds. Factors include fund performance both long and short term, risk levels, associated fees and quality and tenure of management. Funds are given a rating level between 1 and 5 stars, 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest. The website describes this method as “opinionated ratings.”  They are clear and upfront about their methods and their belief that all fund rating agencies and websites are inherently subjective.   This makes LB’s ratings akin to Morningstar’s Analyst Ratings (the Gold, Silver … designations).

LearnBonds screenshot

Extras

Every fund listed is accompanied by a compact but comprehensive report that outlines its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the rationale behind its rating. In addition to their bond fund and ETF lists, LB Ratings also offers links to bond and fund related articles. Additionally, website visitors can sign up for a daily newsletter, or download the free e-book “How to Invest in Bonds.”

Pros

The website is simple and straightforward, providing shortlists of funds that were hand chosen by experts in the field.  The rating report that accompanies each fund is clear and concise, giving readers information that can be useful to them independent of the rating. Fewer categories and shorter lists may be less stressful to some investors and help to reduce confusion.

Cons

The limited number of categories and funds means that inevitably many strong candidates will be missing. The subjective nature of the ratings will be too abstract for many. The lack of comparative tools – and tools in general – will limit the site’s appeal to investors who need more in-depth coverage. One practical concern we have is that there’s no evidence of predictive validity for the LB ratings; that is, they don’t have proof that their five star funds will perform better in the future than their three star ones.  Here’s Mr. Prosser’s response:

As far as predictive analysis , I would make the argument that at least for actively traded bonds funds we are in a period of time where quantitative analysis is difficult to employ:

Funds have radically changed the profile of the assets they hold and significantly drifted away from their benchmarks. Here are two easy examples; the Templeton World Bond Fund is now a short-duration fund, with a duration two years shorter than its peers. The PIMCO Total Return Fund now is a large holder of munis. which are neither included in its benchmark nor have they ever been a major part of its holdings.  In both cases, these are radical departures from the past . . . and at the same time [might be] temporary positions . . .  As a result, more than ever you’re “betting” on the skill of the fund’s manager.  Or put another way, historically the best performing bond mutual funds had most their returns generated from beta and now they are generating it from alpha. In short, I don’t think the quant models being employed really capture this shift.  [Assessing these funds] requires more qualitative analysis.

Bottom Line

Although the website’s offerings are limited, many investors may prefer a human chosen shortlist of choices over one generated by a computer.  For those who don’t need or likely will not use tools such as screeners and comparative charts, the simple straightforward nature of LB Ratings will be welcome. As the website itself acknowledges though, a fund rating website is built on trust.  Trust is earned over time, and ultimately only time will tell how the “opinionated ratings” approach fares against the tried and tested methods of the industry’s heavyweights in terms of performance.  For now, we conclude that LB has a sensible niche, that it’s interesting, worth watching and potentially useful, so long as you use their ratings as a starting point rather than a final word.

Website

http://www.learnbonds.com/lb-rated-funds/

December 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund will seek a high level of current income by investing in floating rate loans and “other floating rate investments.”  The “other” includes “floating rate debt securities; inflation-indexed securities; certain mortgage- and asset-backed securities, including those backed by collateral that carry an adjustable or floating rate of interest, such as adjustable rate mortgages; certain collateralized loan obligations; certain collateralized debt obligations; certain collateralized mortgage obligations; adjustable rate mortgages; floaters; inverse floaters; money market securities of all types; repurchase agreements; and shares of money market and short-term bond funds”.  The fund will be managed by Bonnie Baha and Robert Cohen.  Ms. Baha was part of Mr. Gundlach’s original TCW team.  No word on Mr. Cohen’s background. The minimum initial investment is $2000, reduced to $500 for IRAs. Expenses not yet set.

Epiphany FFV Global Ecologic Fund

Epiphany FFV Global Ecologic Fund will seek long-term capital growth by investing in a global portfolio of common and dividend-paying preferred stocks.  They seek “to encourage environmentally responsible business practices and a cleaner environment by investing … in environmentally responsible and sustainable companies.”  They anticipate holding about 50 names and, they assure us, they’ll invest no more than 5% in “pure play renewable energy.”  The managers will be  Frank Morris, founder and CEO of Ecologic Advisors andSamuel J. Saladino, CEO of Trinity Fiduciary Partners and the manager of Epiphany FFV Fund and Latin America Fund.  The former is a tiny, perfectly respectable US large cap fund.  The latter is new but doing well so far.  FFV refers to Faith and Family Values and represents the underlying theme of the social and moral screening.  The minimum initial investment is $1000, reduced to $100 for accounts set up with an automatic investing plan. The expense ratio is 1.56%.

Lyrical U.S. Value Equity Fund

Lyrical U.S. Value Equity Fund will seek to achieve long-term capital growth by buying “the stocks of companies that the Adviser believes are undervalued, the undervaluation to be temporary, the underlying business to have sufficient quality and durability, and the estimated discount in the stock price to be large enough to compensate for the risks of the investment.”  Good companies temporarily down.  Got it.  The fund will be managed by Andrew Wellington, Chief Investment Officer of Lyrical Asset Management.  The manager ran a hedge fund for a while, managed institutional midcap value money for Neuberger and was a founding member of Pzena Investment Management. The minimum investment is $10,000, reduced to $1,000 for IRAs.  The expense ratio is 1.45%.

Market Vectors High-Yield/Treasury Bond ETF

Market Vectors High-Yield/Treasury Bond ETF will track an index that invests in global high yield bonds and shorts U.S. Treasuries in order “to hedge interest rate sensitivity.”  Michael Mazier and Francis Rodilosso of Van Eck will manage the fund.  Expense not yet set.

MCM All-Cap Growth Fund

MCM All-Cap Growth Fund (MCAEX) will seek capital appreciation by investing in 25-50 smaller cap US growth stocks.  The fund will be managed by Rich Jones and Jonn Wullschleger, both of Mitchell Capital Management.  Their separate account composite, for accounts managed in this style, modestly outperformed the Russell 3000 Growth Index pretty consistently. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  Expenses are capped at 1.0%.

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund will pursue maximum total return, consistent with prudent investment management. The plan is to invest in “a broad range of emerging market fixed income asset classes, such as external debt obligations of sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and corporate entities; currencies, and local currency-denominated obligations of sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and corporate issuers.”  The managers will actively manage both the asset allocation and security selection.  The benchmark asset allocation is 50% JPMorgan Global Bond Index Emerging Markets- Global Diversified, 25% JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global and 25% JPMorgan Corporate Emerging Market Bond Index Diversified.  They can implement their allocation plan directly by buying securities or indirectly by investing in funds and ETFs.  The manager has not yet been named.  There will be a $1000 investment minimum for the no-load “D” shares.  Expenses have not yet been set.

Shelton Green Alpha Fund

Shelton Green Alpha Fund will seek a high level of long-term capital appreciation by investing in stocks “in the green economy.”  The prospectus is bereft of potentially useful details, such as what they’ll charge and who’ll manage the fund.  We do know that it’s a no-load fund, that the minimum investment is $1000, and that “green” funds have largely been a disaster for both sponsor and investor.  I wish them well.

Manager changes, November 2012

By Chip

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
PCDFX Aberdeen Core Fixed Income J. Christopher Gagnier, Oliver Boulind and Timothy Vile have stepped down Existing comanagers, Stephen Cianci and Neil Moriarty will be joined by Michael Degernes, Edward Grant, and Charles Tan. 11/12
AUDIX Aberdeen Ultra-Short Duration Bond Oliver Boulind and Neil Moriarty have stepped down The rest of the team remains. 11/12
AIFLX American Independence Large Cap Growth Robert S. Natale John Christopher Jacobs 11/12
AIFSX American Independence Small Cap Growth Robert S. Natale John Christopher Jacobs 11/12
MDFGX BlackRock Capital Appreciation Jeff Lindsey Lawrence Kemp 11/12
MAFOX BlackRock Focus Growth Jeff Lindsey Lawrence Kemp 11/12
BLDAX BlackRock Low Duration Bond Comanager Stuart Spodek Scott MacLellan joins as a new comanager with Tom Musmanno, who remains. 11/12
DEQAX Dreyfus Global Equity Income No one, but . . . Nick Clay joined James Harries as a comanager 11/12
SNIEX Dreyfus/Newton International Equity No one, but . . . Jeff Munroe joined Paul Markham as a comanager 11/12
EAGMX Eaton Vance Global Macro Absolute Return Mark Venezia will retire The other managers remain. 11/12
FTEAX Forward Tactical Enhanced Christopher J. Guptill, an outsider who was doing a singularly fine job. Jim O’Donnell and Jim Welsh take over as part of an “in-housing” trend at Forward 11/12
GALLX Goldman Sachs Flexible Cap Growth No one, but . . . Warren Fisher was added as a comanager 11/12
IMOIX ING Growth and Income Core Portfolio (formerly, ING Thornburg Value Portfolio) Connor Browne and Edward Maran, as subadvisor Thornburg Investment Management was terminated. Christopher F. Corapi and Michael Pytosh of subadvisor, ING Investment Management 11/12
JMIGX Jacob Micro Cap Growth Jamie Cuellar Ryan Jacob, who bought the former Pinebridge Micro Cap fund in July and has installed himself as manager 11/12
PBSBX Jacob Small Cap Growth Jamie Cuellar Ryan Jacob, same story as with Micro Cap: bought the fund, hired himself, didn’t lower the 3.4% expense ratio. 11/12
PZFVX John Hancock Classic Value No one, but . . . Ben Silver has joined as the fourth comanager. 11/12
LGILX Laudus Growth Investor US Large Cap Growth Lawrence Kemp has retired from UBS, the subadvisor. He’s being replaced by a team of three, Paul Graham, Sam Console, and Peter Bye. 11/12
MFDAX Managers Fixed Income Subadvisor Loomis Sayles is out, along with Dan Fuss.  Fuss is splendid and quite elderly and his heir apparent jumped ship so … Gannett Welsh & Kotler, LLC, is in, with Mary Kane as portfolio manager. 11/12
NCBIX New Covenant Balanced Income John J. McCue Derek Papastrat 11/12
NSAGX Nuveen Santa Barbara Growth James Boothe Robert C. Doll Jr. 11/12
OPMSX Oppenheimer Main Street Small- & Mid-Cap No one, but . . . Raymond Anello is now lead manager, and Joy Budzinski, Kristin Ketner Pak, Magnus Krantz, and Adam Weine were added as comanagers. 11/12
PIGFX Pioneer Fundamental Growth Timothy Mulrenan Paul Cloonan 11/12
PINDX Pioneer Independence Timothy Mulrenan Andrew Acheson continues alone. 11/12
PRIAX Principal International Emerging Markets Michael Ade and Michael Reynal Mohammed Zaidi will join Mihail Dobrinov as a manager 11/12
PPGAX Putnam Global Sector No one, but . . . Isabel Buccellati joins the team, now numbering 14 11/12
PRFRX T. Rowe Price Floating Rate Justin Gerbereux has stepped down Comanager Paul Massaro remains as the sole manager. 11/12
RPIFX T. Rowe Price Institutional Floating Rate Justin Gerbereux has stepped down Comanager Paul Massaro remains as the sole manager. 11/12
TGGEX TCW Growth Equities Husam Nazer and Brendt Stallings will be out by the end of the year Mike Olson and Chang Lee will assume the duties 11/12
TGSCX TCW Small Cap Growth Husam Nazer and Brendt Stallings, who managed a high volatility/low returns style, will be out by the end of the year Mike Olson and Chang Lee will assume the duties 11/12
TGSDX TCW SMID Cap Growth Husam Nazer and Brendt Stallings will be out by the end of the year Mike Olson and Chang Lee will assume the duties 11/12
USGRX USAA Growth & Income Subadvisors Loomis Sayles and UBS Global Asset Management. An in-house team, John Toohey and Wasif Latif, join the other subadvisors. 11/12
USISX USAA Income Stock No one, but . . . They’re adding an internal team to comanage a portion of the fund. The internal team consists of Wasif Latif, John Toohey, Julianne Bass, and Steve Klaffke. The existing subadvisors will remain. 11/12

 

A Look Back at Dodge & Cox Stock Fund (DODGX)

By Charles Boccadoro

From the Mutual Fund Observer discussion board, November 2012

Several recent posts prompted me to take a closer look at DODGX historical performance. Ted posted the most recent: Dodge & Cox: The San Francisco Treat. Basically, an article from Morningstar defending why D&C has been a top pick for years, based on a strong corporate fiduciary culture and long term record, despite its struggle in 2008 and poor stock selections since, like HPQ, a DODGX heavy for years. hank and Shostakovich made good comments about AUM, definition of value, intrinsic risk management, and debated whether a better approach for a value shop is to be all-in or have some assets in cash at times.

An earlier post: 3 Former Star Funds to Avoid, a stunner by Steve Goldberg, which challenged DODGX exalted status, pointing to “deep flaws in the fund’s stock picking” in 2008 and mediocre performance since. The article took its share of lashings from most, but not all, MFO readers.

I lamented a bit on an earlier related post: Dodge & Cox Balanced Regains Its Stride, Finally? A look back at my decision to buy DODBX over VWELX in 2002. This post includes more recent entries describing HPQ’s 13% plunge on Oct 3. scott weighed in on transient nature of defining value for technology companies. (This week HPQ had another 12% downer-day on suspected fraud disclosure over recent acquisition. Can you believe? This is Hewlett Packard for crying out loud. Good grief.) And fundalarm noted how Dodge & Cox doesn’t appear to “have price targets at which point to book profits or cut losses,” which again brings into question D&C’s risk management philosophy.

OK, stage set. I was very interested in looking at DODGX from a perspective both before and after the real estate collapse in 2008. With David’s assertion that folks are more concerned about loses than gains, and VintageFreaks’ comment about it’s “WHEN you buy, not WHAT you buy,” I looked at worst-case rolling performance, initiated every month over the periods noted, from DODGX’s inception in Feb 65.

The figure below illustrates one reason why everybody was clamoring to own shares in DODGX before 2008. Basically, its worst-case return beat SP500’s worst-case return consistently over just about any period:

1_2012-11-21_0907

Note also that DODGX lost virtually no money for any 8-year or longer period, whereas an unlucky investor in SP500 could still be looking at nearly 20% loss, even after 9 years.

Even longer term, depicted below, DODGX trounced SP500. Basically, the worst period for DODGX was substantially better than the worst period for SP500. 

2_2012-11-21_0918

After 2007, however, an investor could have worse return in near-term with DODGX than with SP500:

3_2012-11-21_0821

But despite this near-term under-performance, an investor with DODGX for periods of about 9 years or more has still never lost money, even periods including 2008, whereas SP500 investors must have invested for periods of 12 years or more to avoid loss.

OK, so that is worst-case DODGX versus worst-case SP500.

Next, I compared DODGX relative to SP500 for same rolling periods. Basically, wanting to see, depending on WHEN, whether it was better to be in DODGX or SP500. So, below are comparisons of DODGX best and worst total returns relative to SP500 for rolling periods dating back to Feb 65 through to present Oct 12:

4_2012-11-21_0930
5_2012-11-21_0931

Clearly, there are periods when DODGX has under-performed the SP500, especially over the short-term. But then its periods of over-performance tend to be more impressive. Over its life, DODGX has bested the SP500 hands-down.

Taking a closer look at WHEN, data from above two charts are tabulated below, along with ending month/year of the corresponding best and worst periods. At a glance, most of the best over-performance were during periods leading up to the real estate bubble in 2008, while most of the worst under-performance actually occurred in the years leading up the tech bubble in 2000.

6_2012-11-22_0600

Going still further, the chart below shows growth comparison from DODGX inception through 1987 market crash. Basically, for first 20 plus years of DODGX existence, it beat SP500 handsomely overall. Perhaps more important is that DODGX performed comparable to the market, within 2-4%, during the five or so significant down-markets during this time.

7_2012-12-02_1315

Then, during the next 20 years, shown below, DODGX had its most extraordinary performance, which surely helped establish the many recommendations for DODGX, by M*, Kiplinger, and others.

8_2012-12-02_1320

Leading up to late ’90s, DODGX actually lagged the SP500 somewhat; in fact, that’s where its worst total returns relative to SP500 actually occurred. But when the tech bubble popped in 2000, DODGX sailed-on through. While the SP500 lost 45% in the down-market from Sep 00 through Sep 02, DODGX lost nothing. In the five years after the bubble, it continued to handsomely beat the SP500. No doubt, DODGX’s stellar reputation was born during this extraordinary period of performance. Everybody clamored to get in, AUM grew, and the fund closed. It had become the perfect equity fund, avoiding down-side losses, while over-performing in up-markets. Until, of course, 2007. The funny thing here is that DODGX lost only 9% more than the SP500 during the great recession, but its reputation–that of being the perfect equity fund–was tarnished, if not shattered.

Just a few more comparisons, and I will stop, promise.

The tabulation below shows a “batting average,” basically number of times DODGX beat SP500 in rolling periods considered since Feb 65. On any given year, it has beaten SP500 more than 50% of time. More than 60% in any 2-year period. More than 70% any 7-year period. More than 80% in any 10-year period.

The tabulation also shows the number of these periods that DODGX and SP500 have lost money. Since Feb 1965, SP500 has never lost money over any 12 year period or longer. DODGX has never lost money over any 10-year period. A closer look shows that it only lost 2% in its worst case 9-year period. In fact, there were only two 8-year periods out of 478 considered that DODGX lost money: the period ending Feb 09 when its total return was -13.2% and Mar 09 when it was -4.2%.

9_2012-11-22_0701

Here is link to original thread.

November 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

I had imagined this as the “post-storm, pre-cliff” edition of the Observer but it appears that “post-storm” would be a very premature characterization.  For four million of our friends who are still without power, especially those along the coast or in outlying areas, the simple pleasures of electric lighting and running water remain a distant hope.  And anything that looks like “normal” might be months in their future.  Our thoughts, prayers, good wishes and spare utility crews go out to them.

I thought, instead, I’d say something about the U.S. presidential election.  This is going to sting, but here it is:

It’s going to be okay.

Hard to believe, isn’t it?  We’re acculturated into viewing the election if as it were some apocalyptic video game whose tagline reads: “America can’t survive .”  The reality is, we can and we will.  The reality is that both Obama and Romney are good guys: smart, patriotic, obsessively hard-working, politically moderate, fact-driven, given to compromise and occasionally funny.  The reality is that they’re both trapped by the demands of electoral politics and polarized bases.

But, frankly, freed of the constraints of those bases, these guys would agree on rather more than they disagree on.  In a less-polarized world, they could run together as a ticket (Obomney 2020!) and do so with a great deal of camaraderie and mutual respect. (Biden-Ryan, on the other hand, would be more than a little bit scary.)  Neither strikes me as a great politician or polished communicator; that’s going to end up constraining – and perhaps crippling – whoever wins.

Why are we so negative?  Because negative (“fear and loathing on the campaign trail”) raises money (likely $6 billion by the time it’s all done) and draws viewers.  While it’s easy to blame PACs, super PACs and other dark forces for that state, the truth is that the news media – mainstream and otherwise – paint good men as evil.  A startling analysis conducted by the Project for Excellence in Journalism found that 72% of all character references to Messrs. Obama and Romney are negative, one of the most negative set of press portrayals on record.

I live in Iowa, labeled a “battleground state,” and I receive four to six (largely poisonous) robo-calls a day.  And so here’s the final reality: Iowa is not a battleground and we’d all be better off if folks stopped using the term.  It’s a place where a bunch of folks are worried, a bunch of folks (often the same ones) are hopeful and we’re trying to pick as best we can.

The Last Ten: T. Rowe Price in the Past Decade

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.  We started with Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches.  Sadly, the pattern of the last decade is clear and clearly worse: despite 154 fund launches since 2002, Fidelity has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price is a far smaller firm.  Where Fidelity has $1.4 trillion in assets under management, Price is under $600 billion.  Fidelity manages 340 funds.  Price has 110.  Fidelity launched 154 funds in a decade, Price launched 22.

Morningstar Rating

Category

Size (millions, slightly rounded)

Africa & Middle ★★★ Emerging Markets Stock

150

Diversified Mid Cap Growth ★★★ Mid-Cap Growth

200

Emerging Markets Corporate Bond

Emerging Markets Bond

30

Emerging Markets Local Currency

Emerging Markets Bond

50

Floating Rate

Bank Loan

80

Global Infrastructure

Global Stock

40

Global Large-Cap ★★★ Global Stock

70

Global Real Estate ★★★★★ Global Real Estate

100

Inflation Protected Bond ★★★ Inflation-Protected Bond

570

Overseas Stock ★★★ Foreign Large Blend

5,000

Real Assets

World Stock

2,760

Retirement 2005 ★★★★ Target Date

1,330

Retirement 2010 ★★★ Target Date

5,850

Retirement 2015 ★★★★ Target Date

7,340

Retirement 2025 ★★★ Target Date

9,150

Retirement 2035 ★★★★ Target Date

6,220

Retirement 2045 ★★★★ Target Date

3,410

Retirement 2050 ★★★★ Target Date

2,100

Retirement 2055 ★★★★★ Target-Date

490

Retirement Income ★★★ Retirement Income

2,870

Strategic Income ★★ Multisector Bond

270

US Large-Cap Core ★★★ Large Blend

50

What are the patterns?

  1. Most Price funds reflect the firm’s strength in asset allocation and emerging asset classes. Price does really first-rate work in thinking about which assets classes make sense and in what configuration. They’ve done a good job of communicating that research to their investors, making things clear without making them childish.
  2. Most Price funds succeed. Of the funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).
  3. Most Price funds remain reasonably nimble. While Fido funds quickly swell into the multi-billion range, a lot of the Price funds have remaining under $200 million which gives them both room to grow and to maneuver. The really large funds are the retirement-date series, which are actually funds of other funds.
  4. Price continues to buck prevailing wisdom. There’s no sign of blossoming index fund business or the launch of a series of superfluous ETFs. There’s a lot to be said for knowing your strengths and continuing to develop them.

Finally, Price continues to deliver on its promises. Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play. The success of that strategy is evident in Price’s domination of . . .

The Observer’s Honor Roll, Unlike Any Other

Last month, in the spirit of FundAlarm’s “three-alarm” fund list, we presented the Observer’s second Roll Call of the Wretched.  Those were funds that managed to trail their peers for the past one-, three-, five- and ten-year periods, with special commendation for the funds that added high expenses and high volatility to the mix.

This month, I’d like to share the Observer’s Honor Roll of Consistently Bearable Funds.  Most such lists start with a faulty assumption: that high returns are intrinsically good.

Wrong!

While high returns can be a good thing, the practical question is how those returns are obtained.  If they’re the product of alternately sizzling and stone cold performances, the high returns are worse than meaningless: they’re a deadly lure to hapless investors and advisors.  Investors hate losing money much more than they love making it.

In light of that, the Observer asked a simple question: which mutual funds are never terrible?  In constructing the Honor Roll, we did not look at whether a fund ever made a lot of money.  We looked only at whether a fund could consistently avoid being rotten.  Our logic is this: investors are willing to forgive the occasional sub-par year, but they’ll flee in terror in the face of a horrible one.  That “sell low” – occasionally “sell low and stuff the proceeds in a zero-return money fund for five years” – is our most disastrous response.

We looked for no-load, retail funds which, over the past ten years, have never finished in the bottom third of their peer groups.   And while we weren’t screening for strong returns, we ended up with a list of funds that consistently provided them anyway.

U.S. stock funds

Strategy

Assets (millions)

2011 Honoree or the reason why not

Fidelity Growth Company (FDGRX)

Large Growth

44,100

Rotten 2002

Laudus Growth Investors US Large Cap Growth (LGILX)

Large Growth

1,400

2011 Honoree

Merger (MERFX)

Market Neutral

4,700

Rotten 2002

Robeco All Cap Value (BPAVX)

Large Value

400

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Capital Opportunities (PRCOX)

Large Blend

400

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Growth (RPMGX)

Mid-Cap Growth

18,300

2011 Honoree

TIAA-CREF Growth & Income (TIIRX)

Large Blend

2,900

Not around in 2002

TIAA-CREF Mid-Cap Growth (TCMGX)

Mid-Cap Growth

1,300

Not around in 2002

Vanguard Explorer (VEXPX)

Small Growth

9,000

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Mid Cap Growth (VMGRX)

Mid-Cap Growth

2,200

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Morgan Growth (VMRGX)

Large Growth

9,000

2011 Honoree

International stock funds

American Century Global Growth (TWGGX)

Global

400

2011 Honoree

Driehaus Emerging Markets Growth (DREGX)

Emerging Markets

900

2011 Honoree

Thomas White International (TWWDX)

Large Value

600

2011 Honoree

Vanguard International Growth (VWIGX)

Large Growth

17,200

2011 Honoree

Blended asset funds

Buffalo Flexible Income (BUFBX)

Moderate Hybrid

600

2011 Honoree

Fidelity Freedom 2020 (FFFDX)

Target Date

14,300

2011 Honoree

Fidelity Freedom 2030 (FFFEX)

Target Date

11,000

Rotten 2002

Fidelity Puritan (FPURX)

Moderate Hybrid

20,000

2011 Honoree

Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Extended Term (MNBAX)

Moderate Hybrid

1,300

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Balanced (RPBAX)

Moderate Hybrid

3,400

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Balanced (TRPBX)

Moderate Hybrid

1,700

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Personal Strategy Income (PRSIX)

Conservative Hybrid

1,100

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Retirement 2030 (TRRCX)

Target Date

13,700

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Retirement 2040 (TRRDX)

Target Date

9,200

Not around in 2002

T. Rowe Price Retirement Income (TRRIX)

Retirement Income

2,900

Not around in 2002

Vanguard STAR (VGSTX)

Moderate Hybrid

14,800

2011 Honoree

Vanguard Tax-Managed Balanced (VTMFX)

Conservative Hybrid

1,000

Rotten 2002

Specialty funds

Fidelity Select Industrials (FCYIX)

Industrial

600

Weak 2002

Fidelity Select Retailing (FSRPX)

Consumer Cyclical

600

Weak 2002

Schwab Health Care (SWHFX)

Health

500

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Global Technology (PRGTX)

Technology

700

2011 Honoree

T. Rowe Price Media & Telecomm (PRMTX)

Communications

2,400

2011 Honoree

Reflections on the Honor Roll

These funds earn serious money.  Twenty-nine of the 33 funds earn four or five stars from Morningstar.  Four earn three stars, and none earn less.  By screening for good risk management, you end up with strong returns.

This is consistent with the recent glut of research on low-volatility investing.  Here’s the basic story: a portfolio of low-volatility stocks returns one to two percent more than the stock market while taking on 25% less risk.

That’s suspiciously close to the free lunch we’re not supposed to get.

There’s a very fine, short article on low-volatility investing in the New York Times: “In Search of Funds that Don’t Rock the Boat” (October 6, 2012).  PIMCO published some of the global data, showing (at slightly numbing length) that the same pattern holds in both developed and developing markets: “Stock Volatility: Not What You Might Think” (January 2012). There are a slug of ETFs that target low-volatility stocks but I’d be hesitant to commit to one until we’d looked at other risk factors such as turnover, market cap and sector concentration.

The roster is pretty stable.  Only four funds that qualified under these screens at the end of 2011 dropped out in 2012.  They are:

FPA Crescent (FPACX) – a 33% cash stake isn’t (yet) helping.  That said, this has been such a continually excellent fund that I worry more about the state of the market than about the state of Crescent.

New Century Capital (NCCPX) – a small, reasonably expensive fund-of funds that’s trailing 77% of its peers this year.  It’s been hurt, mostly, by being overweight in energy and underweight in resurgent financials.

New Century International (NCFPX) – another fund-of-funds that’s trailing about 80% of its peers, hurt by a huge overweight in emerging markets (primarily Latin), energy, and Canada (which is sort of an energy play).

Permanent Portfolio (PRPFX) – it hasn’t been a good year to hold a lot of Treasuries, and PRPFX by mandate does.

The list shows less than half of the turnover you’d expect if funds were there by chance.

One fund deserves honorable mentionT. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRCWX) has only had one relatively weak year in this century; in 2007, it finished in the 69th percentile which made it (barely) miss inclusion.

What you’ve heard about T. Rowe Price is true.  You know all that boring “discipline, consistency, risk-awareness” stuff.  Apparently so.  There are 10 Price funds on the list, nearly one-third of the total.  Second place: Fidelity and Vanguard, far larger firms, with six funds.

Sure bets?  Nope.  Must have?  Dear God, no.  A potentially useful insight into picking winners by dodging a penchant for the occasional disaster?  We think so.

In dullness there is strength.

“TrimTabs ETF Outperforms Hedge Funds”

And underperforms pretty much everybody else.  The nice folks at FINAlternatives (“Hedge Fund and Private Equity News”) seem to have reproduced (or condensed) a press release celebrating the first-year performance of TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF (TTFS).

(Sorry – you can get to the original by Googling the title but a direct-link always takes you to a log-in screen.)

Why is this journalism?  They don’t offer the slightest hint about what the fund does.  And, not to rain on anybody’s ETF, but their trailing 12-month return (21.46% at NAV, as of 10/18) places them 2050th in Morningstar’s database.  That list includes a lot of funds which have been consistently excellent (Akre Focus, BBH Core Select (closing soon – see below), ING Corporate Leaders, Mairs & Power Growth and Sequoia) for decades, so it’s not immediately clear what warrants mention.

Seafarer Rolls On

Andrew Foster’s Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income Fund (SFGIX) continues its steady gains.

The fund is outperforming every reasonable benchmark: $10,000 invested at the fund’s inception has grown to $10,865 (as of 10/26/12).  The same amount invested in the S&P’s diversified emerging markets, emerging Asia and emerging Latin America ETFs would have declined by 5-10%.

Assets are steadily rolling in: the fund is now at $17 million after six months of operation and has been gaining nearly two million a month since summer.

Opinion-makers are noticing: Andrew and David Nadel of Royce Global Value (and five other funds ‘cause that’s what Royce managers do) were the guests on October 26th edition of Wealth Track with Consuelo Mack.  It was good to hear ostensible “growth” and “value” investors agree on so much about what to look for in emerging market stocks and which countries they were assiduously avoiding.  The complete interview on video is available here.  (Thanks to our endlessly vigilant Ted for both the heads-up and the video link.)

Legg Mason Rolls Over

Legg Mason seems to be struggling.  On the one hand we have the high visibility struggles of its former star manager, Bill Miller, who’s now in the position of losing more money for more people than almost any manager.  Their most recent financial statement, released July 27, shows that assets, operating revenue, operating income, and earnings are all down from the year before.   Beside that, there’s a more fundamental struggle to figure out what Legg Mason is and who wants to bear the name.

On October 5 2009 Legg announced a new naming strategy for its funds:

Most funds that were formerly named Legg Mason or Legg Mason Partners will now include the Legg Mason name, the name of the investment affiliate and the Fund’s strategy (such as the Legg Mason ClearBridge Appreciation Fund or the Legg Mason Western Asset Managed Municipals Fund).

The announced rationale was to “leverage the Legg Mason brand awareness.”

Welcome to the age of deleveraging:  This year those same funds are moving to hide the Legg Mason taint.  Western Asset dropped the Legg Mason number this summer.  Clearbridge is now following suit, so that the Legg Mason ClearBridge Appreciation Fund is about to become just Clearbridge Appreciation.

Royce, another Legg Mason affiliate, has never advertised that association.  Royce has always had a great small-value discipline. Since being acquired by Legg Mason in 2001, the firm acquired two other, troubling distinctions.

  1. Managers who are covering too many funds.  By way of a quick snapshot, here are the funds managed by 72-year-old Chuck Royce (and this is after he dropped several):
    Since … He’s managed …

    12/2010

    Royce Global Dividend Value

    08/2010

    Royce Micro-Cap Discovery

    04/2009

    Royce Partners

    06/2008

    Royce International Smaller-Companies

    09/2007

    Royce Enterprise Select

    12/2006

    Royce European Smaller Companies

    06/2005

    Royce Select II

    05/2004

    Royce Dividend Value

    12/2003

    Royce Financial Services

    06/2003

    Royce 100

    11/1998

    Royce Select I

    12/1995

    Royce Heritage

    12/1993

    Royce Total Return

    12/1991

    Royce Premier

    11/1972

    Royce Pennsylvania Mutual

     

    Their other senior manager, Whitney George, manages 11 funds.  David Nadel works on nine, Lauren Romeo helps manage eight.

  2. A wild expansion out of their traditional domestic small-value strength.  Between 1962 and 2001, Royce launched nine funds – all domestic small caps.  Between 2001 and the present, they launched 21 mutual funds and three closed-end funds in a striking array of flavors (Global Select Long/Short, International Micro-Cap, European Smaller Companies).  While many of those later launches have performed well, many have found no traction in the market.  Fifteen of their post-2001 launches have under $100 million in assets, 10 have under $10 million.  That translates into higher expenses in some already-expensive niches and a higher hurdle for the managers to overcome.Legg reports progressively weaker performance among the Royce funds in recent years:

    Three out of 30 funds managed by Royce outperformed their benchmarks for the 1-year period; 4 out of 24 for the 3-year period; 12 out of 19 for the 5-year period; and all 11 outperformed for the 10-year period.

That might be a sign of a fundamentally unhealthy market or the accumulated toll of expenses and expansion.  Shostakovich, one of our discussion board’s most experienced correspondents, pretty much cut to the chase on the day Royce reopened its $1.1 billion micro-cap fund to additional investors: “Chuck sold his soul. He kept his cashmere sweaters and his bow ties, but he sold his soul. And the devil’s name is Legg Mason.”  Interesting speculation.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

Scout Unconstrained Bond (SUBFX): If these guys have a better track record than the one held by any bond mutual fund (and they do), why haven’t you heard of it?  Worse yet, why hadn’t I?

Stewart Capital Mid-Cap (SCMFX):  If this is one of the top two or three or ten mid-cap funds in operation (and it is), why haven’t you heard of it?  Worse yet, why hadn’t I?

Launch Alert: RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write Fund (RNBWX)

On  October 12, 2012, RiverNorth launched their fourth fund, RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write Fund.  “Buy-write” describes a sort of “covered call” strategy in which an investor might own a security and then sell to another investor the option to buy the security at a preset price in a preset time frame.  It is, in general, a defensive strategy which generates a bit of income and some downside protection for the investor who owns the security and writes the option.

As with any defensive strategy, you end up surrendering some upside in order to avoid some of the downside.  RiverNorth’s launch announcement contained a depiction of the risk-return profiles for a common buy-write index (the BXM) and three classes of stock:

A quick read is that the BXM offered 90% of the upside of the stock market with only 70% of the downside, which seems the very definition of a good tradeoff.

RiverNorth believes they can do better through active management of the portfolio.  The fund will be managed by Eric Metz, who joined RiverNorth in 2012 and serves as their Derivatives Strategist.  He’s been a partner at Bengal Capital, a senior trader at Ronin Capital and worked at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) and Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE).   The investment minimum is $5000.  Expenses are capped at 1.80%.

Because the strategy is complex, the good folks at RiverNorth have agreed to an extended interview at their offices in Chicago on November 8th.  With luck and diligence, we’ll provide a full profile of the fund in our December issue.

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves.  Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Twenty-nine new no-load funds were placed in registration this month.  Those include three load-bearing funds becoming no-loads, two hedge funds merging to become one mutual fund, one institutional fund becoming retail and two dozen new offerings.  An unusually large number of the new funds feature very experienced managers.  Four, in particular, caught our attention:

BBH Global Core Select is opening just as the five-star BBH Core Select closes.  Core Select invests about 15% of its money outside the U.S., while the global version will place at least 40% there.  One of Core Select’s managers will co-manage the new fund with a BBH analyst.

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that “seek[s] total return and provide income [and] a relatively stable risk profile.”  The managers, John Gambla and Rob A. Guttschow, had been managing five closed-end funds for Nuveen.

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund, which will invest in 40-80 large caps that trade “at a significant discount to the present value of future cash flows,” will be run by Joseph Huber, who also manages the five-star Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX) and Huber Equity Income (HULIX) funds.

Oakseed Opportunity Fund is a new global fund, managed by Greg L. Jackson and John H. Park. These guys managed or co-managed some “A” tier funds (Oakmark Global, Acorn, Acorn Select and Yacktman) before moving to Blum Capital, a private equity firm, from about 2004-2012.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down about 50 fund manager changes, including the blockbuster announcement of Karen Gaffney’s departure from Loomis Sayles.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity conference call

Based on the success of our September conference call with David Sherman of Cohanzick Asset Management and RiverPark’s president, Morty Schaja, we have decided to try to provide our readers with one new opportunity each month to speak with an “A” tier fund manager.

The folks at RiverPark generously agreed to participate in a second conference call with Observer readers. It will feature Mitch Rubin, lead manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RLSFX), a fund that we profiled in August as distinctive and distinctly promising.  This former hedge fund crushed its peers.

I’ll moderate the call.  Mitch will open by talking a bit about the fund’s strategy and then will field questions (yours and mine) on the fund’s strategies and prospects. The call is November 29 at 7:00 p.m., Eastern. Participants can register for the conference by navigating to  http://services.choruscall.com/diamondpass/registration?confirmationNumber=10020992

We’ll have the winter schedule in our December issue.  For now, I’ll note that managers of several really good funds have indicated a willingness to spend serious time with you.

Small Funds Communicating Smartly

The Mutual Fund Education Alliance announced their 2012 STAR Awards, which recognize fund companies that do a particularly good job of communicating with their investors.  As is common with such awards, there’s an impulse to make sure lots of folks get to celebrate so there are 17 sub-categories in each of three channels (retail, advisor, plan participant) plus eleven overall winners, for 62 awards in total.

US Global Investors was recognized as the best small firm overall, for “consistency of messaging and excellent use of the various distribution outlets.”  Matthews Asia was celebrated as the outstanding mid-sized fund firm.  Judges recognized them for “modern, effective design [and] unbelievable branding consistency.”

Ironically, MFEA’s own awards page is danged annoying with an automatic slide presentation that makes it hard to read about any of the individual winners.

Congratulations to both firms.  We’d also like to point you to our own Best of the Web winners for most effective site design: Seafarer Funds and Cook & Bynum Fund, with honorable mentions to Wintergreen, Auxier Focus and the Tilson Funds.

Briefly Noted . . .

Artio meltdown continues.  The Wall Street Journal reports that Richard Pell, Artio’s CEO, has stepped down.  Artio is bleeding assets, having lost nearly 50% of their assets under management in the past 12 months.  Their stock price is down 90% since its IPO and we’d already reported the closure of their domestic-equity funds.  This amounts to a management reshuffle, with Artio’s president becoming CEO and Pell remaining at CIO.  He’ll also continue to co-manage the once-great (top 5% over 15 years, bottom 5% over the past five years) Artio International Equity Fund (BJBIX) with Rudolph-Riad Younes.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth Fund (SSETX) reopened to new investors on November 1, 2012. It’s a decent little fund with below average expenses.  Both risk and return tend to be below average as well, with risk further below average than returns.

Fidelity announced the launch of a dozen new target-date funds in its Strategic Advisers Multi-Manager Series, 2020 through 2055 and Retirement Income.  The Multi-Manager series allows Fidelity to sell the skills of non-Fidelity managers (and their funds) to selected retirement plans.  Christopher Sharpe and Andrew Dierdorf co-manage all of the funds.

CLOSINGS

The board of BBH Core Select (BBTEX) has announced its imminent closure.  The five-star large cap fund has $3.2 billion in assets and will close at $3.5 billion.  Given its stellar performance and compact 30-stock portfolio, that’s certainly in its shareholders’ best interests.  At the same time, BBH has filed to launched a Global Core fund by year’s end.  It will be managed by one of BBTEX’s co-managers.  For details, see our Funds in Registration feature.

Invesco Balanced-Risk Commodity Strategy (BRCAX) will close to new investors effective November 15, 2012.

Investment News reports that 86 ETFs ceased operations in the first 10 months of 2012.  Wisdom Tree announced three more in late October (LargeCap Growth ROI,  South African Rand SZR and Japanese Yen JYF). Up until 2012, the greatest number of closures in a single calendar year was 58 during the 2008 meltdown.  400 more (Indonesian Small Caps, anyone?) reside on the ETF Deathwatch for October 2012; ETFs with tiny investor bases and little trading activity.  The hidden dimension of the challenge provided by small ETFs is the ability of their boards to dramatically change their investment mandates in search of new assets.  Investors in Global X S&P/TSX Venture 30 Canada ETF (think “Canadian NASDAQ”) suddenly found themselves instead in Global X Junior Miners ETF (oooo … exposure to global, small-cap nickel mining!).

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Under the assumption that indecipherable is good, Allianz announced three name changes: Allianz AGIC Structured Alpha Fund is becoming AllianzGI Structured Alpha Fund. Allianz AGIC U.S. Equity Hedged Fund becomes AllianzGI U.S. Equity Hedged Fund and Allianz NFJ Emerging Markets Value Fund becomes AllianzGI NFJ Emerging Markets Value Fund.

BBH Broad Market (BBBIX) has changed its name to BBH Limited Duration Fund.

Effective December 3, 2012, the expensive, small and underperforming Forward Aggressive Growth Allocation Fund (ACAIX) will be changed to the Forward Multi-Strategy Fund. Along with the new name, this fund of funds gets to add “long/short, tactical and other alternative investment strategies” to its armamentarium.  Presumably that’s driven by the fact that the fund does quite poorly in falling markets: it has trailed its benchmark in nine of the past nine declining quarters.  Sadly, adding hedge-like funds to the portfolio will only drive up expenses and serve as another drag on performance.

Schwab Premier Income (SWIIX) will soon become Schwab Intermediate-Term Bond, with lower expenses but a much more restrictive mandate.  At the moment the fund can go anywhere (domestic, international and emerging market debt, income- and non-income-producing equities, floating rate securities, REITs, ETFs) but didn’t, while the new fund will invest only in domestic intermediate term bonds.

Moving in the opposite direction, Alger Large Cap Growth Institutional (ALGRX) becomes Alger Capital Appreciation Focus at the end of the year. The fund will adopt an all-cap mandate, but will shrink the target portfolio size from around 100 stocks to 50.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

The Board of Directors of Bhirud Funds Inc. has approved the liquidation of Apex Mid Cap Growth Fund (BMCGX) effective on or about November 14, 2012. In announcing Apex’s place on our 2012 “Roll Call of the Wretched,” we noted:

The good news: not many people trust Suresh Bhirud with their money.  His Apex Mid Cap Growth (BMCGX) had, at last record, $192,546 – $100,000 below last year’s level.  Two-thirds of that amount is Mr. Bhirud’s personal investment.  Mr. Bhirud has managed the fund since its inception in 1992 and, with annualized losses of 9.2% over the past 15 years, has mostly impoverished himself.

We’re hopeful he puts his remaining assets in a nice, low-risk index fund.

The Board of Trustees of Dreyfus Investment Funds approved the liquidation of Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Tax-Sensitive Equity Fund (SDCEX) on January 8, 2013.  Ironically, this fund has outperformed the larger, newly-reopened SSETX.  And, while they were at it, the Board also approved the liquidation of Dreyfus Small Cap Fund (the “Fund”), effective on January 16, 2013

ING will liquidate ING Alternative Beta (IABAX) on December 7, 2012.  In addition to an obscure mandate (what is alternative beta?), the fund has managed to lose money over the past three years while drawing only $18 million in assets.

Munder International Equity Fund (MUIAX) is slated to be merged in Munder International Fund — Core Equity (MAICX), on December 7, 2012.

Uhhh . . .

Don’t get me wrong.  MUIAX is a bad fund (down 18% in five years) and deserves to go.  But MAICX is a worse fund by far (it’s down 29% in the same period).  And much smaller.  And newer.

This probably explains why I could never serve on a fund’s board of directors.  Their logic is simply too subtle for me.

Royce Mid-Cap (RMIDX) is set to be liquidated on November 19, 2012. It’s less than three years old, has performed poorly and managed to draw just a few million in assets.  The management team is being dispersed among Royce’s other funds.

It was named Third Millennium Russia Fund (TMRFX) and its charge was to invest “in securities of companies located in Russia.”  This is a fund that managed to gain or lose more than 70% in three of the past 10 years.  Investors have largely fled and so, effective October 10, 2012, the board of trustees tweaked things.  It’s now called Toreador International Fund and its mandate is to invest “outside of the United States.”  As of this writing, Morningstar had not yet noticed.

In Closing . . .


We’ve added an unusual bit of commercial presence, over to your right.  Amazon created a mini-site dedicated to the interests of investors.  In addition to the inevitable links to popular investing books, it features a weekly blog post, a little blog aggregator at the bottom (a lot of content from Bloomberg, some from Abnormal Returns and Seeking Alpha), and some sort of dead, dead, dead discussion group.  We thought you might find some of it useful or at least browseable, so we decided to include it for you.

And yes, it does carry MFO’s embedded link.  Thanks for asking!

Thanks, too, to all the folks (Gary, Martha, Dean, Richard, two Jacks, and one Turtle) who contributed to the Observer in October.

We’ll look for you in December.

 

Scout Unconstrained Bond Fund (SUBFX), November 2012

By David Snowball

This fund is now the Carillon Reams Unconstrained Bond Fund.

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks to maximize total return consistent with the preservation of capital.  The fund can invest in almost any sort of fixed-income instrument, though as a practical matter their international investments are quite limited.  The fund’s maturity will not normally exceed eight years, but they maintain the option of going longer in some markets and even achieving a negative duration (effectively shorting the bond market) in others.  They can use derivative instruments, such as options, futures contracts (including interest rate futures contracts), currency forwards or swap agreements (including credit default swaps) to enhance returns, increase liquidity and/or gain exposure to particular areas of the market.  Because they sell a security when it approaches fair market value, this may be a relatively high turnover fund.

Adviser

Scout Investments, Inc. Scout is a wholly-owned subsidiary of UMB Financial, both are located in Kansas City, Missouri. Scout advises the eleven Scout funds. As of June 30, 2012, assets under the management of the Advisor were approximately $22.37 billion.  Scout’s four fixed-income funds are managed by its Reams Asset Management division, including Low-Duration Bond (SCLDX), Core Bond (SCCYX, four stars) and Core Plus Bond (SCPZX, rated five star/Silver by Morningstar, as of October 2012).

Manager

Mark M. Egan is the lead portfolio manager of the Fixed Income Funds. Thomas M. Fink, Todd C. Thompson and Stephen T. Vincent are co-portfolio managers of the Fixed Income Funds. Mr. Egan joined the Advisor on November 30, 2010. He oversees the entire fixed income division of the Advisor, Reams Asset Management, and retains oversight over all investment decisions. Mr. Egan was a portfolio manager of Reams Asset Management Company, LLC (“Reams”) from April 1994 until November 2010 and was a portfolio manager of Reams Asset Management Company, Inc. from June 1990 until March 1994. Mr. Egan was a portfolio manager of National Investment Services until May 1990.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Messrs. Egan, Fink and Thompson have each invested over $1,000,000 in the fund.  Mr. Vincent has between $10,000 – 50,000 in it.

Opening date

September 29, 2011.

Minimum investment

$1,000 for regular accounts, reduced to $100 for IRAs or accounts with AIPs.

Expense ratio

0.99%, after waivers, on assets of $45 million (as of October 2012).

Comments

There are 6850 funds of all kinds in Morningstar’s database.  Of those, precisely 117 have a better one-year record than Scout Unconstrained Bond.

There are 1134 fixed-income funds in Morningstar’s database.  Of those, precisely five have a better one-year record.

98.3% of all funds trail Scout Unconstrained between November 1, 2011 and October 30, 2012.  99.6% of all fixed-income funds trailed Scout for the same period.

Surprised?  You might not be if you knew the record of the management team that runs Scout Unconstrained.  Mark Egan and his team from Reams Asset Management have been investing money using this strategy since 1998.  Their audited performance for the private accounts (about $231 million worth of them) is stunningly better than the records of the most renowned bond fund managers.  The funds below represent the work of the three best-known bond managers (Jeff Gundlach at DoubleLine, Bill Gross at PIMCO, Dan Fuss at Loomis) plus the performance of the Gold-rated funds in Morningstar’s two most-flexible categories: multi-sector and world.

 

1 Yr.

3 Yrs.

5 Yrs.

10 Yrs.

Unconstrained Composite

33.98%

20.78

17.45

15.67

SUBFX

25.37

DoubleLine Core Fixed Income

8.62

Loomis Sayles Bond

14.25

10.83

7.08

10.41

Loomis Sayles Strategic Income

14.02

10.63

6.89

11.14

PIMCO Total Return

9.08

11.51

8.92

6.95

Templeton Global Bond

12.92

8.03

9.47

10.95

ML 3 Month LIBOR

0.48

0.37

1.44

2.26

Annualized Performance Ending September 30, 2012

You’ll notice that the performance of Scout Unconstrained does not equal the performance of the Unconstrained Composite.  The difference is that the team bought, in the private accounts, deeply distressed securities in the 2008 panic and they’re now harvesting the rewards of those purchases.  Since the fund didn’t exist, its investors don’t have the benefit of that exposure. Clark Holland, a Portfolio Analyst on the Fund, reports that, “We strive to invest the separate accounts and the mutual fund as closely as possible so returns should be similar going forward.”

Just because I’m a cautious person, I also screened all bond funds against the trailing record of the Unconstrained Bond composite, looking for close competitors.  There were none.

But I’m not sure why.  The team’s strategy is deceptively simple.  Find where the best values are, then buy them.  The Reams website posits this process:

STEP 1: Determine whether the bond market is cheap or expensive by comparing the current real interest rate to historical rates.

STEP 2: Focus on sectors offering relative value and select securities offering the highest risk‐adjusted return.

STEP 3: Continually measure and control exposure to security‐ and portfolio‐level risks.

It looks like the fund benefits from the combination of two factors: boldness and caution.

It’s clear that the managers have sufficient confidence in their judgment to act when other hesitate.  Their 2012 Annual Report cites one such instance:

A contribution to performance in the asset-backed securities (ABS) sector can be traced to our second lien or home equity holdings, which strongly outperformed.  We purchased these securities at an extreme discount after the 2008-2009 financial crisis, when defaults on home equity loans were high. Since then, default rates declined, the perceived risk of owning these securities lessened, and the prices of the securities have risen sharply.

As you comb through the fund’s reports, you find discussions of “airline enhanced equipment trust certificates” and the successful exploitation of mispricing in the derivatives market:

High-yield index swaps (CDX) such as those we own, which represent groups of credit default swaps (CDS), usually are priced similarly to high-yield cash bonds. Due to somewhat technical reasons, a price gap opened, in the second quarter of this year, between the price of high-yield CDX index swaps and high-yield cash bonds .We took advantage of the price gap to buy the CDX index swap at an attractive price and captured a nice return when pricing trended back toward a more normal level.

One simple and bold decision was to have zero long exposure to Treasuries; their peers average 35%.   As with RiverPark Short Term High Yield, the fact that their strategy (separate accounts plus the fund) has attracted a relatively small amount of investment, they’re able to drive performance with a series of relatively small, profitable trades that larger funds might need to skip over.

At the same time, you get a sense of intense risk-consciousness.  Cautious about rising interest rates, the managers expect to maintain a shorter average duration as they look for potential investments. In his October 3, 2012 letter to investors, Mr. Egan lays out his sense of how the market is evolving and how his team will respond:

What to do? Recognize the reality of a challenging environment, focus on your realistic goals as an investor, and be ready to seize opportunities as they arise.  A well-known investor recently opined as to the death of equity as an asset class.  Our take is the death of static risk allocations, or even what constitutes risk, along with buy and hold investing.  The successful investor will be aware of the challenges we face as a society, understand the efficacy or lack of it in the various (mostly political) solutions prescribed, and allow volatility, and the inevitable mispricing that will result, to be your guide. Flexibility and nimbleness will be required.  For our part, we have positioned accounts in a cautious, conservative stance as the cost of doing so has rapidly declined. We may be early and we may forgo some modest gains in risk assets, but it is both appropriate and in keeping with the style that has generated returns well in excess of our peers over most time periods.

Bottom Line

You need to approach any “too good to be true” investment with care and diligence.  The track record behind SUBFX, which is splendid and carefully documented, was earned in a different sort of investment vehicle.  As assets grow, the fund’s opportunity set will change and, possibly, narrow.  That said, the managers have successfully invested substantial sums via this strategy for nearly 15 years; the fact that they’ve placed millions of their own dollars at risk represents a very serious endorsement.

Fund website

Scout Unconstrained Bond.  Mr. Egan also wrote a very good white paper entitled “Fixed Income: The Search for Total Returns in Volatile Markets” (March 2012).  If you’re intrigued by the fund, you’ll get a better sense of the managers’ approach.  Even if you’re not, you might well benefit from their discussion of “the growing risks of not taking risks.”

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2012. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

Stewart Capital Mid Cap Fund (SCMFX), November 2012

By David Snowball

This fund has been liquidated.

Objective and Strategy

Stewart Capital Mid Cap Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation.  It invests, primarily, in domestic midcap stocks.  While it is technically a “diversified” fund, the managers warn that they prefer to invest in “a relatively small number of intensively researched companies.”  They operationalize “relatively small” as 30-60.  They target firms that don’t need “large amounts of leverage to execute their business plan” and firms with sustainable business advantages (favorable demographics and long-term trends, high barriers to entry, good management teams, and high returns on invested capital).

Adviser

Stewart Capital Advisors, LLC, was founded in August 2005.  It is a wholly-owned subsidiary of S&T Bank, headquartered in Indiana, PA.  As of December 31, 2011, Stewart had $965 million in assets under management.

Managers

Matthew A. Di Filippo, Charles G. Frank, Jonathan V. Pavlik, Malcolm E. Polley, Helena Rados-Derr and Nicholas Westric.  Mr. Di Filippo is the senior manager and the adviser’s investment strategist.  Mr. Polley is president and CIO.  His investing career started on Black Monday, 1987 and includes 25 years of primarily-midcap investing.  Except for Ms. Rados-Derr and Mr. Westric, the managers have all been with the fund since inception.  Each of the managers also handles something like 100-300 private accounts.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Modest.  Three of the managers have invested between $10,001-50,000 in the fund: Polley, Di Filippo and Pavlik.  The others have invested under $10,000.  I expressed my concern about such modest commitments to President Polley.  He writes:

I could require that staff invest solely in the fund, but realize that a portfolio that is solely mid-cap oriented for some folks does not meet their risk parameters.  Also, I want staff to invest in the fund on its merits. That said, I have exactly two investments: S&T Bank stock and the Stewart Capital Mid Cap Fund.  I also have two children in college and have been using some of my investment in that fund to pay for that expense.  So, I believe I put my money where my mouth is.

Opening date

December 29, 2006. The fund converted to no-load on April 1, 2012.

Minimum investment

$1,000 or $100 for accounts with an automatic investment plan.

Expense ratio

1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $37.0 million.

Comments

I wandered by the Stewart Capital booth at Morningstar Investment Conference in June, picked up the fund’s factsheet and reports, and then stood there for a long time.  Have you ever had one of those “how on earth did I manage to miss this?” moments? As I looked at the fund’s record, that’s precisely what went through my mind: small, no-load, independent fund, great returns, low risk, low minimum investments.  Heck, they’re even in Steeler Country.  How on earth did I manage to miss this?

Part of the answer is that Stewart was not always a no-load fund, so they weren’t traditionally in my coverage universe, and their marketing efforts are very low-key.

There’s a lot to like here. The two reliable fund rating services, Morningstar and Lipper, agree that SCMFX is at the top of the midcap pack in both risk management and returns.  Here’s the Morningstar snapshot:

 

Returns

Risk

Rating

3-year

High

Below Average

Five Stars

5-year

High

Below Average

Five Stars

Overall

High

Below Average

Five Stars

(Morningstar ratings, as of 10/30/12)

Morningstar’s estimate of tax-adjusted returns places Stewart in the top 1% of mid-cap funds over the past five years.

Lipper supports a similar conclusion:

 

Total Return

Consistent Return

Preservation

Tax Efficiency

3-year

5

5

5

4

5-year

5

5

5

5

Overall

5

5

5

5

(Lipper Leaders ratings, as of 10/30/12)

The fund has a striking pattern of performance over time. Normally good funds make their money either on the upside or the downside; that is, they consistently outperform in either rising or falling markets. Stewart seems to do both.  It has outperformed its peer group in eight of eight down quarters in the past five years (2008 – Q3 2012) but in only four of 11 rising quarters. But it still wins in rising markets. In quarters when the market has been rising, SCMFX gains an average of 10.65% versus 10.58% for its peer group, reflecting the fact that its “up” quarters rarely trail the market by much and sometimes lead it by a lot.

When I asked the simple question, “which mid-cap funds have been as successful? And screened for folks who could match or better Stewart over the past one, three and five year periods, I could find only four funds in a universe of 300 midcaps. Of those, only one fund, the $1.6 billion Nicholas Fund (NICSX), was less volatile.

That’s a distinguished record in a notably volatile market: 10 of the past 23 quarters have seen double-digit gains (six) or losses (four) for midcap stocks.

The fund is distinguished by effective active management. They buy the stocks they expect to outperform, regardless of the broader market’s preferences. They target stocks where they anticipate a 15% annual rate of return and which are selling at a discount to fair-value of at least 15%. Their question seems to be, “would we want to own this whole company?”  That leads them to buy businesses where the industry is favorably positioned (they mostly avoid financials, for example, because the industry only thrives when assets are growing and Stewart suspects that growth is going to be limited for years and years) and the individual firm has exceptional management. An analysis of the portfolio shows the result. They own high quality companies, ones which are growing much more quickly (whether measured by long-term earnings, cash flow, or book value) than their peers.  And they are buying those companies at a good price; their high-quality portfolio is selling at a slight discount (in price/earnings, price/sales, price/cash flow) to their peers.

Bottom Line

This is arguably one of the top two midcap funds on the market, based on its ability to perform in volatile rising and falling markets. Their strategy seems disciplined, sensible and repeatable. Management has an entirely-admirable urge “to guard against … making foolish decisions” based on any desire to buy what’s popular at the moment.  They deserve a spot on the due diligence list for anyone looking to add actively-managed, risk-conscious equity exposure.

Fund website

Stewart Capital

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2012. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

November 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

Advisory Research Value Income Fund

Advisory Research Value Income Fund will seek high current income and long term capital appreciation.  Interesting plan: they intend to invest primarily in preferred securities, but retain the option of buying “other income producing securities including convertible securities, debt securities, common stocks, and securities of other investment companies.”  No more than 20% of the portfolio will be non-U.S. This fund represents a conversion of two hedge funds (Advisory Research Value Income Fund, L.P. and Advisory Research Value Income Fund II, L.P.) into one mutual fund.  The hedge fund returned an average of 4.7% per year from 2003 to 2011, vastly better than the 1.2% registered by its benchmark (Merrill Lynch US Preferred Fixed Rate Index).   Brien M. O’Brien, James M. Langer and Bruce M. Zessar will manage the portfolio.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio is not yet set.

BBH Global Core Select

BBH Global Core Select will seek to provide investors with long-term growth of capital by investing in mid- and large-cap stocks around the world.  They describe themselves as “buy and own” investors.  They intend to invest mostly in developed markets, but can invest without limit in emerging markets as well.  At least 40% of the portfolio will be non-US and they can hedge their currency exposure.  Regina Lombardi and Timothy E. Hartch will manage the portfolio.  BBH recently described Lombardi as part of their team of media and consumer analysts.  Hartch comanages the excellent, recently closed BBH Core Select (BBTRX) fund.  The minimum initial investment is $10,000.  The expense ratio is not yet set.

BRC Large Cap Focus Equity Fund

BRC Large Cap Focus Equity Fund (Advisor Class Shares) wants to achieve long-term capital appreciation that will exceed the S&P 500 Index over a three- to five-year time horizon.  They’ll invest in 30-35 large cap stocks.  BRC stands for “Bounded Rationality Concepts.”  These guys believe in behavioral economics and think that they can anticipate events like positive earnings surprises and upgrades.  John R. Riddle will head the portfolio team.  The three managers previously worked for Duff & Phelps which, like Leuthold, is known for its investment research and analysis. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio, after waivers, will be 1.24%.

Drexel Hamilton Multi-Asset Real Return Fund

Drexel Hamilton Multi-Asset Real Return Fund will seek (duh) real return which they define as “total return that exceeds U.S. inflation over a full [five-year] inflation cycle.”  They plan to invest, mostly, in other Drexel Hamilton funds, in TIPs and in commodity-linked ETFs and ETNs.  The other two Drexel funds in which it will invest have been around less than a year.  Andrew Bang, a West Point grad and the firm’s founder, is the portfolio manager.  Before founding Drexel, he was a Senior Vice President at Shinhan Investment America, a Vice President at AIG Global Investments, and a Portfolio Manager for GE Asset Management (GEAM).  In that latter role he managed $2.5 billion or so. The minimum initial investment is $10,000.  The expense ratio is 1.81% after waivers.

First Trust High Yield Long/Short ETF

First Trust High Yield Long/Short ETF will be an actively-managed ETF which will invest most of its portfolio (long and short) in high yield U.S. and non-U.S. corporate debt obligations, bank loans and convertible bonds. It may invest in “special situations” including defaulted securities and common stocks; companies whose financial condition is troubled or uncertain and that may be involved in bankruptcy proceedings, reorganizations or financial restructurings.  Finally, the manager expects routinely to short U.S. Treasuries and some investment grade U.S. corporate debt; the fund “intends to use the proceeds from the Fund’s short positions to purchase high yield debt securities, thereby creating a form of financial  leverage.” William Housey, Scott D. Fries, Peter Fasone, Todd Larson and Eric Maisel will manage the fund.  All of them seem to have extensive high yield experience at other firms (Morgan Stanley/Van Kampen, BNP Paribas, ABN AMBR)).  Expenses are not yet set.

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund

First Trust Global Tactical Asset Allocation and Income Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that “seek[s] total return and provide income [and] a relatively stable risk profile.”  It will invest in other ETFs, plus some ETNs and sovereign debt.  They’ll also try to sell calls on a portion of the portfolio to supplement their yield.  The description of the fund’s underlying asset allocation strategy isn’t terribly informative; they’ll have a neutral allocation (which isn’t spelled out) and will move from it as conditions call for.  John Gambla and Rob A. Guttschow will manage the fund. Up until 2011, they managed five closed-end funds for Nuveen: Dow 30 Premium and Dividend Income (DPD), Dow 30 Enhanced Premium & Income (NYSE: DPO), NASDAQ Premium Income & Growth (QQQX), Nuveen Core Equity Alpha Fund (JCE) and Nuveen Tax-Advantaged Dividend Growth Fund (JTD). Expenses not yet set.

Hotchkis & Wiley Global Value Fund

Hotchkis & Wiley Global Value Fund seeks capital appreciation by investing, primarily, in stocks of companies located in developed markets.  At least 40% will be non-US and up to 20% might be in emerging markets.  They plan a bottom-up, fundamentals-driven strategy. Scott McBride and Judd Peters will manage the fund.  They have managed private accounts using this strategy since 2011 but the firm hasn’t released performance information yet.  Their public record is mixed: they’re on the management teams for two sad sack domestic funds, Diversified Value (HWCAX) and Large Cap Value (HWLAX).  Since joining the teams, the funds have gone from dreadful to mediocre, so that’s sort of an endorsement. The minimum investment is $2500.  Expenses are not yet set.  There is a 5.75% front-load but H&W funds are generally available no-load at Schwab.

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund

Huber Capital Diversified Large Cap Value Fund seeks to achieve current income and capital appreciation by investing in 40-80 large caps that trade “at a significant discount to the present value of future cash flows.” The fund is benchmarked against the Russell 1000 Value, whose smallest firm has a $230 million market cap, but the managers expect to invest mostly in U.S. stocks above $5 billion.  It may invest up to 20% in ADRs.  Joseph Huber, who also manages the five-star Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX) and Huber Equity Income (HULIX) funds, will manage the portfolio.  The minimum initial investment is $5000, reduced to $2500 for IRAs.  The opening expense ratio will be 1.25%.

Janus Diversified Alternatives Fund

Janus Diversified Alternatives Fund will seek absolute return with low correlation to stocks and bonds.   Their description of investment strategies is mostly self-important babble about “risk premia opportunities.”  It looks like they use a risk-parity model to set their neutral asset allocation across equity, fixed income, commodity, and currency asset classes.  That is, they adjust allocations so that the risk generated by stocks is the same as that generated by bonds or commodities.  They then look for the sources of the aforementioned “risk premia opportunities,” which is to say, mis-priced securities.  They can invest both long and short. They can invest directly or through mutual funds, ETFs or ETNs. Andrew B. Weisman and John S. Fujiwara will manage the fund.  Both are hedge fund guys who joined Janus in 2012.  “S” shares are available no-load and NTF. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  The expense ratio is not yet set.

Kellner Event Fund

Kellner Event Fund seeks to achieve positive risk-adjusted returns independent of the returns generated by the overall equity markets. The plan is to invest, long and short, “using various strategies” in order to “seek to profit from securities experiencing catalyst driven change.”  Such events might include mergers, bankruptcies, financial or operational stress, restructurings, asset sales, recapitalizations, spin-offs, litigation, regulatory and legislative changes “as well as other types of events.”  It can invest in pretty much any asset class.  George A. Kellner, the adviser’s founder & Chief Executive Officer, will lead the management team.   The public record for the team is awfully thin.  They launched a merger-arbitrage fund in July 2012 and it’s been pretty average.  Several of the managers have experience with event-driven hedge funds, but of course there’s no record available.  The minimum initial investment is $2500, reduced to $2000 for various tax-advantaged plans and $100 for accounts set up with an AIP.  The opening expense ratio will be 2.75% (yikes) in addition to a 2% redemption fee.

Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced Fund

Managers AMG Chicago Equity Partners Balanced Fund, yet another convert from the world of loaded funds, will pursue “a high total investment return, consistent with the preservation of capital and prudent economic risk.”  The fund will ordinarily invest 50-65% in stocks and the rest in bonds and cash. It will invest mostly in mid- to large-cap stocks, selected on the basis of “momentum, value, and quality factors.”  The predecessor fund, the same except for a sales load, has been quite consistently above-average.  David C. Coughenour of CEP leads the management team. The minimum initial investment is $2,000.  The expense ratio, after waiver, is 1.10%.  The “service class,” sold through financial intermediaries, is 0.25% cheaper.

Oakseed Opportunity Fund

Oakseed Opportunity Fund will seek long term capital appreciation by investing, mostly, in the stocks of high quality US companies.  They do have the right to invest overseas and they may also invest up to 10% short.  Greg L. Jackson and John H. Park will manage the fund.  These guys managed or co-managed some “A” tier funds (Oakmark Global, Acorn, Acorn Select and Yacktman) around the turn of the century.  Both worked at  Blum Capital, a private equity firm, from about 2004-2012. The minimum initial investment is $2500, reduced to $1000 for various tax-advantaged plans and $100 for accounts set up with an AIP.  The opening expense ratio will be 1.4% in addition to a 2% redemption fee for shares held fewer than 90 days.

Pacific Financial Alternative Strategies, Flexible Growth & Income, Balanced, Foundational Asset Allocation, Faith & Values Based Moderate, Conservative and Aggressive Funds

Pacific Financial Alternative Strategies, Flexible Growth & Income, Balanced, Foundational Asset Allocation, Faith & Values Based Moderate, Conservative and Aggressive Funds.  You’re welcome to read about them if you’d like, but I’m not going to spend time on them.  Here’s the story: Pacific Financial’s three-person management team already runs five funds with diverse focuses.  The “investor” class for every one of those funds is one-star (as of 10/26/2012).  They’re now proposing to add seven more funds, requiring yet more expertise that they have not demonstrated that they possess.  The expense ratios aren’t yet set.  The minimum purchase is $5000.

Riverbridge Growth Fund

Riverbridge Growth Fund will pursue to seek long term capital appreciation by investing in small- to mid-cap US stocks (and some ADRs).   The managers intend to focus on “companies that it views as building their earnings power and building their intrinsic … values over long periods of time.  The advisor uses a bottom-up approach that seeks to identify high quality growth companies that demonstrate the ability to sustain strong secular earnings growth, regardless of overall economic conditions.” Mark A. Thompson, Rick D. Moulton and Dana L. Feick will manage the fund.  Over the last decade, the composite performance of the private accounts using this strategy has been pretty good: up 8.2% per year versus 6.1% for the Russell 3000 over the same period.  The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio, which will include a waiver, is not yet set.  There’s a 1% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 90 days.

Riverbridge Eco Leaders Fund

Riverbridge Eco Leaders Fund will pursue to seek long term capital appreciation by investing in “companies that use strategic technologies, materials and services to: (1) increase productivity by improving quality, efficiency and performance or (2) lower costs by reducing raw materials usage, scrap, and the amount and toxicity of waste as companies having a net positive impact on the environment.”  The managers intend to focus on “companies that it views as building their earnings power and building their intrinsic … values over long periods of time.  The advisor uses a bottom-up approach that seeks to identify high quality growth companies that demonstrate the ability to sustain strong secular earnings growth, regardless of overall economic conditions.” Mark A. Thompson, Rick D. Moulton and Dana L. Feick will manage the fund.  Over the last decade, the composite performance of the private accounts using this strategy has been pretty good: up 7.5% per year versus 5.3% for the S&P500 over the same period. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.  The expense ratio, which will include a waiver, is not yet set.  There’s a 1% redemption fee on shares held fewer than 90 days.

Schwab Target 2045, 2050 and 2055 Funds

Schwab Target 2045, 2050 and 2055 Funds are all funds-of-Schwab-funds.  It appears that they’re only available to “eligible investors,” which appears to translate as “institutions.”  Not sure of why.  Zifan Tang (cool name) manages them all.  Expenses not yet set.

Stonebridge Small-Cap Growth Fund

Stonebridge Small-Cap Growth Fund appears in the SEC filings of October 5, 2012 as a new fund with an N-1A filing.  It is, in reality, an old, expensive and underperforming institutional fund that is becoming a retail one.  This is odd, since there already was a retail version.  It claims to seek long-term growth of capital. “Short-term income is a secondary objective.”  I’m not entirely sure what “short term income” is.  In any case, they invest in domestic small cap stocks, those between $100 million and $3 billion.  And they look for “companies with strong balance sheets, high/growing return on invested capital, positive free cash flow, and earnings growth in excess of 20%.”  Up to 10% may be invested overseas.  Richard C. Barrett and Matthew W. Markatos have managed it for about 30 years. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  The opening expense ratio will be 1.97% and there’s a 2% redemption fee on shares held under 30 days.

Scharf Balanced Opportunity Fund

Scharf Balanced Opportunity Fund seeks long-term capital appreciation and income.  They’ll invest 50-75% in global equities and the rest in global fixed income.  Brian A. Krawez, president of Scharf, is the portfolio manager. Scharf manages a bunch of private accounts using this same strategy and they’ve done quite well over time.  In the five years since Mr. Krawez has been around, the separate accounts outperformed a 60/40 benchmark by between 150 – 300 basis points per year.   The minimum initial investment is $10,000.  The expense ratio, after waiver, is 1.20%.

Sit Quality Income Fund

Sit Quality Income Fund will seek high current income and safety of principal.  The fund invests at least 50% of its assets in U.S. government debt securities and the remainder in investment grade debt securities issued by corporations and municipalities, and mortgage and other asset backed securities.  They’re targeting an average effective duration for the portfolio of approximately 0 to 2 years. Michael C. Brilley, Bryce A. Doty, Mark H. Book, and Chris M. Rasmussen constitute the management team and also manage the five-star Sit US Government Securities fund (SNGVX). The minimum initial investment is $5,000, reduced to $2000 for IRAs.  The expense ratio, after waiver, is 0.90%.

Systematic Mid Cap Value Fund

Systematic Mid Cap Value Fund (SYAMX), which is being converted from a front-loaded fund to a no-load one, will pursue long-term capital appreciation by investing in 60-80 mid-cap stocks.  The manager “[s]eeks out value companies with a confirmed catalyst for sustained fundamental improvement that should eventually lead to either revised earnings estimates or earnings surprises in the future.” Despite an uninspired track record, the earlier version of the fund did accumulate $300 million in assets. Ron Mushock and D. Kevin McCreesh have managed the fund since launch.  The minimum initial investment is $2,000.  The expense ratio, after a generous one basis-point waiver, is 1.13%.  The “service class,” sold through financial intermediaries, is 0.25% cheaper.

WisdomTree Global Corporate Bond Fund

WisdomTree Global Corporate Bond Fund will be an actively-managed ETF that will pursue a high level of total return consisting of both income and capital appreciation.  They plan to invest in debt issues by public, private, and state-owned or sponsored corporations.   They’ll limit emerging market debt to 25% of the portfolio, they can invest 25% in derivatives and expect to hedge their currency exposure.  It looks as if there will be four managers, but their names have not been published and the expenses not yet set.

Manager changes, October 2012

By Chip

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
PGWCX Allianz RCM Focused Growth, formerly Allianz AGIC Growth Fund The entire AGI Capital team. The RMC team of Scott T. Migliori, Karen Hiatt, and David Jedlicka 11/12
ARMAX Allianz RCM Global Commodity Equity Alec Patterson Paul Strand becomes the lone manager 11/12
APHMX Artisan Mid Cap No one, but . . . Matthew Kamm has stepped up to a named manager role 11/12
BIAOX Brown Advisory Opportunity Fund Darryl R. Oliver Paul Li, Maneesh Bajaj and Eric Gordon 11/12
APFAX Cohen & Steers Emerging Markets Real Estate No one, but . . . William Leung has joined as comanager.  Leung had 12 years at Deutsche Bank/RREEF Real Estate.  Presumably Deutsche Bank’s ongoing efforts to sell its RREEF unit weighed on him. 11/12
CSFAX Cohen & Steers Global Realty No one, but . . . William Leung has joined as comanager 11/12
IRFAX Cohen & Steers International Realty No one, but . . . William Leung has joined as comanager 11/12
CALFX Cutler Income Fund Michael Cheung Xavier J. Urpi 11/12
SEMGX DWS Emerging Markets Equity Jason Inzer Comanager, Thomas Voecking, will remain, joined by Anna Wallentin, Juergen Foerster, and Johannes Prix 11/12
SZEAX DWS Enhanced Emerging Markets Fixed Income No one, but . . . Kumar Vemuri was added.  Given that the “Enhanced” fund typically resides in the bottom 10% of its peer group, his addition can’t hurt. 11/12
KDHAX DWS Equity Dividend Jason Inzer Comanager, Thomas Voecking, will remain, joined by Anna Wallentin, Juergen Foerster, and Johannes Prix 11/12
GGGGX DWS GNMA John Ryan has been removed as portfolio comanager Lead manager, Bill Chepolis, remains with the other comanagers 11/12
SCINX DWS International Jason Inzer Comanager, Thomas Voecking, will remain, joined by Anna Wallentin, Juergen Foerster, and Johannes Prix 11/12
KUSAX DWS Strategic Government Securities John Ryan has been removed as portfolio comanager Lead manager, Bill Chepolis, remains with the other comanagers 11/12
FDMAX Fidelity Advisor Communications Equipment Charlie Chai has stepped down Ali Khan will remain as the sole manager 11/12
FAMKX Fidelity Advisor Emerging Markets Robert von Rekowsky no longer serves as portfolio manager Sammy Simnegar 11/12
FAGAX Fidelity Advisor Growth Opportunities No one, but . . . Gopal Reddy will join Steven Wymer 11/12
FGVAX Fidelity Advisor Growth Strategies Patrick Venanzi Eddie Yoon joins the team 11/12
FGCAX Fidelity Advisor Mid Cap Growth No one, but . . . Edward Yoon was added as a comanager 11/12
FMCDX Fidelity Advisor Stock Selector Mid Cap Patrick Venanzi Eddie Yoon joins the team 11/12
FSMGX Fidelity Mid Cap Growth Patrick Venanzi Eddie Yoon joins the team 11/12
FSDCX Fidelity Select Communications Equipment Charlie Chai has stepped down Ali Khan will remain as the sole manager 11/12
FSHOX Fidelity Select Construction & Housing Dan Kelley has stepped down as comanager Holger Boerner will remain. 11/12
FSDAX Fidelity Select Defense & Aerospace John Sheehy has stepped down Douglas Scott will remain as sole manager 11/12
FSAEX Fidelity Series All Sector Equity John Avery and Adam Hetnarski Monty Kori and Brian Lempel 11/12
FMSVX FMC Strategic Value No one, but . . . Paul E. Patrick, joins Edward I. Lefferman, as a comanager. Lefferman has managed the fund since its inception in 1998.  The fund has sort of fallen off the rails since 2010 after a long, strong run. 11/12
GARTX Goldman Sachs Absolute Return Tracker Jonathan Sheridan Matthew Hoehn and Don Mulvihill remain, presumably trying to find the “absolute” in a fund that’s down 11% since launch. 11/12
IFCAX ING Greater China, soon to be called ING Emerging Markets Equity Dividend The entire team is leaving as the strategy and name are changed. Nicolas Simar, Manu Vandenbulck, and Robert Davis 11/12
JMIGX Jacob Micro Cap Growth Fund Jamie Cuellar Darren Chervitz and Ryan Jacob
SBLGX Legg Mason ClearBridge Large Cap Growth Comanager Scott Glasser will be stepping down, but not until March 2013 Margaret Vitrano was added.  The “Legg Mason” moniker will soon disappear. 11/12
LSBRX Loomis Sayles Bond Kathleen Gaffney leaves for a position with Eaton Vance after three decades with Loomis Sayles. Founder, Daniel Fuss, remains along with comanagers Matthew Eagan and Elaine Stokes 11/12
EPIPX MainStay Epoch International Small Cap Emily Baker will leave as of Dec 31 Eric Citerne, Michael Welhoelter, and William Priest will continue 11/12
ICAUX Mainstay ICAP Equity No one, but . . . Thomas Cole joined the team 11/12
ICGLX Mainstay ICAP Global No one, but . . . Thomas Cole joined the team 11/12
ICEVX Mainstay ICAP International No one, but . . . Thomas Cole joined the team 11/12
ICSRX Mainstay ICAP Select Equity No one, but . . . Thomas Cole joined the team 11/12
MAPAX Mainstay MAP No one, but . . . Thomas Cole joined the team 11/12
EXTCX Manning & Napier Technology Tariq Siddiqi Jacob Boak 11/12
PWEAX PACE International Emerging Markets Equity Subadvisors, Delaware Management Company and Pzena Investment Management Lee Munder is a new subadvisor 11/12
PGMDX PIMCO Global Multi-Asset No one, but . . . Saumil Parikh is now a comanager 11/12
POLIX Polen Growth No one, but . . . Damon Ficklin has joined Dan Davidowitz.    The fund is up to $355 million after two years, which might explain the added staff. 11/12
USGRX USAA Growth & Income John Leonard Ian McIntosh 11/12
USISX USAA Income Stock Sam Wilderman David Cowan 11/12
VMMSX Vanguard Emerging Markets Select Stock Michael Godfrey, who comanaged for subadvisor M&G Matthew Vaight will continue for M&G 11/12
WTMGX Westcore MIDCO Growth William Chester is retiring. Comanagers Mitch Begun and F. Wiley Reed will remain 11/12
WTSLX Westcore Select William Chester is retiring. Comanagers Mitch Begun and F. Wiley Reed will remain 11/12